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Commentary  
on the  
**OLD TESTAMENT**

C. F. KEIL and F. DELITZSCH

*Translated from the German by James Martin*

**VOLUME VI**

Proverbs, Ecclesiastes,  
Song of Solomon

by F. DELITZSCH

*Three Volumes in One*

WILLIAM B. EERDMANS PUBLISHING COMPANY

Grand Rapids, Michigan



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IN TEN VOLUMES

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THE PENTATEUCH

JOSHUA, JUDGES, RUTH

THE BOOKS OF SAMUEL

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*Volumes translated by James Kennedy*

THE PROPHECIES OF JEREMIAH, VOL. II

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## TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

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THE volume which is here presented to English readers is the first of three which will contain the Solomonic writings. They form the last section of the "Keil and Delitzsch" series of Commentaries on the Books of the Old Testament Scriptures. The remaining volume on the Proverbs, as well as that on Ecclesiastes and the Canticles, which has also been prepared by Delitzsch, and is now in course of publication in Germany, will be issued with as little delay as possible.

In this translation I have endeavoured accurately to reproduce the original, so as to bring the student as much as possible into direct contact with the learned commentator himself. Any explanatory notes or words I have thought it right to add are enclosed in square brackets [ ], so as to be easily distinguishable. The Arabic and Syriac words occurring in the original have been, with very few exceptions, printed in English characters. In their vocalization I have followed the system of Forbes in his *Arabic Grammar*, so that the student will be readily able to restore the original. When nothing depends on the inflection of these words, the consonants only are printed.

It might appear superfluous in me to speak in commendation of the great work which is now drawing to a close; but a translator, since he has necessarily been in close fellowship with the author, may be expected to be in a position to offer an opinion on the character of the work on which he has been engaged; and I am sure that all my *collaborateurs* will concur with me in speaking of the volumes which form this commentary as monuments of deep

and careful research into the meaning of the sacred Scriptures. Whether or not we can in all cases accept the conclusions reached by the respected authors, no one can fail to see how elaborate and minute the investigation has been. These volumes are the ripest fruits of life-long study of the Old Testament. Their authors are exegetes who have won for themselves an honoured place in the foremost rank for their profound acquaintance with the Hebrew and its cognate languages. With a scholarship of rare compass and accuracy, they combine a reverent sympathy with the sacred Scriptures, and a believing appreciation of its saving truths.

The satisfaction I have had in the study of this work, and in spending so many of my leisure hours in rendering it into English, is greatly heightened by the reflection, that I have been enabled in this way to contribute to the number of exegetical works within reach of the English student. The exegetical study of God's word, which appears to be increasingly drawing the attention of theologians, and which has been so greatly stimulated by the Translations issued by the publishers of this work, cannot fail to have the most beneficial results. The minister of the gospel will find such study his best and truest preparation for his weighty duties as an expounder of Scripture, if prosecuted in the spirit of a devout recognition of the truth, that "*bene orasse est bene studuisse.*" Thus is he led step by step into a thorough and full understanding of the words and varying forms of expression used by those "holy men of old, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

## AUTHOR'S PREFACE

---



THE preparation of this Commentary on the *Mishle*, which was begun in 1869 (not without previous preparation), and twice interrupted by providential events, extended into the winter of 1872. There is now wanting to the completion of the Commentary on the Old Testament, undertaken by Dr. Keil and myself, only the Commentary on the Canticles and Ecclesiastes, which will form the concluding volume.

In the preparation of this Commentary on the Proverbs, I am indebted in varied ways to my friends Fleischer and Wetzstein. In the year 1836, Fleischer entered on his duties as Professor at Leipzig by delivering a course of lectures on the Book of the Proverbs of Solomon. I was one of his hearers, and am now so fortunate as to be able from his own MS. (begun 13th May, completed 9th September 1836) to introduce this beloved teacher into the number of interpreters of the Book of Proverbs. The assistance contributed by Wetzstein begins at chapter xxx., and consists in remarks on Mühlau's work on the Proverbs of Agur and Lemuel (1869), which my Dorpat friend placed at my disposal.

The exegetical apparatus has in the course of this work extended far beyond the list given at pp. 50, 51. I obtained the Commentary of the Karaite Ahron b. Joseph (1294), which was printed at Koslow (Eupatoria) in 1835, and had lent to me from the library of Dr. Hermann Lotze the Commentary by the Roman poet Immanuel [born at Rome about 1265], who was intimately associated with Dante, printed at Naples in 1487, and equal in value to a MS. Among the interpreters comprehended in the *Biblia Rabbinica*, I made use also of the Commentary of the Spanish

Menachem b. Salomo Meîri (1447), which first appeared in the Amsterdam *Bibelwerk*, and came under my notice in a more handy edition (Fürth, 1844) from the library of my dear friend and companion in study, Baer. To him I owe, among many other things, the comparison of several mss., particularly of one brought from Arabia by Jacob Sappir, which has come into his possession.

In making use of the *Græcus Venetus*, I was not confined to Villoison's edition (1784). The only existing ms. (found in Venice) of this translation one of my young friends, von Gebhardt, has compared with the greatest care with Villoison's printed edition, in which he has found many false readings and many omissions. We have to expect from him a critical, complete edition of this singular translation, which, both as regards the knowledge its author displays of the Hebrew language and his skill in the Greek language, remains as yet an unsolved mystery.

The Index<sup>1</sup> (to the words etymologically explained in this Commentary) has been prepared by Dr. Hermann Strack, who, by his recently-published *Prolegomena ad Vetus Testamentum Hebraicum*, has shown himself to be a Hebraist of rare attainments.

Bacon, in his work *De Augmentis Scientiarum* (viii. 2), rightly speaks<sup>2</sup> of Solomon's proverbs as an unparalleled collection. May it be granted me, by the help of God, to promote in some degree the understanding of this incomparable Book, as to its history, its language, and its practical lessons!

LEIPZIG, 30th October 1872.

<sup>1</sup> Will be given with vol. ii.

<sup>2</sup> [In hoc genere autem nihil invenitur, quod ullo modo comparandum sit cum aphorismis illis, quos edidit rex Salomon; de quo testatur Scriptura *cor illi fuisse instar arenæ maris*: sicut enim arenæ maris universas orbis oras circumdant, ita et sapientia ejus omnia humana, non minus quam divina, complexa est. In aphorismis vero illis, præter alia majis theologica, reperies liquido haud pauca præcepta et monita civilia præstantissima, ex profundis quidem sapientiæ penetralibus scaturientia, atque in amplissimum varietatis campum excurrentia.]

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## INTRODUCTION.

	PAGE
1. PLAN OF THE BOOK, AND ITS ORIGIN, . . . . .	2
2. THE SEVERAL PARTS OF THE BOOK, AND MANIFOLD FORMS OF THE PROVERBS, . . . . .	6
Distichs, . . . . .	7
Tetrastichs, Hexastichs, Octostichs, . . . . .	10
Pentastichs, Heptastichs, . . . . .	11
The Fifteen Mashal-strains of the First Part of the Book, . . . . .	12
The <i>Midda, Priamel</i> , . . . . .	13
The Second Part of the Collection, . . . . .	15
The "Words of the Wise," . . . . .	16
The "Hezekiah-Collection," . . . . .	17
Appendices to the Second Collection, . . . . .	18
Ewald's View regarding the Parts of the Book, . . . . .	20
3. THE REPETITIONS IN THE BOOK OF PROVERBS, . . . . .	24
The <i>Time</i> at which the First Collection was made, . . . . .	27
4. THE MANIFOLDNESS OF THE STYLE AND FORM OF INSTRUCTION IN THE BOOK, . . . . .	31
Relation of the Introduction to the First Collection, . . . . .	33
Style of the Supplements, xxii. 17-xxiv. 22 and xxiv. 23 ff., . . . . .	35
The Supplements to the Hezekiah-Collection, . . . . .	36
Names given to the whole Book, . . . . .	36
Jewish Literature in the Age of Solomon, . . . . .	38
The <i>Chokma</i> , . . . . .	41
5. THE ALEXANDRIAN TRANSLATION OF THE BOOK, . . . . .	46
Literature of the Interpretation of the Book, . . . . .	50

## THE OLDER BOOK OF PROVERBS, I.—XXIV.

	PAGE
The External Title of the Book, i. 1-6, . . . . .	52
Motto of the Book, i. 7, . . . . .	58
FIRST INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, i. 8-19, . . . . .	59
SECOND           "           "           i. 20 ff., . . . . .	67
THIRD           "           "           ii., . . . . .	75
FOURTH          "           "           iii. 1-18, . . . . .	85
FIFTH           "           "           iii. 19-26, . . . . .	91
SIXTH           "           "           iii. 27-35, . . . . .	98
SEVENTH        "           "           iv.-v. 6, . . . . .	105
EIGHTH         "           "           v. 7-23, . . . . .	122
NINTH          "           "           vi. 1-5, . . . . .	134
TENTH          "           "           vi. 6-11, . . . . .	139
ELEVENTH       "           "           vi. 12-19, . . . . .	142
TWELFTH        "           "           vi. 20 ff., . . . . .	149
THIRTEENTH    "           "           vii., . . . . .	156
FOURTEENTH    "           "           viii., . . . . .	172
FIFTEENTH      "           "           ix., . . . . .	195
FIRST COLLECTION OF SOLOMONIC PROVERBS, x.-xxii. 16, . . . . .	207
CHAPTER xi., . . . . .	229
CHAPTER xii., . . . . .	250
CHAPTER xiii., . . . . .	270
CHAPTER xiv., . . . . .	288
CHAPTER xv., . . . . .	315
CHAPTER xvi., . . . . .	334
CHAPTER xvii., . . . . .	352

# THE BOOK OF PROVERBS

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## INTRODUCTION.



THE Book of Proverbs bears the external title סֵפֶר מִשְׁלֵי, which it derives from the words with which it commences. It is one of the three books which are distinguished from the other twenty-one by a peculiar system of accentuation, the best exposition of which that has yet been given is that by S. Baer,<sup>1</sup> as set forth in my larger *Psalmen-commentar*.<sup>2</sup> The memorial word for these three books, viz. Job, Mishle (Proverbs), and Tehillim (Psalms), is תָּאֵם, formed from the first letter of the first word of each book, or, following the Talmudic and Masoretic arrangement of the books, תָּאֵם.

Having in view the superscription מִשְׁלֵי שְׁלֹמֹה, with which the book commences, the ancients regarded it as wholly the composition of Solomon. The circumstance that it contains only 800 verses, while according to 1 Kings v. 12 (iv. 32) Solomon spake 3000 proverbs, R. Samuel bar-Nachmani explains by remarking that each separate verse may be divided into two or three allegories or apothegms (*e.g.* xxv. 12), not to mention other more arbitrary modes of reconciling the discrepancy.<sup>3</sup> The opinion also of R. Jonathan, that Solomon first composed the Canticles, then the Proverbs, and last of all Ecclesiastes, inasmuch as the first corresponds<sup>4</sup> with the spring-time of youth, the second with the wis-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Outlines of Hebrew Accentuation, Prose and Poetical*, by Rev. A. B. Davidson, D.D., Professor of Hebrew, Free Church College, Edinburgh, 1861, based on Baer's *Torath Emeth*, Rödelheim 1872.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. ii., ed. of 1860, pp. 477–511.

<sup>3</sup> *Pesikta*, ed. Buber (1868), 34b, 35a. Instead of 800, the Masora reckons 915 verses in the Book of Proverbs.

<sup>4</sup> *Schir-ha-Schirim Rabba*, c. i. f. 4a.

dom of manhood, and the third with the disappointment of old age, is founded on the supposition of the unity of the book and of its Solomonic authorship.

At the present day also there are some, such as Stier, who regard the Book of Proverbs from first to last as the work of Solomon, just as Klauss (1832) and Randegger (1841) have ventured to affirm that all the Psalms without exception were composed by David. But since historical criticism has been applied to Biblical subjects, that blind submission to mistaken tradition appears as scarcely worthy of being mentioned. The Book of Proverbs presents itself as composed of various parts, different from each other in character and in the period to which they belong. Under the hands of the critical analysis it resolves itself into a mixed market of the most manifold intellectual productions of proverbial poetry, belonging to at least three different epochs.

1. *The external plan of the Book of Proverbs, and its own testimony as to its origin.*—The internal superscription of the book, which recommends it, after the manner of later Oriental books, on account of its importance and the general utility of its contents, extends from ver. 1 to ver. 6. Among the moderns this has been acknowledged by Löwenstein and Maurer; for ver. 7, which Ewald, Bertheau, and Keil have added to it, forms a new commencement to the beginning of the book itself. The book is described as “The Proverbs of Solomon,” and then there is annexed the statement of its object. That object, as summarily set forth in ver. 2, is practical, and that in a twofold way: partly moral, and partly intellectual. The former is described in vers. 3–5. It presents moral edification, moral sentiments for acceptance, not merely to help the unwise to attain to wisdom, but also to assist the wise. The latter object is set forth in ver. 6. It seeks by its contents to strengthen and discipline the mind to the understanding of thoughtful discourses generally. In other words, it seeks to gain the moral ends which proverbial poetry aims at, and at the same time to make familiar with it, so that the reader, in these proverbs of Solomon, or by means of them as of a key, learns to understand such like apothegms in general. Thus interpreted, the title of the book does not say that the book contains proverbs of other wise men besides those of Solomon; if it did so, it would contradict itself. It is possible that the book contains proverbs

other than those of Solomon, possible that the author of the title of the book added such to it himself, but the title presents to view only the Proverbs of Solomon. If i. 7 begins the book, then after reading the title we cannot think otherwise than that here begin the Solomonic proverbs. If we read farther, the contents and the form of the discourses which follow do not contradict this opinion; for both are worthy of Solomon. So much the more astonished are we, therefore, when at x. 1 we meet with a new superscription, מִשְׁלֵי שְׁלֹמֹה, from which point on to xxii. 16 there is a long succession of proverbs of quite a different tone and form—short maxims, Mashals proper—while in the preceding section of the book we find fewer proverbs than monitory discourses. What now must be our opinion when we look back from this second superscription to the part i. 7–ix., which immediately follows the title of the book? Are i. 7–ix., in the sense of the book, not the “Proverbs of Solomon”? From the title of the book, which declares them to be so, we must judge that they are. Or are they “Proverbs of Solomon”? In this case the new superscription (x. 1), “The Proverbs of Solomon,” appears altogether incomprehensible. And yet only one of these two things is possible: on the one side, therefore, there must be a false appearance of contradiction, which on a closer investigation disappears. But on which side is it? If it is supposed that the tenor of the title, i. 1–6, does not accord with that of the section x. 1–xxii. 6, but that it accords well with that of i. 7–ix. (with the breadth of expression in i. 7–ix., it has also several favourite words not elsewhere occurring in the Book of Proverbs; among these, עֲרֻמָּה, subtilty, and מִזְמָה, discretion, i. 4), then Ewald’s view is probable, that i.–ix. is an original whole written at once, and that the author had no other intention than to give it as an introduction to the larger Solomonic Book of Proverbs beginning at x. 1. But it is also possible that the author of the title has adopted the style of the section i. 7–ix. Bertheau, who has propounded this view, and at the same time has rejected, in opposition to Ewald, the idea of the unity of the section, adopts this conclusion, that in i. 8–ix. there lies before us a collection of the admonitions of different authors of proverbial poetry, partly original introductions to larger collections of proverbs, which the author of the title gathers together in order that he may give a comprehensive introduction to the larger collection contained in x. 1–xxii. 16. But such an origin of the section as Bertheau thus imagines

is by no means natural; it is more probable that the author, whose object is, according to the title of the book, to give the proverbs of Solomon, introduces these by a long introduction of his own, than that, instead of beginning with Solomon's proverbs, he first presents long extracts of a different kind from collections of proverbs. If the author, as Bertheau thinks, expresses indeed, in the words of the title, the intention of presenting, along with the "Proverbs of Solomon," also the "words of the wise," then he could not have set about his work more incorrectly and self-contradictorily than if he had begun the whole, which bears the superscription "Proverbs of Solomon" (which must be regarded as presenting the proverbs of Solomon as a key to the words of the wise generally), with the "words of the wise." But besides the opinion of Ewald, which in itself, apart from internal grounds, is more natural and probable than that of Bertheau, there is yet the possibility of another. Keil, following H. A. Hahn, is of opinion, that in the sense of the author of the title, the section i.-ix. is Solomonic as well as x.-xxii., but that he has repeated the superscription "Proverbs of Solomon" before the latter section, because from that point onward proverbs follow which bear in a special measure the characters of the *Mashal* (Hävernicks *Einkl.* iii. 428). The same phenomenon appears in the book of Isaiah, where, after the general title, there follows an introductory address, and then in ii. 1 the general title is repeated in a shorter form. That this analogy, however, is here inapplicable, the further discussion of the subject will show.

The introductory section i. 7-ix., and the larger section x.-xxii. 16, which contains uniform brief Solomonic apothegms, are followed by a third section, xxii. 17-xxiv. 22. Hitzig, indeed, reckons x.-xxiv. 22 as the second section, but with xxii. 17 there commences an altogether different style, and a much freer manner in the form of the proverb; and the introduction to this new collection of proverbs, which reminds us of the general title, places it beyond a doubt that the collector does not at all intend to set forth these proverbs as Solomonic. It may indeed be possible that, as Keil (iii. 410) maintains, the collector, inasmuch as he begins with the words, "Incline thine ear and hear words of the wise," names his own proverbs generally as "words of the wise," especially since he adds, "and apply thine heart to my knowledge;" but this supposition is contradicted by the superscription of a fourth section, xxiv. 23 ff., which follows. This short section, an appendix to the

third, bears the superscription, "These things also are לְחֻכְּמִים." If Keil thinks here also to set aside the idea that the following proverbs, in the sense of this superscription, have as their authors "the wise," he does unnecessary violence to himself. The ל is here that of authorship; and if the following proverbs are composed by the חֻכְּמִים, "the wise," then they are not the production of the one חֹכֵם, "wise man," Solomon, but they are "the words of the wise" in contradistinction to "the Proverbs of Solomon."

The Proverbs of Solomon begin again at xxv. 1; and this second large section (corresponding to the first, x. 1-xxii. 16) extends to xxix. This fifth portion of the book has a superscription, which, like that of the preceding appendix, commences thus: "Also (וְ) these are proverbs of Solomon which the men of Hezekiah king of Judah collected." The meaning of the word הַעֲתִיקוּ is not doubtful. It signifies, like the Arameo-Arabic נסח, to remove from their place, and denotes that the men of Hezekiah removed from the place where they found them the following proverbs, and placed them together in a separate collection. The words have thus been understood by the Greek translator. From the supplementary words αἱ ἀδιάκριτοι (such as exclude all διάκρισις) it is seen that the translator had a feeling of the important literary historical significance of that superscription, which reminds us of the labours of the poetical grammarians appointed by Pisistratus to edit older works, such as those of Hesiod. The Jewish interpreters, simply following the Talmud, suppose that the "also" (וְ) belongs to the whole superscription, inclusive of the relative sentence, and that it thus bears witness to the editing of the foregoing proverbs also by Hezekiah and his companions;<sup>1</sup> which is altogether improbable, for then, if such were the meaning of the words, "which the men of Hezekiah," etc., they ought to have stood after i. 1. The superscription xxv. 1 thus much rather distinguishes the following collection from that going before, as having been made under Hezekiah. As two appendices followed the "Proverbs of Solomon," x. 1-xxii. 16, so also two appendices the Hezekiah-gleanings of Solomonic proverbs. The former two appendices, however, originate in general from the "wise," the latter more definitely name the authors: the first, xxx., is by "Agur the son of Jakeh;" the second, xxxi.

<sup>1</sup> *Vid. B. Bathra*, 15a. From the fact that Isaiah outlived Hezekiah it is there concluded that the Hezekiah-collegium also continued after Hezekiah's death. Cf. Fürst on the *Canon of the O. T.* 1868, p. 78 f.

1-9, by a "King Lemuel." In so far the superscriptions are clear. The names of the authors, elsewhere unknown, point to a foreign country; and to this corresponds the peculiar complexion of these two series of proverbs. As a third appendix to the Hezekiah-collection, xxxi. 10 ff. follows, a complete alphabetical proverbial poem which describes the praiseworthy qualities of a virtuous woman.

We are thus led to the conclusion that the Book of Proverbs divides itself into the following parts:—(1) The title of the book, i. 1-6, by which the question is raised, how far the book extends to which it originally belongs; (2) the hortatory discourses, i. 7-ix., in which it is a question whether the Solomonic proverbs must be regarded as beginning with these, or whether they are only the introduction thereto, composed by a different author, perhaps the author of the title of the book; (3) the first great collection of Solomonic proverbs, x.-xxii. 16; (4) the first appendix to this first collection, "The words of the wise," xxii. 17-xxiv. 22; (5) the second appendix, supplement of the words of some wise men, xxiv. 23 ff.; (6) the second great collection of Solomonic proverbs, which the "men of Hezekiah" collected, xxv.-xxix.; (7) the first appendix to this second collection, the words of Agur the son of Jakeh, xxx.; (8) the second appendix, the words of King Lemuel, xxxi. 1-9; (9) third appendix, the acrostic ode, xxxi. 10 ff. These nine parts are comprehended under three groups: the introductory hortatory discourses with the general title at their head, and the two great collections of Solomonic proverbs with their two appendices. In prosecuting our further investigations, we shall consider the several parts of the book first from the point of view of the manifold forms of their proverbs, then of their style, and thirdly of their type of doctrine. From each of these three subjects of investigation we may expect elucidations regarding the origin of these proverbs and of their collections.

2. *The several parts of the Book of Proverbs with respect to the manifold forms of the proverbs.*—If the Book of Proverbs were a collection of popular sayings, we should find in it a multitude of proverbs of one line each, as *e.g.*, "Wickedness proceedeth from the wicked" (1 Sam. xxiv. 13); but we seek for such in vain. At the first glance, xxiv. 23b appears to be a proverb of one line; but the line "To have respect of persons in judgment is not good," is only the introductory line of a proverb which consists of several

lines, ver. 24 f. Ewald is right in regarding as inadmissible a comparison of the collections of Arabic proverbs by Abu-Obeida, Meidani, and others, who gathered together and expounded the current popular proverbs, with the Book of Proverbs. Ali's Hundred Proverbs are, however, more worthy of being compared with it. Like these, Solomon's proverbs are, as a whole, the production of his own spirit, and only mediately of the popular spirit. To make the largeness of the number of these proverbs a matter of doubt were inconsiderate. Eichhorn maintained that even a god-like genius scarcely attains to so great a number of pointed proverbs and ingenious thoughts. But if we distribute Solomon's proverbs over his forty years' reign, then we have scarcely twenty for each year; and one must agree with the conclusion, that the composition of so many proverbs even of the highest ingenuity is no impossible problem for a "godlike genius." When, accordingly, it is related that Solomon wrote 3000 proverbs, Ewald, in his *History of Israel*, does not find the number too great, and Bertheau does not regard it as impossible that the collection of the "Proverbs of Solomon" has the one man Solomon as their author. The number of the proverbs thus cannot determine us to regard them as having for the most part originated among the people, and the form in which they appear leads to an opposite conclusion. It is, indeed, probable that popular proverbs are partly wrought into these proverbs,<sup>1</sup> and many of their forms of expression are moulded after the popular proverbs; but as they thus lie before us, they are, as a whole, the production of the technical *Mashal* poetry.

The simplest form is, according to the fundamental peculiarity of the Hebrew verse, the *distich*. The relation of the two lines to each other is very manifold. The second line may repeat the thought of the first, only in a somewhat altered form, in order to express this thought as clearly and exhaustively as possible. We call such proverbs *synonymous distichs*; as *e.g.* xi. 25 :

A soul of blessing is made fat,  
And he that watereth others is himself watered.

Or the second line contains the other side of the contrast to the statement of the first; the truth spoken in the first is explained in the second by means of the presentation of its contrary. We call such proverbs *antithetic distichs*; as *e.g.* x. 1 :

<sup>1</sup> Isaac Euchel († 1804), in his *Commentary on the Proverbs*, regards xiv. 4a and xvii. 19b as such popular proverbs.

A wise son maketh his father glad,  
And a foolish son is his mother's grief.

Similar forms, x. 16, xii. 5. Elsewhere, as xviii. 14, xx. 24, the antithesis clothes itself in the form of a question. Sometimes it is two different truths that are expressed in the two lines; and the authorization of their union lies only in a certain relationship, and the ground of this union in the circumstance that two lines are the minimum of the technical proverb—*synthetic* distichs; e.g. x. 18:

A cloak of hatred are lying lips,  
And he that spreadeth slander is a fool.

Not at all infrequently one line does not suffice to bring out the thought intended, the begun expression of which is only completed in the second. These we call *integral* (*eingedankige*) distichs; as e.g. xi. 31 (cf. 1 Pet. iv. 18):

The righteous shall be recompensed on the earth—  
How much more the ungodly and the sinner!

To these distichs also belong all those in which the thought stated in the first receives in the second, by a sentence presenting a reason, or proof, or purpose, or consequence, a definition completing or perfecting it; e.g. xiii. 14, xvi. 10, xix. 20, xxii. 28.<sup>1</sup> But there is also a fifth form, which corresponds most to the original character of the *Mashal*: the proverb explaining its ethical object by a resemblance from the region of the natural and every-day life, the *παραβολή* proper. The form of this *parabolic* proverb is very manifold, according as the poet himself expressly compares the two subjects, or only places them near each other in order that the hearer or reader may complete the comparison. The proverb is

<sup>1</sup> Such integral distichs are also xv. 3, xvi. 7, 10, xvii. 13, 15, xviii. 9, 13, xix. 26, 27, xx. 7, 8, 10, 11, 20, 21, xxi. 4, 13, 16, 21, 23, 24, 30, xxii. 4, 11, xxiv. 8, 26, xxvi. 16, xxvii. 14, xxviii. 8, 9, 17, 24, xxix. 1, 5, 12, 14. In xiv. 27, xv. 24, xvii. 23, xix. 27, the second line consists of one sentence with *וְ* and the infin.; in xvi. 12, 26, xxi. 25, xxii. 9, xxvii. 1, xxix. 19, of one sentence with *כִּי*; with *כִּי אֵם*, xviii. 2, xxiii. 17. The two lines, as xi. 31, xv. 11, xvii. 7, xix. 7ab, 10, xx. 27, form a conclusion *a minori ad majus*, or the reverse. The former or the latter clauses stand in grammatical relation in xxiii. 1, 2, 15 f., xxvii. 22, xxix. 21 (cf. xxii. 29, xxiv. 10, xxvi. 12, xxix. 20, with hypoth. perf., and xxvi. 26 with hypoth. fut.); in the logical relation of reason and consequence, xvii. 14, xx. 2, 4; in comparative relation, xii. 9, etc. These examples show that the two lines, not merely in the more recent, but also in the old Solomonic *Mashal*, do not always consist of two parallel members.

least poetic when the likeness between the two subjects is expressed by a verb; as xxvii. 15 (to which, however, ver. 16 belongs):

As continual dropping in a rainy day  
And a contentious woman are alike.

The usual form of expression, neither unpoetic nor properly poetic, is the introduction of the comparison by  $\text{כִּי}$  [as], and of the similitude in the second clause by  $\text{כִּי}$  [so]; as x. 26:

As vinegar to the teeth, and as smoke to the eyes,  
So is the sluggard to them who give him a commission.

This complete verbal statement of the relation of likeness may also be abbreviated by the omission of the  $\text{כִּי}$ ; as xxv. 13, xxvi. 11:

As a dog returning to his vomit—  
A fool returning to his folly.

We call the parabolic proverbs of these three forms *comparisons*. The last, the abbreviated form of the comparative proverb, forms the transition to another kind of parabolic proverb, which we will call, in contradistinction to the comparative, the *emblematic*, in which the contrast and its emblem are loosely placed together without any nearer expression of the similitude; as *e.g.* xxvi. 20, xxvii. 17, 18, 20. This takes place either by means of the copulative *Vav*,  $\text{וְ}$ , as xxv. 25—

Cold water to a thirsty soul,  
And good news from a far country.<sup>1</sup>

Or without the *Vav*; in which case the second line is as the subcription under the figure or double figure painted in the first; *e.g.* xxv. 11 f., xi. 22:

A gold ring in a swine's snout—  
A fair woman and without understanding.

These ground-forms of two lines can, however, expand into forms of several lines. Since the distich is the peculiar and most appropriate form of the technical proverb, so, when two lines are not sufficient for expressing the thought intended, the multiplication to

<sup>1</sup> This so-called *Vav adæquationis*, which appears here for the first time in the Proverbs as the connection between the figure and the thing itself without a verbal predicate (cf., on the other hand, Job v. 7, xii. 11, xiv. 11 f.), is, like the *Vav*,  $\text{וְ}$ , of comparison, only a species of that *Vav* of association which is called in Arab. *Waw alajam'a*, or *Waw alam'ayat*, or *Waw al'asatsahab* (vid. at Isa. xlii. 5); and since usage attributes to it the verbal power of *secum habere*, it is construed with the accus. Vid. examples in Freytag's *Arabum Proverbia*, among the recent proverbs beginning with the letter  $\text{ك}$  (*k*).

four, six, or eight lines is most natural. In the *tetrastich* the relation of the last two to the first two is as manifold as is the relation of the second line to the first in the distich. There is, however, no suitable example of four-lined stanzas in antithetic relation. But we meet with *synonymous* tetrastichs, *e.g.* xxiii. 15 f., xxiv. 3 f., 28 f.; *synthetic*, xxx. 5 f.; *integral*, xxx. 17 f., especially of the form in which the last two lines constitute a proof passage beginning with *וְ*, xxii. 22 f., or *וְ*, xxii. 24 f., or without exponents, xxii. 26 f.; *comparative* without expressing the comparison, xxv. 16 f. (cf., on the other hand, xxvi. 18 f., where the number of lines is questionable), and also the *emblematical*, xxv. 4 f. :

Take away the dross from the silver,  
And there shall come forth a vessel for the goldsmith ;  
Take away the wicked from before the king,  
And his throne shall be established in righteousness.

Proportionally the most frequently occurring are tetrastichs, the second half of which forms a proof clause commencing with *וְ* or *וְ*. Among the less frequent are the *six-lined*, presenting (xxiii. 1-3, xxiv. 11 f.) one and the same thought in manifold aspects, with proofs interspersed. Among all the rest which are found in the collection, xxiii. 12-14, 19-21, 26-28, xxx. 15 f., xxx. 29-31, the first two lines form a prologue introductory to the substance of the proverb ; as *e.g.* xxiii. 12-14 :

O let instruction enter into thine heart,  
And apply thine ears to the words of knowledge.  
Withhold not correction from the child ;  
For if thou beatest him with the rod—he dies not.  
Thou shalt beat him with the rod,  
And deliver his soul from hell.

Similarly formed, yet more expanded, is the *eight-lined stanza*, xxiii. 22-28 :

Hearken unto thy father that begat thee,  
And despise not thy mother when she is old.  
Buy the truth and sell it not :  
Wisdom, and virtue, and understanding.  
The father of a righteous man greatly rejoices,  
And he that begetteth a wise child hath joy of him.  
Thy father and thy mother shall be glad,  
And she that bare thee shall rejoice.

The Mashal proverb here inclines to the Mashal ode ; for this octastich may be regarded as a short Mashal song,—like the alpha-

betical Mashal psalm xxxvii., which consists of almost pure tetrastichs.

We have now seen how the distich form multiplies itself into forms consisting of four, six, and eight lines; but it also unfolds itself, as if in one-sided multiplication, into forms of three, five, and seven lines. *Tristichs* arise when the thought of the first line is repeated (xxvii. 22) in the second according to the synonymous scheme, or when the thought of the second line is expressed by contrast in the third (xxii. 29, xxviii. 10) according to the antithetic scheme, or when to the thought expressed in one or two lines (xxv. 8, xxvii. 10) there is added its proof. The parabolic scheme is here represented when the object described is unfolded in two lines, as in the comparison xxv. 13, or when its nature is portrayed by two figures in two lines, as in the emblematic proverb xxv. 20 :

To take off clothing in cold weather,  
Vinegar upon nitre,  
And he that singeth songs to a heavy heart.

In the few instances of *pentastichs* which are found, the last three lines usually unfold the reason of the thought of the first two: xxiii. 4 f., xxv. 6 f., xxx. 32 f.; to this xxiv. 13 forms an exception, where the  $\text{פ}$  before the last three lines introduces the expansion of the figure in the first two. As an instance we quote xxv. 6 f. :

Seek not to display thyself in the presence of the king,  
And stand not in the place of the great.  
For better that it be said unto thee, "Come up hither,"  
Than that they humble thee in the presence of the prince,  
While thine eyes have raised themselves.

Of *heptastichs* I know of only one example in the collection, viz. xxiii. 6-8 :

Eat not the bread of the jealous,  
And lust not after his dainties ;  
For he is like one who calculates with himself :—  
"Eat and drink," saith he to thee,  
And his heart is not with thee.  
Thy morsel which thou hast eaten must thou vomit up,  
And thou hast wasted thy pleasant words.

From this heptastich, which one will scarcely take for a brief Mashal ode according to the compound strophe-scheme, we see that the proverb of two lines can expand itself to the dimensions

of seven and eight lines. Beyond these limits the whole proverb ceases to be מִשָּׁל in the proper sense; and after the manner of Ps. xxv., xxxiv., and especially xxxvii., it becomes a Mashal ode. Of this class of Mashal odes are, besides the prologue, xxii. 17-21, that of the drunkard, xxiii. 29-35; that of the slothful man, xxiv. 30-34; the exhortation to industry, xxvii. 23-27; the prayer for a moderate portion between poverty and riches, xxx. 7-9; the mirror for princes, xxxi. 2-9; and the praise of the excellent wife, xxxi. 10 ff. It is singular that this ode furnishes the only example of the alphabetical acrostic in the whole collection. Even a single trace of original alphabetical sequence afterwards broken up cannot be found. There cannot also be discovered, in the Mashal songs referred to, anything like a completed strophe-scheme; even in xxxi. 10 ff. the distichs are broken by tristichs intermingled with them.

In the whole of the first part, i. 7-ix., the prevailing form is that of the extended flow of the Mashal song; but one in vain seeks for strophes. There is not here so firm a grouping of the lines; on the supposition of its belonging to the Solomonic era, this is indeed to be expected. The rhetorical form here outweighs the purely poetical. This first part of the Proverbs consists of the following fifteen Mashal strains: (1) i. 7-19, (2) 20 ff., (3) ii., (4) iii. 1-18, (5) 19-26, (6) 27 ff., (7) iv. 1-v. 6, (8) 7 ff., (9) vi. 1-5, (10) 6-11, (11) 12-19, (12) 20 ff., (13) vii., (14) viii., (15) ix. In iii. and ix. there are found a few Mashal odes of two lines and of four lines which may be regarded as independent Mashals, and may adapt themselves to the schemes employed; other brief complete parts are only waves in the flow of the larger discourses, or are altogether formless, or more than octastichs. The octastich vi. 16-19 makes the proportionally greatest impression of an independent inwoven Mashal. It is the only proverb in which symbolical numbers are used which occurs in the collection from i. to xxix.:

There are six things which Jahve hateth,  
And seven are an abhorrence to His soul:  
Haughty eyes, a lying tongue,  
And hands that shed innocent blood;  
An heart that deviseth the thoughts of evil,  
Feet that hastily run to wickedness,  
One that uttereth lies as a false witness,  
And he who soweth strife between brethren.

Such *numerical* proverbs to which the name מִקְרָא has been given

by later Jewish writers (see my *Gesch. der jüd. Poesie*, pp. 199, 202) are found in xxx. With the exception of xxx. 7-9, 24-28 (cf. Sir. xxv. 1, 2), the numerical proverb has this peculiarity, found also in most of the numerical proverbs of Sirach (Sir. xxiii. 16, xxv. 7, xxvi. 5, 28), that the number named in the first parallel line is in the second (cf. Job v. 9) increased by one. On the other hand, the form of the *Priamel*<sup>1</sup> is used neither in the Book of Proverbs nor in that of Sirach. Proverbs such as xx. 10 ("Diverse weights, diverse measures—an abomination to Jahve are they both") and xx. 12 ("The hearing ear, the seeing eye—Jahve hath created them both"), to be distinguished from xvii. 3, xxvii. 21, and the like, where the necessary unity, and from xxvii. 3, where the necessary resemblance, of the predicate is wanting, are only a weak approach to the *Priamel*,—a stronger, xxv. 3, where the three subjects form the preamble ("The heaven for height, and the earth for depth, and the heart of kings—are unsearchable"). Perhaps xxx. 11-14 is a greater mutilated *Priamel*. Here four subjects form the preamble, but there is wanting the conclusion containing the common predicate. This, we believe, exhausts the forms of the *Mashal* in the collection. It now only remains to make mention of the *Mashal chain*, i.e. the ranging together in a series of proverbs of a similar character, such as the chain of proverbs regarding the fool, xxvi. 1-12, the sluggard, xxvi. 13-16, the tale-bearer, xxvi. 20-22, the malicious, xxvi. 23-28—but this form belongs more to the technics of the *Mashal collection* than to that of the *Mashal poetry*.

We now turn to the separate parts of the book, to examine more closely the forms of their proverbs, and gather materials for a critical judgment regarding the origin of the proverbs which they contain. Not to anticipate, we take up in order the separate parts of the arrangement of the collection. Since, then, it cannot be denied that in the introductory pædagogic part, i. 7-ix., notwithstanding its rich and deep contents, there is exceedingly little of the technical form of the *Mashal*, as well as generally of technical form at all. This part, as already shown, consists not of proper *Mashals*, but of fifteen *Mashal odes*, or rather, perhaps, *Mashal discourses*, didactic poems of the *Mashal* kind. In the flow of these discourses separate *Mashals* intermingle, which may either be regarded as independent, or, as

<sup>1</sup> [From *præambulum*, designating a peculiar kind of epigram found in the German poetry of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.]

i. 32, iv. 18 f., can easily be so understood. In the Mashal chains of chap. iv. and ix. we meet with proverbs that are synonymous (ix. 7, 10), antithetic (iii. 35, ix. 8), integral, or of one thought (iii. 29, 30), and synthetic (i. 7, iii. 5, 7), of two lines and of four lines variously disposed (iii. 9 f., 11 f., 31 f., 33 f.); but the parabolic scheme is not at all met with, separate proverbs such as iii. 27 f. are altogether without form, and keeping out of view the octastich numerical proverb, vi. 16–19, the thoughts which form the unity of separate groups are so widely expanded that the measure of the Mashal proper is far exceeded. The character of this whole part is not concentrating, but unfolding. Even the intermingling proverbs of two lines possess the same character. They are for the most part more like dissolved drops than gold coins with sharp outline and firm impress; as *e.g.* ix. 7 :

He that correcteth the mocker getteth to himself shame ;  
And he that rebuketh the sinner his dishonour.

The few that consist of four lines are closer, more compact, more finished, because they allow greater space for the expression ; *e.g.* iii. 9 f. :

Honour Jahve with thy wealth,  
And with the first-fruits of all thine income :  
And thy barns shall be filled with plenty,  
And thy vats shall overflow with must.

But beyond the four lines the author knows no limits of artistic harmony ; the discourse flows on till it has wholly or provisionally exhausted the subject ; it pauses not till it reaches the end of its course, and then, taking breath, it starts anew. We cannot, moreover, deny that there is beauty in this new springing forth of the stream of the discourse with its fresh transparent waves ; but it is a peculiar beauty of the rhetorically decomposed, dissolved Mashal, going forth, as it were, from its confinement, and breathing its fragrance far and wide.

The fifteen discourses, in which the Teacher appears twelve times and Wisdom three times, are neither of a symmetrically chiselled form nor of internally fashioned coherence, but yet are a garland of songs having internal unity, with a well-arranged manifoldness of contents. It is true that Bertheau recognises here neither unity of the contents nor unity of the formal character ; but there is no Old Testament portion of like extent, and at the same time of more systematic internal unity, and which bears throughout a like formal

impress, than this. Bertheau thinks that he has discovered in certain passages a greater art in the form; and certainly there are several sections which consist of just ten verses. But this is a mere accident; for the first Mashal ode consists of groups of 1, 2, and 10 verses, the second of 8 and 6 verses, the third of 10 and 12, the fourth of 10 and 8, the fifth of 2 and 6, etc.—each group forming a complete sense. The 10 verses are met with six times, and if iv. 1–9 from the Peshito, and iv. 20–27 from the LXX., are included, eight times, without our regarding these decades as strophes, and without our being able to draw any conclusion regarding a particular author of these decade portions. In i. 20–33, Bertheau finds indeed, along with the regular structure of verses, an exact artistic formation of strophes (3 times 4 verses with an echo of 2). But he counts instead of the stichs the Masoretic verses, and these are not the true formal parts of the strophe.

We now come to the second part of the collection, whose superscription מִשְׁלֵי שְׁלֹמֹה can in no respect be strange to us, since the collection of proverbs here commencing, compared with i. 7–ix., may with special right bear the name *Mishle*. The 375 proverbs which are classed together in this part, x.–xxii. 16, without any comprehensive plan, but only according to their more or fewer conspicuous common characteristics (Bertheau, p. xii), consist all and every one of distichs; for each Masoretic verse falls naturally into two stichs, and nowhere (not even xix. 19) does such a distich proverb stand in necessary connection with one that precedes or that follows; each is in itself a small perfected and finished whole. The tristich xix. 7 is only an apparent exception. In reality it is a distich with the disfigured remains of a distich that has been lost. The LXX. has here two distichs which are wanting in our text. The second is that which is found in our text, but only in a mutilated form:

ὁ πολλὰ κακοποιῶν τελεσιουργεῖ κακίαν,

[He that does much harm perfects mischief,]

ὃς δὲ ἐρεθίζει λόγους οὐ σωθήσεται.

[And he that uses provoking words shall not escape.]

Perhaps the false rendering of

מרע רבים ישלם-רע

מרדף אמרים לא ימלט:

The friend of every one is rewarded with evil,  
He who pursues after rumours does not escape.

But not only are all these proverbs distichs, they have also, not indeed without exception, but in by far the greatest number, a common character in that they are *antithetic*. Distichs of predominating antithetic character stand here together. Along with these all other schemes are, it is true, represented: the synonymous, xi. 7, 25, 30, xii. 14, 28, xiv. 19, etc.; the integral, or of one thought, xiv. 7, xv. 3, etc., particularly in proverbs with the comparative *כִּי*, xii. 9, xv. 16, 17, xvi. 8, 19, xvii. 10, xxi. 19, xxii. 1, and with the ascending *כִּי* [much more], xi. 31, xv. 11, xvii. 7, xix. 7, 10, xxi. 27; the synthetic, x. 18, xi. 29, xiv. 17, xix. 13; the parabolic, the most feebly represented, for the only specimens of it are x. 26, xi. 22; besides which I know not what other Bertheau could quote. We shall further see that in another portion of the book the parabolic proverbs are just as closely placed together as are the antithetic. Here almost universally the two members of the proverbs stand together in technical parallelism as thesis and antithesis; also in the synonymous proverbs the two members are the parallel rays of one thought; in the synthetic two monostichs occur in loose external connection to suffice for the parallelism as a fundamental law of the technical proverb. But also in these proverbs in which a proper parallelism is not found, both members being needed to form a complete sentence, verse and members are so built up, according to Bertheau's self-confirmatory opinion, that in regard to extent and the number of words they are like verses with parallel members.

To this long course of distichs which profess to be the *Mishle* of Solomon, there follows a course, xxii. 17–xxiv. 22, of “words of the wise,” prefaced by the introduction xxii. 17–21, which undeniably is of the same nature as the greater introduction, i. 7–ix., and of which we are reminded by the form of address preserved throughout in these “words of the wise.” These “words of the wise” comprehend all the forms of the *Mashal*, from those of two lines in xxii. 28, xxiii. 9, xxiv. 7, 8, 9, 10, to the *Mashal* song xxiii. 29–35. Between these limits are the tetrastichs, which are the most popular form, xxii. 22 f., 24 f., 26 f., xxiii. 10 f., 15 f., 17 f., xxiv. 1 f., 3 f., 5 f., 15 f., 17 f., 19 f., 21 f.,—pentastichs, xxiii. 4 f., xxiv. 13 f., and hexastichs, xxiii. 1–3, 12–14, 19–21, 26–28, xxiv. 11 f.;—of tristichs, heptastichs, and octastichs are at least found one specimen of each, xxii. 29, xxiii. 6–8, xxiii. 22–25. Bertheau maintains that there is a difference between the structure of these

proverbs and that of the preceding, for he counts the number of the words which constitute a verse in the case of the latter and of the former; but such a proceeding is unwarrantable, for the remarkably long Masoretic verse xxiv. 12 contains eighteen words; and the poet is not to be made accountable for such an arrangement, for in his mind xxiv. 11 f. forms a hexastich, and indeed a very elegant one. Not the *words* of the Masoretic verse, but the *stichs* are to be counted. Reckoning according to the *stichs*, I can discover no difference between these proverbs and the preceding. In the preceding ones also the number of the words in the stichs extends from two to five, the number two being here, however, proportionally more frequently found (*e.g.* xxiv. 4*b*, xxiv. 8*a*, 10*b*); a circumstance which has its reason in this, that the symmetry of the members is often very much disturbed, there being frequently no trace whatever of parallelism. To the first appendix to the "Proverbs of Solomon" there follows a second, xxiv. 23 ff., with the superscription, "These things also to the wise," which contains a hexastich, xxiv. 23*b*–25, a distich, ver. 26, a tristich, ver. 27, a tetrastich, ver. 28 f., and a Mashal ode, ver. 30 ff., on the sluggard—the last in the form of an experience of the poet like Ps. xxxvii. 35 f. The moral which he has drawn from this recorded observation is expressed in two verses such as we have already found at vi. 10 f. These two appendices are, as is evident from their commencement as well as from their conclusion, in closest relation to the introduction, i. 7–ix.

There now follows in xxv.–xxix. the second great collection of "Proverbs of Solomon," "copied out," as the superscription mentions, by the direction of King Hezekiah. It falls, apparently, into two parts; for as xxiv. 30 ff., a Mashal hymn, stands at the end of the two appendices, so the Mashal hymn xxvii. 23 ff. must be regarded as forming the division between the two halves of this collection. It is very sharply distinguished from the collection beginning with chap. x. The extent of the stichs and the greater or less observance of the parallelism furnish no distinguishing mark, but there are others worthy of notice. In the first collection the proverbs are exclusively in the form of distichs; here we have also some tristichs, xxv. 8, 13, 20, xxvii. 10, 22, xxviii. 10, tetrastichs, xxv. 4 f., 9 f., 21 f., xxvi. 18 f., 24 f., xxvii. 15 f., and pentastichs, xxv. 6 f., besides the Mashal hymn already referred to. The kind of arrangement is not essentially different from that in

the first collection; it is equally devoid of plan, yet there are here some chains or strings of related proverbs, xxvi. 1-12, 13-16, 20-22. A second essential distinction between the two collections is this, that while in the first the *antithetic* proverb forms the prevailing element, here it is the *parabolic*, and especially the *emblematic*; in xxv.-xxvii. are sentences almost wholly of this character. We say *almost*, for to place together proverbs of this kind exclusively is not the plan of the collector. There are also proverbs of the other schemes, fewer synonymous, etc., than antithetic, and the collection begins in very varied quodlibet: xxv. 2, an antithetic proverb; xxv. 3, a priamel with three subjects; xxv. 4 f., an emblematic tetrastich; xxv. 6 f., a pentastich; xxv. 8, a tristich; xxv. 9 f., a tetrastich, with the negative  $\text{פֶּן}$ ; xxv. 11, an emblematic distich ("Golden apples in silver caskets—a word spoken in a fitting way"). The antithetic proverbs are found especially in xxviii. and xxix.: the first and the last proverb of the whole collection, xxv. 2, xxix. 27, are antithetic; but between these two the comparative and the figurative proverbs are so prevalent, that this collection appears like a variegated picture-book with explanatory notes written underneath. In extent it is much smaller than the foregoing. I reckon 126 proverbs in 137 Masoretic verses.

The second collection of Solomon's proverbs has also several appendices, the first of which, xxx., according to the inscription, is by an otherwise unknown author, Agur the son of Jakeh. The first poem of this appendix presents in a thoughtful way the unsearchableness of God. This is followed by certain peculiar pieces, such as a tetrastich regarding the purity of God's word, xxx. 5 f.; a prayer for a moderate position between riches and poverty, vers. 7-9; a distich against slander, ver. 10; a priamel without the conclusion, vers. 11-14; the insatiable four (a *Midda*), ver. 15 f.; a tetrastich regarding the disobedient son, ver. 17; the incomprehensible four, vers. 18-20; the intolerable four, vers. 21-23; the diminutive but prudent four, vers. 24-28; the excellent four, vers. 29-31; a pentastich recommending prudent silence, ver. 32 f. Two other supplements form the conclusion of the whole book: the counsel of Lemuel's mother to her royal son, xxxi. 2-9, and the praise of the virtuous woman in the form of an alphabetical acrostic, xxxi. 10 ff.

After we have acquainted ourselves with the manifold forms of the technical proverbs and their distribution in the several parts of the collection, the question arises, What conclusions regarding the

origin of these several parts may be drawn from these forms found in them? We connect with this the conception of Ewald, who sees represented in the several parts of the collection the chief points of the history of proverbial poetry. The "Proverbs of Solomon," x. 1-xxii. 16, appear to him to be the oldest collection, which represents the simplest and the most ancient kind of proverbial poetry. Their distinguishing characteristics are the symmetrical two-membered verse, complete in itself, containing in itself a fully intelligible meaning, and the quick contrast of thesis and antithesis. The oldest form of the technical proverb, according to Ewald, is, according to our terminology, the antithetic distich, such as predominates in x. 1-xxii. 16. Along with these antithetic distichs we find here also others of a different kind. Ewald so considers the contrast of the two members to be the original fundamental law of the technical proverb, that to him these other kinds of distichs represent the diminution of the inner force of the two-membered verse, the already begun decay of the art in its oldest limits and laws, and the transition to a new method. In the "Proverbs of Solomon," xxv.-xxix., of the later collection, that rigorous formation of the verse appears already in full relaxation and dissolution: the contrast of the sense of the members appears here only exceptionally; the art turns from the crowded fulness and strength of the representation more to the adorning of the thought by means of strong and striking figures and forms of expression, to elegant painting of certain moral conditions and forms of life; and the more the technical proverb is deprived of the breath of a vigorous poetic spirit, so much the nearer does it approach to the vulgar proverb; the full and complete symmetry of the two members disappears, less by the abridgment of one of them, than by the too great extension and amplification of the two-membered proverb into longer admonitions to a moral life, and descriptions relating thereto. So the proverbial poetry passes essentially into a different form and manner. "While it loses in regard to internal vigorous brevity and strength, it seeks to gain again by means of connected instructive exposition, by copious description and detailed representation; breaking up its boldly delineated, strong, and yet simply beautiful form, it rises to oratorical display, to attractive eloquence, in which, indeed, though the properly poetical and the artistic gradually disappears, yet the warmth and easy comprehension are increased." In chap. i.-ix., the introduction of the older collection,

and xxii. 17-xxiv., of the first half of the supplement to the older collection (xxv.-xxix. is the second half), supplied by a later writer, the great change is completed, the growth of which the later collection of the "Proverbs of Solomon," particularly in xxv.-xxix., reveals. The symmetry of the two members of the verse is here completely destroyed; the separate proverb appears almost only as an exception; the proverbial poetry has passed into admonition and discourse, and has become in many respects lighter, and more flexible, and flowing, and comprehensible. "It is true that on the side of this later form of proverbial poetry there is not mere loss. While it always loses the excellent pointed brevity, the inner fulness and strength of the old proverbs, it gains in warmth, impressiveness, intelligibility; the wisdom which at first strives only to make its existence and its contents in endless manifoldness known, reaches this point at last, that having become clear and certain, it now also turns itself earnestly and urgently to men." In the later additions, chap. xxx. xxxi., appended altogether externally, the proverbial poetry has already disappeared, and given place to elegant descriptions of separate moral truths. While the creative passes into the background, the whole aim is now toward surprising expansion and new artistic representation.

This view of the progressive development of the course of proverbial poetry is one of the chief grounds for the determination of Ewald's judgment regarding the parts that are Solomonic and those that are not Solomonic in the collection. In x. 1-xxii. 16 he does not regard the whole as Solomon's, as immediately and in their present form composed by Solomon; but the breath of the Solomonic spirit enlivens and pervades all that has been added by other and later poets. But most of the proverbs of the later collection (xxv.-xxix.) are not much older than the time of Hezekiah; yet there are in it some that are Solomonic, and of the period next to Solomon. The collection stretches backward with its arms, in part indeed, as the superscription, the "Proverbs of Solomon," shows, to the time of Solomon. On the other hand, in the introduction, i.-ix., and in the first half of the appendix (xxii. 17-xxiv.), there is not found a single proverb of the time of Solomon; both portions belong to two poets of the seventh century B.C., a new era, in which the didactic poets added to the older Solomonic collection longer pieces of their own composition. The four small pieces, xxx. 1-14, 15-33, xxxi. 1-9, 10 ff., are of a still later date;

they cannot belong to an earlier period than the end of the seventh or the beginning of the sixth century B.C.

We recognise the penetration, the sensibility, the depth of thought indicated by this opinion of Ewald's regarding the origin of the book; yet for the most part it is not supported by satisfactory proof. If we grant that he has on the whole rightly construed the history of proverbial poetry, nevertheless the conclusion that proverbs which bear in themselves the marks of the oldest proverbial poetry belong to the Solomonic era, and that the others belong to a period more nearly or more remotely subsequent to it, is very fallacious. In this case much that is found in Sirach's Book of Proverbs must be Solomonic; and the *משלי אסף* of Isaac Satanow,<sup>1</sup> the contemporary of Moses Mendelssohn, as well as many other proverbs in the collection *מלן ררבנן*, and in the poetical works of other Jewish poets belonging to the middle ages or to later times, might be dated back perhaps a thousand years. Along with the general course of development the individuality of the poet is also to be taken into account; an ancient poet can, along with the formally completed, produce the imperfect, which appears to belong to a period of art that has degenerated, and a modern poet can emulate antiquity with the greatest accuracy. But Ewald's construction of the progress of the development of proverbial poetry is also in part arbitrary. That the two-membered verse is the oldest form of the technical proverb we shall not dispute, but that it is the two-membered antithetic verse is a supposition that cannot be proved; and that Solomon wrote only antithetic distichs is an absurd assertion, to which Keil justly replies, that the adhering to only one form and structure is a sign of poverty, of mental narrowness and one-sidedness. There are also other kinds of parallelism, which are not less beautiful and vigorous than the antithetic, and also other forms of proverbs besides the distich in which the thought, which can in no way be restrained within two lines, must necessarily divide itself into the branches of a greater number of lines. Thus I must agree with Keil in the opinion, that Ewald's assertion that in the Hezekiah-collection the strong form of the technical proverb is in full dissolution, contains an exaggeration. If the

<sup>1</sup> [Isaac Ha-Levi was born at Satanow (whence his name), in Russian Poland, 1732, died at Berlin 1802. Besides other works, he was the author of several collections of gnomes and apothegms in imitation of the Proverbs. *Vid. Delitzsch Zur Gesch. der Jüd. Poesie*, p. 115.]

first collection, x. 1-xxii. 16, contains only two (x. 26, xi. 22) figurative proverbs, while it would be altogether foolish to deny that these two, because they were figurative proverbs, were Solomonic, or to affirm that he was the author of only these two, so it is self-evident that the Hezekiah-collection, which is principally a collection of figurative proverbs, must contain many proverbs in which a different kind of parallelism prevails, which has the appearance of a looser connection. Is it not probable that Solomon, who had an open penetrating eye for the greatest and the smallest objects of nature, composed many such proverbs? And is *e.g.* the proverb xxvi. 23,

Dross of silver spread over a potsherd—  
Burning lips and a wicked heart,

less beautiful, and vigorous, and worthy of Solomon than any anti-thetic distich? If Ewald imagines that the 3000 proverbs which Solomon wrote were all constructed according to this one model, we are much rather convinced that Solomon's proverbial poetry, which found the distich and the tetrastich as forms of proverbs already in use, would not only unfold within the limits of the distich the most varied manifoldness of thought and form, but would also within the limits of the *Mashal* generally, run through the whole scale from the distich up to octastichs and more extensive forms. But while we cannot accept Ewald's criteria which he applies to the two collections, x. 1-xxii. 16 and xxv.-xxix., yet his delineation of the form and kind of proverbial poetry occurring in i.-ix., xxii. 17 ff., is excellent, as is also his conclusion, that these portions belong to a new and more recent period of proverbial poetry. Since in xxii. 17-21 manifestly a new course of "Words of the Wise" by a poet later than Solomon is introduced, it is possible, yea, not improbable, that he, or, as Ewald thinks, another somewhat older poet, introduces in i. 7-ix. the "Proverbs of Solomon" following, from x. 1 onward.

But if Solomon composed not only distichs, but also tristichs, etc., it is strange that in the first collection, x.-xxii. 16, there are exclusively distichs; and if he constructed not only contrasted proverbs, but equally figurative proverbs, it is as strange that in the first collection the figurative proverbs are almost entirely wanting, while in the second collection, xxv.-xxix., on the contrary, they prevail. This remarkable phenomenon may be partly explained if we could suppose that not merely the second collection,

but both of them, were arranged by the "men of Hezekiah," and that the whole collection of the Solomonic proverbs was divided by them into two collections according to their form. But leaving out of view other objections, one would in that case have expected in the first collection the proportionally great number of the antithetic distichs which stand in the second. If we regard both collections as originally one whole, then there can be no rational ground for its being divided in this particular way either by the original collector or by a later enlarger of the collection. We have therefore to regard the two portions as the work of two different authors. The second is by the "men of Hezekiah;" the first cannot be by Solomon himself, since the number of proverbs composed, and probably also written out by Solomon, amounted to 3000; besides, if Solomon was the author of the collection, there would be visible on it the stamp of his wisdom in its plan and order: it is thus the work of another author, who is certainly different from the author of the introductory *Mashal* poems, i. 7-ix. For if the author of the title of the book were not at the same time the author of the introduction, he must have taken it from some other place; thus it is inconceivable how he could give the title "*Proverbs of Solomon*," etc., i. 1-6, to poems which were not composed by Solomon. If i. 7-ix. is not by Solomon, then these *Mashal* poems are explicable only as the work of the author of the title of the book, and as an introduction to the "*Proverbs of Solomon*," beginning x. 1. It must be one and the same author who edited the "*Proverbs of Solomon*" x. 1-xxii. 16, prefixed i. 7-ix. as an introduction to them, and appended to them the "*Words of the Wise*," xxii. 17-xxiv. 22; the second collector then appended to this book a supplement of the "*Words of the Wise*," xxiv. 23 ff., and then the Hezekiah-collection of Solomonic proverbs, xxv.-xxix.; perhaps also, in order that the book might be brought to a close in the same form in which it was commenced, he added<sup>1</sup> the non-Solomonic proverbial poem xxx. f. We do not, however, maintain that the book has this origin, but only this, that on the supposition of the non-Solomonic origin of i. 7-ix. it cannot well have any other origin. But the question arises again, and more emphatically, How was it possible that the first collector left as gleanings to

<sup>1</sup> Zöckler takes xxiv. 23 ff. as a second appendix to the first principal collection. This is justifiable, but the second superscription rather suggests two collectors.

the second so great a number of distichs, almost all parabolical, and besides, all more than two-lined proverbs of Solomon? One can scarcely find the reason of this singular phenomenon in anything else than in the judgment of the author of the first collection as the determining motive of his selection. For when we think also on the sources and origin of the two collections, the second always presupposes the first, and that which is singular in the author's thus restricting himself can only have its ground in the freedom which he allowed to his subjectivity.

Before we more closely examine the style and the teaching of the book, and the conclusions thence arising, another phenomenon claims our attention, which perhaps throws light on the way in which the several collections originated; but, at all events, it may not now any longer remain out of view, when we are in the act of forming a judgment on this point.

3. *The repetitions in the Book of Proverbs.*—We find not only in the different parts of the collection, but also within the limits of one and the same part, proverbs which wholly or in part are repeated in the same or in similar words. Before we can come to a judgment, we must take cognizance as closely as possible of this fact. We begin with "The Proverbs of Solomon," x.-xxii. 16; for this collection is in relation to xxv.-xxix. certainly the earlier, and it is especially with respect to the Solomonic proverbs that this fact demands an explanation. In this earlier collection we find, (1) whole proverbs repeated in exactly the same words: xiv. 12 = xvi. 25;—(2) proverbs slightly changed in their form of expression: x. 1 = xv. 20, xiv. 20 = xix. 4, xvi. 2 = xxi. 2, xix. 5 = xix. 9, xx. 10 = xx. 23, xxi. 9 = xxi. 19;—(3) proverbs almost identical in form, but somewhat different in sense: x. 2 = xi. 4, xiii. 14 = xiv. 27;—(4) proverbs the first lines of which are the same: x. 15 = xviii. 11;—(5) proverbs with their second lines the same: x. 6 = x. 11, x. 8 = x. 10, xv. 33 = xviii. 12;—(6) proverbs with one line almost the same: xi. 13 = xx. 19, xi. 21 = xvi. 5, xii. 14 = xiii. 2, xiv. 31 = xvii. 5, xvi. 18 = xviii. 12, xix. 12 = xx. 2; comp. also xvi. 28 with xvii. 9, xix. 25 with xxi. 11. In comparing these proverbs, one will perceive that for the most part the external or internal resemblance of the surrounding has prompted the collector to place the one proverb in this place and the other in that place (not always indeed; for what reason *e.g.* could determine

the position of xvi. 25 and xix. 5, 9, I cannot say); then that the proverb standing earlier is generally, to all appearance, also the earlier formed, for the second of the pair is mostly a synonymous distich, which generally further extends antithetically one line of the first: cf. xviii. 11 with x. 15, xx. 10, 23 with xi. 1, xx. 19 with xi. 13, xvi. 5 with xi. 21, xx. 2 with xix. 12, also xvii. 5 with xiv. 31, where from an antithetic proverb a synthetic one is formed; but here also there are exceptions, as xiii. 2 compared with xii. 14, and xv. 33 with xviii. 12, where the same line is in the first case connected with a synonymous, and in the second with an antithetic proverb; but here also the contrast is so loose, that the earlier-occurring proverb has the appearance of priority.

We now direct our attention to the second collection, xxv.-xxix. When we compare the proverbs found here with one another, we see among them a disproportionately smaller number of repetitions than in the other collection; only a single entire proverb is repeated in almost similar terms, but in an altered sense, xxix. 20 = xxvi. 12; but proverbs such as xxviii. 12, 28, xxix. 2, notwithstanding the partial resemblance, are equally original. On the other hand, in this second collection we find numerous repetitions of proverbs and portions of proverbs from the first:—(1) Whole proverbs perfectly identical (leaving out of view insignificant variations): xxv. 24 = xxi. 9, xxvi. 22 = xviii. 8, xxvii. 12 = xxii. 3, xxvii. 13 = xx. 16;—(2) proverbs identical in meaning, with somewhat changed expression: xxvi. 13 = xxii. 13, xxvi. 15 = xix. 24, xxviii. 6 = xix. 1, xxviii. 19 = xii. 11, xxix. 13 = xxii. 2;—(3) proverbs with one line the same and one line different: xxvii. 21 = xvii. 3, xxix. 22 = xv. 18; cf. also xxvii. 15 with xix. 13. When we compare these proverbs with one another, we are uncertain as to many of them which has the priority, as *e.g.* xxvii. 21 = xvii. 3, xxix. 22 = xv. 18; but in the case of others there is no doubt that the Hezekiah-collection contains the original form of the proverb which is found in the other collection, as xxvi. 13, xxviii. 6, 19, xxix. 13, xxvii. 15, in relation to their parallels. In the other portions of this book also we find such repetitions as are met with in these two collections of Solomonic proverbs. In i. 7-ix. we have ii. 16, a little changed, repeated in vii. 5, and iii. 15 in viii. 11; ix. 10a = i. 7a is a case not worthy of being mentioned, and it were inappropriate here to refer to ix. 4, 16. In the first appendix of "the Words of the Wise," xxii. 17-xxiv. 22, single lines often repeat themselves in another con-

nection ; cf. xxiii. 3 and 6, xxiii. 10 and xxii. 28, xxiii. 17 f. and xxiv. 13 f., xxii. 23 and xxiii. 11, xxiii. 17 and xxiv. 1. That in such cases the one proverb is often the pattern of the other, is placed beyond a doubt by the relation of xxiv. 19 to Ps. xxxvii. 1 ; cf. also xxiv. 20 with Ps. xxxvii. 38. If here there are proverbs like those of Solomon in their expression, the presumption is that the priority belongs to the latter, as xxiii. 27 cf. xxii. 14, xxiv. 5 f. cf. xi. 14, xxiv. 19 f. cf. xiii. 9, in which latter case the justice of the presumption is palpable. Within the second appendix of "the Words of the Wise," xxiv. 23 ff., no repetitions are to be expected on account of its shortness ; yet is xxiv. 23 repeated from the Solomonic Mashal xxviii. 21, and as xxiv. 33 f. are literally the same as vi. 10 f., the priority is presumably on the side of the author of i. 7-ix., at least of the Mashal in the form in which he communicates it. The supplements xxx. and xxxi. afford nothing that is worth mention as bearing on our present inquiry,<sup>1</sup> and we may therefore now turn to the question, What insight into the origin of these proverbs and their collection do the observations made afford ?

From the numerous repetitions of proverbs and portions of proverbs of the first collection of the "Proverbs of Solomon" in the Hezekiah-collection, as well as from another reason stated at the end of the foregoing section of our inquiry, we conclude that the two collections were by different authors ; in other words, that they had not both "the men of Hezekiah" for their authors. It is true that the repetitions in themselves do not prove anything against the oneness of their authorship ; for there are within the several collections, and even within i.-ix. (cf. vi. 20 with i. 8, viii.

<sup>1</sup> Quite the same phenomenon, Fleischer remarks, presents itself in the different collections of proverbs ascribed to the Caliph Ali, where frequently one and the same thought in one collection is repeated in manifold forms in a second, here in a shorter, there in a longer form. As a general principle this is to be borne in mind, that the East transmits unchanged, with scrupulous exactness, only religious writings regarded as holy and divine, and therefore these Proverbs have been transmitted unchanged only since they became a distinct part of the canon ; before that time it happened to them, as to all in the East that is exposed to the arbitrariness of the changing spirit and the intercourse of life, that one and the same original text has been modified by one speaker and writer after another. Thus of the famous poetical works of the East, such e.g. as Firdusi's *Schah-Nameh* [*Book of the Kings*] and Sadi's *Garden of Roses*, not one MS. copy agrees with another.

10 f. with iii. 14 f.), repetitions, notwithstanding the oneness of their authorship. But if two collections of proverbs are in so many various ways different in their character, as x. 1-xxii. 16 and xxv.-xxix., then the previous probability rises almost to a certainty by such repetitions. From the form, for the most part anomalous, in which the Hezekiah-collection presents the proverbs and portions of proverbs which are found also in the first collection, and from their being otherwise independent, we further conclude that "the men of Hezekiah" did not borrow from the first collection, but formed it from other sources. But since one does not understand why "the men of Hezekiah" should have omitted so great a number of genuine Solomonic proverbs which remain, after deducting the proportionally few that have been repeated (for this omission is not to be explained by saying that they selected those that were appropriate and wholesome for their time), we are further justified in the conclusion that the other collection was known to them as one current in their time. Their object was, indeed, not to supplement this older collection; they rather regarded their undertaking as a similar people's book, which they wished to place side by side with that collection without making it superfluous. The difference of the selection in the two collections has its whole directing occasion in the difference of the intention. The first collection begins (x. 1) with the proverb—

A wise son maketh glad his father,  
And a foolish son is the grief of his mother;

the second (xxv. 2) with the proverb—

It is the glory of God to conceal a thing,  
And the glory of kings to search out a matter.

The one collection is a book for youth, to whom it is dedicated in the extended introduction, i. 7-ix.; the second is a people's book suited to the time of Hezekiah ("Solomon's Wisdom in Hezekiah's days," as Stier has named it), and therefore it takes its start not, like the first, from the duties of the child, but from those of the king. If in the two collections everything does not stand in conscious relation to these different objects, yet the collectors at least have, from the commencement to the close (cf. xxii. 15 with xxix. 26), these objects before their eyes.

As to the *time* at which the first collection was made, the above considerations also afford us some materials for forming a judgment. Several pairs of proverbs which it contains present to us

essentially the same sayings in older and more recent forms. Keil regards the proverbs also that appear less original as old-Solomonic, and remarks that one and the same poet does not always give expression to the same thoughts with the same pregnant brevity and excellence, and affirms that changes and reproductions of separate proverbs may proceed even from Solomon himself. This is possible; but if we consider that even Davidic psalms have been imitated, and that in the "Words of the Wise" Solomonic proverbs are imitated,—moreover, that proverbs especially are subject to changes, and invite to imitation and transformation,—we shall find it to be improbable. Rather we would suppose, that between the publication of the 3000 proverbs of Solomon and the preparation of the collection x.—xxii. 16 a considerable time elapsed, during which the old-Solomonic *Mashal* had in the mouths of the people and of poets acquired a multitude of accretions, and that the collector had without hesitation gathered together such indirect Solomonic proverbs with those that were directly Solomonic. But did not then the 3000 Solomonic proverbs afford to him scope enough? We must answer this question in the negative; for if that vast number of Solomonic proverbs was equal in moral-religious worth to those that have been preserved to us, then neither the many repetitions within the first collection nor the proportional poverty of the second can be explained. The "men of Hezekiah" made their collection of Solomonic proverbs nearly 300 years after Solomon's time; but there is no reason to suppose that the old book of the Proverbs of Solomon had disappeared at that time. Much rather we may with probability conclude, from the subjects to which several proverbs of these collections extend (husbandry, war, court life, etc.), and from Solomon's love for the manifold forms of natural and of social life, that his 3000 proverbs would not have afforded much greater treasures than these before us. But if the first collection was made at a time in which the old-Solomonic proverbs had been already considerably multiplied by new combinations, accretions, and imitations, then probably a more suitable time for their origination could not be than that of Jehoshaphat, which was more related to the time of Solomon than to that of David. The personality of Jehoshaphat, inclined toward the promotion of the public worship of God, the edification of the people, the administration of justice; the dominion of the house of David recognised and venerated far and wide among neighbouring

peoples ; the tendencies of that time towards intercourse with distant regions ; the deep peace which followed the subjugation of the confederated nations,—all these are features which stamped the time of Jehoshaphat as a copy of that of Solomon. Hence we are to expect in it the fostering care of the *Chokma*. If the author of the introduction and editor of the older book of Proverbs lived after Solomon and before Hezekiah, then the circumstances of the case most suitably determine his time as at the beginning of the reign of Jehoshaphat, some seventy years after Solomon's death. If in i.-ix. it is frequently said that wisdom was seen openly in the streets and ways, this agrees with 2 Chron. xvii. 7-9, where it is said that princes, priests, and Levites, sent out by Jehoshaphat (compare the Carolingian *missi*), went forth into the towns of Judah with the book of the law in their hands as teachers of the people, and with 2 Chron. xix. 4, where it is stated that Jehoshaphat himself "went out through the people from Beer-sheba to Mount Ephraim, and brought them back unto the Lord God of their fathers." We have an evidence of the fondness for allegorical forms of address at that time in 2 Kings xiv. 8-11 (2 Chron. xxv. 17-21), which is so far favourable to the idea that the allegorizing author of i.-ix. belonged to that epoch of history.

This also agrees with the time of Jehoshaphat, that in the first collection the kingdom appears in its bright side, adorned with righteousness (xiv. 35, xvi. 10, 12, 13, xx. 8), wisdom (xx. 26), grace and truth (xx. 28), love to the good (xxii. 11), divine guidance (xxi. 1), and in the height of power (xvi. 14, 15, xix. 12) ; while in the second collection, which immediately begins with a series of the king's sayings, the kingdom is seen almost only (with exception of xxix. 14) on its dark side, and is represented under the destructive dominion of tyranny (xxviii. 15, 16, xxix. 2), of oppressive taxation (xxix. 4), of the Camarilla (xxv. 5, xxix. 12), and of multiplied authorities (xxviii. 2). Elster is right when he remarks, that in x.-xxii. 16 the kingdom in its actual state corresponds to its ideal, and the warning against the abuse of royal power lies remote. If these proverbs more distinguishably than those in xxv.-xxix. bear the physiognomy of the time of David and Solomon, so, on the other hand, the time of Jehoshaphat, the son and successor of Asa, is favourable to their collection ; while in the time of Hezekiah, the son and successor of Ahaz, and father and predecessor of Manasseh, in which, through the sin of Ahaz, negotiations with the world-

kingdom began, that cloudy aspect of the kingdom which is borne by the second supplement, xxiv. 23-25, was brought near.

Thus between Solomon and Hezekiah, and probably under Jehoshaphat, the older Book of Proverbs contained in i.-xxiv. 22 first appeared. The "Proverbs of Solomon," x. 1-xxii. 16, which formed the principal part, the very kernel of it, were enclosed on the one side, at their commencement, by the lengthened introduction i. 7-ix., in which the collector announces himself as a highly gifted teacher and as the instrument of the Spirit of revelation, and on the other side are shut in at their close by "the Words of the Wise," xxii. 17-xxiv. 34. The author, indeed, does not announce i. 6 such a supplement of "the Words of the Wise;" but after these words in the title of the book, he leads us to expect it. The introduction to the supplement xxii. 17-21 sounds like an echo of the larger introduction, and corresponds to the smaller compass of the supplement. The work bears on the whole the stamp of a unity; for even in the last proverb with which it closes (xxiv. 21 f., "My son, fear thou Jahve and the king," etc.), there still sounds the same key-note which the author had struck at the commencement. A later collector, belonging to the time subsequent to Hezekiah, enlarged the work by the addition of the Hezekiah-portion, and by a short supplement of "the Words of the Wise," which he introduces, according to the law of analogy, after xxii. 17-xxiv. 22. The harmony of the superscriptions xxiv. 23, xxv. 1, favours at least the supposition that these supplements are the work of one hand. The circumstance that "the Words of the Wise," xxii. 17-xxiv. 22, in two of their maxims refer to the older collection of Solomonic proverbs, but, on the contrary, that "the Words of the Wise," xxiv. 23 ff., refer in xxiv. 23 to the Hezekiah-collection, and in xxiv. 33 f. to the introduction i. 7-ix., strengthens the supposition that with xxiv. 23 a second half of the book, added by another hand, begins. There is no reason for not attributing the appendix xxx.-xxxi. to this second collector; perhaps he seeks, as already remarked above, to render by means of it the conclusion of the extended Book of Proverbs uniform with that of the older book. Like the older collection of "Proverbs of Solomon," so also now the Hezekiah-collection has "Proverbs of the Wise" on the right and on the left, and the king of proverbial poetry stands in the midst of a worthy retinue. The second collector distinguishes himself from the first by this, that he never

professes himself to be a proverbial poet. It is possible that the proverbial poem of the "virtuous woman," xxxi. 10 ff., may be his work, but there is nothing to substantiate this opinion.

After this digression, into which we have been led by the repetitions found in the book, we now return, conformably to our plan, to examine it from the point of view of the forms of its language and of its doctrinal contents, and to inquire whether the results hitherto attained are confirmed, and perhaps more fully determined, by this further investigation.

4. *The Book of the Proverbs on the side of its manifoldness of style and form of instruction.*—We commence our inquiry with the relation in which x.–xxii. 16 and xxv.–xxix. stand to each other with reference to their forms of language. If the primary stock of both of these sections belongs indeed to the old time of Solomon, then they must bear essentially the same verbal stamp upon them. Here we of course keep out of view the proverbs that are wholly or partially identical. If the expression חֲרֵי־בֵטֶן (the chambers of the body) is in the first collection a favourite figure (xviii. 8, xx. 27, 30), coined perhaps by Solomon himself, the fact that this figure is also found in xxvi. 22 is not to be taken into account, since in xxvi. 22 the proverb xviii. 8 is repeated. Now it cannot at all be denied, that in the first collection certain expressions are met with which one might expect to meet again in the Hezekiah-collection, and which, notwithstanding, are not to be found in it. Ewald gives a list of such expressions, in order to show that the old-Solomonic dialect occurs, with few exceptions, only in the first collection. But his catalogue, when closely inspected, is unsatisfactory. That many of these expressions occur also in the introduction i. 1–ix. proves, it is true, nothing against him. But מִרְפָּא (health), xii. 18, xiii. 17, xiv. 30, xv. 4, xvi. 24, occurs also in xxix. 1; רָדַף (he pursueth), xi. 19, xii. 11, xv. 9, xix. 7, also in xxviii. 19; נִרְנָן (a tattler), xvi. 28, xviii. 8, also in xxvi. 20, 22; לֹא יִנָּקָה (not go unpunished), xi. 21, xvi. 5, xvii. 5, also in xxviii. 20. These expressions thus supply an argument for, not against, the linguistic oneness of the two collections. The list of expressions common to the two collections might be considerably increased, e.g.: נִפְרָע (are unruly), xxix. 18, Kal xiii. 18, xv. 32; מְרַחֵץ (he that hastens), xix. 2, xxi. 5, xxviii. 20, xxix. 19; מְרִיבִים (of contentions), xxi. 9 (xxv. 24), xxi. 19, xxiii. 29, xxvi. 21, xxvii.

25. If it may be regarded as a striking fact that the figures of speech *מְקוֹר חַיִּים* (a fountain of life), x. 11, xiii. 14, xiv. 27, xvi. 22, and *עֵץ חַיִּים* (a tree of life), xi. 30, xiii. 12, xv. 4, as also the expressions *מַחֲרָה* (destruction), x. 14, 15, xiii. 3, xiv. 28, xviii. 7, x. 29, xxi. 15, *יִפֹּת* (he uttereth), xii. 17, xiv. 5, 25, xix. 5, 9; *סָלַף* (perverteth), xiii. 6, xix. 3, xxi. 12, xxii. 12, and *סָלְף* (perverseness), xi. 3, xv. 4, are only to be found in the first collection, and not in that by the "men of Hezekiah," it is not a decisive evidence against the oneness of the origin of the proverbs in both collections. The fact also, properly brought forward by Ewald, that proverbs which begin with *שֵׁן* (there is),—*e.g.* xi. 24, "There is that scattereth, and yet increaseth still,"—are exclusively found in the first collection, need not perplex us; it is one peculiar kind of proverbs which the author of this collection has by preference gathered together, as he has also omitted all parabolic proverbs except these two, x. 26, xi. 22. If proverbs beginning with *וַ* are found only in the first, so on the other hand the parabolic *Vav* and the proverbial perfect, reporting as it were an experience (cf. in the second collection, besides xxvi. 13, xxvii. 12, xxix. 13, also xxviii. 1, xxix. 9), for which Döderlein<sup>1</sup> has invented the expression *aoristus gnomicus*,<sup>2</sup> are common to both sentences. Another remark of Ewald's (*Jahrb.* xi. 28), that extended proverbs with *שֵׁן* are exclusively found in the Hezekiah-collection (xxix. 9, 3, xxv. 18, 28), is not fully established; in xvi. 27–29 three proverbs with *שֵׁן* are found together, and in xx. 6 as well as in xxix. 9 *שֵׁן* occurs twice in one proverb. Rather it strikes us that the article, not merely the punctatorially syncopated, but that expressed by *ה*, occurs only twice in the first collection, in xx. 1, xxi. 31; oftener in the second, xxvi. 14, 18, xxvii. 19, 20, 22. Since, however, the first does not wholly omit the article, this also cannot determine us to reject the linguistic unity of the second collection with the first, at least according to their primary stock.

But also what of the linguistic unity of i. 1–ix. with both of these, maintained by Keil? It is true, and merits all consideration, that a unity of language and of conception between i. 1–ix. and x.–xxii. 16 which far exceeds the degree of unity between x.–xxii. 16 and xxv.–xxix. may be proved. The introduction is bound with the

<sup>1</sup> *Reden u. Auf:ätze*, ii. 316.

<sup>2</sup> A similar thing is found among German proverbs, *e.g.*: *Wer nicht mitsass, auch nicht mitass* (Whoso sat not, ate not).

first collection in the closest manner by the same use of such expressions as אָנַר (gathereth), vi. 8, x. 5; אִישׁוֹן (the middle, *i.e.* of the night, deep darkness), vii. 9, xx. 20; אַחֲרִית (the end), v. 4, xxiii. 18, xxiv. 14; אֶכְזָרִי (fierce), v. 9, xvii. 11; בִּינָה (understanding), i. 2, xvi. 16; תְּבוּנָה (understanding), ii. 6, iii. 19, xxi. 30; זָרָה (an adulteress), v. 3, xxii. 14, xxiii. 33; חָסֵר לֵב (lacking understanding), vi. 32, vii. 7, xii. 11; יוֹסֵף לָמַד (will increase learning), i. 5, ix. 9, xvi. 21, 23; יָפִיחַ (uttereth), vi. 19, xiv. 5, xix. 5, 9; נָלוֹז (perverted), iii. 32, xiv. 2; מְדַנִּים (contention), vi. 14, 19, x. 12; מְרַפָּא (health), iv. 22, xii. 18, xiii. 17, xvi. 24 (deliverance, xxix. 1); נִפְחָ (are plucked up), ii. 22, xv. 25; הֵעִזָּה (shall not be unpunished), vi. 29, xi. 21, xvi. 5; הֵעִזָּה (strengthened, *i.e.* the face), vii. 13, xxi. 29; עֵץ חַיִּים (tree of life), iii. 18, xi. 30, xiii. 12, xv. 4; עָרַב (becometh surety) and תִּקַּע (strikereth hands) occurring together, vi. 1, xvii. 18, xxii. 26; פְּתִימִים and פְּתָאִים (simplicity, folly), i. 22, 32, viii. 5, ix. 6, xxiii. 3; קָרַץ (to wink with the eyes), vi. 13, x. 10; קָרַת (a city), viii. 3, ix. 3, 14, xi. 11; רֵאשִׁית (the beginning), i. 7, xvii. 14; שֶׁכֶּל טוֹב (good understanding), iii. 4, xiii. 15; יִשְׁכְּנוּ-אֶרֶץ (shall dwell in the land), ii. 21, x. 30; שְׁלַח מָרוֹן (sendeth forth strife), vi. 14, xvi. 28; תִּהְפְּכוֹת (evil words), ii. 12, vi. 14, x. 31, xvi. 28; תוֹרָה (instruction), i. 8, iii. 1, iv. 2, vii. 2, xiii. 14; תוֹשִׁיָּה (counsel), iii. 21, viii. 14, xviii. 1; תַּחְבּוּלוֹת (prudent measures), i. 5, xx. 18, xxiv. 6;—and these are not the only points of contact between the two portions which an attentive reader will meet with. This relation of i. 1–ix. 18 to x.–xxii. 16 is a strong proof of the internal unity of that portion, which Bertheau has called in question. But are we therefore to conclude, with Keil, that the introduction is not less of the old time of Solomon than x.–xxii. 16? Such a conclusion lies near, but we do not yet reach it. For with these points of contact there are not a few expressions exclusively peculiar to the introduction;—the expressions מְזֻמָּה sing. (counsel), i. 4, iii. 21; עֲרָמָה (prudence), i. 4, viii. 5, 12; מְלִיצָה (an enigma, obscure maxim), i. 6; מַעְגָּל (a path of life), ii. 9, iv. 11, 26; מַעְגָּלָה, ii. 15, 18, v. 6, 21; אִישׁוֹן (the apple of the eye), vii. 2, 9; גִּרְגְרוֹת (the throat), i. 9, iii. 3, 22; the verbs אָתָה (cometh), i. 27, פָּלַם (make level or plain), iv. 26, v. 6, 21, and שָׁטָה (deviate), iv. 15, vii. 25. Peculiar to this section is the heaping together of synonyms in close connection, as “congregation” and “assembly,” v. 14, “lovely hind” and “pleasant roe,” v. 19; cf. v. 11, vi. 7, vii. 9, viii. 13, 31. This usage is,

however, only a feature in the characteristic style of this section altogether different from that of x. 1-xxii. 16, as well as from that of xxv.-xxix., of its disjointed diffuse form, delighting in repetitions, abounding in synonymous parallelism, even to a repetition of the same words (cf. *e.g.* vi. 2), which, since the linguistic and the poetic forms are here inseparable, we have already spoken of in the second part of our introductory dissertation. This fundamental diversity in the whole condition of the section, notwithstanding those numerous points of resemblance, demands for i. 1-ix. an altogether different author from Solomon, and one who is more recent. If we hold by this view, then these points of resemblance between the sections find the most satisfactory explanation. The gifted author of the introduction (i. 1-ix.) has formed his style, without being an altogether slavish imitator, on the Solomonic proverbs. And why, then, are his parallels confined almost exclusively to the section x. 1-xxii. 16, and do not extend to xxv.-xxix.? Because he edited the former and not the latter, and took pleasure particularly in the proverbs which he placed together, x. 1-xxii. 16. Not only are expressions of this section, formed by himself, echoed in his poetry, but the latter are for the most part formed out of germs supplied by the former. One may regard xix. 27, cf. xxvii. 11, as the germ of the admonitory addresses to the son. and xiv. 1 as the occasion of the allegory of the wise and the foolish woman, ix. Generally, the poetry of this writer has its hidden roots in the older writings. Who does not hear, to mention only one thing, in i. 7-ix. an echo of the old שָׁמַע (hear), Deut. vi. 4-9, cf. xi. 18-21? The whole poetry of this writer savours of the Book of Deuteronomy. The admonitory addresses i. 7-ix. are to the Book of Proverbs what Deuteronomy is to the Pentateuch. As Deuteronomy seeks to bring home and seal upon the heart of the people the תּוֹרָה of the Mosaic law, so do they the תּוֹרָה of the Solomonic proverbs.

We now further inquire whether, in the style of the two supplements, xxii. 17-xxiv. 22 and xxiv. 23 ff., it is proved that the former concludes the Book of Proverbs edited by the author of the general introduction, and that the latter was added by a different author at the same time with the Hezekiah-collection. Bertheau places both supplements together, and attributes the introduction to them, xxii. 17-21, to the author of the general introduction, i. 7-ix. From the fact that in ver. 19 of this lesser introduction ("I have taught

thee, אַתָּה-אַתָּה, even thee") the pronoun is as emphatically repeated as in xxiii. 15 (לִבִּי גַם-אֲנִי), cf. xxiii. 14, 19), and that נָעִים (sweet), xxii. 18, also occurs in the following proverbs, xxiii. 8, xxiv. 4, I see no ground for denying it to the author of the larger general introduction, since, according to Bertheau's own just observation, the linguistic form of the whole collection of proverbs has an influence on the introduction of the collector; with more justice from שְׂלֵישִׁים, xxii. 20 [only in *Keri*], as the title of honour given to the collection of proverbs, compared with נְגִידִים, viii. 6, may we argue for the identity of the authorship of both introductions. As little can the contemporaneousness of the two supplements be shown from the use of the pronoun, xxiv. 32, the שֵׁית לִבִּי (*animum advertere*, xxiv. 32), and יִנָּעַם (shall be delight) xxiv. 25, for these verbal points of contact, if they proved anything, would prove too much: not only the contemporaneousness of the two supplements, but also the identity of their authorship; but in this case one does not see what the superscription גַּם-אֵלֶּה לְחֻכְמִים (these also of the wise men), separating them, means. Moreover, xxiv. 33 f. are from vi. 10 f., and nearer than the comparison of the first supplement lies the comparison of יִנָּעַם with ii. 10, ix. 17, אָדָם חָסֵר לֵב (a man lacking understanding) with xvii. 18, יִעָמְדוּ with xxii. 14,—points of contact which, if an explanatory reason is needed, may be accounted for from the circumstance that to the author or authors of the proverbs xxiv. 23 ff. the Book of Proverbs i. 1–xxiv. 22 may have been perfectly familiar. From imitation also the points of contact of xxii. 17–xxiv. 22 may easily be explained; for not merely the lesser introduction, the proverbs themselves also in part strikingly agree with the prevailing language of i. 1–ix.: cf. אֲשֶׁר בִּדְרֹךְ (go straight forward in the way), xxiii. 19, with iv. 14; חֻכְמוֹת (wisdom), xxiv. 7, with i. 20, ix. 1; and several others. But if, according to i. 7, we conceive of the older Book of Proverbs as accompanied with, rather than as without דְּבָרֵי חֻכְמִים (words of wise men), then from the similarity of the two superscriptions xxiv. 23, xxv. 1, it is probable that the more recent half of the canonical book begins with xxiv. 23, and we cannot therefore determine to regard xxiv. 23 ff. also as a component part of the older Book of Proverbs; particularly since xxiv. 23b is like xxviii. 21a, and the author of the introduction can scarcely have twice taken into his book the two verses xxiv. 33 f., which moreover seem to stand in their original connection at vi. 10f.

The supplements to the Hezekiah-collection, xxx. f., are of so peculiar a form, that it will occur to no one (leaving out of view such expressions as דַּעַת קְדֻשִׁים, knowledge of the Holy, xxx. 3, cf. ix. 10) to ascribe them to one of the authors of the preceding proverbs. We content ourselves here with a reference to Mühlau's work, *De Proverbiorum quæ dicuntur Aguri et Lemuelis origine atque indole*, 1869, where the Aramaic-Arabic colouring of this in all probability foreign section is closely investigated.

Having thus abundantly proved that the two groups of proverbs bearing the inscription מִשְׁלֵי שְׁכֵמָה are, as to their primary stock, truly old-Solomonic, though not without an admixture of imitations; that, on the contrary, the introduction, i. 7-ix., as well as the רִבְרֵי חֲכָמִים, xxii. 17-xxiv. and xxx. f., are not at all old-Solomonic, but belong to the editor of the older Book of Proverbs, which reaches down to xxiv. 22, so that thus the present book of the poetry of Solomon contains united with it the poems of the older editor, and besides of other poets, partly unknown Israelites, and partly two foreigners particularly named, Agur and Lemuel; we now turn our attention to the DOCTRINAL CONTENTS of the work, and ask whether a manifoldness in the type of instruction is noticeable in it, and whether there is perceptible in this manifoldness a progressive development. It may be possible that the Proverbs of Solomon, the Words of the Wise, and the Proverbial poetry of the editor, as they represent three eras, so also represent three different stages in the development of proverbial poetry. However, the Words of the Wise xxii. 17-xxiv. are so internally related to the Proverbs of Solomon, that even the sharpest eye will discover in them not more than the evening twilight of the vanishing Solomonic Mashal. There thus remain on the one side only the Proverbs of Solomon with their echo in the Words of the Wise, on the other the Proverbial Poems of the editor; and these present themselves as monuments of two sharply defined epochs in the progressive development of the Mashal.

The common fundamental character of the book in all its parts is rightly defined when we call it a Book of Wisdom. Indeed, with the Church Fathers not only the Book of Sirach and the Solomonic Apocrypha, but also this Book of Proverbs bears this title, which seems also to have been in use among the Jews, since Melito of Sardes adds to the title "Proverbs of Solomon," ἡ καὶ Σοφία; since, moreover, Eusebius (*H. E.* iv. 22) affirms, that not only Hege-

sippus and Irenæus, but the whole of the ancients, called the Proverbs of Solomon Πανάρετος Σοφία.<sup>1</sup> It is also worthy of observation that it is called by Dionysius of Alexandria ἡ σοφὴ βιβλος, and by Gregory of Nazianzum ἡ παιδαγωγικὴ σοφία. These names not only express praise of the book, but they also denote at the same time the circle of human intellectual activity from which it emanated. As the books of prophecy are a product of the נְבִיאִים, so the Book of the Proverbs is a product of the חֲכָמִים, σοφία, the human effort to apprehend the objective σοφία, and thus of φιλοσοφία, or the *studium sapientiæ*. It has emanated from the love of wisdom, to incite to the love of wisdom, and to put into the possession of that which is the object of love—for this end it was written. We need not hesitate, in view of Col. ii. 8, to call the Book of Proverbs a “philosophical” treatise, since the origin of the name φιλοσοφία is altogether noble: it expresses the relativity of human knowledge as over against the absoluteness of the divine knowledge, and the possibility of an endlessly progressive advancement of the human toward the divine. The characteristic ideas of a dialectic development of thought and of the formation of a scientific system did not primarily appertain to it—the occasion for this was not present to the Israelitish people: it required fructification through the Japhetic spirit to produce philosophers such as Philo, Maimonides, and Spinoza. But philosophy is everywhere present when the natural, moral, positive, is made the object of a meditation which seeks to apprehend its last ground, its legitimate coherence, its true essence and aim. In this view C. B. Michaelis, in his *Adnotationes uberiores in Hagiographa*, passes from the exposition of the Psalms to that of the Proverbs with the words, “From David’s closet, consecrated to prayer, we now pass into Solomon’s school of wisdom, to admire the greatest of philosophers in the son of the greatest of theologians.”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This name [meaning “wisdom, including all virtue”], there are many things to show, was common in Palestine. The Jerusalem Talmud, in a passage quoted by Krochmal, *Kerem Chemed*, v. 79, divides the canon into תורה, נבואה, and חכמה. Rashi, in *Baba bathra*, 14b, calls Mishle (Proverbs) and Koheleth (Ecclesiastes) ספרי חכמה. The Book of Koheleth is called (*b. Megilla*, 7a), according to its contents, חכמתו של שלמה. The Song bears in the Syriac version (the Peshito) the inscription *chekmetho dechekmetho*.

<sup>2</sup> “In hoc genere,” says Lord Bacon, *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, viii. 2, “nihil invenitur, quod ullo modo comparandum sit cum aphorismis illis, quos edidit rex Salomon, de quo testatur Scriptura, cor illi fuisse instar arenæ maris.

When we give the name *φιλοσοφία* to the tendency of mind to which the Book of Proverbs belongs, we do not merely use a current scientific word, but there is an actual internal relation of the Book of Proverbs to that which is the essence of philosophy, which Scripture recognises (Acts xvii. 27, cf. Rom. i. 19 f.) as existing within the domain of heathendom, and which stamps it as a natural product of the human spirit, which never can be wanting where a human being or a people rises to higher self-consciousness, and begins to reflect on the immediate self-consciousness and its operations in their changing relation to the phenomena of the external world. The mysteries of the world without him and of the world within him give man no rest, he must seek to solve them; and whenever he does that, he philosophizes, *i.e.* he strives after a knowledge of the nature of things, and of the laws which govern them in the world of phenomena and of events; on which account also Josephus, referring to Solomon's knowledge of nature, says (*Ant.* viii. 2. 5), οὐδεμίαν τούτων φύσιν ἠγνόησεν οὐδὲ παρήλθεν ἀνεξέταστον ἀλλ' ἐν πάσαις ἐφιλοσόφησεν. Cf. Irenæus, *Cont. Her.* iv. 27. 1: *eam quæ est in conditione (κτίσει) sapientiam Dei exponebat physiologice.*

The historical books show us how much the age of Solomon favoured philosophical inquiries by its prosperity and peace, its active and manifold commercial intercourse with foreign nations, its circle of vision extending to Tarshish and Ophir, and also how Solomon himself attained to an unequalled elevation in the extent of his human and secular knowledge. We also read of some of the wise men in 1 Kings v. 11, cf. Ps. lxxxviii. lxxxix., who adorned the court of the wisest of kings; and the *לְשׁוֹן חָכָם*, which became, through his influence, a special branch of Jewish literature, is the peculiar poetic form of the *חֵכֶם*. Therefore in the Book of Proverbs we find the name *חֵכֶם חָכָם* (words of the wise) used for *מִשְׁלֵי* (proverbs); and by a careful consideration of all the proverbs in which mention is made of the *חֵכֶם*, one will convince

Sicut enim arenæ maris universas orbis oras circumdant, ita et sapientia ejus omnia humana non minus quam divina complexa est. In aphorismis vero illis præter alia magis theologica reperies liquido haud pauca præcepta et monita civilia præstantissima, ex profundis quidem sapientiæ penetralibus scaturientia atque in amplissimum varietatis campum excurrentia." Accordingly, in the same work Bacon calls the Proverbs of Solomon "insignes parabolas s. aphorismos de divina atque morali philosophia."

himself that this name has not merely a common ethical sense, but begins to be the name of those who made wisdom, *i.e.* the knowledge of things in the depths of their essence, their special lifework, and who connected themselves together in oneness of sentiment and fellowship into a particular circle within the community. To this conclusion we are conducted by such proverbs as xiii. 20—

He that walketh with wise men becomes wise,  
And whoever has intercourse with fools is destroyed ;

xv. 12—

The scorner loveth not that one reprove him :  
To wise men he goeth not ;—

and by the contrast, which prevails in the Book of Proverbs, between *לֵצַל* (mockers) and *חֲכָמִים* (wise), in which we see that, at the same time with the striving after wisdom, scepticism also, which we call free thought, obtained a great ascendancy in Israel. Mockery of religion, rejection of God in principle and practice, a casting away of all fear of Jahve, and in general of all *δαιμονία*, were in Israel phenomena which had already marked the times of David. One may see from the Psalms that the community of the Davidic era is to be by no means regarded as furnishing a pattern of religious life : that there were in it *גוֹיִם* (Gentile nations) which were in no way externally inferior to them, and that it did not want for rejecters of God. But it is natural to expect that in the Solomonic era, which was more than any other exposed to the dangers of sensuality and worldliness, and of religious indifference and free-thinking latitudinarianism, the number of the *לֵצִים* increased, and that scepticism and mockery became more intensified. The Solomonic era appears to have first coined the name of *לֵצַל* for those men who despised that which was holy, and in doing so laid claim to wisdom (xiv. 6), who caused contention and bitterness when they spake, and carefully avoided the society of the *חֲכָמִים*, because they thought themselves above their admonitions (xv. 12). For in the psalms of the Davidic time the word *נָבֵל* is commonly used for them (it occurs in the Proverbs only in xvii. 21, with the general meaning of low fellow, Germ. *Bube*), and the name *לֵצַל* is never met with except once, in Ps. i. 1, which belongs to the post-Davidic era. One of the Solomonic proverbs (xxi. 24) furnishes a definite idea of this newly formed word :

An inflated arrogant man they call a scorner (*לֵצַל*),  
One who acts in the superfluity of haughtiness.

By the self-sufficiency of his ungodly thoughts and actions he is distinguished from the פְּתִי (simple), who is only misled, and may therefore be reclaimed, xix. 25, xxi. 11; by his non-recognition of the Holy in opposition to a better knowledge and better means and opportunities, he is distinguished from the בְּסִיל (foolish, stupid), xvii. 16, the אָוִיל (foolish, wicked), i. 7, vii. 22, and the חֶסֶר לֵב (the void of understanding), vi. 32, who despise truth and instruction from want of understanding, narrowness, and forgetfulness of God, but not from perverse principle. This name specially coined, the definition of it given (cf. also the similarly defining proverb xxiv. 8), and in general the rich and fine technical proverbs in relation to the manifold kinds of wisdom (בִּינָה, xvi. 16; מוֹסֵר, i. 8; תְּבוּנוֹת, xxi. 30; מְנוּמוֹת, v. 2; תְּחִבּוּלוֹת, i. 5, xii. 5; the תוֹשִׁיעָה first coined by the Chokma, etc.), of instruction in wisdom (לָקַח, i. 5; תוֹרָה, iv. 2, vi. 23; רָעָה, to tend a flock, to instruct, x. 21; חֲנֹךְ, xxii. 6; הוֹדִיחַ, xv. 12; לָקַח נַפְשׁוֹת, to win souls, vi. 25, xi. 30), of the wise men themselves (חֲכָמִים, xii. 15; נָבוֹן, x. 13; מוֹכִיחַ, a reprover, preacher of repentance, xxv. 12, etc.), and of the different classes of men (among whom also אֲחֲרֵי אֲדָם, one who steps backwards [retrograder], xxviii. 23)—all this shows that חֲכָמָה was at that time not merely the designation of an ethical quality, but also the designation of a science rooted in the fear of God to which many noble men in Israel then addicted themselves. Jeremiah places (xviii. 18) the חֲכָם along with the כֹּהֵן (priest) and נְבִיא (prophet); and if Ezek. (vii. 26) uses זָקֵן (old man) instead of חֲכָם, yet by reference to Job xii. 12 this may be understood. In his "Dissertation on the popular and intellectual freedom of Israel from the time of the great prophets to the first destruction of Jerusalem" (*Jahrbücher*, i. 96 f.), Ewald says, "One can scarcely sufficiently conceive how high the attainment was which was reached in the pursuit after wisdom (philosophy) in the first centuries after David, and one too much overlooks the mighty influence it exerted on the entire development of the national life of Israel. The more closely those centuries are inquired into, the more are we astonished at the vast power which wisdom so early exerted on all sides as the common object of pursuit of many men among the people. It first openly manifested itself in special circles of the people, while in the age after Solomon, which was peculiarly favourable to it, eagerly inquisitive scholars gathered around individual masters, until ever increasing schools were formed. But its influence gradually pene-

trated all the other pursuits of the people, and operated on the most diverse departments of authorship." We are in entire sympathy with this historical view first advanced by Ewald, although we must frequently oppose the carrying of it out in details. The literature and the national history of Israel are certainly not understood if one does not take into consideration, along with the נְבוּאָה (prophecy), the influential development of the חֻכְמָה as a special aim and subject of intellectual activity in Israel.

And how was this *Chokma* conditioned—to what was it directed? To denote its condition and aim in one word, it was universalistic, or humanistic. Emanating from the fear or the religion of Jahve (יְהוָה, the way of the Lord, x. 29), but seeking to comprehend the spirit in the letter, the essence in the forms of the national life, its effort was directed towards the general truth affecting mankind as such. While prophecy, which is recognised by the *Chokma* as a spiritual power indispensable to a healthful development of a people (בְּאֵין חוֹזֵן יִפְרַע עִם, xxix. 18), is of service to the historical process into which divine truth enters to work out its results in Israel, and from thence outward among mankind, the *Chokma* seeks to look into the very essence of this truth through the robe of its historical and national manifestation, and then to comprehend those general ideas in which could already be discovered the fitness of the religion of Jahve for becoming the world-religion. From this aim towards the ideal in the historical, towards the everlasting same amid changes, the human (I intentionally use this word) in the Israelitish, the universal religion in the Jahve-religion (Jahvetum), and the universal morality in the Law, all the peculiarities of the Book of Proverbs are explained, as well as of the long, broad stream of the literature of the *Chokma*, beginning with Solomon, which, when the Palestinian Judaism assumed the rugged, exclusive, proud national character of Pharisaism, developed itself in Alexandrinism. Bertheau is amazed that in the Proverbs there are no warnings given against the worship of idols, which from the time of the kings gained more and more prevalence among the Israelitish people. "How is it to be explained," he asks (*Spr.* p. xlii.), "if the proverbs, in part at least, originated during the centuries of conflict between idolatry and the religion of Jahve, and if they were collected at a time in which this conflict reached its climax and stirred all ranks of the people—this conflict against the immorality of the Phœnician-Babylonian religion of nature, which must often have

led into the same region of the moral contemplation of the world over which this book moves?!" The explanation lies in this, that the *Chokma* took its stand-point in a height and depth in which it had the mingling waves of international life and culture under it and above it, without being internally moved thereby. It naturally did not approve of heathenism, it rather looked upon the fear of Jahve as the beginning of wisdom, and the seeking after Jahve as implying the possession of all knowledge (xxviii. 5, cf. 1 John ii. 20); but it passed over the struggle of prophecy against heathendom, it confined itself to its own function, viz. to raise the treasures of general religious-moral truth in the Jahve-religion, and to use them for the ennobling of the Israelites as men. In vain do we look for the name *יְהוָה* in the Proverbs, even the name *תּוֹרָה* has a much more flexible idea attached to it than that of the law written at Sinai (cf. xxviii. 4, xxix. 18 with xxviii. 7, xiii. 14, and similar passages); prayer and good works are placed above sacrifice, xv. 8, xxi. 3, 27, —practical obedience to the teaching of wisdom above all, xxviii. 9. The Proverbs refer with special interest to Gen. i. and ii., the beginnings of the world and of the human race before nations took their origin. On this primitive record in the book of Genesis, to speak only of the *מִשְׁלֵי שְׁלֹמֹה*, the figure of the tree of life (perhaps also of the fountain of life), found nowhere else in the Old Testament, leans; on it leans also the contrast, deeply pervading the Proverbs, between life (immortality, xii. 28) and death, or between that which is above and that which is beneath (xv. 24); on it also many other expressions, such, *e.g.*, as what is said in xx. 27 of the "spirit of man." This also, as Stier (*Der Weise ein König*, 1849, p. 240) has observed, accounts for the fact that *אֱדָם* occurs by far most frequently in the Book of Job and in the Solomonic writings. All these phenomena are explained from the general human universal aim of the *Chokma*.

When James (iii. 17) says that the "wisdom that is from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy," his words most excellently designate the nature and the contents of the discourse of wisdom in the Solomonic proverbs, and one is almost inclined to think that the apostolic brother of the Lord, when he delineates wisdom, has before his eyes the Book of the Proverbs, which raises to purity by the most impressive admonitions. Next to its admonitions to purity are those especially to

peacefulness, to gentle resignation (xiv. 30), quietness of mind (xiv. 33) and humility (xi. 2, xv. 33, xvi. 5, 18), to mercy (even toward beasts, xii. 10), to firmness and sincerity of conviction, to the furtherance of one's neighbour by means of wise discourse and kind help. What is done in the Book of Deuteronomy with reference to the law is continued here. As in Deuteronomy, so here, love is at the bottom of its admonitions, the love of God to men, and the love of men to one another in their diverse relations (xii. 2, xv. 9); the conception of  $\text{חֶסֶד}$  gives way to that of charity, of almsgiving ( $\text{δικαιοσύνη} = \text{ἐλεημοσύνη}$ ). Forgiving, suffering love (x. 12), love which does good even to enemies (xxv. 21 f.), rejoices not over the misfortune that befalls an enemy (xxiv. 17 f.), retaliates not (xxiv. 28 f.), but commits all to God (xx. 22),—love in its manifold forms, as that of husband and wife, of children, of friends,—is here recommended with New Testament distinctness and with deepest feeling. Living in the fear of God (xxviii. 14), the Omniscient (xv. 3, 11, xvi. 2, xxi. 2, xxiv. 11 f.), to whom as the final Cause all is referred (xx. 12, 24, xiv. 31, xxii. 2), and whose universal plan all must subserve (xvi. 4, xix. 21, xxi. 30), and on the other side active pure love to man—these are the hinges on which all the teachings of wisdom in the Proverbs turn. Frederick Schlegel, in the fourteenth of his *Lectures on the History of Literature*, distinguishes, not without deep truth, between the historico-prophetic books of the Old Testament, or books of the history of redemption, and the Book of Job, the Psalms, and the Solomonic writings, as books of aspiration, corresponding to the triple chord of faith, hope, charity as the three stages of the inner spiritual life. The Book of Job is designed to support faith amid trials; the Psalms breathe forth and exhibit hope amid the conflicts of earth's longings; the Solomonic writings reveal to us the mystery of the divine love, and the Proverbs that wisdom which grows out of and is itself eternal love. When Schlegel in the same lecture says that the books of the Old Covenant, for the most part, stand under the signature of the lion as the element of the power of will and spirited conflict glowing in divine fire, but that in the inmost hidden kernel and heart of the sacred book the Christian figure of the lamb rises up out of the veil of this lion strength, this may specially be said of the Book of Proverbs, for here that same heavenly wisdom preaches, which, when manifested in person, spake in the Sermon on the Mount, New Testament love in the midst of the Old Testament.

It is said that in the times before Christ there was a tendency to apocryphize not only the Song of Solomon and Ecclesiastes, but also the Book of Proverbs, and that for the first time the men of the Great Synagogue established their canonicity on the ground of their spiritual import; they became perplexed about the Proverbs, according to *b. Sabbath*, 30*b*, on account of such self-contradictory proverbs as xxvi. 4, 5, and according to *Aboth de-Rabbi Nathan*, c. 1, on account of such secular portions as that of the wanton woman, vii. But there is no need to allegorize this woman, and that self-contradiction is easily explained. The theopneustic character of the book and its claim to canonicity show themselves from its integral relation to the Old Testament preparation for redemption; but keeping out of view the book as a whole, it is self-evident that the conception of a practical proverb such as xiv. 4 and of a prophecy such as Isa. vii. 14 are very different phenomena of the spiritual life, and that in general the operation of the Divine Spirit in a proverb is different from that in a prophecy.

We have hitherto noted the character of the instruction set forth in the Proverbs according to the marks common to them in all their parts, but in such a way that we have taken our proofs only from the "Proverbs of Solomon" and the "Words of the Wise," with the exclusion of the introductory proverbial poems of the older editor. If we compare the two together, it cannot be denied that in the type of the instruction contained in the latter, the *Chokma*, of which the book is an emanation and which it has as its aim (לְרַעַת חִכְמָה, i. 2), stands before us in proportionally much more distinctly defined comprehension and form; we have the same relation before us whose adumbration is the relation of the instruction of wisdom in the Avesta and in the later Minochired (Spiegel, *Parsi-Grammatik*, p. 182 ff.). The *Chokma* appears also in the "Proverbs of Solomon" as a being existing in and for itself, which is opposed to ambiguous subjective thought (xxviii. 26); but here there is attributed to it an objectivity even to an apparent personality: it goes forth preaching, and places before all men life and death for an eternally decisive choice, it distributes the spirit to those who do not resist (i. 23), it receives and answers prayer (i. 28). The speculation regarding the *Chokma* is here with reference to Job xxviii. (cf. Prov. ii. 4, iii. 14 f., viii. 11, 19), and particularly to xxviii. 27, where a demiurgic function is assigned to wisdom, carried back to its source in eternity: it is the

medium by which the world was created, iii. 19; it was before the creation of the world with God as from everlasting, His son of royal dignity, viii. 22–26; it was with Him in His work of creation, viii. 27–30; after the creation it remained as His delight, rejoicing always before Him, and particularly on the earth among the sons of men, viii. 30 f. Staudenmaier (*Lehre von der Idee*, p. 37) is certainly not on the wrong course, when under this rejoicing of wisdom before God he understands the development of the ideas or life-thoughts intimately bound up in it—the world-idea. This development is the delight of God, because it represents to the divine contemplation the contents of wisdom, or of the world-idea founded in the divine understanding, in all its activities and inner harmonies; it is a calm delight, because the divine idea unites with the fresh and ever young impulse of life, the purity, goodness, innocence, and holiness of life, because its spirit is light, clear, simple, childlike, in itself peaceful, harmonious, and happy; and this delight is experienced especially on the earth among the sons of men, among whom wisdom has its delight; for, as the divine idea, it is in all in so far as it is the inmost life-thought, the soul of each being, but it is on the earth of men in whom it comes to its self-conception, and self-conscious comes forth into the light of the clear day. Staudenmaier has done the great service of having worthily estimated the rich and deep fulness of this biblical theologumenon of wisdom, and of having pointed out in it the foundation-stone of a sacred metaphysics and a means of protection against pantheism in all its forms. We see that in the time of the editor of the older Book of Proverbs the wisdom of the schools in its devotion to the chosen object of its pursuit, the divine wisdom living and moving in all nature, and forming the background of all things, rises to a height of speculation on which it has planted a banner showing the right way to latest times. Ewald rightly points to the statements in the introduction to the Proverbs regarding wisdom as a distinct mark of the once great power of wisdom in Israel; for they show us how this power learned to apprehend itself in its own purest height, after it had become as perfect, and at the same time also as self-conscious, as it could at all become in ancient Israel.

Many other appearances also mark the advanced type of instruction contained in the introduction. Hitzig's view (*Sprüche*, p. xvii. f.), that i. 6–ix. 18 are the part of the whole collection

which was earliest written, confutes itself on all sides; on the contrary, the views of Bleek in his *Introduction to the Old Testament*, thrown out in a sketchy manner and as if by a diviner, surprisingly agree with our own results, which have been laboriously reached and are here amply established. The advanced type of instruction in the introduction, i.-ix., appears among other things in this, that we there find the allegory, which up to this place occurs in Old Testament literature only in scattered little pictures built up into independent poetic forms, particularly in ix., where without any contradiction אִשֶּׁת פְּסִילֹת [a simple woman, v. 13] is an allegorical person. The technical language of the *Chokma* has extended itself on many sides and been refined (we mention these synonyms: תוֹשֵׁבִיָּה, מוֹסֵר, מְזֻמָּה, עֶרְכָּה, בִּינָה, דַּעַת, חֲכָמָה); and the seven pillars in the house of wisdom, even though it be inadmissible to think of them as the seven liberal arts, yet point to a division into seven parts of which the poet was conscious to himself. The common address, בְּנִי [my son], which is not the address of the father to the son, but of the teacher to the scholar, countenances the supposition that there were at that time חֲכָמִים, *i.e.* scholars of the wise men, just as there were “sons of the prophets” (נְבִיאִים), and probably also schools of wisdom. “And when it is described how wisdom spake aloud to the people in all the streets of Jerusalem, in the high places of the city and in every favourable place, does not one feel that such sublime descriptions could not be possible unless at that time wisdom were regarded by the people as one of the first powers, and the wise men truly displayed a great public activity?” We must answer this question of Ewald’s in the affirmative.

Bruch, in his *Weisheitslehre der Hebräer*, 1851, was the first to call special attention to the *Chokma* or humanism as a peculiar intellectual tendency in Israel; but he is mistaken in placing it in an indifferent and even hostile relation to the national law and the national cultus, which he compares to the relation of Christian philosophy to orthodox theology. Oehler, in his *Grundzüge der alttestamentl. Weisheit*, which treats more especially of the doctrinal teachings of the Book of Job, judges more correctly; cf. also his comprehensive article, *Pädagogik des A. T.* in Schmid’s *Pädagogischer Encyclopädie*, pp. 653–695 (partic. 677–683).

##### 5. *The Alexandrian Translation of the Book of Proverbs.*—Of

highest interest for the history of the Book of Proverbs is the relation of the LXX. to the Hebrew text. One half of the proverbs of Agur (xxx. of the Hebrew text) are placed in it after xxiv. 22, and the other half after xxiv. 34; and the proverbs of King Lemuel (xxxi. 1-9 of the Hebrew text) are placed after the proverbs of Agur, while the acrostic proverbial poem of the virtuous woman is in its place at the end of the book. That transposition reminds us of the transpositions in Jeremiah, and rests in the one place as well as in the other on a misunderstanding of the true contents. The translator has set aside the new superscription, x. 1, as unsuitable, and has not marked the new beginning, xxii. 17; he has expunged the new superscription, xxiv. 23, and has done the same to the superscription, "The words of Agur" (xxx. 1), in two awkward explanations (λόγον φυλασσόμενος and τοὺς ἐμούς λόγους φοβήθητι), and the superscription, "The words of Lemuel" (xxxi. 1), in one similar (οἱ ἐμοὶ λόγοι εἴρηνται ὑπὸ Θεοῦ), so that the proverbs of Agur and of Lemuel are without hesitation joined with those of Solomon, whereby it yet remains a mystery why the proverbs beginning with "The words of Agur" have been divided into two parts. Hitzig explains it from a confounding of the columns in which, two being on each page, the Hebrew MS. which lay before the translator was written, and in which the proverbs of Agur and of Lemuel (names which tradition understood symbolically of Solomon) were already ranked in order before ch. xxv. But besides these, there are also many other singular things connected with this Greek translation interesting in themselves and of great critical worth. That it omits i. 16 may arise from this, that this verse was not found in the original MS., and was introduced from Isa. lix. 7; but there are wanting also proverbs such as xxi. 5, for which no reason can be assigned. But the additions are disproportionately more numerous. Frequently we find a line added to the distich, such as in i. 18, or an entire distich added, as iii. 15; or of two lines of the Hebrew verse, each is formed into a separate distich, as i. 7, xi. 16; or we meet with longer interpolations, extending far beyond this measure, as that added to iv. 27. Many of these proverbs are easily re-translated into the Hebrew, as that added to iv. 27, consisting of four lines:

כִּי דַרְכֵי מִיָּמִינִים יָדַעַתְּ יְהוָה  
וְעַקְשֵׁים דַּרְכֵי מִשְׁמָאִילִים

הוא יפלם מעגלותיך  
ארחותיך בשלום יצליח:

But many of them also sound as if they had been originally Greek; *e.g.* the lines appended to ix. 10, xiii. 15; the distich, vi. 11; the imperfect tristich, xxii. 14; and the formless trian, xxv. 10. The value of these enlargements is very diverse; not a few of these proverbs are truly thoughtful, such as the addition to xii. 13—

He who is of mild countenance findeth mercy;

He who is litigious crushes souls—

and singularly bold in imagery, as the addition to ix. 12—

He who supports himself by lies hunts after (רעה) the wind,

He catches at fluttering birds;

For he forsakes the ways of his own vineyard,

And wanders away from the paths of his own field,

And roams through arid steppes and a thirsty land,

And gathers with his hand withered heath.

The Hebrew text lying before the Alexandrian translators had certainly not all these additions, yet in many passages, such as xi. 16, it is indeed a question whether it is not to be improved from the LXX.; and in other passages, where, if one reads the Greek, the Hebrew words naturally take their place, whether these are not at least old Hebrew marginal notes and interpolations which the translation preserves. But this version itself has had its gradual historical development. The text, the *κοινή* (*communis*), proceeds from the Hexaplar text edited by Origen, which received from him many and diverse revisions; and in the times before Christ, perhaps (as Hitz. supposes), down to the second century after Christ, the translation itself, not being regarded as complete, was in the progress of growth, for not unfrequently two different translations of one and the same proverb stand together, as xiv. 22, xxix. 25 (where also the Peshito follows the LXX. after which it translates), or also interpenetrate one another, as xxii. 8, 9. These doubled translations are of historical importance both in relation to the text and to the interpretation of it. Along with the Books of Samuel and Jeremiah, there is no book in regard to which the LXX. can be of higher significance than the Book of Proverbs; we shall seek in the course of our exposition duly to estimate the text<sup>1</sup> as adopted by Bertheau (1847) and Hitzig (1858) in their

<sup>1</sup> Cf. also J. Gottlob Jäger's *Observationes in Proverbiorum Salomonis Versionem Alexandrinam*, 1788; de Lagarde's *Anmerkungen zur griech. Uebersetzung*

commentaries, and by Ewald in his *Jahrb.* xi. (1861) and his commentary (2d ed. 1867). The historical importance of the Egyptian text-recension is heightened by this circumstance, that the old Syrian translator of the Solomonic writings had before him not only the original text, but also the LXX.; for the current opinion, that the Peshito, as distinguished from the Syro-Hexaplar version, sprang solely from the original text with the assistance of the Targum, is more and more shown to be erroneous. In the Book of Proverbs the relation of the Peshito and Targum is even the reverse; the Targum of the Proverbs, making use of the Peshito, restores the Masoretic text,—the points of contact with the LXX. showing themselves here and there, are brought about<sup>1</sup> by the Peshito. But that Jerome, in his translation of the Vulgate according to the *Hebræa veritas*, sometimes follows the LXX. in opposition to the original text, is to be explained with Hitzig from the fact that he based his work on an existing Latin translation made from the LXX. Hence it comes that the two distichs added in the LXX. to iv. 27 remain in his work, and that instead of the one distich, xv. 6, we have two:—*In abundanti* (after the phrase בְּרֵב instead of בֵּית of the Masoretic text) *justitia virtus maxima est, cogitationes autem impiorum eradicabuntur. Domus* (בֵּית) *justi plurima fortitudo, et in fructibus impii conturbatio*; for Jerome has adopted the two translations of the LXX., correcting the second according to the original text.<sup>2</sup>

*der Proverbien*, 1863; M. Heidenheim's *Zur Textkritik der Proverbien*, in his *Quarterly Journal for German and English Theological Criticism and Investigation*, No. VIII. (1865), and IX., XI. (1866). The text of the LXX. (cf. Angelo Mai's *Classici Auctores*, t. ix.) used by Procopius in his *Ἑρμηνεία εἰς τὰς παροιμίας* is peculiar, and here and there comes near to the Hebrew original. The *scholion* of Evagrius in the *Σχόλια εἰς τὰς παροιμίας* of Origen, edited by Tischendorf in his *Notitia*, 1860, from a MS. of Patmos, shows how soon even the Hexaplar text became ambiguous.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Dathe, *De ratione consensus Versionis Syriacæ et Chaldaicæ Proverbiorum Salomonis* (1764), edited by Rosenmüller in his *Opuscula*. Maybaum, in the *Treatise on the Language of the Targum to the Proverbs and its relation to the Syriac*, in Merx's *Archiv*, ii. 66–93, labours in vain to give the priority to that of the Targum: the Targum is written from the Peshito, and here and there approaches the Hebrew text; the language is, with few differences, the Syriac of the original.

<sup>2</sup> The Ethiopic translation, also, is in particular points, as well as on the whole, dependent on the LXX., for it divides the Book of Proverbs into proverbs (παροιμίας), i. – xxiv., and instructions (παιδείαι) of Solomon, xxv. – xxxi. *Vid.* Dillmann in Ewald's *Jahrb.* v. 147, 150.

The fragments of the translations of Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, etc., contained in Greek and Syrian sources, have been recently collected, more perfectly than could have been done by Montfaucon, by Fried. Field, in his work *Origenis Hexaplorum quæ supersunt*, etc. (Oxonii, 1867, 4). Of special interest is the more recent translation of the original text, existing only in a MS. laid up in the Library of St. Mark [at Venice], executed in bold language, rich in rare and newly invented words, by an unknown author, and belonging to an age which has not yet been determined (*Græcus Venetus*): cf. d'Ansse de Villoison's *nova versio Græca Proverbiorum, Ecclesiastis, Cantici Canticorum*, etc., *Argentorati*, 1784; and also the *Animadversiones* thereto of Jo. Ge. Dahler, 1786.

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The literature of the interpretation of the Book of Proverbs is found in Keil's *Einleitung in das A. T.* (1859), p. 346 f. [*Manual of Historico-Critical Introduction to the Old Testament*, translated by Professor Douglas, D.D., Free Church College, Glasgow. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Vol. i. p. 468 f.]. The most important of the older linguistic works on this book is the commentary of Albert Schultens (*Lugduni Batavorum*, 1748, 4), whose service to the cause of Semitic philology and O. T. exegesis Mühlau has brought to remembrance in the *Lutheran Zeitschrift*, 1870, 1; Vogel's abstract (*Halæ*, 1769), prefaced by Semler, does not altogether compensate for the original work. From the school of Schultens, and also from that of Schröder, originate the *Anmerkungen* by Alb. Jac. Arnoldi, maternal grandson of Schultens, a Latin edition of which was published (*Lugduni Bat.* 1783) by Henr. Alb. Schultens, the grandson of Schultens by his son. Among the commentaries of English interpreters, that in Latin by Thomas Cartwright (*Amstelredami*, 1663, 4), along with the *Exposition of the Book of Proverbs* by Charles Bridges (4th ed., London, 1859), hold an honourable place. The *Critical Remarks on the Books of Job, Proverbs*, etc., by D. Durell (Oxford, 1772, 4), also merit attention. Of more recent commentaries, since Keil gave his list of the literature of the subject, have been published those of Elster (1858) and of Zöckler (1867), forming a part of the theologico-homiletical *Bibelwerk* edited by J. P. Lange. Chaps. xxv.–xxix. Rud. Stier has specially interpreted in two works entitled *Der*

*Weise ein König* ["The Wise Man a King"], and *Salomonis Weisheit in Hiskiastagen* ["Solomon's Wisdom in the Days of Hezekiah"], 1849; and chapters xxx. xxxi. in a work entitled *Die Politik der Weisheit* ["The Politics of Wisdom"], 1850. Part III. (1865) of the new exegetico-critical *Aehrenlese* ["Gleanings"] of Fried. Böttcher, edited by Mühlau, furnishes 39 pages of remarks on the Proverbs. Leop. Dukes, author of the Rabbinical *Blumenlese* ["Anthology"], 1844, and the *Schrift zur rabbinischen Spruchkunde*, 1851, has published (1841) a commentary to the Proverbs in Cahen's French *Bibelwerk*. There also is furnished a list of Jewish interpreters down to the appearance of L. H. Loewenstein's Commentary (1838), which contains valuable contributions to the critical confirmation of the Masoretic text, in which Heidenheim's MS. remains, and also the Codex of 1294 mentioned in my preface to Baer's edition of the Psalter, and in the *Specimen Lectionum* of Baer's edition of Genesis, are made use of. Among Malbim's best works are, after his Commentary on Isaiah, that on the Mishle (Warsaw, 1867). [*Vide* Preface.]

# I.

## THE OLDER BOOK OF PROVERBS

### I.-XXIV.

#### SUPERSCRPTION AND MOTTO, I. 1-7.



THE external title, *i.e.* the Synagogue name, of the whole collection of Proverbs is מִשְׁלֵי (*Mishle*), the word with which it commences. Origen (Euseb. *H. E.* vi. 25) uses the name *Μισλώθ*, *i.e.* מִשְׁלֹת, which occurs in the Talmud and Midrash as the designation of the book, from its contents. In a similar way, the names given to the Psalter, תְּהִלִּים and תְּהִלּוֹת, are interchanged.

This external title is followed by one which the Book of Proverbs, viewed as to its gradual formation, and first the older portion, gives to itself. It reaches from i. 1 to ver. 6, and names not only the contents and the author of the book, but also commends it in regard to the service which it is capable of rendering. It contains "Proverbs of Solomon, the son of David, king of Israel." The books of the נבואה and חכמה, including the Canticles, thus give their own titles; among the historical books, that of the memoirs of Nehemiah is the only one that does so. מִשְׁלֵי has the accent *Dechî*, to separate<sup>1</sup> it from the following complex genitive which it governs, and מֶלֶךְ יִשְׂרָאֵל is made the second hemistich, because it belongs to שְׁלָמָה, not to דָּוִד.<sup>2</sup> As to the fundamental idea of the word מִשְׁלֵי, we refer to the derivation given in the *Gesch. der jud. Poesie*, p. 196, from מִשַּׁל, Aram. מַחַל, root חל, Sanskr. *tul* (whence *tulâ*, balance, similarity), Lat. *tollere*; the comparison of the Arab. *mathal* leads to the same

<sup>1</sup> Norzi has erroneously accented מִשְׁלֵי with the accent *Munach*. The מ is besides the Masoretic *majusculum*, like the ב, ש, and א at the commencement of the Law, the Canticles, and Chronicles.

<sup>2</sup> If it had belonged to דָּוִד, then the sentence would have been accented thus: מִשְׁלֵי שְׁלָמָה בֶן-דָּוִד מֶלֶךְ יִשְׂרָאֵל.

conclusion. “מִשָּׁל signifies, not, as Schultens and others after him affirm, *effigies ad similitudinem alius rei expressa*, from מִשָּׁל in the primary signification *premere, premente manu tractare*; for the corresponding Arab. verb *mathal* does not at all bear that meaning, but signifies to stand, to present oneself, hence to be like, properly to put oneself forth as something, to represent it; and in the Hebr. also to rule, properly with עַל to stand on or over something, with בָּ to hold it erect, like Arab. *kam* with *b*, *rem administravit* [vid. *Jesaia*, p. 691]. Thus e.g., Gen. xxiv. 2, it is said of Eliezer: הַמִּשָּׁל בְּכָל-אֲשֶׁר-לוֹ, who ruled over all that he (Abraham) had (Luther: was a prince over all his goods). Thus מִשָּׁל, figurative discourse which represents that which is real, similitude; hence then parable or shorter apothegm, proverb, in so far as they express primarily something special, but which as a general symbol is then applied to everything else of a like kind, and in so far stands figuratively. An example is found in 1 Sam. x. 11 f. It is incorrect to conclude from this meaning of the word that such memorial sayings or proverbs usually contained comparisons, or were clothed in figurative language; for that is the case in by far the fewest number of instances: the oldest have by far the simplest and most special interpretations” (Fleischer). Hence *Mashal*, according to its fundamental idea, is that which stands with something = makes something stand forth = representing. This something that represents may be a thing or a person; as e.g. one may say Job is a *Mashal*, i.e. a representant, similitude, type of Israel (*vide* the work entitled עֵץ הַחַיִּים, by Ahron b. Elia, c. 90, p. 143); and, like Arab. *mathal* (more commonly *mithl* = מִשָּׁל, cf. מִשָּׁל, Job xli. 25), is used quite as generally as is its etymological cogn. *instar* (*instare*). But in Hebr. *Mashal* always denotes representing discourse with the additional marks of the figurative and concise, e.g. the section which presents (Hab. ii. 6) him to whom it refers as a warning example, but particularly, as there defined, the gnome, the apothegm or maxim, in so far as this represents general truths in sharply outlined little pictures.

Ver. 2. Now follows the statement of the object which these proverbs subserve; and first, in general,

To become acquainted with wisdom and instruction,  
To understand intelligent discourses.

They seek on the one side to initiate the reader in wisdom and instruction, and on the other to guide him to the understanding

of intelligent discourses, for they themselves contain such discourses in which there is a deep penetrating judgment, and they sharpen the understanding of him who engages his attention with them.<sup>1</sup> As Schultens has already rightly determined the fundamental meaning of יָדָע, frequently compared with the Sanskr. *vid*, to know (whence by gunating,<sup>2</sup> *vêda*, knowledge), after the Arab. *wad'a*, as *deponere*, *penes se condere*, so he also rightly explains הִכְמָה by *soliditas*; it means properly (from הִכָּם, Arab. *hakm*, R. *hk*, *vide* under Ps. x. 8, to be firm, closed) compactness, and then, like *πυκνότης*, ability, worldly wisdom, prudence, and in the higher general sense, the knowledge of things in the essence of their being and in the reality of their existence. Along with wisdom stands the moral מִוֶּסֶר, properly discipline, *i.e.* moral instruction, and in conformity with this, self-government, self-guidance, from יָסַר = וָסַר, cogn. אָסַר, properly *adstrictio* or *constrictio*; for the ו of the noun signifies both *id quod* or *aliquid quod* (ὅτι) and *quod* in the conjunctive sense (ὅτι), and thus forms both a concrete (like מוֹסֵר = מוֹאֶסֶר, fetter, chain) and an abstract idea. The first general object of the Proverbs is רָעַת, the reception into oneself of wisdom and moral edification by means of education and training; the second is to comprehend utterances of intelligence, *i.e.* such as proceed from intelligence and give expression to it (cf. אֲמַרִי אֶמֶת, xxii. 21). בֵּין, *Kal*, to be distinguished (whence בֵּין, between, *constr.* of בֵּין, space between, interval), signifies in *Hiph.* to distinguish, to understand; בִּינָה is, according to the sense, the *n. actionis* of this *Hiph.*, and signifies the understanding as the capability effective in the possession of the right criteria of distinguishing between the true and the false, the good and the bad (1 Kings iii. 9), the wholesome and the pernicious.

Vers. 3-5. In the following, 2*a* is expanded in vers. 3-5, then 2*b* in ver. 6. First the immediate object:

- 3 To attain intelligent instruction,  
Righteousness, and justice, and integrity;
- 4 To impart to the inexperienced prudence,  
To the young man knowledge and discretion
- 5 Let the wise man hear and gain learning,  
And the man of understanding take to himself rules of conduct.

<sup>1</sup> לָרַעַת is rightly pointed by Löwenstein with *Dechî* after Cod. 1294; *vide* the rule by which the verse is divided, *Torath Emeth*, p. 51, § 12.

<sup>2</sup> [Guna = a rule in Sanskrit grammar regulating the modification of vowels.]

With *דעת*, denoting the reception into oneself, acquiring, is interchanged (cf. ii. 1) *קחת*, its synonym, used of intellectual reception and appropriation, which, contemplated from the point of view of the relation between the teacher and the learner, is the correlative of *תת*, *παραδιδόναι*, *tradere* (ix. 9). But *מוסר הישגל* is that which proceeds from *chokma* and *musar* when they are blended together: discipline of wisdom, discipline training to wisdom; i.e. such morality and good conduct as rest not on external inheritance, training, imitation, and custom, but is bound up with the intelligent knowledge of the Why and the Wherefore. *הישגל*, as xxi. 16, is *inf. absol.* used substantively (cf. *השקט*, keeping quiet, Isa. xxxii. 17) of *שכל* (whence *שכל*, *intellectus*), to entwine, involve; for the thinking through a subject is represented as an interweaving, complicating, configuring of the thoughts (the syllogism is in like manner represented as *אשכל*, Aram. *סגול*, a bunch of grapes), (with which also *סכל*, a fool, and *הסביל*, to act foolishly, are connected, from the confusion of the thoughts, the entangling of the conceptions; cf. Arab. *'akl*, to understand, and *מעקל*). The series of synonyms (cf. xxiii. 23) following in 3b, which are not well fitted to be the immediate object to *לקחת*, present themselves as the unfolding of the contents of the *מוסר הישגל*, as meaning that namely which is dutiful and right and honest. With the frequently occurring two conceptions, *צדק ומשפט* (ii. 9), (or with the order reversed as in Ps. cxix. 121) is interchanged *משפט וצדקה* (or with the order also reversed, xxi. 3). The remark of Heidenheim, that in *צדק* the conception of the *justum*, and in *צדקה* that of the *æquum* prevails, is suggested by the circumstance that not *צדק* but *צדקה* signifies *δικαιοσύνη* (cf. x. 2) in the sense of liberality, and then of almsgiving (*ἐλεημοσύνη*); but *צדק* also frequently signifies a way of thought and action which is regulated not by the letter of the law and by *talio*, but by love (cf. Isa. xli. 2, xlii. 6). *Tsedek* and *ts'dakah* have almost the relation to one another of integrity and justice which practically brings the former into exercise. *משפט* (from *שפט*, to make straight, to adjust, cf. *שבת*, Arab. *sabita*, to be smooth) is the right and the righteousness in which it realizes itself, here subjectively considered, the right mind.<sup>1</sup> *משפטים* (defect. for *משפטים*, from *ישר*, to be straight, even) is plur. *tantum*; for its sing. *מִשְׁפָּט*.

<sup>1</sup> According to Malbim, *משפט* is the fixed objective right, *צדק* the righteousness which does not at once decide according to the letter of the law, but always according to the matter and the person.

(after the form מִיָּטֵב) the form מִישׁוֹר (in the same ethical sense, e.g. Mal. ii. 6) is used: it means thus a way of thought and of conduct that is straight, i.e. according to what is right, true, i.e. without concealment, honest, i.e. true to duty and faithful to one's word.

Ver. 4. This verse presents another aspect of the object to be served by this book: it seeks to impart prudence to the simple. The form פְּתָאִים<sup>1</sup> (in which, as in בָּוִים, the י plur. remains unwritten) is, in this mongrel form in which it is written (cf. vii. 7, viii. 5, ix. 6, xiv. 18, xxvii. 12), made up of פְּתִים (i. 22, 32, once written *plene*, פְּתִיִּים, xxii. 3) and פְּתָאִים (vii. 7). These two forms with י and the transition of י into א are interchanged in the plur. of such nouns as פְּתִי, segolate form, "from פָּתַח (cogn. פָּתַח), to be open, properly the open-hearted, i.e. one whose heart stands open to every influence from another, the harmless, good-natured,—a *vox media* among the Hebrews commonly (though not always, cf. e.g. Ps. cxvi. 6) in *malam partem*: the foolish, silly, one who allows himself to be easily persuaded or led astray, like similar words in other languages—Lat. *simplex*, Gr. εὐήθης, Fr. *naïf*; Arab. *fatyn*, always, however, in a good sense: a high and noble-minded man, not made as yet mistrustful and depressed by sad experiences, therefore *juvenis ingenuus, vir animi generosi*" (Fl.). The פְּתָאִים, not of firm and constant mind, have need of עֲרָמָה; therefore the saying xiv. 15, cf. viii. 5, xix. 25. The noun עֲרָמָה (a fem. segolate form like הִכְמָה) means here *calliditas* in a good sense, while the corresponding Arab. 'aram (to be distinguished from the verb 'aram, עָרַם, to peel, to make bare, *nudare*) is used only in a bad sense, of malevolent, deceptive conduct. In the parallel member the word נָעַר is used, generally (collectively) understood, of the immaturity which must first obtain intellectual and moral clearness and firmness; such an one is in need of *peritia et sollertia*, as Fleischer well renders it; for דַּעַת is experimental knowledge, and מְזַמָּה (from זָמַם, according to its primary signification, to press together, *comprimere*; then, referred to mental concentration: to think) signifies in the sing., *sensu bono*, the capability of comprehending the right purposes, of seizing the right measures, of projecting the right plans.

Ver. 5. In this verse the infinitives of the object pass into inde-

<sup>1</sup> Like עֲפָאִים, Ps. civ. 12, וּבְעֲבָאִים, 1 Chron. xii. 8, cf. *Michlol*, 196a. In vers. 22, 32, the mute א is wanting.

pendent sentences for the sake of variety. That **יִשְׁמַע** cannot mean *audiet*, but *audiat*, is shown by ix. 9; but **יִסְפֹּף** is jussive (with the tone thrown back before **לָקַח**; cf. x. 9, and xvi. 21, 23 where the tone is not thrown back, as also 2 Sam. xxiv. 3) with the consecutive *Vav* (ו) (= Arab. **ف**, *f*): let him hear, thus will he . . . or, in order that he. Whoever is wise is invited to hear these proverbs in order to add learning (*doctrinam*) to that which he already possesses, according to the principle derived from experience, ix. 9, Matt. xiii. 12. The segolate **לָקַח**, which in *pausa* retains its **־** (as also **בָּטַח**, **יָשַׁע**, **צָמַח**, **מָלַךְ**, **צָדַק**, **קָרַם**, and others), means reception, and concretely what one takes into himself with his ear and mind; therefore learning (*διδασχῆ* with the object of the *ἀποδοχή*), as Deut. xxxii. 2 (parallel **אָמְרָה**, as iv. 2 **תּוֹרָה**), and then learning that has passed into the possession of the receiver, knowledge, science (Isa. xxix. 24, parall. **בִּינָה**). Schultens compares the Arab. *lakah*, used of the fructification of the female palm by the flower-dust of the male. The part. **נָבֹן** (the *fin.* of which is found only once, Isa. x. 13) is the passive or the reflexive of the *Hiph.* **הִבִּין**, to explain, to make to understand: one who is caused to understand or who lets himself be informed, and thus an intelligent person—that is one who may gain **תְּהִבְלוֹת** by means of these proverbs. This word, found only in the plur. (probably connected with **הַיָּל**, shipmaster, properly one who has to do with the **הַבָּלִים**, ship's ropes, particularly handles the sails, LXX. *κυβέρνησις*), signifies guidance, management, skill to direct anything (Job xxxii. 7, of God's skill which directs the clouds), and in the plur. conception, the taking measures, designs, in a good sense, or also (as in xii. 5) in a bad sense; here it means guiding thoughts, regulating principles, judicious rules and maxims, as xi. 14, prudent rules of government, xx. 18, xxiv. 6 of stratagems. Fl. compares the Arab. *tedbîr* (guidance, from **דָּבַר**, to lead cattle), with its plur. *tedâbîr*, and the Syr. *dubôro*, direction, management, etc.

Ver. 6. The mediate object of these proverbs, as stated in ver. 2*b*, is now expanded, for again it is introduced in the infinitive construction:—The reader shall learn in these proverbs, or by means of them as of a key, to understand such like apothegms generally (as xxii. 17 ff.):

To understand proverb and symbol,  
The words of wise men and their enigmas.

In the *Gesch. der jüd. Poesie*, p. 200 f., the derivation of the noun מְלִיצָה is traced from לָץ, primarily to shine, Sanskr. *las*, frequently with the meanings *ludere* and *lucere*; but the Arab. brings near another primary meaning. “מְלִיצָה, from Arab. root *las*, *flexit*, *torsit*, thus properly *oratio detorta*, *obliqua*, *non aperta*; hence לָץ, mocker, properly *qui verbis obliquis utitur*: as *Hiph.* הִלִּץ, to scoff, but also *verba detorta retorquere*, i.e. to interpret, to explain” (Fl.). Of the root ideas found in הִירָה, to be sharp, pointed (הָר, perhaps related to the Sanskr. *katu*, sharp of taste, but not to *acutus*), and to be twisted (cf. אָחַד, אָנַד, עָקַד, harmonizing with the at present mysterious *catena*), the preference is given to the latter already, Ps. lxxviii. 2. “The Arab. *hād*, to revolve, to turn (whence *hid*, bend, turn aside!), thence הִירָה, *στροφή*, cunning, intrigue, as also enigma, dark saying, *perplexum dictum*” (Fl.) The comparison made by Schultens with the Arab. *hidt* as the name of the knot on the horn of the wild-goat shows the sensible fundamental conception. In post-biblical literature חִירָה is the enigma proper, and מְלִיצָה poetry (with הִלִּצָה of poetical prose). The *Græc. Venet.* translates it ῥητοπέλας.

Ver. 7. The title of the book is followed by its motto, symbol, device :

The fear of Jahve is the beginning of knowledge ;  
Wisdom and discipline is despised by fools.

The first hemistich expresses the highest principle of the Israelitish *Chokma*, as it is found also in ix. 10 (cf. xv. 33), Job xxviii. 28, and in Ps. cxi. 10 (whence the LXX. has interpolated here two lines). יִרְאַת־יְהוָה combines in itself, as ἀρχή, the ideas of *initium* (accordingly J. H. Michaelis: *initium cognitionis, a quo quisquis recte philosophari cupit auspiciū facere debet*) and *principium*, i.e. the basis, thus the root (cf. Mic. i. 13 with Job xix. 28).<sup>1</sup> Wisdom comes from God, and whoever fears Him receives it (cf. Jas. i. 5 f.). יִרְאַת־יְהוָה is reverential subordination to the All-directing, and since designedly יְהוָה is used, and not אֱלֹהִים (הַ), to the One God, the Creator and Governor of the world, who gave His law unto Israel, and also beyond Israel left not His holy will unattested; the reverse side of the fear of Jahve as the Most Holy One is שִׁנְאָת־רַע, viii. 13 (post-biblical יִרְאַת־הַטָּא). The inverted placing

<sup>1</sup> In Sirach i. 14, 16, the Syr. has both times רִישׁ חֲכָמָא; but in the second instance, where the Greek translation has *πληθυσμὸς σοφίας*, שִׁבַּע חֲכָמָה (after Ps. xvi. 11) may have existed in the original text.

of the words 7b imports that the wisdom and discipline which one obtains in the way of the fear of God is only despised by the אִי־לִים, *i.e.* the hard, thick, stupid; see regarding the root-word אול, *coalescere, cohærere, incrassari, der Prophet Jesaia*, p. 424, and at Ps. lxxiii. 4. Schultens rightly compares παχεῖς, *crassi pro stupidis*.<sup>1</sup> בּוֹי has the tone on the *penult.*, and thus comes from בּוּ; the 3d pr. of בָּיָה would be בָּיָה or בָּיָה. The perf. (cf. ver. 29) is to be interpreted after the Lat. *oderunt* (Ges. § 126).

### FIRST INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, I. 8-19.

#### WARNING AGAINST FELLOWSHIP WITH THOSE WHO SIN AGAINST THEIR NEIGHBOUR'S LIFE AND PROPERTY.

Vers. 8, 9. After the author has indicated the object which his Book of Proverbs is designed to subserve, and the fundamental principle on which it is based, he shows for whom he has intended it; he has particularly the rising generation in his eye:

8 Hear, my son, thy father's instruction,  
And refuse not the teaching of thy mother;  
9 For these are a fair crown to thy head,  
And jewels to thy neck.

"My son," says the teacher of wisdom to the scholar whom he has, or imagines that he has, before him, addressing him as a fatherly friend. The N. T. representation of birth into a new spiritual life, 1 Cor. iv. 15, Philem. 10, Gal. iv. 19, lies outside the circle of the O. T. representation; the teacher feels himself as a father by virtue of his benevolent, guardian, tender love. Father and mother are the beloved parents of those who are addressed. When the Talmud understands אֱבִיר of God, אָמָר of the people (אָמָר), that is not the grammatico-historic meaning, but the practical interpretation and exposition, after the manner of the Midrash. The same admonition (with נָצַר, keep, instead of שָׁמַע, hear, and מִצְוָה, command, instead of מוֹסֵר, instruction) is repeated in vi. 20, and what is said of the parents in one passage is in x. 1 divided into two synonymous parallel passages. The stricter

<sup>1</sup> Malbim's explanation is singular: the sceptics, from אִי־לִים, perhaps! This also is Heidenheim's view.

*musar*, which expresses the idea of sensible means of instruction (discipline), (xiii. 24, xxii. 15, xxiii. 13 f.), is suitably attributed to the father, and the *torah* to the mother, only administered by the word; Wisdom also always says תּוֹרַתִּי (*my torah*), and only once, viii. 10, מוֹסְרִי (*my musar*).

Ver. 9. הֵם, which is also used in the neut. *illa*, e.g. Job xxii. 24, refers here to the paternal discipline and the maternal teaching. These, obediently received and followed, are the fairest ornament of the child. לְיוֹה, from לָוָה, to wind, to roll, Arab. *lawy* (from לוּ, whence also לָל = לָלֵל, as רוּד, to boil up, = רוֹדֵד), means winding, twisted ornament, and especially wreath; a crown of gracefulness is equivalent to a graceful crown, a *corolla gratiosa*, as Schultens translates it; cf. iv. 9, according to which, Wisdom bestows such a crown.<sup>1</sup> עֲנָקִים (or עֲנָקוֹת, Judg. viii. 26) are necklaces, jewels for the neck; denom. of the Arab. *'unek*, and Aram. עֲנִיק, the neck (perhaps from עָנַק = עָנָה, to oppress, of heavy burdens; cf. ἀνχών, the neck). פִּרְנִיתוֹת is, like *fauces*, the throat by which one swallows (Arab. *g'arg'ara*, *tag'arg'ara*), a plur. extensive (Böttcher, § 695), and is better fitted than פֶּרֶן to indicate the external throat; Ezekiel, however, uses (xvi. 11) *garon*, as our poet (iii. 3, 22, vi. 21) uses *garg'roth*, to represent the front neck.<sup>2</sup>

Ver. 10. The general counsel of ver. 9 is here followed by a more special warning:

My son, if sinners entice thee  
Consent thou not.

The בְּנִי<sup>3</sup> (*my son*) is emphatically repeated. The intensive form חַטָּאִים signifies men to whom sin has become a habit, thus vicious, wicked. פִּתָּה (*Pi.* of פָּתַח, to open) is not denom., to make or wish to make a פֶּתִי; the meaning, to entice (harmonizing with πείθειν), פִּתָּה obtains from the root-meaning of the *Kal*, for it is related to it as *pandere* (*januam*) to *patere*: to open, to make accessible, susceptible, namely to persuasion. The warning 10b is as brief as possible a call of alarm back from the abyss. In the form תִּבְּא (from תִּבְּא, to agree to, to be willing, see Wetstein on Job, p. 349)

<sup>1</sup> In לִית הֵן the הֵן has the conjunctive accent *shalshleth*, on account of which the *Pesiq* accent ( ) is omitted. This small *shalshleth* occurs only eight times. See *Torath Emeth*, p. 36.

<sup>2</sup> The writing varies greatly. Here and at vi. 21 we have לִגְרִנְרוֹתֶיךָ; at iii. 3, עַל-גְּרִנְרוֹתֶיךָ; iii. 22, לִגְרִנְרוֹתֶיךָ. Thus according to the Masora and correct texts.

<sup>3</sup> The accent *Pazer* over the בְּנִי has the force of *Athnach*.

the preformative א is wanting, as in תִּמְרוּ, 2 Sam. xix. 14, cf. Ps. cxxxix. 20, Ges. § 68, 2, and instead of תִּבְּהּ (= תִּאֲבֶה, 1 Kings xx. 8) is vocalized not תִּבְּהּ (cf. xi. 25), but after the Aram. תִּבְּהּ (cf. יִגְלִי); see Gen. xxvi. 29, and *Comment. on Isaiah*, p. 648; Gesen. § 75, 17.

Vers. 11-14. Of the number of wicked men who gain associates to their palliation and strengthening, they are adduced as an example whom covetousness leads to murder.

- 11 If they say, "Go with us, we will lurk for blood,  
Lie in wait for the innocent without cause;
- 12 Like the pit we will swallow them alive  
And in perfect soundness like them that go down to the grave.
- 13 We find all manner of precious treasure,  
Fill our houses with spoil.
- 14 Thou shalt cast thy lot amongst us,  
We all have only one purse."

Ver. 11. The verb אָרַב signifies *nectere*, to bind fast (from רַב, close, compact), (see under Isa. xxv. 11), and particularly (but so that it bears in itself its object without ellipsis) *insidias nectere* = *insidiari*. Regarding לָרֵם Fleischer remarks: "Either elliptically for לְשֹׁפְדֵי-דָם (Jewish interp.), or, as the parallelism and the usage of the language of this book rather recommend, *per synecd.* for: for a man, with particular reference to his blood to be poured out (cf. our saying 'ein junges Blut,' a young blood = a youth, with the underlying conception of the blood giving colour to the body as shining through it, or giving to it life and strength), as Ps. xciv. 21." As in post-biblical Heb. בָּשָׂר וָדָם (or inverted, αἷμα καὶ σάρξ, Heb. ii. 14), used of men as such, is not so used in the O. T., yet דָּם, like נֶפֶשׁ, is sometimes used synecdochically for the person, but never with reference to the blood as an essentially constituent part of corporeality, but always with reference to violent putting to death, which separates the blood from the body (cf. my *System der bib. Psychologie*, p. 242). Here לָרֵם is explained by לְרָמִים, with which it is interchanged, Mic. vii. 2: let us lurk for blood (to be poured out). The verb צָפַן is never, like טָמַן (to conceal), connected with הִבְלִים, מִוִּקְשִׁים, רֶשֶׁת, פֶּחַ—thus none of these words is here to be supplied; the idea of gaining over one expressed in the organic root צָפַ (whence צָפָה, *diducendo obducere*) has passed over into that of restraining oneself, watching, lurking, hence צָפַן (cog. Aram. צָפִין) in the sense of *speculari*, *insidiari*, interchanges with צָפָה (to spy), (cf. Ps. x. 8, lvi. 7 with xxxvii. 32). The adv. הֵנָּה (an old accus. from

יָדוּ) properly means in a gracious manner, as a free gift (*δωρεάν*, *gratis* = *gratius*), and accordingly, without reward, also without cause, which frequently = without guilt; but it never signifies *sine effectu qui noceat*, i.e. with impunity (Löwenst.). We have thus either to connect together נָקִי חֲנֻם, “innocent in vain” (as אֹיְבֵי חֲנֻם, my enemies without a cause, Lam. iii. 52): his innocence helps him nothing whom God protects not against us notwithstanding his innocence (Schultens, Bertheau, Elster, and others); or connect חֲנֻם with the verb (lie in wait for), for which Hitzig, after the LXX., Syr., Rashi,<sup>1</sup> Ralbag, Immanuel, rightly decides in view of 1 Sam. xix. 5, xxv. 31; cf. also Job ix. 17, where the succession of the accents is the same (*Tarcha* transmuted from *Mugrash*). Frequently there are combined together in this חֲנֻם (cf. Isa. xxviii. 14 f.), that which the author thinks, and that which those whom he introduces as speaking think.

Ver. 12. The first clause of this verse Hitzig translates: “as the pit (swallows) that which lives.” This is untenable, because בְּ with the force of a substantive (as *instar*, likeness) is regarded as a preposition, but not a conjunction (see at Ps. xxxviii. 14 f.). חַיִּים (the living) is connected with נִבְלָעִים, and is the accus. of the state (حال, according to the terminology of the Arab. grammarians) in which they will, with impunity, swallow them up like the pit (the insatiable, xxvii. 20, xxx. 16), namely, while these their sacrifices are in the state of life’s freshness,<sup>2</sup> “the living,”—without doubt, like Ps. lv. 16, lxiii. 10, cxxiv. 3, in fact and in expression an allusion to the fate of the company of Korah, Num. xvi. 30, 33. If this is the meaning of חַיִּים, then תְּמִימִים as the parallel word means *integros* not in an ethical sense, in which it would be a synonym of נָקִי of ver. 11b (cf. xxix. 10 with Ps. xix. 14), but in a physical sense (*Græc. Venet. καὶ τελείους*; Parchon as Rashi, בְּרִיאִים וְשְׁלֵמִים, *vid.* Büttcher, *De Inferis*, § 293). This physical sense is claimed for תָּם, Job xxi. 23, for תָּם probably, Ps. lxxiii. 4, and why should not תָּמִים, used in the law regarding sacrifices (*e.g.* Ex. xii. 5, “without blemish”) of the faultlessness of the victim,

<sup>1</sup> [Rashi, i.e. Rabbi Salomo Isaaki, of Troyes, died A.D. 1105. Ralbag, i.e. Rabbi Levi ben Gershon, usually referred to by Christian writers as Master Leo de Bannolis, or Gersonides, a native of Banolas near Gerona, died about 1342.]

<sup>2</sup> Only in this sense is the existing accentuation of this verse (cf. the Targ.) to be justified.

also signify such an one אֲשֶׁר אֵינָם כִּתְּחָם (Isa. i. 6)? In the midst of complete external health they will devour them like those that go down to the grave (cf. Ps. xxviii. 1, lxxxviii. 5, with Isa. xiv. 19), *i.e.* like those under whose feet the earth is suddenly opened, so that, without leaving any trace behind, they sink into the grave and into Hades. The connection of the finite with the accus. of place, Ps. lv. 16, lies at the foundation of the genitive connection יֹרְדֵי בֹרַי (with the tone thrown back): those that go down to the grave.

Vers. 13, 14.<sup>1</sup> To their invitation, bearing in itself its own condemnation, they add as a lure the splendid self-enriching treasures which in equal and just fellowship with them they may have the prospect of sharing. הֵן (from הֵן, *levem*, then *facilem esse, être aisé, à son aise*) means *aisance*, convenience, opulence, and concretely that by which life is made agreeable, thus money and possessions (Fleischer in Levy's *Chald. Wörterbuch*, i. 423 f.). With this הֵן with remarkable frequency in the *Mishle* יָקַר (from יָקַר, Arab. *wakar*, *grave esse*) is connected in direct contrast, according to its primary signification; cf. xii. 27, xxiv. 4: heavy treasures which make life light. Yet it must not be maintained that, as Schultens has remarked, this oxymoron is intended, nor also that it is only consciously present in the language. מָצָא has here its primitive appropriate signification of attaining, as Isa. x. 14 of reaching. שָׁלַל (from שָׁלַל, to draw from, draw out, from שָׁל, cf. שָׁלַח, Arab. *salab*, *Comm. on Isa.* p. 447) is that which is drawn away from the enemy, *exuvie*, and then the booty and spoil taken in war generally. מָלֵא, to fill with anything, make full, governs a double accusative, as the *Kal* (to become full of anything) governs only one. In ver. 14, the invitation shows how the prospect is to be realized. Interpreters have difficulty in conceiving what is here meant. Do not a share by lot and a common purse exclude one another? Will they truly, in the distribution of the booty by lot, have equal portions at length, equally much in their money-bags? Or is it meant that, apart from the portion of the booty which falls to every one by lot, they have a common purse which, when their business is ebbing, must supply the wants of the company, and on which the new companion can maintain himself beforehand? Or does it mean only that they will

<sup>1</sup> Here, in ver. 14, גִּזְרֵךְ is to be written with *Munach* (not *Metheg*) in the second syllable; *vid. Torah Emeth*, p. 20. *Accentuationssystem*, vii. § 2.

be as mutually helpful to one another, according to the principle τὰ τῶν φίλων κοινά (*amicorum omnia communia*), as if they had only one purse? The meaning is perfectly simple. The oneness of the purse consists in this, that the booty which each of them gets, belongs not wholly or chiefly to him, but to the whole together, and is disposed of by lot; so that, as far as possible, he who participated not at all in the affair in obtaining it, may yet draw the greatest prize. This view harmonizes the relation between 14b and 14a. The common Semitic כֶּסֶף is even used at the present day in Syria and elsewhere as the name of the Exchange ("Börse") (plur. *akjās*); here it is the purse ("Kasse") (χρημάτων δοχείον, Procop.), which is made up of the profits of the business. This profit consists not merely in gold, but is here thought of in regard to its worth in gold. The apparent contradiction between distributing by lot and having a common purse disappears when the distribution by lot of the common property is so made, that the retaining of a stock-capital, or reserve fund, is not excluded.

Ver. 15. After the men are described against whose enticements a warning is given forth, the warning is emphatically repeated, and is confirmed by a threefold reason :

My son! go not in the way with them.  
Keep back thy foot from their path.

If בְּדֶרֶךְ (in the way), taken alone, cannot be equivalent to אֶתֶר (in one way), so is אִתָּם (with them) to be regarded as its determination.<sup>1</sup> Foot (not feet), as eye, hand, etc., is used where the members come less under consideration than what they unitedly bring about (iv. 26 f.). נִתְּיָבָה, from נָתַב, signifies properly that which is raised, especially the (raised) footstep.

Ver. 16. The *first* argument to enforce the warning :

For their feet run to the evil,  
And hasten to shed blood.

That this is their object they make no secret (ver. 11 ff.); but why is it that such an object as this should furnish no ground of warning against them, especially as on this beginning the stamp of that which is morally blamable is here impressed with לָרַע?

<sup>1</sup> The Arab. grammarians regard this as half determination, and call it *takhsys*; that אִתָּם has with them the force of a virtually co-ordinated attributive; while, according to the Arab. gram., it is also possible that בְּדֶרֶךְ, "in one way," is equivalent to on the common way, for in the indetermination sometimes there lies the conception not merely of *âhad*, but of *weahad*.

Besides, this circular movement of the thoughts is quite after the manner of this poet; and that ver. 16 is in his style, vi. 18 shows. The want of this distich (16b = Rom. iii. 15) in LXX. B. א. weighs heavier certainly than the presence of it in LXX. A. (Procop., Syro-Hexap.), since the translation is not independent, but is transferred from Isa. lix. 7; but if for the first time, at a later period, it is supplied in the LXX., yet it has the appearance of an addition made to the Hebr. text from Isa. lix. 7 (Hitzig, Lagarde); cf. *Comm. on Isaiah*, xl.-lxvi. לְשֹׁפֵף is always pointed thus; for, as a regular rule, after ל as well as מ the aspiration disappears; but in Ezek. xvii. 17 בְּשֹׁפֵף is also found, and in this case (cf. at Ps. xl. 15) the punctuation is thus inconsequent.

Ver. 17. The *second* argument in support of the warning.

For in vain is the net spread out  
In the eyes of all (the winged) birds.

The interpretation *conspersum est rete*, namely, with corn as a bait, which was put into circulation by Rashi, is inadmissible; for as little as הָזָה (*Hiph.* of נָזָה) can mean to strew, can זָרָה mean to spread. The object is always that which is scattered (*gestreut*), not that which is spread (*bestreut*). Thus, *expansum est rete*, but not from מָזַר, *extendere*, from which מְזוֹרָה in this form cannot be derived (it would in that case be מְזוֹרָה), but from זָרָה, pass. of זָרָה, to scatter, spread out. The alluring net, when it is shaken out and spread, is, as it were, scattered, *ventilatur*. But if this is done incautiously before the eyes of the birds to be caught, they forthwith fly away. The principal stress lies on the בְּעֵינֵי (before the eyes) as the reason of the הֶזֶם (in vain), according to the saying of Ovid, *Quæ nimis apparent retia, vitat avis*. The *applicatio similitudinis* lying near, according to J. H. Michaelis, is missed even by himself and by most others. If the poet wished to say that they carried on their work of blood with such open boldness, that he must be more than a simpleton who would allow himself to be caught by them, that would be an unsuitable ground of warning; for would there not be equally great need for warning against fellowship with them, if they had begun their enticement with more cunning, and reckoned on greater success? Hitzig, Ewald, Zöckler, and others, therefore interpret חנם, not in the sense of

<sup>1</sup> The ms. Masora remarks לִית וְחָסֵר, and hence מְזוֹרָה is written defectively in the *Erfurt*, 1, 2, 3, *Frankf.* 1294, in the edition of Nörzi and elsewhere.

in vain, inasmuch as they do not let themselves be caught; but: in vain, for they see not the net, but only the scattered corn. But according to the preceding, הָרֶשֶׁת (the net) leads us to think only either of the net of the malicious designs, or the net of the alluring deceptions. Thus, as Ziegler has noticed, the warned ought to make application of the similitude to himself: Go not with them, for their intention is bad; go not with them, for if the bird flees away from the net which is spread out before it, thou wilt not surely be so blind as suffer thyself to be ensnared by their gross enticements. בָּעַל כָּנָף: the furnished with the wing (wings in Eccles. x. 20); בַּעַל forms the idea of property (lord).

Ver. 18. The causal conj. כִּי (for) in vers. 16 and 17 are co-ordinated; and there now follows, introduced by the conj. ו ("and"), a *third* reason for the warning:

And they lie in wait for their own blood,  
They lay snares for their own lives.

The warning of ver. 16 is founded on the immorality of the conduct of the enticer; that of 17 on the audaciousness of the seduction as such, and now on the self-destruction which the robber and murderer bring upon themselves: they wish to murder others, but, as the result shows, they only murder themselves. The expression is shaped after ver. 11, as if it were: They lay snares, as they themselves say, for the blood of others; but it is in reality for their *own* blood: they certainly lie in wait, as they say; but not, as they add, for the innocent, but for their own lives (Fl.). Instead of לְדָמָם, there might be used לְדַמְיָהֶם, after Mic. vii. 2; but לְנַפְשָׁם would signify *ipsis* (post-biblical, לְעַצְמָם), while לְנַפְשָׁתָם leaves unobliterated the idea of the life: *animis ipsorum*; for if the O. T. language seeks to express *ipse* in any other way than by the personal pronoun spoken emphatically, this is done by the addition of נַפֵּשׁ (Isa. liii. 11). וְהֵם was on this account necessary, because ver. 17 has another subject (cf. Ps. lxiii. 10).

Ver. 19. An *epiphonema*:

Such is the lot of all who indulge in covetousness;  
It takes away the life of its owner.

This language is formed after Job viii. 13. Here, as there, in the word אֶצְרוֹת, the ideas of action and issue, manner of life and its result, are all combined. בָּצַע signifies properly that which is cut off, a piece, fragment broken off, then that which one breaks off and takes to himself—booty, gain, particularly unjust gain

(xxviii. 16).  $\text{בַּצֵּעַ בַּצֵּעַ}$  is he who is greedy or covetous. The subject to  $\text{לָקַח}$  is  $\text{בַּצֵּעַ}$ , covetousness,  $\pi\lambda\epsilon\omicron\nu\epsilon\xi\acute{\iota}\alpha$  (see Isa. lvii. 17). As Hosea, iv. 11, says of three other things that they take away  $\text{לֵב}$ , the understanding ( $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ ), so here we are taught regarding unjust gain or covetousness, that it takes away  $\text{נַפְשׁ}$ , the life ( $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ ) ( $\text{לָקַח נַפְשׁ}$ , to take away the life, 1 Kings xix. 10, Ps. xxxi. 14).  $\text{בַּעֲלֵי}$  denotes not the possessor of unjust gain, but as an inward conception, like  $\text{בַּעַל אֵף}$ , xxii. 24, cf. xxiii. 2, xxiv. 8, Eccles. x. 11, him of whom covetousness is the property. The sing.  $\text{נַפְשׁ}$  does not show that  $\text{בַּעֲלֵי}$  is thought of as sing.; cf. xxii. 23, Ps. xxxiv. 23; but according to iii. 27, xvi. 22, Eccles. viii. 8, this is nevertheless probable, although the usage without the suffix is always  $\text{בַּצֵּעַ}$ , and not  $\text{בַּעֲלֵי}$  (of plur. intens.  $\text{בַּעֲלִים}$ ).

## SECOND INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, I. 20-33.

### DISCOURSE OF WISDOM TO HER DESPISERS.

After the teacher of wisdom has warned his disciples against the allurements of self-destroying sin, whose beastly demoniacal nature culminates in murder and robbery, he introduces Wisdom herself saying how by enticing promises and deterring threatenings she calls the simple and the perverse to repentance. Wisdom is here personified, *i.e.* represented as a person. But this personification presupposes, that to the poet wisdom is more than a property and quality of human subjectivity: she is to him as a divine power, existing independently, to submit to which is the happiness of men, and to reject which is their destruction. And also to the public appearance of wisdom, as it is here represented, there must be present objective reality, without which the power of conviction departs from the figure. The author must think on historical and biographical facts, on human organs (as 2 Chron. xvii. 7-9, cf. Wisd. vii. 27), through which, without words and in words, Wisdom delivers such addresses. But the figure cannot be so historical that it sustains only the relation to a definite time, and not to all time; it is a call to repentance, going forth to all time and to all places, which, divested of all the accidents of its externality, he here refers to its invisible divine background, when he begins in these words:

- 20 Wisdom cries, sounding loudly in the streets,  
 She causes her voice to be heard in the chief streets.  
 21 Over the places of greatest tumult she calleth ;  
 In the porches of the gates, in the city, she speaketh forth her words.

Ver. 20. Looking to its form and vocalization, חִכְמוֹת may be an Aramaizing abstract formation (Gesen.; Ew. 165, c; Olsh. 219, b); for although the forms אֲחוֹת and נָלוֹת are of a different origin, yet in רְבוֹת and הוֹלָלוֹת such abstract formations lie before us. The termination *ûth* is here, by the passing over of the *u* into the less obscure but more intensive *o* (cf. יְהוּ in the beginning and middle of the word, and יְהוּ יְהוּ at the end of the word), raised to *ôth*, and thereby is brought near to the fem. plur. (cf. חִכְמוֹת, xiv. 1, *sapientia*, as our plur. of the neut. *sapiens*, חִכְמָה), approaching to the abstract. On the other hand, that חִכְמוֹת is sing. of abstract signification, is not decisively denoted by its being joined to the plur. of the predicate (for תִּרְנָה here, as at viii. 3, is scarcely plur.; and if רִאמוֹת, xxiv. 7, is plur., חִכְמוֹת as the numerical plur. may refer to the different sciences or departments of knowledge); but perhaps by this, that it interchanges with תְּבוּנוֹת, Ps. xlix. 4, cf. Prov. xi. 12, xxviii. 16, and that an abstract formation from חִכְמָה (fem. of חָכַם, חִכְמָה), which besides is not concrete, was unnecessary. Still less is חִכְמוֹת = חִכְמָה a singular, which has it in view to change חִכְמָה into a proper name, for proof of which Hitzig refers to תְּהוֹמוֹת, Ps. lxxviii. 15; the singular ending *ôth* without an abstract signification does not exist. After that Dietrich, in his *Abhandl.* 1846, has shown that the origin of the plur. proceeds not from separate calculation, but from comprehension,<sup>1</sup> and that particularly also names denoting intellectual strength are frequently plur., which multiply the conception not externally but internally, there is no longer any justifiable doubt that חִכְמוֹת signifies the all-comprehending, absolute, or, as Böttcher, § 689, expresses it, the full personal wisdom. Since such intensive plurals are sometimes united with the plur. of the predicate, as e.g. the monotheistically interpreted *Elohim*, Gen. xxxv. 7 (see *l. c.*), so תִּרְנָה may be plur. On the other hand, the idea that it is a *forma mixta* of תִּרְנָה (from רָנַן) and תִּרְנָה (Job xxxix. 23) or תִּרְנָה, the final sound in *ah* opposes. It may, however, be the emphatic form of the 3d fem. sing. of רָנַן; for, that the

<sup>1</sup> In the Indo-Germanic languages the *s* of the plur. also probably proceeds from the prep. *sa* (*sam*) = *συν*. See Schleicher, *Compend. der vergl. Gram.* § 247.

Hebr. has such an emphatic form, corresponding to the Arab. *taktubanna*, is shown by these three examples (keeping out of view the suspicion of a corruption of the text, Olsh. p. 452), Judg. v. 26, Job xvii. 16, Isa. xxviii. 3; cf. תִּשְׁלַחְנָה, Obad. 13 (see Caspari, *l.c.*), an example of the 2d masc. sing. of this formation. רִנָּן (with רָנָה) is a word imitative of sound (*Schallwort*), used to denote “a clear-sounding, shrill voice (thence the Arab. *rannan*, of a speaker who has a clear, piercing voice); then the clear shrill sound of a string or chord of a bow, or the clear tinkle of the arrow in the quiver, and of the metal that has been struck” (Fl.). The meaning of רִחְבוֹת is covered by *plateæ* (Luke xiv. 21), wide places; and חוץ, which elsewhere may mean that which is without, before the gates of the city and courts, here means the “open air,” in contradistinction to the inside of the houses.

Ver. 21. הַמְּיוֹת (plur. of הוֹמִי, the ground-form of הוֹמָה, from הָמָה = הִמָּה), “they who are making noise;” for the epithet is poetically used (Isa. xxii. 2) as a substantive, crowded noisy streets or places. ראש is the place from which on several sides streets go forth: cf. *ras el-ain*, the place where the well breaks forth; *ras en-nahr*, the place from which the stream divides itself; the sing. is meant distributively as little as at viii. 2. פֶּתַח, if distinguished from שַׁעַר (which also signifies cleft, breach), is the opening of the gate, the entrance by the gate. Four times the poet says that Wisdom goes forth preaching, and four times that she preaches publicly; the בְּעִיר used in five places implies that Wisdom preaches not in the field, before the few who there are met with, but in the city, which is full of people.

Ver. 22. The poet has now reached that part of his introduction where he makes use of the very words uttered by Wisdom:

How long, ye simple, will ye love simplicity,  
And scorers delight in scorning,  
And fools hate knowledge?

Three classes of men are here addressed: the פְּתִיִּים, the simple, who, being accessible to seduction, are only too susceptible of evil; the לְצִיִּים, mockers, *i.e.* free-thinkers (from לָוִץ, Arab. *lus*, *flectere*, *torquere*, properly *qui verbis obliquis utitur*); and the בְּסִילִים, fools, *i.e.* the mentally imbecile and stupid (from בָּסַל, Arab. *kasal*, to be thick, coarse, indolent). The address to these passes immediately over into a declaration regarding them; cf. the same enallage, i. 27 f. עֲרֻמָּתִי has the accent *Mahpach*, on account of the *Pasek* following; *vid. Torath*

*Emeth*, p. 26. Intentionally, Wisdom addresses only the פתים, to whom she expects to find soonest access. Between the futt., which express the continuing love and hatred, stands the perf. הִמְדוּ, which expresses that in which the mockers found pleasure, that which was the object of their love. לָהֶם is the so-called *dat. ethicus*, which reflexively refers to that which is said to be the will and pleasure of the subject; as we say, "I am fond of this and that." The form תִּהְיֶה, Abulwalîd, Parchon, and Kimchi regard as *Piel*; but תִּהְיֶה instead of תִּהְיֶה would be a recompensation of the virtual doubling, defacing the character of the *Piel*. Schultens regards it as a defectively written *Paiël* (in Syr.), but it is not proved that this conjugation exists in Hebr.; much rather תִּהְיֶה is the only possible *Kal* form with תִּהְיֶה without the pause, regularly formed from תִּהְיֶה (*vid.* Ewald, § 193, a). The division by the accent *Mercha-Mahpach* of the two words תִּהְיֶה פתים is equal in value to the connecting of them by *Makkeph*; *vid.* Baer's *Psalterium*, p. x. In codd., and also in correct texts, תִּהְיֶה is written with the accent *Galgal* on the first syllable, as the servant of the *Mercha-Mahpach*. The *Gaja* is incorrectly here and there placed under the ת.

Ver. 23. To the call to thoughtfulness which lies in the complaint "How long?" there follows the entreaty:

Turn ye at my reproof!  
Behold! I would pour out my Spirit upon you,  
I would make you to know my words.

23a is not a clause expressive of a wish, which with the particle expressive of a wish, which is wanting, would be תִּשְׁכַּח־נָא, or according to xxiii. 1 and xxvii. 23 would be שׁוּב תִּשְׁכַּח. The הִנֵּה, introducing the principal clause, stamps 23a as the conditional clause; the relation of the expressions is as Isa. xxvi. 10, Job xx. 24. תִּשְׁכַּח<sup>1</sup> is not equivalent to *si convertamini*, which would require תִּפְנֵי, but to *si revertamini*; but לְתוֹכַחְתִּי<sup>2</sup> does not therefore mean at my reproof, *i.e.* in consequence of it (*Hitzig*, after Num. xvi. 34), but it is a *constructio prægnaus*: turning and placing yourselves under my reproof. With תוֹכַח there is supposed an ἔλεγχος (LXX., Symm.): bringing proof, conviction, punishment. If

<sup>1</sup> In the *Hagiographa* everywhere written *plene*, with exception of Job xvii. 10.

<sup>2</sup> The *Metheg* belongs to the ת, under which it should be placed (and not to the ל), as the commencing sound of the second syllable before the tone-syllable; cf. ver. 25.

they, leaving their hitherto accustomed way, permit themselves to be warned against their wickedness, then would Wisdom cause her words to flow forth to them, *i.e.* would without reserve disclose and communicate to them her spirit, cause them to know (namely by experience) her words. הִבִּיעַ (from נָבַע, R. נָב; *vid. Genesis*, p. 635) is a common figurative word, expressive of the free pouring forth of thoughts and words, for the mouth is conceived of as a fountain (cf. xviii. 4 with Matt. xii. 34), and the *ῥῆσις* (*vid. LXX.*) as *ῥεῦσις*; only here it has the Spirit as object, but parallel with דְּבַרִּי, thus the Spirit as the active power of the words, which, if the Spirit expresses Himself in them, are πνεῦμα καὶ ζωή, John vi. 63. The addresses of Wisdom in the Book of Proverbs touch closely upon the discourses of the Lord in the Logos-Gospel. Wisdom appears here as the fountain of the words of salvation for men; and these words of salvation are related to her, just as the λόγοι to the divine λόγος expressing Himself therein.

Vers. 24-27. The address of Wisdom now takes another course. Between vers. 23 and 24 there is a pause, as between Isa. i. 20 and 21. In vain Wisdom expects that her complaints and enticements will be heard. Therefore she turns her call to repentance into a discourse announcing judgment.

- 24 Because I have called, and ye refused;  
Stretched out my hand, and no man regarded;
- 25 And ye have rejected all my counsel,  
And to my reproof have not yielded:
- 26 Therefore will I also laugh at your calamity,  
Will mock when your terror cometh;
- 27 When like a storm your terror cometh,  
And your destruction sweeps on like a whirlwind;  
When distress and anguish cometh upon you.

Commencing with עַל (which, like מַעַן, from עָנָה, to oppose, denotes the intention, but more the fundamental reason or the cause than, as לְמַעַן, the motive or object), the clause, connected with וְנִסִּיתִי, *ego vicissim*, turns to the conclusion. As here וְעַל קִרְבָּתִי (as the word of Jahve) are connected by וְנִסִּיתִי to the expression of the *talia* in Isa. lxvi. 4, so also מִמֶּנִּי, with its contrast וְנִסִּיתִי, Isa. i. 19 f. The construction *quoniam vocari et renuistis* for *quoniam quum vocarem renuistis* (cf. Isa. xii. 1) is the common diffuse (*zers'treute*) Semitic, the paratactic instead of the periodizing style. The stretching out of the hand is, like the "spreading out" in Isa. lxxv. 2, significant of striving to beckon to the wandering, and to bring them near. Regarding

הַקָּשִׁיב, viz. אָזְנִי, to make the ear stiff (R. קש), *arrigere*, incorrectly explained by Schultens, after the Arab. *kashab*, *polire*, by *aurem purgare*, vid. *Isaiah*, p. 257, note.

Ver. 25. פָּרַע is synonymous with נָטַשׁ, i. 8; cf. iv. 15 פָּרַעְהוּ, turn from it. Gesenius has inaccurately interpreted the phrase פָּרַע ראשׁ of the shaving off of the hair, instead of the letting it fly loose. פָּרַע means to loosen (= to lift up, syn. הִחַל), to release, to set free; it combines the meanings of loosening and making empty, or at liberty, which is conveyed in Arab. by فرغ and فرغ. The latter means, intrans., to be set free, therefore to be or to become free from occupation or business; with מִן of an object, to be free from it, i.e. to have accomplished it, to have done with it (Fl.). Thus: since ye have dismissed (*missum fecistis*) all my counsel (לְדָרָה as עֲצָה), from (וְעַז, وَعِظ), i.e. what I always would advise to set you right. אָבָה combines in itself the meanings of consent, i. 10, and compliance, i. 30 (with לָ), and, as here, of acceptance. The principal clause begins like an echo of Ps. ii. 4 (cf. Jer. xx. 7).

Vers. 26, 27. שָׁחַק, as xxxi. 25 shows, is not to be understood with בָּ; בָּ is that of the state or time, not of the object. Regarding אֵיר, *calamitas opprimens, obruens* (from אָוַר = אֹר, to burden, to oppress), see at Ps. xxxi. 12. בָּא is related to יָאֲבֹהַ as arriving to approaching; פֶּה־דָכָם is not that for which they are in terror,—for those who are addressed are in the condition of carnal security,—but that which, in the midst of this, will frighten and alarm them. The *Chethûb* שָׁאוּה is pointed thus, שָׂאוּה (from שָׂאוּ = שָׂאָה, as רָאוּה, רָאוּה after the form אָהֲבָה, אָהֲבָה); the *Kerî* substitutes for this infinitive name the usual particip. שָׂאָה (where then the *Vav* is יתיר, “superfluous”), crashing (fem. of שָׂאָה), then a crash and an overthrow with a crash; regarding its root-meaning (to be waste, and then to sound hollow), see under Ps. xxxv. 8. סוּפָה (from סוּף = סָפָה), sweeping forth as a (see x. 25) whirlwind. The infinitive construction of 27a is continued in 27b in the finite. “This syntactical and logical attraction, by virtue of which a *modus* or *tempus* passes by ו or by the mere parallel arrangement (as ii. 2) from one to another, attracted into the signification and nature of the latter, is peculiar to the Hebr. If there follows a new clause or section of a clause where the discourse takes, as it were, a new departure, that attraction ceases, and the original form of expression is resumed; cf. i. 22, where after the accent *Athnach* the future is returned to, as here

in 27c the infinitive construction is restored" (Fl.). The alliterating words צָרָה וְצִקָּה, cf. Isa. xxx. 6, Zeph. i. 15, are related to each other as narrowness and distress (Hitzig); the Mashal is fond of the stave-rhyme.<sup>1</sup>

Vers. 28-31. Then—this sublime preacher in the streets continues—distress shall teach them to pray:

- 28 Then shall they call on me, and I will not answer;  
 They shall early seek after me, and not find me;  
 29 Because that they hated knowledge,  
 And did not choose the fear of Jahve.  
 30 They have not yielded to my counsel,  
 Despised all my reproof:  
 31 Therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their way,  
 And satiate themselves with their own counsels.

In the full emphatic forms, יִקְרְאוּנִי, they shall call on me, יִשְׁחַרְנוּנִי, they shall seek me, and יִמְצְאוּנִי, they shall find me, the suffix נִי may be joined to the old plur. ending *ûn* (Gesenius, Olshausen, Böttcher); but open forms like יְבַרְכֵּהוּ, He will bless him, יְכַבְּדֵנִי, He will honour me (from יְכַבְּדֵנִי), and the like, rather favour the conclusion that נ is epenthetic (Ew. § 250, b).<sup>2</sup> The address here takes the form of declaration: *Stultos nunc indignos censet ulteriori alloquio* (Mich.). It is that laughter and scorn, ver. 26, which here sounds forth from the address of the Judge regarding the incorrigible. שָׁחַר is denom. of שָׁחַר, to go out and to seek with the morning twilight, as also בָּקַר, Ps. xxvii. 5, perhaps to appear early, and usually (Arab.) *bakar* (I. II. IV.), to rise early, to be zealous (Lane: "He hastened to do or accomplish, or attain the thing needed"). Zöckler, with Hitzig, erroneously regards vers. 29, 30 as the antecedent to ver. 31. With וַיֹּאכְלוּ, "and they shall eat," the fut. announcing judgment are continued from ver. 28; cf. Deut. xxviii. 46-48. The conclusion after כִּי, "therefore because," or as usually expressed (except

<sup>1</sup> Jul. Ley, in his work on the *Metrical Forms of Hebrew Poetry*, 1866, has taken too little notice of these frequently occurring alliteration staves; Lagarde communicated to me (8th Sept. 1846) his view of the stave-rhyme in the Book of Proverbs, with the remark, "Only the Hebr. technical poetry is preserved to us in the O. T. records; but in such traces as are found of the stave-rhyme, there are seen the echoes of the poetry of the people, or notes passing over from it."

<sup>2</sup> In the Codd. יִקְרְאוּנִי is written; in this case the *Metheg* indicates the tone syllable: *vid. Torah Emeth*, p. 7 note, p. 21 note; and *Accentssystem*, ii. § 1, note. In יִשְׁחַרְנוּנִי the *Rebia* is to be placed over the ר. In the *Silluk*-word יִמְצְאוּנִי it appears undoubtedly that the form is to be spoken as *Milel*, i.e. with tone on the penult.

here and Deut. iv. 37, cf. Gen. iv. 25), *תַּחַת אִשֶּׁר* (*avth' w'v*), is otherwise characterized, Deut. xxii. 29, 2 Chron. xxi. 12; and besides, *אִשֶּׁר תַּחַת אִשֶּׁר* stands after (*e.g.* 1 Sam. xxvi. 21; 2 Kings xxii. 17; Jer. xxix. 19) oftener than before the principal clause. *בָּחַר* combines in itself the meanings of *eligere* and *diligere* (Fl.). The construction of *לְאָבָה* (to be inclining towards) follows that of the analogous *לְשִׁמַּע* (to hear). Each one eats of the fruit of his way—good fruit of good ways (Isa. iii. 10), and evil fruit of evil ways. “The *מן*, 31b, introduces the object from which, as a whole, that which one eats, and with which he is satisfied, is taken as a part, or the object from which, as from a fountain, satisfaction flows forth” (Fl.). In correct texts, *וַיֵּאָכְלוּ* has the accent *Dechî*, and at the same time *Munach* as its servant. Regarding the laws of punctuation, according to which *וּמִמְעֻצֵּיהֶם* (with *Munach* on the tone-syllable, *Tarcha* on the antepenult, and *Metheg* before the *Chateph-Pathach*) is to be written, see Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 11, *Accentssystem*, iv. § 4. Norzi accents the word incorrectly with *Rebia Mugrash*. With the exception of Prov. xxii. 22, the pluralet<sup>1</sup> *מוֹעֲצוֹת* has always the meaning of ungodly counsels.

Vers. 32, 33. The discourse is now summarily brought to a close:

32 For the perverseness of the simple slays them,  
And the security of fools destroys them.

33 But whoever hearkeneth to me dwells secure,  
And is at rest from fear of evil.

Of the two interpretations of *שׁוּב*, a turning towards (with *אָל* and the like, conversion) or a turning away (with *מֵאַחֲרַי* or *מֵעַל*, desertion), in *מִשׁוּבָה* the latter (as in the *post-Bib.* *תְּשׁוּבָה*, repentance, the former) is expressed; apostasy from wisdom and from God are conjoined. *שְׁלוֹה* is here *carnalis securitas*; but the word may also denote the external and the internal peace of the righteous, as *שְׁאָנָן*, whence *שְׁלֵאָנָן*, Job xxi. 23, as a superlative is formed by the insertion of the *ל* of *שָׁלוּ*, is taken in *bonam et malam partem*. *שְׁאָנָן* is, according to the Masora (also in Jer. xxx. 10, xlv. 27, xlviii. 11), 3d perf. *Pilel* (Ewald, § 120, *a*), from the unused *שָׁאָן*, to be quiet: he has attained to full quietness, and enjoys such. The construction with *מן* follows the analogy of *מִן הַיָּיִת* (to give rest from), *שָׁקַט מִן* (to rest from), and the like. The negative interpretation of *מן*, *sine ullo pavorē mali*

<sup>1</sup> [A plur. denoting unity in the circumstances, and a similarity in the relations of time and space.]

(Schultens, Ewald), is unnecessary; also Job xxi. 9 may be explained by "peace from terror," especially since שָׁלוֹם is derived from the root של, *extrahere*. פֶּחַד רָעָה, "fear of evil," one may perhaps distinguish from פֶּחַד רָע as the genitive of combination.

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### THIRD INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, II.

#### EARNEST STRIVING AFTER WISDOM AS THE WAY TO THE FEAR OF GOD AND TO VIRTUE.

The admonition so far has almost wholly consisted of warning and threatening. The teacher, directing back to the discipline of the paternal home, warns against fellowship in the bloody deeds of the covetous, which issue in self-murder; and Wisdom holds up before her despisers the mirror of the punishment which awaits them. Now the admonition becomes positive. The teacher describes separately the blessings of the endeavour after wisdom; the endeavour after wisdom, which God rewards with the gift of wisdom, leads to religious and moral knowledge, and this guards men on the way of life from all evil. The teacher accordingly interweaves conditions and promises:

- 1 My son, if thou receivest my words,  
And keepest my commandments by thee;
- 2 So that thou inclinest thine ear unto wisdom,  
Turnest thine heart to understanding;—
- 3 Yea, if thou callest after knowledge,  
To understanding directest thy voice;
- 4 If thou seekest her as silver,  
And searchest for her as for treasures:
- 5 Then shalt thou understand the fear of Jahve,  
And find the knowledge of God.
- 6 For Jahve giveth wisdom:  
From His mouth cometh knowledge and understanding.
- 7 He preserves for the upright promotion;  
A shield for such as walk in innocence.
- 8 For He protects the paths of justice,  
And guards the way of His saints.

The first אֵן, with that which it introduces, vers. 1, 2, is to be interpreted as an exclamation, "O that!" (*O si*), and then as an optative, as Ps. lxxxi. 9, cxxxix. 19. אֵן . . . 'ךָ, vers. 3–5, with

the inserted connecting clauses, would then be confirmatory, "for then." But since this poet loves to unfold one and the same thought in ever new forms, one has perhaps to begin the conditional premisses with ver. 1, and to regard **כִּי אֵם** as a new commencement. Hitzig takes this **כִּי אֵם** in the sense of *imo*: "much more if thou goest to meet her, *e.g.* by curious inquiry, not merely permittest her quietly to come to thee." **אֵם** would then preserve its conditional meaning; and **כִּי**, as in Job xxxi. 18, Ps. cxxx. 4, since it implies an intentional negative, would receive the meaning of *imo*. But the sentences ranged together with **אֵם** are too closely related in meaning to admit such a negative between them. **כִּי** will thus be confirmatory, not mediately, but immediately; it is the "for = yes" of confirmation of the preceding conditions, and takes them up again (Ewald, § 356 *b*, cf. 330 *b*) after the form of the conditional clause was given up. The **צָפַן**, which in i. 11, 18 is the synonym of **צָפָה**, *speculari*, presents itself here, 1*b*, 7*a*, as the synonym of **טָמַן**, whence **מִטְמוֹנִים**, synon. of **צִפְיוֹנִים**, *recondita*; the group of sounds, **צָפָה**, **צָם**, **טָם** (cf. also **דָּף**, in Arab. *dafan*, whence *dafynat*, treasure), express shades of the root representation of pressing together. The inf. of the conclusion **לְהִקְשִׁיב**, to incline (Gr. Venet. ὡς ἀκροῶτο), is followed by the accus. of the object **אָזְנְךָ**, thine ear, for **הִקְשִׁיב** properly means to stiffen (not to purge, as Schultens, nor to sharpen, as Gesenius thinks); cf. under Ps. x. 17. With **הַבִּינָה** are interchanged **בִּינָה**, which properly means that which is distinguished or separated, and **תְּבִינָה**, which means the distinguishing, separating, appellations of the capacity of distinguishing in definite cases and in general; but it does not represent this as a faculty of the soul, but as a divine power which communicates itself as the gift of God (*charisma*).

Vers. 3–8. Instead of **כִּי אֵם** there is an old **אֵל תְּקַרֵּי**<sup>1</sup> (read not so, but thus), **כִּי אֵם** (if thou callest understanding mother), which supposes the phrase **כִּי אֵם** (LXX.) as traditional. If **אֵם** were intended (according to which the Targ. in the *Bibl. rabbinica*, but not in Norzi's text, translates), then 3*b* would correspond; *vid.* vii. 4, cf. Job xvii. 14. Thus: Yea, if thou callest for understanding, *i.e.* callest her to thee (xviii. 6), invitest her to thee (ix. 15). The **ק** of **בִּקְשִׁי** is, with the exception of the imper. (*e.g.* **בִּקְשִׁי**), always without the *Dagesh*. Ver. 4*b* belongs to the ideas in the Book of Job found in these introductory discourses, cf. Job iii. 21, as at ver.

<sup>1</sup> Regarding this formula, see Strack's *Prolegomena*, pp. 66–70.

14, Job iii. 22 (Ewald, *Sprüche*, p. 49). חֲפָטָה (חֲפָטָה), *scrutari*, proceeds, as חֲפָטָה shows, from the primary meaning of a ditch, and is thus in its root-idea related to חָפַר (to dig, search out). In the principal clause of ver. 5 the 'יִרְצֵת ה' as Ps. xix. 10, is the fear of Jahve as it ought to be, thus the reverence which is due to Him, the worshipping of Him as revealed. 'ה' and אֱלֹהִים are interchanged as קִרְשִׁים and 'ה' at ix. 10. דַּעַת is knowledge proceeding from practice and experience, and thus not merely cognition (*Kenntnis*), but knowledge (*Erkenntnis*). The thoughts revolve in a circle only apparently. He who strives after wisdom earnestly and really, reaches in this way fellowship with God; for just as He gives wisdom, it is nowhere else than with Him, and it never comes from any other source than from Him. It comes (ver. 6) מִפִּי (LXX. erroneously מִפְּנֵי), i.e. it is communicated through the medium of His word, Job xxii. 22, or also (for λόγος and πνεῦμα lie here undistinguished from one another) it is His breath (Book of Wisdom vii. 25: ἀτμὶς τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀπὸ ῥόγια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης ἐίλικρινῆς); the inspiration (נִשְׁמַח) of the Almighty (according to Job xxxii. 8) gives men understanding. In ver. 7a, whether חֶתֶב (Chethûb) or כֶּרִי (Kerî) is read, the meaning is the same. The former is the expression of the completed fact, as ἡτοίμασεν, 1 Cor. ii. 9, and is rightly preferred by LXX. and Syr., for one reluctantly misses the copula (since the thought is new in comparison with ver. 6). חֶתֶב should be written with the accent *Dechê*. The Chokma-word (besides in Proverbs and Job, found only in Mic. vi. 9 and Isa. xxviii. 29) חֶתֶב is a *Hiphil* formation (with the passing over of ô into û, as in חֶתֶב from חוֹשֵׁב) (whence the pr. names חֶשֶׁב and חֶשֶׁב) = (Arab.) *wasy* and *âsy*, to re-establish, to advance, *Hiph.* of חָשַׁב = חָשַׁב, to stand, and thus means furtherance, i.e. the power or the gift to further, and concretely that which furthers and profits, particularly true wisdom and true fortune.<sup>1</sup> The derivation from חָשַׁב (viii. 21) is to be rejected, because "the formation would be wholly without analogy, so much the more because the ' of this word does not represent the place of the ' as

<sup>1</sup> I was formerly in error in regarding the word as a *Hophal* formation, and in assigning to it the primary signification of being in a state of realized existence, of reality, in contradistinction to appearance only. The objection of J. D. Michaelis, *Supplem.* p. 1167, *Non placent in linguis ejusmodi etyma metaphysica*, etc., does not apply here, since the word is a new one coined by the *Chokma*, but all the shades of meaning are naturally derived from the funda-

is seen from the Arab. ليس and the Syr. ܠܝܣ (Fl.);<sup>1</sup> and the derivation of שָׁוה = וְשָׁה, to be smooth (Hitzig), passes over without any difficulty into another system of roots.<sup>2</sup> In the passage under consideration (ver. 7), תְּוַשִּׁיָּה signifies advancement in the sense of true prosperity. The parallel passage 7a clothes itself in the form of an apposition: (He) a shield (מָגֵן, *n. instr.* of מָגַן, to cover) for הַלְכֵי תָם, pilgrims of innocence (Fl.), *i.e.* such as walk in the way (the object-accus., as vi. 12, for which in x. 9 בֶּן) of innocence. תָם is whole, full submission, moral faultlessness, which chooses God with the whole heart, seeks good without exception: a similar thought is found in Ps. lxxxiv. 12. לִבְנֵיךָ, 8a, is such an inf. of consequence as לְהַקְשִׁיב (ver. 2), and here, as there, is continued in the finite. The “paths of justice” are understood with reference to those who enter them and keep in them; parallel, “the way of His saints” (חֲסִיד, he who cherishes חֶסֶד, earnest inward love to God), for that is just אֶרֶץ-צִדְקָה (xii. 28): they are הַלְכֵי צִדְקוֹת (Isa. xxxiii. 15). Instead of the *Mugrash*, the conjunctive *Tarcha* is to be given to יוֹרֶדָה.

Vers. 9–11. With the אֵן repeated, the promises encouraging to the endeavour after wisdom take a new departure:

- 9 Then shalt thou understand righteousness, and justice,  
And uprightness; every way of good.
- 10 For wisdom will enter into thine heart,  
And knowledge will do good to thy soul;
- 11 Discretion will keep watch over thee,  
Understanding will keep thee.

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mental signification “furtherance” (cf. Seneca, *Deus stator stabilitorque est*). “תושיה, from Arab. *âsy* and *wasy*, to further by word and deed, to assist by counsel and act, to render help, whence the meanings *auxilium*, *salus*, and *prudens consilium*, *sapientia*, easily follow; cf. Ali’s Arab. proverb, *واساك من — تعافل* ‘He furthers thee, who does not trouble himself about thee.’”

<sup>1</sup> The Arab. <sup>ل</sup>أيس (almost only in the negative <sup>ل</sup>ليس = لا يس), of the same signification as <sup>י</sup>יש, with which the Aram. אֵית (אֵיתִי) is associated, pre-

supposes an <sup>א</sup>אס (= <sup>א</sup>אס), to be founded, to found, and is rightly regarded by the Arabs as an old segolate noun in which the verbal force was comprehended.

<sup>2</sup> The Arab. <sup>س</sup>وسى and <sup>س</sup>سوى are confounded in common usage (Wetstein, *Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitschr.* xxii. 19), but the roots <sup>ש</sup>וש and <sup>ש</sup>שו are different; <sup>ש</sup>וש and <sup>ש</sup>אש, on the contrary, are modifications of one root.

Regarding the ethical triad מִישָׁרִים [righteousness, rightness], מִשְׁפָּט [judgment], and צֶדֶק [rectitude], *vid.* i. 3. Seb. Schmid is wrong in his rendering, *et omnis via qua bonum aditur erit tibi plana*, which in comparison with Isa. xxvi. 7 would be feebly expressed. J. H. Michaelis rightly interprets all these four conceptions as object-accusatives; the fourth is the summarizing asyndeton (cf. Ps. viii. 7) breaking off the enumeration: *omnem denique orbitam boni*; Jerome, *bonam*: in this case, however, טוֹב would be genitive (*vid.* xvii. 2). מַעֲגָל is the way in which the chariot rolls along; in עָגַל there are united the root-conceptions of that which is round (גַּל) and rolling (גָּל). Whether כִּי, ver. 10, is the argumentative “because” (according to the versions and most interpreters) or “for” (“*denn*,” J. H. Michaelis, Ewald, and others), is a question. That with כִּי = “for” the subject would precede the verb, as at vers. 6, 21, and i. 32 (Hitzig), determines nothing, as ver. 18 shows. On the one hand, the opinion that כִּי = “because” is opposed by the analogy of the כִּי, ver. 6, following אִשָּׁף, ver. 5; the inequality between vers. 5-8 and ver. 9 ff. if the new commencement, ver. 9, at once gives place to another, ver. 10; the relationship of the subject ideas in vers. 10, 11, which makes ver. 11 unsuitable to be a conclusion from ver. 10. On the contrary, the promise not only of intellectual, but at the same time also of practical, insight into the right and the good, according to their whole compass and in their manifoldness, can be established or explained quite well as we thus read vers. 10, 11: For wisdom will enter (namely, to make it a dwelling-place, xiv. 33; cf. John xiv. 23) into thine heart, and knowledge will do good to thy soul (namely, by the enjoyment which arises from the possession of knowledge, and the rest which its certainty yields). דַּעַת, γνῶσις, is elsewhere fem. (Ps. cxxxix. 6), but here, as at viii. 10, xiv. 6, in the sense of τὸ γινῶναι, is masc. In ver. 11 the contents of the אִזְ תִּבִּין (ver. 9) are further explained. שָׁמַר עַל, of watching (for Job xvi. 16 is to be interpreted differently), is used only by our poet (here and at vi. 22). Discretion, *i.e.* the capacity of well-considered action, will hold watch over thee, take thee under protection; understanding, *i.e.* the capacity in the case of opposing rules to make the right choice, and in the matter of extremes to choose the right medium, will be bestowed upon thee. In תִּנְצֶרְפָּה, as in Ps. lxi. 8, cxi. 2, 5, Deut. xxxiii. 9, etc., the first stem letter is not assimilated, in order that the word may have a

fuller sound; the writing כָּה־ for הָ־ is meant to affect the eye.<sup>1</sup>

Vers. 12–15. As in vers. 10, 11, the אָז תִּבְיֶן (“then shalt thou understand,” ver. 5) is expanded, so now the watching, preserving, is separately placed in view:

- 12 To deliver thee from an evil way,  
From the man who speaks falsehood;
- 13 (From those) who forsake the ways of honesty  
To walk in ways of darkness,
- 14 Who rejoice to accomplish evil,  
Delight in malignant falsehood—
- 15 They are crooked in their paths,  
And perverse in their ways.

That דֶּרֶךְ רָע is not genitival, *via mali*, but adjectival, *via mala*, is evident from דֶּרֶךְ לֹא־טוֹב, xvi. 29. From the evil way, *i.e.* conduct, stands opposed to the false words represented in the person of the deceiver; from both kinds of *contagium* wisdom delivers. תְּהַפְּכוֹת (like the similarly formed תְּהַבְּלוֹת, occurring only as plur.) means misrepresentations, *viz.* of the good and the true, and that for the purpose of deceiving (xvii. 20), *fallaciæ*, *i.e.* intrigues in conduct, and lies and deceit in words. Fl. compares Arab. *ifk*, a lie, and *affak*, a liar. לְהַצִּילָהּ has *Munach*, the constant servant of *Dechî*, instead of *Metheg*, according to rule (*Accentssystem*, vii. § 2). הָעֵצִים (ver. 13) is connected with the collective אֵשׁ (cf. Judg. ix. 55); we have in the translation separated it into a relative clause with the abstract present. The vocalization of the article fluctuates, yet the expression הָעֵצִים, like ver. 17 הָעֹבֶת, is the better established (*Michlol* 53b); הָעֵצִים is one of the three words which retain their *Metheg*, and yet add to it a *Munach* in the tone-syllable (*vid.* the two others, Job xxii. 4, xxxix. 26). To the “ways of honesty” (*Geradheit*) (cf. the adj. expression, Jer. xxxi. 9), which does not shun to come to the light, stand opposed the “ways of darkness,” the ἔργα τοῦ σκοτους, Rom. xiii. 12, which designedly conceal themselves from God (Isa. xxix. 15) and men (Job xxiv. 15, xxxviii. 13, 15).

Ver. 14. In this verse the regimen of the מִן, 12b, is to be regarded as lost; the description now goes on independently. Whoever does not shrink back from evil, but gives himself up to deceit, who finally is at home in it as in his own proper life-element,

<sup>1</sup> For the right succession of the accents here, see *Torath Emeth*, p. 49, § 5; *Accentuationssystem*, xviii. § 3.

and rejoices, yea, delights in that which he ought to shun as something destructive and to be rejected. The neut.  $\text{רָע}$  is frequently an attributive genit., vi. 24, xv. 26, xxviii. 5; cf.  $\text{טוב}$ , xxiv. 25, which here, since  $\text{תְּהַפְּכוֹת}$  are those who in themselves are bad, does not separate, but heightens: *perversitates non simplices aut vulgares, sed pessimæ et ex omni parte vitiosæ* (J. H. Michaelis). With  $\text{אֲשֶׁר}$  ( $\text{οἷτινες}$ ), ver. -15, this part is brought to a conclusion. Fleischer, Bertheau, and others interpret  $\text{אֲרָחֶתֶּיָּהֶם}$  as the accus. of the nearer definition, as  $\text{σκολιὸς τὸν νοῦν, τὰς πράξεις}$ ; but should it be an accus., then would we expect, in this position of the words,  $\text{עֲקָשׁוֹ}$  (Isa. lix. 8; Prov. x. 9, cf. ix. 15).  $\text{עֲקָשִׁים}$  is the pred.; for  $\text{אָרַח}$ , like  $\text{דָּרַךְ}$ , admits of both genders.  $\text{וַיִּגְלוּיָם}$  carries in it its subject  $\text{הֵם}$ ;  $\text{לָזָו}$ , like the Arab. *l'd, l'dh*, is a weaker form of  $\text{לָזַן}$ , *flectere, inclinare*, intrans. *recedere*: they are turned aside, inclined out of the way to the right and left in their walk ( $\text{בָּ}$  as xvii. 20).

Vers. 16-19. With the resumption of  $\text{לְהַצִּילָהּ}$ , the watchful protection which wisdom affords to its possessors is further specified in these verses:

- 16 To save thee from the strange woman,  
From the stranger who useth smooth words;
- 17 Who forsakes the companion of her youth,  
And forgets the covenant of her God;
- 18 For she sinks down to death together with her house,  
And to the shadow of Hades her paths—
- 19 All they who go to her return not again,  
And reach not the paths of life

The subject here continued is the fourfold wisdom named in vers. 10, 11.  $\text{זָר}$  signifies *alienus*, which may also be equivalent to *alius populi*, but of a much wider compass—him who does not belong to a certain class (*e.g.* the non-priestly or the laity), the person or thing not belonging to me, or also some other than I designate; on the other hand,  $\text{נִכְרִי}$ , *peregrinus*, scarcely anywhere divests itself of the essential mark of a strange foreign origin. While thus  $\text{אִשָּׁה זָרָה}$  is the non-married wife,  $\text{נִכְרִיָּה}$  designates her as non-Israelitish. Prostitution was partly sanctioned in the cultus of the Midianites, Syrians, and other nations neighbouring to Israel, and thus was regarded as nothing less than customary. In Israel, on the contrary, the law (Deut. xxiii. 18 f.) forbade it under a penalty, and therefore it was chiefly practised by foreign women (xxiii. 27, and cf. the

exception, Ruth ii. 10),<sup>1</sup>—an inveterate vice, which spread itself particularly from the latter days of Solomon, along with general ungodliness, and excusing itself under the polygamy sanctioned by the law, brought ruin on the state. The *Chokma* contends against this, and throughout presents monogamy as alone corresponding to the institution and the idea of the relation. Designating marriage as the “covenant of God,” it condemns not only adulterous but generally promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, because unhallowed and thus unjustifiable, and likewise arbitrary divorce. Regarding the ancient ceremonies connected with the celebration of marriage we are not specially informed; but from ver. 17, Mal. ii. 14 (Ewald, Bertheau, Hitzig, but not Köhler), it appears that the celebration of marriage was a religious act, and that they who were joined together in marriage called God to witness and ratify the vows they took upon themselves. The perf. in the attributive clause *אֲמָרֶיהָ הֵחֵלֵקָהּ* proceeds on the routine acquired in cajoling and dissembling: who has smoothed her words, *i.e.* learned to entice by flattering words (Fl.).

Vers. 17–19. *אֲלֹף*, as here used, has nothing to do with the phylarch-name, similar in sound, which is a denom. of *אָלַף*; but it comes immediately from *אָלַף*, to accustom oneself to a person or cause, to be familiar therewith (while the Aram. *אָלַף*, *יָלַף*, to learn, *Pa.* to teach), and thus means, as the synon. of *רֵעַ*, the companion or familiar associate (*vid.* Schultens). Parallels such as Jer. iii. 4 suggested to the old interpreters the allegorical explanation of the adulteress as the personification of the apostasy or of heresy. Ver. 18a the LXX. translate: *ἔθετο γὰρ παρὰ τῷ θανάτῳ τὸν οἶκον αὐτῆς*: she (the dissolute wife) has placed her house beside death (the abyss of death). This *שָׁחָה* [*ἔθετο*] is perhaps the original, for the text as it lies before us is doubtful, though, rightly understood, admissible. The accentuation marks *בֵּיתָהּ* as the subject, but *בֵּית* is elsewhere always masc., and does not, like the rarer *אֶרֶח*, ver. 15, admit in usage a double gender; also, if the fem. usage were here introduced (Bertheau, Hitzig), then the predicate, even though *בֵּיתָהּ* were regarded as fem., might be, in conformity with rule, *שָׁחָה*, as *e.g.* Isa. ii. 17. *שָׁחָה* is, as in Ps. xlv. 26, 3d pr. of *שָׁחָה*, Arab. *sākh*, to go down, to sink; the emendation *שָׁחָה*

<sup>1</sup> In Talmudic Heb. *אֲרָמִית* (Aramean) has this meaning for the Biblical *נְכָרִיָּה*.

(Joseph Kimchi) does not recommend itself on this account, that שָׁחָה and שָׁחָה mean, according to usage, to stoop or to bend down; and to interpret (Rabag, השפילה) שָׁחָה transitively is inadmissible. For that reason Aben Ezra interprets בֵּיתָה as in apposition: to death, to its house; but then the poet in that case should say אֶל-שָׁחָה, for death is not a house. On the other hand, we cannot perceive in בֵּיתָה an accus. of the nearer definition (J. H. Michaelis, Fl.); the expression would here, as 15a, be refined without purpose. Böttcher has recognised בֵּיתָה as permutative, the personal subject: for she sinks down to death, her house, *i.e.* she herself, together with all that belongs to her; cf. the permutative of the subject, Job xxix. 3, Isa. xxix. 23 (*vid. comm. l.c.*), and the more particular statement of the object, Ex. ii. 6, etc. Regarding רַפָּאִים, shadows of the under-world (from רָפָה, *synon.* הָלָה, weakened, or to become powerless), a word common to the Solomonic writings, *vid. Comment. on Isaiah*, p. 206. What ver. 18b says of the person of the adulteress, ver. 19 says of those who live with her בֵּיתָה, her house-companions. בָּאִיָּה, “those entering in to her,” is equivalent to בָּאִים אֵלֶיהָ; the participle of verbs *eundi et veniendi* takes the accusative object of the finite as gen. in *st. constr.*, as *e.g.* i. 12, ii. 7, Gen. xxiii. 18, ix. 10 (cf. Jer. x. 20). The יִשׁוּבֶנָּה, with the tone on the ult., is a protestation: there is no return for those who practise fornication,<sup>1</sup> and they do not reach the paths of life from which they have so widely strayed.<sup>2</sup>

Vers. 20-22. With לִמְעַן there commences a new section, co-ordinating itself with the לְהַצִּילָה (“to deliver thee”) of vers. 12, 16, unfolding that which wisdom accomplishes as a preserver and guide:

- 20 So that thou walkest in the good way,  
And keepest the right paths.
- 21 For the upright shall inhabit the land,  
And the innocent shall remain in it.
- 22 But the godless are cut off out of the land,  
And the faithless are rooted out of it.

<sup>1</sup> One is here reminded of the expression in the *Æneid*, vi. 127-129:

*Revocare gradum superasque evadere ad auras,  
Hoc opes, hoc labor est.*

See also an impure but dreadful Talmudic story about a dissolute Rabbi, *b. Aboda zara*, 17a.

<sup>2</sup> In correct texts וְלֹא-יִשְׁבֹּנוּ has the *Makkeph*. *Vid. Torath Emeth*, p. 41; *Accentuationssystem*, xx. § 2.

Wisdom—thus the connection—will keep thee, so that thou shalt not fall under the seductions of man or of woman; keep, in order that thou . . . לְמַעַן (from מַעַנָה = tendency, purpose) refers to the intention and object of the protecting wisdom. To the two negative designations of design there follows, as the third and last, a positive one. טוֹבִים (contrast to רָעִים, xiv. 19) is here used in a general ethical sense: the good (*Guten*, not *Gütigen*, the kind). שְׁמֵר, with the object of the way, may in another connection also mean to keep oneself from, *cavere ab* (Ps. xvii. 4); here it means: carefully to keep in it. The promise of ver. 21 is the same as in the Mashal Ps. xxxvii. 9, 11, 22; cf. Prov. x. 30. אֶרֶץ is Canaan, or the land which God promised to the patriarchs, and in which He planted Israel, whom He had brought out of Egypt; not the earth, as Matt. v. 5, according to the extended, unlimited N. T. circle of vision. יִתְּרֵי (*Milel*) is erroneously explained by Schultens: *funiculis bene firmis irrobora-bunt in terra*. The verb יָתַר, Arab. *watar*, signifies to yoke (whence יָתַר, a cord, rope), then intrans. to be stretched out in length, to be hanging over (*vid.* Fleischer on Job xxx. 11); whence יָתַר, residue, Zeph. ii. 9, and after which the LXX. here renders ὑπολειφθήσονται, and Jerome *permanebunt*. In 22*b* the old translators render יִפְחוּ as the fut. of the pass. נִפַּח, Deut. xxviii. 63; but in this case it would be יִנְפְּחוּ. The form יִפְחוּ, pointed יִפְחוּ, might be the *Niph.* of פָּחַח, but פָּחַח can neither be taken as one with נִפַּח, of the same meaning, nor with Hitzig is it to be vocalized יִפְחוּ (*Hoph.* of נָפַח); nor, with Böttcher (§ 1100, p. 453), is יִפְחוּ to be regarded as a veritable fut. *Niph.* יִפְחוּ is, as at xv. 25, Ps. lii. 7, active: *evellant*; and this, with the subj. remaining indefinite (for which J. H. Michaelis refers to Hos. xii. 9), is equivalent to *evellentur*. This indefinite “they” or “one” (“man”), Fleischer remarks, can even be used of God, as here and Job vii. 3,—a thing which is common in Persian, where *e.g.* the expression rendered *hominem ex pulvere fecerunt* is used instead of the fuller form, which would be rendered *homo a Deo ex pulvere factus est*. בּוֹנֵדִים bears (as בִּגְדֵי proves) the primary meaning of concealed, *i.e.* malicious (treacherous and rapacious, Isa. xxxiii. 1), and then faithless men.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Similar is the relation in Arab. of *labbasa* to *libâs* (لَبَّاسَ); it means to make a thing unknown by covering it; whence *telbîs*, deceit, *mulebbis*, a falsifier.

## FOURTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, III. 1-18.

## EXHORTATION TO LOVE AND FAITHFULNESS, AND SELF-SACRIFICING DEVOTION TO GOD, AS THE TRUE WISDOM.

The foregoing Mashal discourse seeks to guard youth against ruinous companionship; this points out to them more particularly the relation toward God and man, which alone can make them truly happy, vers. 1-4.

- 1 My son, forget not my doctrine,  
And let thine heart keep my commandments;
- 2 For length of days, and years of life,  
And peace, will they add to thee.
- 3 Let not kindness and truth forsake thee:  
Bind them about thy neck,  
Write them on the tablet of thy heart,
- 4 And obtain favour and true prudence  
In the eyes of God and of men.

The admonition takes a new departure. *תּוֹרָתִי* and *מִצְוֹתַי* refer to the following new discourse and laws of conduct. Here, in the midst of the discourse, we have *יָצַר* and not *יִצְרָה*; the non-assimilated form is found only in the conclusion, *e.g.* ii. 11, v. 2. The plur. *יוֹסִיפוּ* (ver. 2) for *תּוֹסִיפֶנָּה* (they will bring, add) refers to the doctrine and the precepts; the synallage has its ground in this, that the fem. construction in Hebrew is not applicable in such a case; the vulgar Arab. also has set aside the forms *jaktubna*, *taktubna*. "Extension of days" is continuance of duration, stretching itself out according to the promise, Ex. xx. 12; and "years of life" (ix. 11) are years—namely, many of them—of a life which is life in the full sense of the word. *חַיִּים* has here the pregnant signification *vita vitalis*, *βίος βιωτός* (Fl.). *שָׁלוֹם* (R. של) is pure well-being, free from all that disturbs peace or satisfaction, internal and external contentment.

Ver. 3. With this verse the doctrine begins; *אַל* (not *לֹא*) shows that 3a does not continue the promise of ver. 2. *חֶסֶד* (R. חס, *stringere, afficere*) is, according to the prevailing usage of the language, well-affectedness, it may be of God toward men, or of men toward God, or of men toward one another—a loving disposition, of the same meaning as the N. T. *ἀγάπη* (*vid. e.g.* Hos. vi. 6). *אַמֶּת* (from *אַמְנָה*), continuance, a standing to one's promises, and not

falsifying just expectations; thus fidelity, *πίστις*, in the inter-related sense of *fides* and *fidelitas*. These two states of mind and of conduct are here contemplated as moral powers (Ps. lxi. 8, xliii. 3), which are of excellent service, and bring precious gain; and 4b shows that their ramification on the side of God and of men, the religious and the moral, remains radically inseparable. The suffix *־וֹ* does not refer to the doctrine and the precepts, but to these two cardinal virtues. If the disciple is admonished to bind them about his neck (*vid.* i. 9, cf. iii. 22), so here reference is made, not to ornament, nor yet to protection against evil influences by means of them, as by an amulet<sup>1</sup> (for which proofs are wanting), but to the signet which was wont to be constantly carried (Gen. xxxviii. 18, cf. Cant. viii. 6) on a string around the neck. The parallel member 3c confirms this; 3b and 3c together put us in mind of the *Tephillin* (phylacteries), Ex. xiii. 16, Deut. vi. 8, xi. 18, in which what is here a figure is presented in external form, but as the real figure of that which is required in the inward parts. *לִיָּה* (from *לָהַךְ*, Arab. *lah*, to begin to shine, *e.g.* of a shooting star, gleaming sword; *vid.* Wetzstein, *Deutsch. morgenl. Zeitschr.* xxii. 151 f.) signifies the tablet prepared for writing by means of polish; to write love and fidelity on the tablet of the heart, is to impress deeply on the heart the duty of both virtues, so that one will be impelled to them from within outward (Jer. xxxi. 33).

Ver. 4. To the admonitory imper. there follows here a second, as iv. 4, xx. 13, Amos v. 4, 2 Chron. xx. 20, instead of which also the *perf. consec.* might stand; the counsellor wishes, with the good to which he advises, at the same time to present its good results. *שֶׁכֶּל* is (1 Sam. xxv. 3) the appearance, for the Arab. *shakl* means *forma*, as uniting or binding the lineaments or contours into one figure, *σχῆμα*, according to which *שֶׁכֶּל טוֹב* may be interpreted of the pleasing and advantageous impression which the well-built external appearance of a man makes, as an image of that which his internal excellence produces; thus, favourable view, friendly judgment, good reputation (Ewald, Hitzig, Zöckler). But everywhere else (xiii. 15; Ps. cxi. 10; 2 Chron. xxx. 22) this phrase means good, *i.e.* fine, well-becoming insight, or prudence; and *שֶׁכֶּל*

<sup>1</sup> Fleischer is here reminded of the giraffe in the Jardin des Plantes, the head of which was adorned by its Arabic keeper with strings and jewels, the object of which was to turn aside the *'ain* (the bad, mischievous look) from the precious beast.

has in the language of the *Mishle* no other meaning than *intellectus*, which proceeds from the inwardly forming activity of the mind. He obtains favour in the eyes of God and man, to whom favour on both sides is shown; he obtains refined prudence, to whom it is on both sides adjudicated. It is unnecessary, with Ewald and Hitzig, to assign the two objects to God and men. In the eyes of both at the same time, he who carries love and faithfulness in his heart appears as one to whom *חַן* and *שִׂכָּל טוֹב* must be adjudicated.

Vers. 5-8. Were "kindness and truth" (ver. 3) understood only in relation to men, then the following admonition would not be interposed, since it proceeds from that going before, if there the quality of kindness and truth, not only towards man, but also towards God, is commended:

- 5 Trust in Jahve with thy whole heart,  
And lean not on thine own understanding.
- 6 In all thy ways acknowledge Him,  
And He will make plain thy paths.
- 7 Be not wise in thine own eyes;  
Fear Jahve, and depart from evil.
- 8 Health will then come to thy navel,  
And refreshing to thy bones.

From God alone comes true prosperity, true help. He knows the right way to the right ends. He knows what benefits us. He is able to free us from that which does us harm: therefore it is our duty and our safety to place our confidence wholly in Him, and to trust not to our own judgment. The verb *בָּטַח*, Arab. *bath*, has the root-meaning *expandere*, whence perhaps, by a more direct way than that noted under Ps. iv. 6, it acquires the meaning *confidere*, to lean with the whole body on something, in order to rest upon it, strengthened by *עַל*, if one lean wholly—Fr. *se reposer sur quelqu'un*; Ital. *riposarsi sopra alcuno*,—like *הִשָּׁעַן* with *עַל*, to lean on anything, so as to be supported by it; with *עַל*, to support oneself on anything (Fl.). *דָּעָהוּ* (the same in form as *שָׂאָהוּ*, Num. xi. 12) is not fully represented by "acknowledge Him;" as in 1 Chron. xxviii. 9 it is not a mere theoretic acknowledgment that is meant, but earnest penetrating cognizance, engaging the whole man. The practico-mystical *דָּעָהוּ*, in and of itself full of significance, according to O. and N. T. usage, is yet strengthened by *toto corde*. The heart is the central seat of all spiritual soul-strength; to love God with the whole heart is to concentrate the whole inner life on the active

contemplation of God, and the ready observance of His will. God requites such as show regard to Him, by making plain their path before them, *i.e.* by leading them directly to the right end, removing all hindrances out of their way. אֶרְחֹתַי has *Cholem* in the first syllable (*vid.* Kimchi's *Lex.*).<sup>1</sup> "Be not wise in thine own eyes" is equivalent to *ne tibi sapiens videare*; for, as J. H. Michaelis remarks, *confidere Deo est sapere, sibi vero ac suæ sapientiæ, desipere*. "Fear God and depart from evil" is the twofold representation of the εὐσέβεια, or practical piety, in the *Chokma* writings: Prov. xvi. 6, the Mashal psalm xxxiv. 10, 15, and Job xxviii. 28 cf. i. 2. For מֵרַע, כִּרְמֵי, the post-biblical expression is יָרָא חֲטָא.

Ver. 8. The subject to תִּהְיֶה (it shall be) is just this religious-moral conduct. The conjectural reading בְּשָׂרָךְ (Clericus), לְשָׂרָךְ = לְשִׁמְךָ (Ewald, Hitzig), to thy flesh or body, is unnecessary; the LXX. and Syr. so translating, generalize the expression, which is not according to their taste. שָׂר, from שָׂרַר, Arab. *sarr*, to be fast, to bind fast, properly, the umbilical cord (which the Arabs call *surr*, whence the denom. *sarra*, to cut off the umbilical cord of the new-born); thus the navel, the origin of which coincides with the independent individual existence of the new-born, and is as the firm centre (*cf.* Arab. *saryr*, foundation, basis, *Job*, p. 487) of the existence of the body. The system of punctuation does not, as a rule, permit the doubling of ר, probably on account of the prevailing half guttural, *i.e.* the uvular utterance of this sound by the men of Tiberias.<sup>2</sup> לְשָׂרָךְ here, and שָׂרָךְ at Ezek. xvi. 4, belong to the exceptions; *cf.* the expanded duplication in שָׂרָרָךְ, Cant. vii. 3, to which a chief form שָׂר is as little to be assumed as is a הָרַר to הָרִיר. The ἀπ. γεργ. רפאות, healing, has here, as מִרְפָּא, iv. 22, xvi. 24, and תְּרוּפָה, Ezek. xlvii. 12, not the meaning of restoration from sickness, but the raising up of enfeebled strength, or the confirming of that which exists; the navel comes into view as the middle point of the *vis vitalis*. שָׂקִי is a *Piel* formation, corresponding to the abstract *Kal* formation רפאות; the Arab. سَقَى, used transit.

(to give to drink), also سَقَى (*cf.* *Pu.* Job xxi. 24) and اسقى, like

<sup>1</sup> In the *st. constr.* ii. 19, and with the grave suff. ii. 15, *ō* instead of *ō* is in order; but Ben-Asher's אֶרְחֹתַי, Job xiii. 27, *cf.* xxxiii. 11, is an inconsistency.

<sup>2</sup> See my work, *Physiologie u. Musik in ihrer Bedeutung für Grammatik besonders die hebräische*, pp. 11–13.

the Hebr. הִשָּׂקָה (*Hiph.* of שָׁקָה, to drink); the infin. سَقَى means, to the obliterating of the proper signification, distribution, benefaction, showing friendship, but in the passage before us is to be explained after Job xxi. 24 (the marrow of his bones is well watered; Arnheim—full of sap) and xv. 30. Bertheau and Hitzig erroneously regard ver. 8 as the conclusion to ver. 7, for they interpret רפאות as the subject; but had the poet wished to be so understood, he should have written וַתְּהִי. Much rather the subject is devotion withdrawn from the evil one and turned to God, which externally proves itself by the dedication to Him of earthly possessions.

Ver. 9 Honour Jahve with thy wealth,  
And with the first-fruits of all thine increase:  
10 Then shall thy barns be filled with plenty,  
And thy vats overflow with must.

It may surprise us that the Chokma, being separated from the ceremonial law, here commends the giving of tithes. But in the first place, the consciousness of the duty of giving tithes is older than the Mosaic law, Gen. xxviii. 22; in this case, the giving of tithes is here a general ethical expression. עָשַׂר and מַעְשֵׂר do not occur in the Book of Proverbs; in the post-biblical phraseology the tithes are called חֶלֶק הַגְּבוּהָ, the portion of the Most High. כָּבֵד, as the Arab. *wakkra*, to make heavy, then to regard and deal with as weighty and solemn (*opp.* קָלַל, to regard and treat as light, from קָלַל = Arab. *hân*, to be light). הֵן, properly lightness in the sense of *aisance*, opulency, forms with כָּבֵד an *oxymoron* (*fac Jovam gravem de levitate tua*), but one aimed at by the author neither at i. 13 nor here. מֵן (in מֵהוֹנֵךְ and מֵר', ver. 9) is in both cases partitive, as in the law of the Levitical tenths, Lev. xxvii. 30, and of the *Challa* (heave-offering of dough), Num. xv. 21, where also רֵאשִׁית (in Heb. vii. 4, ἀροθίνια) occurs in a similar sense, cf. Num. xviii. 12 (in the law of the *Theruma* or wave-offering of the priests), as also תְּבוּאָה in the law of the second tenths, Dent. xiv. 22, cf. Num. xviii. 30 (in the law of the tenths of the priests). Ver. 10. With ו *apodosis imperativi* the conclusion begins. שָׂבַע, satisfaction, is equivalent to fulness, making satisfied, and that, too, richly satisfied; תִּירוֹשׁ also is such an accusative, as verbs of filling govern it, for פָּרַץ, to break through, especially to overflow, signifies to be or become overflowingly full (Job i. 10). אָסַם (from אָסַם,

Chald. אֶסַן, Syr. *āsan*, to lay up in granaries) is the granary, of the same meaning as the Arab. *ākhzan* (from *khazan* = אָחַז, Isa. xxiii. 18, *recondere*), whence the Spanish *magazen*, the French and German *magazin*. יָקֵב (from יָקַב, Arab. *wakab*, to be hollow) is the vat or tub into which the must flows from the wine-press (נֶחַל or פְּוֶרֶה), *λάκκος* or *ὑπολήνιον*. Cf. the same admonition and promise in the prophetic statement of Mal. iii. 10–12.

Vers. 11, 12. The contrast here follows. As God should not be forgotten in days of prosperity, so one should not suffer himself to be estranged from Him by days of adversity.

- 11 The school of Jahve, my son, despise thou not,  
Nor loathe thou His correction;  
12 For Jahve correcteth him whom He loveth,  
And that as a father his son whom he loveth

*Vid.* the original passage Job v. 17 f. There is not for the Book of Job a more suitable motto than this tetrastich, which expresses its fundamental thought, that there is a being chastened and tried by suffering which has as its motive the love of God, and which does not exclude sonship.<sup>1</sup> One may say that ver. 11 expresses the problem of the Book of Job, and ver. 12 its solution. מוֹסֵר, *παιδεῖα*, we have translated "school," for יָסַר, *παιδεύειν*, means in reality to take one into school. *Ahndung* [punishment] or *Rüge* [reproof] is the German word which most corresponds to the Hebr. תּוֹכַחַת or תּוֹכַחָה. קִיץ בָּ (whence here the prohibitive תִּקַּץ with אַל) means to experience loathing (disgust) at anything, or aversion (vexation) toward anything. The LXX. (cited Heb. xii. 5 f.), *μηδὲ ἐκλύου*, nor be faint-hearted, which joins in to the general thought, that we should not be frightened away from God, or let ourselves be estranged from Him by the attitude of anger in which He appears in His determination to inflict suffering. In 12a the accentuation leaves it undefined whether יְהוָה as subject belongs to the relative or to the principal clause; the traditional succession of accents, certified also by Ben Bileam, is יְהוָה יִסְרֵב אִשְׁרֵי יִסְרֵב, for this passage belongs to the few in which more than three servants (*viz.* *Mahpach*, *Mercha*, and three *Munachs*) go before the *Athnach*.<sup>2</sup> The further peculiarity is here to be observed, that אִשְׁרֵי

<sup>1</sup> Here Procop. rightly distinguishes between *παιδεία* and *τιμωρία*.

<sup>2</sup> *Vid.* *Torath Emeth*, p. 19; *Accentuationssystem*, vi. § 6; the differences between Ben-Asher and Ben-Naphtali in the Appendixes to *Biblia Rabbinica*; Dachselt's *Biblia Accentuata*, and Pinner's *Prospectus*, p. 91 (Odessa, 1845).

although without the *Makkeph*, retains its *Segol*, besides here only in Ps. xlvii. 5, lx. 2. 12*b* is to be interpreted thus (cf. ix. 5*b*): “and (that) as a father the son, whom he loves.” The ו is explanatory, as 1 Sam. xxviii. 3 (Gesenius, § 155, 1*a*), and יִרְצֶה (which one may supplement by אֱהוּ or בּוֹ) is a defining clause having the force of a clause with אִשֵּׁר. The translation, *et ut pater qui filio bene cupit*, is syntactically (cf. Isa. xl. 11) and accentually (*vid.* 13*b*) not less admissible, but translating “and as a father he holds his son dear,” or with Hitzig (after Jer. xxxi. 10, a passage not quite syntactically the same), “and holds him dear, as a father his son” (which Zöckler without syntactical authority prefers on account of the 2*d* modus, cf. *e.g.* Ps. li. 18), does not seem a right parallel clause, since the giving of correction is the chief point, and the love only the accompanying consideration (xiii. 24). According to our interpretation, יוֹכִיחַ is to be carried forward in the mind from 12*a*. The LXX. find the parallel word in יִכָּאֵב, for they translate *μαστιγοῖ δὲ πάντα υἱὸν, ὃν παραδέχεται*, and thus have read יִכָּאֵב or יִכָּאֵב.

Vers. 13-15. Such submission to God, the All-wise, the All-directing, who loves us with fatherly affection, is wisdom, and such wisdom is above all treasures.

- 13 Blessed is the man who has found wisdom,  
And the man who has gained understanding;
- 14 For better is her acquisition than the acquisition of silver,  
And her gain than fine gold.
- 15 More precious is she than corals;  
And all thy jewels do not equal her value.

The imperfect יִפִּיק, which as the *Hiph.* of פִּיק, *exire*, has the general meaning *educere*, interchanges with the perfect מִצָּץ. This bringing forth is either a delivering up, *i.e.* giving out or presenting, Isa. lviii. 10, Ps. cxl. 9, cxliv. 13 (cf. נָפַק, Arab. *nafak*, to give out, to pay out), or a fetching out, getting out, receiving, viii. 35, xii. 2, xviii. 22. Thus 13*a* reminds one of the parable of the treasure in the field, and 13*b* of that of the goodly pearl for which the ἔμπορος who sought the pearl parted with all that he had. Here also is declared the promise of him who trades with a merchant for the possession of wisdom; for סִחֵרָה and סִחֵר (both, as Isa. xxiii. 3, 18, xlv. 15, from סִחַר, the latter after the forms נָטַע, זָרַע, without our needing to assume a second primary form, סִחָר) go back to the root-word סִחַר, to trade, go about as a trader,

with the fundamental meaning *ἐμπορεύεσθαι* (LXX.); and also the mention of the pearls is not wanting here, for at all events the meaning “pearls” has blended itself with פְּנִינִים, which is a favourite word in the Mashal poetry, though it be not the original meaning of the word. In 14b פֶּסֶף is surpassed by חֲרִיז (besides in the Proverbs, found only in this meaning in Ps. lxxviii. 14), which properly means ore found in a mine, from חָרַץ, to cut in, to dig up, and hence the poetic name of gold, perhaps of gold dug out as distinguished from molten gold. Hitzig regards χρυσός as identical with it; but this word (Sansk. without the ending *hir*, Zend. *zar*) is derived from *ghar*, to glitter (*vid.* Curtius). תְּבוּאָתָהּ we have translated “gain,” for it does not mean the profit which wisdom brings, the tribute which it yields, but the gain, the possession of wisdom herself.

Ver. 15. As regards פְּנִינִים, for which the *Kethib* has פְּנִינִים, the following things are in favour of the fundamental meaning “corals,” viz.: (1.) The name itself, which corresponds with the

Arab. فَنّ; this word, proceeding from the root-idea of shooting forth, particularly after the manner of plants, means the branch and all that raises or multiplies itself branch-like or twig-like (Fleischer). (2.) The redness attributed to the פְּנִינִים, Lam. iv. 7, in contradistinction to the pure whiteness attributed to snow and milk (*vid.* at Job xxviii. 18). The meaning of the word may, however, have become generalized in practice (LXX. *in loc.* λίθων πολυτελών, Græc. Venet. λιθιδίων); the meaning “pearls,” given to it in the Job-Targum by Rashi, and particularly by Bochart, lay so much the nearer as one may have wrought also corals and precious stones, such as the carbuncle, sardius, and sapphire, into the form of pearls. יִקְרָה, in consequence of the retrogression of the tone, has *Munach* on the *penult.*, and that as an exception, as has been remarked by the Masora, since in substantives and proper names terminating in ה־ the נסוג אֶחָד, *i.e.* the receding of the tone, does not elsewhere appear, *e.g.* יִפְהָ הָיָא, Gen. xii. 14, בִּרְהָ הָיָא, Cant. vi. 9, צִרְהָ הָיָא, Jer. xxx. 7. “הִפֵּן is first *abstr.*, a being inclined to something, lust, will, pleasure in anything, then also *concr.*, anything in which one has pleasure, what is beautiful,

precious; cf. نجيس, hence نجاسة, حجارة نجيسة, precious stones” (Fleischer). נָשָׂה with פֶּ means to be an equivalent (purchase-price,

exchange) for anything; the most natural construction in Arab. as well as in Hebr. is that with לְ, to be the equivalent of a thing (*vid.* at Job xxxiii. 27); the בֶּ is the *Beth pretii*, as if one said in Arab.: *biabi anta* thou art in the estimate of my father, I give it for thee. One distinctly perceives in vers. 14, 15, the echo of Job xxviii. This tetrastich occurs again with a slight variation at viii. 10, 11. The Talmud and the Midrash accent it so, that in the former the expression is וּכְל־חַפְצִים, and in the latter וּכְל־חַפְצֵיךְ, and they explain the latter of precious stones and pearls (אבנים טובות ומרגליות).

Vers. 16-18. That wisdom is of such incomparable value is here confirmed:

- 16 Length of days is in her right hand;  
In her left, riches and honour.
- 17 Her ways are pleasant ways,  
And all her paths are peace.
- 18 A tree of life is she to those that lay hold upon her,  
And he who always holdeth her fast is blessed.

As in the right hand of Jahve, according to Ps. xvi. 11, are pleasures for evermore, so Wisdom holds in her right hand "length of days," viz. of the days of life, thus life, the blessing of blessings; in her left, riches and honour (viii. 18), the two good things which, it is true, do not condition life, but, received from Wisdom, and thus wisely, elevate the happiness of life—in the right hand is the chief good, in the left the *προσθήκη*, Matt. vi. 33. Didymus: *Per sapientiæ dextram divinarum rerum cognitio, ex qua immortalitatis vita oritur, significatur; per sinistram autem rerum humanarum notitia, ex qua gloria opumque abundantia nascitur.* The LXX., as between 15a and 15b, so also here after ver. 16, interpolate two lines: "From her mouth proceedeth righteousness; justice and mercy she bears upon her tongue,"—perhaps translated from the Hebr., but certainly added by a reader.

Ver. 17. דְּרָכֶי-נָעִם are ways on which one obtains what is agreeable to the inner and the outer man, and which it does good to enjoy. The parallel שְׁלוֹם is not a genitive to נְתִיבוֹת to be supplied; the paths of Wisdom are themselves שְׁלוֹם, for she brings well-being on all sides and deep inward satisfaction (peace). In regard to נְתִיבָה, *via eminens, elata*, Schultens is right (*vid.* under i. 15);<sup>1</sup> נְתִיבוֹתֶיהָ has *Munach*, and instead of the *Metheg*, *Tarcha*, *vid.* under i. 31b.

<sup>1</sup> The root is not תָּב, to grope, but נָת; whence Arab. *natt*, to bubble up, *natâ*, to raise oneself, to swell up, etc.

The figure of the tree of life the fruit of which brings immortality, is, as xi. 30, xv. 4 (cf. xiii. 12), Rev. ii. 7, taken from the history of paradise in the Book of Genesis. The old ecclesiastical saying, *Lignum vitæ crux Christi*, accommodates itself in a certain measure, through Matt. xi. 19, Luke xi. 49, with this passage of the Book of Proverbs. **הִחֲזִיק בְּ** means to fasten upon anything, more fully expressed in Gen. xxi. 18, to bind the hand firm with anything, to seize it firmly. They who give themselves to Wisdom, come to experience that she is a tree of life whose fruit contains and communicates strength of life, and whoever always keeps fast hold of Wisdom is blessed, *i.e.* to be pronounced happy (Ps. xli. 3, *vid.* under Ps. cxxxvii. 8). The predicate **מְאַשֵּׁר**, blessed, refers to each one of the **תְּמַכֶּיָּהּ**, those who hold her, cf. xxvii. 16, Num. xxiv. 9. It is the so-called distributive singular of the predicate, which is freely used particularly in those cases where the plur. of the subject is a participle (*vid.* under ver. 35).

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#### FIFTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, III. 19-26.

##### THE WORLD-CREATIVE WISDOM AS MEDIATRIX OF DIVINE PROTECTION.

O son, guard against seducers (i. 8 ff.); listen to the warning voice of Wisdom (i. 20 ff.); seek after Wisdom: she is the way to God, comes from God, and teaches thee to shun the wicked way and to walk in the way that is good (ii.); thou shalt obtain her if, renouncing self-confidence, thou givest thyself unreservedly to God (iii. 1-18)—these are the four steps, so far, of this introductory *παράδεισις*. Each discourse contributes its own to present vividly and impressively what Wisdom is and what she procures, her nature and her blessings. From her hand come all good gifts of God to men. She is the tree of life. Her place between God and men is thus that of a mediatrix.

Vers. 19, 20. This place of a mediatrix—the speaker here now continues—she had from the beginning. God's world-creating work was mediated by her:

19 Jahve hath by wisdom founded the earth,  
Established the heavens by understanding.

20 By His knowledge the water-floods broke forth,  
And the sky dropped down dew.

That wisdom is meant by which God planned the world-idea, and now also wrought it out; the wisdom in which God conceived the world ere it was framed, and by which also He gave external realization to His thoughts; the wisdom which is indeed an attribute of God and a characteristic of His actions, since she is a property of His nature, and His nature attests itself in her, but not less, as appears, not from this group of tetrastichs, but from all that has hitherto been said, and from the personal testimony, viii. 22 ff., of which it is the *prælude*, she goes forth as a divine power to which God has given to have life in herself. Considered apart from the connection of these discourses, this group of verses, as little as Jer. x. 2, Ps. civ. 24, determines regarding the attributive interpretation; the Jerusalem Targum, I., when it translates, Gen. i. 1, בראשית by בְּחֻכְמָא (בְּחֻכְמָתָא), combines viii. 22 with such passages as this before us. יָסַד (here with the tone thrown back) properly signifies, like the Arab. *wasad*, to lay fast, to found, for one gives to a fact the firm basis of its existence. The parallel *Pil.* of בָּן (Arab. *kân*, cogn. בָּהֵן, see on *Isaiah*, p. 691) signifies to set up, to restore; here equivalent to, to give existence.

Ver. 20. It is incorrect to understand 20*a*, with the Targ., of division, *i.e.* separating the water under the firmament from the water above the firmament; בִּבְקָע is spoken of water, especially of its breaking forth, Gen. vii. 11, Ex. xiv. 21, cf. Ps. lxxiv. 15, properly dividing itself out, *i.e.* welling forth from the bowels of the earth; it means, without distinguishing the primordial waters and the later water-floods confined within their banks (cf. Job xxxviii. 8 f., Ps. civ. 6–8), the overflowing of the earth for the purpose of its processes of cultivation and the irrigation of the land. תְּהוֹמוֹת (from הוֹם = הָמָה, to groan, to roar) are chiefly the internal water stores of the earth, Gen. xlix. 25, Ps. xxxiii. 7. But while 20*a* is to be understood of the waters under the firmament, 20*b* is to be interpreted of those above. עֲתָקִים (from עָתַק, Arab. *shak*, *comminuere*, *attenuare*) properly designates the uppermost stratum of air thinly and finely stretching itself far and wide, and then poetically the clouds of heaven (*vid.* under Ps. lxxvii. 18). Another name, עֲרִיסִים, comes from עָרַף, which is transposed from רָעַף (here used in 20*b*), Arab. *r'af*, to drop, to run. The טָל added on the object accusative represents synecdochically all the waters coming down from heaven

and fructifying the earth. This watering proceeds from above (ורעפו); on the contrary, the endowing of the surface of the earth with great and small rivers is a fundamental fact in creation (נבקעו).

Vers. 21–22. From this eminence, in which the work of creation presents wisdom, exhortations are now deduced, since the writer always expresses himself only with an ethical intention regarding the nature of wisdom :

- 21 My son, may they not depart from thine eyes—  
Preserve thoughtfulness and consideration,  
22 And they will be life to thy soul  
And grace to thy neck.

If we make the synonyms of wisdom which are in 21b the subject *per prolepsin* to אֶל-יָלְדוֹ (Hitzig and Zöckler), then 19–20 and 21–22 clash. The subjects are wisdom, understanding, knowledge, which belong to God, and shall from Him become the possession of those who make them their aim. Regarding לָח, *obliquari, deflectere*, see under ii. 15, cf. iv. 21; regarding חֲשִׁיחַ (here *defective* after the Masora, as rightly in Vened. 1515, 1521, and Nissel, 1662), see at ii. 7; יָלְדוֹ for תִּלְוָנָה, see at iii. 2b. The LXX. (cf. Heb. ii. 1) translate without distinctness of reference: *νὴ ἐν μὴ παραρῥυῆς* (*παρὰρρυῆς*), let it not flow past, i.e. let it not be unobserved, hold it always before thee; the Targ. with the Syr. render לָא נִיל, *ne vilesceat*, as if the words were אֶל-יָוִל. In 22a the *synallage generis* is continued: וְיִהְיֶה for וְתִהְיֶינָה. Regarding נִרְנָת, see at i. 9. By wisdom the soul gains life, divinely true and blessed, and the external appearance of the man grace, which makes him pleasing and gains for him affection.

Vers. 23–26. But more than this, wisdom makes its possessor in all situations of life confident in God :

- 23 Then shalt thou go thy way with confidence,  
And thy foot shall not stumble.  
24 When thou liest down, thou art not afraid,  
But thou layest thyself down and hast sweet sleep.  
25 Thou needest not be afraid of sudden alarm,  
Nor for the storm of the wicked when it breaketh forth.  
26 For Jahve will be thy confidence  
And keep thy foot from the snare.

The לְבָטָח (cf. our “*bei guter Laune*” = in good cheer), with ל of the condition, is of the same meaning as the conditional adverbial accusative בְּבָטָח, x. 9, i. 33. Ver. 23b the LXX. translate *ὁ δὲ*

ποῦς σου οὐ μὴ προσκόψῃ, while, on the contrary, at Ps. xci. 12 they make the person the subject (μήποτε προσκόψῃς τὸν κ.τ.λ.); here also we retain more surely the subject from 23a, especially since for the intrans. of נָנַף (to smite, to push) a *Hithpa.* הִתְנַנֵּף is used Jer. xiii. 16. In ver. 24 there is the echo of Job xi. 18, and in ver. 25 of Job v. 21. 24b is altogether the same as Job v. 24b: *et decumbes et suavis erit somnus tuus = si decubueris, suavis erit.* The hypothetic perf., according to the sense, is both there and at Job xi. 18 (cf. Jer. xx. 9) oxytoned as *perf. consec.* Similar examples are vi. 22, Gen. xxxiii. 13, 1 Sam. xxv. 31, cf. Ewald, § 357a. עֲרִיבָה (of sleep as Jer. xxxi. 26) is from עָרַב, which in Hebr. is used of pleasing impressions, as the Arab. 'ariba of a lively, free disposition. שָׁנָה, *somnus* (nom. actionis from שָׁן, with the ground-form *sina* preserved in the Arab. *lidat*, vid. *Job*, p. 284, note), agrees in inflexion with שָׁנָה, *annus*. אַל, ver. 25a, denies, like Ps. cxxi. 3, with emphasis: be afraid only not = thou hast altogether nothing to fear. Schultens rightly says: *Subest species prohibitionis et tanquam abominationis, ne tale quicquam vel in suspicionem veniat in mentemve cogitando admittatur.* פֶּחַד here means terror, as i. 26 f., the terrific object; פֶּתָאִם (with the accus. *om*) is the virtual genitive, as xxvi. 2 חָנָם (with accus. *am*). Regarding שֹׂאָה, see under i. 27. The genitive רִשְׁעִים may be, after Ps. xxxvii. 17, the *genit. subjecti*, but still it lies nearer to say that he who chooses the wisdom of God as his guiding star has no ground to fear punishment as transgressors have reason to fear it; the שֹׂאָה is meant which wisdom threatens against transgressors, i. 27. He needs have no fear of it, for wisdom is a gift of God, and binds him who receives it to the giver: Jahve becomes and is henceforth his confidence. Regarding ב *essentiæ*, which expresses the closest connection of the subject with the predicate which it introduces, see under Ps. xxxv. 2. As here, so also at Ex. xviii. 4, Ps. cxviii. 7, cxlvi. 5, the predicate is a noun with a pronominal suffix. בָּסָל is, as at Ps. lxxviii. 7, Job xxxi. 24, cognate to מִבְּטָח and מִקְוֶה,<sup>1</sup> the object and ground of confidence. That the word in other connections may mean also foolhardiness, Ps. xlix. 14, and folly, Eccles. vii. 25 (cf. regarding בָּסִיל, which in Arab. as *belid* denotes the dull, in Hebr. fools, see under i. 22), it follows that it proceeds from the fundamental con-

<sup>1</sup> According to Malbim, מִקְוֶה is the expectation of good, and בָּסָל, confidence in the presence of evil.

ception of fulness of flesh and of fat, whence arise the conceptions of dulness and slothfulness, as well as of confidence, whether confidence in self or in God (see Schultens *l.c.*, and Wünsche's *Hosea*, p. 207 f.). לָכַד is taking, catching, as in a net or trap or pit, from לָכַד, to catch (cf. Arab. *lakida*, to fasten, III. IV. to hold fast); another root-meaning, in which Arab. *lak* connects itself with *nak*, נָק, to strike, to assail (whence *al-lakdat*, the assault against the enemy, *Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitsch.* xxii. 140), is foreign to the Hebr. Regarding the מן of מִלְכָּד, Fleischer remarks: "The מן after verbs of guarding, preserving, like שָׁמַר and נָצַר, properly expresses that one by those means holds or seeks to hold a person or thing back from something, like the Lat. *defendere, tueri aliquem ab hostibus, a periculo.*"<sup>1</sup>

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#### SIXTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, III. 27-35.

##### EXHORTATION TO BENEVOLENCE AND RECTITUDE.

The promise in which it terminates, designates the close of the fifth discourse. The sixth differs from it in this, that, like none of the preceding, it adds proverb to proverb. The first series recommends love to one's neighbour, and the second warns against fellowship with the uncharitable.

Vers. 27, 28. The first illustration of neighbourly love which is recommended, is readiness to serve :

<sup>1</sup> Hitzig rejects iii. 22-26 as a later interpolation. And why? Because iii., which he regards as a complete discourse, consists of twice ten verses beginning with בְּנִי. In addition to this symmetry other reasons easily reveal themselves to his penetration. But the discourses contained in chap. i.-ix. do not all begin with בְּנִי (*vid.* i. 20); and when it stands in the beginning of the discourse, it is not always the first word (*vid.* i. 8); and when it occurs as the first word or in the first line, it does not always commence a new discourse (*vid.* i. 15 in the middle of the first, iii. 11 in the middle of the fourth); and, moreover, the Hebr. poetry and oratory does not reckon according to verses terminated by *Soph Pasuk*, which are always accented distichs, but they in reality frequently consist of three or more lines. The rejected verses are in nothing unlike those that remain, and which are undisputed; they show the same structure of stichs, consisting for the most part of three, but sometimes also only of two words (cf. iii. 22b with i. 9b, 10b), the same breadth in the course of the thoughts, and the same accord with Job and Deuteronomy.

- 27 Refuse no manner of good to him to whom it is due  
When it is in thy power to do it.  
28 Say not to thy neighbour, "Go, and come again,  
To-morrow I will give it," whilst yet thou hast it.

Regarding the intensive plur. בְּעָלָיו with a sing. meaning, see under i. 19. The form of expression without the suffix is not בְּעָלִי but בְּעַל טוֹב; and this denotes here, not him who does good (בעל as Arab. *dhw* or *sahab*), but him to whom the good deed is done (cf. xvii. 8), i.e. as here, him who is worthy of it (בעל as Arab. *ahl*), him who is the man for it (Jewish interp.: לוֹ מִי שְׁהוּא רֵאיוֹ לוֹ). We must refuse nothing good (nothing either legally or morally good) to him who has a right to it (מִנֶּעַם לוֹ as Job xxii. 7, xxxi. 16),<sup>1</sup> if we are in a condition to do him this good. The phrase יָשִׁילָאֵל יָדִי, Gen. xxxi. 29, and frequently, signifies: it is belonging to (practicable) the power of my hand, i.e. I have the power and the means of doing it. As יָדִי signifies the haughty, insolent, but may be also used in the neuter of insolent conduct (*vid.* Ps. xix. 14), so אֵל signifies the strong, but also (although only in this phrase) strength. The *Keri* rejects the plur. יָדַי, because elsewhere the hand always follows לֵאל in the singular. But it rejects the plur. לְרַעֲיָךְ (ver. 28) because the address following is directed to one person. Neither of these emendations was necessary. The usage of the language permits exceptions, notwithstanding the *usus tyrannus*, and the plur. לְרַעֲיָךְ may be interpreted distributively: to thy fellows, it may be this one or that one. Hitzig also regards לְרַעֲיָךְ as a singular; but the mas. of רָעָה, the ground-form of which is certainly *raʿj*, is רָעָה, or shorter, רַע. לֵךְ וְשׁוּב does not mean: forth! go home again! but: go, and come again. שׁוּב, to come again, to return to something, to seek it once more.<sup>2</sup> The ו of וַיֵּשׁ אֶתְּךָ is, as 29b, the conditional: *quum sit penes te, sc. quod ei des*. "To-morrow shall I give" is less a promise than a delay and putting off, because it is difficult for him to alienate himself from him who makes the request. This

<sup>1</sup> Accentuate אֵל-תִּמְנַע טוֹב, not אֵל-תִּמְנַע-טוֹב. The doubling of the *Makkeph* is purposeless, and, on the contrary, the separating of טוֹב from מִבְּעָלָיו by the *Dechi* (the separating accent subordinate to *Athnach*) is proper. It is thus in the best MSS.

<sup>2</sup> Thus also (Arab.) *raj'* is used in Thaalebi's *Confidential Companion*, p. 24, line 3, of Flügel's ed. Admission was prevented to one Haschmid, then angry he sought it once more; he was again rejected, then he sought it not again (Arab. *flm yraj'*), but says, etc. Flügel has misunderstood the passage. Fleischer explains *raj'*, with reference to Prov. iii. 28, by *revenir à la charge*.

holding fast by one's own is unamiable selfishness; this putting off in the fulfilment of one's duty is a sin of omission—οὐ γὰρ οἶδας, as the LXX. adds, τί τέξεται ἡ ἐπιούσα.

Ver. 29. A second illustration of neighbourly love is harmlessness :

Devise not evil against thy neighbour,  
While he dwelleth securely by thee.

The verb חָרַשׁ, χαράσσειν, signifies to cut into, and is used of the *faber ferrarius* as well as of the *tignarius* (*Isaiah*, p. 463), who with a cutting instrument (חָרַשׁ, Gen. iv. 22) works with metal or wood, and from his profession is called חָרַשׁ. But the word means as commonly to plough, i.e. to cut with the plough, and חָרַשׁ is used also of a ploughman, and, without any addition to it, it always has this meaning. It is then a question whether the metaphorical phrase חָרַשׁ רָעָה signifies to fabricate evil, cf. *dolorum faber, mendacia procudere*, ψευδῶν καὶ ἀπατῶν τέκτων, and the Homeric κακὰ φρεσὶ βυσσοδομεύειν (Fleischer and most others), or to plough evil (Rashi, Ewald, etc.). The Targ., Syriac, and Jerome translate חָרַשׁ, without deciding the point, by *moliri*; but the LXX. and *Græcus Venet.* by τεκταίνειν. The correctness of these renderings is not supported by Ezek. xxi. 36, where חָרַשׁ מִשְׁחָתִית are not such as fabricate destruction, but smiths who cause destruction; also מַחְרִישׁ, 1 Sam. xxiii. 9, proves nothing, and probably does not at all appertain to חָרַשׁ *incidere* (Keil), but to חָרַשׁ *silere*, in the sense of *dolose moliri*. On the one hand, it is to be observed from Job iv. 8, Hos. x. 13, cf. Ps. cxxix. 3, that the meaning *arare malum* might connect itself with חָרַשׁ רָעָה; and the proverb of Sirach vii. 12, μὴ ἀροτρία ψευδὸς ἐπ' ἀδελφῶ σου, places this beyond a doubt. Therefore in this phrase, if one keeps before him a clear perception of the figure, at one time the idea of fabricating, at another that of ploughing, is presented before us. The usage of the language in the case before us is more in favour of the latter than of the former. Whether יָשַׁב אִתָּה means to dwell together with, or as Böttcher, to sit together with, after Ps. i. 1, xxvi. 4 f., need not be a matter of dispute. It means in general a continued being together, whether as sitting, Job ii. 13, or as dwelling, Judg. xvii. 11.<sup>1</sup> To take advantage of the regardlessness of him who imparts

<sup>1</sup> Accentuate וְהוּא יֹשֵׁב לְבִתָּהּ. It is thus in correct texts. The *Rebia Mugrash* is transformed, according to the *Accentuationssystem*, xviii. § 2.

to us his confidence is unamiable. Love is doubly owing to him who resigns himself to it because he believes in it.

Ver. 30. A third illustration of the same principle is peaceableness :

Contend not with a man without a cause,  
When he has inflicted no evil upon thee.

Instead of *תָּרוּב*, or as the *Kerî* has amended it *תָּרִיב*, the abbreviated form *תָּרַב* or *תָּרִב* would be more correct after *אֵל* ; *רִיב* or *רֹיב* (from *רַב*, to be compact) means to fall upon one another, to come to hand-blows, to contend. Contending and quarrelling with a man, whoever he may be, without sufficient reason, ought to be abandoned ; but there exists no such reason if he has done me no harm which I have to reproach him with. *נָמַל רָעָה* with the accus. or dat. of the person signifies to bring evil upon any one, *malum inferre*, or also *referre* (Schultens), for *נָמַל* (cogn. *נָמַר*) signifies to execute, to complete, accomplish,—both of the initiative and of the requital, both of the anticipative and of the recompensing action ; here in the former of these senses.

Vers. 31, 32. These exhortations to neighbourly love in the form of warning against whatever is opposed to it, are followed by the warning against fellowship with the loveless :

- 31 Be not envious toward the man of violence,  
And have no pleasure in all his ways.  
32 For an abhorrence to Jahve is the perverse,  
But with the upright is His secret.

The conceptions of jealousy and envy lie in *קִנְיָא* (derived by Schultens from *קָנָא*, Arab. *kanâ*, *intensius rubere*) inseparable from each other. The LXX., which for *תִּקְנָא* reads *תִּקְנָה* (*κτῆση*), brings the envy into 31b, as if the words here were *וְאֵל-תִּתְחַתֵּר*, as in Ps. xxxvii. 1, 7 (there the LXX. has *μὴ παραζήλου*, here *μηδὲ ζηλώσης*). There is no reason for correcting our text in accordance with this (substituting *תִּתְחַתֵּר* for *תִּבְחַתֵּר* as Hitzig does), because *בְּכָל-דִּרְכָיו* would be too vague an expression for the object of the envy, while *אֵל-תִּבְחַתֵּר* altogether agrees with it ; and the contrary remark, that *בְּכָל בִּחַר* is fundamentally no *בַּחַר*, fails, since (1) *בַּחַר* frequently expresses pleasure in anything without the idea of choice, and (2) “have not pleasure in all his ways” is in the Hebrew style equivalent to “in any one of his ways ;” Ewald, § 323b. He who does “violence to the law” (Zeph. iii. 4) becomes thereby, according to the common course of the world, a person who is feared, whose autho-

rity, power, and resources are increased, but one must not therefore envy him, nor on any side take pleasure in his conduct, which in all respects is to be reprobated; for the נָלֹךְ, *inflexus, tortuosus* (*vid. ii. 15*), who swerves from the right way and goes in a crooked false way, is an object of Jahve's abhorrence, while, on the contrary, the just, who with a right mind walks in the right way, is Jahve's סוֹר—an echo of Ps. xxv. 14. סוֹר (R. סָר, to be firm, compressed) means properly the being pressed together, or sitting together (*cf. the Arab. wisâd, wisâdt, a cushion, divan, corresponding in form to the Hebr. יְסוֹר*) for the purpose of private communication and conversation (יְהִי סוֹר), and then partly the confidential intercourse, as here (*cf. Job xxix. 4*), partly the private communication, the secret (*Amos iii. 7*). LXX., ἐν δὲ δικαίοις [οὐ] συνεδριάζει. Those who are out of the way, who prefer to the simplicity of right-doing all manner of crooked ways, are contrary to God, and He may have nothing to do with them; but the right-minded He makes partakers of His most intimate intercourse, He deals with them as His friends.

Ver. 33. The prosperity of the godless, far from being worthy of envy, has as its reverse side the curse:

The curse of Jahve is in the house of the godless,  
And the dwelling of the just He blesseth.

מָאֲרָה (a curse), like מַסְלָה (a highway, from סָלַל), is formed from אָרַר (*cf. Arab. harr, detestari, abhorrere, a word-imitation of an interjection used in disagreeable experiences*). The curse is not merely a deprivation of external goods which render life happy, and the blessing is not merely the fulness of external possessions; the central-point of the curse lies in continuous disquiet of conscience, and that of the blessing in the happy consciousness that God is with us, in soul-rest and peace which is certain of the grace and goodness of God. The poetic נִיָּה (from נוה = Arab. *nwy, tetendit aliquo*) signifies the place of settlement, and may be a word borrowed from a nomad life, since it denotes specially the pasture-ground; *cf. xxiv. 15* (Fleischer). While the curse of God rests in the house of the wicked (*vid. Köhler on Zech. v. 4*), He blesses, on the contrary, the dwelling-place of the righteous. The LXX. and Jerome read יְבִרָה, but יְבִרָה is more agreeable, since God continues to be the subject.

Ver. 34. His relation to men is determined by their relation to Him.

As for the scorers, He scorneth them,  
But to the lowly He giveth grace.

Most interpreters render the verse thus: "If the scorner He (even He, in return) scorneth, so He (on the other hand) giveth grace to the lowly." For the sequence of the words in the consequence, in which the precedence of the verb is usual, *e.g.* Lev. xii. 5, we are referred to xxiii. 18, cf. xxiv. 14; but why had the poet placed the two facts in the relation of condition and consequence? The one fact is not the consequence but the reverse of the other, and accordingly they are opposed to each other in coordinated passages, Ps. xviii. 26 f. The *Vav* in such antitheses has generally the meaning of "and on the other hand," *e.g.* Job viii. 20, while the LXX., Targ., Syriac, and Jerome altogether pass over the ו as if it did not exist. Ziegler translates: "Truly! the scorner He scorneth;" but an affirmative ו does not exist, the asseveration after the manner of an oath is negative. Bertheau's expedient would be more acceptable, by which he makes the whole of ver. 34 the protasis to ver. 35; but if this were intended, another subject would not enter into ver. 35. Thus 34a and 34b are two independent parallel passages; ו-ללצים is the protasis: if as regards the scorers, *i.e.* if His conduct is directed to the scorers, so He scorneth. The ל denotes relation, and in this elliptical usage is like the ל of superscription, *e.g.* Jer. xxiii. 9. הוא is the emphatic αὐτός: He on the contrary, and in a decisive way (Ewald, § 314ab). Instead of ללצים there might have been used ללצים (for הלץ, where it occurs as a governing word, has the accusative, xix. 28, Ps. cxix. 51), but we do not miss the object: if it relates to scorers (thus also Löwenstein translates), so it is He in return who scorneth. The LXX. renders it: κύριος ὑπερηφάνους ἀντιτάσσεται, ταπεινοῖς δὲ δίδωσι χάριν; cf. Jas. iv. 6, 1 Pet. v. 5. הוא is used as a name of God (*Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitschr.* xvi. 400), on which account it is rendered like יהוה by κύριος. Ἀὑπερήφανος (appearing above others, *i.e.* overbearing) is the ללץ, according to the definition xxi. 24. The expression of the *talio* is generalized in ἀντιτάσσεται (resists them). For עני the *Kerî* has עני: עני (from ענה, the ground-form עני, Arab. 'anaw) is the lowly (ταπεινός), or he who bends himself, *i.e.* the gentle and humble, the patient, and the passive עני, he who is bowed down, the suffering; but the limits of the conception are moveable, since in עני is presupposed the possession of fruit-virtues gained in the school of affliction,

Ver. 35. This group of the proverbs of wisdom now suitably closes with the fundamental contrast between the wise and fools :

The wise shall inherit honour,  
But fools carry away shame.

If we take יִבְסִילִים as the object, then we can scarcely interpret the clause : shame sweeps fools away (Umbreit, Zöckler, Bertheau), for הָרִים [Hiph. of רָם] signifies (Isa. lvii. 14, Ezek. xxi. 31) "to raise up anything high and far," not "to sweep away." Preferable is the rendering : τὸν δ' ἄφρονος ὑψοῖ ἀτιμία (Græc. Venet., and similarly Jerome), i.e. only to it do they owe their celebrity as warning examples (Ewald), to which Oetinger compares "whose glory is in their shame," Phil. iii. 19;<sup>1</sup> but קָלֶון is the contrary of קְבוֹר (glory, Hab. ii. 16), and therefore is as much an object conception as is the latter, 35a. If it is the object, then if we take מְרִים from מָר after the form of לוֹ, Neh. xiii. 21 = מְמִירִים (Hos. iv. 7), it might be rendered : Yet fools exchange shame (Löwenstein). But מָר, like the Arab. *mrr*, *transire*, means properly to pass over or to wander over; it is intransitive, and only in Hiph. signifies actively to exchange. מְרִים thus will be the participle of הָרִים; the plur. taken distributively (fools = whoever is only always a fool) is connected with the singular of the predicate. This change in the number is here, however, more difficult than at iii. 18, and in other places, where the plur. of the part. permits the resolution into a relative clause with *quicumque*, and more difficult than at xxviii. 1, where the sing. of the predicate is introduced by attraction; wherefore מְרִים may be an error in transcribing for מְרִימִים or מְרִימִי (Böttcher). J. H. Michaelis (after the Targ. and Syr.) has properly rendered the clause : "*stulti tollunt ignominiam tanquam portionem suam*," adding "*quæ derivato nomine תְּרוּמָה dicitur*." הָרִים signifies, in the language of the sacrificial worship and of worship generally, to lift off from anything the best portion, the legitimate portion due to God and the priesthood (*vid.* at iii. 9); for which reason Rashi glosses מְרִים by מַפְרִישׁ לוֹ, and Ralbag by מְגַבִּיהַ לוֹ. See xiv. 29. Honour is that which the wise inherit, it falls to them unsought as a possession, but fools receive shame as the offal (*viz.* of their foolish conduct). The fut. and part. are significantly interchanged. The life of the wise ends in glory, but

<sup>1</sup> Jona Gerundi renders it otherwise : "But shame raises the fools high;" i.e. only the infamous, he who has no sense of honour, makes much advancement out of fools.

fools inherit shame; the fruit of their conduct is shame and evermore shame.

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SEVENTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, IV.-V. 6.

RECOLLECTIONS OF HIS FATHER'S HOUSE.

The means are not yet exhausted by which the teacher of wisdom seeks to procure acceptance for his admonitions and warnings, and to give them emphasis. He has introduced the importance of his person in order that he might gain the heart of the disciple, and has presented as speaker, instead of himself, the revered person of Wisdom herself, who seeks to win, by means of warnings and promises, the souls of men.

Chap. iv. 1-4. He now confirms and explains the command to duty which he has placed at the beginning of the whole (i. 8). This he does by his own example, for he relates from the history of his own youth, to the circle of disciples by whom he sees himself surrounded, what good doctrine his parents had taught him regarding the way of life:

- 1 Hear, ye sons, the instruction of a father,  
And attend that ye may gain understanding;
- 2 For I give to you good doctrine,  
Forsake not my direction!
- 3 For I was a son to my father,  
A tender and only (son) in the sight of my mother.
- 4 And he instructed me, and said to me:  
"Let thine heart hold fast my words:  
Observe my commandments and live!"

That בָּנִים in the address comes here into the place of בְּנִי, hitherto used, externally denotes that בְּנִי in the progress of these discourses finds another application: the poet himself is so addressed by his father. Intentionally he does not say אֲבִיכֶם (cf. i. 8): he does not mean the father of each individual among those addressed, but himself, who is a father in his relation to them as his disciples; and as he manifests towards them fatherly love, so also he can lay claim to paternal authority over them. לָרַעַת is rightly vocalized, not לְרַעַת. The words do not give the object of attention, but the design, the aim. The combination of ideas in רַעַת בִּינָה (cf. i. 2),

which appears to us singular, loses its strangeness when we remember that רעת means, according to its etymon, deposition or reception into the conscience and life. Regarding לָקַח, apprehension, reception, lesson = doctrine, *vid.* i. 5. נָתַתִּי is the perf., which denotes as fixed and finished what is just now being done, Gesenius, § 126, 4. עֹבֵב is here synonym of נָטַשׁ, i. 8, and the contrary of שָׁמַר, xxviii. 4. The relative *factum* in the perfect, designating the circumstances under which the event happened, regularly precedes the chief *factum* וַיִּרְאֵנִי; see under Gen. i. 2 f. Superficially understood, the expression 3a would be a platitude; the author means that the natural legal relation was also confirming itself as a moral one. It was a relation of many-sided love, according to 3a: he was esteemed of his mother—לִפְנֵי, used of the reflex in the judgment, Gen. x. 9, and of loving care, Gen. xvii. 18, means this—as a tender child, and therefore tenderly to be protected (רָךְ as Gen. xxxiii. 13), and as an only child, whether he were so in reality, or was only loved as if he were so. יָחִיד (Aq., Sym., Theod., *μονογενής*) may with reference to number also mean *unice dilectus* (LXX. ἀγαπώμενος); cf. Gen. xxii. 2, יָחִידֶךָ (where the LXX. translate τὸν ἀγαπητόν, without therefore having יָרִידֶךָ before them). לִפְנֵי is maintained by all the versions; לִבְנִי is not a variant.<sup>1</sup> The instruction of the father begins with the jussive, which is pointed<sup>2</sup> יִתְמַךְ- to distinguish it from יִתְמַךְ- on account of the ם. The LXX. has incorrectly ἐπιδέτω, as if the word were יִסְמַךְ; Symmachus has correctly κατεχέτω. The imper. וְיָחִיד is, as vii. 2, Gen. xx. 7, more than וְיִתְחַיֶּה; the teacher seeks, along with the means, at the same time their object: Observe my commandments, and so become a partaker of life! The Syriac, however, adds וְתוֹרָתִי כַּאֲשֶׁן עֵינֶיךָ [and my instruction as the apple of thine eye], a clause borrowed from vii. 2.

Vers. 5, 6. The exhortation of the father now specializes itself:

5 Get wisdom, get understanding;

Forget not and turn not from the words of my mouth.

<sup>1</sup> In some editions לִבְנִי is noted as *Kerî* to לִפְנֵי, but erroneously and contrary to the express evidence of the Masora, which affirms that there are two passages in which we ought to read not לִפְנֵי, but לִבְנִי, viz. Ps. lxxx. 3 and Prov. iv. 3.

<sup>2</sup> The writing of יִתְמַךְ- with the grave *Metheg* (*Gaja*) and *Kamets-Chatuph* (ׁ) is that of Ben Asher; on the other hand, יִתְמַךְ- with *Cholem* (ׁ) and the permanent *Metheg* is that of Ben Naphtali; *vid.* *Michlol* 21a (under the verbal form 25), § 30.

6 Forsake her not, so shall she preserve thee;  
Love her, so shall she keep thee.

Wisdom and understanding are (5a) thought of as objects of merchandise (cf. xxiii. 23, iii. 14), like the one pearl of great price, Matt. xiii. 46, and the words of fatherly instruction (5b), accordingly, as offering this precious possession, or helping to the acquisition of it. One cannot indeed say correctly *אֶל-תִּשְׁכַּח מֵאֲמִרֵּי*, but *אֶל-תִּשְׁכַּח מִשְׁמֵר אֲמִרֵּי* (Ps. cii. 5); and in this sense *אֶל-תִּשְׁכַּח* goes before, or also the accus. object, which in *אֶל-תִּשְׁכַּח* the author has in his mind, may, since he continues with *אֶל-תֵּט*, now not any longer find expression as such. That the *אֲמִרֵּי* are the means of acquiring wisdom is shown in ver. 6, where this continues to be the primary idea. The verse, consisting of only four words, ought to be divided by *Mugrash*;<sup>1</sup> the *Vav* (ו) in both halves of the verse introduces the *apodosis imperativi* (cf. e.g. iii. 9 f., and the *apodosis prohibitivi*, iii. 21 f.). The actual representation of wisdom, ver. 5, becomes in ver. 6 personal.

Vers. 7-9. Referring to ver. 5, the father further explains that wisdom begins with the striving after it, and that this striving is itself its fundamental beginning:

- 7 The beginning of wisdom is "Get wisdom,"  
And with [*um*, at the price of] all thou hast gotten get understanding.  
8 Esteem her, so shall she lift thee up;  
She will bring thee honour if thou dost embrace her.  
9 She will put on thine head a graceful garland,  
She will bestow upon thee a glorious diadem.

In the motto of the book, i. 7, the author would say that the fear of Jahve is that from which all wisdom takes its origin. *יִרְאַת יְהוָה* (i. 7) is the subject, and as such it stands foremost. Here he means to say what the beginning of wisdom consists in. *רֵאשִׁית חֵכְמָה* is the subject, and stands forth as such. The predicate may also be read *קִנְיַת חֵכְמָה* (= קִנּוּת), after xvi. 16. The beginning of wisdom is (consists in) the getting of wisdom; but the imperative *קִנֵּה*, which also Aq., Sym., Theod. (*κτῆσαι*), Jerome, Syr., Targ. express (the LXX. leaves ver. 7 untranslated), is supported by 7b. Hitzig, after Mercier, De Dieu, and Döderlein, translates the verse

<sup>1</sup> According to correct readings in codd. and older editions, *וּחְשָׁמֶךָ* has also indeed *Rebia Mugrash*, and *אֶהְבֶּהּ*, *Mercha* (with *Zinnorith*); *vid. Torah Emeth*, p. 47, § 6; *Accentuationssystem*, xviii. § 1, 2; and regarding the *Zinnorith*, see *Liber Psalmorum Hebraicus* by S. Baer, p. xii.

thus: "the highest thing is wisdom; get wisdom," which Zöckler approves of; but the reasons which determine him to this rendering are subtleties: if the author had wished himself to be so understood, he ought at least to have written the words רִאשִׁית הַחֲכָמָה. But רִאשִׁית הַחֲכָמָה is a genitive of relation, as is to be expected from the relativity of the idea רִאשִׁית, and his intention is to say that the beginning of wisdom consists in the proposition קִנְיַת הַחֲכָמָה (cf. the similar formula, Eccles. xii. 13); this proposition is truly the *lapis philosophorum*, it contains all that is necessary in order to becoming wise. Therefore the Greek σοφία called itself modestly φιλοσοφία; for ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς the Book of Wisdom has, vi. 18, ἡ ἀληθεστάτη παιδείας ἐπιθυμία. In 7b the proposition is expressed which contains the *specificum* helping to wisdom. The בָּ denotes price: give all for wisdom (Matt. xiii. 46, 44); no price is too high, no sacrifice too great for it.

Ver. 8. The meaning of the ἀπ. γεγρ. סִלְסַל is determined by רוּמָם in the parallel clause; סִלְסַל signifies to raise, exalt, as a way or dam by heaping up; the *Pilpel*, here tropical: to value or estimate highly. Böttcher interprets well: hold it high in price, raise it (as a purchaser) always higher, make offer for it upon offer. The LXX. (approved by Bertheau), περιχαράκωσον αὐτήν, circumvallate it, i.e. surround it with a wall (סִלְסַלָה)—a strange and here unsuitable figure. Hold it high, says the author, and so it will reward<sup>1</sup> thee with a high place, and (with chiasmic transposition of the performance and the consequence) she will honour<sup>2</sup> thee if (ἐάν) thou lovingly embracest her. חֶבֶק is used of embracing in the pressure of tender love, as in the Canticles ii. 6, viii. 3; the *Piel* is related to the *Kal* as *amplexari* to *amplecti*. Wisdom exalts her admirers, honours her lovers, and makes a man's appearance pleasant, causing him to be revered when he approaches. Regarding לִי־חֵן, vid. i. 9. מָנַן, to deliver up (Gen. xiv. 20), to give up (Hos. xi. 8), is connected in the free poetic manner with two accusatives, instead of with an accus. and dat. LXX. has ὑπερασπίσῃ, but one does not defend himself (as with a shield) by a wreath or crown.

<sup>1</sup> Löwenstein has rightly ותרוֹמָמךְ, vid. my preface to Baer's *Genesis*, p. vii.

<sup>2</sup> We read תִּכְבֶּדְךָ, not תִּכְבֶּדְךָ (Hahn) or תִּכְבֶּדְךָ (Löwenstein); the tone lies on the *penult.*, and the tone-syllable has the point *Tsere*, as in וַיִּנְדֹּף, Deut. xxxii. 7; vid. *Michlol* 66b.

Vers. 10-12. There is no reason for the supposition that the warning which his father gave to the poet now passes over into warnings given by the poet himself (Hitzig); the admonition of the father thus far refers only in general to the endeavour after wisdom, and we are led to expect that the good doctrines which the father communicates to the son as a *viaticum* will be further expanded, and become more and more specific when they take a new departure.

- 10 Hearken, my son, and receive my sayings,  
So shall the years of life be increased to thee.
- 11 In the way of wisdom have I taught thee,  
Guided thee in the paths of rectitude.
- 12 When thou goest, thy step shall not be straitened;  
And if thou runnest, thou shalt not stumble.

Regarding קַח (לָקַח) of appropriating reception and taking up in *succum et sanguinem*, vid. i. 3; regarding שְׁנוֹת חַיִּים, years not merely of the duration of life, but of the enjoyment of life, iii. 2; regarding מַעְגָּל (מַעְגָּלָה), path (track), ii. 9; regarding the בָּ of הוֹרָה, of the department and subject of instruction, Ps. xxv. 8. The perfects, ver. 11, are different from נִתְּתִי, 2a; they refer to rules of life given at an earlier period, which are summarily repeated in this address. The way of wisdom is that which leads to wisdom (Job xxviii. 23); the paths of rectitude, such as trace out the way which is in accordance with the rule of the good and the right. If the youth holds to this direction, he will not go on in darkness or uncertainty with anxious footsteps; and if in youthful fervour he flies along his course, he will not stumble on any unforeseen obstacle and fall. יָצַר is as a metaplastic fut. to צָרַר or צָר, to be narrow, to straiten, formed as if from יָצַר. The Targ. after Aruch,<sup>1</sup> לֹא תִשְׁנַק אֶרְחָךְ, thou shalt not need to bind together (*constringere*) or to hedge up thy way.

Vers. 13-17. The exhortations attracting by means of promises, now become warnings fitted to alarm:

- 13 Hold fast to instruction, let her not go;  
Keep her, for she is thy life.
- 14 Into the path of the wicked enter not,  
And walk not in the way of the evil.

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<sup>1</sup> [R. Nathan ben Jechiel, A.D. 1106, who is usually styled by the Jewish writers בעל ערוך, *Auctor Aruch*, author of a Talmudical Lexicon.]

- 15 Avoid it, enter not into it;  
Turn from it and pass away.  
16 For they cannot sleep unless they do evil,  
And they are deprived of sleep unless they bring others to ruin.  
17 For they eat the bread of wickedness,  
And they drink the wine of violence.

Elsewhere מוֹסֵר means also self-discipline, or moral religious education, i. 3; here discipline, *i.e.* parental educative counsel. תָּרַף is the segolated fut. apoc. *Hiph.* (indic. תִּרְפֶּה) from *tarp*, cf. the imper. *Hiph.* תָּרַף from *harp*. נָצְרָה is the imper. *Kal* (not *Piel*, as Aben Ezra thinks) with *Dagesh dirimens*; cf. the verbal substantive נִצְרָה, Ps. cxli. 3, with similar *Dagesh*, after the form יִקְהֶה, Gen. xlix. 10. מוֹסֵר (elsewhere always masc.) is here used in the fem. as the synonym of the name of wisdom: keep her (instruction), for she is thy life,<sup>1</sup> *i.e.* the life of thy life. In ver. 14 the godless (*vid.* on the root-idea of רָשָׁע under Ps. i. 1) and the habitually wicked, *i.e.* the vicious, stand in parallelism; בּוֹא and אָשֵׁר are related as entering and going on, *ingressus* and *progressus*. The verb אָשֵׁר signifies, like יָשָׁר, to be straight, even, fortunate, whence אָשֵׁר = Arab. *yusâr*, happiness, and to step straight out, ix. 6, of which meanings אָשֵׁר is partly the intensive, as here, partly the causative, xxiii. 19 (elsewhere causative of the meaning, to be happy, Gen. xxx. 13). The meaning *progredi* is not mediated by a supplementary צִעְרִי; the derivative אָשׁוּר (אֲשׁוּר), a step, shows that it is derived immediately from the root-idea of a movement in a straight line. Still less justifiable is the rendering by Schultens, *ne vestigia imprimas in via malorum*; for the Arab. *âththr* is denom. of *ithr*, אָתַר, the primitive verb roots of which, *athr*, אָתַר = אָשֵׁר, are lost.

Ver. 15. On פָּרַעְהוּ, avoid it (the way), (*opp.* אָחַז, Job xvii. 9; תָּמַד, Ps. xvii. 5), see under i. 25. שָׁטָה, elsewhere (as the Arab. *shatt*, to be without measure, insolent) used *in malam partem*, has here its fundamental meaning, to go aside. מַעְלִי (expressed in French by *de dessus*, in Ital. by *di sopra*) denotes: so that thou comest not to stand on it. עָבַר means in both cases *transire*, but the second instance, "to go beyond (farther)" (cf. 2 Sam. xv. 22, and under Hab. i. 11), coincides with "to escape, *evadere*."

Ver. 16. In the reason here given the perf. may stand in the con-

<sup>1</sup> Punctuate הִיא כֵּי; the *Zinnorith* represents the place of the *Makkeph*, *vid.* *Torath Emeth*, p. 9.

ditional clauses as well as in Virgil's *Et si non aliqua nocuisses, mortuus esses*; but the fut., as in Eccles. v. 11, denotes that they (the רָעִים and the רָשָׁעִים) cannot sleep, and are deprived of their sleep, unless they are continually doing evil and bringing others into misery; the interruption of this course of conduct, which has become to them like a second nature, would be as the interruption of their diet, which makes them ill. For the *Kal* יִכְשֹׁלוּ, which here must have the meaning of the person sinning (cf. ver. 19), and would be feeble if used of the confirmed transgressors, the *Kerî* rightly substitutes the *Hiphil* יִכְשִׁילוּ, which occurs also 2 Chron. xxv. 8, there without an object, in the meaning to cause to fall, as the contrast of עֹזֵר (to help).

Ver. 17. The second בִּי introduces the reason of their bodily welfare being conditioned by evil-doing. If the poet meant: they live on bread which consists in wickedness, *i.e.* on wickedness as their bread, then in the parallel sentence he should have used the word חֶמֶס; the genitives are meant of the means of acquisition: they live on unrighteous gain, on bread and wine which they procure by wickedness and by all manner of violence or injustice. On the etymon of חֶמֶס (Arab. *hamas*, *durum*, *asperum*, *vehementem esse*), *vid.* Schultens; the plur. חֶמְסִים belongs to a more recent epoch (*vid.* under 2 Sam. xxii. 49 and Ps. xviii. 49). The change in the tense represents the idea that they having eaten such bread, set forth such wine, and therewith wash it down.

Vers. 18, 19. The two ways that lie for his choice before the youth, are distinguished from one another as light is from darkness:

18 And the path of the just is like the brightness of the morning light,  
Which shines more and more till the perfect day.

19 The way of the wicked is deep darkness,  
They know not at what they stumble.

The Hebr. style is wont to conceal in its *Vav* (ו) diverse kinds of logical relations, but the *Vav* of 18<sub>a</sub> may suitably stand before 19<sub>a</sub>, where the discontinuance of this contrast of the two ways is unsuitable. The displacing of a *Vav* from its right position is not indeed without example (see under Ps. xvi. 3); but since ver. 19 joins itself more easily than ver. 18 to ver. 17 without missing a particle, thus it is more probable that the two verses are to be transposed, than that the ו of וְאִרְחֶה (ver. 17) is to be prefixed to וְרָחֶה (ver. 18). Sinning, says ver. 16, has become to the godless as

a second nature, so that they cannot sleep without it; they must continually be sinning, adds ver. 17, for thus and not otherwise do they gain for themselves their daily bread. With reference to this fearful self-perversion to which wickedness has become a necessity and a condition of life, the poet further says that the way of the godless is כְּאֶפְלָה,<sup>1</sup> as deep darkness, as the entire absence of light: it cannot be otherwise than that they fall, but they do not at all know whereat they fall, for they do not at all know wickedness as such, and have no apprehension of the punishment which from an inward necessity it brings along with it; on the contrary, the path of the just is in constantly increasing light—the light of knowledge, and the light of true happiness which is given<sup>2</sup> in and with knowledge. On בִּפְנֵי *vid.* under Isa. ii. 22; it is מְכַשּׁוֹל, σκάνδαλον, that is meant, stumbling against which (cf. Lev. xxvi. 37) they stumble to their fall. נִגְהָ,<sup>3</sup> used elsewhere than in the Bible, means the morning star (Venus), (Sirach l. 4, Syr.); when used in the Bible it means the early dawn, the light of the rising sun, the morning light, 2 Sam. xxiii. 4, Isa. lxii. 1, which announces itself in the morning twilight, Dan. vi. 20. The light of this morning sunshine is הוֹלֵךְ וְאוֹר, going and shining, *i.e.* becoming ever brighter. In the connection of הוֹלֵךְ וְאוֹר it might be a question

<sup>1</sup> In good mss. and printed copies the כ has the *Pathach*, as Kimchi states the rule in *Michlol* 45a: כָּל כְּאֶפְלָה פֶתַח, כל באבנים פתח.

<sup>2</sup> Hitzig inverts the order of vers. 18 and 19, and connects the כִּי of 16a immediately with ver. 19 (for the way of the wicked . . .). He moreover regards vers. 16, 17 as an interpolation, and explains ver. 16 as a gloss transforming the text of ver. 19. "That the wicked commit wickedness," says Hitzig, "is indeed certain (1 Sam. xxiv. 14), and the warning of ver. 15 ought not to derive its motive from their energy in sinning." But the warning against the way of the wicked is founded not on their energy in sinning, but on their bondage to sin: their sleep, their food and drink—their life both when they sleep and when they wake—is conditioned by sin and is penetrated by sin. This foundation of the warning furnishes what is needed, and is in nothing open to objection. And that in vers. 16 and 19 לֹא יֵדְעוּ and לֹא יֵרְעוּ, כְּאֶפְלָה and נִגְזְלָה, יִכְשְׁלוּ and יִכְשְׁלוּ seem to be alike, does not prove that ver. 16 originated as a parallel text from ver. 19—in the one verse as in the other the thoughts are original.

<sup>3</sup> Böttcher, under 2 Sam. xxiii. 4, explains נִגְהָ of the brightness striking against, conquering (cf. נִגְהָ, נִגְהָ) the clouds; but *ferire* or *percutere* lies nearer (cf. נִגְעַת, Ezek. xvii. 10, נִכְחָ, Ps. cxxi. 6, and the Arab. *darb*, used of strong sensible impressions), as Silius, iv. 329, says of the light: *percussit lumine campos*.

whether **אִוֵּר** is regarded as gerundive (Gen. viii. 3, 5), or as participle (2 Sam. xvi. 5, Jer. xli. 6), or as a participial adjective (Gen. xxvi. 13, Judg. iv. 24); in the connection of **הָלֹךְ וְאִוֵּר**, on the contrary, it is unquestionably the gerundive: the partic. denoting the progress joins itself either with the partic., Jon. i. 11, or with the participial adjective, 2 Sam. iii. 1, 2 Chron. xvii. 12, or with another adjective formation, 2 Sam. xv. 12, Esth. ix. 4 (where **וְנִדָּל** after **וְנִדָּל** of other places appears to be intended as an adjective, not after 2 Sam. v. 10 as gerundive). Thus **וְאִוֵּר**, as also **וְטֹב**, 1 Sam. ii. 26, will be participial after the form **בֹּשֵׁשׁ**, being ashamed (Ges. § 72, 1); cf. **בֹּשֵׁשׁ**, Zech. x. 5, **קִים**, 2 Kings xvi. 7. “**נִכְוֵן הַיּוֹם**” quite corresponds to the Greek *τὸ σταθῆρὸν τῆς ἡμέρας, ἡ σταθῆρὰ μεσημβρία* (as one also says *τὸ σταθῆρὸν τῆς νυκτός*), and to the

Arabic **قائمة الظهيرة** and **قائمة النهار**. The figure is probably derived from the balance (cf. Lucan's *Pharsalia*, lib. 9: *quum cardine summo Stat librata dies*): before and after midday the tongue on the balance of the day bends to the left and to the right, but at the point of midday it stands directly in the midst” (Fleischer). It is the midday time that is meant, when the clearness of day has reached its fullest intensity,—the point between increasing and decreasing, when, as we are wont to say, the sun stands in the zenith (= Arab. *samt*, the point of support, i.e. the vertex). Besides Mark iv. 28, there is no biblical passage which presents like these two a figure of gradual development. The progress of blissful knowledge is compared to that of the clearness of the day till it reaches its midday height, having reached to which it becomes a knowing of all in God, xxviii. 5, 1 John ii. 20.

Vers. 20-22. The paternal admonition now takes a new departure:

- 20 My son, attend unto my words,  
Incline thine ear to my sayings.
- 21 Let them not depart from thine eyes;  
Keep them in the midst of thine heart.
- 22 For they are life to all who get possession of them,  
And health to their whole body.

Regarding the *Hiph.* **הִלִּיז** (for **הִלִּיז**), ver. 21, formed after the Chaldee manner like **הִלִּיז**, **הִפִּיז**, **הִנִּיז**, *vid.* Gesenius, § 72, 9;—Ewald, § 114, c, gives to it the meaning of “to mock,” for he interchanges

it with הִלִּיץ, instead of the meaning to take away, *efficere ut recedat* (cf. under ii. 15). This supposed causative meaning it has also here: may they = may one (*vid.* under ii. 22) not remove them from thine eyes; the object is (ver. 20) the words of the paternal admonition. Hitzig, indeed, observes that “the accusative is not supplied;” but with greater right it is to be remarked that יִלְיוּ (fut. *Hiph.* of לָו) and יִלְיוּ (fut. *Kal* of *id.*) are not one and the same, and the less so as הִלִּיץ is not, like הִלֵּץ, intrinsically transitive. Here and there יִלְיוּ occurs, but the masoretical and grammatical authorities (*e.g.* Kimchi) demand יִלְיוּ. The plur. לְמוֹצְאֵיהֶם is continued, 22*b*, in the sing., for that which is said refers to each one of the many (iii. 18, 28, 35). מָצָא is fundamentally an active conception, like our “*finden*,” to find; it means to attain, to produce, to procure, etc. מִרְפָּא means, according as the מ is understood of the “that = *ut*” of the action or of the “what” of its performance, either health or the means of health; here, like רְפָאוֹת, iii. 8, not with the underlying conception of sickness, but of the fluctuations connected with the bodily life of man, which make needful not only a continual strengthening of it, but also its being again and again restored. Nothing preserves soul and body in a healthier state than when we always keep before our eyes and carry in our hearts the good doctrines; they give to us true guidance on the way of life: “Godliness has the promise of this life, and of that which is to come.” 1 Tim. iv. 8.

Vers. 23–27. After this general preface the exhortation now becomes special:

- 23 Above all other things that are to be guarded, keep thy heart,  
For out from it life has its issues.
- 24 Put away from thee perverseness of mouth,  
And waywardness of lips put far from thee.
- 25 Thine eyes should look straight forward,  
And thine eyelids look straight to the end before thee.
- 26 Make even the path of thy feet,  
And let all thy ways be correct.
- 27 Turn not aside to the right and to the left;  
Remove thy foot from evil.

Although מִשְׁמֵר in itself and in this connection may mean the object to be watchfully avoided (*cavendi*) (*vid.* under ii. 20*b*): thus the usage of the language lying before us applies it, yet only as denoting the place of watching or the object *observandi*; so that it is not to be thus explained, with Raschi and others: before

all from which one has to protect himself (*ab omni re cavenda*), guard thine heart; but: before all that one has to guard (*præ omni re custodienda*), guard it as the most precious of possessions committed to thy trust. The heart, which according to its etymon denotes that which is substantial (*Kernhafte*) in man (cf. Arab. *lubb*, the kernel of the nut or almond), comes here into view not as the physical, but as the intellectual, and specially the ethical *centrum*.

Ver. 24. The תּוֹצֵאוֹת are the point of a thing, *e.g.* of a boundary, from which it goes forth, and the linear course proceeding from thence. If thus the author says that the תּוֹצֵאוֹת הַיָּיִם go out from the heart,<sup>1</sup> he therewith implies that the life has not only its fountain in the heart, but also that the direction which it takes is determined by the heart. Physically considered, the heart is the receptacle for the blood, in which the soul lives and rules; the pitcher at the blood-fountain which draws it and pours it forth; the chief vessel of the physically self-subsisting blood-life from which it goes forth, and into which it disembogues (*Syst. der bib. Psychol.* p. 232). What is said of the heart in the lower sense of corporeal vitality, is true in the higher sense of the intellectual soul-life. The Scripture names the heart also as the intellectual soul-centre of man, in its concrete, central unity, its dynamic activity, and its ethical determination on all sides. All the radiations of corporeal and of soul life concentrate there, and again unfold themselves from thence; all that is implied in the Hellenic and Hellenistic words νοῦς, λόγος, συνείδησις, θυμός, lies in the word καρδία; and all whereby בָּשָׂר (the body) and נֶפֶשׁ (the spirit, *anima*) are affected comes in לֵב into the light of consciousness (*Id.* p. 251). The heart is the instrument of the thinking, willing, perceiving life of the spirit; it is the seat of the knowledge of self, of the knowledge of God, of the knowledge of our relation to God, and also of the law of God impressed on our moral nature; it is the workshop of our individual spiritual and ethical form of life brought about by self-activity,—the life in its higher and in its lower sense goes out from it, and receives from it the impulse of the direction which it takes; and how earnestly, therefore, must we feel ourselves admonished, how sacredly bound to preserve the heart in purity (Ps. lxxiii. 1), so that from this spring of life may

<sup>1</sup> The correct form here is בִּי-מִפְּנֵי, with the *Makkeph* to כִּי.

go forth not mere seeming life and a caricature of life, but a true life well-pleasing to God! How we have to carry into execution this careful guarding of the heart, is shown in ver. 24 and the golden rules which follow. Mouth and lips are meant (ver. 24) as instruments of speech, and not of its utterance, but of the speech going forth from them. עֲקָשׁוֹת, *distorsio*, refers to the mouth (vi. 12), when what it speaks is disfiguring and deforming, thus falsehood as the contrast of truth and love (ii. 12); and to the lips לוֹזוֹת, when that which they speak turns aside from the true and the right to side-ways and by-ways. Since the *Kametz* of such *abstracta*, as well of verbs ע'ו like רָמוֹת, Ezek. xxxii. 5, as of verbs ל'ה like נָלוֹת, Isa. xlv. 13, לוֹזוֹת, Isa. xxviii. 18, is elsewhere treated as unalterable, there lies in this לוֹזוֹת either an inconsistency of punctuation, or it is presupposed that the form לוֹזוֹת was vocalized like שְׁבוֹת = שְׁבִית, Num. xxi. 29.

Ver. 25. Another rule commends gathering together (concentration) in opposition to dissipation. It is also even externally regarded worthy of consideration, as Ben-Sira, ix. 5, expresses it: *μη περιβλέπου ἐν ῥύμαις πόλεως* — purposeless, curious staring about operates upon the soul, always decentralizing and easily defiling it. But the rule does not exhaust itself in this meaning with reference to external self-discipline; it counsels also straightforward, unswerving directness toward a fixed goal (and what else can this be in such a connection than that which wisdom places before man?), without the turning aside of the eye toward that which is profitless and forbidden, and in this inward sense it falls in with the demand for a single, not squinting eye, Matt. vi. 22, where Bengel explains ἀπλοῦς by *simplex et bonus, intentus in cælum, in Deum, unice*. נָכַח (R. נָךְ) means properly fixing, or holding fast with the look, and נָגַד (as the Arab. *najad*, to be clear, to be in sight, shows) the rising up which makes the object stand conspicuous before the eyes; both denote here that which lies straight before us, and presents itself to the eye looking straight out. The naming of the עֲפָעָפִים (from עָפַעַף, to flutter, to move tremblingly), which belongs not to the seeing apparatus of the eye but to its protection, is introduced by the poetical parallelism; for the eyelids, including in this word the twinkling, in their movement follow the direction of the seeing eye. On the form יִשְׁרִי (fut. *Hiph.* of יָשַׁר, to be straight), defective according to the Masora, with the *Jod* audible, cf. Hos. vii. 12, 1 Chron. xii. 2, and under

Gen. viii. 17; the softened form הַיָּשִׁיר does not occur, we find only הַיָּשִׁיר or הוֹשִׁיר.

Ver. 26. The understanding of this rule is dependent on the right interpretation of פָּלַם, which means neither “weigh off” (Ewald) nor “measure off” (Hitzig, Zöckler). פָּלַם has once, Ps. lviii. 3, the meaning to weigh out, as the denom. of פָּלֶם, a level, a steel-yard;<sup>1</sup> everywhere else it means to make even, to make level, to open a road: *vid.* under Isa. xxvi. 7, xl. 12. The admonition thus refers not to the careful consideration which measures the way leading to the goal which one wishes to reach, but to the preparation of the way by the removal of that which prevents unhindered progress and makes the way insecure. The same meaning appears if פָּלַם, of cognate meaning with פָּלַן, denoted first to level, and then to make straight with the level (Fleischer). We must remove all that can become a moral hindrance or a dangerous obstacle in our life-course, in order that we may make right steps with our feet, as the LXX. (Heb. xii. 13) translate. 26*b* is only another expression for this thought. הָקִין דְּרָכָו (2 Chron. xxvii. 6) means to give a direction to his way; a right way, which keeps in and facilitates the keeping in the straight direction, is accordingly called נָכוֹן דְּרָכָו; and “let all thy ways be right” (cf. Ps. cxix. 5, LXX. κατευσθυσθῆσαι) will thus mean: see to it that all the ways which thou goest lead straight to the end.

Ver. 27. In closest connection with the preceding, 27*a* cautions against by-ways and indirect courses, and 27*b* continues it in the briefest moral expression, which is here הָסֵר רִגְלְךָ מִדָּרֵךְ instead of סִיר מִדָּרֵךְ, iii. 7, for the figure is derived from the way. The LXX. has other four lines after this verse (27), which we have endeavoured to retranslate into the Hebrew (Introd. p. 47). They are by no means genuine; for while in 27*a* right and left are equivalent to by-ways, here the right and left side are distinguished as that of truth and its contrary; and while there [in LXX.] the ὁρθὰς τροχιάς ποιεῖν is required of man, here it is promised as the operation of God, which is no contradiction, but in this similarity of expression betrays poverty of style. Hitzig disputes also the genuineness of the Hebrew ver. 27. But it continues explanatorily ver. 26, and is related to it, yet not as a gloss, and in the general

<sup>1</sup> The Arabic word *teffis*, said to be of the same signification (a balance), and which is given in the most recent editions of Gesenius' Lexicon, has been already shown under Job xxxvii. 16 to be a word devoid of all evidence.

relation of 26 and 27a there comes a word, certainly not unwelcome, such as 27b, which impresses the moral stamp on these thoughts.

That with ver. 27 the admonition of his father, which the poet, placing himself back into the period of his youth, reproduces, is not yet concluded, the resumption of the address בְּנִי, v. 1, makes evident; while on the other hand the address בְּנִים in v. 7 shows that at that point there is advance made from the recollections of his father's house to conclusions therefrom, for the circle of young men by whom the poet conceives himself to be surrounded. That in v. 7 ff. a subject of the warning with which the seventh address closes is retained and further prosecuted, does not in the connection of all these addresses contradict the opinion that with v. 7 a new address begins. But the opinion that the warning against adultery does not agree (Zöckler) with the designation אִשָּׁה, iv. 3, given to him to whom it is addressed, is refuted by 1 Chron. xxii. 5, 2 Chron. xiii. 7.

Chap. v. 1-6. Here a fourth rule of life follows the three already given, iv. 24, 25, 26-27:

- 1 My son, attend unto my wisdom,  
And incline thine ear to my prudence,
- 2 To observe discretion,  
And that thy lips preserve knowledge.
- 3 For the lips of the adulteress distil honey,  
And smoother than oil is her mouth;
- 4 But her end is bitter like wormwood,  
Sharper than a two-edged sword.
- 5 Her feet go down to death,  
Her steps cleave to Hades.
- 6 She is far removed from entering the way of life,  
Her steps wander without her observing it.

Wisdom and understanding increase with the age of those who earnestly seek after them. It is the father of the youth who here requests a willing ear to his wisdom of life, gained in the way of many years' experience and observation. In ver. 2 the inf. of the object is continued in the *finitum*, as in ii. 2, 8. מְזִמּוֹת (*vid.* on its etymon under i. 4) are plans, projects, designs, for the most part in a bad sense, intrigues and artifices (*vid.* xxiv. 8), but also used of well-considered resolutions toward what is good, and hence of the purposes of God, Jer. xxiii. 20. This noble sense of the word מְזִמּוֹת, with its plur., is peculiar to the introductory portion (i.-ix.)

of the Book of Proverbs. The plur. means here and at viii. 12 (placing itself with *הַבְּנוּת* and *הַכְּמוּת*, *vid.* p. 68) the reflection and deliberation which is the presupposition of well-considered action, and *שָׁמַר* is thus not otherwise than at xix. 8, and everywhere so meant, where it has that which is obligatory as its object: the youth is summoned to careful observation and persevering exemplification of the *quidquid agas, prudenter agas et respice finem*. In 2b the *Rebia Mugrash* forbids the genitive connection of the two words *וְדַעַת שְׂפָתֶיךָ*; we translate: *et ut scientiam labia tua tueantur*. Lips which preserve knowledge are such as permit nothing to escape from them (Ps. xvii. 3b) which proceeds not from the knowledge of God, and in Him of that which is good and right, and aims at the working out of this knowledge; *vid.* Köhler on Mal. ii. 7. *שְׂפָתֶיךָ* (from *שָׁפָה*, Arab. *shafat*, edge, lip, properly that against which one rubs, and that which rubs itself) is fem., but the usage of the language presents the word in two genders (cf. 3a with xxvi. 23). Regarding the pausal *יִצְרוּ* for *יָצְרוּ*, *vid.* under iii. 1, ii. 11. The lips which distil the honey of enticement stand opposite to the lips which distil knowledge; the object of the admonition is to furnish a protection against the honey-lips.

Ver. 3. *זָרָה* denotes the wife who belongs to another, or who does not belong to him to whom she gives herself or who goes after her (*vid.* ii. 16). She appears here as the betrayer of youth. The poet paints the love and amiableness which she feigns with colours from the Canticles, iv. 11, cf. v. 16. *נֶפֶת* denotes the honey flowing of itself from the combs (*צִיפִים*), thus the purest and sweetest; its root-word is not *נָפַף*, which means to shake, vibrate, and only mediately (when the object is a fluid) to scatter, sprinkle, but, as Schultens has observed, a verb *נָפַת* = Arab. *nafat*, to bubble, to spring up, *nafath*, to blow, to spit out, to pour out. Parchon places the word rightly under *נֶפֶת* (while Kimchi places it under *נָפַף* after the form *בִּשְׁתָּה*), and explains it by *חֲלוֹת דְּבַשׁ הַיִּצְאִים מִן הַכוּוֹרֹת* (the words *דְּבַשׁ הַיִּצְאָה* should have been used): the honey which flows from the cells before they are broken (the so-called virgin honey). The mouth, *הֶהָ* = Arab. *hink* (from *הִנָּה*, Arab. *hanak*, *imbueret*, e.g., after the manner of Beduins, the mouth of the newly-born infant with date-honey), comes into view here, as at viii. 7, etc., as the instrument of speech: smoother than oil (cf. Ps. lv. 22), it shows itself when it gives forth amiable, gentle, impressive words (ii. 16, vi. 24); also our “schmeicheln” (= to

flatter, caress) is equivalent to to make smooth and fair; in the language of weavers it means to smooth the warp.

Vers. 4, 5. In verse 4 the reverse of the sweet and smooth external is placed opposite to the attraction of the seducer, by whose influence the inconsiderate permits himself to be carried away: her end, *i.e.* the last that is experienced of her, the final consequence of intercourse with her (cf. xxiii. 32), is bitter as wormwood, sharp as a two-edged sword. The O. T. language regards bitterness and poison as related both in meaning and in reality; the word לַעֲנָה (Aq. ἀψίνθιον = wormwood) means in Arab. the curse. חֶרֶב פִּיּוֹת is translated by Jerome after the LXX., *gladius biceps*; but חֶרֶב שְׁנֵי פִּיּוֹת (Judg. iii. 16) means a double-edged sword. Here the plur. will thus poetically strengthen the meaning, like ξίφος πολύστομον, that which devours, as if it had three or four edges (Fl.). The end in which the disguised seduction terminates is bitter as the bitterest, and cutting as that which cuts the most: self-condemnation and a feeling of divine anger, anguish of heart, and destructive judgment. The feet of the adulteress go downward to death. In Hebr. this *descendentes ad mortem* is expressed by the genitive of connection; מָוֶת is the genitive, as in יוֹרְדֵי בּוֹר i. 12; elsewhere the author uses יוֹרְדוֹת אֵל vii. 27, ii. 18. Death, מָוֶת (so named from the stretching of the corpse after the stiffness of death), denotes the condition of departure from this side as a punishment, with which is associated the idea of divine wrath. In שְׁאֹל (sinking, abyss, from שָׁאַל, R. של, χαλάν, *vid.* under Isa. v. 14), lie the ideas of the grave as a place of corruption, and of the under-world as the place of incorporeal shadow-life. Her steps hold fast to Hades is equivalent to, they strive after Hades and go straight to it; similar to this is the Arab. expression, *hđhâ âldrb yâkhđh âly âlbld*: this way leads straight forward to the town (Fl.).

Ver. 6. If we try to connect the clause beginning with פֶּן with 5b as its principal sentence: she goes straight to the abyss, so that by no means does she ever tread the way of life (thus *e.g.* Schultens), or better, with 6b: never more to walk in the way of life, her paths fluctuate hither and thither (as *Gr. Venet.* and Kamphausen in Bunsen's *Bibelwerk*, after Bertheau and Ewald, translate); then in the former case more than in the latter the difference of the subject opposes itself, and in the latter, in addition, the לֹא תִרְעָה, only disturbing in this negative clause. Also by the arrangement of

the words, 6a appears as an independent thought. But with Jewish expositors (Rashi, Aben-Ezra, Ralbag, Malbim, etc.) to interpret תַּפְּלִים, after the Talmud (*b. Moëd katan* 9a) and Midrash, as an address is impracticable; the warning: do not weigh the path of life, affords no meaning suitable to this connection—for we must, with Cartwright and J. H. Michaelis, regard 6a as the antecedent to 6b: *ne forte semitam vitæ ad sequendum eligas, te per varios deceptionum mæandros abripit ut non noveris, ubi locorum sis*; but then the continuation of the address is to be expected in 6b. No, the subject to תַּפְּלִים is the adulteress, and פֶּן is an intensified לֵא. Thus the LXX., Jerome, Syr., Targ., Luther, Geier, Nolde, and among Jewish interpreters Heidenheim, who first broke with the tradition sanctioned by the Talmud and the Midrash, for he interpreted 6a as a negative clause spoken in the tone of a question. But פֶּן is not suitable for a question, but for a call. Accordingly, Böttcher explains: *viam vitæ ne illa complanare studeat!* (פֶּן in the meaning *complanando operam dare*). But the adulteress as such, and the striving to come to the way of life, stand in contradiction: an effort to return must be meant, which, because the power of sin over her is too great, fails; but the words do not denote that, they affirm the direct contrary, viz. that it does not happen to the adulteress ever to walk in the way of life. As in the warning the independent פֶּן may be equivalent to *cave ne* (Job xxxii. 13), so also in the declaration it may be equivalent to *absit ut*, for פֶּן (from פָּנָה, after the forms פָּן = Arab. *banj*, פָּנָה = Arab. *'asj*) means turning away, removal. Thus: Far from taking the course of the way of life (which has life as its goal and reward)—for פֶּלֶם, to open, to open a road (Ps. lxxviii. 50), has here the meaning of the open road itself—much rather do her steps wilfully stagger (Jer. xiv. 10) hither and thither, they go without order and without aim, at one time hither, at another time thither, without her observing it; i.e. without her being concerned at this, that she thereby runs into the danger of falling headlong into the yawning abyss. The unconsciousness which the clause לֹא תִרְע expresses, has as its object not the falling (Ps. xxxv. 8), of which there is here nothing directly said, but just this staggering, vacillation, the danger of which she does not watch against. מֵעַי has *Mercha* under the ע with *Zinnorith* preceding; it is *Milra* [an oxytone] (*Michlol* 111b); the punctuation varies in the accentuation of the form without evident reason:

Olsh. § 233, p. 285. The old Jewish interpreters (and recently also Malbim) here, as also at ii. 16, by the זָרָה [strange woman] understand heresy (מִינוּת), or the philosophy that is hostile to revelation; the ancient Christian interpreters understood by it folly (Origen), or sensuality (Procopius), or heresy (Olympiodorus), or false doctrine (Polychronios). The LXX., which translates, ver. 5, רַגְלִיהָ by τῆς ἀφροσύνης οἱ πόδες, looks toward this allegorical interpretation. But this is unnecessary, and it is proved to be false from v. 15–20, where the זָרָה is contrasted with the married wife.

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#### EIGHTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, V. 7–23.

##### WARNING AGAINST ADULTERY AND COMMENDATION OF MARRIAGE.

With v. 1–6, which like iv. 20 commences it once more, the seventh discourse is brought to a conclusion. The address בְּנִי is three times repeated in similar connections, iv. 10, 20, v. 1. There is no reason for breaking off the fatherly admonition (introduced with the words, “And he said to me,” iv. 4), which was addressed to the author in the period of his youth, earlier than here, where the author again resumes the שְׁמָעִי בָנִים with which he had begun (iv. 1) this seventh narrative address. That after the father has ceased speaking he does not express himself in a rounded manner, may be taken as a sign that toward the end he had become more and more unmindful of the rôle of the reporter, if this וְעַתָּה בָנִים following, with which he realizes for his circle of hearers the admonition which had been in part addressed to himself, does not prove the contrary.

Vers. 7–11. The eighth discourse springs out of the conclusion of the seventh, and connects itself by its reflective מַעֲלִיָּה so closely with it that it appears as its continuation; but the new beginning and its contents included in it, referring only to social life, secures its relative independence. The poet derives the warning against intercourse with the adulteress from the preceding discourse, and grounds it on the destructive consequences.

7 And now, ye sons, hearken unto me,  
And depart not from the words of my mouth.

- 8 Hold thy path far from her neighbourhood,  
And come not to the door of her house !  
9 That thou mayest not give the freshness of thy youth to another,  
Nor thy years to the cruel one ;  
10 That strangers may not sate themselves with thy possessions,  
And the fruit of thy toils come into the house of a stranger,  
11 And thou groanest at the end,  
When thy flesh and thy body are consumed.

Neither here nor in the further stages of this discourse is there any reference to the criminal punishment inflicted on the adulterer, which, according to Lev. xx. 10, consisted in death, according to Ezek. xvi. 40, cf. John viii. 5, in stoning, and according to a later traditional law, in strangulation (שׁוֹתֵק). Ewald finds in ver. 14 a play on this punishment of adultery prescribed by law, and reads from ver. 9 f. that the adulterer who is caught by the injured husband was reduced to the state of a slave, and was usually deprived of his manhood. But that any one should find pleasure in making the destroyer of his wife his slave is a far-fetched idea, and neither the law nor the history of Israel contains any evidence for this punishment by slavery or the mutilation of the adulterer, for which Ewald refers to Grimm's *Deutsche Rechtsaltertümer*. The figure which is here sketched by the poet is very different. He who goes into the net of the wanton woman loses his health and his goods. She stands not alone, but has her party with her, who wholly plunder the simpleton who goes into her trap. Nowhere is there any reference to the husband of the adulteress. The poet does not at all think on a married woman. And the word chosen directs our attention rather to a foreigner than to an Israelitish woman, although the author may look upon harlotry as such as heathenish rather than Israelitish, and designate it accordingly. The party of those who make prostitutes of themselves consists of their relations and their older favourites, the companions of their gain, who being in league with her exhaust the life-strength and the resources of the befooled youth (Fl.). This discourse begins with וְעַתָּה, for it is connected by this concluding application (cf. vii. 24) with the preceding.

Vers. 8, 9. In verse 8, one must think on such as make a gain of their impurity. מֵעַל, Schultens remarks, with reference to Ezek. xxiii. 18, *crebrum in rescisso omni commercio*: מֵעַל denotes the departure, and עַל the nearness, from which one must remove himself to a distance. Regarding הוֹר (ver. 9), which primarily, like our

*Pracht* (*bracht* from *brechen*=to break) [pomp, magnificence], appears to mean fulness of sound, and then fulness of splendour, see under Job xxxix. 20; here there is a reference to the freshness or the bloom of youth, as well as the years, against the sacrifice of which the warning is addressed—in a pregnant sense they are the fairest years, the years of youthful fulness of strength. Along with אַחֲרִים the *singulare-tantum* אֶכְזָרִי (*vid.* Jer. l. 42) has a collective sense; regarding the root-meaning, *vid.* under Isa. xiii. 9. It is the *adj. relat.* of אֶכְזָר after the form אֶכְזָב, which is formed not from אָזַר, but from an unknown verb אֶכְזַר. The ancients referred it to death and the devil; but the אֶכְזָר belongs to the covetous society, which impels ever anew to sin, which is their profit, him who has once fallen into it, and thus brings bodily ruin upon him: they are the people who stand far aloof from this their sacrifice, and among them are barbarous, rude, inexorably cruel monsters (*Unmenschen*) (*Græcus Venetus*, τῶ ἀπανθρώπων), who rest not till their victim is laid prostrate on the ground and ruined both bodily and financially.

Ver. 10. This other side of the ruin ver. 10 presents as an image of terror. For הָיָה refers to the person in his stately appearance, but בָּהֶם to his possessions in money and goods; for this word, as well as in the strikingly similar passage Hos. vii. 9, is used as the synonym of חֵיל (Gen. xxxiv. 29, etc.), in the sense of ability, estate. This meaning is probably mediated by means of a metonymy, as Gen. iv. 12, Job xxxi. 39, where the idea of the capability of producing is passed over into that of the produce conformable to it; so here the idea of work-power passes over into that of the gain resulting therefrom. וְעֲצָבֶיךָ (and thy toils) is not, like בָּחֶד, the accusative governed by יִשְׁבְּעֶי; the carrying over of this verb disturbs the parallelism, and the statement in the passage besides does not accord therewith, which, interpreted as a virtual predicate, presents 10b as an independent prohibitive clause: *neve sint labores tui in domo peregrini*, not *peregrina*; at least נִכְרִי according to the usage of the language is always personal, so that בֵּית נִכְרִי (cf. Lam. v. 2), like מַלְבוּשׁ נִכְרִי, Zeph. i. 8, is to be explained after עֵיר נִכְרִי, Judg. xix. 12. עָצַב (from עָצַב, Arab. 'asab, to bind fast, to tie together, then to make effort, ποιεῖν, *laborare*) is difficult work (x. 22), and that which is obtained by it; Fleischer compares the Ital. *i miei sudori*, and the French *mes sueurs*.

Ver. 11. The fut. יִשְׁבְּעֶי and the יְהִי needed to complete 10b are

continued in ver. 11 in the *consec. perf.* נָהַם, elsewhere of the hollow roaring of the sea, Isa. v. 30, the growling of the lion, xxviii. 15, here, as also Ezek. xxiv. 23, of the hollow groaning of men; a word which echoes the natural sound, like הָמָה, הוֹם. The LXX., with the versions derived from it, has καὶ μεταμεληθήσῃ, i.e. וְנִחַמָּה (the *Niph.* נָחַם, to experience the sorrow of repentance, also an echo-word which imitates the sound of deep breathing)—a happy *quid pro quo*, as if one interchanged the Arab. *naham*, *fremere*, *anhelare*, and *nadam*, *pœnitere*. That wherein the end consists to which the deluded youth is brought, and the sorrowful sound of despair extorted from him, is stated in 11b: his flesh is consumed away, for sensuality and vexation have worked together to undermine his health. The author here connects together two synonyms to strengthen the conception, as if one said: All thy tears and thy weeping help thee nothing (Fl.); he loves this heaping together of synonyms, as we have shown at p. 33. When the blood-relation of any one is called שָׂאֵר בְּשָׂרוֹ, Lev. xviii. 6, xxv. 49, these two synonyms show themselves in subordination, as here in close relation. שָׂאֵר appears to be closely connected with שְׂרִירִים, muscles and sinews, and with שֵׁר, the umbilical cord, and thus to denote the flesh with respect to its muscular nature adhering to the bones (Mic. iii. 2), as בָּשָׂר denotes it with respect to its tangible outside clothed with skin (*vid.* under *Isaiah*, p. 418).

Vers. 12-14. The poet now tells those whom he warns to hear how the voluptuary, looking back on his life-course, passes sentence against himself.

- 12 And thou sayest, "Why have I then hated correction,  
And my heart despised instruction!  
13 And I have not listened to the voice of my teachers,  
Nor lent mine ear to my instructors?  
14 I had almost fallen into every vice  
In the midst of the assembly and the congregation!"

The question 12a (here more an exclamation than a question) is the combination of two: How has it become possible for me? How could it ever come to it that . . . Thus also one says in Arab.: *Kyf f'alat hadhâ* (Fl.). The regimen of אֵיךְ in 12b is becoming faint, and in 13b has disappeared. The *Kal* נָאָץ (as i. 30, xv. 5) signifies to despise; the *Piel* intensively, to condemn and reject (R. נָץ, *pungere*).

Ver. 13. שָׁמַע בְּ means to cleave to anything in hearing, as

רָאָה בְּ is to do so in seeing; שָׁמַע לְ yet more closely corresponds with the classic ἐπακούειν, *obedire*, e.g. Ps. lxxxi. 9; שָׁמַע בְּקוֹל is the usual phrase for “hearken!”

Ver. 14. כְּמַעֲט with the perf. following is equivalent to: it wanted but a little that this or that should happen, e.g. Gen. xxvi. 10. It is now for the most part thus explained: it wanted but a little, and led astray by that wicked companionship I would have been drawn away into crime, for which I would then have been subjected to open punishment (Fl.). Ewald understands רָע directly of punishment in its extreme form, stoning; and Hitzig explains כָּל-רָע by “the totality of evil,” in so far as the disgraceful death of the criminal comprehends in it all other evils that are less. But כָּל-רָע means, either, into every evil, misfortune, or into every wickedness; and since רָע, in contradistinction to לָב (Hitzig compares Ezek. xxxvi. 5), is a conception of a species, then the meaning is equivalent to *in omni genere mali*. The reference to the death-punishment of the adulteress is excluded thereby, though it cannot be denied that it might be thought of at the same time, if he who too late comes to consider his ways were distinctly designated in the preceding statements as an adulterer. But it is on the whole a question whether כָּל-רָע is meant of the evil which follows sin as its consequence. The usage of the language permits this, cf. 2 Sam. xvi. 8, Ex. v. 19, 1 Chron. vii. 23, Ps. x. 6, but not less the reference to that which is morally bad, cf. Ex. xxxii. 22 (where Keil rightly compares with 1 John v. 19); and הִיָּיתִי (for which in the first case one expected נִפְלֵיתִי, I fell into, *vid.* xiii. 17, xvii. 20, xxviii. 14) is even more favourable to the latter reference. Also בְּתוֹךְ קָהָל וְעָרָה (cf. on the heaping together of synonyms under 11*b*), this paraphrase of the *palam ac publice*, with its בְּתוֹךְ (cf. Ps. cxi. 1, 2 Chron. xx. 14), looks rather to a heightening of the moral self-accusation. He found himself in all wickedness, living and moving therein in the midst of the congregation, and thereby giving offence to it, for he took part in the external worship and in the practices of the congregation, branding himself thereby as a hypocrite. That by the one name the congregation is meant in its civil aspect, and by the other in its ecclesiastical aspect, is not to be supposed: in the congregation of the people of the revealed law, the political and the religious sides are not so distinguished. It is called without distinction קָהָל and עָרָה (from יָעַר). Rather we would say that קָהָל is the whole *ecclesia*, and עָרָה the whole of its representatives; but

also the great general council bears sometimes the one name (Ex. xii. 3, cf. 21) and sometimes the other (Deut. xxxi. 30, cf. 28) —the placing of them together serves thus only to strengthen the conception.

Vers. 15-17. The commendation of true conjugal love in the form of an invitation to a participation in it, is now presented along with the warning against non-conjugal intercourse, heightened by a reference to its evil consequences.

- 15 Drink water from thine own cistern,  
And flowing streams from thine own fountain.  
16 Shall thy streams flow abroad,  
The water-brooks in the streets!  
17 Let them belong to thyself alone,  
And not to strangers with thee.

One drinks water to quench his thirst; here drinking is a figure of the satisfaction of conjugal love, of which Paul says, 1 Cor. vii. 9, *κρείσσόν ἐστι γαμῆσαι ἢ πυρῶσθαι*, and this comes into view here, in conformity with the prevailing character of the O. T., only as a created inborn natural impulse, without reference to the poisoning of it by sin, which also within the sphere of married life makes government, moderation, and restraint a duty. Warning against this degeneracy of the natural impulse to the *πάθος ἐπιθυμίας* authorized within divinely prescribed limits, the apostle calls the wife of any one *τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σκεῦος* (cf. 1 Pet. iii. 7). So here the wife, who is his by covenant (ii. 17), is called "cistern" (בּוֹר)<sup>1</sup> and "fountain" (בְּאֵר) of the husband to whom she is married. The figure corresponds to the sexual nature of the wife, the expression for which is נִקְבָּה; but Isa. li. 1 holds to the natural side of the figure, for according to it the wife is a pit, and the children are brought out of it into the light of day. Aben-Ezra on Lev. xi. 36 rightly distinguishes between בּוֹר and בְּאֵר: the former catches the rain, the latter wells out from within. In the former, as Rashi in *Erubin* ii. 4 remarks, there are מֵיִם מְכֻנְסִים, in the latter מֵיִם חַיִּים. The post-biblical Hebrew observes this distinction less closely (*vid.* Kimchi's *Book of Roots*), but the biblical throughout; so far the *Kerâ*, Jer. vi. 7, rightly changes בּוֹר into the form בְּיַר, corresponding to the Arab. *byar*. Therefore בּוֹר is the cistern, for the making of which הָצַב, Jer. ii. 13, and בְּאֵר the well, for the formation of which

<sup>1</sup> The LXX. translate ἀπὸ ὧν ἀγγείων, i.e. מְכֻנְסִים (vid. Lagarde).

חפר, Gen. xxi. 30, and ברה, xxvi. 25, are the respective words usually employed (*vid.* Malbim, *Sifra* 117*b*). The poet shows that he also is aware of this distinction, for he calls the water which one drinks from the בור by the name מים, but on the other hand that out of the באר by the name נוֹתָלִים, running waters, *fluenta*; by this we are at once reminded of Cant. iv. 15, cf. 12. The בור offers only stagnant water (according to the *Sohar*, the בור has no water of its own, but only that which is received into it), although coming down into it from above; but the באר has living water, which wells up out of its interior (מתוך, 15*b*, intentionally for the mere מן), and is fresh as the streams from Lebanon (נוֹל, properly *labi*, to run down, cf. אָל, *placide ire*, and generally *ire*; زال, *loco cedere*, *desinere*; جَلَّ, IV., to cause to glide back, *deglutire*, of the gourmand). What a valuable possession a well of water is for nomads the history of the patriarchs makes evident, and a cistern is one of the most valuable possessions belonging to every well-furnished house. The figure of the cistern is here surpassed by that of the fountain, but both refer to the seeking and finding satisfaction (cf. the opposite passage, xxiii. 27) with the wife, and that, as the expressive possessive suffixes denote, with his legitimate wife.

Ver. 16. Here we meet with two other synonyms standing in a similar relation of progression. As עֵיִן denotes the fountain as to its point of outflow, so מַעְיָן (*n. loci*) means water flowing above on the surface, which in its course increases and divides itself into several courses; such a brook is called, with reference to the water dividing itself from the point of outflow, or to the way in which it divides, פֶּלֶג (from פָּלַג, Job xxxviii. 25), Arab. *falcj* (as also the Ethiop.) or *falj*, which is explained by *nahar saghayr* (Fl.).<sup>1</sup> We cannot in this double figure think of any reference to the generative power in the *sperma*; similar figures are the waters of Judah, Isa. xlviii. 1, and the waters of Israel flowing forth as if from a bucket, Num. xxiv. 7, where זָרַע is the parallel word to מים, cf. also the proper name מוֹצֵב (from מוֹ = מוֹי from מוֹה, *diffluere*), *aqua h.e. semen patris*, and שַׁגְלָל, Deut. xxviii. 30, = Arab. *sajal* (whence *sajl* = רֵל, *situla*), which is set aside by the *Kerî*. Many interpreters

<sup>1</sup> The latter idea (*vid.* under Ps. i. 3) lies nearer, after Job xxxviii. 25: the brook as dividing channels for itself, or as divided into such; *fali* (*falaj*) signifies, according to the representation Isa. lviii. 8, also like *fajr*, the morning-light (as breaking forth from a cleft).

have by הוצֵה and בְּרִחְבוֹת been here led into the error of pressing into the text the exhortation not to waste the creative power in sinful lust. The LXX. translates יִפְצֹו by ὑπερεκχέσθω; but Origen, and also Clemens Alexandrinus, used the phrase μὴ ὑπερεκχέσθω, which is found in the Complut., Ald., and several codd., and is regarded by Lagarde, as also Cappellus, as original: the three Göttingen theologians (Ewald, Bertheau, and Elster) accordingly make the emendation אֶל-יִפְצֹו. But that μὴ of the LXX. was not added till a later period; the original expression, which the Syro-Hexapl. authorizes, was ὑπερεκχέσθω without μὴ, as also in the version of Aquila, διασκορπιζέσθωσαν without μὴ (*vid.* Field). The Hebrew text also does not need אֶל. Clericus, and recently Hitzig, Zöckler, Kamphausen, avoid this remedy, for they understand this verse interrogatively—an expedient which is for the most part and also here unavailing; for why should not the author have written אִם יִפְצֹו? Schultens rightly remarks: *nec negationi nec interrogationi ullus hic locus*, for (with Fleischer and von Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, ii. 2, 402) he regards ver. 16 as a conclusion: *tunc exundabunt*; so that he strengthens the summons of ver. 15 by the promise of numerous descendants from unviolated marriage. But to be so understood, the author ought to have written וַיִּפְצֹו. So, according to the text, יִפְצֹו as jussive continues the *imper.* שְׁתַּח (15a), and the full meaning according to the connection is this: that within the marriage relation the generative power shall act freely and unrestrained. חוץ and רִחְבוֹת denote (i. 20) the space free from houses, and the ways and places which lead towards and stretch between them; חוץ (from חוץ, Arab. *khass*, to split, *seorsim ponere*) is a very relative conception, according as one thinks of that which is without as the contrast of the house, the city, or the country. Here חוץ is the contrast of the person, and thus that which is anywhere without it, whereto the exercise of its manly power shall extend. The two figurative expressions are the description of the *libero flumine*, and the contrast, that restriction of self which the marriage relation, according to 1 Cor. vii. 3-5, condemns.

Ver. 17. That such matters as these are thought of, is manifest from this verse. As זֶרַע comprehends with the cause (*sperma*) the effect (posterity), so, in ver. 16, with the *effusio roboris virilis* is connected the idea of the beginnings of life. For the subjects of ver. 17 are the *effusiones seminis* named in ver. 16. These in their

effects (ver. 17) may belong to thee alone, viz. to thee alone (לְבַדְּךָ, properly in thy separateness) within thy married relation, not, as thou hast fellowship with other women, to different family circles, Aben-Ezra rightly regards as the subject, for he glosses thus: הפלגים שהם הבנים הכשרים, and Immanuel well explains יְהִי לְךָ by יתחוללך. The child born out of wedlock belongs not to the father alone, he knows not to whom it belongs; its father must for the sake of his honour deny it before the world. Thus, as Grotius remarks: *ibi sere ubi prolem metas*. In ואין the יהיו is continued. It is not thus used adverbially for לא, as in the old classic Arabic *lyas* for *l* (Fl.), but it carries in it the force of a verb, so that יהיו, according to rule, in the sense of ולא יהיו = ולא היו, continues it.

Vers. 18-20. With ver 18 is introduced anew the praise of conjugal love. These three verses, 18-21, have the same course of thought as 15-17.

- 18 Let thy fountain be blessed,  
And rejoice in the wife of thy youth.  
19 The lovely hind and the graceful gazelle—  
May her bosom always charm thee;  
In her love mayest thou delight thyself evermore.  
20 But why wilt thou be fascinated with a stranger,  
And embrace the bosom of a foreign woman?

Like בור and באר, מְקוֹר is also a figure of the wife; the root-word is קור, from כר, קר, the meanings of which, to dig and make round, come together in the primary conception of the round digging out or boring out, not קור = קָרַר, the *Hiph.* of which means (Jer. vi. 7) to well out cold (water). It is the fountain of the birth that is meant (cf. מְקוֹר of the female עֲרֹה, e.g., Lev. xx. 18), not the procreation (LXX., ἡ σὴ φλέψ, viz. φλέψ γονίμη); the blessing wished for by him is the blessing of children, which בְּרִיָּה so much the more distinctly denotes if בָּרַךְ, Arab. *barak*, means to spread out, and בָּרַךְ thus to cause a spreading out. The מן, 18b, explains itself from the idea of drawing (water), given with the figure of a fountain; the word בְּאִשָּׁת found in certain codices is, on the contrary, prosaic (Fl.). Whilst שִׂמַּח מִן is found elsewhere (Eccles. ii. 20, 2 Chron. xx. 27) as meaning almost the same as שִׂמַּח בְּ; the former means rejoicing from some place, the latter in something. In the genitive connection, "wife of thy youth" (cf. ii. 17), both of these significations lie: thy youthful wife, and she who was chosen by thee in thy youth, according as we refer the suffix to the whole idea or only to the second member of the chain of words.

Ver. 19. The subject, 19a, set forth as a theme courts love for her who is to be loved, for she presents herself as lovely. אֵילָה is the female of the stag, which may derive its name אֵיל from the weapon-power of its horns, and יַעֲלָה (from יָעַל, Arab. *w'al*, to climb), that of the wild-goat (יָעַל); and thus properly, not the gazelle, which is called צִבִּי on account of its elegance, but the chamois. These animals are commonly used in Semitic poetry as figures of female beauty on account of the delicate beauty of their limbs and their sprightly black eyes. אֶהְבֵּים signifies always sensual love, and is interchanged in this erotic meaning (vii. 18) with דוֹרִים. In 19b the predicate follows the subject. The *Græc. Venet.* translates as if the word were דוֹרִיה, and the *Syr.* as if it were דְּרִכִּיה, but Aquila rightly translates *τίτθαι αὐτῆς*. As *τίτθος* is derived (*vid.* Curtius, *Griech. Etymologie*, Nr. 307) from *dhâ*, to suck (causative, with *anu*, to put to sucking), so דָּר, שָׁד, תָּד, Arab. *thady* (commonly in dual *thadjein*), from שָׁדָה, Arab. *thdy*, *rigare*, after which also the verb יִרְוֶה is chosen: she may plentifully give thee to drink; figuratively equivalent to, refresh or (what the Aram. רִוִּי precisely means) fascinate<sup>1</sup> thee, satisfy thee with love. דְּרִים also is an erotic word, which besides in this place is found only in Ezekiel (xxiii. 3, 8, 21). The LXX. obliterates the strong sensual colouring of this line. In 19c it changes תִּשְׁנָה into תִּשְׁנָה, *πολλοστός ἔση*, perhaps also because the former appeared to be too sensual. Moses ha-Darshan

(in Rashi) proposes to explain it after the Arab. ساجى, to cover, to cast over, to come over anything (III. = עָסַק, to employ oneself with something): engage thyself with her love, *i.e.* be always devoted to her in love. And Immanuel himself, the author of a Hebrew Divan expatiating with unparalleled freedom in erotic representations, remarks, while he rightly understands תִּשְׁנָה of the fascination of love: קורא התמדת חשקו אפילו באשתו שננה, he calls the husband's continual caressing of the wife an error. But this moral side-glance lies here at a distance from the poet. He speaks here of a morally permissible love-ecstasy, or rather, since תָּמִיד excludes that which is extraordinary, of an intensity of love connected with the feeling of superabundant happiness. תִּשְׁנָה properly signifies to err from the way, therefore figuratively, with ב of a matter, like

<sup>1</sup> Many editions have here בְּכָל-; but this *Dagesh*, which is contrary to rule, is to be effaced.

*delirare ea*, to be wholly captivated by her, so that one is no longer in his own power, can no longer restrain himself—the usual word for the intoxication of love and of wine, xx. 1 (Fl.).

Ver. 20. The answer to the Why? in this verse is: no reasonable cause,—only beastly sensuality, only flagitious blindness can mislead thee. The ב of בִּירָה is, as 19b and Isa. xxviii. 7, that of the object through which one is betrayed into intoxication. חֵק (thus, according to the Masora, four times in the O. T. for חֵיק) properly means an incision or deepening, as حَجْر (from حَجَر, *cohibere*), the front of the body, the part between the arms or the female breasts, thus the bosom, Isa. xl. 11 (with the swelling part of the clothing, *sinus vestis*, which the Arabs call *jayb*), and the lap; חֵיק (as iv. 8), to embrace, corresponds here more closely with the former of these meanings; also elsewhere the wife of any one is called אִשְׁתְּ חֵיקוֹ or הַשְּׁכֵנֶת בְּחֵיקוֹ, as she who rests on his breast. The ancients, also J. H. Michaelis, interpret vers. 15–20 allegorically, but without thereby removing sensual traces from the elevated N. T. consciousness of pollution, striving against all that is fleshly; for the *castum cum Sapientia conjugium* would still be always represented under the figure of husband and wife dwelling together. Besides, though זֶרָה might be, as the contrast of חֲכָמָה, the personified lust of the world and of the flesh, yet 19a is certainly not the חֲכָמָה, but a woman composed of flesh and blood. Thus the poet means the married life, not in a figurative sense, but in its reality—he designedly describes it thus attractively and purely, because it bears in itself the preservative against promiscuous fleshly lust.

Vers. 21–23. That the intercourse of the sexes out of the married relationship is the commencement of the ruin of a fool is now proved.

- 21 For the ways of every one are before the eyes of Jahve,  
And all his paths He marketh out.
- 22 His own sins lay hold of him, the evil-doer,  
And in the bands of his sins is he held fast.
- 23 He dies for the want of correction,  
And in the fulness of his folly he staggers to ruin.

It is unnecessary to interpret נֶכַח as an adverbial accusative: straight before Jahve's eyes; it may be the nominative of the predicate: the ways of man (for אִישׁ is here an individual, whether man or woman) are an object (properly, fixing) of the eyes

of Jahve. With this the thought would suitably connect itself: *et omnes orbitas ejus ad amussim examinat*; but פָּלַס, as the denom. of פָּלַס, Ps. lviii. 3, is not connected with all the places where the verb is united with the obj. of the way, and Ps. lxxviii. 50 shows that it has there the meaning to break through, to open a way (from פָּל, to split, cf. Talmudic מִפְּלֵשׁ, opened, accessible, from פָּלַשׁ, פָּלַשׁ, *perfodere, fodiendo viam, aditum sibi aperire*). The opening of the way is here not, as at Isa. xxvi. 7, conceived of as the setting aside of the hindrances in the way of him who walks, but generally as making walking in the way possible: man can take no step in any direction without God; and that not only does not exempt him from moral responsibility, but the consciousness of this is rather for the first time rightly quickened by the consciousness of being encompassed on every side by the knowledge and the power of God. The dissuasion of ver. 20 is thus in ver. 21 grounded in the fact, that man at every stage and step of his journey is observed and encompassed by God: it is impossible for him to escape from the knowledge of God or from dependence on Him. Thus opening all the paths of man, He has also appointed to the way of sin the punishment with which it corrects itself: "his sins lay hold of him, the evil-doer." The suffix יָ- does not refer to שֹׂאֵם of ver. 21, where every one without exception and without distinction is meant, but it relates to the obj. following, the evil-doer, namely, as the explanatory permutative annexed to the "him" according to the scheme, Ex. ii. 6; the permutative is distinguished from the apposition by this, that the latter is a forethought explanation which heightens the understanding of the subject, while the former is an explanation afterwards brought in which guards against a misunderstanding. The same construction, xiv. 13b, belonging to the *syntaxis ornata* in the old Hebrew, has become common in the Aramaic and in the modern Hebrew. Instead of יִלְכְּדוּהוּ (ver. 22), the poet uses poetically יִלְכְּדֵנוּ; the interposed ם may belong to the emphatic ground-form יִלְכְּדוֹן, but is epenthetic if one compares forms such as קָבָנוּ (R. קָב), Num. xxiii. 13 (cf. p. 73). The קָבָנוּ governed by חֲבָלֵי, *laquei* (חֲבָלֵי, *tormina*), is either *gen. exrg.*: bands which consist in his sin, or *gen. subj.*: bands which his sin unites, or better, *gen. possess.*: bands which his sin brings with it. By these bands he will be held fast, and so will die: he (הוא referring to the person described) will die in insubordination (Symm. δὲ

ἀπαιδευσίαν), or better, since אִין and רֵב are placed in contrast: in want of correction. With the יִשְׁנֶה (ver. 23b), repeated purposely from ver. 20, there is connected the idea of the overthrow which is certain to overtake the infatuated man. In ver. 20 the sense of moral error began already to connect itself with this verb. אִילָה is the right name of unrestrained lust of the flesh. אִילָה is connected with אֵל, the belly; אֵל, Arab. *âl*, to draw together, to condense, to thicken (*Isaiah*, p. 424). *Dummheit* (stupidity) and the Old-Norse *dumba*, darkness, are in their roots related to each other. Also in the Semitic the words for blackness and darkness are derived from roots meaning condensation. אִיל is the mind made thick, darkened, and become like crude matter.

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#### NINTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, VI. 1-5.

##### WARNING AGAINST INCONSIDERATE SURETYSHIP.

The author does not return to the subject of chastity till the twelfth discourse, vi. 20 ff. Between the eighth and the twelfth three other groups of moral proverbs are introduced, which are neither connected with one another nor with the eight discourses which precede them. Must we therefore, with Hitzig and Kamphausen, hold vi. 1-5, 6-11, 12-19, to be an interpolation here introduced from some other place? We find here the fondness for synonyms and words similar in sound peculiar to the author of the introduction, vi. 2, 3, 5, and meet with the same interchange of words, vi. 4, cf. iv. 25, and figurative expressions, vi. 18, cf. iii. 29 (חרש), word-formations, vi. 10 (חֶפֶץ), cf. iii. 8 (שְׁקִי), ideas, vi. 12, cf. iv. 28 (עֲקֻשׁוֹת פֶּה), vi. 14, cf. ii. 12, 14 (חֶפְכֹּה), and constructions, vi. 12 (הוֹלֵךְ עֲקֻשׁוֹת פֶּה), cf. ii. 7 (הִלְכֵי חֵם); like delineations of character, vi. 18b, cf. i. 16, and threatenings, vi. 15, cf. i. 26 f., iii. 25—as many marks of identity of the authorship as could be expected. And what had moved the interpolators to introduce the three groups of proverbs, vi. 1-5, 6-11, 12-19, just here? In vain does Hitzig seek to extract from chap. v. certain words and ideas common to it with chap. vi. which shall make it clear that the groups of proverbs in question are here an interpolation; the points of contrast are not prominent. If now the poet has already in iii.

1-18, but still more in iii. 27 ff., connected together all manner of rules of life without any close or visible connection, it is not strange if at vi. 1, where besides the בני denotes the new section, he breaks off to a new subject out of the fulness of his matter; and the connection wanting between vi. 1 and v. 23, as well as between iii. 27 and iii. 26, does not therefore warrant critical suspicion.

Vers. 1-5. The author warns against suretyship; or rather, he advises that if one has made himself surety, he should as quickly as possible withdraw from the snare.

- 1 My son, if thou hast become surety for thy neighbour,  
Hast given thy hand for another :
- 2 Thou art entangled in the words of thy mouth,  
Ensnared in the words of thy mouth.
- 3 Do this then, my son, and free thyself—  
For thou hast come under the power of thy neighbour—  
Go, instantly entreat and importune thy neighbour.
- 4 Give no sleep to thine eyes,  
And no slumber to thine eyelids ;
- 5 Tear thyself free like a gazelle from his hand,  
And as a bird from the hand of the fowler.

The chief question here is, whether עֵרֵב after לְ after עֵרֵב introduces him for whom or with whom one becomes surety. Elsewhere עֵרֵב (R. רֵב, whence also אָרֵב, *nectere*, to twist close and compact) with the accusative of the person means to become surety for any one, to represent him as a surety, xi. 15, xx. 16 (xxvii. 13), Gen. xliii. 9, xliv. 33 (as with the accusative of the matter, to pledge anything, to deposit it as a pledge, Jer. xxx. 21, Neh. v. 3, = שֵׁם, Arab. *wad'a*, Job xvii. 3); and to become surety with any one is expressed, xvii. 18, by עֵרֵב לְפָנַי. The phrase עֵרֵב לְ is not elsewhere met with, and is thus questionable. If we look to ver. 3, the רֵעַ (רֵעִה) mentioned there cannot possibly be the creditor with whom one has become surety, for so impetuous and urgent an application to him would be both purposeless and unbecoming. But if he is meant for whom one has become surety, then certainly לְרֵעִה is also to be understood of the same person, and לְ is thus *dat. commodi*; similar to this is the Targumic עֵרְבֻתָא עַל, suretyship for any one, xvii. 18, xxii. 26. But is the זֶר, 1b, distinguished from רֵעַ, the stranger with whom one has become surety? The parallels xi. 15. xx. 16, where זֶר denotes the person whom one represents, show that in both lines one and the same person is meant; זֶר is in the Proverbs

equivalent to אָהֵר, each different from the person in the discourse, v. 17, xxvii. 2,—thus, like רֵעַ, denotes not the friend, but generally him to whom one stands in any kind of relation, even a very external one, in a word, the fellow-creatures or neighbours, xxiv. 28 (cf. the Arab. *sahbk* and *karynk*, which are used as vaguely and superficially). It is further a question, whether we have to explain 1b: if thou hast given thine hand to another, or for another. Here also we are without evidence from the usage of the language; for the phrase תִּקַּע בָּהּ, or merely תִּקַּע, appears to be used of striking the hand in suretyship where it elsewhere occurs without any further addition, xvii. 18, xxii. 26, xi. 15; however, Job xvii. 3, תִּקַּע לִי, appears the same: to strike into the hand of any one, i.e. to give to him the hand-stroke. From this passage Hitzig concludes that the surety gave the hand-stroke, without doubt in the presence of witnesses, first of all of the creditor, to the debtor, as a sign that he stood for him. But this idea is unnatural, and the “without doubt” melts into air. He on whose hand the stroke falls is always the person to whom one gives suretyship, and confirms it by the hand-stroke. Job also, *l.c.*, means to say: who else but Thou, O Lord, could give to me a pledge, viz. of my innocence? If now the וְ, ver. 1b, is, as we have shown, not the creditor,<sup>1</sup> but the debtor, then is the ל the *dat. commodi*, as 1a, and the two lines perfectly correspond. תִּקַּע properly means to drive, to strike with a resounding noise, cogn. with the Arab. *wak'a*, which may be regarded as its *intrans.* (Fl.); then particularly to strike the hand or with the hand. He to whom this hand-pledge is given for another remains here undesignated. A new question arises, whether in ver. 6, where נִקְשׁ (illaqueari) and נִלְכַּד (comprehendi) follow each other as Isa. viii. 15, cf. Jer. l. 24, the hypothetical antecedent is continued or not. We agree with Schultens, Ziegler, and Fleischer against the continuance of the אָם. The repetition of the בְּאַמְרֵי פִיךָ (cf. ii. 14) serves rightly to strengthen the representation of the thought: thou, thou thyself and no other, hast then ensnared thyself in the net; but this strengthening of the expression would greatly lose in force

<sup>1</sup> A translation by R. Joseph Joel of Fulda, 1787, whose autograph ms. Baer possesses, renders the passage not badly thus:—“My son, if thou hast become surety for thy friend, and hast given the hand to another, then thou art bound by thy word, held by thy promise. Yet do what I say to thee, my son: Be at pains as soon as thou canst to get free, otherwise thou art in the power of thy friend; shun no trouble, be urgent with thy friend.”

by placing ver. 2 in the antecedent, while if ver. 2 is regarded as the conclusion, and thus as the principal proposition, it appears in its full strength.

Ver. 3. The new commencement needs no particle denoting a conclusion; the **וְכִנּוּיָא**, making the summons emphatic (cf. 2 Kings x. 10, frequently in interrogative clauses), connects it closely enough. **וְנֹאמַר**, *neut.*, refers to what follows. The **ו** before **הַנֶּעֱלֵל** is explanatory, as we say in familiar language: Be so good as tell me, or do me the favour to come with me; while no Frenchman would say, *Faites-moi le (ce) plaisir et venez avec moi* (Fl.).<sup>1</sup> The clause **כִּי בָאָהְךָ**<sup>2</sup> is not to be translated: in case thou art fallen into the hand of thy neighbour; for this is represented (vers. 1, 2) as having already in fact happened. On two sides the surety is no longer *sui juris*: the creditor has him in his hand; for if the debtor does not pay, he holds the surety, and in this way many an honourable man has lost house and goods, Sirach xxix. 18, cf. viii. 13;—and the debtor has him, the surety, in his hand; for the performance which is due, for which the suretyship avails, depends on his conscientiousness. The latter is here meant: thou hast made thy freedom and thy possessions dependent on the will of thy neighbour for whom thou art the surety. The clause introduced with **כִּי** gives the reason for the call to set himself free (**הַנֶּעֱלֵל** from **נָעַל**, R. **נָעַל**, **שָׁלַע**, to draw out or off); it is a parenthetical sentence. The meaning of **הַתְּרַפָּס** is certain. The verb **רָפַס** (**רָפַשׁ**, **רָפַס**) signifies to stamp on, *calcare*, *conculcare*; the *Kamûs*<sup>3</sup> explains *rafas* by *rakad balarjal*. The *Hithpa.* might, it is true, mean to conduct oneself in a trampling manner, to tread roughly, as **הִתְנַבֵּא**, and the medial *Niph.* **נִבָּא**, to conduct oneself speaking (in an impassioned manner); but Ps. lxxviii. 31 and the analogy of **הִתְבֹּסַס** favour the meaning to throw oneself in a stamping manner, *i.e.* violently, to the ground, to trample upon oneself,—*i.e.* let oneself be trampled upon, to place oneself in the attitude of most earnest humble prayer. Thus the *Græc. Venet.*

<sup>1</sup> For the right succession of the accents here (three serviles before the *Pazer*), *vid. Torath Emeth*, p. 30; *Accentuationssystem*, xii. § 4. According to Ben-Naphtali, *Mercha* is to be given to the **וְנֹאמַר**.

<sup>2</sup> The *Zinnorith* before the *Mahpach* in these words represents at the same time the *Makkeph*. But Ben-Naphtali differs here from Ben-Asher, for he adopts the *Makkeph* and rejects the *Zinnorith*; *vid. Torath Emeth*, p. 16, and my *Psalmencomm.* Bd. ii. (1860), p. 460, note 2.

<sup>3</sup> [El-Feyroozábadee's *Kâmus*, a native Arabic Lexicon; *vid. Lane's Arab. Lex.* Bk. i. pt. 1, p. xvii.]

πατήθητι, Rashi (“humble thyself like to the threshold which is trampled and trode upon”), Aben-Ezra, Immanuel (“humble thyself under the soles of his feet”); so Cocceius, J. H. Michaelis, and others: *conculcandum te præbe*. יִרְהַב is more controverted. The Talmudic-Midrash explanation (*b. Joma*, 87a; *Bathra*, 173b, and elsewhere): take with thee in great numbers thy friends (יִרְהַב = הִרְבָּה), is discredited by this, that it has along with it the explanation of הִתְרַפַּס by (יִרְ) הִתֵּר פֶּסֶם, *solve palmam (manus)*, i.e. pay what thou canst. Also with the meaning to rule (Parchon, Immanuel), which רַהַב besides has not, nothing is to be done. The right meaning of יִרְהַב is to rush upon one boisterously, Isa. iii. 5. יִרְהַב means in general to be violently excited (Arab. *rahiba*, to be afraid), and thus to meet one, here with the accusative: assail impetuously thy neighbour (viz. that he fulfil his engagement). Accordingly, with a choice of words more or less suitable, the LXX. translates by παρόξυνε, Symm., Theodotion by παρόρμησον, the Græc. Venet. by ἐνίσχυσον, the Syr. (which the Targumist copies) by גִּרָּנָה (*solicita*), and Kimchi glosses by: lay an arrest upon him with pacifying words. The Talmud explains יִרְהַב as plur.;<sup>1</sup> but the plur., which was permissible in iii. 28, is here wholly inadmissible: it is thus the *plena scriptio* for יִרְהַב with the retaining of the third radical of the ground-form of the root-word (יִרְהַב = יִרְהַב), or with י as *mater lectionis*, to distinguish the pausal-form from that which is without the pause; cf. xxiv. 34. LXX., Syr., Jerome, etc., rightly translate it in the sing. The immediateness lying in יִרְהַב (cf. ὕπαγε, Matt. v. 24) is now expressed as a duty, ver. 4 f. One must not sleep and slumber (an expression quite like Ps. cxxxii. 4), not give himself quietness and rest, till the other has released him from his bail by the performance of that for which he is surety. One must set himself free as a gazelle or as a bird, being caught, seeks to disentangle itself by calling forth all its strength and art.

Ver. 5. The naked מִיָּד is not to be translated “immediately;” for in this sense the word is rabbinical, not biblical. The versions (with exception of Jerome and the Græc. Venet.) translate as if the word were מִפֶּה [out of the snare]. Bertheau prefers this reading, and Böttcher holds צִיד [a hunter] to have fallen out after מִיָּד. It is not a parallelism with reservation; for a bird-catcher is not at

<sup>1</sup> There is here no distinction between the *Kethib* and the *Keri*. The Masora remarks, “This is the only passage in the Book of Proverbs where the word is written with *Yod* (י);” it thus recognises only the undisputed יִרְהַב.

the same time a gazelle-hunter. The author, if he has so written, has conceived of מִיד, as at 1 Kings xx. 42, as absolute, and connected it with הִנָּעַל : tear thyself free like the gazelle from the hand into which thou hast fallen (Hitzig); according to which, the section should be accentuated thus : הִנָּעַל כַּצְבִּי מִיד. צָבִי, Aram. מָבִי, Arab. *zaby*, is the gazelle (Arab. *ghazâl*), so called from its elegance ; צָפֹר, the bird, from its whistling (צַפַּר, Arab. *ṣafar*, R. צָף, cf. Arab. *saffârat*, the whistling of a bird), Arab. *safar*, whistler (with prosthesis, 'asafwar, warbler, *Psalm*. p. 794). The bird-catcher is called יָקוּשׁ (from יָקַשׁ, after the form יָכַל, cog. קָוֶשׁ, Isa. xxix. 21, נָקַשׁ, R. קָשׁ), after the form בָּנוֹד (fem. בְּנוֹדָה), or יָקוּשׁ ; one would think that the *Kametz*, after the form *kâtul* (*vid.* under Isa. i. 17), must here be fixed, but in Jer. v. 26 the word is vocalized יָקוּשִׁים.

#### TENTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, VI. 6-11.

##### CALL TO THE SLUGGARD TO AWAKE.

*Altera parænesis* (remarks J. H. Michaelis) *ad debitorem potius directa, sicut prima ad fidejussorem*. But this connection is a subtle invention. These brief proverbial discourses, each of which forms a completed whole, have scarcely been *a priori* destined for this introduction to the Salomonic Book of Proverbs edited by the author ; but he places them in it ; and that he so arranges them that this section regarding sluggards follows that regarding sureties, may have been occasioned by accidental points of contact of the one with the other (cf. לֵךְ, 6a, with 3b ; תְּנוּמוֹת . . . שְׁנוֹת, ver. 10, with ver. 4), which may also further determine the course in which the proverbs follow each other.

Vers. 6-8. As Elihu (Job xxxv. 11) says that God has set the beasts as our teachers, so he sends the sluggard to the school of the ant (*Ameise*), so named (in Germ.) from its industry (*Emsigkeit*) :

- 6 Go to the ant, sluggard ;  
Consider her ways, and be wise !
- 7 She that hath no judge,  
Director, and ruler :
- 8 She prepareth in summer her food,  
Has gathered in harvest her store.

The *Dechî* written mostly under the לֵךְ separates the inseparable. The thought, Go to the ant, sluggard! permits no other distinction than in the vocative; but the *Dechî* of לֵךְ אֶל-נַמְלָה is changed into *Munach*<sup>1</sup> on account of the nature of the *Athnach*-word, which consists of only two syllables without the counter-tone. The ant has for its Hebrew-Arabic name נַמְלָה, from the R. נם (*Isaiah*, p. 687), which is first used of the sound, which expresses the idea of the low, dull, secret,—thus of its active and yet unperceived motion; its Aramaic name in the Peshîto, ܢܡܠܬܐ, and in the Targ. שׁוּמְשׁוּמָא (also Arab. *sumsum*, *simsim*, of little red ants), designates it after its quick activity, its busy running hither and thither (*vid.* Fleischer in Levy's *Chald. Wörterb.* ii. 578). She is a model of unwearied and well-planned labour. From the plur. דְּרָכֶיהָ it is to be concluded that the author observed their art in gathering in and laying up in store, carrying burdens, building their houses, and the like (*vid.* the passages in the Talmud and Midrash in the *Hamburg Real-Encyclopädie für Bibel und Talmud*, 1868, p. 83 f.). To the ant the sluggard (עָצֵל, Aram. and Arab. عَاطِل, with the fundamental idea of weight and dulness) is sent, to learn from her to be ashamed, and to be taught wisdom.

Ver. 7. This relative clause describes the subject of ver. 8 more fully: it is like a clause with כִּי נָם, *quamquam*.<sup>2</sup> The community of ants exhibits a peculiar class of workers; but it is not, like that of bees, composed of grades terminating in the queen-bee as the head. The three offices here named represent the highest judiciary, police, and executive powers; for קָצִין (from קָצָה, to distinguish, with the ending *in*, *vid.* *Jesurun*, p. 215 s.) is the judge; שֹׁטֵר (from שָׁטַר, Arab. *satr*, to draw lines, to write) is the overseer (in war the director, controller), or, as Saalschütz indicates the province of the *schotrim* both in cities and in the camp, the office of police; מִשְׁלָּ (vid. *Isaiah*, p. 691), the governors of the whole state organism subordinated to the *schoftim* and the *schotrim*. The Syr., and the Targ. slavishly following it, translate קָצִין by הַצָּדָא (harvest), for they interchange this word with קָצִיר.

Ver. 8. In this verse the change of the time cannot be occasioned by this, that קָצִין and קָצִיר are distinguished as the earlier and the

<sup>1</sup> Cod. 1294 accentuates לֵךְ אֶל-נַמְלָה; and that, according to Ben-Asher's rule, is correct.

<sup>2</sup> Ver. 7 is commonly halved by *Rebia*; but for the correct accentuation, *vid.* *Torath Emeth*, p. 48, § 3.

later period of the year; for קָיֵץ (= Arab. *kayt*, from *kât*, to be glowing hot, cf. Arab. *kghyyt* of the glow of the mid-day heat) is the late summer, when the heat rises to the highest degree; but the son of the Shunammite succumbed to the sun-stroke in the time of harvest (2 Kings iv. 18 f.). Löwenstein judiciously remarks that קָיֵץ refers to immediate want, אֲנִיָּהּ to that which is future; or, better, the former shows them engaged in persevering industry during the summer glow, the latter as at the end of the harvest, and engaged in the bringing home of the winter stores. The words of the procuring of food in summer are again used by Agur, Prov. xxx. 25; and the Aramaic fable of the *ant and the grasshopper*,<sup>1</sup> which is also found among those of Æsop and of Syntipas, serves as an illustration of this whole verse. The LXX. has, after the "Go to the ant," a proverb of five lines, ἡ πορεύθητι πρὸς τὴν μέλισσαν. Hitzig regards it as of Greek origin; and certainly, as Lagarde has shown, it contains idiomatic Greek expressions which would not occur to a translator from the Hebrew. In any case, however, it is an interpolation which disfigures the Hebrew text by overlading it.

Vers. 9-11. After the poet has admonished the sluggard to take the ant as an example, he seeks also to rouse him out of his sleepiness and indolence:

- 9 How long, O sluggard, wilt thou lie?  
 When wilt thou rise up from thy sleep?  
 10 "A little sleep, a little slumber,  
 A little folding of the hands to rest!"  
 11 So comes like a strong robber thy poverty,  
 And thy want as an armed man.

Vers. 9, 10. The awakening cry, ver. 9, is not of the kind that Paul could have it in his mind, Eph. v. 14. פָּעֶק has, as the vocative, *Pasek* after it, and is, on account of the *Pasek*, in correct editions accentuated not with *Munach*, but *Mercha*. The words, ver. 10, are not an ironical call (sleep only yet a little while, but in truth a long while), but *per mimesin* the reply of the sluggard with which he turns away the unwelcome disturber. The plurals with פָּעֶק sound like self-delusion: yet a little, but a sufficient! To fold the hands, *i.e.* to cross them over the breast, or put them into the bosom, denotes also, Eccles. iv. 5, the idler. קָבִיעַ, *complicatio*

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Goldberg's *Chofes Matmonim*, Berlin 1845; and Landsberger's Berlin Graduation Thesis, *Fabulæ aliquot Aramææ*, 1846, p. 28.

(cf. in Livy, *compressis quod aiunt manibus sidere*; and Lucan, ii. 292, *compressas tenuisse manus*), is formed like שָׁקַי, iii. 8, and the *inf.* שָׁכַב like חָסַר, x. 21, and שָׁפַל, xvi. 19. The *perf. consec.* connects itself with the words heard from the mouth of the sluggard, which are as a hypothetical antecedent thereto: if thou so sayest, and always again sayest, then this is the consequence, that suddenly and inevitably poverty and want come upon thee. That מְהֵלֵךְ denotes the *grassator*, i.e. vagabond (Arab. *dawwar*, one who wanders much about), or the robber or foe (like the Arab. *'aduww*, properly *transgressor finium*), is not justified by the usage of the language; הֵלֵךְ signifies, 2 Sam. xii. 4, the traveller, and מְהֵלֵךְ is one who rides quickly forward, not directly a *κακὸς ὁδοιπόρος* (LXX.).

Ver. 11. The point of comparison, 11*a*, is the unforeseen, as in quick march or assault (Böttcher), and 11*b* the hostile and irretrievable surprise; for a man in armour, as Hitzig remarks, brings no good in his armour: he assails the opponent, and he who is without defence yields to him without the possibility of withstanding him. The LXX. translate באִישׁ מִן by ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς δρομεύς (cf. δρομεύς = מְנִי־אֶרֶץ, Job vii. 6, LXX., Aq.), for what reason we know not. After ver. 11 they interpose two other lines: "but if thou art assiduous, thy harvest will come to thee as a fountain, but want will go away ὥσπερ κακὸς δρομεύς." Also this "bad runner" we must let go; for Lagarde's retranslation, וּמַחֲסִיר כְּחֵשׁ בְּאִישׁ נִמְנֵם, no one can understand. The four lines, vers. 10, 11, are repeated in the appendix of Words of the Wise, xxiv. 33 f.; and if this appendix originated in the time of Hezekiah, they may have been taken therefrom by the poet, the editor of the older Book of Proverbs. Instead of בְּמֵהֵלֵךְ, מְהֵלֵךְ is there used (so comes forward thy poverty, i.e. again and again, but certainly moving forward); and instead of מַחֲסִיר, מַחֲסִירִי is written, as also here, ver. 6, for מִשְׁנֵתִי is found the variant מִשְׁנֵתִיךְ with Jod as *mater lectionis* of the pausal *Segol*.

#### ELEVENTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, VI. 12-19.

##### WARNING AGAINST DECEIT AND MALICE.

There follows now a *third* brief series of instructions, which run

to a conclusion with a deterring prospect similar to the foregoing.

- 12 A worthless man, a wicked man,  
Is he who practiseth falsehood with his mouth ;
- 13 Who winketh with his eyes, scrapeth with his foot,  
Pointeth with his fingers.
- 14 Malice is in his heart,  
He deviseth evil at all times,  
He spreadeth strife.
- 15 Therefore suddenly his destruction shall come,  
Suddenly shall he be destroyed, and there is no remedy.

It is a question, what is the subject and what the predicate in ver. 12. Thus much is clear, that upon him who is here described according to his deceitful conduct the sentence of condemnation shall fall. He who is so described is thus subject, and **אָדָם בְּלִיעֵל** is without doubt predicate. But does the complex subject begin with **אִישׁ אֵין**? Thus *e.g.* Hitzig: "A worthless man is the wicked man who . . ." But the interchange of **אָדָם** and **אִישׁ** is a sign of parallel relation; and if 12*b* belonged attributively to **אִישׁ אֵין**, then since **אִישׁ הָאֵין** is not used, it ought at least to have been continued by **הַהוּלָה**. The general moral categories, 12*a*, are thus predicates, as was indeed besides probable; the copious division of the subject demands also in point of style a more developed predicate. xvi. 27 is simpler in plan, and also logically different. There the expression is, as is usual, **אִישׁ בְּלִיעֵל**. Since **אָדָם אֵין** is not possible, the author uses instead **בְּלִיעֵל**. This word, composed of **בְּלִי** and **עֵל** (from **יַעַל**, **וַעַל**, to be useful, to be good for), so fully serves as one word, that it even takes the article, 1 Sam. xxv. 25. It denotes worthlessness, generally in a chain of words in the genitive, but also the worthless, Job xxxiv. 18; and it is to be so taken here, for **אָדָם** does not form a *constructivus*, and never governs a genitive. **בְּלִיעֵל** is thus a virtual adjective (as *nequam* in *homo nequam*); the connection is like that of **אָדָם רָשָׁע**, xi. 7, and elsewhere, although more appositional than this pure attributive. Synonymous with **בְּלִיעֵל** is **אֵין** (from *an*, to breathe), wickedness, *i.e.* want of all moral character. Thus worthless and wicked is he who practises deceit with his mouth (cf. iv. 24), *i.e.* who makes language the means of untruthfulness and uncharitableness. **עֲקִשְׁתִּית פֶּה** is meant in a moral sense, but without excluding that distortion of the mouth which belongs to the mimicry of the malicious. It is the accus. of the object; for **הָלָה** is also bound in a moral sense with the accusative

of that which one practises, *i.e.* dealing with, exercises himself in, ii. 7, xxviii. 18, Isa. xxxiii. 15.

Ver. 13. קוֹרֵץ בְּעֵינָיו is translated according to the sense: who winks (*nictat*) with his eyes; but that is not the proper meaning of the word, for קרץ is used not only of the eyes, x. 10 (cf. xvi. 30, *qui oculos morsicat* or *connivet*), Ps. xxxv. 19, but also of the lips, xvi. 30. Thus Löwenstein's explanation: who opens up the eyes, is incorrect. The verb קרץ unites in it the meanings of قرض, to pinch off with a sharp implement, and قرض, with a blunt instrument (Arab. *mikrad*, pincers). It means to pince, to nip, as Arab. *kars*, pincer,—*e.g.* *kars balskyn alarsasat*, he cuts off with the knife the leaden seal,—hence frequently, to nip together the eyes, provincially: to wink (“*zwickern*,” frequent. of “*zwicken*,” to nip) with the eyes—the action of the deceiver, who thereby gives the sign to others that they help or at least do not hinder him from bantering and mocking, belying and deceiving a third person (Fl.); cf. Ali's proverb, “O God, pardon to us the culpable winking with the eye (*ramzat*),” and Fleischer's notes thereon, the *Proverbs of Ali*, p. 100 f.

That the words which follow, מוֹלֵל בְּרַגְלָיו, are meant of discourse, *i.e.* the giving of signs, with the feet, and, so to say, significant *oratio pedestris* (LXX., Aben-Ezra, Bertheau, Hitzig, and others), is very improbable, since the usage of language has set apart the *Piel* מִלֵּל for the meaning *loqui*, and מוֹלֵל admits another suitable signification, for מוֹלֵל means in Talmudic *fricare, confricare*,—*e.g.* הַמוֹלֵל מִלִּילוֹת, he who grinds the parched ears of corn (*b. Beza* 12b; *Ma'seroth*, iv. 5),—after which Syr., Targ., תָּכַס (stamping), Aq. *τριβων*, Symm. *προστριβων*, Jerome, (*qui*) *terit pede*, and Rashi מַשְׁפֵּשֶׁף (grinding, scratching); it means one who scrapes with his feet, draws them backwards and forwards on the ground in order thereby to give a sign to others; also the Arab. مَلَّ, *levem et agilem esse*, which as the synonym of اسرع is connected with فِى of the way, signifies properly to move the feet quickly hither and thither (Fl.).<sup>1</sup> מָרָה

<sup>1</sup> The root-idea of the Arab. *mall* is inquietness of motion; the Arab. noun *mallt* signifies the glow with its flickering light and burning: glowing ashes, inner agitation, external haste; Arab. *malil* (مَلِيل) is the feverish patient, but also one quickly hastening away, and generally an impatient or hasty person (*vid.* Wetstein in Baudissin in his *Job. Tischendorffianus*, vii. 6). The grinding

appears here, in accordance with its primary signification (*projicere*, *sc. brachium* or *digitum* = *monstrare*), connected with בָּאַצְבְּעָתִי; another expression for this scornful, malicious δακτυλοδεικνείν is שָׁלַח אֶצְבֶּעַ, Isa. lviii. 9.

Ver. 14. In this verse is continued the description of the subject, only once returning to the *particip.* The clauses are arranged independently, but logically according to the complex conception of the subject. תְּהַפְּכוֹת are just the knaveries, *i.e.* the malicious wickedness which comes to light in word and deportment as עֲקֻשׁוֹת פֶּה. Regarding the double figure of the smithy and of agriculture underlying חֲרָשׁ, *machinari*, *vid.* at iii. 29, and regarding the omission of the הוּא to חֲרָשׁ, at Ps. vii. 10 The phrase שָׁלַח מְדֻנִּים (as ver. 19, xvi. 28), to let loose disputes, so that they break forth, reminds us rather of the unfettering of the winds by Æolus than of the casting in of the apple of discord. Instead of מְדֻנִּים the *Kerî* has מְדֻנִּים; on the other hand, מְדֻנִּים remains uncorrected vi. 19, x. 12. The form מְדֻנִּים occurs once, xviii. 18, and its *constr.* מְדֻנִּי once, xix. 13. Everywhere else the text has מְדֻנִּים, for which the *Kerî* has מְדֻנִּים, xviii. 19, xxi. 9, 19, xxiii. 29, xxv. 24, xxvi. 21, xxvii. 15. The forms מְדֻנִּי and מְדֻנִּי are also recognised: the former stands alone without any analogous example; the latter is compared at least with מְצָר, Arab. *masâd* (*Psalmen*, p. 163, 3). Probably these two forms are warranted by Gen. xxv. 2, cf. xxxvii. 28, 36, where מְדֻנִּי and מְדֻנִּי occur as the names of two sons of Abraham by Keturah. But the national name מְדֻנִּים is no reason for the seven times laying aside of the regular form מְדֻנִּים, *i.e.* מְדֻנִּים, which is the plur. of מְדֻנִּי after the forms מְאֻרִּים, מְעֻרִּים, although מְדֻנִּים, after the forms מְבוֹשִׁים, מְצֻקִּים, is also found.

Ver. 15. With the 14th verse the description terminates. A worthless and a wicked person is he who does such things. The point lies in the characteristic out of which the conclusion is drawn: therefore his ruin will suddenly come upon him, etc. Regarding אֵיד, the root-meaning of which is illustrated by Amos ii. 13, *vid.* at i. 26. פִּתָּא is an old accus. of an absol. פִּתָּא, of the same meaning as פִּתָּע, used as an adverbial accus., both originating in the root-idea of splitting, opening, breaking out and breaking forth. "Shall be

is made by means of a quick movement hither and thither; and so also is speaking, for the instrument of speech, particularly the tongue, is set in motion. Only the meaning *præcidere*, *circumcidere*, does not connect itself with that root-idea: מַל in this signification appears to be a nuance of מַר, *stringere*.

broken to pieces" (as a brittle potter's vessel, Ps. ii. 9, Isa. xxx. 14, Jer. xxix. 11) is a frequent figure for the destruction (שָׁבַר) of an army (cf. Arab. *ânksar âljysh*), of a city or a state, a man. וְאֵין continues the שָׁבַר as xxix. 1: there shall be as it were no means of recovery for his shattered members (Fl.). Without the *Vav* this אֵין מְרַפֵּא would be a clause conceived of accusatively, and thus adverbially: without any healing.

Vers. 16–19. What now follows is not a separate section (Hitzig), but the corroborative continuation of that which precedes. The last word (מְרִיבִים, strife) before the threatening of punishment, 14*b*, is also here the last. The thought that no vice is a greater abomination to God than the (in fact satanical) striving to set men at variance who love one another, clothes itself in the form of the numerical proverb which we have already considered, pp. 12, 13. From that place we transfer the translation of this example of a *Midda*:—

- 16 There are six things which Jahve hateth,  
And seven are an abhorrence to His soul:
- 17 Haughty eyes, a lying tongue,  
And hands that shed innocent blood;
- 18 An heart that deviseth the thoughts of evil,  
Feet that hastily run to wickedness,
- 19 One that uttereth lies as a false witness,  
And he who soweth strife between brethren.

The sense is not, that the six things are hateful to God, and the seventh an abomination to Him besides (Löwenstein); the *Midda*-form in Amos i. 3–ii. 6, and in the proverb in Job v. 19, shows that the seven are to be numbered separately, and the seventh is the *non plus ultra* of all that is hated by God. We are not to translate: *sex hæcce odit*, for הָפָה, הֵנָּה (הֵן, הֵם) points backwards and hitherwards, but not, as אֵלֶּה, forwards to that immediately following; in that case the words would be שֵׁשׁ אֵלֶּה, or more correctly הַשֵּׁשׁ אֵלֶּה. But also Hitzig's explanation, "These six things (viz. vers. 12–15) Jahve hateth," is impossible; for (which is also against that *hæcce*) the substantive pronoun הֵנָּה, הֵמָּה (הֵהֵמָּה) is never, like the Chald. הֵמָּן (הֵמָּן), employed as an accus. in the sense of אֵתְּהֶן, אֵתְּהֶם, it is always (except where it is the virtual gen. connected with a preposition) only the nom., whether of the subject or of the predicate; and where it is the nom. of the predicate, as Deut. xx. 15, Isa. li. 19, substantival clauses precede in which הֵנָּה (הֵמָּה) repre-

sents the substantive verb, or, more correctly, in which the logical copula resulting from the connection of the clause itself remains unexpressed. Accordingly, 'שָׂנֵא ה' is a relative clause, and is therefore so accentuated here, as at xxx. 15 and elsewhere: *seu* (sunt) *ea quæ Deus odit, et septem* (sunt) *abominatio animæ ejus*. Regarding the statement that the soul of God hates anything, *vid.* at Isa. i. 14. תועבות, an error in the writing occasioned by the numeral (*vid.* xxvi. 25), is properly corrected by the *Kerî*; the poet had certainly the singular in view, as iii. 32, xi. 1, when he wrote תועבת. The first three characteristics are related to each other as mental, verbal, actual, denoted by the members of the body by means of which these characteristics come to light. The virtues are taken all together as a body (organism), and meekness is its head. Therefore there stands above all, as the sin of sins, the *mentis elatæ tumor*, which expresses itself in *elatum* (*grande*) *supercilium*: עֵינִים רָמוֹת, the feature of the רָם, haughty (cf. Ps. xviii. 28 with 2 Sam. xxii. 28), is the opposite of the feature of the שָׁח עֵינִים, Job xxii. 29; עֵץ is in the O. T. almost always (*vid.* Cant. iv. 9) fem., and adjectives of course form no dual. The second of these characteristics is the lying tongue, and the third the murderous hands. דָּם-נָקִי is innocent blood as distinguished from דָּם הַנָּקִי, the blood of the innocent, Deut. xix. 13.<sup>1</sup>

Ver. 18. The fourth characteristic is a deceitful heart. On חֵרֶשׁ, *vid.* ver. 14, iii. 29, and on אָזֵן, ver. 12. The fifth: feet running with haste to evil; לָרָעָה as לָרָע in Isa. lix. 7, echoing the distich i. 16, as here, 17*b* and 18*b*. The connection מְהֵרָה לָרוֹץ, *propere cucurrit* (contrast לֵאחֲרָיָהּ), is equivalent to מְהֵרָה.

Ver. 19. The sixth: "A speaker of lies, a tongue of falsehood," is hateful to God. It is one subject which is thus doubly characterized. כְּזָבִים are fictions, and שֶׁקֶר is the disfiguring (*deformatio*) of the actual facts. They are purposely placed together in this connection. The derivations of these synonyms are obscure; Fürst gives to the former the root-idea of spinning (properly knotting together), and to the latter that of painting. כְּזָבִים is introduced

<sup>1</sup> The writing דָּם follows the Masoretic rule, *vid.* Kimchi, *Michlol* 205*b*, and Heidenheim under Deut. xix. 10, where in printed editions of the text (also in Norzi's) the irregular form נָקִי דָּם is found. Besides, the *Metheg* is to be given to דָּם, so that one may not read it *dom*, as e.g. שֶׁשׁ-מֵאוֹת, Gen. vii. 11, that one may not read it שֶׁשׁ.

to support שָׁקֵר.<sup>1</sup> It would also be verbally permissible to interpret עַד שָׁקֵר in the sense of עֲדוּת שָׁקֵר, like xxv. 18, as in apposition to כֹּזְבִים; but in the nearest parallel, xiv. 15, the idea is personal, for it is said of the עַד שָׁקֵר that he breathes out lies. In that place there can be no doubt that the clause is a verbal one, and יָפִיחַ *finitum*, viz. *Hiph.* of פִּיחַ. This *Hiph.* signifies elsewhere also *sufflare*, xx. 8, *afflare*, Ps. x. 5, Ezek. xxi. 36, *perflare*, Cant. iv. 16, *anhelare* (*desiderare*), Ps. xii. 6, Hab. ii. 3, but with כֹּזְבִים, *efflare*, a synonym to רִבֵּר, as הִבִּיעַ and הִפְטִיף, which has (cf. xii. 17) no secondary meaning in use, but is mostly connected with כֹּזְבִים, not without reference to the fact that that which is false is without reality and is nothing more than הַבֵּל וְרוּחַ. But what kind of a form is יָפִיחַ, where it is not, as xiv. 5, the predicate of a verbal clause, but in connection with כֹּזְבִים, as here and at xiv. 25, xix. 5, 9 (once with אֲמוֹנָה, xii. 17), is the subject of a substantival clause? That which lies nearest is to regard it as a noun formed from the *fut. Hiph.* Such formations we indeed meet only among proper names, such as יָקִים, יִכִּין, יֵאִיר; however, at least the one *n. appell.* יָרִיב (an adversary) is found, which may be formed from the *Hiph.* as well as from the *Kal*. But should not the *constr.* of יָפִיחַ after the form יָרִיב be יָפִיחַ? One does not escape from this consideration by deriving יָפִיחַ, after the forms יִנִּיעַ, יִחִיל, יִדִּיר, יִשְׁשֵׁ, and the like, from a secondary verb יָפַח, the existence of which is confirmed by Jer. iv. 31, and from which also יָפַח, Ps. xxvii. 12, appears to be derived, although it may be reduced also, after the form יָרַב (with יָרִיב), to הִפְיַח. But in this case also one expects as a connecting form יָפִיחַ like יִדִּיר, as in reality יָפַח from יָפַח (cf. שָׁמַח, אָבֵל, from שָׂמַח, אָבֵל). Shall it now be assumed that the *Kametz* is treated as fixed? This were contrary to rule, since it is not naturally long. Thus the connection is not that of the genitive. But if יָפִיחַ were a substantive formed with the preformative of the second *modus* like יִלְקִיט [1 Sam. xvii. 40], or were it a participial intensive form of active signification such as נִבְיֵא, then the verbal force remaining in it is opposed to the usage of the language. There remains nothing further, therefore, than to regard יָפִיחַ as an attributive put in the place of a noun: one who breathes out; and there is a homogeneous example of this, for in any other way we cannot explain יוֹסִיף, Eccles. i. 18. In 19b the numeral proverb reaches its point. The chief of all that God hates is he who takes

<sup>1</sup> Isaak Albo thus distinguishes these synonyms in his dogmatic, bearing the title סֵפֶר עֲקָרִים, ii. 27.

a fiendish delight in setting at variance men who stand nearly related. Thus this brief proverbial discourse rounds itself off, coming back again to 14*b* as a refrain.

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TWELFTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, VI. 20 ff.

WARNING AGAINST ADULTERY, BY REFERENCE TO ITS FEARFUL CONSEQUENCES.

After these three smaller sections, the teacher of wisdom returns here to the theme of the eighth: Warning against sins of the flesh, whose power and prevalence among men is so immeasurably great, that their terrible consequences cannot sufficiently be held up before them, particularly before youth.

20 Keep, my son, the commandment of thy father,  
And reject not the instruction of thy mother.

21 Bind them to thy heart evermore,  
Fasten them about thy neck.

The suff. *-ēm* refers to the good doctrine (cf. vii. 3) pointed out by *מִצְוָה* and *תּוֹרָה*; the masc. stands, as is usual (e.g. i. 16, v. 2), instead of the fem. Regarding the figure, reminding us of the Tefillin and of Amuletes for perpetual representation, *vid.* under iii. 3. Similarly of persons, Cant. viii. 6. The verb *עָנֵךְ* (only here and Job xxxi. 36) signifies to bend, particularly to bend aside (Arab. *'ind*, bending off, going aside; accus. as adv., aside, *apud*), and to bend up, to wind about, *circumplicare*.

Ver. 22. The representation of the good doctrine is now personified, and becomes identified with it.

When thou walkest, it will guide thee;  
When thou liest down, it will keep watch over thee;  
And when thou wakest, it will talk with thee.

The subject is the doctrine of wisdom, with which the representation of wisdom herself is identified. The futures are not expressive of a wish or of an admonition, but of a promise; the form of the third clause shows this. Thus, and in the same succession as in the *schema* Deut. vi. 7, cf. xi. 19, are the three circumstances of the outward life distinguished: going, lying down, and rising up. The punctuation *בְּהִתְהַלֵּךְ*, found here and there, is Ben-Naphtali's

variant; Ben-Asher and also the *Textus rec.* reject the *Metheg* in this case, *vid.* Baer's *Metheg-Setzung*, § 28. The verb נָתַח, with its *Hiph.* in a strengthened *Kal*-signification, is more frequently found in the Psalms than in the Proverbs; the Arab. نَحَلَ shows that it properly signifies to direct (*dirigere*), to give direction, to move in a definite direction. שָׁמַר with עַל, to take into protection, we had already ii. 11; this author has favourite forms of expression, in the repetition of which he takes delight. With lying down, sleeping is associated. וְהִקְיִצוֹתָ is, as Ps. cxxxix. 18, the *hypoth. perf.*, according to Ewald, § 357a: *et ut expergefactus es, illa te compellabit.* Bertheau incorrectly: she will make thee thoughtful. But apart from the fact that there is no evidence of the existence of this *Hiph.* in the language of the Bible, the personification demands a clearer figure. שֵׁיחַ (שֵׁיחַ) signifies mental speech and audible speech (Gen. xxiv. 63, poet., in the Talmudic<sup>1</sup> a common word); with ב, speaking concerning something (*fabulari de*), Ps. lxix. 13; with the accus., that which is said of a thing, Ps. cxlv. 5, or the address, briefly for לְ שֵׁיחַ, Job xii. 8 (as מִן with accus. iv. 9 = מִן): when thou art awake, wisdom will forthwith enter into conversation with thee, and fill thy thoughts with right matter, and give to thy hands the right direction and consecration.

Ver. 23. Since in חֵי the idea of wisdom and of wholesome doctrine lie in one another, the author can proceed with proof:

For a lamp is the commandment, and instruction a light (Jerome, *et lex lux*);

And a way of life, disciplinary reproofs.

That תּוֹרָה has here not the positive, specifically Israelitish sense, but the generalized sense of instruction in conformity with truth regarding the will of God and the duty of man, *vid.* p. 42. This instruction mediated by man, but of divine origin, is אֹר, light, which enlightens the man who submits to it; and the commandment, מִצְוָה, which directs men in every case to do what is right, and forbids that which is wrong (including the prohibition Lev. iv. 2), is נֵר, a lamp which, kindled at that light, enlightens all the darkness of ignorance with reference to human conduct and its consequences.

<sup>1</sup> The conjecture thrown out by Wetstein, that (Arab.) *shykh* is equivalent to מְשִׁיחַ (מְסִיחַ), speaker, is untenable, since the verb *shakh*, to be old, a so-called *munsarif*, i.e. conjugated throughout, is used in all forms, and thus is certainly the root of *shykh*.

אור and נר are related to each other as general and particular, primary and derivative. Löwenstein accentuates incorrectly וְתוֹרָה אֹר instead of וְתוֹרָה אֹר (as the Cod. 1294 and the 3 Erfurt Codd.); *vid.* on the retrogression of the tone, not existing here, under iii. 15. The gen. מִיֶּסֶר denotes the object or character of the admonition: not disciplinary in the external sense of the word, but rather moral, having in view discipline in the sense of education, *i.e.* moral edification and elevation. Such corrections are דֶּרֶךְ חַיִּים, the way to true life, direction how to obtain it.

Ver. 24. The section thus closes:

To keep thee from the vile woman,  
From the flattery of the strange tongue.

Regarding the genitive connection אִשָּׁת רָע, a woman of a wicked character, *vid.* under ii. 14; and regarding the adjectival connection לְשׁוֹן נְכַרִּיהַ, under ver. 17; the strange tongue is the tongue (לְשׁוֹן) of the strange (foreign) woman (*vid.* p. 81), alluring with smooth words (ii. 16). Ewald, Bertheau: from her of a smooth tongue, the stranger, as Symm., Theod., ἀπὸ λειογλώσσου ξένης; but חֶלְקֶת is a substantive (Gen. xxvii. 16), and as a fem. adject. form is without an example. Rather חֶלְקֶת לְשׁוֹן is to be regarded as the first member and נְכַרִּיהַ as the second of the *st. constr.*, for the former constitutes one idea, and לְשׁוֹן on this account remains unabbreviated; cf. Ps. lxviii. 22, Isa. xxviii. 1; but (1) this syntactical phenomenon is yet problematical, *vid.* Friedr. Philippi, *Wesen und Ursprung des St. Constr.* p. 17; and (2) the supposition of such an anomaly is here unnecessary.

The *proœmium* of these twelve proverbial discourses is now at an end. Wisdom herself begins striking the note of the Decalogue:

- 25 Long not for her beauty in thy heart,  
And let her not catch thee with her eyelids;  
26 Because for a harlot one cometh down to a piece of bread,  
And a man's wife lieth in wait for a precious soul.

The warning 25a is in the spirit of the "thou shalt not covet," Ex. xx. 17, and the ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ, Matt. v. 28, of the Preacher on the Mount. The Talmudic proverb קָשׁוּ מַעֲבִירָה (Joma 29a) means only that the imagination of the sinful act exhausts the body even more than the act itself. The warning, "let her not catch thee with her eyelids," refers to her (the adulteress's) coquettish ogling and amorous winking. In the reason

added, beginning with **כִּי בָעַר** (thus it is to be punctuated), there is the appositional connection **וְזָנָה אִשָּׁה**, Gesen. § 113; the idea of **וְזָנָה** goes over into 26b. “**כֶּבֶר לֶחֶם** [= **כֶּרֶכֶר**, R. **כַּר**, to round, *vid.* at Gen. xlix. 5], properly a circle of bread, is a small round piece of bread, such as is still baked in Italy (*pagnotta*) and in the East (Arab. *kurs*), here an expression for the smallest piece” (Fl.). **בָּעַר** (*constr.* of **בַּעַר**), as Job ii. 4, Isa. xxxii. 14, is used in the sense of *ὑπέρ, pro*, and with **עַר** there is connected the idea of the coming down to this low point. Ewald, Bertheau explain after the LXX., *τιμὴ γὰρ πόρνῃς ὄσση καὶ ἐνὸς ἄρτου, γυνὴ δὲ ἀνδρῶν τιμίας ψυχὰς ἀγρεύει*. But nothing is said here of price (reward); the parallelism is synonymous, not antithetic: he is doubly threatened with loss who enters upon such a course. The adulterer squanders his means (xxix. 3) to impoverishment (*vid.* the mention of a loaf of bread in the description of poverty 1 Sam. ii. 36), and a man’s wife (but at the same time seeking converse with another) makes a prey of a precious soul; for whoever consents to adulterous converse with her, loses not perhaps his means, but certainly freedom, purity, dignity of soul, yea, his own person. **צַדִּיק** comprehends—as **צִידֹן**, fisher’s town [Zidon], Arab. *syād*, hunter and fisher, show—all kinds of hunting, but in Hebr. is used only of the hunting of wild beasts. The root-meaning (cf. **צָרִיף**) is to spy, to seize.

Vers. 27–29. The moral necessity of ruinous consequences which the sin of adultery draws after it, is illustrated by examples of natural cause and effect necessarily connected :

- 27 Can one take fire in his bosom  
And his clothes not be burned ?
- 28 Or can any one walk over burning coals  
And his feet not be burned ?
- 29 So he that goeth to his neighbour’s wife,  
No one remains unpunished that toucheth her.

We would say : Can any one, without being, etc. ; the former is the Semitic “extended (paratactic)<sup>1</sup> construction.” The first **וְ** has the conjunctive *Shalsheleth*. **וְצָדִיק** signifies to seize and draw forth a brand or coal with the fire-tongs or shovel (**מַחֲתָה**, the instrument for this); cf. Arab. *khât*, according to Lane, “he seized or snatched

<sup>1</sup> [The *πααρατακτικὸς χρόνος* denotes the imperfect tense, because it is still extended to the future.]

away a thing;" the form יַחַתָּה is *Kal*, as יַחַתָּה (*vid.* Köhler, *De Tetragrammate*, 1867, p. 10). חֵיק (properly indentation) is here not the lap, but, as Isa. xl. 11, the bosom.

Ver. 28. A second example of destructive consequences naturally following a certain course is introduced with אִם of the double question. נַחֲלִים (from נָחַל, after the form פָּחַם, but for which נַחֲלָה is used) is the regular modification of *gahhalim* (Gesen. § 27, 2). The fem. וְרַגְלֵי is followed here (cf. on the other hand i. 16) by the rhythmically full-sounding form הַפְּוִיגָה (retaining the distinction of gender), from פָּוָה, Arab. *kwy*, to burn so that a brand-mark (כִּי, Isa. iii. 24, *cauterium*) remains.

Ver. 29. The instruction contained in these examples here follows: τὸ εἰς πῦρ καὶ εἰς γυναῖκα ἐμπεσεῖν ἴσον ὑπάρχει (Pythagoras in Maximi *Eclog.* c. 39). בּוֹא אֶל is here, as the second in Ps. li. 1, a euphemism, and נָגַע בָּ, to come in contact with, means, as נָגַע אֶל, to touch, Gen. xx. 6. He who goes in to his neighbour's wife shall not do so with impunity (נָקָה). Since both expressions denote fleshly nearness and contact, so it is evident he is not guiltless.

Vers. 30, 31. The thief and the adulterer are now placed in comparison with one another, in such a way that adultery is supposed to be a yet greater crime.

- 30 One does not treat the thief scornfully if he steals  
To satisfy his craving when he is hungry;  
31 Being seized, he may restore sevenfold,  
Give up the whole wealth of his house.

For the most part 30a is explained: even when this is the case, one does not pass it over in the thief as a bagatelle. Ewald remarks: לֹא בּוֹא stands here in its nearest signification of overlooking, whence first follows that of contemning. But this "nearest" signification is devised wholly in favour of this passage;—the interpretation, "they do not thus let the thief pass," is set aside by Cant. viii. 1, 7; for by 31b, cf. Cant. viii. 7b, and 34a, cf. Cant. viii. 6a, it is proved that from ver. 30 on, reminiscences from the Canticles, which belong to the literature of the Chokma, find their way into the Mashal language of the author. Hitzig's correct supposition, that לֹא בּוֹא always signifies positive contemning, does not necessitate the interrogative interpretation: "Does not one despise the thief if . . .?" Thus to be understood, the author ought to have written בִּי אֶף or בִּי גַם. Michaelis rightly: *furtum licet merito pro infami*

*in republica habetur, tamen si cum adulterio comparatur, minus probrosum est.* Regarding נֶפֶשׁ in the sense of appetite, and even throat and stomach, *vid. Psychologie*, p. 204. A second is, that the thief, if he is seized (but we regard אֶנְצָר not as the *hypoth. perf.*, but as the *part. deprehensus*), may make compensation for his crime. The fut. יִשְׁלֵם thus to be understood as the potential lies near from this, that a sevenfold compensation of the thing stolen is unheard of in the Israelitish law; it knows only of a twofold, fourfold, fivefold restoration, Ex. xxi. 37, xxii. 1–3, 8 (cf. Saalschütz, *Mos. Recht*, p. 554 ff.). This excess over that which the law rendered necessary leads into the region of free-will: he (the thief, by which we are now only to think of him whom bitter necessity has made such) may make compensation sevenfold, *i.e.* superabundantly; he may give up the whole possessions (*vid.* on הָן at i. 13) of his house, so as not merely to satisfy the law, but to appease him against whom he has done wrong, and again to gain for himself an honoured name. What is said in vers. 30 and 31 is perfectly just. One does not condemn a man who is a thief through poverty, he is pitied; while the adulterer goes to ruin under all circumstances of contempt and scorn. And: theft may be made good, and that abundantly; but adultery and its consequences are irreparable.

Vers. 32, 33. Here there is a contrast stated to ver. 30:

32 He who commits adultery (*adulterans mulierem*) is beside himself,  
A self-destroyer—who does this.

33 He gains stripes and disgrace,  
And his reproach is never quenched.

הִנָּף, which primarily seems to mean *excedere*, to indulge in excess, is, as also in the Decalogue, cf. Lev. xx. 10, transitive: ὁ μοιχεύων γυναῖκα. Regarding being mad (*herzlos* = *heartless*) = *amens* (*excors, vecors*), *vid. Psychologie*, p. 254. מְשֻׁחֵיחַ נַפְשׁוֹ is he who goes to ruin with wilful perversity. A self-murderer—*i.e.* he intends to ruin his position and his prosperity in life—who does it, viz. this, that he touches the wife of another. It is the worst and most inextinguishable dishonouring of oneself. Singularly Behaji: who annihilates it (his soul), with reference to Deut. xxi. 12, Eccles. iv. 17, where עֲשֵׂה would be equivalent to בָּטַל, καταργεῖν, which is untrue and impossible.<sup>1</sup> נֶגַע refers to the corporal punishment in-

<sup>1</sup> Behaji ought rather to have referred to Zeph. iii. 19, Ezek. vii. 27, xxii. 14; but there עֲשֵׂה אֵת means *agere cum aliquo*, as we say: *mit jemandem abrechnen* (to settle accounts with any one).

flicted on the adulterer by the husband (Deut. xvii. 8, xxi. 5); Hitzig, who rejects ver. 32, refers it to the stripes which were given to the thief according to the law, but these would be called מַכָּה (מַכּוֹת). The punctuation נָגַע וְקָלָן is to be exchanged for נָגַע וְקָלָן (Löwenstein and other good editors). מָצָא has a more active signification than our "*finden*" (to find): *consequitur*, τυγχάνει.

Vers. 34, 35. One who has been stolen from is to be appeased, but not the injured husband.

34 For jealousy is the fury of a husband,  
And he spareth not in the day of vengeance.

35 He regardeth not any ransom,  
And is not contented though thou offerest to him gifts ever so great.

The connection marks קִנְיָאָה as the subject; for it respects carnal intercourse with another's wife. Jealousy is not usually חֲמָה, the glow of anger (from יָחַם, as שָׁנָה from יָשַׁן), but חֲמַת-גִּבּוֹר (constr. as שִׁנָּה), the glow of a man's anger, who with the putting forth of all his manly strength will seek satisfaction to his wounded honour. גִּבּוֹר, here significant for אִישׁ, with the fundamental idea of strength, firmness; cf. Arab. *jabr*, to make fast, to put right again something broken in pieces, particularly a broken vessel, hence *Algebra*, properly the operation by which an incomplete magnitude is completed (Fl.). The following וְלֹא-יִחַמֵּל (with the orthophonic *Dayesh*, as ver. 25 יִחַמֵּד, and with *Makkeph*) is connected with גִּבּוֹר, with definite reference to the man whom the faithless guest has made a cuckold. When the day comes in which the adultery brought to light demands and admits of vengeance, then, wounded in his right and in his honour, he knows no mercy; he pays no regard to any atonement or recompense by which the adulterer seeks to appease him and induce him not to inflict the punishment that is due: he does not consent, even though thou makest ever so great the gift whereby thou thinkest to gain him. The phrase נִשָּׂא פָנִים, πρόσωπον λαμβάνειν, signifies elsewhere to receive the countenance, i.e. the appearance and the impression of a man, i.e. to let it impress one favourably; here it is used of the כִּפּוּר, i.e. the means by which covering, i.e. non-punishment, pardon of the crime, impunity of the guilty, is obtained. Regarding אֶבְרָה, to consent to, *vid.* at i. 10. שִׁחָד, Aram. שִׁחָדָה, is a gift, particularly bribery. That the language may again finally assume the form of an address, it beautifully rounds itself off.

## THIRTEENTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, VII.

WARNING AGAINST ADULTERY BY THE REPRESENTATION OF ITS ABHORRENT AND DETESTABLE NATURE AS SEEN IN AN EXAMPLE.

The fearful desolation which adultery, and in general the sin of uncleanness, occasions in the life of the individual who is guilty of it, as well as in society, does not suffer the author of this discourse, directed to youth, to abandon his theme, which he has already treated of under different aspects. He takes up his warning once more, strengthens it by an example he himself had witnessed of one who fell a sacrifice to this sin, and gives it a very impressive conclusion, ver. 24 ff.

The introduction first counsels in general to a true appreciation of these well-considered life-rules of wisdom.

- 1 My son, keep my words,  
And treasure up my commandments with thee.
- 2 Keep my commandments, and thou shalt live;  
And my instruction as the apple of thine eye.
- 3 Wind them about thy fingers,  
Write them on the tablet of thy heart.

The LXX. has after ver. 1 another distich; but it here disturbs the connection. Regarding צַפֵּן, *vid.* at ii. 1; אָתָּךְ refers, as there, to the sphere of one's own character, and that subjectively. Regarding the *imper.* וְחָיָה, which must here be translated according to its sense as a conclusion, because it comes in between the objects governed by נֶשְׁמַר, *vid.* at iv. 4. There וְחָיָה is punctuated with *Silluk*; here, according to Kimchi (*Michlol* 125a), with *Segol-Athnach*, וְחָיָה, as in the *Cod. Erfurt.* 2 and 3, and in the editions of Athias and Clodius, so that the word belongs to the class פִּתְחוּן בִּאֲתָנָה (with short instead of long vowel by the pausal accent): no reason for this is to be perceived, especially as (iv. 4) the *Tsere* (ê from a) which is characteristic of the *imper.* remains unchanged. Regarding אִישׁוֹן הָעַיִן, Arab. *insân el-'ain*, the little man of the eye, *i.e.* the apple of the eye, named from the miniature portrait of him who looks into it being reflected from it, *vid.* at Ps. xvii. 8; the ending *ôn* is here diminutive, like Syr. *achuno*, little brother, *ḅruno*, little son, and the like. On ver. 3, *vid.* at vi. 21, iii. 3. The תְּפִלִּין שֶׁל יָד

<sup>1</sup> [תְּפִלִּין, *prayer-fillts, phylacteries.*]

were wound seven times round the left arm and seven times round the middle finger. The writing on the table of the heart may be regarded as referring to Deut. vi. 9 (the *Mezuzoth*).<sup>1</sup>

Vers. 4, 5. The subject-matter of this earnest warning are the admonitions of the teacher of wisdom, and through him of Wisdom herself, who in contrast to the world and its lust is the worthiest object of love, and deserves to be loved with the purest, sincerest love:

- 4 Say to wisdom: "Thou art my sister!"  
And call understanding "Friend;"  
5 That they may keep thee from the strange woman,  
From the stranger who useth smooth words.

The childlike, sisterly, and friendly relationship serves also to picture forth and designate the intimate confidential relationship to natures and things which are not flesh and blood. If in Arabic the poor is called the brother of poverty, the trustworthy the brother of trustworthiness, and *abu, um* (أبو, أم), *achu, ucht*, are used in manifold ways as the expression for the interchangeable relation between two ideas; so (as also, notwithstanding Ewald, § 273b, in many Hebr. proper names) that has there become national, which here, as at Job xvii. 14, xxx. 29, mediated by the connection of the thoughts, only first appears as a poetic venture. The figurative words of ver. 4 not merely lead us to think of wisdom as a personal existence of a higher order, but by this representation it is itself brought so near, that אָחִי easily substitutes itself, ii. 3, in the place of אָם. אָחִי of Solomon's address to the bride brought home is in its connection compared with Book of Wisdom viii. 2. While the *ôth* of אָחִי by no means arises from abstr. *ûth*, but *achôth* is derived from *achajath*, מוֹרֵעַ (as Ruth ii. 1, cf. מוֹרֵעַ, iii. 2), here by *Mugrash* מוֹרֵעַ, properly means acquaintance, and then the person known, but not in the superficial sense in which this word and the Arab. *ma'arfat* are used (e.g. in the Arabic phrase quoted by Fleischer, *kanna aṣḥaab ṣarna m'auraf*—*nous étions amis, nous en sommes plus que de simples connaissances*), but in the sense of familiar, confidential alliance. The *infin.* לִישׁוֹרֶךָ does not need for its explanation some intermediate thought to be introduced: *quod eo conducet tibi ut* (Mich.), but connects itself immediately as the purpose: bind wisdom to thyself and thyself to wisdom thus

<sup>1</sup> [=the *door-posts*, afterwards used by the Jews to denote the passages of Scripture written on the door-posts.]

closely that thou mayest therewith guard thyself. As for the rest, *vid.* ii. 16; this verse repeats itself here with the variation of one word.

How necessary it is for the youth to guard himself by the help of wisdom against the enticements of the wanton woman, the author now shows by a reference to his own observation.

- 6 For through the window of my house,  
From behind the lattice I looked out;  
7 Then saw I among the simple ones,  
Discerned among the young people, a youth devoid of  
understanding.

כִּי refers indeed to the immediately following clause, yet it actually opens up the whole following exemplification. The connection with ver. 5 would be closer if instead of the extended Semitic construction it were said: *nam quum . . . prospicerem vidi, etc.* חֲלֹן (from חָלַל, to bore through) is properly a place where the wall is bored through. אֶשְׁנֵב (from שָׁנַב = Arab. *shaniba*, to be agreeable, cool, fresh) is the window-lattice or lattice-window, *i.e.* lattice for drawing down and raising up, which keeps off the rays of the sun. נִשְׁקָה signifies primarily to make oneself long in order to see, to stretch up or out the neck and the head, *καταδοκεῖν*, Arab. *atall*, *atal'a*, and *tatall'a* of things, *imminere*, to overtop, to project, to jut in; cf. Arab. *askaf* of the ostrich, long and bent, with respect to the neck stretching it up, *sakaf*, *abstr.* crooked length. And בָּעֵר is thus used, as in Arab. *duna*, but not *b'ad*, is used: so placed, that one in relation to the other obstructs the avenue to another person or thing: "I looked forth from behind the lattice-window, *i.e.* with respect to the persons or things in the room, standing before the lattice-window, and thus looking out into the open air" (Fleischer). That it was far in the night, as we learn at ver. 9, does not contradict this looking out; for apart from the moon, and especially the lighting of the streets, there were star-lit nights, and to see what the narrator saw there was no night of Egyptian darkness. But because it was night 6a is not to be translated: I looked about among those devoid of experience (thus *e.g.* Löwenstein); but he saw among these, observed among the youths, who thus late amused themselves without, a young man whose want of understanding was manifest from what further happened. Bertheau: that I might see, is syntactically impossible. The meaning of וְאֶרְאֶה is not determined by the

אָבִינָה following, but conversely אָבִינָה stands under the operation of וְאָבִינָה (= וְאָבִינָה, Neh. xiii. 7), characterizing the historic *ao*rist. Regarding פָּתִי, *vid.* at i. 4. בָּנִים is the masc. of בְּנוֹת, Arab. *benât* in the meaning maiden. בְּבָנִים has in correct texts, according to the rules of the accents, the *raphatum*.<sup>1</sup>

Now follows, whither he saw the young fop [*Laffen*] then go in the darkness.

- 8 Going up and down the street near her corner,  
And he walked along the way to her house,  
9 In the twilight, when the day declined,  
In the midst of the night and deep darkness.

We may interpret לֵבֵר as appos.: *juvenem amentem, ambulantem*, or as the predicate accus.: *vidi juvenem . . . ambulantem*; for that one may so express himself in Hebrew (cf. *e.g.* Isa. vi. 1, Dan. viii. 7), Hitzig unwarrantably denies. The passing over of the *part.* into the *finite*, 8*b*, is like ii. 14, 17, and that of the *inf.* i. 27, ii. 8. שֹׁק, Arab. *suk* (dimin. *suweika*, to separate, from *sikkat*, street, alley), still means, as in former times, a broad street, a principal street, as well as an open place, a market-place where business is transacted, or according to its etymon: where cattle are driven for sale. On the street he went backwards and forwards, yet so that he kept near to her corner (*i.e.* of the woman whom he waited for), *i.e.* he never withdrew himself far from the corner of her house, and always again returned to it. The corner is named, because from that place he could always cast a look over the front of the house to see whether she whom he waited for showed herself. Regarding פָּנָה for פִּנְתָּה, *vid.* at Ps. xxvii. 5: a primary form פָּן has never been in use; פָּנִים, Zech. xiv. 10, is plur. of פָּנָה. אָצֵל (from אָצַל, Arab. *wasl*, to bind) is, as a substantive, the side (as the place where one thing connects itself with another), and thus as a preposition it means (like *juxta* from *jungere*) beside, Ital. *allato*. וְרָקָה is the object. accus., for thus are construed verbs *eundi* (*e.g.* Hab. iii. 12, Num. xxx. 17, cf. xxi. 22).

Ver. 9. The designations of time give the impression of progress to a climax; for Hitzig unwarrantably denies that נֶטָף means the twilight; the Talmud, *Berachoth* 3*b*, correctly distinguishes תְּרֵי נֶטָפִי two twilights, the evening and the morning twilight. But the idea is not limited to this narrow sense, and does not need this,

<sup>1</sup> Regarding the Targ. of vii. 6, 7, *vid.* Perles, *Etymologische Studien*, 1871, p. 9.

since the root-word נִשָּׁף (*vid.* at Isa. xl. 24) permits the extension of the idea to the whole of the cool half (evening and night) of the entire day; cf. the parallel of the adulterer who veils himself by the darkness of the night and by a mask on his countenance, Job xxiv. 15 with Jer. xiii. 16. However, the first group of synonyms, בִּנְשָׁף בַּעֲרֵב יוֹם (with the *Cod. Frankf.* 1294, to be thus punctuated), as against the second, appears to denote an earlier period of the second half of the day; for if one reads, with Hitzig, בַּעֲרֵב יוֹם (after Judg. xix. 9), the meaning remains the same as with בַּעֲרֵב יוֹם, viz. *advesperascente die* (Jerome), for עֲרֵב = Arab. *gharab*, means to go away, and particularly to go under, of the sun, and thus to become evening. He saw the youth in the twilight, as the day had declined (κέκλικεν, Luke xxiv. 29), going backwards and forwards; and when the darkness of night had reached its middle, or its highest point, he was still in his lurking-place. אֵישׁוֹן לַיְלָה, apple of the eye of the night, is, like the Pers. *dili scheb*, heart of the night, the poetic designation of the middle of the night. Gusset incorrectly: *crepusculum in quo sicut in oculi pupilla est nigredo sublustris et quasi mistura lucis ac tenebrarum*. אֵישׁוֹן is, as elsewhere לֵב, particularly the middle; the application to the night was specially suitable, since the apple of the eye is the black part in the white of the eye (Hitzig). It is to be translated according to the accus., *in pupilla noctis et caligine* (not *caliginis*); and this was probably the meaning of the poet, for a ב is obviously to be supplied to וַאֲפֹלָה.

Finally, the young man devoid of understanding sees his waiting rewarded: like meets like.

- 10 And, lo, a woman coming to meet him,  
In the attire of an harlot and of subtle heart.
- 11 Boisterous is she, and ungovernable;  
Her feet have no rest in her own house.
- 12 At one time before her door, at another in the street,  
And again at every corner she places herself on the watch.

“Ver. 12 (Hitzig) expresses what is wont to be, instead of a single event, ver. 11, viz. the custom of a street harlot. But she who is spoken of is not such an one; lurking is not applicable to her (cf. Job xxxi. 9), and, ver. 11, it is not meant that she is thus inclined.” But Hitzig’s rendering of ver. 11, “she was boisterous . . . in her house her feet had no rest,” is inaccurate, since neither וְהָיָה nor שְׁכָנָה is used. Thus in vers. 11 and 12 the poet gives a charac-

teristic of the woman, introduced by יְהִיָּה into the frame of his picture, which goes beyond that which then presented itself to his eyes. We must with ver. 12 reject also ver. 11; and even that would not be a radical improvement, since that characteristic lying behind the evident, that which was then evident begins with וַנִּצֵּר לָב (and subtle in heart). We must thus suppose that the woman was not unknown to the observer here describing her. He describes her first as she then appeared. נִשִּׁית Hitzig regards as equivalent to נִשְׁוּיָה, similitude (from נִשְׁוָה), and why? Because נִשִּׁית does not mean “to lay against,” but “to place.” But Ex. xxxiii. 4 shows the contrary, and justifies the meaning attire, which the word also has in Ps. lxxiii. 6. Meiri less suitably compares 2 Kings ix. 30, but rightly explains תִּקּוּן (dressing, ornament), and remarks that נִשִּׁית elliptical is equivalent to בְּנִשִּׁית. It is not the nominative (Bertheau), but the accusative, as תַּבְנִית, Ps. cxliv. 12, Ewald, § 279*d*. How Hitzig reaches the translation of וַנִּצֵּר לָב by “and an arrow in her heart” (*et saucia corde*<sup>1</sup>), one can only understand by reading his commentary. The usage of the language, iv. 23, he remarks, among other things, would stamp her as a virtuous person. As if a phrase like נִצֵּר לָב could be used both *sensu bono* and *sensu malo*! One can guard his heart when he protects it carefully against moral danger, or also when he purposely conceals that which is in it. The *part.* נִצֵּר signifies, Isa. i. 8, besieged (blockaded), Ezek. xvi. 12, protected, guarded, and Isa. xlviii. 6, lxv. 4, concealed, hidden. Ewald, § 187*b*, refers these three significations in the two passages in Isaiah and in the passage before us to צִר, *Niph.* נִצֵּר (as נָגַל); but (1) one would then more surely take צִר (cf. נִבְכִּים, נִמּוּל) as the verbal stem; (2) one reaches the idea of the concealed (the hidden) easier from that of the preserved than from that of the confined. As one says in Lat. *homo occultus, tectus, abstrusus*, in the sense of *κρυφίους*, so it is said of that woman וַנִּצֵּר לָב, not so much in the sense of *retenta cor*, *h.e. quæ quod in corde haberet non pandebat*, Fr. *retenue* (Cocc.), as in the sense of *custodita cor, quæ intentionem cordis mentemque suam callide novit premere* (Mich.): she is of a hidden mind, of a concealed nature; for she feigns fidelity to her husband and flatters her paramours as her only beloved, while in truth she loves none, and each of them is to her only a means to an end, viz. to the indulgence of her worldly sensual desire. For, as the author further

<sup>1</sup> Virgil's *Æneid*, iv. 1.

describes her, she is הַמִּיָּה (fem. of הָמִי = הָמִי, as i. 21, Isa. xxii. 2), *tumultuosa*, externally as internally impetuous, because full of intermingling lust and deceit (*opp.* ἡσυχίος, 1 Pet. iii. 4, 1 Tim. ii. 11), and כַּרְרָת, self-willed, not minding the law of duty, of discretion, or of modesty (from כָּרַר, Arab. *sharr*, *pervicacem*, *malum esse*). She is the very opposite of the noiseless activity and the gentle modesty of a true house-wife, rude, stubborn, and also vagrant like a beast in its season (Hos. iv. 14): *in domo ipsius residere nequeunt pedes ejus*; thus not οἰκουρός or οἰκουργός (Tit. ii. 5), far removed from the genuine woman-like εἶσω ἡσυχον μένειν δόμων<sup>1</sup>—a *radt*, as they call such a one in Arab. (Wünsche on Hos. xii. 1), or as she is called in Aram. נַפְקַת פְּרָא.

Ver. 12. This verse shows how she conducts herself when she wanders abroad. It is no common street-walker who is designated (no "*Husterin*," Arab. *kahbt*, after which also the female demon-name (Arab.) *se'alâ* is explained), but that licentious married wife, who, no better than such a strumpet when she wanders abroad, hunts after lovers. The alternating פָּעַם (properly a stroke) Fleischer compares with the Arab. synonyms, *marrt*, a going over, *karrt*, a going back, *una volta*, *una fiata*, *une fois* (Orelli, *Synon. der Zeit und Ewigkeit*, p. 51). Regarding חוץ, *vid.* at v. 16: it is the free space without, before the house-door, or also before the gate of the city; the parallelism speaks here and at i. 20 more in favour of the former signification.

Ver. 13. After this digression the poet returns to the subject, and further describes the event as observed by himself.

And she laid hold on him and kissed him;  
Put on a bold brow and said to him.

The verb נִשְׁקָה is here, after its primary signification, connected with the dat.: *osculum fixit ei*. Thus also Gen. xxvii. 26 is construed, and the *Dagesh* in לו is, as there, *Dag. forte conj.*, after the law for which the national grammarians have coined the technical name אַתִּי מֵרַחֵק (*veniens e longinquo*, "coming out of the distance," *i.e.* the attraction of a word following by one accented on the penult.). The penult.-accenting of נִשְׁקָה is the consequence of the retrogression of the accent (נִסְגָּה אַחֲרָיו), which here, where the word from the first had the penult. only with Metheg, and thus with half a tone, brings with it the dageshing of the לו following, as the original

<sup>1</sup> Eurip. *Herac.*

penultima-accenting of וְהִתְחַזְקָה does of the בּוּ which follows it, for the reading בּוּ by Löwenstein is contrary to the laws of punctuation of the *Textus receptus* under consideration here.<sup>1</sup> As בּוּ and לוּ have received the doubling *Dagesh*, so on the other hand, according to Ewald, § 193*b*, it has disappeared from הִעֲזָה (written with *Raphe* according to Kimchi, *Michlol* 145*a*). And as נִשְׁקָה has the tone thrown back, so the proper pausal וְהִתְחַזְקָה is accented on the ult., but without attracting the לוּ following by *dageshing*, which is the case only when the first of the two words terminates in the sound of *ā* (*āh*). הִעֲזָה פָּנָיו is said of one who shows firmness or hardness of countenance (Arab. *slabt alwajh*), i.e. one who shows shamelessness, or, as we say, an iron forehead (Fl.).

She laid hold on him and kissed him, both of which actions were shameless, and then, assuming the passivity and modesty befitting the woman, and disregarding morality and the law, she said to the youth :

- 14 “ To bring peace-offerings was binding upon me,  
To-day have I redeemed my vows.  
15 Therefore am I come out to meet thee,  
To seek thy face, and have found thee.”

We have translated שְׁלָמִים וְבָחִי “peace-offerings,” proceeding on the principle that שְׁלָם (sing. only Amos v. 22, and on the Phœnician altar at Marseilles) denotes contracting friendship with one (from שָׁלַם, to hold friendly relationship), and then the gifts having this in view ; for the idea of this kind of offering is the attestation and confirmation of communion with God. But in view of the derivatives שְׁלָמִים and שְׁלֹום, it is perhaps more appropriate to combine שְׁלָם with שָׁלַם, to discharge perfectly, and to translate it thank-payment-offering, or with v. Hofmann, a due-offering, where not directly thank-offering ; for the proper eucharistic offering, which is the expression of thanks on a particular occasion, is removed from the species of the *Shelamim* by the addition of the words עַל-תּוֹרָה (Lev. vii. 12–25). The characteristic of the *Shelamim* is the division of the flesh of the sacrifice between Jahve and His priests on the one side, and the person (or persons) bringing it on the other side : only one part of the flesh of the sacrifice was Jahve’s, consumed by fire (Lev. iii. 16) ; the priests received one part ; those who brought the offering received back another part

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Baer’s *Torath Emeth*, p. 29 sq., and *Psalmen-Commentar* under Ps. lii. 5.

as it were from the altar of God, that they might eat it with holy joy along with their household. So here the adulteress says that there was binding upon her, in consequence of a vow she had taken, the duty of presenting peace-offerings, or offerings that were due; to-day (she reckons the day in the sense of the *dies civilis* from night to night) she has performed her duties, and the *שְׁלָמִי נָדָר* have yielded much to her that she might therewith regale him, her true lover; for with *עַל־כֵּן* she means to say that even the prospect of the gay festival which she can prepare for him moved her thus to meet him. This address of the woman affords us a glimpse into the history of the customs of those times. The *Shelamim* meals degenerated in the same manner as our *Kirmsen*.<sup>1</sup> Secularization lies doubly near to merrymaking when the law sanctions this, and it can conceal itself behind the mask of piety. Regarding *שָׁחַר*, a more exact word for *בִּקֵּשׁ*, *vid.* at i. 28. To seek the countenance of one is equivalent to to seek his person, himself, but yet not without reference to the wished-for look [*aspectus*] of the person.

Thus she found him, and described to him the enjoyment which awaited him in eating and drinking, then in the pleasures of love.

- 16 "My bed have I spread with cushions,  
Variegated coverlets, Egyptian linen;  
17 I have sprinkled my couch  
With myrrh, aloes, and cinnamon.  
18 Come then, we will intoxicate ourselves with love till the morning,  
And will satisfy ourselves in love."

The noun *עֶרֶשׁ*, from *עָרַשׁ*, = Arab. '*arash, ædificare, fabricari*, signifies generally the wooden frame; thus not so much the bed within as the erected bed-place (cf. Arab. '*arsh*, throne, and '*arysh*, arbour). This bedstead she had richly and beautifully cushioned, that it might be soft and agreeable. *רָבַד*, from *רָב*, signifies to lay on or apply closely, thus either *vincire* (whence the name of the necklace, Gen. xli. 42) or *sternere* (different from *רָפַד*, Job xvii. 13, which acquires the meaning *sternere* from the root-meaning to raise up from under, *sublevare*), whence *מְרִבְדִים*, cushions, pillows, *stragulæ*. Böttcher punctuates *מְרִבְדִים* incorrectly; the *ב* remains aspirated, and the connection of the syllables is looser than in *מְרִבָּה*; Ewald, § 88*d*. The *הַמְבוֹת* beginning the second half-verse is in no case an adjective to *מְרִבְדִים*, in every case only *appos.*, pro-

<sup>1</sup> [*Kirmse* = anniversary of the dedication of a church, village *fête*.]

bably an independent conception; not derived from *חֵטֶב* (cogn. *חֵצֵב*), to hew wood (whence Arab. *hatab*, fire-wood), according to which Kimchi, and with him the *Græc. Venet.* (*περιξύστοις*), understands it of the carefully polished bed-poles or bed-boards, but from *חֵטֶב* = Arab. *khateba*, to be streaked, of diverse colours (*vid.* under Ps. cxliv. 12), whence the Syriac *machtabto*, a figured (striped, checkered) garment. Hitzig finds the idea of coloured or variegated here unsuitable, but without justice; for the pleasantness of a bed is augmented not only by its softness, but also by the impression which its costliness makes on the eye. The following *מִצְרֵי־אֶטָן* stands in an appositional relation to *חֲטָבוֹת*, as when one says in Arabic *taub-un dîbâg'-un*, a garment brocade = of brocade. *אֶטָן* (after the Syr. for *אֶטָן*, as *אֶטָן*) signifies in the Targum the cord (*e.g.* Jer. xxxviii. 6), like the Arab. *tunub*, Syr. (*e.g.* Isa. liv. 2) *tûnob*; the root is *טָן*, not in the sense of to bind, to wind (Dietr.), but in the sense of to stretch; the thread or cord is named from the extension in regard to length, and *אֶטָן* is thus thread-work, whether in weaving or spinning.<sup>1</sup> The fame of Egyptian manufactures is still expressed in the Spanish *aclabtea*, fine linen cloth, which is equivalent to the modern Arabic *el-kobtîje* (*kibtîje*); they had there particularly also an intimate acquaintance with the dye stuffs found in the plants and fossils of the country (Klemm's *Culturgeschichte*, v. 308-310).

Vers. 17, 18. These verses remind us of expressions in the Canticles. There, at iv. 14, are found the three names for spicery as here, and one sees that *מֵר אֶהֱלִים* are not to be connected genitively: there are three things, accented as in the title-verse i. 3. The myrrh, *מֵר* (*Balsamodendron myrrha*), belongs, like the frankincense, to the species of the *Amyris*, which is an exotic in Palestine not less than with us; the aromatic quality in them does not arise from the flowers or leaves, so that Cant. i. 13 leads us to think of a bunch of myrrh, but from the resin oozing through the bark (*Gummi myrrhæ* or merely *myrrha*), consisting of bright glossy red or golden-yellow grains more or less transparent. *אֶהֱלִים* (used by Balaam, Num. xxiv. 6) is the Semitic Old-Indian name of the aloë, *agaru* or *aguru*; the aromatic quality is in the wood of the *Aquilaria agallocha*, especially its root (*agallochum* or

<sup>1</sup> Hence perhaps the Greek *ῥόνη*, which Fick in his *Vergl. Wörterbuch* connects with the Arab. verb-root *vadh*, to bind, wind, clothe, but not without making thereto interrogation marks.

*lignum aloes*) dried in the earth,—in more modern use and commerce the inspissated juice of its leaves. קִנְמון is *κιννάμωμον* (like מֶר, a Semitic word<sup>1</sup> that had come to the Greeks through the Phœnicians), the cinnamon, *i.e.* the inner rind of the *Laurus cinnamomum*. The myrrh is native to Arabia; the aloë, as its name denotes, is Indian; the cinnamon in like manner came through Indian travellers from the east coast of Africa and Ceylon (Taprobane). All these three spices are drugs, *i.e.* are dry apothecaries' wares; but we are not on that account to conclude that she perfumed (Hitzig) her bed with spices, *viz.* burnt in a censer, an operation which, according to Cant. iii. 6, would rather be designated קִטְרָתִי. The verb נָפַח (only here as *Kal*) signifies to lift oneself up (*vid.* under Ps. xlviii. 13), and transitively to raise and swing hither and thither (= הֵינִיחַ); here with a double accusative, to besprinkle anything out of a vessel moved hither and thither. According to this sense, we must think of the three aromas as essences in the state of solution; cf. Ex. xxx. 22–33, Esth. ii. 12. Hitzig's question, "Who would sprinkle bed-sheets with perfumed and thus impure water?" betrays little knowledge of the means by which even at the present day clean linen is made fragrant. The expression רָוַה רֹדִים sounds like שָׁכַר רֹדִים, Cant. v. 1, although there רֹדִים is probably the *voc.*, and not, as here, the *accus.*; רָוַה is the *Kal* of רָוַה, v. 19, and signifies to drink something copiously in full draughts. The verbal form עָלַץ for עָלַם is found besides only in Job xx. 18, xxxix. 13; the *Hithpa.* signifies to enjoy oneself greatly, perhaps (since the *Hithpa.* is sometimes used reciprocally, *vid.* under Gen. ii. 25) with the idea of reciprocity (Targ. חָרַלְחָר). We read *bo'habim* with *Chateph-Kametz* after Ben-Asher (*vid.* Kimchi's *Lex.*); the punctuation בְּאַהֲבִים is that of Ben-Naphtali.

The adulteress now deprives the youth of all fear; the circumstances under which her invitation is given are as favourable as possible.

19 " For the man is not at home,  
He has gone on a long journey.

<sup>1</sup> Myrrh has its name מֶר from the bitterness of its taste, and קִנְם appears to be a secondary formation from קִנְה, whence קִנְה, reed; cf. the names of the cinnamon, *cannella*, Fr. *cannelle*. *Cinnamum* (κιννάμωμον) is only a shorter form for *cinnamomum*. Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* xii. 19 (42), uses both forms indiscriminately.

20 He has taken the purse with him ;

He will not return home till the day of the full moon."

It is true that the article stands in **הָאִישׁ**, Arab. *alm'ar-fat*, i.e. serves to define the word : the man, to whom here **κατ' ἑξοχήν** and alone reference can be made, viz. the husband of the adulteress (Fl.) ; but on the other side it is characteristic that she does not say **אִישִׁי** (as e.g. Gen. xxix. 32), but ignores the relation of love and duty in which she is placed to him, and speaks of him as one standing at a distance from her (Aben-Ezra). Erroneously Vogel reads **בְּבֵית** after the Targ. instead of **בְּבֵיתוֹ**. We say in Hebr. **אֵינוּ בְּבֵיתוֹ**, *il n'est pas chez soi*, as we say **לָקַח בְּיָדוֹ**, *il a pris avec soi* (cf. Jer. xxxviii. 10). **מֵרָחוֹק** Hitzig seeks to connect with the verb, which, after Isa. xvii. 13, xxii. 3, is possible ; for the Hebr. **מֵרָחוֹק** (**מִמְּרָחוֹק**), far off, has frequently the meaning from afar, for the measure of length is determined not from the point of departure outward, but from the end, as e.g. Homer, *Il.* ii. 456 : **ἐκαθεν δέ τε φαίνεται αὐγῇ**, from afar the gleam is seen, i.e. shines hither from the distance. Similarly we say in French, *il vient du côté du nord*, he comes from the north, as well as *il va du côté du nord*, he goes northwards. But as we do not say : he has gone on a journey far off, but : on a distant journey, so here **מֵרָחוֹק** is virtually an adj. (*vid.* under Isa. v. 26) equivalent to **רְחוֹקָה** (Num. ix. 10) : a journey which is distant = such as from it he has a long way back. Michaelis has well remarked here : *ut timorem ei penitus adimat, veluti per gradus incedit*. He has undertaken a journey to a remote point, but yet more : he has taken money with him, has thus business to detain him ; and still further : he has even determined the distant time of his return. **צִרְוֹר־הַכֶּסֶף** (thus to be written after Ben-Asher, *vid.* Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 41) is the purse (from **צָרַר**, to bind together), not one of many, but that which is his own. The terminus precedes 20b to emphasize the lateness ; *vid.* on **כָּסֶף** under Ps. lxxxi. 4. *Græc. Venet.* **τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τοῦ καιροῦ**, after Kimchi and others, who derive **כָּסֶף** (**כֶּסֶף**) from the root **כֶּס**, to reckon, and regard it as denoting only a definite time. But the two passages require a special idea ; and the Syr. **kêso**, which in 1 Kings xii. 32, 2 Chron. vii. 10, designates the time from the 15th day of the month, shows that the word denotes not, according to the Talmud, the new moon (or the new year's day), when the moon's disk begins to cover itself, i.e. to fill (**יִתְכַסֶּה**), but the full moon, when it is covered, i.e. filled ; so that thus the time of the night-

scene here described is not that of the last quarter of the moon (Ewald), in which it rises at midnight, but that of the new moon (Hitzig), when the night is without moonlight. Since the derivation of the word from כסא (כסה), to cover, gives the satisfactory idea of the covering or filling of the moon's disk, we do not seek after any other; Dietrich fixes on the root-idea of roundness, and Hitzig of vision (כסא = סכה, שכח; *vid.*, on the contrary, under Ps. cxliii. 9). The ל is that of time at which, in which, about which, anything is done; it is more indefinite than א would be. He will not return for some fourteen days.

The result:—

- 21 She beguiled him by the fulness of her talking,  
By the smoothness of her lips she drew him away.

Here is a climax. First she brought him to yield, overcoming the resistance of his mind to the last point (cf. 1 Kings xi. 3); then drove him, or, as we say, hurried him wholly away, viz. from the right path or conduct (cf. Deut. xiii. 6, 11). With הִטָּתוּ (= הִטָּתָהּ) as the chief *factum*, the past imperf. is interchanged, 21b. Regarding לָקַח, see above, p. 56. Here is the rhetoric of sin (Zöckler); and perhaps the לָקַח of 20a has suggested this antiphrastic לָקַח to the author (Hitzig), as חָלַק (the inverted לָקַח, formed like שָׁפַל, which is the *abstr.* of שָׁפַל as that is of חָלַק) and תְּדִיחָנוּ are reciprocally conditioned, for the idea of the slippery (Ps. lxxiii. 18) connects itself with חָלַק.

What followed:—

- 22 So he goes after her at once  
As an ox which goeth to the slaughter-house,  
And as one bereft of reason to the restraint of fetters,  
23 As a bird hastens to the net,  
Without knowing that his life is at stake—  
Till the arrow pierces his liver.

The *part.* הִלָּךְ (thus to be accentuated according to the rule in Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 25, with *Mercha* to the tone-syllable and *Mahpach* to the preceding open syllable) preserves the idea of the fool's going after her. פְּתָאֵם (suddenly) fixes the point, when he all at once resolves to betake himself to the rendezvous in the house of the adulteress, now a *κεκρωθελς*, as the LXX. translates, *i.e.*, as we say, a simpleton who has gone on the lime-twigg. He follows her as an ox goes to the slaughter-house, unconscious that

he is going thither to be slaughtered; the LXX. ungrammatically destroying the attributive clause: ὥσπερ δὲ βοῦς ἐπὶ σφαγῇν ἄγεται. The difficulties in וּבְעֶכֶם (thus punctuated, after Kimchi, with a double *Segol*, and not וּבְעֵכֶם, as is frequently the case) multiply, and it is not to be reconciled with the traditional text. The ox appears to require another beast as a side-piece; and accordingly the LXX., Syr., and Targ. find in עֶכֶם a dog (to which from אוֹל they also pick out אֵיל, a stag), Jerome a lamb (*et quasi agnus* כֶּבֶשׂ), Rashi a venomous serpent (perhaps after ἔχιδνα?), Löwenstein and Malbim a rattlesnake (נָחָשׁ מְצַלֵּץ after עֶכֶם); but all this is mere conjecture. Symmachus' σκιρτῶν (ἐπὶ δεσμῶν ἀφρων) is without support, and, like the favourite rendering of Schelling, *et sicut saliens in vinculum cervus* (אֵיל), is unsuitable on account of the unsemitic position of the words. The noun עֶכֶם, plur. עֶכְסִים, signifies, Isa. iii. 18, an anklet as a female ornament (whence ver. 16 the denom. עֶכֶם, to make a tinkling of the anklets). In itself the word only means the fetter, *compes*, from עָכַם, Arab. 'akas, 'akash, *contrahere, constringere* (*vid.* Fleischer under Isa. lix. 5); and that it can also be used of any kind of means of checking free movement, the Arab. 'ikās, as the name of a cord with which the camel is made fast by the head and forefeet, shows. With this signification the interpretation is: *et velut pedicā* (= וּבְעֶכֶם) *implicatus ad castigationem stulti*, he follows her as if (bound) with a fetter to the punishment of the fool, *i.e.* of himself (Michaelis, Fleischer, and others). Otherwise Luther, who first translated "in a fetter," but afterwards (supplying לֵּ, not לָ): "and as if to fetters, where one corrects fools." But the ellipsis is harsh, and the parallelism leads us to expect a living being in the place of עֶכֶם. Now since, according to Gesenius, עֶכֶם, fetter, can be equivalent to a fettered one neither at Isa. xvii. 5, xxi. 17, nor Prov. xxiii. 28 (according to which עֶכֶם must at least have an active personal signification), we transpose the nouns of the clause and write וּבְכֶאֱוִיל אֶל-מוֹסַר עֶכֶם, he follows her as a fool (*Psychol.* p. 292) to correction (restraint) with fetters; or if אוֹל is to be understood not so much physically as morally, and refers to self-destroying conduct (Ps. cvii. 7): as a madman, *i.e.* a criminal, to chains. The one figure denotes the fate into which he rushes, like a beast devoid of reason, as the loss of life; and the other denotes the fate to which he permits himself to be led by that woman, like a criminal by the officer, as the loss of freedom and of honour.

Ver. 23. The confusion into which the text has fallen is continued in this verse. For the figure of the deadly arrow connects itself neither with that of the ox which goes to the slaughter-house, nor with that of the madman who is put in chains: the former is not killed by being shot; and with the latter, the object is to render him harmless, not to put him to death. The LXX. therefore converts אֵיל into אֵל, a stag, and connects the shooting with an arrow with this: ἡ ὥς ἔλαφος τοξεύματι πεπληγὼς εἰς τὸ ἦπαρ. But we need no encroachment on the text itself, only a correct placing of its members. The three thoughts, ver. 23, reach a right conclusion and issue, if with מְחַיֵּה צִיּוֹר אֶל-פֶּחַ (here *Merchamahpach*) a new departure is begun with a comparison: he follows her with eager desires, like as a bird hastens to the snare (*vid.* regarding פֶּחַ, a snare, and מוֹקֵשׁ, a noose, under Isa. viii. 15). What then follows is a continuation of 22a. The subject is again the youth, whose way is compared to that of an ox going to the slaughter, of a culprit in chains, and of a fool; and he knows not (*non novit*, as iv. 19, ix. 18, and according to the sense, *non curat*, iii. 6, v. 6) that it is done at the risk of his life (בְּנַפְשׁוֹ as 1 Kings ii. 23, Num. xvii. 3), that his life is the price with which this kind of love is bought (הוּא, *neut.*, as not merely Eccles. ii. 1 and the like, but also *e.g.* Lev. x. 3, Esth. ix 1)—that does not concern him till (עַד = אֲשֶׁר עַד or כִּי עַד) the arrow breaks or pierces through (פָּלַח as Job. xvi. 13) his liver, *i.e.* till he receives the death-wound, from which, if not immediately, yet at length he certainly dies. Elsewhere the part of the body struck with a deadly wound is called the reins or loins (Job, etc.), or the gall-bladder (Job xx. 25); here the liver, which is called כִּבֶּד, Arab. *kebid*, perhaps as the organ in which sorrowful and painful affections make themselves felt (*cf.* Æschylus, *Agam.* 801: δῆγμα λύπης ἐφ' ἦπαρ προσικνεῖται), especially the latter, because the passion of sensual love, according to the idea of the ancients, reflected itself in the liver. He who is love-sick has *jecur ulcerosum* (Horace, *Od.* i. 25. 15); he is diseased in his liver (*Psychol.* p. 268). But the arrow is not here the arrow of love which makes love-sick, but the arrow of death, which slays him who is ensnared in sinful love. The befooled youth continues the disreputable relation into which he has entered till it terminates in adultery and in lingering disease upon his body, remorse in his soul, and dishonour to his name, speedily ending in inevitable ruin both spiritually and temporally.

Vers. 24, 25. With וַעֲתָהּ, as at v. 7, the author now brings his narrative to a close, adding the exhortation deduced from it:

- 24 And now, ye children, give ear unto me,  
And observe the words of my mouth!  
25 Let not thine heart incline to her ways,  
And stray not in her paths.

The verb שָׁטָה (whence *jēst*, like *jēt*, iv. 15, with long *ē* from *i*) the author uses also of departure from a wicked way (iv. 15); but here, where the portraiture of a faithless wife (a סוֹטָה) is presented, the word used in the law of jealousy, Num. v., for the trespass of an אִשָּׁה אִישׁ is specially appropriate. שָׁטָה is interchanged with תָּעָה (cf. Gen. xxi. 14): wander not on her paths, which would be the consequence of straying on them. Theodotion: καὶ μὴ πλανηθῆς ἐν ἀτραποῖς αὐτῆς, with καί, as also Syr., Targ., and Jerome. The Masora reckons this verse to the 25 which have לָא at the beginning and וְאֵל at the middle of each clause (*vid.* Baer in the *Luth. Zeitschrift*, 1865, p. 587); the text of Norzi has therefore correctly וְאֵל, which is found also in good MSS. (*e.g.* the Erfurt, 2 and 3).

Vers. 26, 27. The admonition, having its motive in that which goes before, is now founded on the emphatic *finale*:

- 26 For many are the slain whom she hath caused to fall,  
And many are her slain.  
27 A multiplicity of ways to hell is her house,  
Going down to the chambers of death.

The translation "for many slain has she laid low" (Syr., Targ., Jerome, Luther) is also syntactically possible; for רַבִּים can be placed before its substantive after the manner of the demonstratives and numerals (*e.g.* Neh. ix. 28, cf. אַחֵר, Cant. iv. 9), and the accentuation which requires two servants (the usual two *Munachs*) to the *Athnach* appears indeed thus to construe it. It is otherwise if רַבִּים here meant *magni* (thus *e.g.* Ralbag, and recently Bertheau), and not *multi*; but רַבִּים and עֲצֻמִּים stand elsewhere in connection with each other in the signification many and numerous, Ps. xxxv. 18, Joel ii. 2, Mic. iv. 3. "Her slain" are those slain by her; the part. pass. is connected with the genitive of the actor, *e.g.* ix. 18; cf. (Arab.) *katyl ālmhabbt*, of one whom love kills (Fl.). With ver. 27 cf. ii. 18, ix. 18. In 27a, בֵּיתָהּ is not equivalent to בֵּיתָהּ after viii. 2, also not elliptical and equivalent to דִּרְכֵי בֵּיתָהּ; the former is unnecessary, the latter is in no case established by Ps.

xliv. 7, Ezra x. 13, nor by Deut. viii. 15, 2 Kings xxiii. 17 (see, on the other hand, Philippi's *Status Constructus*, pp. 87-93). Rightly Hitzig has: her house forms a multiplicity of ways to hell, in so far as adultery leads by a diversity of ways to hell. Similarly the subject and the predicate vary in number, xvi. 25, Ps. cx. 3, Job xxvi. 13, Dan. ix. 23, and frequently. If one is once in her house, he may go in this or in that way, but surely his path is to destruction: it consists of many steps to hell, such as lead down (רָרַךְ, fem. Isa. xxxvii. 34, masc. Isa. xxx. 21) to the extreme depths of death (cf. Job ix. 9, "chambers of the south" = its remotest regions veiling themselves in the invisible); for חֶדֶר (Arab. *khiddr*) is the part of the tent or the house removed farthest back, and the most private (Fl.). These חֲדָרֵי-מָוֶת, cf. עֲמָקֵי שְׁאוֹל, ix. 18, approach to the conception of גֵּיהֶנֶם, which is afterwards distinguished from שְׁאוֹל.

#### FOURTEENTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE VIII.

##### A DISCOURSE OF WISDOM CONCERNING HER EXCELLENCE AND HER GIFTS.

The author has now almost exhausted the ethical material; for in this introduction to the Solomonic Book of Proverbs he works it into a memorial for youth, so that it is time to think of concluding the circle by bending back the end to the beginning. For as in the beginning, i. 20 ff., so also here in the end, he introduces Wisdom herself as speaking. There, her own testimony is delivered in contrast to the alluring voice of the deceiver; here, the daughter of Heaven in the highways inviting to come to her, is the contrast to the adulteress lurking in the streets, who is indeed not a personification, but a woman of flesh and blood, but yet at the same time as the incarnate *ἀπάτη* of worldly lust. He places opposite to her Wisdom, whose person is indeed not so sensibly perceptible, but who is nevertheless as real, coming near to men in a human way, and seeking to win them by her gifts.

- 1 Doth not Wisdom discourse,  
And Understanding cause her voice to be heard?
- 2 On the top of the high places in the way,  
In the midst of the way, she has placed herself.

3 By the side of the gates, at the exit of the city,  
At the entrance to the doors, she calleth aloud.

As הַיָּד points to that which is matter of fact, so הֵלֵא calls to a consideration of it (cf. xiv. 22); the question before the reader is doubly justified with reference to i. 20 ff. With תְּבוּנָה, חֲכָמָה is interchanged, as e.g. ii. 1-6; such names of wisdom are related to its principal name almost as אֱלֹהִים, עֲלִיָּן, and the like, to יְהוָה. In describing the scene, the author, as usual, heaps up synonyms which touch one another without coming together.

Ver. 2. By מְרִמִּים Hitzig understands the summit of a mountain, and therefore regards this verse as an interpolation; but the "high places" are to be understood of the high-lying parts of the city. There, on the way which leads up and down, she takes her stand.

עָלִי = *على*, old and poetic for עַל, signifies here "hard by, close to," properly, so that something stands forward over the edge of a thing, or, as it were, passes over its borders (Fl.). The בֵּית, Hitzig, as Bertheau, with LXX., Targ., Jerome, interpret prepositionally as a strengthening of בֵּין (in the midst); but where it once, Ezek. i. 27, occurs in this sense, it is fully written בֵּיתָּ. Here it is the *accus. loci* of the substantive; "house of the ascent" (Syr. *bêth urchotho*) is the place where several ways meet, the uniting point, as אֵם הַדֶּרֶךְ (Ezek. xxi. 26), the point of departure, exit; the former the cross-way, as the latter the separating way. Thus Immanuel: the place of the frequented streets; Meîri: the place of the ramification (more correctly, the concentration) of the ways. נִצָּבָה signifies more than קָמָה (she raises herself) and עָמְדָה (she goes thither); it means that she plants herself there.

Ver. 3. In this verse Bertheau finds, not inappropriately, the designations of place: on this side, on that side, and within the gate. לְיָד, at the hand, is equivalent to at the side, as Ps. cxl. 6. לְפִי, of the town, is the same as לְפֶתַח, ix. 14, of the house: at the mouth, i.e. at the entrance of the city, thus where they go out and in. There are several of these ways for leaving and entering a city, and on this account מְבוֹא פֶתָחִים are connected: generally where one goes out and in through one of the gates (doors). מְבוֹא, fully represented by the French *avenue*, the space or way which leads to anything (Fl.). There she raises her voice, which sounds out far and wide; *vid.* concerning הִרְנָה (*Græc. Venet.* incorrectly, after Rashi, ἀλαλάξουσιν), at i. 20.

Now begins the discourse. The exordium summons general attention to it with the emphasis of its absolute truth :

- 4 " To you, ye men, is my discourse addressed,  
And my call is to the children of men !
- 5 Apprehend, O ye simple ones, what wisdom is;  
And, ye fools, what understanding is.
- 6 Hear, for I will speak princely things,  
And the opening of my lips is upright.
- 7 For my mouth uttereth truth,  
And a wicked thing is an abomination to my lips.
- 8 The utterances of my mouth are in rectitude,  
There is nothing crooked or perverse in them.
- 9 To the men of understanding they are all to the point,  
And plain to those who have attained knowledge."

Hitzig rejects this section, 4-12, as he does several others in viii. and ix., as spurious. But if this preamble, which reminds us of Elihu, is not according to every one's taste, yet in respect of the circle of conception and thought, as well as of the varying development of certain fundamental thoughts, it is altogether after the manner of the poet. The terminology is one that is strange to us; the translation of it is therefore difficult; that which is given above strives at least not to be so bad as to bring discredit on the poet. The tautology and flatness of ver. 4 disappears when one understands אִישִׁים and בְּנֵי אָדָם like the Attic *ἄνδρες* and *ἄνθρωποι*; *vid.* under Isa. ii. 9, liii. 3 (where אִישִׁים, as here and Ps. cxli. 4, is equivalent to בְּנֵי אִישׁ, Ps. xlix. 3, iv. 3). Wisdom turns herself with her discourses to high and low, to persons of standing and to the *proletariat*. The verbal clause 4a interchanges with a noun clause 4b, as frequently a preposition with its noun (*e.g.* ver. 8a) completes the whole predicate of a semistich (Fl.).

Ver. 5. Regarding אֶרְמָה, *calliditas*, in a good sense, *vid.* at i. 4; regarding פְּתָאִים, those who are easily susceptible of good or bad, according to the influence that is brought to bear upon them, *vid.* also i. 4; and regarding בְּסִילִים, the intellectually heavy, dull persons in whom the flesh burdens the mind, *vid.* at i. 22. לֵב is parallel with עֲרֻמָּה, for the heart (according to its Semitic etymon, that which remains fast, like a kernel, the central-point) is used for the understanding of which it is the seat (*Psychol.* p. 249), or heartedness = intelligence (cf. חֶסֶד-לֵב, vi. 32 = *ἄνους* or *ἄλογος*). We take עֲרֻמָּה and לֵב as objective, as we have translated: that which is in both, and in which they consist. Thus הִבֵּן, which is a favourite word

with this author, has both times the simple transitive meaning of the gain of understanding into the nature and worth of both; and we neither need to interpret the second הָבִינִי in the double transitive meaning, "to bring to understanding," nor, with Hitzig, to change it into הָבִינִי<sup>1</sup> [direct, *i.e.* *applicate*].

Ver. 6. That to which Wisdom invites, her discourse makes practicable, for she speaks of נְגִידִים. Hitzig interprets this word by *conspicua*, manifest truths, which the *Græc. Venet.* understands to be *ἐναντία*, after Kimchi's interpretation: truths which one makes an aim and object (נָגַד) on account of their worth. Fürst, however, says that נָגַד, from נָגַד, Arab. *najad*, means to be elevated, exalted, and thereby visible (whence also הָבִינִי, to bring to light, to bring forward); and that by נְגִידִים, as the plur. of this נָגַד, is to be understood *princeps* in the sense of *principalia*, or *præstantia* (LXX. *σεμνά*; Theodot. *ἡγεμονικά*; Jerome, *de rebus magnis*) (cf. νόμος βασιλικός of the law of love, which surpasses the other laws, as kings do their subjects), which is supported by the similar expression, xxii. 20. But that we do not need to interpret נְגִידִים as *abstr.*, like מִישָׁרִים, and as the *acc. adverb.*: in noble ways, because in that case it ought to be נְגִירוֹת (Berth.), is shown by xxii. 20, and also xvi. 13; cf. on this neuter use of the masc., Ewald, § 172a. "The opening of my lips (*i.e.* this, that they open themselves, not: that which they disclose, lay open) is upright" is to be regarded as *metonymia antecedentis pro consequ.*: that which I announce is . . .; or also as a poetic attribution, which attributes to a subject that which is produced by it (cf. iii. 17b): my discourse bearing itself right, brings to light (Fl.). xxiii. 16, cf. 31, is parallel both in the words and the subject; מִישָׁרִים, that which is in accordance with fact and with rectitude, uprightness (*vid.* at i. 3), is a word common to the introduction (i.-ix.), and to the first appendix to the first series of Solomonian Proverbs (xxii. 17-xxiv. 22), with the Canticles. In Cant. v. 16 also, as here (cf. v. 3, Job vi. 30), the word palate [*Gaumen*] is used as the organ of speech.

Ver. 7. כִּי continues the reason (begun in ver. 6) for the Harken! (cf. i. 15-17, iv. 16 f.); so that this second reason is co-ordinated with the first (Fl.). Regarding אָמַת, *vid.* at iii. 3; הָנָה, here of the palate (cf. Ps. xxxvii. 30), as in xv. 28 of the heart, has not hitherto occurred. It signifies quiet inward meditation, as well as also (but only poetically) discourses going forth from

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* the *Hebr. Zeitschrift*, החלוץ, 1856, p. 112.

it (*vid.* at Ps. i. 2). The contrary of truth, *i.e.* moral truth, is רִשְׁעָה, wickedness in words and principles,—a segolate, which retains its *Segol* also in *pausa*, with the single exception of Eccles. iii. 16.

Vers. 8, 9. The בּ of בְּצִדְקָה is that of the close connection of a quality with an action or matter, which forms with a substantive *adverbia* as well as virtual *adjectiva*, as here: *cum rectitudine (conjuncta i. e. vera) sunt omnia dicta oris mei* (Fl.); it is the בּ of the distinctive attribute (Hitzig), certainly related to the בּ *essentie* (iii. 26, according to which Schultens and Bertheau explain), which is connected with the abstract conception (*e.g.* Ps. xxxiii. 4), but also admits the article designating the gender (*vid.* at Ps. xxix. 4). The opposite of צִדְקָה (here in the sense of *veracitas*, which it means in Arab.) is נִפְתָּל וְעִקְשׁ, *dolosum ac perversum*. עִקְשׁ (cf. Gesen. § 84, 9) is that which is violently bent and twisted, *i.e.* estranged from the truth, which is, so to speak, parodied or caricatured. Related to it in meaning, but proceeding from a somewhat different idea, is נִפְתָּל. פָּתַל, used primarily of threads, cords, ropes, and the like, means to twist them, to twine them over and into one another, whence פִּתְּלִי, a line or string made of several intertwisted threads (cf. فتيلة, a wick of a candle or lamp); *Niph.*, to be twisted, specifically *luctari*, of the twisting of the limbs, and figuratively to bend and twist oneself, like the crafty (*versutus*) liars and deceivers, of words and thoughts which do not directly go forth, but by the crafty twistings of truth and rectitude, *opp.* יָשָׁר, נָכוֹן (Fl.). There is nothing of deception or error in the utterances of wisdom; much rather they are all נִכְחִים, straight out from her (cf. Isa. lvii. 2), going directly out, and without circumlocution directed to the right end for the intelligent, the knowing (cf. Neh. x. 29); and יֵשְׁרִים, straight or even, giving no occasion to stumble, removing the danger of erring for those who have obtained knowledge, *i.e.* of good and evil, and thus the ability of distinguishing between them (Gesen. § 134, 1),—briefly, for those who know how to estimate them.

Her self-commendation is continued in the resumed address :

- 10 "Receive my instruction, and not silver,  
And knowledge rather than choice gold!
- 11 For wisdom is better than corals,  
And all precious jewels do not equal her.
- 12 I. Wisdom, inhabit prudence,  
And the knowledge of right counsels is attainable by me."

Instead of **וְלֹא-כֶסֶף** influenced by **קָחוּ**, is **וְאֶל-כֶּסֶף** with **תִּקְחוּ** to be supplied; besides, with most Codd. and older editions, we are to accentuate **קָחוּ מוֹסֶרִי** with the erasure of the *Makkeph*. "Such negations and prohibitions," Fleischer remarks, "are to be understood comparatively: instead of acquiring silver, rather acquire wisdom. Similar is the old Arabic **النار ولا العار**, the fire, and not

the disgrace! Also among the modern Arabic proverbs collected by Burckhardt, many have this form, *e.g.* No. 34, *alhajamat balafas wala alhajaj alanas*, Better to let oneself be cut with the axe than to beg for the favour of another" 10*b* is to be translated, with Jerome, Kimchi, and others: and knowledge is more precious than fine gold (**נִבְחָר**, neut.: *auro pretiosius*); and in view of xvi. 16, this construction appears to be intended. But Fleischer has quite correctly affirmed that this assertatory clause is unsuitably placed as a parallel clause over against the preceding imperative clause, and, what is yet more important, that then ver. 11 would repeat *idem per idem* in a tautological manner. We therefore, after the Aramaic and Greek translators, take **כֶּסֶף נִבְחָר** together here as well as at ver. 19, inasmuch as we carry forward the **קָחוּ**: *et scientiam præ auro lectissimo*, which is also according to the accentuation. Equally pregnant is the **מִן** in **מִתְחַרְצִין** of the passage iii. 14, 15, which is here varied.

Ver. 12 follows ver. 11 = iii. 15 as a justification of this estimating of wisdom above all else in worth. Regarding **אֲנִי** with *Gaja*, *vid.* the rule which the accentuation of this word in the three so-called metrical books follows in Merx' *Archiv*, 1868, p. 203 (cf. Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 40). We translate: *ego sapientia incolo sollertiam*, for the verb **נִשְׁכַּן** is construed with the accusative of the object, ii. 21, x. 30, Ps. xxxvii. 3 (cf. **נִיר**, Ps. v. 5), as well as with **ב**, Gen. xxvi. 2, Ps. lxix. 37. Wisdom inhabits prudence, has settled down, as it were, and taken up her residence in it, is at home in its whole sphere, and rules it. Bertheau not unsuitably compares *οἰκῶν* with *μόνος ἔχων*, 1 Tim. vi. 16. Regarding **מְחִמּוֹת**, *vid.* i. 4, v. 2. It denotes well-considered, carefully thought out designs, plans, conclusions, and **דַּעַת** is here the knowledge that is so potent. This intellectual power is nothing beyond wisdom, it is in her possession on every occasion; she strives after it not in vain, her knowledge is defined according to her wish. Wisdom describes herself here personally with regard to that which she bestows on men who receive her.

Far remote is the idea that 13a is dependent on אָמַץ (I acquire) (Löwenstein, Bertheau). With this verse begins a new series of thoughts raising themselves on the basis of the fundamental clause 13a. Wisdom says what she hates, and why she hates it:

13 “ The fear of Jahve is to hate evil ;  
Pride and arrogancy, and an evil way  
And a deceitful mouth, do I hate.”

If the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom (ix. 10, i. 7), then wisdom, personally considered, stands before all else that is to be said of her in a relation of homage or reverence toward God corresponding to the fear of God on the part of man; and if, as the premiss 13a shows, the fear of God has as its reverse side the hatred of evil, then there arises what Wisdom says in שָׂנְאתִי (I hate) of herself. Instead of the *n. actionis* שְׂנֵאת (hatred), formed in the same way with יָרֵאת, which, admitting the article, becomes a substantive, the author uses, in order that he might designate the predicate as such (Hitzig), rather the *n. actionis* שְׂנֵאת, which is indeed also a noun, but is not used substantively; שְׂנֵאת as מְלֵאת, Jer. xxix. 10. קָרֵאת, Judg. viii. 1, is equivalent to שְׂנֵאת like יִבֶּשֶׁת, the becoming dry, יָכֹלֶת, the being able; cf. (Arab.) *shanat*, hating, *malât*, well-being, *karât*, reading (Fl.). The evil which Wisdom hates is now particularized as, vi. 16–19, the evil which Jahve hates. The virtue of all virtues is humility; therefore Wisdom hates, above all, self-exaltation in all its forms. The *paronomasia* גָּאֹה וְגִאֹן (pride and haughtiness) expresses the idea in the whole of its contents and compass (cf. Isa. xv. 6, iii. 1, and above at i. 27). גָּאֹה (from גָּאָה, the nominal form), that which is lofty = pride, stands with גִּאֹן, as Job iv. 10, גָּבִה, that which is high = arrogance. There follows the *viam mali*, representing the sins of walk, i.e. of conduct, and *os fullax* (vid. at ii. 12), the sins of the mouth. Hitzig rightly rejects the interpunctuation רָע, and prefers רָעָ. In consequence of this *Dechî* (*Tiphcha init.*), וְיָפִי תִהְיֶהכֶת, have in Codd. and good editions the servants *Asla* and *Illuj* (vid. Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 11); Aben-Ezra and Moses Kimchi consider the *Asla* erroneously as disjunctive, and explain וְיָפִי by *et os = axioma meum*, but *Asla* is conjunctive, and has after it the *raphatum*.

After Wisdom has said what she hates, and thus what she is not, she now says what she is, has, and promises:

- 14 " Mine is counsel and promotion ;  
 I am understanding, mine is strength.  
 15 By me kings reign,  
 And rulers govern justly.  
 16 By me princes rule, and nobles—  
 All judges of the earth."

Whoever gives anything must himself possess it ; in this sense Wisdom claims for herself counsel, promotion (in the sense of offering and containing that which is essentially and truly good ; *vid.* concerning תְּחִינָה, ii. 7), and energy (*vid.* Eccles. vii. 19). But she does not merely possess בִּינָה ; this is much rather her peculiar nature, and is one with her. That ver. 14 is formed after Job xii. 13, 16 (Hitzig) is possible, without there following thence any argument against its genuineness. And if ver. 15 f., and Isa. xxxii. 1, x. 1, stand in intentional reciprocal relation, then the priority is on the side of the author of the Proverbs. The connection gives to the laconic expression its intended comprehensiveness. It is not meant that Wisdom has the highest places in the state to give, but that she makes men capable of holding and discharging the duties of these.

Ver. 15*b*. Here we are led to think of legislation, but the usage of the language determines for the *Po.* חָקַק only the significations of commanding, decreeing, or judging ; צֶדֶק is the object. accus., the opposite of חֲקִיעֵי-אֵין (decrees of unrighteousness), Isa. x. 1. רָזָן is a poetic word, from רָזָן = Arab. *razuna*, to be heavy, weighty, then to be firm, incapable of being shaken, figuratively of majestic repose, dignity (cf. قَار and فَبُور) in the whole external *habitus*, in speech and action such as befits one invested with power (Fl.).

Ver. 16*a*. We may not explain the second clause of this verse : *et ad ingenua impelluntur quicunque terræ imperant*, for נָרִיב is adj. without such a verbal sense. But besides, נָרִיבִים is not pred., for which it is not adapted, because, with the obscuring of its ethical signification (from נָרִב, to impel inwardly, viz. to noble conduct, particularly to liberality), it also denotes those who are noble only with reference to birth, and not to disposition (Isa. xxxii. 8). Thus נָרִיבִים is a fourth synonym for the highly exalted, and כָּל-יִשְׁעֵי אֶרֶץ is the summary placing together of all kinds of dignity ; for יִשְׁעֵי unites in itself references to government, administration of justice, and rule. כָּל is used, and not וְכָל—a so-called *asyndeton summaticum*.

Instead of אָרֶץ (LXX.) there is found also the word צֶדֶק (Syr., Targ., Jerome, *Græc. Venet.*, adopted by Norzi after Codd. and Neapol. 1487). But this word, if not derived from the conclusion of the preceding verse, is not needed by the text, and gives a summary which does not accord with that which is summed up (נְדִיבִים, שְׂרִים, רוֹנִים, מְלָכִים); besides, the Scripture elsewhere calls God Himself שׁוֹפֵט צֶדֶק (Ps. ix. 5; Jer. xi. 20). The Masoretic reading<sup>1</sup> of most of the editions, which is also found in the Cod. Hillel (סֵפֶר הַלֵּל<sup>2</sup>), merits the preference.

The discourse of Wisdom makes a fresh departure, as at ver. 13: she tells how, to those who love her, she repays this love:

- 17 "I love them that love me,  
And they that seek me early find me.  
18 Riches and honour are with me,  
Durable riches and righteousness.  
19 Better is my fruit than pure and fine gold,  
And my revenue (better) than choice silver.  
20 In the way of righteousness do I walk,  
In the midst of the paths of justice.  
21 To give an inheritance to them that love me  
And I fill their treasures."

The Chethîb אֶהְבֵּיהָ (*ego hos qui eam amant redamo*), Gesenius, *Lehrgeb.* § 196, 5, regards as a possible synallage (*eam* = *me*), but one would rather think that it ought to be read (יהוה =) 'אֶהְבֵּיהָ. The ancients all have the reading אֶהְבֵּיהָ. אֶהְבֵּיהָ (= אֶהְבֵּיהָ, with the change of the *é* into *ê*, and the compression of the radical א; cf. אֶמֶר, חֶבֶא, i. 10) is the form of the *fut. Kal*, which is inflected תִּהְבֵּיהָ, i. 22. Regarding שִׁחַר (the *Græc. Venet.* well: οἱ ὀρθρίζοντές μοι), *vid.* i. 28, where the same *epenth. fut.* form is found.

Ver. 18. In this verse part of iii. 16 is repeated, after which אִתִּי is meant of possession (*mecum* and *penes me*). Regarding הֵן, *vid.* i. 13; instead of the adjective יָקָר there, we have here עָתָק. The verb עָתָק signifies *promoveri*, to move forwards, whence are derived the meanings old (cf. *ætās prorecta*, advanced age), venerable for age, and noble, free (cf. עָתִיק, Isa. xxviii. 9, and Arab. 'atyk, manu-

<sup>1</sup> If the Masoretes had read שִׁפְטִי צֶדֶק, then would they have added the remark לֹא יִשְׁפָּט (‘‘it does not further occur’’), and inserted the expression in their Register of Expressions, which occurs but once, *Masora finalis*, p. 62.

<sup>2</sup> [One of the most ancient and celebrated Codd. of the Heb. Scriptures, called Hillel from the name of the man who wrote it. *Vid.* Strack's *Prolegomena*, p. 112 It was written about A.D. 600.]

*missus*), unbound, the bold. Used of clothing, עָרֵץ (Isa. xxiii. 18) expresses the idea of venerable for age. עָתָק used of possessions and goods, like the Arab. *'âtak*, denotes such goods as increase during long possession as an inheritance from father to son, and remain firm, and are not for the first time gained, but only need to be inherited, *opes perennes et firmæ* (Schultens, Gesenius' *Thesaur.*, Fleischer), although it may be also explained (which is, however, less probable with the form עָתָק) of the idea of the venerable from *opes superbæ* (Jerome), splendid opulence. צִדְקָה is here also a good which is distributed, but properly the distributing goodness itself, as the Arab. *sadakat*, influenced by the later use of the Hebrew צִדְקָה (*δικαιοσύνη* = *ἐλεημοσύνη*), denotes all that which God of His goodness causes to flow to men, or which men bestow upon men (Fl.). Righteousness is partly a recompensative goodness, which rewards, according to the law of requital, like with like; partly communicative, which, according to the law of love without merit, and even in opposition to it, bestows all that is good, and above all, itself; but giving itself to man, it assimilates him to itself (*vid.* Ps. xxiv. 7), so that he becomes צִדִּיק, and is regarded as such before God and men, ver. 19.

The fruit and product of wisdom (the former a figure taken from the trees, iii. 18; the latter from the sowing of seed, iii. 9) is the gain and profit which it yields. With חֲרִיץ, viii. 10, iii. 14, פֶּזֶז is here named as the place of fine gold, briefly for מִפְּזֵז, solid gold, gold separated from the place of ore which contains it, or generally separated gold, from פָּזַז, violently to separate metals from base mixtures; Targ. דִּבְבָּא אֹבְרִיזִין, gold which has stood the fire-test, *obrussa*, of the crucible, Greek *ὄβρυζον*, Pers. *ebrîz*, Arab. *ibrîz*. In the last clause of this verse, as also in 10*b*, נִבְחָר is to be interpreted as pred. to תְּבוֹאָתִי, but the balance of the meaning demands as a side-piece to the מַחְרִיץ וּמִפּוֹ (19*a*) something more than the mere כֶּסֶף. In 20*f*. the reciprocal love is placed as the answer of love under the point of view of the requiting righteousness. But recompensative and communicative righteousness are here combined, where therefore the subject is the requital of worthy pure love and loving conduct, like with like. Such love requires reciprocal love, not merely cordial love, but that which expresses itself outwardly.

Vers. 20, 21. In this sense, Wisdom says that she acts strictly according to justice and rectitude, and adds (21) wherein this her

conduct manifests itself. The *Piel* הִקִּי expresses firm, constant action; and בָּתוֹךְ means that she turns from this line of conduct on no side. לְהִנְחִיל is distinguished from בְּהִנְחִיל, as *ut possidendam tribuam* from *possidendam tribuendo*; the former denotes the direction of the activity, the latter its nature and manner; both combine if we translate *ita ut* . . .<sup>1</sup> Regarding the origin of שֵׁי, *vid.* at ii. 7; it denotes the being founded, thus *substantia*, and appears here, like the word in mediæval Latin and Romanic (Ital. *sustanza*, Span. *substancia*), and like οὐσία and ὑπαρξίς (τὰ ὑπάρχοντα) in classic Greek, to denote possessions and goods. But since this use of the word does not elsewhere occur (therefore Hitzig explains שֵׁי = לִי, I have it [= *presto est*]), and here, where Wisdom speaks, שֵׁי connects itself in thought with הוֹשִׁיעָה, it will at least denote real possession (as we also are wont to call not every kind of property, but only landed property, *real* possession), such possession as has real worth, and that not according to commercial exchange and price, but according to sound judgment, which applies a higher than the common worldly standard of worth. The *Pasek* between אֱהָבִי and שֵׁי is designed to separate the two *Jods* from each other, and has, as a consequence, for לְהִנְחִיל אֱהָבִי the accentuation with *Tarcha* and *Mercha* (*vid.* *Accentssystem*, vi. § 4; cf. *Torath Emeth*, p. 17, § 3). The carrying forward of the inf. with the finite, 21b, is as i. 27, ii. 2, and quite usual.

Ver. 22. Wisdom takes now a new departure, in establishing her right to be heard, and to be obeyed and loved by men. As the Divine King in Ps. ii. opposes to His adversaries the self-testimony: "I will speak concerning a decree! Jahve said unto me: Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten Thee;" so Wisdom here unfolds her divine patent of nobility: she originates with God before all creatures, and is the object of God's love and joy, as she also has the object of her love and joy on God's earth, and especially among the sons of men:

"Jahve brought me forth as the beginning of His way,  
As the foremost of His works from of old."

The old translators render קִנְיִי (with *Kametz* by *Dechî*; *vid.* under Ps. cxviii. 5) partly by verbs of creating (LXX. ἐκτίσσει, Syr.

<sup>1</sup> Biesenthal combines the etymologically obscure הִנְחִיל with נָחַל: to make to flow into, so that נָחַל denotes inheritance in contradistinction to acquisition; while נִחְלָה, in contradistinction to יִרְשָׁה, denotes the inheritance rather of many than of the individual.

Targ. חֵכְמָה), partly by verbs of acquiring (Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, Venet. ἐκτήσατο; Jerome, *possedit*); Wisdom appears also as created, certainly not without reference to this passage, Sir. i. 4, προτέρα πάντων ἔκτισται σοφία; i. 9, αὐτὸς ἔκτισεν αὐτήν; xxiv. 8, ὁ κτίσας με. In the christological controversy this word gained a dogmatic signification, for they proceeded generally on the identity of σοφία ὑποστατική (*sapientia substantialis*) with the *hypostasis* of the Son of God. The Arians used the ἔκτισέ με as a proof of their doctrine of the *filius non genitus, sed factus*, i.e. of His existence before the world began indeed, but yet not from eternity, but originating in time; while, on the contrary, the orthodox preferred the translation ἐκτήσατο, and understood it of the co-eternal existence of the Son with the Father, and agreed with the ἔκτισε of the LXX. by referring it not to the actual existence, but to the position, place of the Son (Athanasius: *Deus me creavit regem* or *caput operum suorum*; Cyrill.: *non condidit secundum substantiam, sed constituit me totius universi principium et fundamentum*). But (1) Wisdom is not God, but is God's; she has personal existence in the Logos of the N. T., but is not herself the Logos; she is the world-idea, which, once projected, is objective to God, not as a dead form, but as a living spiritual image; she is the archetype of the world, which, originating from God, stands before God, the world of the idea which forms the medium between the Godhead and the world of actual existence, the communicated spiritual power in the origination and the completion of the world as God designed it to be. This wisdom the poet here personifies; he does not speak of the personal Logos, but the further progress of the revelation points to her actual personification in the Logos. And (2) since to her the poet attributes an existence preceding the creation of the world, he thereby declares her to be eternal, for to be before the world is to be before time. For if he places her at the head of the creatures, as the first of them, so therewith he does not seek to make her a creature of this world having its commencement in time; he connects her origination with the origination of the creature only on this account, because that *à priori* refers and tends to the latter; the power which was before heaven and earth were, and which operated at the creation of the earth and of the heavens, cannot certainly fall under the category of the creatures around and above us. Therefore (3) the translation with ἔκτισεν has nothing against it, but it is different from the κτίσις of the

heavens and the earth, and the poet has intentionally written not בְּרָאֲנִי, but קָנִי. Certainly קָנָה, Arab. *knā*, like all the words used of creating, refers to one root-idea: that of forging (*vid.* under Gen. iv. 22), as בָּרָא does to that of cutting (*vid.* under Gen. i. 1); but the mark of a commencement in time does not affix itself to קָנָה in the same way as it does to בָּרָא, which always expresses the divine production of that which has not hitherto existed. קָנָה comprehends in it the meanings to create, and to create something for oneself, to prepare, *parare* (*e.g.* Ps. cxxxix. 13), and to prepare something for oneself, *comparare*, as *κτίζειν* and *κτᾶσθαι*, both from *kshi*, to build, the former expressed by *struere*, and the latter by *sibi struere*. In the קָנִי, then, there are the ideas, both that God produced wisdom, and that He made Himself to possess it; not certainly, however, as a man makes himself to possess wisdom from without, iv. 7. But the idea of the bringing forth is here the nearest demanded by the connection. For יְרָאִשִׁית יִרְבּוֹ is not equivalent to בְּרָאִשִׁית יִרְבּוֹ (Syr., Targ., Luther), as Jerome also reads: *Ita enim scriptum est: ADONAI CANANI BRESITH DERCHO* (*Ep. cxi. ad Cyprian.*); but it is, as Job xl. 19 shows, the second accusative of the object (LXX., Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion). But if God made wisdom as the beginning of His way, *i.e.* of His creative efficiency (*cf.* Rev. iii. 14 and Col. i. 15), the making is not to be thought of as acquiring, but as a bringing forth, revealing this creative efficiency of God, having it in view; and this is also confirmed by the חוֹלֵלְתִי (*genita sum*; *cf.* Gen. iv. 1, קִנִּיתִי, *genui*) following. Accordingly, קֶדֶם מִפְעֻלָּיו (foremost of His works) has to be regarded as a parallel second object. accusative. All the old translators interpret קֶדֶם as a preposition [before], but the usage of the language before us does not recognise it as such; this would be an Aramaism, for קֶדֶם, Dan. vii. 7, frequently מִן־קֶדֶם (Syr., Targ.), is so used. But as קֶדֶם signifies previous existence in space, and then in time (*vid.* Orelli, *Zeit und Ewigkeit*, p. 76), so it may be used of the object in which the previous existence appears, thus (after Sir. i. 4): *προτέραν τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ* (Hitzig).

Ver. 23. A designation of the When? expressed first by מִמֶּנּוּ (Isa. xlviii. 8, *cf.* xl. 21), is further unfolded:

“ From everlasting was I set up,

From the beginning, from the foundations of the earth.”

That מְסֻכָּתִי cannot be translated: I was anointed = consecrated, *vid.* at Ps. ii. 6. But the translation also: I was woven = wrought

(Hitzig, Ewald, and previously one of the Greeks, ἐδιάσθην), does not commend itself, for נָסַךְ (Ps. cxxxix. 15), used of the embryo, lies far from the metaphorical sense in which נָסַךְ = Arab. *nasaj*, *texere*, would here be translated of the origin of a person, and even of such a spiritual being as Wisdom; נִסְכָּהּ, as the LXX. reads (ἐθεμελιώσε με), is not once used of such. Rightly Aquila, κατεστάθην; Symmachus, προκείρισμαι; Jerome, *ordinata sum*. Literally, but unintelligibly, the Gr. Venet. κέχυμαι, according to which (cf. Sir. i. 10) Böttcher: I was poured forth = formed, but himself acknowledging that this figure is not suitable to personification; nor is it at all likely that the author applied the word, used in this sense of idols, to the origin of Wisdom. The fact is, that נָסַךְ, used as seldom of the anointing or consecration of kings as סָךְ, passes over, like יָצַק (הִצִּיק), צִוּק (מְצִוּק, a pillar), and יָצַג (הִצִּיג), from the meaning of pouring out to that of placing and appointing; the mediating idea appears to be that of the pouring forth of the metal, since נָסַךְ, Dan. xi. 8, like נָסַךְ, signifies a molten image. The Jewish interpreters quite correctly remark, in comparing it with the princely name נָסִיךְ [cf. Ps. lxxxiii. 12] (although without etymological insight), that a placing in princely dignity is meant. Of the three synonyms of *æternitas a parte ante*, מְעוֹלָם points backwards into the infinite distance, מֵרֵאשִׁית into the beginning of the world, מִקְדָּמִי-אָרֶץ not into the times which precede the origin of the earth, but into the oldest times of its gradual arising; this קִדְמִי it is impossible to render, in conformity with the Hebr. use of language: it is an extensive plur. of time, Böttcher, § 697. The מֶן repeated does not mean that the origin and greatness of Wisdom are contemporaneous with the foundation of the world; but that when the world was founded, she was already an actual existence.

This her existence before the world began is now set forth in yet more explicit statements:

- 24 " When there were as yet no floods was I brought forth,  
When as yet there were no fountains which abounded with water;  
25 For before the mountains were settled,  
Before the hills was I brought forth,  
26 While as yet He had not made land and plains,  
And the sum of the dust of the earth."

The description is poetical, and affords some room for imagination. By תְּהוֹמוֹת are not intended the unrestrained primeval waters, but, as also iii. 20, the inner waters, treasures of the earth; and conse-

quently by מַעֲיִנוֹת, not the fountains of the sea on this earth (Ewald, after Job xxxviii. 16), but the springs or places of springs (for מַעֲיִן is *n. loci* to עֵין, a well as an eye of the earth; *vid.* Gen. xvi. 7), by means of which the internal waters of the earth communicate themselves to the earth above (cf. Gen. vii. 11 with xlix. 25). נִכְבְּדֵי-מִים (abounding with water) is a descriptive *epitheton* to מַעֲיִנוֹת, which, notwithstanding its fem. plur., is construed as masc. (cf. v. 16). The Masora does not distinguish the thrice-occurring נִכְבְּדֵי according to its form as written (Isa. xxiii. 8, 9). The form נִכְבְּדֵי (which, like בְּתִים, would demand *Metheg*) is to be rejected; it is everywhere to be written נִכְבְּדֵי (Ewald, § 214b) with *Pathach*, with *Dagesh* following; *vid.* Kimchi, *Michlol* 61b. Kimchi adds the gloss מַעֲיִנֵי מִים רַבִּים, which the *Gr. Venet.*, in accordance with the meaning of נִכְבְּדֵי elsewhere, renders by *πηγαῖς δεδοξασμένων ὑδάτων* (as also Böttcher: the most honoured = the most lordly); but Meîri, Immanuel, and others rightly judge that the adjective is here to be understood after Gen. xiii. 2, Job xiv. 21 (but in this latter passage כִּבְדֵּי does not mean “to be numerous”): loaded = endowed in rich measure.

Ver. 25. Instead of בְּאֵין, in (yet) non-existence (24), we have here טָרַם, a subst. which signifies cutting off from that which already exists (*vid.* at Gen. ii. 5), and then as a particle *nondum* or *antequam*, with בְּ always *antequam*, and in ver. 26 עַד-לֹא, so long not yet (this also originally a substantive from עָרָה, in the sense of progress). With הִתְבַּעְעוּ (were settled) (as Job xxxviii. 6, from טָבַע, to impress into or upon anything, *imprimere, infigere*) the question is asked: wherein? Not indeed: in the depths of the earth, but as the Caraites Ahron b. Joseph answers, אֵל קֶרֶקַע הַיָּם, in the bottom of the sea; for out of the waters they rise up, Ps. civ. 8 (cf. at Gen. i. 9).

Ver. 26. אֶרֶץ וְחוּצוֹת is either, connecting the whole with its part: *terra cum campis*, or אֶרֶץ gains by this connection the meaning of land covered with buildings, while חוּצוֹת the expanse of unoccupied land, or the free field outside the towns and villages (cf. בָּר, Arab. *barrytt*) (Fl.), *vid.* Job v. 10, xviii. 17 (where we have translated “in the steppe far and wide”); and regarding the fundamental idea, *vid.* above at v. 16. Synonymous with אֶרֶץ, as contrast to חוּצוֹת, is תְּבֵל, which like יָבֹל (produce, wealth) comes from יָבַל, and thus denotes the earth as fruit-bearing (as אֶדְמָה properly denotes the *humus* as the covering of earth). Accordingly,

with Ewald, we may understand by ראש עפרות, "the heaps of the many clods of the fertile arable land lying as if scattered on the plains." Hitzig also translates: "the first clods of the earth." We do not deny that עפרות may mean clods of earth, *i.e.* pieces of earth gathered together, as Job xxviii. 6, עפרות זהב, gold ore, *i.e.* pieces of earth or ore containing gold. But for clods of earth the Heb. language has the nouns רֶגֶב and מְנוּרָפָה; and if we read together עפרות, plur. of the collective עפר (dust as a mass), which comes as from a *n. unitatis* עֶפְרָה, and ראש, which, among its meanings in poetry as well as in prose, has also that of the sum, *i.e.* the chief amount or the total amount (cf. the Arab. *rās ālmāl*, the capital, τὸ κεφάλαιον), then the two words in their mutual relation yield the sense of the sum of the several parts of the dust, as of the atoms of dust (Cocceius; Schultens, *summam pulverum orbis habitabilis*); and Fleischer rightly remarks that other interpretations, as *ab initio pulveris orbis, præcipua quæque orbis terrarum, caput orbis terrarum* (*i.e.* according to Rashi, the first man; according to Umbreit, man generally), leave the choice of the plur. עפרות unintelligible. Before these creatures originated, Wisdom was, as she herself says, and emphatically repeats, already born; חוללת is the passive of the *Pilel* חולל, which means to whirl, to twist oneself, to bring forth with sorrow (Aquila, Theodotion, ὠδυνήθην; Græc. Venet. 24a, πέπλασμαι, 25b, ὠδίνημαι), then but poet. generally to beget, to bring forth (xxv. 23, xxvi. 10).

Ver. 27. But not only did her existence precede the laying of the foundation of the world; she was also actively taking part in the creative work:

"When He prepared the heavens, I was there,

When He measured out a circle for the mirror of the multitude of waters."

Again a sentence clothed with two designations of time. The adv. of place שם is used, chiefly poetically, for אז, *eo tempore* (Arab. *thumm*, in contradistinction to *thamm*, *eo loco*); but here it has the signification of place, which includes that of time: Wisdom was there when God created the world, and had then already long before that come into existence, like as the servant of Jahve, Isa. xlvi. 16, with just such a שם אז, says that He is there from the time that the history of nations received a new direction, beginning with Cyrus. קִבֵּץ signifies to give a firm position or a definite direction. Thus Job xxviii. 27 of Wisdom, whom the Creator places before Himself as a pattern (ideal); here, as Jer. x. 12, Ps.

lxv. 7, of the setting up, restoring throughout the whole world. In the parallel member, חוג, corresponding to שָׁמַיִם, appears necessarily to designate the circle or the vault of the heavens (Job xxii. 14), which, according to the idea of the Hebrews, as in Homer, rests as a half-globe on the outermost ends of the disc of the earth surrounded with water, and thus lies on the waters. *Vid.* Hupfeld under Ps. xxiv. 2. This idea of the ocean girdling the earth is introduced into the O. T. without its being sanctioned by it. The LXX. (καὶ ὅτε ἀφώριξε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ θρόνον ἐπ' ἀνέμων) appears to understand תהום of the waters above; but תהום never has this meaning, יָם (Job ix. 8, xxxvi. 30) might rather be interpreted of the ocean of the heavens. The passage in accordance with which this before us is to be expounded is Job xxvi. 10: He has set a limit for the surface of the waters, *i.e.* describing over them a circle setting bounds to their region. So here, with the exchange of the functions of the two words: when He marked out a circle over the surface of the multitude of waters, *viz.* to appoint a fixed region (מִקְוֵה, Gen. i. 10) for them, *i.e.* the seas, fountains, rivers, in which the waters under the heavens spread over the earth. קָנָה signifies *incidere, figere*, to prescribe, to measure off, to consign, and directly to mark out, which is done by means of firm impressions of the graver's tools. But here this verb is without the *Dagesh*, to distinguish between the infinitive and the substantive קָנָה (his statute or limit); for correct texts have בְּקָנָה (*Michlol* 147a); and although a monosyllable follows, yet there is no throwing back of the tone, after the rule that words terminating in *o* in this case maintain their ultima accentuation (*e.g.* מִשְׁמֹי אֵל, Num. xxiv. 23). Fleischer also finally decides for the explanation: *quum delinearet circulum super abyssu*, when He marked out the region of the sea as with the circle.

In 28, 29, these two features of the figure of the creation of the world return (the beginning of the firmament, and the embankment of the under waters); hence we see that the discourse here makes a fresh start with a new theme:

- 28 " When He made firm the ether above,  
When He restrained the fountains of the waters;
- 29 When He set to the sea its bounds,  
That the waters should not pass their limits;  
When He settled the pillars of the earth;
- 30 Then was I with Him as director of the work,  
And was delighted day by day,  
Rejoicing always before Him,

## 31 Rejoicing in His earth,

And having my delight in the children of men."

We have, with Symmachus, translated שִׁחֲקִים (from שִׁחַק, Arab. *shak*, to grind, to make thin) by αἰθέρα, for so the fine transparent strata of air above the hanging clouds are called—a poetic name of the firmament רָקִיעַ. The making firm אָמַן is not to be understood locally, but internally of the spreading out of the firmament over the earth settled for continuance (an expression such as Ps. lxxviii. 23). In 28*b* the Masora notices the plur. עִינֹת instead of עִינֹת with לִית as *unicum* (cf. *Michlol* 191*a*); the transition of the sound is as in נָלִית from *galajta*. The inf. עָוֹן appears on the first look to require a transitive signification, as the LXX. and the Targ., the *Græc. Venet.* and Luther (*da er festiget die Brünnen der tieffen* = when He makes firm the fountains of the deep) have rendered it. Elster accordingly believes that this signification must be maintained, because פָּ here introduces creative activity, and in itself is probably the transitive use of עָוֹן, as the Arab. 'azz shows: when He set His עֵן against the מַיִם עֵינִים (Isa. xliii. 16). But the absence of the subject is in favour of the opinion that here, as everywhere else, it is intransitive; only we may not, with Hitzig, translate: when the fountains of the flood raged wildly; but, since 28*b*, if not a creative efficiency, must yet express a creative work, either as Ewald, with reference to מַעֲזָה, fortress: when they became firm, or better as Fleischer, with reference to מַיִם עֵינִים: when they broke forth with power, with strong fulness. Whether the suff. of חָקוּ, 29*a*, refers back to the sea or to Jahve, is decided after the parallel פִּי. If this word is equivalent to its coast (cf. Ps. civ. 9), then both suffixes refer to the sea; but the coast of the sea, or of a river, is called שֹׁפָה, not פֶּה, which only means *ostium* (mouth), not *ora*. Also Isa. xix. 7 will require to be translated: by the mouth of the Nile; and that פִּי, Ps. cxxxiii. 2, may denote the under edge, arises from this, that a coat has a mouth above as well as below, *i.e.* is open. Thus both suff. are to be referred to God, and פִּי is to be determined after Job xxiii. 12. The clause beginning with וּמַיִם corresponds in periodizing discourse to a clause with *ut*, Ewald, § 338. בְּחָקוּ is the same form, only written *plene*, as ver. 27, בְּחָקוּ = בְּחָקוּ = בְּחָקוּ.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> One might regard it as modified from בְּחָקוּ; but that שָׁרִי, Ps. xcii. 12, is modified from שָׁרִי, or הוֹרִי, Gen. xlix. 26, from הָרִי, is by no means certain.

Ver. 30. In this sentence, subordinating to itself these designations of time, the principal question is as to the meaning of חֲסִיד. Hofmann's interpretation (*Schriftbew.* i. 97) "continually" (*inf. absol.* in an adverbial sense) is a judicious idea, and חֲסִיד, to endure, remains indeed in חֲסִיד (stability); but in this sense, which חֲסִיד represents, it is not otherwise used. Also מְהִימְנָתָא (believing, trusting) of the Targ. (*Græc. Venet.* πίστις, as if the word used were חֲסִיד) is linguistically inadmissible; the Hebr. חֲסִיד corresponds to the Aram. *haimēn*. One of these two only is possible: חֲסִיד means either *opifex* or *alumnus*. The meaning *alumnus* (Aquila, *τιθηνομένη*; Meiri and Malbim, חֲסִיד בְּחִיק הָאֵל, ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ) would derive the word from חֲסִיד, to support, make firm, take care of; the form ought to have a passive sense (Symm. Theod. ἐστηρικμένη), as נִדָּב, twined, pressed, strong, great, and be pointed נִדָּב (with a moveable *ā*, different from the form בְּנִדָּב, Isa. i. 17); and חֲסִיד, in the meaning nursling, foster-child, favourite (Schultens, Euchel, Elster, and others, also Rashi and Kimchi, who all find in חֲסִיד the meaning of education, נִדָּב), would place itself with חֲסִיד, fostered, Lam. iv. 5, חֲסִיד, fosterer, חֲסִידָה, foster-mother. This is the meaning of the word according to the connection, for Wisdom appears further on as the child of God; as such she had her joy before Him; and particularly God's earth, where she rejoiced with the sons of men, was the scene of her mirth. But on this very account, because this is further said, we also lose nothing if חֲסִיד should be interpreted otherwise. And it is otherwise to be interpreted, for Wisdom is, in consequence of קָנִי (viii. 22), and הוֹלֵלְתִי, which is twice used (viii. 24, 25), God's own child; but the designation חֲסִיד would make Him to be the חֲסִיד of Wisdom; and the child which an חֲסִיד bears, Num. xi. 12, and fosters, Esth. ii. 7, is not his own. Hence it follows that חֲסִיד in this signification would be an ἀπαξ λεγόμενον; on the other hand, it really occurs elsewhere, Jer. lii. 15 (*vid.* Hitzig *l.c.*), in the sense of *opifex*. This sense, which recommends itself to Ewald, Hitzig, Bertheau, and Zöckler, lies also at the foundation of the ἀρμόζουσα of the LXX., מְחַנֵּא of the Syr., the *cuncta componens* of Jerome, and the designation of Wisdom as ἡ τῶν πάντων τεχνῆτις of the Book of Wisdom vii. 21. The workmaster is called חֲסִיד, for which, Cant. vii. 2, חֲסִיד, or rather חֲסִיד (*ommān*), Aram. and Mishn. חֲסִיד; not, perhaps, as he whom one entrusts with something in whom one confides or may confide in a work (*vid.* Fleischer, *loc.*), but from חֲסִיד, to be firm, as

one who is strong in his art, as perhaps also the right hand, which has the name מִן, as being the *artifex* among the members. The word occurs also as an adjective in the sense of "experienced, skilful," and does not form a fem. according to the use of the word in this case before us, only because handicraft (אֲמָנוּת) belongs to men, and not to women; also in the Greek, *δημιουργός*, in the sense of τὰ δημόσια (εἰς τὸ δημόσιον) ἐργαζόμενος, has no fem.; and in Lat., *artifex* is used as a substantive (e.g. in Pliny: *artifex omnium natura*), like an adj. of double gender. It is thus altogether according to rule that we read אֲמָנוֹן and not אֲמָנָה (after the form בְּנוֹרָה); also we would make a mistake if we translated the word by the German "*Werkmeisterin*" [work-mistress, directress] (Hitzig), for it is intended to be said that she took up the place of a workmaster with Him, whereby chiefly the artistic performances of a חָרָשׁ [artificer] are thought of. This self-designation of Wisdom is here very suitable; for after she has said that she was brought forth by God before the world was, and that she was present when it was created, this אֲמָנוֹ now answers the question as to what God had in view when He gave to Wisdom her separate existence, and in what capacity she assisted in the creation of the world: it was she who transferred the creative thoughts originally existing in the creative will of God, and set in motion by His creative order, from their ideal into their real effectiveness, and, as it were, artistically carried out the delineations of the several creatures; she was the mediating cause, the demiurgic power which the divine creative activity made use of, as is said, iii. 19, "Jahve has by Wisdom founded the earth," and as the Jerusalem Targ. Gen. i. 1, in connection with Prov. viii. 22, translates: בְּחֻכְמָא בְּרָא יְיָ יֵת שְׂמִיָּא וְיֵת אֶרְעָא.

But—this is now the question—does the further unfolding of the thoughts here agree with this interpretation of אֲמָנוֹ? That we may not misunderstand what follows, we must first of all represent to ourselves, that if אֲמָנוֹ meant the foster-child, Wisdom could not yet, in what follows, be thought of as a little child (Num. xi. 12), for that would be an idea without any meaning; to rejoice [*spielen* = play] is certainly quite in accordance with youth, as 2 Sam. ii. 14 shows (where שָׁחַק לִפְנֵי is said of the sportive combat of youthful warriors before the captain), not exclusively little children. So, then, we must guard against interpreting שְׂעִשְׂעוּתִים, with the LXX. and Syr., in the sense of שְׂעִשְׂעוּתֵי,—an interpretation which the

Targ., Jerome, the *Græc. Venet.*, and Luther have happily avoided; for mention is not made here of what Wisdom is for Jahve, but of what she is in herself. The expression is to be judged after Ps. cix. 4 (cf. Gen. xii. 2), where Hitzig rightly translates, "I am wholly prayer;" but Böttcher, in a way characteristic of his mode of interpretation, prefers, "I am ointment" (*vid. Neue Aehrenlese*, No. 1222). The delight is meant which this mediating participation in God's creating work imparted to her—joy in the work in which she was engaged. The plural *עַמְּוֹנָהּ* is to be understood here, not after Jer. xxxi. 20, but after Isa. xi. 8, Ps. cxix. 70, where its root-word, the *Pilpel* *עַמְּוֹנָהּ* (proceeding from the primary meaning of caressing, *demulcere*), signifies intransitively: to have his delight somewhere or in anything, to delight oneself,—a synonym to the idea of play (cf. Aram. *עָפַף*, *Ethpe.* to play, *Ethpa.* to chatter); for play is in contrast to work, an occupation which has enjoyment in view. But the work, *i.e.* the occupation, which aims to do something useful, can also become a play if it costs no strenuous effort, or if the effort which it costs passes wholly into the background in presence of the pleasure which it yields. Thus Wisdom daily, *i.e.* during the whole course of creation, went forth in pure delight; and the activity with which she translated into fact the creative thoughts was a joyful noise in the sight of God, whose commands she obeyed with childlike devotion; cf. 2 Sam. vi. 21, where David calls his dancing and leaping before the ark of the covenant a *שִׁחָק לִפְנֵי ה'*. But by preference, her delight was in the world, which is illustrated from the Persian *Minokhired*, which personifies Wisdom, and, among other things, says of her: "The creation of the earth, and its mingling with water, the springing up and the growth of the trees, all the different colours, the odour, the taste, and that which is pleasing in everything—all that is chiefly the endowment and the performance of Wisdom."<sup>1</sup> She also there says that she was before all celestial and earthly beings, the first with Ormuzd, and that all that is celestial and earthly arose and also remains in existence by her. But the earth was the dearest object of her delight in the whole world; to help in establishing it (iii. 19) was her joyful occupation; to fashion it, and to provide it with the multiplicity of existences designed for it, was the most pleasant part of her creative activity. For the earth is the abode of man, and the heart-pleasure of Wisdom was with (*עִמָּהּ*, prep.)

<sup>1</sup> *Vid. Spiegel's Grammatik der Pârsisprache*, p. 162, cf. 182.

the children of men; with them she found her high enjoyment, these were her peculiar and dearest sphere of activity.

Ver. 31. Since the statements of Wisdom, as to her participation in the creation of the world, are at this point brought to a close, in this verse there is set forth the intimate relation into which she thus entered to the earth and to mankind, and which she has continued to sustain to the present day. She turned her love to the earth for the sake of man, and to man not merely as a corporeal, but especially as a spiritual being, to whom she can disclose her heart, and whom, if he receives her, she can bring back to God (Book of Wisdom vii. 27). There are not here express references to Gen. i. or ii. In יום יום (day for day, as Gen. xxxix. 10, cf. Esth. ii. 4, יום יום) we have not to think of the six days of creation. But inasmuch as the whole description goes down to בְּנֵי אָדָם as its central-point, it denotes that creation came to its close and its goal in man. The connection of חַבֵּל אֶרֶץ is as Job xxxvii. 12, where אֶרֶץ for אֶרֶץ is wholly, as חֲרָסָה, לֵילָה, and the like, an original accusative.

Ver. 32. After that Wisdom has shown in vers. 22-31 how worthy her fellowship is of being an object of desire from her mediating place between God and the world, she begins with this verse (as vii. 24, v. 7) the hortatory (*paränetische*) concluding part of her discourse:

“And now, ye sons, hearken unto me,  
And salvation to those who keep my ways!”

The LXX. omits ver. 33, and obviates the disturbing element of וְאֶשְׁרֵי, 32*b*, arising from its וְ, by a transposition of the stichs. But this וְאֶשְׁרֵי is the same as the *καὶ μακάριος*, Matt. xi. 6; the organic connection lies hid, as Schleiermacher (*Hermeneutik*, p. 73) well expresses it, in the mere sequence; the clause containing the proof is connected by וְ with that for which proof is to be assigned, instead of subordinating itself to it with כִּי. Such an exclamatory clause has already been met with in iii. 13; there אָדָם follows as the governed genitive, here a complete sentence (instead of the usual participial construction, שְׁמִרַי דְּרַכִּי) forms this genitive, Gesen. § 123, 3, Anm. 1.

The summons 32*a*, and its reason 32*b*, are repeated in these verses which follow:

33 “Hear instruction, and be wise,  
And withdraw not.

- 34 Blessed is the man who hears me,  
 Watching daily at my gates,  
 Waiting at the posts of my doors!  
 35 For whosoever findeth me has found life,  
 And has obtained favour from Jahve;  
 36 And whosoever misseth me doeth wrong to himself;  
 All they who hate me love death."

The *imper.* וְחָכְמוּ, 33a (*et sapite*), is to be judged after iv. 4, וְחָיָה, cf. the *Chethîb*, xiii. 20; one sees this from the words וְאַל-תִּפְרְעוּ which follow, to which, after xv. 32, as at iv. 13, to אֶל-תִּרְפָּה, מוֹסֵר is to be placed as object: and throw not to the winds (*ne missam faciatis*; *vid.* regarding פָּרַע at i. 25), viz. instruction (*disciplinam*).

Ver. 34. The אִשְׁרֵי here following שְׁמָעִי is related to it as assigning a motive, like the וְאִשְׁרֵי (ver. 32b) following שְׁמָעִי; according to the Masora, we have to write אִשְׁרֵי with *Mercha*, and on the first syllable *Gaja* (*vid.* Baer's *Torath Emeth*, pp. 26, 29; cf. under Ps. i. 1). שָׁקֵר signifies to watch, not in the sense of *ad vigilandum*, but *vigilando*, as Isa. v. 22, xxx. 1; Ewald, § 380d. In contradistinction to הָעֵיר and הֶקְיִן, which denote watching as the consequence of wakefulness or an interruption of sleep, שָׁקֵר signifies watching as a condition, and that as one which a person willingly maintains (*Psychol.* p. 275), the intentional watching (cf. Arab. *shakidha*, to fix penetrating eyes upon anything), with עַל of the place and object and aim (Jer. v. 6; cf. הָעֵיר עַל, Job viii. 6). The plurals דְּלָחוֹת (*fores*, as חֲמוֹת, Jer. i. 18, *mænia*) and פִּתְחוֹת are amplifying plur. of extension, suggesting the idea of a palace or temple; מְוֹזוֹת (*postes portæ, in quibus cardines ejus moventur*, from וָזָז, to move hither and thither) is intended to indicate that he to whom the discourse refers holds himself in closest nearness to the entrance, that he might not miss the moment when it is opened, or when she who dwells there presents herself to view. "The figure is derived from the service of a court: Wisdom is honoured by her disciples, as a queen or high patroness; cf. Samachschari's *Golden Necklaces*, Pr. 35: Blessed is the man who knocks only at God's door, and who departs not a nail's breadth from God's threshold" (Fl.).

Ver. 35. This verse gives the reason for pronouncing those happy who honour Wisdom. The *Chethîb* is כִּי מַצְאֵי חַיִּים, but the passing over into the sing. 35b is harsh and objectionable; the *Kerî* rightly regards the second מַצְאֵי as a mistaken repetition of the first, and substitutes כִּי מַצְאֵי חַיִּים, with which the וְחָטְאֵי (ver.

36a) of the antithesis agrees. Regarding מַצֵּי, for which, less accurately, מַצֵּי (only with the *Dechâ* without *Metheg*) is generally written, *vid. Accentuationssystem*, vii. § 2. הֹפֵי, to get out = reach, exchanged with מַצֵּי, iii. 13 (*vid. there*); according to its etymon, it is connected with הָ, of him from or by whom one has reached anything; here, as xii. 2, xviii. 22, God's favour, *favorem a Jova impetravit*.

Ver. 36. מַחֲטִי may, it is true, mean "my sinning one = he who sins against me (מַחֲטִי)," as קָטִי is frequently equivalent to קָטִי; but the contrast of מַצֵּי places it beyond a doubt that מַחֲטִי stands here in its oldest signification: to miss something after which one runs (xix. 2), seeks (Job v. 24), at which one shoots (*Hiph.* Judg. xx. 16), etc., *id non attingere quod petitur*, Arab. *âkhta*, to miss, opposite to *âṣab*, to hit (Fl.). Just because it is the idea of missing, which, ethically applied, passes over into that of sin and guilt (of fault, mistake, false step, "*Fehls, Fehlers, Fehltritts*"), מַחֲטִי can stand not only with the accusative of the subject in regard to which one errs, Lev. v. 16, but also with the accusative of the subject which one forfeits, *i.e.* misses and loses, xx. 2, cf. Hab. ii. 10; so that not only מַחֲטִי נַפְשִׁי, xv. 32 (*animam suam nihili facit*), but also מַחֲטִי נַפְשִׁי, xx. 2 (*animam suam pessumdat*), is synonymous with מַחֲטִי נַפְשִׁי (*animæ suæ h. e. sibi ipsi injuriam facit*). Whoever misses Wisdom by taking some other way than that which leads to her, acts suicidally: all they who wilfully hate (*Piel*) wisdom love death, for wisdom is the tree of life, iii. 18; wisdom and life are one, 35a, as the Incarnate Wisdom saith, John viii. 51, "If a man keep my sayings, he shall never see death." In the Logos, Wisdom has her self-existence; in Him she has her personification, her justification, and her truth.

#### FIFTEENTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, IX.

##### A DOUBLE INVITATION: THAT OF WISDOM, AND THAT OF HER RIVAL, FOLLY.

The preceding discourse pronounces those happy who, having taken their stand at the portal of Wisdom, wait for her appearance and her invitation. There is thus a house of Wisdom as there is a

house of God, Ps. lxxxiv. 11 ; and if now the discourse is of a house of Wisdom, and of an invitation to a banquet therein (like that in the parable, Matt. xxii., of the invitation to the marriage feast of the king's son), it is not given without preparation :

- 1 Wisdom hath builded for herself an house,  
Hewn out her seven pillars ;
- 2 Hath slaughtered her beasts, mingled her wine ;  
Hath also spread her table ;
- 3 Hath sent out her maidens ; she waiteth  
On the highest points of the city.

Regarding חִכְמוֹת, *vid.* at i. 20. It is a *plur. excellentiæ*, which is a variety of the *plur. extensivus*. Because it is the expression of a plural unity, it stands connected (as for the most part also אֱלֹהִים, *Deus*) with the sing. of the predicate. The perfects enumerate all that Wisdom has done to prepare for her invitation. If we had a parable before us, the perf. would have run into the historical וַתַּשְׁלַח; but it is, as the תִּקְרָא shows, an allegorical picture of the arrangement and carrying out of a present reality. Instead of בָּנְתָהּ לָהּ בַּיִת there is בָּנְתָהּ בֵּיתָהּ, for the house is already in its origin represented as hers, and 1b is to be translated : she has hewn out her seven pillars (Hitzig); more correctly : her pillars, viz. seven (after the scheme רָצַתָם רָעָה, Gen. xxxvii. 2); but the construction is closer. שִׁבְעָה is, altogether like Ex. xxv. 37, the accusative of the second object, or of the predicate after the species of *verba*, with the idea : to make something, turn into something, which take to themselves a double accusative, Gesen. § 139, 2 : *excidit columnas suas ita ut septem essent*. Since the figure is allegorical, we may not dispense with the interpretation of the number seven by the remark, "No emphasis lies in the number" (Bertheau). First, we must contemplate architecturally the house with seven pillars : "They are," as Hitzig rightly remarks, "the pillars of the מִסְדָּרוֹן (porch) [*vid.* Bachmann under Judg. iii. 23, and Wetstein under Ps. cxliv. 12, where חָטַב is used of the cutting out and hewing of wood, as חָצַב of the cutting out and hewing of stone] in the inner court, which bore up the gallery of the first (and second) floors : four of these in the corners and three in the middle of three sides ; through the midst of these the way led into the court of the house-floor [the area]." But we cannot agree with Hitzig in maintaining that, with the seven pillars of viii. and ix., the author looks back to the first seven chapters (Arab. *âbwab*, gates) of this book ; we think other-

wise of the component members of this Introduction to the Book of Proverbs; and to call the sections of a book "gates, שַׁעֲרִים," is a late Arabico-Jewish custom, of which there is found no trace whatever in the O. T. To regard them also, with Heidenheim (cf. Dante's Prose Writings, translated by Streckfuss, p. 77), as representing the seven liberal arts (שִׁבְעַת הַכְּמוֹת) is impracticable; for this division of the *artes liberales* into seven, consisting of the *Trivium* (Grammar, Rhetoric, and Dialectics) and *Quadrivium* (Music, Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy), is not to be looked for within the old Israelitish territory, and besides, these were the sciences of this world which were so divided; but wisdom, to which the discourse here refers, is wholly a religious-moral subject. The Midrash thinks of the seven heavens (שִׁבְעַת רַקִּיעִים), or the seven climates or parts of the earth (שִׁבְעַת אֲרָצוֹת), as represented by them; but both references require artificial combinations, and have, as also the reference to the seven church-eras (Vitrunga and Chr. Ben. Michaelis), this against them, that they are rendered probable neither from these introductory proverbial discourses, nor generally from the O. T. writings. The patristic and middle-age reference to the seven sacraments of the church passes sentence against itself; but the old interpretation is on the right path, when it suggests that the seven pillars are the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. The seven-foldness of the manifestation of the Spirit, already brought near by the seven lamps of the sacred candelabra (the מְנוֹרָה), is established by Isa. xi. 2 (*vid. l.c.*); and that Wisdom is the possessor and dispenser of the Spirit she herself testifies, i. 23. Her Spirit is the "Spirit of wisdom;" but at the same time, since, born of God, she is mediatrix between God and the world, also the "Spirit of Jahve." He is the "spirit of understanding," the "spirit of counsel," and the "spirit of might" (Isa. xi. 2); for she says, viii. 14, "Counsel is mine, and reflection; I am understanding, I have strength." He is also the "spirit of knowledge," and the "spirit of the fear of the Lord" (Isa. xi. 2); for fear and the knowledge of Jahve are, according to ix. 14, the beginning of wisdom, and essentially wisdom itself.

Ver. 2. If thus the house of Wisdom is the place of her fellowship with those who honour her, the system of arrangements made by her, so as to disclose and communicate to her disciples the fulness of her strength and her gifts, then it is appropriate to understand by the seven pillars the seven virtues of her nature

communicating themselves (apocalyptically expressed, the *ἐπὶ τὰ πνεύματα*), which bear up and adorn the dwelling which she establishes among men. Flesh and wine are figures of the nourishment for the mind and the heart which is found with wisdom, and, without asking what the flesh and the wine specially mean, are figures of the manifold enjoyment which makes at once strong and happy. The segolate *n. verbale* טַבַּח, which vii. 22 denoted the slaughtering or the being slaughtered, signifies here, in the concrete sense, the slaughtered ox; Michaelis rightly remarks that טַבַּח, in contradistinction to זֶבַח, is the usual word for *mactatio extrasacrificialis*. Regarding מִסְכָּה, *vid.* under Isa. v. 22; it is not meant of the mingling of wine with sweet scents and spices, but with water (warm or cold), and signifies simply to make the wine palatable (as *κεραννύναι*, *temperare*); the LXX. ἐκέρασεν εἰς κρατῆρα, κρατήρ is the name of the vessel in which the mixing takes place; they drank not ἄκρατον, but κεκρασμένον ἄκρατον, Rev. xiv. 10. The frequently occurring phrase עָרַךְ שֻׁלְחָן signifies to prepare the table (from שָׁלַח, properly the unrolled and outspread leather cover), viz. by the placing out of the dishes (*vid.* regarding עָרַךְ, under Gen. xxii. 9).

Ver. 3. The verb קָרָא, when a feast is spoken of, means to invite; קָרָאִים, ver. 18 (cf. 1 Sam. ix. 13, etc.), are the guests. נַעֲרוֹתֶיהָ the LXX. translates τοὺς ἐαυτῆς δούλους, but certainly here the disciples are meant who already are in the service of Wisdom; but that those who are invited to Wisdom are thought of as feminine, arises from the tasteful execution of the picture. The invitation goes forth to be known to all far and wide, so that in her servants Wisdom takes her stand in the high places of the city. Instead of בְּרֹאשׁ, viii. 2, i. 21, there is used here the expression עַל-נֶפֶשׁ. We must distinguish the Semitic נֶף (= *ganf*), wings, from גָּנַף = בָּנַף, to cover, and נֶף (= *gaff* or *ganf*), the bark, which is derived either from נָפַף or נִנַּף, جَنَفَ, *convexus, incurvus et extrinsecus gibber fuit*, hence originally any surface bent outwards or become crooked (cf. the roots *cap*, *caf*, נָבַף, etc.), here the summit of a height (Fl.); thus not *super alis* (after the analogy of *πτερύγιον*, after Suidas = ἄκρωτήριον), but *super dorsis* (as in Lat. we say *dorsum montis*, and also *viæ*).

Now follows the street-sermon of Wisdom inviting to her banquet:

- 4 "Who is simple? let him come hither!"  
 Whoso wanteth understanding, to him she saith:  
 5 "Come, eat of my bread,  
 And drink of the wine which I have mingled!  
 6 Cease, ye simple, and live,  
 And walk straight on in the way of understanding."

The question **מִי פְתִי** (thus with *Munach*, not with *Makkeph*, it is to be written here and at ver. 16; *vid.* Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 40), *quis est imperitus*, is, as Ps. xxv. 12, only a more animated expression for *quisquis est*. The retiring into the background of the **נְעֻרֹת** (servants), and the immediate appearance of Wisdom herself, together with the interruption, as was to be expected, of her connected discourses by the **אָמְרָה לֹא**, are signs that the pure execution of the allegorical representation is here at an end. Hitzig seeks, by the rejection of vers. 4, 5, 7-10, to bring in a logical sequence; but these interpolations which he cuts out are yet far more inconceivable than the proverbial discourses in the mouth of Wisdom, abandoning the figure of a banquet, which besides are wholly in the spirit of the author of this book. That Folly invites to her, ver. 16, in the same words as are used by Wisdom, ver. 4, is not strange; both address themselves to the simple (*vid.* on **פְתִי** at i. 4) and those devoid of understanding (as the youth, vii. 7), and seek to bring to their side those who are accessible to evil as to good, and do not fully distinguish between them, which the emulating *devertat huc* of both imports. The fourth verse points partly backwards, and partly forwards; 4a has its introduction in the **תְּקַרָּא** of ver. 3; on the contrary, 4b is itself the introduction of what follows. The setting forth of the *nom. absolutus* **הַמֵּרֶבֶל** is conditioned by the form of 4a; the **מִי** (cf. 4a) is continued (in 4b) without its needing to be supplied: *excors* (= *si quis est excors*) *dicit ei* (not *dixit*, because syntactically subordinating itself to the **תְּקַרָּא**). It is a nominal clause, whose virtual predicate (the devoid of understanding is thus and thus addressed by her) is in ver. 16.

Ver. 5. The plur. of the address shows that the simple (inexperienced) and the devoid of understanding are regarded as essentially one and the same class of men. The **בָּ** after **לֶחֶם** and **שֶׁתֵּה** proceeds neither from the idea of eating into (hewing into) anything, nor from the eating with anything, *i.e.* inasmuch as one makes use of it, nor of pampering oneself with anything (as **בָּ רָצָה**); Michaelis at last makes a right decision (cf. Lev. xxii. 11, Judg.

xiii. 16, Job xxi. 25, and particularly **לֶחֶם**, Ps. cxli. 4): *communicationem et participationem in re fruenda denotat*; the LXX. *φάγετε τῶν ἐμῶν ἄρτων*. The attributive **מִסְכֵּתִי** stands with backward reference briefly for **מִסְכֵּתִי**. That Wisdom, ver. 2, offers flesh and wine, but here presents bread and wine, is no contradiction, which would lead us, with Hitzig, critically to reject vers. 4 and 5 as spurious; **לֶחֶם** is the most common, all-comprehensive name for nourishment. Bertheau suitably compares Jahve's invitation, Isa lv. 1, and that of Jesus, John vi. 35.

Ver. 6. That **פְּתָאִים** is a plur. with abstract signification (according to which the four Greek and the two Aramæan translations render it; the *Græc. Venet.*, however, renders *τοὺς νηπίους*) is improbable; the author forms the abstr. ver. 13 otherwise, and the expression here would be doubtful. For **פְּתָאִים** is here to be rendered as the object-accus.: leave the simple, *i.e.* forsake this class of men (Ahron b. Joseph; Umbreit, Zöckler); or also, which we prefer (since it is always a singular thought that the "simple" should leave the "simple"), as the vocative, and so that **עֲזָבוּ** means not absolutely "leave off" (Hitzig), but so that the object to be thought of is to be taken from **פְּתָאִים**: give up, leave off, viz. the simple (Immanuel and others; on the contrary, Rashi, Meiri, and others, as Ewald, Bertheau, decide in favour of **פְּתָאִים** as *n. abstr.*). Regarding **וַחַיִּי**, for *et vivetis*, *vid.* iv. 4. The LXX., paraphrasing: *ἵνα εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα βασιλεύσητε*. **אֲשֶׁר** is related to **אֲשֶׁר** (**אֲשֶׁר**) as **רָחַק** to **רָחַק**; the *Piel*, not in its intrans. (*vid.* iv. 14) but in its trans. sense (Isa. i. 17, iii. 12, etc.), shows that the idea of going straight out and forwards connects itself therewith. The peculiarity of the **פְּתִי** is just the absence of character.

In what now follows the discourse of Wisdom is continued; wherefore she directs her invitation to the simple, *i.e.* those who have not yet decided, and are perhaps susceptible of that which is better:

- 7 " He who correcteth a scorner draweth upon himself insult;  
And he who communicateth instruction to a scorner, it is a dishonour to him.
- 8 Instruct not a scorner, lest he hate thee;  
Give instruction to the wise, so he will love thee.
- 9 Give to the wise, and he becomes yet wiser;  
Give knowledge to the upright, and he gains in knowledge."

Zöckler thinks that herewith the reason for the summons to the "simple" to forsake the fellowship of men of their own sort, is

assigned (he explains *Ga* as Ahron b. Joseph: *הפרדו מן הפתאים*); but his remark that, under the term "simple," mockers and wicked persons are comprehended as belonging to the same category, confounds two sharply distinguished classes of men. *לֵן* is the freethinker who mocks at religion and virtue (*rid.* i. 22), and *רָשָׁע* the godless who shuns restraint by God and gives himself up to the unbridled impulse to evil. The course of thought in ver. 7 and onwards shows why Wisdom, turning from the wise, who already are hers, directs herself only to the simple, and those who are devoid of understanding: she must pass over the *לֵן* and *רָשָׁע*, because she can there hope for no receptivity for her invitation; she would, contrary to Matt. vii. 6, "give that which is holy to the dogs, and cast her pearls before swine." *יָכַר*, *παιδεύειν* (with the prevailing idea of the bitter lesson of reproof and punishment), and *הוֹכִיחַ*, *ἐλέγχειν*, are interchangeable conceptions, Ps. xciv. 10; the *ל* is here exponent of the object (to bring an accusation against any one), as ver. 8, xv. 12 (otherwise as Isa. ii. 4, xi. 4, where it is the *dat. commodi*: to bring unrighteousness to light, in favour of the injured). *לֵן יָכַר* is pointed with *Mahpach* of the penultima, and thus with the tone thrown back. The *Pasek*, placed in some editions between the two words, is masoretically inaccurate. He who reads the moral to the mocker brings disgrace to himself; the incorrigible replies to the goodwill with insult. Similar to the *לֵקַח לוֹ* here, is *מָרִים תִּלְלִית* = *reportat*, iii. 35, iv. 27. In 7*b* *מוֹמוֹ* is by no means the object governed by *וּמוֹכִיחַ*: and he who shows to the godless his fault (*Me'iri*, Arama, Löwenstein: *מוֹמוֹ* = *על-מוֹמוֹ*, and thus also the *Græc. Venet.* *μῶμον ἐαυτῷ, scil. λαμβάνει*); plainly *מוֹמוֹ* is parallel with *קִלְקַל*. But *מוֹמוֹ* does not also subordinate itself to *לֵקַח* as to the object. parallel *קִלְקַל*: *maculam sibimet scil. acquirit*; for, to be so understood, the author ought at least to have written *מוֹם לוֹ*. Much rather *מוֹמוֹ* is here, as at Deut. xxxii. 5, appos., thus pred. (*Hitzig*), without needing anything to be supplied: his blot it is, viz. this proceeding, which is equivalent to *מוֹמָא הוּא לֵיה* (*Targ.*), *opprobrio ipsi est*. Zöckler not incorrectly compares Ps. cxv. 7 and Eccles. v. 16, but the expression (*macula ejus = ipsi*) lies here less remote from our form of expression. In other words: Whoever correcteth the mockers has only to expect hatred (*אל-תוכח*) with the tone thrown back, according to rule; cf., on the contrary, Judg. xviii. 25), but on the other hand, love from the wise.

Ver. 8. The ו in וְיֵאָהֲבֶךָ is that of consequence (*apodosis imperativi*): so he will love thee (as also Ewald now translates), not: that he may love thee (Syr., Targ.), for the author speaks here only of the consequence, not of something else, as an object kept in view. The exhortation influences the mocker less than nothing, so much the more it bears fruit with the wise. Thus the proverb is confirmed *habenti dabitur*, Matt. xiii. 12, xxv. 29.

Ver. 9. If anything is to be supplied to תֵּן, it is לָקַח (iv. 2); but תֵּן, *tradere*, *παραδιδόναι*, is of itself correlat. of לָקַח, *accipere* (post-bibl. קָבַל), *παραλαμβάνειν*, e.g. Gal. i. 9. הוֹדִיעַ לְ = to communicate knowledge, רָעַת, follows the analogy of הוֹכִיחַ לְ, to impart instruction, תּוֹכַחַת. Regarding the jussive form וְיִוָּסֶף in the *apod. imper.*, vid. Gesen. § 128, 2. Observe in this verse the interchange of חָכָם and עֲדִיק! Wisdom is not merely an intellectual power, it is a moral quality; in this is founded her receptivity of instruction, her embracing of every opportunity for self-improvement. She is humble; for, without self-will and self-sufficiency, she makes God's will her highest and absolutely binding rule (iii. 7).

These words naturally follow:

- 10 "The beginning of wisdom is the fear of Jahve,  
And the knowledge of the Holy One is understanding."

This is the highest principle of the Chokma, which stands (i. 7) as a motto at the beginning of the Book of Proverbs. The LXX. translate ראשית there (i. 7), and תְּהִלָּת here, by ἀρχή. Gusset distinguishes the two synonyms as *pars optima* and *primus actus*; but the former denotes the fear of God as that which stands in the uppermost place, to which all that Wisdom accomplishes subordinates itself; the latter as that which begins wisdom, that which it proposes to itself in its course. With יְהוָה is interchanged, ii. 5, אֱלֹהִים, as here קְדוֹשִׁים, as the internally multiplicative plur. (Dietrich, *Abhandlungen*, pp. 12, 45), as xxx. 3, Josh. xxiv. 9, Hos. xii. 1, of God, the "Holy, holy, holy" (Isa. vi. 3), i.e. Him who is absolutely Holy. Michaelis inaccurately, following the ancients, who understood not this non-numerical plur.: *cognitio quæ sanctos facit et sanctis propria est*. The רָעַת, parallel with יִרְאַת, is meant of lively practical operative knowledge, which subordinates itself to this All-holy God as the normative but unapproachable pattern.

Ver. 11. The singular reason for this proverb of Wisdom is now given:

“ For by me will thy days become many,  
And the years of thy life will be increased.”

Incorrectly Hitzig: “and years of life will increase to thee;” וְיָמֶיךָ is always and everywhere (*e.g.* also Job xxxviii. 11) transitive. In the similar passage, iii. 2, וְיָסִיפוּ had as its subject the doctrine of Wisdom; here וְחַכְמָה and בִּינָה it is not practicable to interpret as subj., since 11*a* Wisdom is the subject discoursing—the expression follows the scheme, *dicunt eos = dicuntur*, as *e.g.* Job vii. 3; Gesen. § 137—a concealing of the operative cause, which lies near, where, as ii. 22, the discourse is of severe judgment, thus: they (*viz.* the heavenly Powers) will grant to thee years of life (יָמֶיךָ in a pregnant sense, as iii. 2) in rich measure, so that constantly one span comes after another. But in what connection of consequence does this stand with the contents of the proverb, ver. 10? The ancients say that the clause with בִּי refers back to ver. 5 f. The vers. 7–10 (according also to Fl.) are, as it were, parenthetic. Hitzig rejects these verses as an interpolation, but the connection of ver. 11 with 5 f. retains also something that is unsuitable: “steps forward on the way of knowledge, for by me shall thy days become many;” and if, as Hitzig supposes, ver. 12 is undoubtedly genuine, whose connection with ver. 11 is in no way obvious, then also will the difficulty of the connection of vers. 7–10 with the preceding and the succeeding be no decisive mark of the want of genuineness of this course of thought. We have seen how the progress of ver. 6 to 7 is mediated: the invitation of Wisdom goes forth to the receptive, with the exclusion of the irrecoverable. And ver. 11 is related to ver. 10, as the proof of the cause from the effect. It is the fear of God with which Wisdom begins, the knowledge of God in which above all it consists, for by it is fulfilled the promise of life which is given to the fear of God, x. 27, xiv. 27, xix. 23, cf. Deut. iv. 40, and to humility, which is bound up with it, x. 17.

Ver. 12. This wisdom, resting on the fear of God, is itself a blessing to the wise:

“ If thou art wise, thou art wise for thyself;  
And if thou mockest, thou alone shalt bear it.”

The LXX., with the Syr., mangle the thought of 12*a*, for they translate: if thou art wise for thyself, so also thou wilt be wise for thy neighbour. The *dat. commodi* לְךָ means that it is for the personal advantage of the wise to be wise. The contrast expressed

by Job xxii. 2 f.: not profitable to God, but to thyself (Hitzig), is scarcely intended, although, so far as the accentuation is antithetic, it is the nearest. The perf. **וְלֹא יִצְחָק** is the hypothetical; Gesen. § 126, 1. To bear anything, viz. anything sinful (**חַטָּא** or **עוֹן**), is equivalent to, to atone for it, Job xxxiv. 2, cf. Num. ix. 13, Ezek. xxiii. 35. Also 12*b* is a contrast scarcely aimed at. Wisdom is its own profit to man; libertinism is its own disgrace. Man decides, whenever he prefers to be wise, or to be a mocker of religion and of virtue, regarding his own weal and woe. With this *nota bene* the discourse of Wisdom closes.

The poet now brings before us another figure, for he personifies Folly working in opposition to Wisdom, and gives her a feminine name, as the contrast to Wisdom required, and thereby to indicate that the seduction, as the 13th proverbial discourse (chap. vii.) has shown, appears especially in the form of degraded womanhood:

- 13 The woman Folly [*Frau Thorheit*] conducts herself boisterously,  
Wantonness, and not knowing anything at all;
- 14 And hath seated herself at the door of her house,  
On a seat high up in the city,
- 15 To call to those who walk in the way,  
Who go straight on their path.

The connection of **אִשָּׁת פְּתִיאוֹת** is genitival, and the genitive is not, as in **אִשָּׁת רָע**, vi. 24, specifying, but appositional, as in **בַּת-צִיּוֹן** (*vid.* under Isa. i. 8). **הוֹמָיָה** [boisterous] is pred., as vii. 11: her object is sensual, and therefore her appearance excites passionately, overcoming the resistance of the mind by boisterousness. In 13*b* it is further said who and how she is. **פְּתִיאוֹת** she is called as wantonness personified. This abstract **פְּתִיאוֹת**, derived from **פָּתִי**, must be vocalized as **אֲבֻרְיוֹת**; Hitzig thinks it is written with *a* on account of the following *u* sound, but this formation always ends in *ijjûth*, not *ajjûth*. But as from **חָזָה** as well **חָזִין** = **חֲזִין** as **חֶזֶן** is formed, so from **פָּתָה** as well **פָּתוֹת** like **חָזוֹת**, or **פָּתוֹת** like **לָזוֹת**, **רָעוֹת**, as **פְּתִיאוֹת** (instead of which **פְּתִיאוֹת** is preferred) can be formed; Kimchi rightly (*Michlol* 181*a*) presents the word under the form **פְּעֻלּוֹת**. With **וְכָל** (xiv. 7) poetic, and stronger than **וְלֹא**, the designation of the subject is continued; the words **וְכָל-יִרְעָה מָה** (thus with *Mercha* and without *Makkeph* following, **יִרְעָה** is to be written, after Codd. and old editions) have the value of an adjective: and not knowing anything at all (**מָה** = **τι**, as Num. xxiii. 3, Job xiii. 13, and here in the negative clause, as in prose **מְאֻמָּה**), *i.e.* devoid of

all knowledge. The Targ. translates explanatorily: not recognising טַבָּתָא, the good; and the LXX. substitutes: she knows not shame, which, according to Hitzig, supposes the word בְּלִמָּה, approved of by him; but כלמה means always *pudefactio*, not *pudor*. To know no כלמה would be equivalent to, to let no shaming from without influence one; for shamelessness the poet would have made use of the expression וּבִלְיִדְעָה בִּשְׁתָּה. In וַיֵּשְׁבָה the declaration regarding the subject beginning with הוֹמִיָּה is continued: Folly also has a house in which works of folly are carried on, and has set herself down by the door (לְפֶתַח as לְפִי, viii. 3) of this house; she sits there עַל־כִּפֶּא. Most interpreters here think on a throne (LXX. ἐπὶ δίφρου, used especially of the *sella curulis*); and Zöckler, as Umbreit, Hitzig, and others, connecting genitiv. therewith מְרִמִּי קֶרֶת, changes in 14b the scene, for he removes the “high throne of the city” from the door of the house to some place elsewhere. But the sitting is in contrast to the standing and going on the part of Wisdom on the streets preaching (Evagrius well renders: *in molli ignavaque sella*); and if כסא and house-door are named along with each other, the former is a seat before the latter, and the accentuation rightly separates by *Mugrash* כסא from מְרִמִּי קֶרֶת. “According to the accents and the meaning, מְרִמִּי קֶרֶת is the *acc. loci*: on the high places of the city, as viii. 2 f.” (Fl.) They are the high points of the city, to which, as Wisdom, ver. 3, viii. 2, so also Folly, her rival (wherefore Eccles. x. 6 does not appertain to this place), invites followers to herself. She sits before her door to call לְעֹבְרֵי דֶרֶךְ (with *Munach*, as in Cod. 1294 and old editions, without the *Makkeph*), those who go along the way (genitive connection with the supposition of the accusative construction, *transire viam*, as ii. 7), to call (invite) הַמֵּי־שָׁרִים (to be pointed with מ *raphatum* and *Gaja* going before, according to Ben-Asher’s rule; *vid. Methegsetz.* § 20), those who make straight their path, *i.e.* who go straight on, directly before them (cf Isa. lvii. 2). The participial construction (the schemes *amans Dei* and *amans Deum*), as well as that of the verb קרא (first with the dat. and then with the accus.), interchange.

The woman, who in her own person serves as a sign to her house, addresses those who pass by in their innocence (לְתָמִים, 2 Sam. xv. 11):

16 “Whoso is simple, let him turn in hither!”

And if any one is devoid of understanding, she saith to him:

17 "Stolen waters taste sweet,  
And the bread of secrecy is pleasant."

פְּתִי (folly, simplicity) has a side accessible to good and its contrary: Wisdom is connected with the one side, and Folly with the other. And as the חֶסֶד-לֵב offers a *vacuum* to Wisdom which may perhaps be filled with the right contents, so is this *vacuum* welcome to Folly, because it meets there no resistance. In this sense, ver. 16 is like ver. 4 (excepting the addition of a connecting and of a concluding ו: *et si quis excors, tum dicit ei*); the word is the same in both, but the meaning, according to the two speakers, is different. That to which they both invite is the pleasure of her fellowship, under the symbol of eating and drinking; in the one case it is intellectual and spiritual enjoyment, in the other sensual. That Wisdom offers (ix. 5) bread and wine, and Folly water and bread, has its reason in this, that the particular pleasure to which the latter invites is of a sensual kind; for to drink water out of his own or out of another fountain is (iii. 15–20) the symbol of intercourse in married life, or of intercourse between the unmarried, particularly of adulterous intercourse. מַיִם וְנוֹבִיִּים (correct texts have it thus, without the *Makkeph*) is sexual intercourse which is stolen from him who has a right thereto, thus carnal intercourse with אִשָּׁה אֵישׁ; and לֶחֶם סִתְרִים fleshly lust, which, because it is contrary to the law, must seek (cf. *furtum*, secret love intrigue) concealment (סִתְרִים, extensive plur., as מַעֲמָקִים; Böttcher, § 694). Just such pleasure, after which one wipes his mouth as if he had done nothing (xxx. 20), is for men who are without wisdom sweet (מתק, Job xx. 12) and pleasant; the prohibition of it gives to such pleasure attraction, and the secrecy adds seasoning; and just such enjoyments the כְּסִילוֹת, personified carnality, offers. But woe to him who, befooled, enters her house!

He goes within:

18 And he knows not that the dead are there;  
In the depths of Hades, her guests.

How near to one another the house of the adulteress and Hades are, so that a man passes through the one into the other, is already stated in ii. 18, vii. 28. Here, in the concluding words of the introduction to the Book of Proverbs, addressed to youth, and for the most part containing warnings against sinful pleasures, these two further declarations are advanced: the company assembled in the house of lewdness consists of רְפָאִים, *i.e.* (cf. p. 83) the old, worn-out, who are only in appearance living, who have gone down

to the seeming life of the shadowy existence of the kingdom of the dead; her (בסִילוֹה) invited ones (cf. vii. 26, her slaughtered ones) are in the depths of Hades (not in the valleys, as Umbreit, Löwenstein, and Ewald translate, but in the depths, Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, ἐπὶ τοῖς βαθέσι; for עֲמָקִי is not only plur. to עֲמָק, but also *per metaplasmum* to עֲמָק, xxv. 3, as אֲמָרִי to אֲמָר), thus in שָׂאוֹל תַּחֲתַיִת (Deut. xxxii. 22); they have forsaken the fellowship of the life and of the love of God, and have sunk into the deepest destruction. The house of infamy into which Folly allures does not only lead to hell, it is hell itself; and they who permit themselves to be thus befooled are like wandering corpses, and already on this side of death are in the realm of wrath and of the curse.<sup>1</sup>

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#### FIRST COLLECTION OF SOLOMONIC PROVERBS, X.-XXII. 16.

The superscription, מִשְׁלֵי שְׁלֹמֹה, here shows that now we have reached that which the title of the book, i. 1-6, presented to view. Here we have the commencement of that collection of Solomonic Proverbs which under this title forms, together with the introduction, i. 7-ix., the Older Book of Proverbs. The introduction is disproportionately long. It is the manner of the editor to extend himself in length and breadth; and besides, an educational zeal in behalf of youth, and his aim, which was without doubt to put them on their guard against certain prevailing moral evils of his time, make him thus persuasive; and if he detains his readers so long from the proper Solomonic Proverbs, yet this might be excused from the circumstance, that though his introduction does not strictly consist of Proverbs of Solomon, yet it consists of proverbs after the manner of Solomon, *i.e.* of proverbs which, as to their contents and form, take their structure from the pattern of those of Solomonic authorship.

In this introduction, i.-ix., there are larger sections of interconnected thoughts having one common aim. Even in vi. 1-19 there are manifestly three proverbial discourses distinguished from one another, shorter indeed, yet containing one fundamental thought.

<sup>1</sup> The LXX. has considerable additions introduced after ver. 18, as also after ver. 12, of which we shall elsewhere speak.

Such proverbs as are primarily designed to form one completed little whole of themselves, are not here to be met with. On the contrary, the Solomonic collection which now follows consists of pure distichs, for the most part antithetical, but at the same time going over all the forms of the technical proverb, as we have already shown; *vid.* p. 16. Accordingly the exposition must from this point onward renounce reproduced combinations of thought. The succession of proverbs here is nevertheless not one that is purely accidental or without thought; it is more than a happy accident when three of the same character stand together; the collector has connected together proverb with proverb according to certain common characteristics (Bertheau). And yet more than that: the mass separates itself into groups, not merely succeeding one another, but because a certain connection of ideas connects together a number of proverbs, in such a way that the succession is broken, and a new point of departure is arrived at (Hitzig). There is no comprehensive plan, such as Oetinger in his summary view of its contents supposes; the progressive unfolding follows no systematic scheme, but continuously wells forth. But that the editor, whom we take also to be the arranger of the contents of the book, did not throw them together by good chance, but in placing them together was guided by certain reasons, the very first proverb here shows, for it is chosen in conformity with the design of this book, which is specially dedicated to youth:

1 A wise son maketh glad his father;  
A foolish son is his mother's grief.

One sees here quite distinctly (cf. Hos. xiii. 13) that חָבֵט (from חִבֵּט, properly to be thick, stout, solid, as *πυκνός* = *σφοδρός*) is primarily a practical and ethical conception. Similar proverbs are found further on, but consisting of synonymous parallel members, in which either the father both times represents the parents, as xvii. 21, xxiii. 24, or father and mother are separated, each being named in different members, as xvii. 25, xxiii. 25, and particularly xv. 20, where 20a = 1a of the above proverb. It is incorrect to say, with Hitzig, that this contrast draws the division after it: the division lies nearer in the synonymous distichs, and is there less liable to be misunderstood than in the antithetic. Thus, from this proverb before us, it might be concluded that grief on account of a befooled son going astray in bypaths, and not coming to the right way, falls principally on the mother, as (Sir. iii. 9) is often the

case in unfortunate marriages. The idea of the parents is in this way only separated, and the two members stand in suppletive interchangeable relationship.  $\text{יִשְׁמַח}$  is the middle of the clause, and is the usual form in connection;  $\text{יִשְׁמַח}$  is the pausal form.  $\text{תִּינָה}$  from  $\text{הוּנָה}$  (ינה), has *pass.*  $\hat{u}$ , as  $\text{תִּוְרָה}$ , *act.*  $\hat{o}$ . "The expression of the *pred.* 1b is like iii. 17, viii. 6, x. 14 f.; cf. e.g. Arab. *âlastakṣa furkat*, oversharpener is dividing, i.e. effects it [inquiries become or lead to separation] (cf. our proverb, *Allzuscharf macht schartig* = too much sharpening makes full of notches); Burckhardt, *Sprüchw.* Nr. 337" (Fl.).

Ver. 2. There follows now a series of proverbs which place possessions and goods under a moral-religious point of view:

Treasures of wickedness bring no profit;  
But righteousness delivers from death.

The LXX. and Aquila translate  $\text{ἀνόμους}$  ( $\text{ἀσεβείς}$ ).  $\text{הוֹעִיל}$  (to profit) with the accus. is possible, Isa. lvii. 12, but  $\text{אֹצְרוֹת}$  one does not use by itself; it requires a genitive designating it more closely. But also  $\text{רִשְׁעָא}$  of the Targ.,  $\text{παρὰ νόμων}$  of Symmachus, fails; for the question still remains, to whom? Rightly Syr., Jerome, Theodotion, and the Quinta:  $\text{ἀσεβείας}$ , cf. iv. 17, Mic. iv. 10; Luke xvi. 9,  $\text{μαμωνᾶς τῆς ἀδικίας}$ . Treasures to which wickedness cleaves profit not, viz. him who has collected them through wickedness. On the contrary, righteousness saves from death (2b = xi. 4b, where the parallelism makes it clear that death as a judgment is meant). In Deut. xxiv. 13 it had been already said that compassionate love is "righteousness before the Lord," the cardinal virtue of the righteousness of life. Faith (Hab. ii. 4) is its soul, and love its life. Therefore  $\text{δικαιοσύνη}$  and  $\text{ἐλεημοσύνη}$  are interchangeable ideas; and it ought not to be an objection against the Apocrypha that it repeats the above proverb,  $\text{ἐλεημοσύνη ἐκ θανάτου ῥύεται}$ , Tob. iv. 10, xii. 9, Sir. iii. 30, xxix. 12, for Dan. iv. 24 also says the very same thing, and the thought is biblical, in so far as the giving of alms is understood to be not a dead work, but (Ps. cxii. 9) the life-activity of one who fears God, and of a mind believing in Him and resting in His word.

Ver. 3. Another proverb, the members of which stand in chiasmic relation to those of the preceding:

Jahve does not suffer the soul of the righteous to hunger;  
But the craving of the godless He disappointeth.

The thought is the same as xiii. 25. There, as also at vi. 30, the

soul is spoken of as the faculty of desire, and that after nourishment, for the lowest form of the life of the soul is the impulse to self-preservation. The parallel  $\text{הָיָה}$ , in which LXX. and Ar. erroneously find the meaning of  $\text{חַיָּה}$ , life, the Syr. Targ. the meaning of  $\text{הוֹן}$ , possession, means the desire, without however being related to  $\text{אָהָה}$  (Berth.); it is the Arab. *hawan*, from  $\text{הָוָה}$ , Arab. *haway*, which, from the fundamental meaning  $\chi\alpha\lambda\upsilon\epsilon\upsilon\iota$ , *hiare*, to gape, yawn, signifies not only unrestrained driving along, and crashing overthrow (cf. xi. 6, xix. 13), but also the breaking forth, *ferri in aliquid*, whence  $\text{הָוָה}$ , Arab. *hawan*, violent desire, in Hebr. generally (here and Ps. lii. 9, Mic. vii. 3) of desire without limits and without restraint (cf. the plur. *âhawâ*, arbitrary actions, caprices); the meanings deduced from this important verbal stem (of which also  $\text{הָיָה}$ ,  $\text{הָיָה}$ , *accidere*, and then *esse*, at least after the Arabic conception of speech, is an offshoot) are given by Fleischer under Job xxxvii. 6, and after Fleischer by Ethé, *Schlafgemach der Phantasie*, ii. p. 6f. The verb  $\text{הָרָה}$  signifies to push in the most manifold shades, here to push forth, *repellere*, as 2 Kings iv. 27 (cf. Arab. *hadhaf*, to push off = to discharge); the fut. is invariably  $\text{יִהְרֶה}$ , like  $\text{יִהְיֶה}$ . God gives satisfaction to the soul of the righteous, viz. in granting blessings. The desire of the wicked He does not suffer to be accomplished; it may appear for a long time as if that which was aimed at was realized, but in the end God pushes it back, so that it remains at a distance, because contrary to Him. Instead of  $\text{וְהוֹת רָשָׁעִים}$ , some editions (Plantin 1566, Bragadin 1615) have  $\text{וְהוֹת בְּנִדְרִים}$ , but, in opposition to all decided testimony, only through a mistaken reference to xi. 6.

Ver. 4. There follow two proverbs which say how one man fails and another succeeds:

He becomes poor who bears a sluggish hand;  
But the hand of the diligent maketh rich.

These three proverbs, xix. 15, xii. 24, 27, are similar. From the last two it is seen that  $\text{רָמְיָה}$  is a subst., as also from Ps. cxx. 2 f. ( $\text{לִשׁוֹן רָמְיָה}$ , from a crafty tongue) that it is an adjunct., and from Lev. xiv. 15 f. (where  $\text{פָּה}$  is fem.) that it may be at the same time an adjunct. here also. The masc. is  $\text{רָמִי}$ , like  $\text{טָרִי}$  to  $\text{טָרְיָה}$ , but neither of these occur; "the fundamental idea is that of throwing oneself down lazily, when one with unbent muscles holds himself no longer erect and stretched, Arab. *taramy*" (Fl.). The translation: deceitful balances (Löwenstein after Rashi), is contrary to biblical usage,

which knows nothing of כף in this Mishnic meaning. But if כף is here regarded as fem., then it cannot be the subject (Jerome, *egestatem operata est manus remissa*), since we read עֲשֶׂה, not עִשֶׂה. But רָאשׁ also is not suitable as the subject (LXX., Syr., Targ.), for poverty is called רִישׁ, רִישׁ, רָאשׁ; on the contrary, רֶשׁ, plur. רְשִׁים or רָאשִׁים, is used adjectively. Since now the adjct. רֶשׁ, 1 Sam. xii. 14, is also written רָאשׁ, it may be translated: Poor is he who . . . (Bertheau); but we much rather expect the statement of that which happens to such an one, thus: Poor will he be . . . רָאשׁ, 3 *præt.* = רֶשׁ, Ps. xxxiv. 11, with the same (grammatically incorrect) full writing as קָאם, Hos. x. 14. In the conception of the subject, כַּף-רמיה, after Jer. xlviii. 10, is interpreted as the accus. of the manner (Berth.: whoever works with sluggish hand); but since עֲשֶׂה רמיה (in another sense indeed: to practise cunning) is a common phrase, Ps. lii. 4, ci. 7, so also will כַּף-רמיה be regarded as the object: *qui agit manum remissam*, whoever carries or moves such a hand (Hitzig). In 4b working is placed opposite to bearing: the diligent hand makes rich, *ditat* or *divitias parit*; but not for itself (Gesen. and others: becomes rich), but for him who bears it. The diligent man is called חָרִיץ, from חָרַץ, to sharpen, for, as in ὀξύς, *acer*, sharpness is transferred to energy; the form is the same as חָלוֹק, smooth (for the *ā* is unchangeable, because recompensative), a kindred form to קָטוֹל like חָמוֹץ, and Arab. *fā'ûl* as *fashawsh*, a boaster, wind-bag, either of active (as חָנוֹן) or (as חָלוֹק, עֲפוֹר, חָרוֹץ, חָנוֹן) of passive signification.

Ver. 5. There is now added a proverb which, thus standing at the beginning of the collection, and connecting itself with ver. 1, stamps on it the character of a book for youth:

He that gathereth in summer is a wise son;

But he that is sunk in sleep in the time of harvest is a son that causeth shame.

Von Hofmann (*Schriftb.* ii. 2. 403) rightly interprets בֶּן מְשֻׁבֵּל and בֶּן מְבִישׁ, with Cocceius and others, as the subject, and not with Hitzig as predicate, for in nominal clauses the rule is to place the predicate before the subject; and since an accurate expression of the inverted relation would both times require הוּא referring to the subject, so we here abide by the usual syntax: he that gathers in summer time is . . . Also the relation of the members of the sentence, xix. 26, is a parallel from which it is evident that the misguided son is called מְבִישׁ as causing shame, although in מְבִישׁ

the idea to put to shame (=to act so that others are ashamed) and to act shamefully (disgracefully), as in השכיל the ideas to have insight and to act intelligently, lie into one another (cf. xiv. 35); the root-meaning of השכיל is determined after שָׁכַל, which from שָׁכַל, *complicare*, designates the intellect as the faculty of intellectual configuration. בּוֹשׁ, properly *disturbare*, proceeds from a similar conception as the Lat. *confundi* (*pudore*). קָצִיר and קִיץ fall together, for קִיץ (from קִיץ = קָץ, to be glowing hot) is just the time of the קָצִיר; *vid.* under Gen. viii. 22. To the activity of a thoughtful ingathering, אָגַר, for a future store (*vid.* vi. 7), stands opposed deep sleep, *i.e.* the state of one sunk in idleness. נָרַם means, as Schultens has already shown, *somno penitus obrui, omni sensu obstructo et oppilato quasi*, from נָרַם, to fill, to shut up, to conclude; the derivation (which has been adopted since Gesenius) from the Arab. word having the same sound, نَرَمَ, *stridere*, to shrill, to rattle (but not *stertere*, to snore), lies remote in the *Niph.*, and also contradicts the usage of the word, according to which it designates a state in which all free activity is bound, and all reference to the external world is interrupted; cf. תִּרְדָּמָה, xix. 15, of dulness, apathy, somnolency in the train of slothfulness. The LXX. has here one distich more than the Hebr. text.

Ver. 6. There now follow two proverbs regarding the blessings and the curses which come to men, and which flow forth from them. Here, however, as throughout, we take each proverb by itself, that it might not appear as if we had a tetrastich before us. The first of these two antithetic distichs is:

Blessings (come) on the head of the just;  
But violence covereth the mouth of the godless.

Blessings are, without being distinguished, bestowed as well as prayed for from above. Regarding the undistinguished uses of לְרֹאשׁ (of a recompense of reward), בְּרֹאשׁ (of penal recompense), and עַל-רֹאשׁ (especially of punishment), *vid.* under Gen. xlix. 26. If we understand, with Ewald, Bertheau, Elster, Zöckler, and others, the two lines after ver. 11, xix. 28, cf. x. 18: the mouth of the wicked covers (hides under a mask) violence, inasmuch as he speaks words of blessing while thoughts of malediction lurk behind them (Ps. lxii. 5), then we renounce the sharpness of the contrast. On the contrary, it is preserved if we interpret יָפִי as object: the violence that has gone out from it covereth the mouth

of the wicked, *i.e.* it falls back upon his foul mouth; or as Fleischer (and Oetinger almost the same) paraphrases it: the deeds of violence that have gone forth from them are given back to them in curses and maledictions, so that going back they stop, as it were, their mouth, they bring them to silence; for it is unnecessary to take פִּי synecdochically for פָּנָיו (cf. *e.g.* Ps. lxi. 8), since in בִּרְכוֹת 6a are perhaps chiefly meant blessings of thankful acknowledgment on the part of men, and the giving prominence to the mouth of the wicked from which nothing good proceeds is well accounted for. The parallels do not hinder us thus to explain, since parts of proverbs repeating themselves in the Book of Proverbs often show a change of the meaning (*vid.* p. 24 f.). Hitzig's conjecture, יִכְסֶה (better יִכְסֶה), is unnecessary; for elsewhere we read, as here, that חַמַּס (violence), *jure talionis*, covers, יִכְסֶה, the wicked, Hab. ii. 17, or that he, using "violence," therewith covers the whole of his external appearance, *i.e.* gives to it the branded impress of the unrighteousness he has done (*vid.* Köhler under Mal. ii. 16).

Ver. 7. Thus, as ver. 6 says how it goes with the righteous and the wicked in this life, so this verse tells how it fares with them after death:

The memory of the righteous remains in blessings,  
And the name of the godless rots.

The tradition regarding the writing of זָכַר with five (זָכַר) or six points (זָכַר) is doubtful (*vid.* Heidenheim in his ed. of the Penta-teuch, *Me'or Enajim*, under Ex. xvii. 14); the Cod. 1294 and old printed copies have here זָכַר. Instead of לְבָרָכָה, לְבָרָה might be used; the phrase הָיָה לְבָרָכָה (*opp.* הָיָה לְקָלָה, often used by Jeremiah), subordinate to the substantival clause, paraphrases the passive, for it expresses a growing to something, and thus the entrance into a state of endurance. The remembrance of the righteous endures after his death, for he is thought of with thankfulness (זִכְרָו = זָכַר, the usual appendix to the name of an honoured, beloved man who has died), because his works, rich in blessing, continue; the name of the godless, on the contrary, far from continuing fresh and green (Ps. lxi. 17) after his departure, becomes corrupt (רָקַב, from רָק, to be or to become thin, to dissolve in fine parts, *tabescere*), like a worm-eaten decayed tree (Isa. xl. 20). The Talmud explains it thus, *Joma* 38b: foulness comes over their name, so that we call no one after their name. Also the idea suggests itself, that his name becomes corrupt, as it were, with his

bones; the Mishna, at least *Ohaloth* ii. 1, uses רֶקֶב of the dust of corruption.

Ver. 8. There follows now a series of proverbs in which reference to sins of the mouth and their contrary prevails:

He that is wise in heart receives precepts;

But he that is of a foolish mouth comes to ruin.

A חֲכָמִים לֵב, wise-hearted, is one whose heart is חֲכָמִים, xxiii. 15; in a word, a נָבוֹן, a person of understanding or judgment, xvi. 21. Such an one does not make his own knowledge the *ne plus ultra*, nor does he make his own will the *noli me tangere*; but he takes commands, i.e. instructions directing or prohibiting, to which he willingly subordinates himself as the outflow of a higher knowledge and will, and by which he sets bounds and limits to himself. But a fool of the lips, i.e. a braggart blunderer, one pleasing himself with vain talk (xiv. 23), falls prostrate, for he thinks that he knows all things better, and will take no pattern; but while he boasts himself from on high, suddenly all at once—for he offends against the fundamental principle of common life and of morality—he comes to lie low down on the ground. The Syr. and Targ. translate יִלְכָּט by, he is caught (Bertheau, ensnared); Aquila, Vulgate, Luther, δαρήσεται, he is slain; Symmachus, βασανισθήσεται; but all without any support in the usage of the language known to us. Theodotion, φυρήσεται, he is confounded, is not tenable; Joseph Kimchi, who after David Kimchi, under Hos. iv. 14, appeals in support of this meaning (ישתבש, similarly Parchon: יתבלבל) to the Arabic, seems to think on *iltibās*, confusion. The demonstrable meanings of the verb לָבַט are the following: 1. To occasion trouble. Thus *Mechilta*, under Ex. xvii. 14, לָבַטוּהוּ, one has imposed upon him trouble; *Sifri*, under Num. xi. 1, נִחַלְבַטוּ, we are tired, according to which Rashi: he fatigues himself, but which fits neither to the subj. nor to the contrast, which is to be supposed. The same may be said of the meaning of the Syr. لَبَّ, to drive on, to press, which without doubt accords with the former meaning of the word in the language of the Midrash. 2. In Arab. *labat* (R. *lab*, vid. Wünsche's *Hos.* p. 172), to throw any one down to the earth, so that he falls with his whole body his whole length; the passive نَلَبَّ, to be thus thrown down by another, or to throw oneself thus down, figuratively of one who falls hopelessly into evil and destruction (Fl.). The Arabic verb is also used of the springing run of the animal ridden on (to gallop), and of the being lame (to hop), according to

which in the Lex. the explanations, he hurries, or he wavers hither and thither, are offered by Kimchi (*Græc. Venet. πλανηθήσεται*). But the former of these explanations, *corrui* (= *in calamitatem ruit*), placed much nearer by the Arabic, is confirmed by the LXX. ὑποσκελισθήσεται, and by the *Berêshith rabba*, c. 52, where לבט is used in the sense to be ruined (= נכשל). Hitzig changes the passive into the active: "he throws the offered לקח scornfully to the ground," but the contrast does not require this. The wanton, arrogant boasting lies already in the designation of the subj. אויל שפחים; and the sequel involves, as a consequence, the contrasted consequence of ready reception of the limitations and guidance of his own will by a higher.

Ver. 9. The form of this verse is like the eighth, word for word:

He that walketh in innocence walketh securely;  
But he that goeth in secret ways is known.

The full form of בָּתוֹם does not, as Hitzig supposes, stand in causal connection with the *Dechî*, for the consonant text lying before us is at least 500 years older than the accentuation. For הִלֵּךְ תוֹם at ii. 7, there is here הִלֵּךְ בָּתוֹם = הִלֵּךְ בְּדֶרֶךְ תוֹם; so מַעֲקֹשׁ דְּרָכָיו denotes, after ii. 15, such an one אֲשֶׁר דְּרָכָיו עֲקָשִׁים. Expressed in the language of the N. T., תוֹם is the property of the ἀπλούς or ἀκέραιος, for the fundamental idea of fulness is here referred to full submission, full integrity. Such an one goes בָּטח (Aquila, ἀμερίμνως), for there is nothing designedly concealed by him, of which he has reason to fear that it will come to the light; whoever, on the contrary, makes his ways crooked, i.e. turns into crooked ways, is perceived, or, as we might also explain it (*vid.* under Gen. iv. 15): if one (*qui* = *si quis*) makes his ways crooked, then it is known—nothing, however, stands opposed to the reference of יָדָע to the person: he is finally known, i.e. unmasked (LXX. Jerome, γνωσθήσεται, *manifestus fiet*). Usually it is explained: he is knowing, clever, with the remark that נודע is here the passive of הוֹדִיעַ (Gesén., Ewald, Hitzig); *Hiph.* to give to feel; *Niph.* to become to feel, properly to be made to know (Luth.: made wise); but the passive of the *Hiph.* is the *Hoph.* Such a *Niph.* in which the causative (not simply transitive) signification of the *Hiph.* would be applied passively is without example (*vid.* Ewald, § 133a); the meaning of Jer. xxxi. 19 also is: after I have become known, i.e. been made manifest, uncovered, drawn into the light.

Ver. 10. This verse contains another proverb, similarly formed, parallel with the half of ver. 8 :

He that winketh with the eye causeth trouble ;  
And a foolish mouth comes to ruin.

Regarding the winking or nipping, *i.e.* the repeated nipping of the eyes (cf. *nictare*, frequent. of *nicere*), as the conduct of the malicious or malignant, which aims at the derision or injury of him to whom it refers, *vid.* under vi. 13 ; there קרץ was connected with כ of the means of the action ; here, as Ps. xxxv. 19, cf. Prov. xvi. 30, it is connected with the object accus. He who so does produces trouble (heart-sorrow, xv. 13), whether it be that he who is the butt of this mockery marks it, or that he is the victim of secretly concerted injury ; יָדָא is not here used impersonally, as xiii. 10, but as xxix. 15, cf. Lev. xix. 28, xxiv. 20, in the sense of the cause. 10*b* forms a striking contrast to 10*a*, according to the text of the LXX. : ὁ δὲ ἐλέγχων μετὰ παρρησίας εἰρηνοποιεῖ. The Targ., however, abides, contrary to the Syr., by the Hebrew text, which certainly is older than this its correction, which Ewald and Lagarde unsuccessfully attempt to translate into Hebrew. The foolish mouth, here understood in conformity with 10*a*, is one who talks at random, without examination and deliberation, and thus suddenly stumbles and falls over, so that he comes to lie on the ground, to his own disgrace and injury.

Ver. 11. Another proverb, similar to the half of ver. 6 :

A fountain of life is the mouth of the righteous ;  
But the mouth of the godless hideth violence.

If we understand 11*b* wholly as 6*b* : *os improborum obteget violentia*, then the meaning of 11*a* would be, that that which the righteous speaks tends to his own welfare (Fl.). But since the words spoken are the means of communication and of intercourse, one has to think of the water as welling up in one, and flowing forth to another ; and the meaning of 11*b* has to accommodate itself to the preceding half proverb, whereby it cannot be mistaken that הָמָס (violence), which was 6*b* subj., bears here, by the contrast, the stamp of the obj. ; for the possibility of manifold windings and turnings is a characteristic of the Mashal. In the Psalms and Prophets it is God who is called מְקוֹר חַיִּים, Ps. xxxvi. 10, Jer. ii. 13, xvii. 13 ; the proverbial poetry plants the figure on ethical ground, and understands by it a living power, from which wholesome effects accrue to its possessor, xiv. 27, and go forth from him to others,

xiii. 14. Thus the mouth of the righteous is here called a fountain of life, because that which he speaks, and as he speaks it, is morally strengthening, intellectually elevating, and inwardly quickening in its effect on the hearers; while, on the contrary, the mouth of the godless covereth wrong (*violentiam*), i.e. conceals with deceitful words the intention, directed not to that which is best, but to the disadvantage and ruin of his neighbours; so that words which in the one case bring to light a ground of life and of love, and make it effectual, in the other case serve for a covering to an immoral, malevolent background.

Ver. 12. Another proverb of the different effects of hatred and of love:

Hate stirreth up strife,  
And love covereth all transgressions.

Regarding מְרִינִים, for which the *Kerî* elsewhere substitutes מְרִינִים, *vid.* under vi. 14. Hatred of one's neighbour, which is of itself an evil, has further this bad effect, that it calls forth hatred, and thus stirreth up strife, feuds, factions, for it incites man against man (cf. עָרַר, Job iii. 8); on the contrary, love covers not merely little errors, but also greater sins of every kind (כָּל-פְּשָׁעִים), viz. by pardoning them, concealing them, excusing them, if possible, with mitigating circumstances, or restraining them before they are executed. All this lies in the covering. James, however, gives it, v. 20, another rendering: love covers them, viz. from the eyes of a holy God; for it forgives them to the erring brother, and turns him from the error of his way. The LXX. improperly translate πάντας δὲ τοὺς μὴ φιλονεικοῦντας κελόπτει φιλία; but Peter (1 Pet. iv. 8) as well as James, but none of the Greek versions: ἡ ἀγάπη καλύψει πλήθος ἁμαρτιῶν. The Romish Church makes use of this passage as a proof for the introduction of the *fides formata*, viz. *caritate*, in justification, which is condemned in the *Apology of the Augsburg Confession*; and, indeed, the *multitudo peccatorum* is not meant of the sins of him who cherishes love, but of the sins of the neighbour. Sin stirs up hatred in men in their relation to one another; but love covers the already existing sins, and smooths the disturbances occasioned by them.

Ver. 13. There follow now two other proverbs on the use and abuse of speech:

On the lips of the man of understanding wisdom is found;  
And the rod for the back of the fool.

With Löwenstein, Hitzig, and others, it is inadmissible to regard יִשְׁבֵּט as second subject to הַמִּצֵּא. The mouth itself, or the word of the mouth, may be called a rod, viz. a rod of correction (Isa. xi. 4); but that wisdom and such a rod are found on the lips of the wise would be a combination and a figure in bad taste. Thus 13b is a clause by itself, as Luther renders it: "but a rod belongs to the fool's back;" and this will express a contrast to 13a, that while wisdom is to be sought for on the lips of the man of understanding (cf. Mal. ii. 7), a man devoid of understanding, on the contrary, gives himself to such hollow and corrupt talk, that in order to educate him to something better, if possible, the rod must be applied to his back; for, according to the Talmudic proverb: that which a wise man gains by a hint, a fool only obtains by a club. The rod is called יִשְׁבֵּט, from שָׁבַט, to be smooth, to go straight down (as the hair of the head); and the back גִּב, from גָּבַה, to be rounded, i.e. concave or convex.

Ver. 14 Wise men store up knowledge;

But the mouth of the fool is threatening destruction.

Ewald, Bertheau, Hitzig, Oetinger: "The mouth of the fool blunders out, and is as the sudden falling in of a house which one cannot escape from." But since מִהֲרָה is a favourite *Mishle*-word to denote the effect and issue of that which is dangerous and destructive, so the sense is perhaps further to be extended: the mouth of the fool is for himself (xiii. 3) and others a near, i.e. an always threatening and unexpectedly occurring calamity; unexpectedly, because suddenly he blunders out with his inconsiderate shame-bringing talk, so that such a fool's mouth is to every one a *præsens periculum*. As to יִצְפֵּנוּ, it is worthy of remark that in the Beduin, ضَفِنَ, *fut. i*, signifies to be still, to be thoughtful, to be absorbed in oneself (*vid.* Wetstein on Job, p. 281). According to Codd. and editions, in this correct, יִפֵּי is to be written instead of יִפֵּי אֵוִיל; *vid.* the law concerning the *Makkeph* in the three poetical books, Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 40.

A pair of proverbs regarding possession and gain.

Ver. 15. Regarding possession:

The rich man's wealth is his strong city;

The destruction of the poor is their poverty.

The first line=xviii. 11. One may render the idea according to that which is internal, and according to that which is external; and the proverb remains in both cases true. As עַל may mean, of itself alone,

power, as means of protection, or a bulwark (Ps. viii. 3), or the consciousness of power, high feeling, pride (Judg. v. 21); so קְרִיַּת עֵוֹל may be rendered as an object of self-confidence, and מִחֲתָה, on the contrary, as an object of terror (Jer. xlviii. 39): the rich man, to whom his estate (*vid.* on הֵן, p. 63) affords a sure reserve and an abundant source of help, can appear confident and go forth energetically; on the contrary, the poor man is timid and bashful, and is easily dejected and discouraged. Thus *e.g.* Oetinger and Hitzig. But the objective interpretation is allowable, and lies also much nearer: the rich man stands thus independent, changes and adversities cannot so easily overthrow him, he is also raised above many hazards and temptations; on the contrary, the poor man is overthrown by little misfortunes, and his despairing endeavours to save himself, when they fail, ruin him completely, and perhaps make him at the same time a moral outlaw. It is quite an experienced fact which this proverb expresses, but one from which the double doctrine is easily derived: (1) That it is not only advised, but also commanded, that man make the firm establishing of his external life-position the aim of his endeavour; (2) That one ought to treat with forbearance the humble man; and if he always sinks deeper and deeper, one ought not to judge him with unmerciful harshness and in proud self-exaltation.

Ver. 16. Regarding gain:

The gain of the righteous tendeth to life;  
The income of the godless to sin.

Intentionally, that which the righteous receives is called פְּעֻלָּה (as Lev. xix. 13), as a reward of his labour; that which the godless receives is called תְּבוּאָה, as income which does not need to be the reward of labour, and especially of his own immediate labour. And with לְחַטָּאת, לְחַיִּים runs parallel, from the supposition that sin carries the germ of death in itself. The reward of his labour serves to the righteous to establish his life, *i.e.* to make sure his life-position, and to elevate his life-happiness. On the contrary, the income of the godless serves only to ruin his life; for, made thereby full and confident, he adds sin to sin, whose wages is death. Hitzig translates: for expiation, *i.e.* to lose it again as atonement for past sins; but if חַיִּים and חַטָּאת are contrasted with each other, then חַטָּאת is death-bringing sin (viii. 35 f.).

The group of proverbs now following bring again to view the

good and bad effects of human speech. The seventeenth verse introduces the transition :

Ver. 17 There is a way to life when one gives heed to correction ;  
And whoever disregards instruction runs into error.

Instead of אֶרֶץ חַיִּים (v. 6), there is here אֶרֶץ לְחַיִּים ; and then this proverb falls into rank with ver. 16, which contains the same word לְחַיִּים. The accentuation denotes אֶרֶץ as subst. ; for אֶרֶץ [way, road] = אֶרֶץ [a wayfarer, part. of אָרַח] would, as שָׁסַע, Lev. xi. 7, נָטַע, Ps. xciv. 9, have the tone on the ultima. It is necessary neither to change the tone, nor, with Ewald, to interpret אֶרֶץ as *abstr. pro concreto*, like הֶלֶךְ, for the expression “wanderer to life” has no support in the *Mishle*. Michaelis has given the right interpretation : *via ad vitam est si quis custodiat disciplinam*. The syntactical contents, however, are different, as e.g. 1 Sam. ii. 13, where the participle has the force of a hypothetical clause ; for the expression : “a way to life is he who observes correction,” is equivalent to : he is on the way to life who . . ; a variety of the manner of expression : “the porch was twenty cubits,” 2 Chron. iii. 4, particularly adapted to the figurative language of proverbial poetry, as if the poet said : See there one observant of correction—that (viz. the שֹׁמֵר [שָׁמַר, to watch] representing itself in this שֹׁמֵר) is the way to life. מוֹסֵר and תּוֹכַחַת are related to each other as παιδεία and ἑλεγχος ; עֹזֵב [עָזַב, to leave, forsake] is equivalent to בִּלְתִּי שֹׁמֵר. מִתְּעָה would be unsuitable as a contrast in the causative sense : who guides wrong, according to which Bertheau understands 17a, that only he who observes correction can guide others to life. We expect to hear what injuries he who thinks to raise himself above all reproach brings on himself. Hitzig, in his Commentary (1858), for this reason places the *Hithpa*. מִתְּעָה (rather write מִתְּעָה) in the place of the *Hiph*. ; but in the *Comm. on Jeremiah* (1866), xlii. 20, he rightly remarks : “To err, not as an involuntary condition, but as an arbitrary proceeding, is suitably expressed by the *Hiph*.” In like manner הִנִּיעַ, הוֹסִיף (to touch), הִרְחִיק (to go to a distance), denote the active conduct of a being endowed with reason ; Ewald, § 122, c. Jewish interpreters gloss מִתְּעָה by supplying נִפְשִׁי ; but it signifies only as inwardly transitive, to accomplish the action of the תְּעוּת.

Ver. 18 He that hideth hatred is a mouth of falsehood ;  
And he that spreadeth slander is a fool.

The LXX., καλύπτουσιν ἔχθραν χεῖλα δίκαια, which Ewald pre-

fers, and which has given occasion to Hitzig to make a remarkable conjecture ("He who conceals hatred, close lips," which no one understands without Hitzig's comment. to this his conjecture). But (1) to hide hatred (cf. ver. 11, xxvi. 24) is something altogether different from to cover sin (ver. 12, xvii. 9), or generally to keep anything secret with discretion (x. 13); and (2) that *δίκαια* is a corrupt reading for *ἀδίκαια* (as Grabe supposes, and Symmachus translates) or *δόλια* (as Lagarde supposes, and indeed is found in Codd.). Michaelis well remarks: *odium tectum est dolosi, manifesta sycophantia stultorum*. Whoever conceals hateful feelings behind his words is שִׁפְתֵי-יִשְׁקָר, a mouth of falsehood (cf. the mouth of the fool, ver. 14); one does not need to supply אִישׁ, but much rather has hence to conclude that a false man is simply so named, as is proved by Ps. cxx. 3. There is a second moral judgment, 18b: he who spreadeth slander (וּמוֹצֵא, according to the Masoretic writing: he who divulges it, the correlate to הַבִּיא, to bring to, Gen. xxxvii. 2) is a *Thor* [fool, stupid, dull], כָּסִיל (not a *Narr* [fool, godless person], אָוִיל); for such slandering can generally bring no advantage; it injures the reputation of him to whom the רִפָּה, i.e. the secret report, the slander, refers; it sows discord, has incalculable consequences, and finally brings guilt on the tale-bearer himself.

Ver. 19 In a multitude of words transgression is not wanting;  
But he who restrains his lips shows wisdom.

We do not, with Bertheau, understand 19a: by many words a transgression does not cease to be what it is; the contrast 19b requires a more general condemnation of the multitude of words, and לֹא הָרַל not only means to cease from doing (to leave off), and to cease from being (to take away), but also not at all to do (to intermit, Ezek. iii. 11; Zech. xi. 12), and not at all to be (to fail, to be absent), thus: *ubi verborum est abundantia non deest peccatum* (Fl.). Michaelis suitably compares πολυλογία πολλὰ σφάλματα ἔχει by Stobäus, and כָּל הַמְרַבֵּה דְּבָרִים מְבִיא חֲטָא in the tractate *Aboth* i. 17, wherewith Rashi explains the proverb. פִּשְׁעַ is not here, as elsewhere, e.g. Ps. xix. 14, with special reference to the sin of falling away from favour, apostasy, but, like the post-biblical עֲבָרָה, generally with reference to every kind of violation (פִּשְׁעַ = فسق *dirumpere*) of moral restraint; here, as Jansen remarks, *peccatum sive mendacii, sive detractionis, sive alterius indiscretæ læsionis, sive*

*vanitatis, sive denique verbi otiosi.* In 19b it is more appropriate to regard מִשְׁכִּיל as the present of the internal transitive (*intelligenter agit*) than to interpret it in the attributive sense (*intelligens*).

Ver. 20 Choice silver is the tongue of the righteous ;  
But the heart of the godless is little worth.

Choice silver is, as viii. 19, cf. 10, pure, freed from all base mixtures. Like it, pure and noble, is whatever the righteous speaks ; the heart, *i.e.* the manner of thought and feeling, of the godless is, on the contrary, like little *instar nihili*, *i.e.* of little or no worth, Arab. *yasway kályla* (Fl.). LXX.: the heart of the godless ἐκλείψει, *i.e.* ימעט, at first arrogant and full of lofty plans, it becomes always the more dejected, discouraged, empty. But 20a leads us to expect some designation of its worth. The Targ. (according to which the Peshito is to be corrected; *vid.* Levy's *Wörterbuch*, ii. 26): the heart of the godless is מַחֲתָא (from נָחַת), refuse, dross. The other Greek versions accord with the text before us.

Ver. 21 The lips of the righteous edify many ;  
But fools die through want of understanding.

The LXX. translate 21a: the lips of the righteous ἐπίστανται ὑψηλά, which would at least require ירעו רבות רָעָה is, like the post-bibl. פְּרִיגִים (*vid.* the *Hebr. Römerbrief*, p. 97), another figure for the N. T. οἰκοδομεῖν: to afford spiritual nourishment and strengthening, to which Fleischer compares the ecclesiastical expressions: *pastor, ovile ecclesiae, les ouailles*; רָעָה means leader, Jer. x. 21, as well as teacher, Eccles. xii. 11, for it contains partly the prevailing idea of leading, partly of feeding. יָרְעִי stands for הִרְעִינָה, as ver. 32, v. 2. In 21b, Bertheau incorrectly explains, as Euchel and Michaelis: *stulti complures per dementem unum moriuntur*; the fool has truly enough in his own folly, and needs not to be first drawn by others into destruction. חָסֵר is not here the connective form of חָסֵרָה (Jewish interpreters: for that reason, that he is such an one), nor of חָסֵר (Hitzig, Zöckler), which denotes, as a concluded idea, *penuria*, but like רָחַב, xxi. 4, שָׁכַב, vi. 10, and שָׁפַל, xvi. 19, *infin.*: they die by want of understanding (cf. v. 23); this *amentia* is the cause of their death, for it leads fools to meet destruction without their observing it (Hos. iv. 6).

Three proverbs which say that good comes from above, and is as a second nature to the man of understanding:

Ver. 22 Jahve's blessing—it maketh rich ;  
And labour addeth nothing thereto

Like 24a, הַיָּא limits the predicate to this and no other subject: “all depends on God’s blessing.” Here is the first half of the *ora et labora*. The proverb is a compendium of Ps. cxxvii. 1, 2. 22b is to be understood, according to ver. 2 of this Solomonic psalm, not that God adds to His blessing no sorrow, much rather with the possession grants at the same time a joyful, peaceful mind (LXX., Targ., Syriac, Jerome, Aben-Ezra, Michaelis, and others), which would require the word עֲלִיָּה; but that trouble, labour, *i.e.* strenuous self-endeavours, add not (anything) to it, *i.e.* that it does not associate itself with the blessing (which, as the Jewish interpreters rightly remark, is, according to its nature, תוספת, as the curse is חסרון) as the *causa efficiens*, or if we supply *quidquam*, as the complement to עִמָּה [along with it]: nothing is added thereto, which goes along with that which the blessing of God grants, and completes it. Thus correctly Rashi, Luther, Ziegler, Ewald, Hitzig, Zöckler. The now current accentuation, וְלֹא יוֹסֵף עֲצֵב עִמָּה, is incorrect. Older editions, as Venice 1525, 1615, Basel 1618, have וְלֹא-יוֹסֵף עֲצֵב עִמָּה, the transformation of וְלֹא-יוֹסֵף עֲצֵב עִמָּה. Besides, עֲצֵב has double Segol (*vid.* Kimchi’s *Lex.*), and יוֹסֵף is written, according to the Masora, in the first syllable *plene*, in the last *defective*.

Ver. 23 Like sport to a fool is the commission of a crime ;  
And wisdom to a man of understanding.

Otherwise Löwenstein : to a fool the carrying out of a plan is as sport ; to the man of understanding, on the contrary, as wisdom. זָמָה, from זָמַם, to press together, mentally to think, as Job xvii. 11, and according to Gesenius, also Prov. xxi. 27, xxiv. 9. But זָמָה has the prevailing signification of an outrage against morality, a sin of unchastity ; and especially the phrase זָמָה עֵשָׂה is in Judg. xx. 6 and in Ezekiel not otherwise used, so that all the old interpreters render it here by *patrare scelus*; only the Targum has the equivocal עֵבֶר עֲבִידָתָא; the Syriac, however, ذنب جليل. Sinful conduct appears to the fool, who places himself above the solemnity of the moral law, as sport ; and wisdom, on the contrary, (appears as sport) to a man of understanding. We would not venture on this acceptance of בְּשִׁחוֹק if שִׁחָה were not attributed, viii. 30 f., to wisdom itself. This alternate relationship recommends itself by the indetermination of נְחִימָה, which is not favourable to the interpretation :

*sed sapientiam colit vir intelligens*, or as Jerome has it: *sapientia autem est viro prudentia*. The subjects of the antithesis chiasmatically combine within the verse: חכמה, in contrast to wicked conduct, is acting in accordance with moral principles. This to the man of understanding is as easy as sporting, just as to the fool is shameless sinning; for he follows in this an inner impulse, it brings to him joy, it is the element in which he feels himself satisfied.

Ver. 24 That of which the godless is afraid cometh upon him,  
And what the righteous desires is granted to him.

The formation of the clause 24a is like the similar proverb, xi. 27b; the subject-idea has there its expression in the genitival *annexum*, of which Gen. ix. 6b furnishes the first example; in this passage before us it stands at the beginning, and is, as in ver. 22, emphatically repeated with הִיא. מְנוּרָה, properly the turning oneself away, hence shrinking back in terror; here, as Isa. lxvi. 4, of the object of fear, parallel to תַּאֲוִיהָ, wishing, of the object of the wish. In 24b Ewald renders יֵתֵן as adj. from יָתַן (whence אֵיתָן), after the form פָּקַח, and translates: yet to the righteous desire is always green. But whether יֵתֵן is probably formed from יָתַן, and not from נָתַן, is a question in xii. 12, but not here, where wishing and giving (fulfilling) are naturally *correlata*. Hitzig corrects יֵתֵן, and certainly the supplying of 'ה' is as little appropriate here as at xiii. 21. Also a "one gives" is scarcely intended (according to which the Targ., Syr., and Jerome translate passively), in which case the Jewish interpreters are wont to explain יָתַן, *scil.* הִנּוּתָן; for if the poet thought of יָתַן with a personal subject, why did he not rescue it from the dimness of such vague generality? Thus, then, יָתַן is, with Böttcher, to be interpreted as impersonal, like xiii. 10, Job xxxvii. 10, and perhaps also Gen. xxxviii. 28 (Ewald, § 295a): what the righteous wish, that there is, *i.e.* it becomes actual, is fulfilled. In this we have not directly and exclusively to think of the destiny at which the godless are afraid (Heb. x. 27), and toward which the desire of the righteous goes forth; but the clause has also truth which is realized in this world: just that which they greatly fear, *e.g.* sickness, bankruptcy, the loss of reputation, comes upon the godless; on the contrary, that which the righteous wish realizes itself, because their wish, in its intention, and kind, and content, stands in harmony with the order of the moral world.

There now follows a series of proverbs, broken by only one dissimilar proverb, on the immoveable continuance of the righteous:

Ver. 25 When the storm sweeps past, it is no more with the wicked ;  
But the righteous is a building firm for ever.

How ver. 25 is connected with ver. 24 is shown in the Book of Wisdom v. 15 (the hope of the wicked like chaff which the wind pursues). The Aram., Jerome, and *Græc. Venet.* interpret כ of comparison, so that the destruction of the godless is compared in suddenness and rapidity to the rushing past of a storm ; but then רוח ought to have been used instead of סופה ; and instead of ואין רשע with the ו *apodosis*, a disturbing element in such a comparison, would have been used יהלך רשע, or at least רשע אין. The thought is no other than that of Job xxi. 18: the storm, which is called סופה, from סוף, to rush forth, is meant, as sweeping forth, and כ the temporal, as Ex. xi. 4 (LXX. παραπορευομένης κατανυγδος), with ו *apod.* following, like *e.g.*, after a similar member of a temporal sentence, Isa. x. 25. סופה is a figure of God-decreed calamities, as war and pestilence, under which the godless sink, while the righteous endure them ; cf. with 25a, i. 27, Isa. xxviii. 18; and with 25b, iii. 25, Hab. ii. 4, Ps. xci. "An everlasting foundation," since עולם is understood as looking forwards, not as at Isa. lviii. 12, backwards, is a foundation capable of being shaken by nothing, and synecdoch. generally a building. The proverb reminds us of the close of the Sermon on the Mount, and finds the final confirmation of its truth in this, that the death of the godless is a penal thrusting of them away, but the death of the righteous a lifting them up to their home. The righteous also often enough perish in times of war and of pestilence ; but the proverb, as it is interpreted, verifies itself, even although not so as the poet, viewing it from his narrow O. T. standpoint, understood it ; for the righteous, let him die when and how he may, is preserved, while the godless perishes.

Ver. 26. This proverb stands out of connection with the series :

As vinegar to the teeth, and as smoke to the eyes,  
So is the sluggard to them who give him a commission.

A parabolic proverb (*vid.* p. 9), *priamel*-like in its formation (p. 13). Here and there לְשֹׁנִים is found with *Mugrash*, but in correct texts it has *Rebîa-magnum* ; the verse is divided into two by *Athnach*, whose subordinate distributive is (*Accentssystem*, xi. § 1) *Rebîa-magnum*. Smoke makes itself disagreeably perceptible to the sense of smell, and particularly to the eyes, which it causes to smart so that they overflow with tears ; wherefore Virgil speaks of it as *amarus*, and Horace *lacrimosus*. חֲמִץ (from חָמַץ, to be sour,

harsh) signifies properly that which is sour, as *acetum*, ὄξος; here, after the LXX. ὄμφαξ, the unripe grapes, but which are called בֶּסֶר (בִּסֶּר) (*vid.* under Job xv. 33), by which the Syr., here following the LXX., translates, and which also in the Talmud, *Demaï* i. 1, is named חֲמֵץ, after a doubtful meaning (*vid.* Aruch, and on the other side Rashi), thus: vinegar, which the word commonly means, and which also accords with the object of the comparison, especially if one thinks of the sharp vinegar-wine of the south, which has an effect on the teeth denoted by the Hebr. verb כָּהה, as the effect of smoke is by כָּהה (Fl.). The plur. לִשְׁלָחִי is that of the category, like xxii. 21, xxv. 13; the parallel אֲרָנִי of the latter passage does not at least make it necessary to regard it, like this, as a *plur. excellentiæ* (Bertheau, Hitzig, Ewald). They who send a sluggard, *i.e.* who make him their agent, do it to their own sorrow; his slothfulness is for them, and for that which they have in view, of dull, *i.e.* slow and restrained, of biting, *i.e.* sensibly injurious operation.

From this point the proverbs fall into the series connecting themselves with ver. 25:

Ver. 27 The fear of Jahve multiplies the days of life;  
But the years of the godless are shortened.

This parable, like ver. 25, also corresponds with the O. T. standpoint, having in view the present life. The present-life history confirms it, for vice destroys body and soul; and the fear of God, which makes men contented and satisfied in God, is truly the right principle of longevity. But otherwise also the pious often enough die early, for God carries them away מפני הרעה [from the face of the evil], Isa. lvii. 1 f.; or if they are martyrs for the truth (Ps. xliv. 23, cf. lx. 6), the verification of the above proverb in such cases moves forward (Wisd. iv. 7 ff.) into eternity, in which the life of the pious continues for ever, while that of the godless loses itself with his death in the state of everlasting death. ix. 11, cf. iii. 2, resembles 27a. Instead of תִּקְצְרֶנָּה, תִּקְצְרֶנָּה was to be expected; but the flexion does not distinguish the transitive קָצַר (Arab. *kašara*) and intransitive קָצַר (Arab. *kašura*) as it ought.

Ver. 28 The expectation of the righteous is gladness,  
And the hope of the godless comes to nothing.

תִּחְלָה as well as תִּקְוָה proceed on the fundamental idea of a strained earnest looking back upon something, the same fundamental idea which in another view gives the meaning of strength (חֵיל, Arab. *hayl*; *kuwwat*, *kawiyy*, cf. גִּדְל, Arab. *jdl*, *plectere*, and גִּדְלוֹ, *strong* and

*strength*). The substantival clause 28a denotes nothing more than : it is gladness (cf. iii. 17, all their steps are gladness), but which is equivalent to, it is that in its issue, *in gaudium desinit*. Hitzig's remark that תהלת is the chief idea for hope and fear, is not confirmed by the usage of the language ; it always signifies joyful, not anxious, expectation ; cf. the interchange of the same two synonyms xiii. 7, and תצית, Ps. cxii. 10, instead of תקות (here and Job viii. 13). While the expectation of the one terminates in the joy of the fulfilment, the hope of the other (אכר, R. בר, to separate) perishes, i.e. comes to nothing.

Ver. 29 Jahve's way is a bulwark to the righteous ;  
But ruin to those that do evil.

Of the two meanings which מעו (מעו) has : a stronghold from עו, and asylum (= Arab. *m'adz*) from עו, the contrast here demands the former. 'ירק' and 'יראת ה', understood objectively, are the two O. T. names of true religion. It means, then, the way which the God of revelation directs men to walk in (Ps. cxliii. 8), the way of His precepts, Ps. cxix. 27, His way of salvation, Ps. lxvii. 3 (4) ; in the N. T. ἡ ὁδὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, Matt. xxii. 16, Acts xviii. 25 f. ; cf. ἡ ὁδὸς simply, Acts ix. 2, xxiv. 14. This way of Jahve is a fortress, bulwark, defence for innocence, or more precisely, a disposition wholly, i.e. unreservedly and without concealment, directed toward God and that which is good. All the old interpreters, also Luther, but not the *Græc. Venet.*, translate as if the expression were לתם ; but the punctuation has preferred the *abstr. pro concreto*, perhaps because the personal תם nowhere else occurs with any such prefix ; on the contrary, תם is frequently connected with ב, כ, ל. לתם דרך, *integro viæ (vitæ)*, are by no means to be connected in one conception (Ziegler, Umbr., Elster), for then the poet ought to have written מעו יהוה לתם-דרך. 29b cannot be interpreted as a thought by itself : and ruin (*vid.* regarding מחרתה, *ruina*, and subjectively *consternatio*, ver. 16) comes to those who do evil ; but the thought, much more comprehensive, that religion, which is for the righteous a strong protection and safe retreat, will be an overthrow to those who delight only in wickedness (*vid.* on אף, p. 143), is confirmed by the similarly formed distich, xxi. 15. Also almost all the Jewish interpreters, from Rashi to Malbim, find here expressed the operation of the divine revelation set over against the conduct of men,—essentially the same as when the Tora or the Chokma present to men for their choice life and death ; or the gospel of salvation,

according to 2 Cor. ii. 15, is to one the savour of life unto life, to another the savour of death unto death.

Ver. 30 The righteous is never moved ;  
But the godless abide not in the land.

Love of home is an impulse and emotion natural to man ; but to no people was fatherland so greatly delighted in, to none was exile and banishment from fatherland so dreadful a thought, as it was to the people of Israel. Expatriation is the worst of all evils with which the prophets threatened individuals and the people, Amos vii. 17, cf. Isa. xxii. 17 f. ; and the history of Israel in their exile, which was a punishment of their national apostasy, confirms this proverb and explains its form ; cf. ii. 21 f., Ps. xxxvii. 29. בל is, like ix. 13, the emphatic No of the more elevated style ; נמוט, the opposite of נכון, xii. 3 ; and שכן signifies to dwell, both inchoative : to come to dwell, and consecutive : to continue to dwell (e.g. Isa. lvii. 15, of God who inhabiteth eternity). In general, the proverb means that the righteous fearlessly maintains the position he takes ; while, on the contrary, all they who have no hold on God lose also their outward position. But often enough this saying is fulfilled in this, that they, in order that they may escape disgrace, became wanderers and fugitives, and are compelled to conceal themselves among strangers.

Ver. 31. For the third time the favourite theme already handled in three appendixes is taken up :

The mouth of the righteous bringeth forth wisdom,  
And the tongue of falsehood shall be rooted up.

Regarding the biblical comparison of thoughts with branches, and of words with flowers and fruits, *vid.* my *Psychol.* p. 181 ; and regarding the root נב (with its weaker אב), to swell up and to spring up (to well, grow, etc.), *vid.* what is said in the *Comm. on Genesis* on נביא, and in *Isaiah* on אוב. We use the word נוב of that which sprouts or grows, and נבב of that which causes that something sprout ; but also נוב may, after the manner of verbs of being full (iii. 10), of flowing (Gesen. § 138, 1, Anm. 2), take the object accus. of that from which anything sprouts (xxiv. 31), or which sprouting, it raises up and brings forth (cf. Isa. lvii. 19). The mouth of the righteous sprouts, brings forth (in Ps. xxxvii. 30, without a figure, יִהְיֶה, i.e. utters) wisdom, which in all relations knows how to find out that which is truly good, and suitable for the end intended, and happily to unriddle difficult complications.

The conception of wisdom, in itself practical (from חכם, to be thick = solid, firm), here gains such contents by the contrast: the tongue—whose character and fruit is falsehood, which has its delight in intentional perversions of fact, and thus increaseth complications (*vid.* regarding תהפכות, ii. 12)—is rooted up, whence it follows as regards the mouth of the righteous, that it continues for ever with that its wholesome fruit.

Ver. 32 The lips of the righteous know what is acceptable;  
But the mouth of the godless is mere falsehood.

Hitzig, instead of יָדַעַן, reads יִבְעַן; the ἀποστᾶζει [they distil or send forth] of the LXX. does not favour this, for it is probably only a corruption of ἐπίσταται, which is found in several MSS. The *Græc. Venet.*, which translates ποιμανοῦσι, makes use of a MS. which it sometimes misreads. The text does not stand in need of any emendations, but rather of a corrected relation between the clauses, for the relation of 31*a* with 32*b*, and of 32*a* with 31*b*, strongly commends itself (Hitzig); in that case the explanation lies near: the lips of the righteous find what is acceptable, viz. to God. But this thought in the Mashal language is otherwise expressed (xii. 2 and paral.); and also 32*a* and 32*b* fit each other as contrasts, if by רָצוֹן, as xi. 27, xiv. 9, is to be understood that which is acceptable in its widest generality, equally then in relation to God and man. It is a question whether יָדַעַן means that they have knowledge of it (as one *e.g.* says יָדַע כִּפּוּר, to understand writing, *i.e.* the reading of it), or that they think thereupon (cf. xxvii. 23). Fundamentally the two ideas, according to the Hebrew conception of the words, lie in each other; for the central conception, perceiving, is biblically equivalent to a delighted searching into or going towards the object. Thus: the lips of the righteous think of that which is acceptable (רָצוֹן, cogn. to חן, gracefulness; χάρις, Col. iv. 6); while the mouth of the godless is mere falsehood, which God (the wisdom of God) hates, and from which discord on all sides arises. We might transfer יָדַעַן to 32*b*; but this line, interpreted as a clause by itself, is stronger and more pointed (Fl.)

The next three proverbs treat of honesty, discretion, and innocence or dove-like simplicity:

xi. 1 Deceitful balances are an abomination to Jahve;  
But a full weight is His delight.

The very same proverb, with slightly varied expression, is found in xx. 23; and other such like proverbs, in condemnation of false

and in approbation of true balances, are found, xx. 10, xvi. 11; similar predicates, but connected with other subjects, are found at xii. 22, xv. 8. "An abomination to Jahve" is an expression we have already twice met with in the introduction, iii. 32, vi. 16, cf. viii. 7; *תועבה* is, like *תועה*, a participial noun, in which the active conception of abhorring is transferred to the action accomplished. *רצון* is in post-biblical Hebr. the designation of the *arbitrium* and the *voluntas*; but here *רצונו* signifies not that which God wishes, but that which He delights in having. "*מְרָמָה*" (here for the first time in Proverbs), from *רָמָה*, the *Piel* of which means (xxvi. 19) *aliquem dolo et fraude petere*. *אֶבֶן*, like the Pers. *sanak*, *sanakh*, Arab. *sajat*, a stone for weight; and finally, without any reference to its root signification, like Zech. v. 8, *אבן העופרת*, a leaden weight, as when we say: a horseshoe of gold, a chess-man of ivory."

Ver. 2. Now follows the Solomonic "Pride goeth before a fall."

There cometh arrogance, so also cometh shame;  
But with the humble is wisdom.

Interpreted according to the Hebr.: if the former has come, so immediately also comes the latter. The general truth as to the causal connection of the two is conceived of historically; the fact, confirmed by many events, is represented in the form of a single occurrence as a warning example; the preterites are like the Greek *aoristi gnomici* (*vid.* p. 32); and the perf., with the *fut. consec.* following, is the expression of the immediate and almost simultaneous consequence (*vid.* at Hab. iii. 10): has haughtiness (*זָרָו*) after the form *לָצוֹן*, from *זָרַר*, to boil, to run over) appeared, then immediately also disgrace appeared, in which the arrogant behaviour is overwhelmed. The harmony of the sound of the Hebr. *זָרָו* and *קָלֹן* cannot be reproduced in German [nor in English]; Hitzig and Ewald try to do so, but such a *quid pro quo* as "*Kommt Unglimpf kommt an ihn Schimpf*" [there comes arrogance, there comes to him disgrace] is not a translation, but a distortion of the text. If, now, the antithesis says that with the humble is wisdom, wisdom is meant which avoids such disgrace as arrogance draws along with it; for the *פְּנוּיָה* thinks not more highly of himself than he ought to think (R. *צָן*, *subsiedere, demitti*, *Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitsch.* xxv. 185).

Ver. 3 The integrity of the upright guideth them;

But the perverseness of the ungodly destroyeth them.

To the upright, *יֵשָׁרִים*, who keep the line of rectitude without turn-

ing aside therefrom into devious paths (Ps. cxxv. 4 f.), stand opposed (as at ii. 21 f.) the ungodly (faithless), בְּנֵי־יָם, who conceal (from בָּנָה, to cover, whence בְּנֵי־יָם = בְּסוֹת) malicious thoughts and plans. And the contrast of תְּמִימָה, integrity = unreserved loving submission, is הִלָּף, a word peculiar to the Solomonic Mashal, with its verb הִלָּף (vid. p. 32). Hitzig explains it by the Arab. *saraf*, to step out, to tread over; and Ewald by *lafat*, to turn, to turn about ("treacherous, false step"), both of which are improbable. Schultens compares *salaf* in the meaning to smear (R. לָב, לָה, ἀλείφειν; cf. regarding such secondary formations with שׁ preceding, Hupfeld on Ps. v. 7), and translates here, *lubricitas*. But this rendering is scarcely admissible. It has against it lexical tradition (Menahem: מוֹטָה, wavering; Parchon: הוֹיָה, falsifying; Kimchi: עוֹמָה, misrepresentation, according to which the *Græc. Venet.* σκολιότης), as well as the methodical comparison of the words. The Syriac has not this verbal stem, but the Targum has הִלָּף in the meaning to distort, to turn the wrong way (σκολιούν, στρεβλούν), Prov. x. 10, and Esth. vi. 10, where, in the second Targum, בְּהִלָּף means "his mouth was crooked." With justice, therefore, Gesenius in his *Thesaurus* has decided in favour of the fundamental idea *pervertere*, from which also the Peshito and Saadia proceed; for in Ex. xxiii. 8 they translate (Syr.) *mhapék* (it, the gift of bribery, perverts) and (Arab.) *tazyf* (= הִלָּף, it falsifies). Fl. also, who at xv. 4 remarks, "הִלָּף, from הִלָּף, to stir up, to turn over, so that the lowermost becomes the uppermost," gives the preference to this primary idea, in view of the Arab. *salaf*, *invertere terram conserendi causa*. It is moreover confirmed by *salaf*, *præcedere*, which is *pervertere* modified to *prævertere*. But how does הִלָּף mean *perversio* (Theod. ὑποσκελισμός), in the sense of the overthrow prepared for thy neighbour? The parallels demand the sense of a condition peculiar to the word and conduct of the godless (treacherous), xxii. 12 (cf. Ex. xxiii. 8), xix. 3, thus *perversitas*, perversity; but this as contrary to truth and rectitude (*opp.* תְּמִימָה), "perverseness," as we have translated it, for we understand by it want of rectitude (dishonesty) and untruthfulness. While the sincerity of the upright conducts them, and, so to say, forms their *salvus conductus*, which guards them against the danger of erring and of hostile assault, the perverseness of the treacherous destroys them; for the disfiguring of truth avenges itself against them, and they experience the reverse of the proverb,

“*das Ehrlich währt am längsten*” (honesty endures the longest). The *Chethîb* וְשֹׂדֵם (וְשָׂדֵם) is an error of transcription; the *Kerî* has the proper correction, וְשֹׂדֵם = וְשָׂדֵם, Jer. v. 6. Regarding שֹׂדֵד (whence שֹׂדֵד), which, from its root-signification of making close and fast, denotes violence and destruction, *vid.* under Gen. xvii.

Three proverbs in praise of צִדְקָה:

Ver. 4 Possessions are of no profit in the day of wrath;  
But righteousness delivereth from death.

That which is new here, is only that possessions and goods (*vid.* regarding הֶון, p. 63) are destitute of all value in the day of the μέλλουσα ὀργή; for יוֹם עֲבָרָה, the day of wrath breaking through the limits (of long-suffering), has the same meaning as in the prophets; and such prophetic words as Isa. x. 3, Zeph. i. 18, and, almost in the same words, Ezek. vii. 19, are altogether similar to this proverb. The LXX., which translates ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐπαγωγῆς, harmonizes in expression with Sir. v. 8, cf. ii. 2. Theodotion translates אֵי, xxvii. 10, by ἐπαγωγῆ (providence, fate).

Ver. 5 The righteousness of the blameless smootheth his way,  
And by his own wickedness doth the wicked fall.

With the תָּמִים (cf. i. 12), formed after the passive, more than with תָּם, is connected the idea of the perfected, but more in the negative sense of moral spotlessness than of moral perfection. The rectitude of a man who seeks to keep his conscience and his character pure, maketh smooth (יָשַׁר, as iii. 6, not of the straightness of the line, but of the surface, evenness) his life's path, so that he can pursue his aim without stumbling and hindrance, and swerving from the direct way; while, on the contrary, the godless comes to ruin by his godlessness—that by which he seeks to forward his interests, and to make a way for himself, becomes his destruction.

Ver. 6 The rectitude of the upright saveth them,  
And in their own covetousness are the faithless taken.

The integrity of those who go straight forward and straight through, without permitting themselves to turn aside on crooked ways, delivers them from the snares which are laid for them, the dangers they encounter; while, on the contrary, the faithless, though they mask their intentions ever so cunningly, are ensnared in their passionate covetousness: the mask is removed, they are convicted, and are caught and lost. Regarding תְּהוֹמָה, abyss, overthrow, also stumbling against anything = covetousness, *vid.* at x. 3, and under Ps. v. 10. The form of the expression 6b follows the scheme, “in

the image of God created He man," Gen. ix. 6. The subject is to be taken from the genitive, as is marked by the accentuation, for it gives *Mugrash* to the גִּבְהֹנָה, as if it were the principal form, for גִּבְהֹנָה.

Three proverbs regarding destruction and salvation :

Ver. 7 When a godless man dies, his hope cometh to nought,  
And the expectation of those who stand in fulness of strength  
is destroyed.

We have already remarked in the Introduction that אָדָם is a favourite word of the Chokma, and the terminological distinction of different classes and properties of men (*vid.* pp. 40, 42); we read, vi. 12, אָדָם בְּלִיעַל, and here, as also Job xx. 29, xxvii. 13, אָדָם רָשָׁע, cf. xxi. 29, אִישׁ רָשָׁע, but generally only רָשָׁע is used. A godless man, to whom earthly possessions and pleasure and honour are the highest good, and to whom no means are too base, in order that he may appease this his threefold passion, rocks himself in unbounded and measureless hopes; but with his death, his hope, *i.e.* all that he hoped for, comes to nought. The LXX. translate τελευτήσαντος ἀνδρὸς δικαίου οὐκ ὀλλυται ἐλπίς, which is the converse of that which is here said, 7a: the hope of the righteous expects its fulfilment beyond the grave. The LXX. further translate, τὸ δὲ καύχημα (תְּהִלָּה) τῶν ἀσεβῶν ὀλλυται; but the distich in the Hebr. text is not an antithetic one, and whether אֹנִיָּם may signify the wicked (thus also the Syr., Targ., Venet., and Luther), if we regard it as a brachyology for אֹנִיָּם רָשָׁעִים, or as the plur. of an adj. אֹנִי, after the form טֹב (Elazar b. Jacob in Kimchi), or wickedness (Zöckler, with Hitzig, "the wicked expectation"), is very questionable. Yet more improbable is Malbim's (with Rashi's) rendering of this אֹנִיָּם, after Gen. xlix. 3, Ps. lxxviii. 51, and the Targ. on Job xviii. 12, of the children of the deceased; children *gignuntur ex robore virili*, but are not themselves the *robur virile*. But while אֹנִיָּם is nowhere the plur. of אֹנִי in its ethical signification, it certainly means in Ps. lxxviii. 51, as the plur. of אֹנִי, manly strength, and in Isa. xl. 26, 29 the fulness of strength generally, and once, in Hos. ix. 4, as plur. of אֹנִי in its physical signification, derived from its root-meaning *anhelitus* (Gen. xxxv. 18, cf. Hab. iii. 7), deep sorrow (a heightening of the אֹנִי, Deut. xxvi. 14). This latter signification has also been adopted: Jerome, *expectatio sollicitorum*; Bertheau, "the expectation of the sorrowing;" Ewald, "continuance of sorrow;" but the meaning of this

in this connection is so obscure, that one must question the translators what its import is. Therefore we adhere to the other rendering, "fulness of strength," and interpret אֹנִים as the opposite of אִין אֹנִים, Isa. xl. 29, for it signifies, *per metonymiam abstracti pro concr.*, those who are full of strength; and we gain the meaning that there is a sudden end to the expectation of those who are in full strength, and build their prospects thereon. The two synonymous lines complete themselves, in so far as אֹנִים gains by אִדם רִשָּׁע the associated idea of self-confidence, and the second strengthens the thought of the first by the transition of the expression from the fut. to the preterite (Fl.). וְתוֹחֶלֶת has, for the most part in recent impressions, the *Mugrash*; the correct accentuation, according to codices and old impressions, is וְתוֹחֶלֶת אֹנִים (*vid.* Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 10, § 4).

Ver. 8 The righteous is delivered from trouble,  
And the godless comes in his stead.

The succession of the tenses gives the same meaning as when, periodizing, we say: while the one is delivered, the other, on the contrary, falls before the same danger. נִחַלֵּץ (*vid.* under Isa. lviii. 11) followed by the historical tense, the expression of the principal fact, is the perfect. The statement here made clothes itself after the manner of a parable in the form of history. It is true there are not wanting experiences of an opposite kind (from that here stated), because divine justice manifests itself in this world only as a prelude, but not perfectly and finally; but the poet considers this, that as a rule destruction falls upon the godless, which the righteous with the help of God escapes; and this he realizes as a moral motive. In itself תַּחֲתֵּי may also have only the meaning of the exchange of places, but the LXX. translate ἀντ' αὐτοῦ, and thus in the sense of representation the proverb appears to be understood in connection with xxi. 18 (*cf.* the prophetic-historical application, Isa. xliii. 4). The idea of atonement has, however, no application here, for the essence of atonement consists in the offering up of an innocent one in the room of the guilty, and its force lies in the offering up of self; the meaning is only, that if the divinely-ordained linking together of cause and effect in the realms of nature and of history brings with it evil, this brings to the godless destruction, while it opens the way of deliverance for the righteous, so that the godless becomes for the righteous the

כִּפְּר, or, as we might say in a figure of similar import, the lightning conductor.

Ver. 9 The wicked with his mouth prepareth destruction for his neighbour;  
But by knowledge the righteous are delivered from it.

The LXX. translate, ἐν στόματι ἀσεβῶν παγίς (תִּשְׁ?) πολίταις, αἰσθησις δὲ δικαίοις εὐδοξ (יִצְלַח). There is no reason for changing (with Hitzig and Ewald) the text, which in the form in which it is here translated was before all other translators (Aq., Symmachus, Theodotion, Syr., Targ., Jerome). The accentuation, which separates the two instrumental statements by greater disjunctives from that which follows, is correct. The "three" Greek versions [viz. of Aquila, Theodotion, and Symmachus] translate תִּכְּרִי by ὑποκριτής, which it means in the modern idiom; but in the ancient Hebr. it signifies, him who is resolved upon evil, as in Arab. *hanyf*, him who is resolved upon that which is right: he who turns aside to evil enters on a path far removed from that which is right. In יִשְׁחִית one is reminded (without any etymological reason) of שָׁחַת (pit), and so in יִחַלְצֵנִי of מִשְׁחִיתוֹתָם (Ps. cvii. 20) or a similar word; but בְּרַעַת contains the reference, in this connection not easy to be mistaken, to the hostile purposes of the wicked masked by the words of the mouth, which are seen through by the righteous by virtue of knowledge which makes them acquainted with men. This penetrating look is their means of deliverance.

Three proverbs follow relating to the nature of city and national life, and between them two against mockery and backbiting:

Ver. 10 In the prosperity of the righteous the city rejoiceth;  
And if the wicked come to ruin, there is jubilation.

The כּ of בְּטוֹב denotes the ground but not the object, as elsewhere, but the cause of the rejoicing, like the כּ, 10b, and in the similar proverb, xxix. 2, cf. xxviii. 12. If it goes well with the righteous, the city has cause for joy, because it is for the advantage of the community; and if the wicked (godless) come to an end, then there is jubilation (substantival clause for תִּהְיֶה), for although they are honoured in their lifetime, yet men breathe freer when the city is delivered from the tyranny and oppression which they exercised, and from the evil example which they gave. Such proverbs, in which the city (*civitas*) represents the state, the πόλις the πολιτεία, may, as Ewald thinks, be of earlier date than the days of an Asa or Jehoshaphat; for "from the days of Moses and Joshua to the days of David and Solomon, Israel was a great nation, divided

indeed into many branches and sections, but bound together by covenant, whose life did not at all revolve around one great city alone." We value such critical judgments according to great historical points of view, but confess not to understand why קִרְיָה must just be the chief city and may not be any city, and how on the whole a language which had not as yet framed the conception of the state (post-bibl. מְדִינָה), when it would describe the community individually and as a whole, could speak otherwise than of city and people.

Ver. 11 By the blessing of the upright a city is exalted,  
But by the mouth of the godless it is broken down.

This verse is related, in the way of confirming it, to ver. 10. The LXX., which omits ver. 4, here omits 10*b* and 11*a*, and combines 10*a* and 11*b* into one proverb (*vid.* Lagarde). The meaning is clear: "by the benedictions and pious prayers of the upright a city rises always to a higher eminence and prosperity; while, on the contrary, the deceitful, arrogant, blasphemous talk of the godless brings ruin to it" (Fl.). The nearest contrast to "by the blessing of the upright" would be "by the cursing of the wicked," but not in the sense of the poet, who means to say that the city raises itself by the blessing of the upright, and on the contrary, when godless men are exalted, then by their words (whose blessing is no better than their curse) it comes to ruin. קָרָה (= קִרְיָה) occurs only four times in Proverbs, and in Job xxix. 7.

Ver. 12. There now follow two proverbs which refer to the intercourse of private life.

He who mocketh his neighbour is devoid of understanding;  
But the intelligent man remaineth silent.

xiv. 21 is a proverb similarly beginning with בֶּן לִרְעוּהוּ; xiii. 13 is another beginning with בֶּן לְדַבֵּר. From this one sees that בֶּן לְ (cf. בֶּן לְ, Isa. xxxvii. 22) does not mean a speaking contemptuously in one's presence; as also from vi. 30, that contemptuous treatment, which expresses itself not in mockery but in insult, is thus named; so that we do not possess a German [nor an English] expression which completely covers it. Whoever in a derisive or insulting manner, whether it be publicly or privately, degrades his neighbour, is unwise (חָסִיד-לֵב as pred., like vi. 32); an intelligent man, on the contrary, keeps silent, keeps his judgment to himself, abstains from arrogant criticisms, for he knows that he is not infallible, that he is not acquainted with the heart, and he pos-

sesses too much self-knowledge to raise himself above his neighbour as a judge, and thinks that contemptuous rejection, unamiable, reckless condemnation, does no good, but on the contrary does evil on all sides.

Ver. 13 He who goeth about tattling revealeth secrets ;

But he who is of a faithful spirit concealeth a matter.

The tattler is called רָבִיל (intensive form of רָבַל), from his going hither and thither. אֲנָשֵׁי רָבִיל, Ezek. xxii. 9, are men given to tattling, backbiters ; הוֹלֵךְ רָבִיל (cf. Lev. xix. 16), one of the tattlers or backbiters goes, a divulger of the matter, a tell-tale. It is of such an one that the proverb speaks, that he reveals the secret (סֹד, properly the being close together for the purpose of private intercourse, then that intercourse itself, *vid.* at Ps. xxv. 14) ; one has thus to be on his guard against confiding in him. On the contrary, a נֶאֱמָן-רוּחַ, *firmus (fidus) spiritu*, properly one who is established, or reflexively one who proves himself firm and true (*vid.* at Gen. xv. 6), conceals a matter, keeps it back from the knowledge and power of another. Zöckler rightly concludes, in opposition to Hitzig, from the parallelism that the הוֹלֵךְ רָבִיל is subject ; the arrangement going before also shows that this is the "ground-word" (Ewald) ; in xx. 19a the relation is reversed : the revealer of secrets is rightly named (cf. Sir. xxvii. 16, ὁ ἀποκαλύπτων μυστήρια, κ.τ.λ.).

Ver. 14 Where there is no direction a people fall ;

But where there is no want of counsellors there is safety.

Regarding תְּחִבָּלוֹת, *vid.* at i. 5. There it means rules of self-government ; here, rules for the government of the people, or, since the *pluralet.* denotes a multiplicity in unity, circumspect κυβένησεις. With 14b, xxiv. 6b (where direction in war, as here in peace, is spoken of, and the meaning of the word specializes itself accordingly) agrees ; cf. also xv. 22b. Hitzig criticises the proverb, remarking, "we who have the longest resorted to many counsellors, as a consequence of the superabundance have learned to say, 'Too many cooks spoil the broth,' and, 'He who asks long, errs.' " But the truth of the clause 14b is in modern times more fully illustrated in the region of ecclesiastical and political affairs ; and in general it is found to be true that it is better with a people when they are governed according to the laws and conclusions which have resulted from the careful deliberation of many competent and authorized men, than when their fate is entrusted

unconditionally to one or to a few. The proverb, it must be acknowledged, refers not to counsellors such as in Isa. iii. 3, but as in Isa. i. 26.

Ver. 15. There follow now two proverbs regarding kindness which brings injury and which brings honour :

It fares ill, nothing but ill, with one who is surety for another ;  
But he who hateth suretyship remaineth in quietness.

More closely to the original : It goes ill with him ; for the proverb is composed as if the writer had before his eyes a definite person, whom one assails when he for whom he became security has not kept within the limits of the performance that was due. Regarding עֶרֶב with the accus. of the person : to represent one as a surety for him, and יָר as denoting the other (the stranger), *vid.* at vi. 1. The meaning of רַע יֵרֹעַ is seen from xx. 16a. יֵרֹעַ is, like xiii. 20, the *fut. Niph.* of רָעַע, or of רֹעַ = רָעַע, after the forms יַעֲוֹר, יַמּוֹל (Olsh. § 265e). The added רַע has, like עֲרִיָּה, Hab. iii. 9, the same function as the *inf. absol.* (*intensivus*) ; but as the *infin.* form רַע could only be *inf. constr.* after the form יִשָּׁה, Jer. v. 26, the *infinitive absol.* must be רֹעַ : thus רַע is an accus., or what is the same, an adverbial adj. : he is badly treated (maltreated) in a bad way, for one holds him to his words and, when he cannot or will not accomplish that which is due in the room of him for whom he is bail, arrests him. He, on the contrary, who hates תּוֹקְעִים has good rest. The persons of such as become surety by striking the hands cannot be meant, but perhaps people thus becoming surety by a hand-stroke,—such sureties, and thus such suretyship, he cannot suffer ; תּוֹקְעִים approaches an abstract [“striking hands,” instead of “those who strike hands”] in connection with this שִׁנָּא, expressing only a strong impossibility, as חֲבָלִים, Zech. ii. 7, 14, means uniting together in the sense of combination.

Ver. 16 A gracious woman retaineth honour,  
And strong men retain riches.

The LXX. had אִשָּׁת חַיִּל (not אִשָּׁת חֵיל) in view : γυνὴ εὐχάριστος ἐγγείρει ἀνδρὶ δόξαν,—this ἀνδρὶ is an interpolation inserted for the sake of the added line, θρόνος δὲ ἀτιμίας γυνὴ μισοῦσα δίκαια. The proverb thus expanded is on both sides true : an amiable woman (*gratiosa*) brings honour to her husband, gives him relief, while one who hates the right (that which is good, gentle) is a disgraceful vessel (*opp.* בִּפְסָא כְּבוֹד, Isa. xxii. 23), which disfigures the

household, makes the family unloved, and lowers it. But the commencing line, by which 16*b* is raised to an independent distich, is so much the more imperfect: *πλούτου ὀκνηροὶ ἐνδεεῖς γίνονται*; for that the negligent (idle) bring it not to riches, is, as they are wont in Swabia to call such truisms, a *Binsenwahrheit*. But it is important that the translation of 16*b*, οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ἐρεῖδονται πλούτῳ (the Syr. has “knowledge” for riches), presupposes the phrase נְהִרְצִים (cf. x. 4, LXX.), and along with it this, that יִתְמְכוּ is so rendered as if the words were יִסְמְכוּ בְעֶשֶׂר, is to be regarded as unhistorical. If we now take the one proverb as it is found in the Hebr. text, then the repetition of the תִּמְךָ in the two lines excites a prejudice in favour of it. The meaning of this otherwise difficult תִּמְךָ is missed by Löwenstein and Zöckler: a gracious woman retaineth honour (Symm. ἀνθέξεται δόξης); for (1) תִּמְךָ חַיִּל would better agree with this predicate, and (2) it is evident from xxix. 23 that תִּמְךָ כְּבוֹד is not to be understood in the sense of *firmiter tenere*, but in the inchoative sense of *consequi honorem*, whence also the ἐγείρει ἀνδρὶ of the LXX. It is true that xxxi. 30 states that “grace (חַן) is nothing,” and that all depends on the fear of God; but here the poet thinks on “grace” along with the fear of God, or he thinks on them as not separated from each other; and since it is doubly true, which is moreover besides this true, that a wife of gracious outward appearance and demeanour obtains honour, her company is sought, she finds her way into the best society, they praise her attractive, pleasant appearance, and that the husband also of such a wife participates to some extent in this honour. Experience also confirms it, that the עֲרִיצִים, strong men, obtain riches (cf. Isa. xlix 25); and this statement regarding the עֲרִיצִים fits better as a contrast to 16*a*, as a like statement regarding the חֲרוּצִים, diligent, for the עֲרִיץ (from עָרַץ, to place in terror, Ps. x. 18), whose power consists in terrorism or violence, is the most direct contrast of a wife, this σκεῦος ἀσθενέστερον, who by heart-winning attraction makes yet better conquests: she thereby obtains a higher good, viz. honour, while the former gains only riches, for “a name” (viz. a good one) “is better than great riches,” xxii. 1. If we read חֲרוּצִים, this thoughtful contrast is lost.

Three proverbs regarding benevolence:

Ver. 17 The benevolent man doeth good to his own soul,

And the violent man brings trouble on his own flesh.

Many interpreters reverse the relation of subject and predicate

(Targ. only in 17*b*, after the phrase ורמוכיר, for which the Syr. has only (ומוכר): *qui sibi ipsi benefacit, is quidem erga alios quoque benignus præsumentur, quum caritas ordinata a se ipsa incipiat; qui vero carnem suam male habet, est crudelis erga alios* (Michaelis). But this cannot be established; for certainly it occurs that whoever does good to himself does good also to others, and that whoever is hard against himself also judges and treats others harshly; but in by far the greatest number of cases the fact is this, that he who does not deny anything to himself is in relation to others an egoist, and this is not a "benevolent man;" and, on the contrary, that he who denies to himself lawful enjoyments is in relation to others capable of self-denial and self-sacrifice, and thus is the contrast of a "violent man." The word of Sirach, xiv. 5, ὁ ποιητὴς ἑαυτοῦ τίνα ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, to which Bertheau appeals, alludes to the niggard, and it is true indeed that this עֵכֶר נְשָׂאוֹ, but not every עֵכֶר נְשָׂאוֹ, is a niggard. Thus the "benevolent man" and the "violent man" will be the two subject conceptions, and as it is said of the benevolent (חָסֵד as e.g. Hos. vi. 6, of a more restricted sense, as Isa. lvii. 1) that he does good (נָמַל, viz. טוֹב, xxxi. 12), so of the violent (unmerciful) (אֶכְזָר as xii. 20, Jer. vi. 23, l. 42) that he brings evil on his own flesh (LXX. αὐτοῦ σῶμα); for נְשָׂאוֹ as a parallel word to נֶפֶשׁוֹ (cf. p. 195) signifies not blood-relations (Symm., Jerome, Luther, and Grotius), but it has here, as at Mic. iii. 2, its nearest signification, from which it then comes to signify those who are of our flesh and blood. But for that reason the meaning of the poet cannot be that given by Elster: "he who exercises benevolence toward others creates within himself a determination which penetrates his whole being with generous and fruitful warmth, as on the other hand the feeling of hatred deprives the heart of him who cherishes it of the true fountain of life." If this were meant, then soul and spirit, not soul and flesh, would stand in parallelism. The weal and woe refers thus to the divine retribution which requites the conduct of a man toward his neighbours, according to its character, with reward or punishment (Hitzig, Zöckler).

Ver. 18. Man consists of body and soul. In regard to both, benevolence brings its reward, and hatred its punishment.

The godless acquires deceptive gain;

But he that soweth righteousness, a true reward.

Jerome makes 18*b* an independent clause, for he translates it as if

the word were written וְלִזְרֹעַ; the Syr. and Targ. also, as if שְׂכָרוֹ אֲמָתוֹ (his fidelity is his reward). But according to the text as it stands, עֲשֵׂה extends its regimen to both parts of the verse; to make is here equivalent to, to work out, to acquire, *περιποιεῖσθαι*, as Gen. xxxi. 1, Jer. xvii. 11, etc. The labour of the godless has selfishness as its motive, and what he acquires by his labour is therefore “delusive gain,”—it is no blessing, it profits him not (x. 2), and it brings him no advantage (x. 16). He, on the contrary, acquires truth, *i.e.* a truly profitable and enduring reward, who sows right-doing, or better: good-doing, by which we also, as the biblical moral in צדקה, think principally of well-doing, unselfish activity and self-sacrificing love. Hos. x. 12 speaks of sowing which has only צדקה as the norm; and how צדקה is understood is seen from the parallel use of חסד [piety]. The “true reward” is just the harvest by which the sowing of the good seed of noble benevolent actions is rewarded.

Ver. 19 Genuine righteousness reaches to life,  
And he who pursues evil does it to his death.

The LXX. translate *υἱὸς δίκαιος*, and the Syrian follows this unwarrantable *quid pro quo*; the Bible uses the phrase בן-עולה and the like, but not בן-צדקה. The *Græc. Venet.* (translating οὕτω) deprives the distich of its supposed independence. The Targ. renders בן with the following ו as correlates, *sic . . . uti*; but בן in comparative proverbs stands naturally in the second, and not in the first place (*vid.* p. 10). Without doubt בן is here a noun. It appears to have a personal sense, according to the parallel וּמְרִדָּה, on which account Elster explains it: he who is firm, steadfast in righteousness, and Zöckler: he who holds fast to righteousness; but בן cannot mean “holding fast,” nor does מְכוֹן;—“fast” does not at all agree with the meaning of the word, it means upright, and in the ethical sense genuine; thus Ewald better: “he who is of genuine righteousness,” but “genuine in (of) righteousness” is a tautological connection of ideas. Therefore we must regard בן as a substantival neuter, but neither the *rectum* of Cocceius nor the *firmum* of Schultens furnishes a naturally expressed suitable thought. Or is בן a substantive in the sense of 2 Kings vii. 31? The word denotes the pedestal, the pillar, the standing-place; but what can the basis refer to here (Euchel)? Rather read “aim” (Oetinger) or “direction” (Löwenstein); but בן does not take its meaning from the *Hiph.* בָּנָה. One might almost

assume that the *Chokma*-language makes כֵּן, *taliter*, a substantive, and has begun to use it in the sense of *qualitas* (like the post-bibl. אֵינוֹת), so that it is to be explained: the quality of righteousness tendeth to life. But must we lose ourselves in conjectures or in modifications of the text (Hitzig, כִּנִּים, as a banner), in order to gain a meaning from the word, which already has a meaning? We say דִּבֶּר כֵּן, to speak right (Num. xxvii. 7), and עָשׂוֹת כֵּן, to do right (Eccles. viii. 10); in both cases כֵּן means standing = consisting, stedfast, right, *recte*. The contrast is לֹא-כֵן, 2 Kings vii. 9, which is also once used as a substantive, Isa. xvi. 6: the unrighteousness of his words. So here כֵּן is used as a substantive connected in the genitive, but not so that it denotes the right holding, retaining of righteousness, but its right quality,—אֱמֶתָהּ, as Rashi explains it, *i.e.*, as we understand it: genuineness, or genuine showing of righteousness, which is not mere appearance without reality. That כִּנִּים denotes such people as seek to appear not otherwise than what they truly are, is in favour of this interpretation. Such genuine righteousness as follows the impulse of the heart, and out of the fulness of the heart does good, has life as its result (xix. 23), an inwardly happy and externally a prosperous life; on the other hand, he who wilfully pursues evil, and finds in it satisfaction, brings death upon himself: he does it to his death, or if we make (which is also possible) דָּרָה the subject: it tends to his death. Thus in other words: Love is life; hatred destroys life.

The following proverbs are especially directed, as connected with this כֵּן, against the contradiction of the external appearance and of the masked internal nature.

Ver. 20 An abomination to Jahve are the crookedly dishonest of heart,  
And they who are of honest walk are His delight.

We read, ii. 15, viii. 8, עֲקֵשׁ (the form of the transgressions); but here, where the “crookedness” is transferred to the heart, we require another word, which renders the idea of falseness, the contrary of directness, lying in it, without any mixture of the fundamental conception *flexuosus* or *tortuosus*. תְּמִימֵי דָרָה are not only those whose walk is externally without offence and blameless, but, in conformity with the contrast, those whose manner of conduct proceeds from a disposition that is pure, free from deception and concealment. Jerome, *et voluntas ejus in iis qui simpliciter ambulant*. But the word is not בְּתִמִּים; they [the upright] are

themselves His רצן (xi. 1) [delight]: He regards them, and only them, with satisfaction.

Ver. 21 Assuredly [the hand to it] the wicked remaineth not unpunished,  
But the seed of the righteous is delivered.

The LXX. render here, as xvi. 5, where the לִיר יִר repeats itself, χειρὶ χεῖρας ἐμβالὼν ἀδίκως, which is not to be understood, as Evagrius supposes, of one that can be bribed, but only of a violent person; the Syr. and Targ. have the same reference; but the subject is certainly עָר, and a governing word, as נָשָׂא (2 Sam. xx. 21), is wanting, to say nothing of the fact that the phrase “one hand against the other” would require the words to be יִר בִּיר. Jerome and the *Græc. Venet.*, without our being able, however, to see their meaning. The translation of the other Greek versions is not given. The Jewish interpreters offer nothing that is worthy, as *e.g.* Immanuel and Meîri explain it by “immediately,” which in the modern Hebr. would require מִיָּד, and besides is not here suitable. The Midrash connects with 21a the earnest warning that he who sins with the one hand and with the other does good, is nevertheless not free from punishment. Schultens has an explanation to give to the words which is worthy of examination: hand to hand, *i.e.* after the manner of an inheritance *per posteros* (Ex. xx. 5), resting his opinion on this, that Arab. *yad* (cf. יָד, Isa. lvi. 5) is used among other significations in that of authorizing an inheritance. Gesenius follows him, but only urging the idea of the sequence of time (cf. Pers. *dest bedest*, hand to hand = continuing after one another), and interprets יִר בִּיר as Fleischer does: *ab ætate in ætatem non (i.e. nullo unquam tempore futuro) erit impunis scelestus, sed posterius justorum salvi erunt.* According to Böttcher, “hand to hand” is equivalent to from one hand to another, and this corresponds to the thought expressed in Plutarch’s *de sera numinis vindicta*: if not immediately, yet at last. We may refer in vindication of this to the fact that, as the Arab. lexicographers say, *yad*, used of the course of time, means the extension (*madd*) of time, and then a period of time. But for the idea expressed by *nunquam*, or *neutiquam*, or *tandem aliquando*, the language supplied to the poet a multitude of forms, and we do not see why he should have selected just this expression with its primary meaning *alternatim* not properly agreeing with the connection. Therefore we prefer with Ewald to regard לִיר יִר as a formula of confirmation derived from the common speech of the

people: hand to hand (לְ as in לְיָדֵי, Job xvii. 3), *i.e.* the hand for it [I pledge it, guarantee it] (Bertheau, Hitzig, Elster, Zöckler). But if 21a assures by the pledge of the hand, and as it were lays a wager to it, that the wicked shall not go unpunished, then the genitive in זֶרַע צְדִיקִים is not that of dependence by origin, but, as Isa. lxv. 23, i. 4, the genitive of apposition, for זֶרַע here, as דֹּר, Ps. xxiv. 6, cxii. 2, denotes a oneness of like origin and of like kind, but with a preponderance of the latter. נִמְלֵט is the 3d *pret.*, which by the preceding fut. retains the reference to the future: the merited punishment comes on the wicked, but the generation of the righteous escapes the judgment. רָע has the ר dagheshed (*Michlol* 63b) according to the rule of the דְּחִיק, according to which the consonant first sounded after a word terminating in an accented *a* or *é* is doubled, which is here, as at xv. 1, done with the ר.

Ver. 22 A golden ring in a swine's snout,—  
A fair woman and without delicacy.

This is the first instance of an emblematical proverb in which the first and second lines are related to each other as figure and its import, *vid.* p. 9. The LXX. translates rhythmically, but by its ὡσπερ . . . οὕτως it destroys the character of this picture-book proverbial form. The nose-ring, נֶזֶם, generally attached to the right nostril and hanging down over the mouth (*vid.* Lane's *Manners, etc.*) is a female ornament that has been in use since the time of the patriarchs (Gen. xxiv. 47). If one supposes such a ring in a swine's snout, then in such a thing he has the emblem of a wife in whom beauty and the want of culture are placed together in direct contrast. טַעַם is taste carried over into the intellectual region, the capability of forming a judgment, Job xii. 20, and particularly the capability of discovering that which is right and adapted to the end in view, 1 Sam. xxv. 33 (of Abigail), here in accordance with the figure of a beast with which the ideas of uncleanness, shamelessness, and rudeness are associated, a mind for the noble, the fine, the fitting, that which in the higher and at the same time intellectual and ethical sense we call tact (fine feeling); פֶּרַת (*alienata*) denotes the want of this capacity, not without the accompanying idea of self-guilt.

Ver. 23 The desire of the righteous is nothing but good,  
The expectation of the godless is presumption.

This is usually explained with Fleischer: If the righteous wish for

anything, their wish reaches to no other than a fortunate issue; but if the godless hope for anything, then there is to them in the end as their portion, not the good they hoped for, but wrath (x. 28, cf. xi. 4). However, that עֲבָרָה is at once to be understood thus, as in יוֹם עֲבָרָה, and that the phrase is to be rendered: the hope of the godless is God's wrath, is doubtful. But עֲבָרָה denotes also want of moderation, and particularly in the form of presumption, xxi. 24, Isa. xvi. 6; and thus we gain the thought that the desire of the righteous is directed only to that which is good, and thus to an object that is attainable because well-pleasing to God, while on the contrary the hope of the godless consists only in the suggestions of their presumption, and thus is vain self-deceit. The punctuation תֵּאוֹת צְרִיקִים is contrary to rule; correct texts have תֵּאוֹת צְרִיקִים, for *Dechî* stands before *Athnach* only if the *Athnach*-word has two syllables (*Torath Emeth*, p. 43; *Accentssystem*, xviii. § 4).

Three proverbs regarding giving which is not loss but gain.

Ver. 24 There is one who giveth bounteously, and he increaseth still more;  
And (there is) one who withholdeth what is due, only to his loss.

The first of the proverbs with יֵשׁ (there is), which are peculiar to the first collection (*vid.* p. 32). The meaning is, that the possessions of the liberal giver do not decrease but increase, and that, on the contrary, the possessions of the niggardly do not increase but decrease. מִפְּנֵי is not to be understood after Ps. cxii. 9. Instead of וְנוֹסֵף עוֹד the three Erfurt codd have וְנוֹסֵף (with retrogression of the tone?), which Hitzig approves of; but the traditional phrase which refers (*et qui augetur insuper*) וְנוֹסֵף not to the possession of him who scattereth, but to himself, is finer in the expression. In the characteristic of the other, מִיֵּשֶׁר is commonly interpreted comparatively: *plus æquo* (Cocceius) or *justo* (Schelling). But מֵן after הִשָּׁה is to be regarded as governed by it, and יֵשֶׁר denotes not competence, riches, as Arab. *yusr* (Bertheau, Zöckler), also not uprightness = beneficence (Midrash, מֵן הַצְדָּקָה), but duty, uprightness, as Job xxxiii. 23, where it denotes that which is advantageous to man, as here that which befits him: he who holds back, namely himself, from that which is due to himself, and thus should permit to himself, such an one profits nothing at all by this ἀφειδία (17b, Col. ii. 23), but it tends only to loss to him, only to the lessening of that which he possesses. We shall meet with this (לְמַחֲסוֹר) אֵף xiv. 23, and frequently again—it is a common Mashal formula (cf. καὶ τόσῳ μᾶλλον ὑστερεῖται, Sir. xi. 11). The

cause of the strange phenomenon that the liberal gains and the niggardly loses is not here expressed, but the following proverb gives the explanation of it:

Ver. 25 A liberal soul [soul of blessing] is made fat,  
And he that watereth others is also watered.

A synonymous distich (*vid.* p. 7). A soul of blessing is one from whom blessings go out to others, who is even a blessing to all with whom he comes into fellowship; בִּרְכָה denotes also particularly the gifts of love, 1 Sam. xxv. 27, בִּרְה denotes, if the Arab. is right, which derives it from the fundamental idea "to spread out:" to cause to increase and prosper by means of word and deed. The blessing which goes out from such a soul comes back again to itself: תִּרְשֵׁן (as xiii. 4, xxviii. 25), it is made fat, gains thereby sap and strength in fulness; the *Pual* refers to the ordinance of God; xxii. 9 is kindred in meaning to this *anima benefica pinguescit*. In 25b יוֹרָא is the Aramaic form of writing, but without the Aramaic vocalization (cf. i. 10 תִּבְא, Isa. xxi. 12 וַיִּתָּא). Perhaps the א makes it noticeable that here a different word from יוֹרָה, morning rain, is used; however, Symm. translates πρωῒνος, and the *Græc. Venet.* (Kimchi following it) ὑετός. As a rule, we do not derive יוֹרָא from יוֹרָה, of which it would be the *Hophal* (= יוֹרָה, as הוֹרַע, Lev. iv. 23, = הוֹרַע) (Ewald, § 131 f.); for the idea *conspergitur*, which the *Ho.* of the *Hiph.* יוֹרָה, Hos. vi. 3, expresses, is, as correlate to מִרְיָה, as a parallel word to תִּרְשֵׁן, one not of equal force. Jerome was guided by correct feeling, for he translates: *et qui inebriat ipse quoque inebriabitur*. The stem-word is certainly רוֹיָה, whether it is with Hitzig to be punctuated יוֹרָא = יוֹרָה, or with Fleischer we are to regard יוֹרָא as derived *per metathesin* from יוֹרָה, as for Arab. *aráy* (to cause to see) is used<sup>1</sup> the vulgar Arab. *arway* (in the Syr. Arab.) and *awray* (in the Egypt. Arab.). We prefer the latter, for the passing of יוֹרָה (from יוֹרָה) into יוֹרָה is according to rule, *vid.* at xxiii. 21.

Ver. 26 Whoso withholdeth corn, him the people curse;  
But blessing is on the head of him that selleth it.

This proverb is directed against the corn-usurer, whose covetousness and deceitful conduct is described Amos viii. 4-8. But whilst it is there said that they cannot wait till the burdensome

<sup>1</sup> Hitzig's comparison of *rawaâ*, *finem respicere*, as transposed from *waray* is incorrect; the former verb, which signifies to consider, thus appears to be original.

interruption of their usurious conduct on account of the sacred days come to an end, the figure here is of a different aspect of their character: they hold back their stores of corn in the times of scarcity, for they speculate on receiving yet higher prices for it. בָּר (from בָּרַר, to purify, to be pure) is thrashed grain, cf. Arab. *burr*, wheat, and *nakky* of the cleaning of the grain by the separation from it of the tares, etc. (Fl.); the word has *Kametz*, according to the Masora, as always in pause and in the history of Joseph. מְנַע has *Munach* on the syllable preceding the last, on which the tone is thrown back, and *Metheg* with the *Tsere* as the sign of a pause, as i. 10 בָּנֵעַ (vid. p. 67). מִשְׁבִּיר, *qui annonam vendit*, is denom. of שָׁבַר, properly that which is crushed, therefore grain (Fl.). לְאֲמִים, which we would understand in the Proph. of nations, are here, as at xxiv. 24, the individuals of the people. The בְּרָכָה which falls on the head of the charitable is the thanks of his fellow-citizens, along with all good wishes.

That self-sacrificing endeavour after the good of others finds its reward in the thought encircling the following proverbs.

Ver. 27 He that striveth after good, seeketh that which is pleasing;  
And he that searcheth after evil, it shall find him.

Here we have together three synonyms of seeking: בָּקַשׁ (R. בָּק, *findere*), which has the general meaning *quærere*, from the root-idea of penetrating and pressing forwards; דָּרַשׁ (R. דָּר, *terere*), which from the root-idea of trying (proving) corresponds to the Lat. *studere*; and שָׁחַר (whence here שָׁחַר instead of מִשְׁחַר, as דָּבַר instead of מְדַבֵּר), which means *mane*, and thus *sedulo quærere* (vid. at i. 28). From 27b, where by רָעָה is meant evil which one prepares for another, there arises for טוֹב the idea of good thoughts and actions with reference to others. He who applies himself to such, seeks therewith that which is pleasing, i.e. that which pleases or does good to others. If that which is pleasing to God were meant, then this would have been said (cf. xii. 2); the idea here is similar to x. 32, and the word יִבְקֹשׁ is used, and not יִמְצֵא, because reference is not made to a fact in the moral government of the world, but a description is given of one who is zealously intent upon good, and thus of a noble man. Such an one always asks himself (cf. Matt. vii. 12): what will, in the given case, be well-pleasing to the neighbour, what will tend to his true satisfaction? Regarding the punctuation here, שָׁחַר, vid. at ver. 26. The subject to תְּבוּאָתִי, which, x. 24, stands as the fundamental idea, here follows

from the governed רָעָה, which may be the gen. (Ps. xxxviii. 13) as well as the accus.

Ver. 28 He that trusteth in his riches shall fall,

And the righteous shall flourish like the green leaf.

יָפֹל (*plene* after the Masora) as well as the figure וַיִּצְלַח (cf. for the punctuation וַיִּצְלַח, x. 26) are singular, but are understood if one observes that in 28*a* a withered tree, and in 28*b* a tree with leaves ever green, hovers before the imagination of the poet (cf. Ps. i. 3, Jer. xvii. 8). The proud rich man, who on the ground of his riches appears to himself to be free from danger, goes on to his ruin (יָפֹל as xi. 5, and frequently in the Book of Proverbs), while on the contrary the righteous continues to flourish like the leaf—they thus resemble the trees which perennially continue to flourish anew. Regarding עָלָה as originally collective (Symm. θάλλος), *vid.* at Isa. i. 30, and regarding פָּרַח (R. פָּר, to break), here of the continual breaking forth of fresh-growing leaf-buds, *vid.* at Isa. xi. 1. The apostolic word names this continual growth the metamorphosis of believers, 2 Cor. ii. 18. The LXX. has read וַיִּצְלַח (approved by Hitzig): and he who raiseth up the righteous.

Ver. 29 He that troubleth his own household shall inherit the wind,

And a fool becomes servant to the wise in heart.

Jerome well translates: *qui conturbat domum suam*, for עָבַר closely corresponds to the Lat. *turbare*; but with what reference is the troubling or disturbing here meant? The Syr. translates 29*a* doubly, and refers it once to deceit, and the second time to the contrary of avarice; the LXX., by ὁ μὴ συμπεριφερόμενος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ ὄκλῳ, understands one who acts towards his own not unsociably, or without affability, and thus not tyrannically. But עָבַר שְׂאֵרָה xi. 17, is he who does not grudge to his own body that which is necessary; עָבַר יִשְׂרָאֵל is applied to Elijah, 1 Kings xviii. 17, on account of whose prayer there was a want of rain; and at xv. 27 it is the covetous who is spoken of as עָבַר בֵּיתוֹ. The proverb has, accordingly, in the man who “troubles his own house” (Luth.), a niggard and sordid person (Hitzig) in view, one who does not give to his own, particularly to his own servants, a sufficiency of food and of necessary recreation. Far from raising himself by his household arrangements, he shall only inherit wind (יָנַחַל, not as the Syr. translates, יִנְחִיל, in the general signification to inherit, to obtain, as iii. 35, xxviii. 10, etc.), *i.e.* he goes always farther and farther back (for he deprives his servants of all pleasure and love

for their work in seeking the prosperity of his house), till in the end the reality of his possession dissolves into nothing. Such conduct is not only loveless, but also foolish; and a foolish person (*vid.* regarding אִיל at i. 7) has no influence as the master of a house, and generally is unable to maintain his independence: "and the servant is a fool to him who is wise of heart." Thus the LXX. (cf. also the LXX. of x. 5), Syr., Targ., Jerome, *Græc. Venet.*, Luth. construe the sentence. The explanation, *et servus stulti cordato (sc. addicitur)*, *i.e.* even the domestics of the covetous fool are at last partakers in the wise beneficence (Fl.), places 29*b* in an unnecessary connection with 29*a*, omits the verb, which is here scarcely superfluous, and is not demanded by the accentuation (*cf. e.g.* xix. 22*b*).

Ver. 30 The fruit of the righteous is a tree of life,  
And the wise man winneth souls.

The LXX. translate, ἐκ καρποῦ δικαιοσύνης φύεται δένδρον ζωῆς; Hitzig takes thence the word צֶדֶק; but this translation discredits itself by the unnatural reversal of the relation of fruit and tree. The fruit of the righteous is here not the good which his conduct brings to him, as Isa. iii. 10, Jer. xxxii. 19, but his activity itself proceeding from an internal impulse. This fruit is a tree of life. We need to supplement פְּרִי [fruit] as little here as אֲרִיז [a traveller] at x. 17; for the meaning of the proverb is, that the fruit of the righteous, *i.e.* his external influence, itself is a tree of life (*vid.* p. 32), namely for others, since his words and actions exert a quickening, refreshing, happy influence upon them. By this means the wise (righteousness and wisdom come together according to the saying of the *Chokma*, i. 7*a*) becomes a winner of souls (לָקַח as vi. 25, but taken in *bonam partem*), or, as expressed in the N. T. (Matt. iv. 19), a fisher of men, for he gains them not only for himself, but also for the service of wisdom and righteousness.

Ver. 31 Lo, the righteous findeth on earth his reward;  
How much more the godless and the sinner!

The particles אִם בִּי signify properly, interrogatively: Shall it yet be said that . . .; it corresponds to the German "*geschweige denn*" [*nedum*] (Fl.). הִנֵּה is already in bibl. Hebr. in the way of becoming a conditional particle; it opens, as here, the antecedent of a *gradatio a minori ad majus* introduced by אִם בִּי, Job xv. 15 f., xxv. 5 f., cf. הִנֵּה (הנה) with וְאַיֶּךָ following, Gen. xlv. 8, 2 Sam. xii. 18. xiii. 13 presents itself as the nearest parallel to שָׁלֵם, where it means, to

be rewarded. It is a *vocabulum anceps*, and denotes full requital, i.e., according to the reference, either righteous reward or righteous punishment. If 30a is understood of reward, and 30b of punishment, then the force of the argument in the conclusion consists in this, that the righteous can put forth no claim to a recompense, because his well-doing is never so perfect as not to be mingled with sin (Eccles. vii. 20; Ps. cxliii. 2); while, on the contrary, the repression of the wicked, who, as עֲשֵׂה as to his intention, and חֲסִיד as to his conduct, actually denies his dependence on God, is demanded by divine holiness. But the conclusion is not stringent, since in the relation of God to the righteous His dispensation of grace and faithfulness to promises also come into view, and thus in both cases עֲשֵׂה appears to require the same interpretation: if the righteous does not remain unrevengeed, so much more shall not the godless and the sinner remain . . ., or how much less shall the godless and the sinner remain so. Thus the *Græc. Venet.*, Θεῶ ὁ δίκαιος ἐν τῇ γῇ ἀποτιθήσεται; thus also Luther, and among the moderns Löwenstein and Elster. Of the proverb so understood the LXX. version, εἰ ὁ μὲν δίκαιος μόλις (μόγισ) σώζεται, ὁ ἀσεβὴς καὶ ἁμαρτωλὸς ποῦ φανείται (cf. 1 Pet. iv. 18) may be a free translation, for in the שָׁלֵם there certainly lies, according to the sense, a כְּמַעֲט יִשָּׁע. Also שָׁלֵם has the principal tone, not בְּאָרֶץ. The thought: even on this side (on earth), lies beyond the sphere of the O. T. consciousness. The earth is here the world of man.

Three proverbs on knowledge, the favour of God, firmness and the means thereto.

- xii. 1 He loveth correction who loveth knowledge,  
And he hateth instruction who is without reason.

It is difficult in such cases to say which is the relation of the ideas that is intended. The sequence of words which lies nearest in the Semitic substantival clause is that in which the predicate is placed first; but the subject may, if it is to be made prominent, stand at the head of the sentence. Here, 1b, the placing of the subject in advance recommends itself: one who hates instruction is devoid of reason. But since we have no reason in 1a to invert the order of the words as they lie together, we take the conceptions placed first in both cases as the predicates. Thus: he who loves knowledge shows and proves that he does so by this, that he willingly puts himself in the place of a learner; and devoid of reason is he who with aversion rejects reproof, which is designed to guard him from

future mistakes and false steps. Regarding the punctuation אָהַב רָעָה (with *Mercha* on the ante-penult. and the העמרה-sign on the penult.), *vid.* at xi. 26 f., i. 19. In 1b the *Munach* in תּוֹכַחַת is transformed from *Mugrash* (*Accentssystem*, xviii. § 2), as in xv. 10b. בָּעִיר (cf. xxx. 2) is a being who is stupid as the brute cattle (בָּעִיר, from בָּעַר, to graze, cattle of all kinds; Arab. *b'ayr*, the beast κατ' ἐξ., i.e. the camel); as a *homo brutus* is compared to a בְּהֵמָה (Ps. xlix. 21, lxxiii. 22), and is called Arab. *behymt*, from *bahym*, "shut up" (spec. *dabb*, a bear; *thwr*, an ox; *hamâr*, an ass) (Fl.).

Ver. 2 A good man obtaineth favour with Jahve,

But the man of wicked devices He condemns.

He who is an אִישׁ מְזִמּוֹת (xiv. 17, cf. Ps. xxxvii. 7) is defined in xxiv. 8 (cf. p. 39): he is a man of devices (*vid.* regarding the etymon, p. 56), namely, that are wicked, one who contrives evil against his neighbour. The meaning of the subject-conception טוֹב is defined according to this, although in itself also it is clear, for טוֹב, used of God (e.g. Ps. lxxiii. 1, lxxxvi. 5) and of men (xiii. 22, xiv. 14), denotes the good (*bonus*) in the sense of the benevolent (*benignus*); the Scripture truths, that God is love, that love is the essence of goodness and is the fulfilling of the law, are so conformed to reason, that they stamp themselves as immediate component parts of the human consciousness. A טוֹב is thus a man who acts according to the ruling motive of self-sacrificing love; such an one obtains (*vid.* on יָפִיק, *educit* = *adipiscitur*, at iii. 13) the favour of God, He is and shows Himself kind to him, while on the contrary He condemns the wicked intriguer. Hitzig translates: the former of intrigues is punishable (as the Syr.: is condemned; Targ.: his contrivance is shattered to pieces); but to become a רָשָׁע = *reus* הַרְשָׁיעַ does not denote, but either to practise רָשָׁע, Job xxxiv. 12, or to set forth as רָשָׁע = to condemn, Isa. i. 9. Taken in the former signification (Jerome, *impie agit*), a declaration is made which is not needed, since the moral badness already lies in the reference of the subject: thus יִרְשָׁע will be used also of Jahve. In proof that the poet did not need to say וְאֵת-אִישׁ, Zöckler rightly points to x. 6, Job xxii. 29.

Ver. 3 A man does not stand by wickedness,

But the root of the righteous remains unmoved.

In רָשָׁע there lies the idea of want of inward stay (*vid.* at Ps. i. 1); in a manner of thought and of conduct which has no stay in God and His law, there can be expected no external endurance, no solidity.

The righteous, on the contrary, have their root in God; nothing can tear them from the ground in which they are rooted, they are as trees which no storm outroots. The very same thought is clothed in other words in x. 25, and another statement regarding the root of the righteous is found at xii. 12.

We now place together vers. 4-12. One proverb concerning the house-wife forms the beginning of this group, and four regarding the management of the house and business form the conclusion.

Ver. 4 A good [*brave*] wife is the crown of her husband,  
But as rottenness in his bones is one that causeth shame.

As xi. 16 says of אִשָּׁת הָיָה, the pleasant wife (הָיָה = *χάρις*), that she obtaineth honour, so this proverb of אִשָּׁת הָיָה, the good wife (הָיָה = *ἀρετή*, *virtus*), that she raises her husband to higher honour: she is for his self-consciousness *στέφανος καυχήσεως* (1 Thess. ii. 19), and is also to him such a crown of honour before the world (cf. xxxi. 23). On the contrary, a מְבִישָׁה, conducting herself shamefully (cf. regarding the double meaning of this *Mishle* word, which only here occurs in the fem., at x. 5), is to her husband *instar cariei in ossibus*. רָקַב (רָקַב, x. 7) denotes both the *caries* and the worm-hole (cf. Job xli. 19, עֵץ רָקֵב, worm-eaten wood). Like as the *caries* slowly but continuously increases, till at last the part of the body which the bone bears and the whole life of the man falls to ruin; so an unhappy marriage gnaws at the marrow of life, it destroys the happiness of life, disturbs the pursuit, undermines the life of the husband.

Ver. 5 The thoughts of the righteous are justice,  
The counsels of the godless are deceit.

They are so, that is, in their contents and their aim. To the righteous are ascribed מַחֲשָׁבוֹת, namely, simple and clear; to the godless, תַּחְבֻּלוֹת, carefully thought out, prudently thought through schemes and measures (regarding the word and the idea, *vid.* p. 57), but on that very account not simple, because with a tendency; for the righteous have an objective rule, namely, that which is right in the sight of God and of men, but the godless have only a selfish purpose, which they seek to attain by deceiving, and at the cost of, their neighbour.

Ver. 6 The word of the godless is to lie in wait for the blood of others,  
But the mouth of the upright delivereth them.

Our editions have דְּבָרֵי רָשָׁעִים, but the right sequence of the accents (in Cod. 1294 and elsewhere) is דְּבָרֵי רָשָׁעִים; the logical relation in this transformation, which is only rhythmically conditioned, remains the same. The vocalization wavers between אָרַב, which would be imper., and אֲרַב, which is infin., like אָמַר, xxv. 7, עָנָשׁ, xxi. 11, אָכַל, Gen. iii. 11. However one punctuates it, the infin. is intended in any case, in which the expression always remains sketchy enough: the words of the godless are lying in wait for blood, *i.e.* they are calculated to bring others to this, into the danger of their lives, *e.g.* before the tribunal by false charges and false witness. דָּם is the accus. of the object; for instead of אָרַב לְדָם (i. 11), to lurk for blood, a shorter expression, אָרַב דָּם, is used (Ewald, § 282a). The suffix of יָצִילִים<sup>1</sup> might appear, after xi. 6a, to refer back to the יֹשְׁרִים; but the thought that their mouth saves the upright, that they thus know to speak themselves out of the danger, is by far less appropriate (*vid.*, on the contrary, בָּרַעַת, xi. 9) than the thought that the mouth of the upright delivereth from danger those whose lives are threatened by the godless, as is rightly explained by Ewald, Bertheau, Elster. The personal subject or object is in the Mashal style often to be evolved from the connection, *e.g.* xiv. 26, xix. 23.

Ver. 7 The godless are overturned and are no more,  
But the house of the righteous stands.

Bertheau and Zöckler explain: The wicked turn about, then are they no more; *i.e.* as we say: it is over with them "in the turning of a hand." The noun in the *inf. absol.* may certainly be the subject, like xvii. 12, as well as the object (Ewald, § 328c), and הִפָּךְ may be used of the turning about of oneself, Ps. lxxviii. 9, 2 Kings v. 26, 2 Chron. ix. 12. That explanation also may claim for itself that הִפָּךְ nowhere occurs with a personal object, if we except one questionable passage, Isa. i. 7. But here the interpretation of the רָשָׁעִים as the object lies near the contrast of בֵּית, and moreover the interpretation of the הִפָּךְ, not in the sense of *στρέφεισθαι* (LXX.), but of *καταστρέφειν* (Syr., Targ., Jerome, *Græc. Venet.*, Luther), lies near the contrast of יַעֲמֹד. The *inf. absol.* thus leaves the power from which the catastrophe proceeds indefinite, as the *pass.* יִהְיֶה־כֵּן would also leave it, and the act de-

<sup>1</sup> Elias Levita, in his note to the root פה in Kimchi's *Wörterbuch*, reads רָשָׁעִים, and so also do 6 codd. in Kennicot. But פָּה is masculine.

signedly presented in a vague manner to connect with 1 the certain consequences therewith, as xxv. 4 f., as if to say: there comes only from some quarter an unparalleled overthrow which overwhelms the godless; thus no rising up again is to be thought on, it is all over with them; while, on the contrary, the house of the righteous withstands the storm which sweeps away the godless.

Ver. 8 According to the measure of his intelligence is a man praised,  
And whoever is of a perverse mind is despised.

Everywhere in the *Mishle* שִׁבְלֵ has no other meaning than *intellectus* (*vid.* p. 87). The praise which is given to a man measures itself לפי שִׁבְלוֹ (punctuate לְפִי־שִׁבְלוֹ, according to *Torath Emeth*, p. 41, *Accentssystem*, xx. § 1), *i.e.* according to the measure (so לפי is used in the oldest form of the language) of his intelligence, or as we may also say, of his culture; for in these proverbs, which make the fear of God the highest principle, שִׁבְלֵ means also understanding of moral excellence, not merely the intellectual superiority of natural gifts. הֵלֵל is here a relative conception of manifold gradations, but it does not mean renown in general, but good renown. Parallel with שִׁבְלוֹ, לֵב refers to the understanding (*νοῦς*); the rendering of Löwenstein, "who is of false heart," is defective. נֶעְוָה (synon. of נִפְתָּל and עָקַשׁ, but nowhere else interchanging with it) means here *a vero et recto detortus et aversus* (Fl.). Such a man who has not a good understanding, nor any certain rule of judgment, falls under contempt (*Græc. Venet.* τῷ ὀντωτῇ εἰς μυσταγμόν, after the false reading of יהוה instead of יהיה), *i.e.* he defames himself by his crooked judgment of men, of things and their relations, and is on this account in no position rightly to make use of them.

Ver. 9 Better is he who is lowly and has a servant,  
Than he that makes himself mighty and is without bread.

This proverb, like xv. 17, commends the middle rank of life with its quiet excellences. נִקְלָה (like 1 Sam. xviii. 23), from קָלָה, cognate with קָלַל, Syr. *'kly*, to despise, properly *levi pendere, levem habere* (whence קָלִיז, scorn, disgrace), here of a man who lives in a humble position and does not seek to raise himself up. Many of the ancients (LXX., Symmachus, Jerome, Syr., Rashi, Luther, Schultens) explain לוֹ וְעֶבֶד by, and is a servant to himself, serves himself; but in that case the words would have been וְעֶבֶד לְנַפְשׁוֹ (Syr. דִּמְשִׁימֵשׁ נַפְשֵׁהּ), or rather וְעֶבְדוֹ הוּא לוֹ. וְעֶבֶד לוֹ would be more appropriate, as thus pointed by Ziegler, Ewald, and Hitzig. But if one adheres to the traditional reading, and interprets this, as it

must be interpreted: *et cui servus* (Targ., Græc. Venet.), then that supplies a better contrast to תְּחִלָּתוֹ, for “the first necessity of an oriental in only moderate circumstances is a slave, just as was the case with the Greeks and Romans” (Fl.). A man of lowly rank, who is, however, not so poor that he cannot support a slave, is better than one who boasts himself and is yet a beggar (2 Sam. iii. 29). The *Hithpa.* often expresses a striving to be, or to wish to appear to be, what the adj. corresponding to the verb states, e.g. הִתְעַשָּׂר, הִתְנַהֵּל; like the Greek middles, ἐξέσθαι, ἀξέσθαι, cf. הִתְחַכֵּם and σοφίζεσθαι. So here, where with Fleischer we have translated: who makes himself mighty, for כָּבֵד, *gravem esse*, is etymologically also the contrast of קָלָה. The proverb, Sirach x. 26: κρείσσων ἐργαζόμενος καὶ περισσεύων ἐν πᾶσι, ἢ δοξαζόμενος καὶ ἀπορῶν ἄρτων (according to the text of Fritzsche), is a half remodelling, half translation of this before us.

Ver. 10 The righteous knows how his cattle feel,  
And the compassion of the godless is cruel.

The explanation: the righteous taketh care for the life of his beast (Fl.), fails, for 10a is to be taken with Ex. xxiii. 9; נֶפֶשׁ signifies also the state of one's soul, the frame of mind, the state of feeling; but יָדַע has, as in the related proverb, xxvii. 23, the meaning of careful cognizance or investigation, in conformity with which one acts. If the *Torâ* includes in the law of the Sabbath (Ex. xx. 10, xxiii. 12) useful beasts and cattle, which are here especially meant, and secures to them the reward of their labour (Deut. xxv. 4); if it forbids the mutilation, and generally the giving of unnecessary pain, to beasts; if it enjoins those who take a bird's nest to let the dam escape (Deut. xxii. 6 f.),—these are the prefigurations of that רָעַת נֶפֶשׁ בַּהֲמָה, and as the God of the *Torâ* thus appears at the close of the Book of Jonah, this wonderful apology (*defensio*) of the all-embracing compassion, the God also of the world-history in this sympathy for the beasts of the earth as the type of the righteous.

In 10b most interpreters find an oxymoron: the compassion of the godless is compassionless, the direct opposite of compassion; i.e. he possesses either altogether no compassion, or he shows such as in its principle, its expression, and in its effects is the opposite of what it ought to be (Fl.). Bertheau believes that in the sing. of the predicate אֲכַזְרִי he is justified in translating: the compassion of the wicked is a tyranny. And as one may speak of a loveless love, i.e. of a love which in its principle is nothing else than selfishness, so

also of a compassionless compassion, such as consists only in gesture and speech, without truth of feeling and of active results. But how such a compassionless compassion toward the cattle, and one which is really cruel, is possible, it may be difficult to show. Hitzig's conjecture, רַחֲמֵי, sprang from this thought: the most merciful among sinners are cruel—the sinner is as such not רַחֲמִים. The LXX. is right in the rendering, τὰ δὲ σπλάγχνα τῶν ἀσεβῶν ἀνελεήμονα. The noun רַחֲמִים means here not compassion, but, as in Gen. xliii. 30 (LXX. ἔντερα or ἔγκατα) and 1 Kings iii. 26 (LXX. μήτρα), has the meaning the bowels (properly tender parts, cf. Arab. *rakhuma*, to be soft, tender, with *rhm*), and thus the interior of the body, in which deep emotions, and especially strong sympathy, are wont to be reflected (cf. Hos. x. 8). The singular of the predicate אֲכֹרִי arises here from the unity of the subject-conception: the inwards, as Jer. l. 12, from the reference of the expression to each individual of the many.

Ver. 11 He that tilleth his own ground is satisfied with bread,

And he that followeth after vain pursuits is devoid of understanding.

Yet more complete is the antithetic parallelism in the *doublette*, xxviii. 19 (cf. also Sir. xx. 27a). The proverb recommends the cultivation of the field as the surest means of supporting oneself honestly and abundantly, in contrast to the grasping after vain, *i.e.* unrighteous means of subsistence, windy speculations, and the like (Fl.). רִיקִים are here not persons (Bertheau), but things without solidity and value (LXX. μάταια; Aquila, Theodotion, κενά), and, in conformity with the contrast, not real business. Elsewhere also the mas. plur. discharges the function of a neut. noun of multitude, *vid.* נְגִידִים, *principalia*, viii. 6, and וְרִים, Ps. xix. 14—one of the many examples of the imperfect use of the gender in Hebr.; the speaker has in רִיקִים, *vana et inania*, not אֲנָשִׁים (Judg. ix. 4), but רִבְרִים (Deut. xxxii. 47) in view. The LXX. erroneously at xxviii. 19, and Symmachus and Jerome at both places understand רִיקִים of slothfulness.

Ver. 12 The godless lusteth after the spoil of evil-doers;

But the root of the righteous shoots forth.

This translation is at the same time an explanation, and agrees with Fleischer's "the godless strives by unrighteous gain like the wicked (iv. 14) to enrich himself, namely, as must be understood from the antithetic members of the parallelism, in vain, without thereby making progress and gaining anything certain. The preterite, as

xi. 2, 8, etc., places the general true proposition as a separate historic principle derived from experience. In 12*b* יָתֵן stands elliptically or pregnantly: *edet, scil. quod radix edere solet, sobolem stirpis, ramorum, etc.*, as in the Arab. *natan* and *ânatan* are specially used without an obj. of the spontaneousness of an odour." מְצוֹר (from צוּר, to spy, to hunt) is elsewhere the instrument of the hunt (a net), here the object and end of it. If the words had been מְצוֹרֵי רָעִים, then we would explain after מְלֶאכֶי רָעִים, Ps. lxxviii. 49 (*vid. comm. on*), and אִשְׁתֵּי רָע, vi. 24; but in the difference of number, רָעִים will not be the qualitative but the subjective personal genitive: *capturam qualem mali captant*. Ewald, who understands רִיחִים, 11*b*, of good-for-nothing-fellows, interprets רָעִים here, on the contrary, as neuter (§ 172*b*): the desire of the wicked is an evil net, *i.e.* wherein he catches all manner of evil for himself. The LXX. has here two proverbs, in which מְצוֹר occurs in the plur. and in the sense of ὀχυρώματα; 12*b* of the Hebr. text is rendered: αἱ δὲ ῥίζαι τῶν εὐσεβῶν ἐν ὀχυρώμασι, which Schleusner explains *immoæ erunt*. The Hebr. text can gain nothing from this variation. That the LXX. read וְיִשְׂרָאֵל צְדִיקִים אֵיתָן is not probable, since they nowhere thus translate אֵיתָן. But Reiske and Ziegler have, like Ewald and Hitzig, combined יָתֵן of this proverb with אֵיתָן from אֵיתָן (Arab. *wâtin*), *firmum, perennem esse*. Hitzig translates the distich, after emending the text of 12*a* by the help of the LXX. and the Arab.: the refuge of the wicked is crumbling clay, but the root of the righteous endures (יָתֵן from אֵיתָן). Böttcher also reads חֲמֵר instead of חֲמֵר, and translates (*vid. p. 192, l. 11*): the refuge of the wicked is miry clay, but the root of the righteous holdeth fast (יָתֵן = Arab. *wâtin*). But this derivation of a verb יָתֵן is not necessary. The Græc. Venet. rightly, ῥίζα δὲ δικαίων δώσει. The obj. is self-evident. Rashi reads מִה שֶׁהוּא רֹאיוֹ לֵיתָן וְהוּא הַפְּרִי. So also Schul-tens. The root giveth, is equivalent to, it is productive in bringing forth that which lies in its nature. That the root of the righteous endures (Targ. נִתְקַיֵּם) is otherwise expressed, xii. 3.

Proverbs regarding injurious and beneficial words, wise hearing and prudent silence.

Ver. 13 In the transgression of the lips there lies a dangerous snare;  
The righteous escapeth from trouble.

The consecutive *modus* (וַיֵּצֵא) is here of greater weight than *e.g.* at xi. 8, where the connection follows without it (וַיָּבֵא) from the idea of the change of place. The translation: but the right-

eous . . . restores וַיֵּצֵא (וַיֵּצֵא), and ignores the syllogistic relation of the members of the proverb, which shows itself here (cf. the contrary, xi. 9) to a certain degree by וַיֵּצֵא. Ewald displaces this relation, for he paraphrases: "any one may easily come into great danger by means of inconsiderate words; yet it is to be hoped that the righteous may escape, for he will guard himself against evil from the beginning." He is right here in interpreting צָרָה and מִקְשָׁ רָע as the designation of danger into which one is betrayed by the transgressions of his lips, but "inconsiderate words" are less than פֶּשַׁע שֶׁפָּזַם. One must not be misled into connecting with פֶּשַׁע the idea of missing, or a false step, from the circumstance that פֶּשַׁע means a step; both verbs have, it is true, the common R. פֶּשַׁע with the fundamental idea of placing apart or separating, but פֶּשַׁע has nothing to do with פֶּשַׁע (step = placing apart of the legs), but denotes (as Arab. *fusuwk fisk*, from the primary meaning *diruptio*, *diremtio*) a sinning, breaking through and breaking off the relation to God (cf. e.g. xxviii. 24), or even the restraints of morality (x. 19). Such a sinning, which fastens itself to, and runs even among the righteous, would not be called פֶּשַׁע, but rather הִטָּאת (xx. 9). According to this the proverb will mean that sinful words bring into extreme danger every one who indulges in them—a danger which he can with difficulty escape; and that thus the righteous, who guards himself against sinful words, escapes from the distress (cf. with the expression, Eccles. vii. 18) into which one is thereby betrayed. רָע is the descriptive and expressive epithet to מִקְשָׁ (cf. Eccles. ix. 12): a bad false trap, a malicious snare, for מִקְשָׁ is the snare which closes together and catches the bird by the feet. This proverb is repeated at xxix. 6, peculiarly remodelled. The LXX. has after ver. 13 another distich:

He who is of mild countenance findeth mercy;  
He who is litigious oppresses souls.

(נַפְשׁוֹ, or rather, more in accordance with the Hebrew original: oppresses himself, נַפְשׁוֹ.)

Ver. 14 From the fruit which the mouth of the man bringeth forth is he satisfied with good,

And what the hands of the man accomplish returns back to him.

The proverb finds its final verification in the last judgment (cf. Matt. xii. 37), but it is also illustrated in the present life. If the mouth of a man bringeth forth fruit,—namely, the fruit of wholesome doctrine, of right guidance, of comforting exhortation, of

peace-bringing consolation for others,—this fruit is also to his own advantage, he richly enjoys the good which flows out of his own mouth, the blessing he bestows is also a blessing for himself. The same also is the case with the actions of a man. That which is done, or the service which is rendered by his hands, comes back to him as a reward or as a punishment. נָמַל signifies primarily accomplishment, execution, and is a twofold, double-sided conception: a rendering of good or evil, and merit on the side of men (whether merited reward or merited punishment), as well as recompense, requital on the side of God. The first line is repeated, somewhat altered, at xiii. 2, xviii. 20. The whole proverb is prophetically echoed in Isa. iii. 10 f. The *Keri* יָשִׁיב has Jahve as the subject, or rather the subject remains undefined, and “one requites him” is equivalent to: it is requited to him. The *Chethlûb* seems to us more expressive; but this use of the active with the undefined subject, instead of the passive, is certainly as much in the *Mishle* style (cf. xiii. 21) as the development of the subject of the clause from a foregoing genitive.

Ver. 15 The way of the fool is right in his own eyes,  
But the wise listeneth to counsel.

Other proverbs, like xvi. 2, say that generally the judgment of a man regarding his character does not go beyond a narrow subjectivity; but there are objective criteria according to which a man can prove whether the way in which he walks is right; but the fool knows no other standard than his own opinion, and however clearly and truly one may warn him that the way which he has chosen is the wrong way and leads to a false end, yet he obstinately persists;<sup>1</sup> while a wise man is not so wise in his own eyes (iii. 7) as not to be willing to listen to well-meant counsel, because, however careful he may be regarding his conduct, yet he does not regard his own judgment so unerring as not to be inclined ever anew to try it and let it stand the test. Ewald has falsely construed: yet whoever hears counsel is wise. In consequence of the contrast, אָוִל and חָכָם are the subject ideas, and with יִשְׁמַע לְעֵצָה is brought forward that which is in contrast to the self-complacency of the fool, the conduct of the wise man.

<sup>1</sup> Vid. kindred proverbs by Carl Schulze, *Die bibl. Sprichwörter der deutschen Sprache* (1860), p. 50, and M. C. Wahl's *Das Sprichwort in der heb.-aram. Literatur, u.s.w.* (1871), p. 31.

Ver. 16. The relations of the subject and the predicate are the same as in the preceding verse.

The fool makes known his vexation on the same day [at once],  
On the contrary, the prudent man hideth the offence.

Very frequently in these proverbs the first line is only defined by the adducing of the second, or the second holds itself in the light of the first. A post-bibl. proverb says that a man is known by three things: by his כּוֹס (his behaviour in drinking), his כּוֹס (his conduct in money transactions), and his כּעַם (his conduct under deep inward excitement). So here: he is a fool who, if some injury is done to him, immediately shows his vexation in a passionate manner; while, on the contrary, the prudent man maintains silence as to the dishonour that is done to him, and represses his displeasure, so as not to increase his vexation to his own injury. Passionless retaliation may in certain cases be a duty of self-preservation, and may appear to be necessary for the protection of truth, but passionate self-defence is always of evil, whether the injury which is inflicted be justifiable or unjustifiable. Regarding עָרוֹם, *callidus*, *vid.* p. 56; Schultens' comparison of the Greek γεγυμνασμένος is only a conceit in want of better knowledge. Regarding כָּסֶה (only here and at ver. 23) with מְכַסֶּה, as שָׁחַר (only xi. 27) with מְשַׁחֵר, *vid.* Ewald, § 170a. כּוֹס signifies on the self-same day = without delay, immediately, and is well translated by the LXX. αὐθιγμένον. With another object, 16b is repeated in 23a.

Most of the remaining parables of this section refer to the right use and the abuse of the tongue.

Ver. 17 He that breathes the love of truth, utters that which is right;  
But a lying tongue, deceit.

This verse is similar in meaning to xiv. 5 (where 5b = vi. 19a); the second line of the distich = xiv. 25b. Everywhere else יִפְיָהּ stand together, only here יִפְיָהּ is joined to אֱמוּנָה; *vid.* regarding this יִפְיָהּ forming an attributive clause, and then employed as an adjective, but with distinct verbal force, at vi. 19. Viewed superficially, the proverb appears tautological; it is not so, however, but places in causal connection the internal character of men and their utterances: whoever breathes אֱמוּנָה, truth or conscientiousness (the property of the אֱמֶת, *vid.* at Ps. xii. 2), *i.e.* lets the voice of this be heard in his utterances, such an one speaks צִדְקָה, *i.e.* uprightness, integrity, that which is correct, right (Isa. xlv. 19, cf. xli. 26), in relation to truth in general, and to the present case in particular;

but he who עֵר שְׁקָרִים, *i.e.* he who, against better knowledge and the consciousness of untruth, confirms by his testimony (from עֵר, *revertere*, to say again and again), therewith gives utterance to his impure character, his wicked intention, proceeding from delight in doing evil or from self-interest, and diverted towards the injury of his neighbour. As אמונה and מרמה correspond as statements of the contents of the utterances, so צדק and שקרים as statements of their motive and aim. מְרַמֶּה is obj. accus. of the יָגִיד (from הֵגִיד, to bring to light, cf. נָגַד, visibility) to be supplied, not the pred. nom. *dolorum structor*, as Fleischer poetically finds.

Ver. 18 There is that babbleth like the thrusts of a sword,  
But the tongue of the wise is healing.

The second (cf. xi. 24) of the proverbs beginning with יֵשׁ. The verb בָּטָה (בִּטָּה), peculiar to the Hebr., which in the modern Hebr. generally means "to speak out" (מְבַטֵּה in the grammar: the pronunciation) (according to which the LXX., Syr., and Targ. translate it by אָמַר), means in biblical Hebr., especially with reference to the binding of oneself by an oath (Lev. v. 4), and to solemn protestations (Num. xxx. 7, 9, according to which Jerome, *promittit*): to utter incautiously in words, to speak without thought and at random, referred erroneously by Gesenius to the R. בַּט, to be hollow, probably a word imitative of the sound, like the Greek βατταρίζω, to stammer, and βαττολογεῖν, to babble, which the lexicographers refer to a talkative person of the name of Βάττος, as our "*salbadern*" [=to talk foolishly] owes its origin to one Jenaer Bader on the Saal. Theod. and the *Græc. Venet.* give the false reading בּוֹטֵה (πεποιθώς). בְּמִדְקָרוֹת חֶרֶב stands *loco accusativi*, the בְּ being regarded as a noun: (*effutiens verba*) *quæ sunt instar confossionum gladii* (Fl.). We also call such a man, who bridles his loquacity neither by reflection nor moderates it by indulgent reference to his fellow-men, a *Schwertmaul* (sword-mouth) or a *Schandmaul* (a mouth of shame = slanderer), and say that he has a tongue like a sword. But on the other hand, the tongue of the wise, which is in itself pure gentleness and a comfort to others, since, far from wounding, rather, by means of comforting, supporting, directing exhortation, exercises a soothing and calming influence. Regarding רָפָא, whence מְרַפֵּא, Dietrich in Gesenius' *Lex.* is right. The root-meaning of the verb רָפָא (cognate רָפָה, to be loose, *Hiph.* to let go, *Hithpa.* xviii. 9, to show oneself slothful) is, as the Arab. kindred word *rafâ, rafa, raf, rawf (râf)* shows,

that of stilling, softening, soothing, whence arises the meaning of healing (for which the Arab. has *tabb* and *'alkh*); the meaning to repair, to mend, which the Arab. *rafâ* and *rafa* have, does not stand in a prior relation to to heal, as might appear from Job xiii. 4, but is a specializing of the general idea of *reficere* lying in *mitigare*, just as the patcher is called ἀκέστρια = ἡπήτρια,<sup>1</sup> from ἀκέομαι, which means equally to still and to heal. Since thus in רפא the meanings of mitigating and of healing are involved, it is plain that מרפא, as it means healing (the remedy) and at the same time (cf. *θεραπεία*, Rev. xxii. 2) the preservation of health, iv. 22, vi. 15, xvi. 24, xxix. 1, so also may mean mildness (here and xv. 4), tranquillity (xiv. 30; Eccles. x. 4, calm patience in contrast to violent passion), and refreshing (xiii. 17). Oetinger and Hitzig translate here "medicine;" our translation, "healing (the means of healing)," is not essentially different from it.

Ver. 19 The lip of truth endures for ever,

But the lying tongue only while I wink with the eye.

None of the old translators understood the phrase וְעַד-אַרְנִיעָה; the *Venet.* also, which follows Kimchi's first explanation, is incorrect: ἕως ῥήξεως, till I split (shatter) it (the tongue). Abulwalîd is nearer the correct rendering when he takes אַרְנִיעָה as a noun = רָנַע with *He parag.* Ahron b. Joseph is better in rendering the phrase by: until I make a רָנַע, and quite correct if רָנַע (from רָנַע = Arab. *raq'*, which is used of the swinging of the balance) is taken in the sense of a twinkling of the eye (Schultens: *vibramen*); cf. Orelli's *Die hebr. Synonyme der Zeit und Ewigkeit*, p. 27 f., where the synonyms for a twinkling of the eye, a moment, are placed together. עַד (properly progress) has in this phrase the meaning, while, so long as, and the cohortative signifies, in contradistinction to אַרְנִיעָה, which may also denote an unwilling movement of the eyelids, a movement proceeding from a free determination, serving for the measurement of a short space of time, Ewald, § 228a. אַרְנִיעָה, Jer. xlix. 19, l. 44, where Ewald takes אַרְנִיעָה כִּי (when I . . .) in the same sense as אַרְנִיעָה here, which is more appropriate than the explanation of Hitzig, who regards כִּי as opening the principal clause, and attaches to אַרְנִיעָה the quite too pregnant signification "to need (for an action) only a moment." The lip of truth, *i.e.* the lip which speaketh truth, endures for ever

<sup>1</sup> Whether ῥάπτειν, explained neither by Curtius nor by Flick, stands in a relation to it, we leave out of view.

(for truth, אֱמֶת = אֱמֶנֶת, is just the enduring); but the tongue of falsehood is only for a moment, or a wink of the eye, for it is soon convicted, and with disgrace brings to silence; for a post-bibl. Aram. proverb says: קוֹשֵׁטָא קָאִי שְׁקָרָא לָא קָאִי, the truth endures, the lie endures not (*Schabbath* 104a), and a Hebrew proverb: הַשֶּׁקֶר אֵין לוֹ רַגְלִים, the lie has no feet (on which it can stand).<sup>1</sup>

Ver. 20 Deceit is in the heart of him who deviseth evil,  
But those who devise peace cause joy.

Regarding the figure of forging, fabricating (LXX., Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, τεκταίνειν), or of ploughing, which underlies the phrase הָרַשׁ רָע, *moliri malum*, *vid.* at iii. 29. That deceit is in the heart of him who deviseth evil (בְּלִב־הָרָשִׁי רָע, as is correctly punctuated *e.g.* by Norzi) appears to be a platitude, for the הָרַשׁ רָע is as such directed against a neighbour. But in the first place, 20a in itself says that the evil which a man hatches against another always issues in a fraudulent, malicious deception of the same; and in the second place, it says, when taken in connection with 20b, where שִׂמְחָה is the parallel word to מְרָמָה, that with the deception he always at the same time prepares for him sorrow. The contrast to רָע הָרַשִׁי is יוֹעֲצֵי שָׁלוֹם, and thus denotes not those who give counsel to contending parties to conclude peace, but such as devise peace, viz. in reference to the neighbour, for יַעַן means not merely to impart counsel, but also mentally to devise, to resolve upon, to decree, 2 Chron. xxv. 16, Isa. xxxii. 7 f.; cf. יַעַן עַל, Jer. xlix. 30. Hitzig and Zöckler give to שָׁלוֹם the general idea of welfare (that which is salutary), and interpret the שִׂמְחָה as the inner joy of the good conscience. Certainly שָׁלוֹם (R. שָׁל, *extrahere*, in the sense of deliverance from trouble) means not only peace as to the external relationship of men with each other, but also both internal and external welfare. Thus it is here meant of external welfare; Hitzig rightly compares Jer. xxix. 11 with Nahum i. 11 to the contrast between שָׁלוֹם and רָע. But as מְרָמָה is not self-deception, but the deception of another, so also שִׂמְחָה is not the joy of those who devise the device in their hearts for the deception of others, but the joy they procure for others. Thoughts of peace for one's neighbour are always thoughts of procuring joy for him, as thoughts of evil are thoughts of deceit, and thus of procuring sorrow for him. Thus וְלִי־עֵצִי is an abbreviated expression for וְלִבִּי יוֹעֲצִי.

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Duke's *Rabbin. Blumenlese* (1844), p. 231.

Ver. 21 No evil befalls the righteous,  
But the godless are full of evil.

Hitzig translates צָרָה "sorrow," and Zöckler "injury;" but the word signifies evil as ethical wickedness, and although it may be used of any misfortune in general (as in בִּן-אֹנִי, *opp.* בְּנֵי־מֵן); thus it denotes especially such sorrow as is the harvest and product of sin, xxii. 8, Job iv. 8, Isa. lix. 4, or such as brings after it punishment, Hab. iii. 7, Jer. iv. 15. That it is also here thus meant the contrast makes evident. The godless are full of evil, for the moral evil which is their life-element brings out of itself all kinds of evil; on the contrary, no kind of evil, such as sin brings forth and produces, falls upon the righteous. God, as giving form to human fortune (Ex. xxi. 13), remains in the background (cf. Ps. xci. 10 with v. 1 f.); *vid.* regarding אָנָּה, the weaker power of עָנָה, to go against, to meet, to march against, Fleischer, Levy's *Chald. Wört-buch*, 572.

Ver. 22 Lying lips are an abhorrence to Jahve,  
And they that deal truly are His delight.

The frame of the distich is like xi. 1, 20. אֱמוּנָה is probity as the harmony between the words and the inward thoughts. The LXX., which translates ὁ δὲ ποιῶν πίστεις, had in view עֲשֵׂה אֱמוּנִים (עֲשֵׂה אֱמוּנִים, cf. Isa. xxvi. 2); the text of all other translations agrees with that commonly received.

Ver. 23 A prudent man conceals knowledge,  
And a heart-fool proclaims imbecility.

In 23a ver. 16b is repeated, only a little changed; also 16a corresponds with 23a, for, as is there said, the fool knows not how to keep his anger to himself, as here, that a heart-fool (cf. the lying mouth, 22a) proclaims (trumpets forth), or as xiii. 16 says, displays folly without referring to himself the *si tacuisses*. To this forward charalatan blustering, which intends to preach wisdom and yet proclaims in the world mere folly, *i.e.* nonsense and imbecility, and thereby makes itself troublesome, and only to be laughed at and despised, stands in contrast the relation of the אָדָם עָרוּם, *homo callidus*, who possesses knowledge, but keeps it to himself without bringing it forth till an occasion presents itself for setting it forth at the right place, at the right time, and to the right man. The right motive also regulates such silence as well as modesty. But this proverb places it under the point of view of prudence.

We take verses 24–28 together as a group. In these verses

the subject is the means of rising (in the world), and the two ways, the one of which leads to error, and the other to life.

Ver. 24 The hand of the diligent attains to dominion,  
But slothfulness will become tributary.

In x. 4 רַמְיָהּ was adj., but to כָּף standing beside it; here it is to be regarded as adj. to יָד (sluggish hand) supplied from 24a, but may be equally regarded as a subst. (slothfulness) (*vid.* at ver. 27). Regarding חֲרֹץ, *vid.* p. 211. מַס signifies tribute and service, *i.e.* tributary service rendered to a master. In xi. 29b עֵבֶר stands for it. It is still the experience of to-day, as it was of Solomon's time, that slothfulness (indolence) brings down to a state of servitude, if not even deeper, but that vigorous activity raises to dominion or to the position of a master, *i.e.* to independence, wealth, respect, and power.

Ver. 25 Trouble in the heart of a man boweth it down,  
And a friendly word maketh it glad.

The twofold anomaly that דָּאָגָה is construed as masc. and לֵב as fem. renders the text doubtful, but the LXX., Syr., Targum, which introduce another subject, *φοβερὸς λόγος* (יִדְבָּר מִדְּאִי?), do not improve it; Theodotion's is preferable, who translates *μέριμνα ἐν καρδίᾳ ἀνδρὸς κατίσχει αὐτόν*, and thus reads יִשְׁחָנֵּה. But the rhyme is thereby lost. As כְּבוֹד, Gen. xlix. 6, so also may לֵב be used as fem., for one thereby thinks on נַפֶּשׁ; the plur. לְבָבוֹת (לִבָּבוֹת), according to which in Ezek. xvi. 30 we find the sing. לֵבָה, may also conform to this. And יִשְׁחָנֵּה as pred. to דָּאָגָה follows the scheme ii. 10b, perhaps not without attractional co-operation after the scheme קֶשֶׁת גְּבִרִים חֲתִים, 1 Sam. ii. 4. הִשְׁחָה, from שָׁחָה, occurs only here; but הִשָּׁח, from שָׁחָה, occurs only twice. דִּבְרַת טוֹב designates in the book of Joshua and in Kings (1 Kings viii. 56) the divine promise; here it is of the same meaning as 1 Kings xii. 7: an appeasing word. Who has not in himself had this experience, how such a word of friendly encouragement from a sympathizing heart cheers the sorrowful soul, and, if only for a time, changes its sorrow into the joy of confidence and of hope!

Ver. 26 The righteous looketh after his pastures,  
But the way of the godless leadeth them into error.

In 26a no acceptable meaning is to be gained from the traditional mode of vocalization. Most of the ancients translate יָתֵר as part. to יָתֵר, as it occurs in post-bib. Hebr., *e.g.* הִבָּה יָתֵרָה, prevailing, altogether peculiar love. Thus the Targum, טַב מִן הַבְרִיָּה; *Venet.*

πεπερίττεται (after Kimchi); on the other hand, Aquila, active: περισσεύων τὸν πλησίον (making the neighbour rich), which the meaning of the *Kal* as well as the form יִתֵּר oppose; Luther, "The righteous man is better than his neighbour," according to which Fleischer also explains, "Probably יִתֵּר from יִתֵּר, πλεονάζειν, has the meaning of πλέον ἔχων, πλεονεκτῶν, he gains more honour, respect, riches, etc., than the other, viz. the unrighteous." Yet more satisfactory Ahron b. Joseph: not the nobility and the name, but this, that he is righteous, raises a man above others. In this sense we would approve of the *præstantior altero justus*, if only the two parts of the proverb were not by such a rendering wholly isolated from one another. Thus יִתֵּר is to be treated as the fut. of הִתֵּר. The Syr. understands it of right counsel; and in like manner Schultens explains it, with Cocceius, of intelligent, skilful guidance, and the moderns (e.g. Gesenius) for the most part of guidance generally. Ewald rather seeks (because the proverb-style avoids the placing of a fut. verb at the commencement of the proverb [but cf. xvii. 10]) to interpret יִתֵּר as a noun in the sense of director, but his justification of the fixed *ā* is unfounded. And generally this sense of the word is exposed to many objections. The verb הִתֵּר signifies, after its root, to go about, "to make to go about," but is, however, not equivalent to, to lead (wherefore Böttcher too ingeniously derives יִתֵּר = יִאֲתֵר from אֲתֵר = אֲשֵׁר); and wherefore this strange word, since the Book of Proverbs is so rich in synonyms of leading and guiding! The *Hiph.* הִתֵּר signifies to send to spy, Judg. i. 23, and in this sense the poet ought to have said יִתֵּר לְרַעְיָהוּ: the righteous spies out (the way) for his neighbour, he serves him, as the Targum-Talmud would say, as תִּיָּר. Thus connected with the obj. accus. the explanation would certainly be: the righteous searches out his neighbour (Löwenstein), he has intercourse with men, according to the maxim, "*Trau schau wem.*" But why not רַעְיָהוּ, but מְרַעְיָהוּ, which occurs only once, xix. 7, in the *Mishle*, and then for an evident reason? Therefore, with Döderlein, Dathe, J. D. Michaelis, Ziegler, and Hitzig, we prefer to read מְרַעְיָהוּ; it is at least not necessary, with Hitzig, to change יִתֵּר into יִתֵּר, since the *Hiphil* may have the force of the intens. of the *Kal*, but יִתֵּר without the jussive signification is a poetic licence for יִתֵּר. That תִּיר can quite well be used of the exploring of the pasture, the deriv. יִתֵּר, Job xxxix. 18, shows. Thus altered, 26a falls into an appropriately contrasted relation to 26b. The way of the godless

leads them into error; the course of life to which they have given themselves up has such a power over them that they cannot set themselves free from it, and it leads the enslaved into destruction: the righteous, on the contrary, is free with respect to the way which he takes and the place where he stays; his view (regard) is directed to his true advancement, and he looketh after his pasture, *i.e.* examines and discovers, where for him right pasture, *i.e.* the advancement of his outer and inner life, is to be found. With מְרַעְהוּ there is a combination of the thought of this verse with the following, whose catch-word is צִירוֹ, his prey.

Ver. 27 The slothful pursues not his prey;

But a precious possession of a man is diligence.

The LXX., Syr., Targ., and Jerome render יִחַרְךָ in the sense of obtaining or catching, but the verbal stem חרך nowhere has this meaning. When Fleischer remarks, חֲרַךְ, ἄπ. λεγ., probably like לָכַד, properly to entangle in a noose, a net, he supports his opinion by reference to חֲרָפִים, which signifies lattice-windows, properly, woven or knitted like a net. But חֲרַךְ, whence this חֲרָכִים, appears to be equivalent to the Arab. *khark*, *fissura*, so that the plur. gives the idea of a manifoldly divided (lattice-like, trellis-formed) window. The Jewish lexicographers (Menahem, Abulwalid, Parchon, also Juda b. Koreish) all aim at that which is in accord with the meaning of the Aram. חֲרַךְ, to singe, to roast (= Arab. *hark*): the slothful roasteth not his prey, whether (as Füst presents it) because he is too lazy to hunt for it (Berth.), or because when he has it he prepares it not for enjoyment (Ewald). But to roast is צָלָה, not רוּך, which is used only of singeing, *e.g.* the hair, and roasting, *e.g.* ears of corn, but not of the roasting of flesh, for which reason Joseph Kimchi (*vid.* Kimchi's *Lex.*) understands צִירוֹ of wild fowls, and יִחַרְךָ of the singeing of the tips of the wings, so that they cannot fly away, according to which the Venet. translates οὐ μενεῖ . . . ἡ θήρα αὐτοῦ. Thus the Arab. must often help to a right interpretation of the ἄπ. λεγ. Schultens is right: *Verbum harak, חרך, apud Arabes est movere, ciere, excitare, κινεῖν generatim, et speciatim excitare prædam e cubili, κινεῖν τὴν θήραν.* The Lat. *agiture*, used of the frightening up and driving forth of wild beasts, corresponds with the idea here, as *e.g.* used by Ovid, *Metam.* x. 538, of Diana:

*Aut pronos lepores aut celsum in cornua cervum*

*Aut agitat damas.*

Thus יִחַרְךָ together with צִירוֹ gains the meaning of hunting, and

generally of catching the prey. רַמְיָה is here incarnate slothfulness, and thus without ellipse equivalent to איש רמיה. That in the contrasted clause חרוץ does not mean ἀποτόμως, decreed (Löwenstein), nor gold (Targ., Jerome, Venet.), nor that which is excellent (Syr.), is manifest from this contrast as well as from x. 4, xii. 24. The clause has from its sequence of words something striking about it. The LXX. placed the words in a different order: κτῆμα δὲ τίμιον ἀνὴρ κατὰρὸς (חרוץ in the sense of Arab. *khālas*). But besides this transposition, two others have been tried: הון אדם חרוץ יקר, the possession of an industrious man is precious, and הון יקר אדם חרוץ, a precious possession is that (supply הון) of an industrious man. But the traditional arrangement of the words gives a better meaning than these modifications. It is not, however, to be explained, with Ewald and Bertheau: a precious treasure of a man is one who is industrious, for why should the industrious man be thought of as a worker for another and not for himself? Another explanation advanced by Kimchi: a valuable possession to men is industry, has the twofold advantage that it is according to the existing sequence of the words, and presents a more intelligible thought. But can חרוץ have the meaning of תַּרְצִיּוֹת (the being industrious)? Hitzig reads חָרוֹץ, to make haste (to be industrious). This is unnecessary, for we have here a case similar to x. 17, where שֹׁמֵר for שָׁמֹר is to be expected: a precious possession of a man is it that, or when, he is industrious, חָרוֹץ briefly for תַּרְצִיּוֹת. The accentuation fluctuates between וְהוֹן אָדָם יָקָר (so e.g. Cod. 1294), according to which the Targum translates, and וְהוֹן אָדָם יָקָר, which, according to our explanation, is to be preferred.

Ver. 28 In the path of righteousness is life,  
And the way of its path is immortality.

All the old versions to the Venet. give אֵל instead of אֵל, and are therefore under the necessity of extracting from וְדֶרֶךְ נְתִיבָה a meaning corresponding to this, εἰς θάνατον, in which they are followed by Hitzig: "a devious way leadeth to death." But נְתִיבָה (נְתִיבָה) signifies step, and generally way and street (*vid.* at i. 15), not "devious way," which is expressed, Judg. v. 6, by עַקְלָלוֹת. And that אֵל is anywhere punctuated thus in the sense of אֵל is previously improbable, because the Babylonian system of punctuation distinguishes the negative אֵל with a short *Pathach*, and the prepositional אֵל (Arab. *ilā*) with a short *Chirek*, from each other

(*vid.* Pinsker, *Einkl.* p. xxii. f.); the punctuation 2 Sam. xiii. 16, Jer. li. 3, gives no support to the opinion that here לֹא is vocalized thus in the sense of לֹא־עַם, and it is not to be thus corrected. Nothing is more natural than that the Chokma in its constant contrast between life and death makes a beginning of expressing the idea of the *ἀθανασία* (*vid.* p. 42), which Aquila erroneously read from the אל-מות, Ps. xlviii. 15. It has been objected that for the formation of such negative substantives and noun-adjectives לֹא (e.g. לֹא-עַם, לֹא-אֵל) and not אֵל is used; but that אֵל also may be in close connection with a noun, 2 Sam. i. 13 shows. There אֵל-טַל is equivalent to אֵל יְהִי טַל, according to which it may also be explained in the passage before us, with Luther and all the older interpreters, who accepted אֵל in its negative signification: and on (the אֵל governing) the way . . . is no death. The negative אֵל frequently stands as an intensifying of the objective לֹא; but why should the Chokma, which has already shown itself bold in the coining of new words, not apply itself to the formation of the idea of immortality?: the idol name אֱלִיל is the result of a much greater linguistic boldness. It is certain that אֵל is here not equivalent to אֱלִיל; the Masora is therefore right in affirming that נְתִיבָה is written with *He raphatum pro map-picato* (*vid.* Kimchi, *Michlol* 31a, and in the *Lex.*), cf. 1 Sam. xx. 20, *vid.* Böttcher, § 418. Thus: the way of their step is immortality, or much rather, since דֶּרֶךְ is not a fixed idea, but also denotes the going to a distance (*i.e.* the journey), the behaviour, the proceeding, the walk, etc.: the walking (the stepping over and passing through) of their way is immortality. Rich in synonyms of the way, the Hebrew style delights in connecting them with picturesque expressions; but דֶּרֶךְ always means the way in general, which divides into אֲרָחוֹת or נְתִיבוֹת (Job vi. 18, Jer. xviii. 5), and consists of such (Isa. iii. 16). The distich is synonymous: on the path of righteousness (accentuate צִדְקָה בְּאֶרֶץ) is life meeting him who walks in it, and giving itself to him as a possession, and the walking in its path is immortality (cf. iii. 17, x. 28); so that to go in it and to be immortal, *i.e.* to be delivered from death, to be exalted above it, is one and the same thing. If we compare with this, xiv. 32b, it is obvious that the Chokma begins (*vid.* *Psychol.* p. 410) to break through the limits of this present life, and to announce a life beyond the reach of death.

The proverb xii. 28 is so sublime, so weighty, that it manifestly

forms a period and conclusion. This is confirmed from the following proverb, which begins like x. 1 (cf. 5), and anew stamps the collection as intended for youth:

xiii. 1 A wise son is his father's correction;  
But a scorner listens not to rebuke.

The LXX., which the Syr. follows, translate *Υἱὸς πανουργὸς ὑπήκοος πατρί*, whence it is not to be concluded with Lagarde that they read *נוֹסֵר* in the sense of a *Ni. tolerantivum*; they correctly understood the text according to the Jewish rule of interpretation, "that which is wanting is to be supplied from the context." The Targ. had already supplied *שָׁמַע* from 1b, and is herein followed by Hitzig, as also by Glassius in the *Philologia sacra*. But such an ellipse is in the Hebr. style without an example, and would be comprehensible only in passionate, hasty discourse, but in a language in which the representation *filius sapiens disciplinam patris audit* numbers among the anomalies is not in general possible, and has not even its parallel in Tacitus, *Ann. xiii. 56: deesse nobis terra, in qua vivamus—in qua moriemur, non potest*, because here the primary idea, which the one expression confirms, the other denies, and besides no particle, such as the *!* of this passage before us, stands between them. Böttcher therefore maintains the falling out of the verb, and writes *יָבִין* before *בֵּין*; but one says not *בֵּין מוֹסֵר*, but *שָׁמַע מוֹסֵר*, i. 8, iv. 1, xix. 27. Should not the clause, as it thus stands, give a sense complete in itself? But *מוֹסֵר* can hardly, with Schultens and Ewald, be taken as *part. Hoph.* of *יָסַר*: one brought up by his father, for the usage of the language knows *מוֹסֵר* only as *part. Hoph.* of *סָוַר*. Thus, as Jerome and the *Venet.* translate: a wise son is the correction of his father, *i.e.* the product of the same, as also Fleischer explains, "Attribution of the cause, the ground, as elsewhere of the effect." But we call that which one has trained (vegetable or animal) his *Zucht* (= *παιδεία* in the sense of *παίδευμα*). To the wise son (x. 1) who is indebted to the *מוֹסֵר אָב* (iv. 1), stands opposed the *לֵץ* (*vid. i. 22*), the mocker at religion and virtue, who has no ear for *נִפְעָרָה*, strong and stern words which awaken in him a wholesome fear (cf. xvii. 10, Jude 23: *ἐν φόβῳ*).

Ver. 2 From the fruit of the mouth of a man he himself enjoys good;  
But the delight of the godless is violence.

2a = xii. 14a, where *יִשְׁבַּע* for *יֵאָכֵל*. A man with a fruit-bringing mouth, himself enjoys also the blessing of his fruit-producing

speech; his food (cf. *βρῶμα*, John iv. 34) is the good action in words, which in themselves are deeds, and are followed by deeds; this good action affords enjoyment not merely to others, but also to himself. Ewald and Bertheau attract *לֹא יֵאָכֵל* to 2*b*; so also does Fleischer: "the violence which the *בְּנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל* wish to do to others turns back upon themselves; they must eat it also, *i.e.* bear its evil consequences." The thought would then be like x. 6: *os improborum obteget violentia*, and "to eat violence" is parallel to "to drink (xxvi. 6) violence (injury)." But wherefore then the naming of the soul, of which elsewhere it is said that it hungers or satiates itself, but never simply (but cf. Luke xii. 19) that it eats? On the contrary, *נַפְשׁ* means also *appetitus*, xxiii. 2, and particularly wicked desire, Ps. xxvii. 12; here, as Ps. xxxv. 25, the object of this desire (*Psychol.* p. 202). Regarding *בְּנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל*, *vid.* above, p. 85. There are such as do injury in a cunning deceitful manner to their neighbour to their own advantage. While the former (the righteous) distributes to his neighbour from the inner impulse without having such a result in view, yet according to God's direction he derives enjoyment himself therefrom: the desire of the latter goes to *מַחֲשָׁבִים*, *ἀδικία*, and thus to the enjoyment of good unrighteously and violently seized.

Ver. 3 He that guardeth his mouth keepeth his soul;

He that openeth wide his lips, to him it is destruction.

3*a* is extended in xxi. 23 to a distich. Mouth and soul stand in closest interchangeable relation, for speech is the most immediate and continuous expression of the soul; thus whoever guards his mouth keeps his soul (the *Venet.*, with excellent rendering of the synonym, *ὁ τηρῶν τὸ στόμα ἑαυτοῦ φυλάσσει τὴν ψυχὴν ἑαυτοῦ*), for he watches that no sinful vain thoughts rise up in his soul and come forth in words, and because he thus keeps his soul, *i.e.* himself, safe from the destructive consequences of the sins of the tongue. On the contrary, he who opens wide his lips, *i.e.* cannot hold his mouth (LXX. *ὁ δὲ προπετὴς χεῖλεσιν*), but expresses unexamined and unconsidered whatever comes into his mind and gives delight, he is destruction to himself (supply *הָיָה*), or to him it is destruction (supply *הָיָה*); both interpretations are possible, the parallelism brings nearer the former, and the parallel xviii. 7 brings nearer the latter. *פִּשְׁפֹּשׁ* means to spread (Schultens: *diducere cum ruptura vel ad rupturam usque*), here the lips, *Pih.* Ezek. xvi. 25, the legs, Arab. *fashkh*, *farshkh*; *vid.* regarding the R. *פָּשַׁח*, to extend, to

spread out, Fleischer in the supplements to the *A. L. Z.* 1843, col. 116. Regarding the *Mishle* word מְחַתֵּה, *vid.* under x. 14.

Ver. 4. The three proverbs (1-3) which refer to hearing and speaking are now followed by a fourth which, like vers. 2 and 3, speaks of the נֶפֶשׁ.

The soul of the sluggard desires, yet has not;  
But the soul of the industrious is richly satisfied.

The view that the *o* in נֶפֶשׁ עָצֵל is the *cholem compaginis*, Böttcher, § 835, meets with the right answer that this would be the only example of a vocal *casus* in the whole of gnomic poetry; but when on his own part (*Neue Aehrenlese*, § 1305) he regards נֶפֶשׁ as the accus. of the nearer definition (= בְּנֶפֶשׁ), he proceeds inadvertently on the view that the first word of the proverb is מְחַתֵּה, while we read מְחַתֵּה, and נֶפֶשׁ is thus the nom. of the subject. נֶפֶשׁ עָצֵל means "his (the sluggard's) soul" (for עָצֵל occurs as explanatory permutative briefly for נֶפֶשׁ עָצֵל), as סְעִיפֶיהָ פְּרִיָּה means "its branches (*i.e.* of the fruitful tree)," Isa. xvii. 6. One might, it is true, add ה to the following word here, as at xiv. 13; but the similar expression appertaining to the *syntax ornata* occurs also 2 Sam. xxii. 33, Ps. lxxi. 7, and elsewhere, where this is impracticable. Meïri appropriately compares the scheme Ex. ii. 6, she saw him, *viz.* the boy. With reference to the יָצָא here violently (*cf.* xxviii. 1) introduced, Böttcher rightly remarks, that it is an adverb altogether like *necquidquam*, xiv. 6, xx. 4, Ps. lxviii. 21, etc., thus: *appetit necquidquam anima ejus, scilicet pigri*. 4b shows the meaning of the desire that has not, for there תִּרְשָׁן occurs, a favourite strong *Mishle* word (xi. 25, xxviii. 25, etc.) for abundant satisfaction (the LXX. here, as at xxviii. 25, ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ, *sc.* ἔσονται, instead of which, Montfaucon supposed *πιμελείᾳ*, which is, however, a word not authenticated). The slothful wishes and dreams of prosperity and abundance (*cf.* xxi. 25 f., a parallel which the Syr. has here in view), but his desire remains unsatisfied, since the object is not gained but only lost by doing nothing; the industrious gain, and that richly, what the slothful wishes for, but in vain.

Ver. 5. Two proverbs of the character of the righteous and of the effect of righteousness:

A deceitful thing the righteous hateth;  
But the godless disgraceth and putteth to shame.

With דָּבָר in the sphere of an intelligible generality (as here of falsehood, or Ps. xli. 9 of worthlessness) a concrete event is in

view, as with דְּבָרִי in the following plur. a general fact is separated into its individual instances and circumstances (*vid.* at Ps. lxxv. 4); for דְּבָרִי means not only the word in which the soul reveals itself, but also any fact in which an inner principle or a general fact or a whole comes forth to view. The righteous hateth all that bears in it the character of a falsehood (punctuate דְּבָרִי־שֶׁקֶר with *Gaja*, cf. xii. 19), but the godless . . . Should we now, with Bertheau, Hitzig, and others, translate “acteth basely and shamefully”? It is true that both *Hiphs.* may be regarded as transitive, but this expression gives no right contrast to 5a, and is pointless. We have seen at x. 5 that הִבִּישׁ, like הִשְׁכִּיל, has also a causative signification: to put to shame, *i.e.* bring shame upon others, and that xix. 26, where מִבִּישׁ וּמַחְפִּיר are connected, this causative signification lies nearer than the intrinsically transitive. Thus it will also here be meant, that while the righteous hateth all that is false or that is tainted by falsehood, the godless on the contrary loves to disgrace and to put to shame. But it is a question whether יִבְאִישׁ is to be derived from בָּאֵשׁ = בּוֹשׁ, and thus is of the same meaning as יָבִישׁ; הִבְאִישׁ, Isa. xxx. 5, which there signifies *pudefactum esse*, is pointed יִבְאִישׁ, and is thus derived from a יָבִישׁ = בּוֹשׁ, *vid.* 2 Sam. xix. 6. But הִבְאִישׁ occurs also as *Hiph.* of בָּאֵשׁ, and means transitively to make of an evil savour, Gen. xxxiv. 30, cf. Ex. v. 21, as well as intransitively to come into evil savour, 1 Sam. xxvii. 12. In this sense of *putidum faciens*, bringing into evil savour, יִבְאִישׁ occurs here as at xix. 26, suitably along with יַחְפִּיר; xix. 26 is the *putidum facere* by evil report (slander), into which the foolish son brings his parents, here by his own evil report, thus to be thought of as brought about by means of slander. The old translators here fall into error; Luther renders both *Hiphils* reflexively; only the *Venet.* (after Kimchi) is right: ὀζώσει (from an ὀζοῦν as trans. to ὀξεῖν) καὶ ἀτιμώσει, he makes to be of ill odour and dishonours.

Ver. 6 Righteousness protecteth an upright walk,

And godlessness bringeth sinners to destruction.

The double thought is closely like that of xi. 5, but is peculiarly and almost enigmatically expressed. As there, רִשְׁעָה and צָדִיקָה are meant of a twofold inner relation to God, which consists of a ruling influence over man's conduct and a determination of his walk. But instead of naming the persons of the תְּמִימֵי דָרֶךְ and הַמַּצְדִּיקִים as the objects of this influence, the proverb uses the abstract expression, but with personal reference, תִּמְצִיקָה and תַּפְאֶת, and

designates in two words the connection of this twofold character with the principles of their conduct. What is meant by *הִצָּר* and *הִסָּף* proceeds from the contrasted relationship of the two (cf. xxii. 12). *נָצַר* signifies *observare*, which is not suitable here, but also *tueri* (*τηρεῖν*), to which *סָפָה* (*vid.* at xi. 3, and in Gesen. *Thesaurus*), not so much in the sense of “to turn upside down,” *pervertere* (as xi. 3, Ex. xxiii. 8), as in the sense of “to overthrow,” *evertere* (as e.g. xxi. 12), forms a fitting contrast. He who walks forth with an unfeigned and untroubled pure mind stands under the shield and the protection of righteousness (cf. with this *prosopœia* Ps. xxv. 21), from which such a walk proceeds, and at the same time under the protection of God, to whom righteousness appertains, is well-pleasing; but he who in his conduct permits himself to be determined by sin, godlessness (cf. Zech. v. 8) from which such a love for sin springs forth, brings to destruction; in other words: God, from whom the *רָשָׁע*, those of a perverse disposition, tear themselves away, makes the sin their snare by virtue of the inner connection established by Him between the *רָשָׁע* and the destruction (Isa. ix. 17). In the LXX. this 6th verse was originally wanting; the translation in the version of Aquila, in the Complut. and elsewhere, which the Syr. follows, falsely makes *הַטָּמֵא* the subj.: *τοὺς δὲ ἀσεβεῖς φαύλους ποιεῖ ἁμαρτία*.

Ver. 7. Two proverbs of riches and poverty:—

There is one who maketh himself rich and hath nothing;

There is another who representeth himself poor amid great riches.

A sentence which includes in itself the judgment which xii. 9 expresses. To the *Hithpa.* *הִתְכַּבֵּר* (to make oneself of importance) there are associated here two others, in the meaning to make oneself something, without anything after it, thus to place oneself so or so, Ewald, § 124a. To the clauses with *וְ* there is supplied a self-intelligible *לוֹ*.

Ver. 8 A ransom for a man's life are his riches;

But the poor heareth no threatening.

Bertheau falls into error when he understands *וְנִצָּרָה* of warning; the contrast points to threatening with the loss of life. The wealth of the rich before the judgment is not here to be thought of; for apart from this, that the *Torá* only in a single case permits, or rather ordains (Ex. xxi. 29 f.), ransom from the punishment of death, and declares it in all other cases inadmissible, Num. xxxv. 31 f. (one might indeed think of an administration of

justice not strictly in accordance with the Mosaic law, or altogether accessible to bribery), 8*b* does not accord therewith, since the poor in such cases would fare ill, because one would lay hold on his person. But one may think *e.g.* on waylayers as those introduced as speaking i. 11–14. The poor has no room to fear that such will threateningly point their swords against his breast, for there is nothing to be got from him: he has nothing, one sees it in him and he is known as such. But the rich is a valuable prize for them, and he has to congratulate himself if he is permitted to escape with his life. Also in the times of war and commotion it may be seen that riches endanger the life of their possessor, and that in fortunate cases they are given as a ransom for his life, while his poverty places the poor man in safety. To לֹא שָׁמַע Hitzig fittingly compares Job iii. 18, xxxix. 7: he does not hear, he has no need to hear. Michaelis, Umbreit, Löwenstein (who calls to remembrance the state of things under despotic governments, especially in the East) also explain 8*b* correctly; and Fleischer remarks: *pauper minas hostiles non audit, i.e. non minatur ei hostis*. Ewald's syntactic refinement: "Yet he became poor who never heard an accusation," presents a thought not in harmony with 8*a*.

The three following proverbs in vers. 9–11 have at least this in common, that the two concluding words of each correspond with one another almost rhythmically.

Ver. 9 The light of the righteous burneth joyously,  
And the lamp of the godless goeth out.

The second line = xxiv. 20*b*, cf. xx. 20. In the Book of Job xviii. 5 *f.*, אֹר רְשָׁעִים יִדְעַךְ and נֵירוֹ עָלֶי יִדְעַךְ (cf. xxi. 17) stand together, and there is spoken of (xxix. 3) a divine נֵר as well as a divine אֹר which enlightens the righteous; however, one must say that the poet, as he, vi. 3, deliberately calls the *Torâ* אֹר, and the commandment, as derived from it and separated, נֵר, so also here designedly calls the righteous אֹר, viz. אֹר הַיּוֹם (iv. 18, cf. 2 Pet. i. 19), and the godless נֵר, viz. נֵר דִּלּוֹק,—the former imparts the sunny daylight, the latter the light of tapers set in darkness. The authentic punctuation is אֹר-צִדִּיקִים, Ben-Naphtali's is 'צ' אֹר without *Makkeph*. To יִשְׂמַח Hitzig compares the "laughing tongue of the taper" of Meidâni, iii. 475; Kimchi also the "laughing, *i.e.* amply measured span, טַפַּח שׁוֹהֵק," of the Talmud; for the light laughs when it brightly shines, and increases rather than decreases; in Arab. *samuha* has in it the idea of joy directly related to that of liberality. The

LXX. translates חַמְצָה incorrectly by διαπαντός, and has a distich following ver. 9, the first line of which is ψυχὰὶ δόλῳ (נַפְשֵׁי רַמְיָה?) πλανῶνται ἐν ἀμαρτίαις, and the second line is from Ps. xxxvii. 21b.

Ver. 10 Nothing comes by pride but contention;

But wisdom is with those who receive counsel.

The restrictive רַק (only) does not, according to the sense, belong to בְּרִירוֹן (by pride), but to חַמְצָה, *vid.* under Ps. xxxii. 6 and Job ii. 10. Of יֵתֵן = there is, *vid.* under x. 24. Bertheau's "one causes" is not exact, for "one" [*man*] is the most general personal subject, but יֵתֵן is in such cases to be regarded as impersonal: by pride is always a something which causes nothing but quarrel and strife, for the root of pride is egoism. Line second is a variant to xi. 2b. *Bescheidenheit* (modesty) is in our old [German] language exactly equivalent to *Klugheit* (prudence). But here the צַוְעִים are more exactly designated as permitting themselves to be advised; the elsewhere reciprocal נוֹצֵץ has here once a tolerative signification, although the reciprocal is also allowable: with such as reciprocally advise themselves, and thus without positiveness supplement each his own knowledge by means of that of another. Most interpreters regard 10b as a substantival clause, but why should not יֵתֵן be carried forward? With such as permit themselves to be advised, or are not too proud to sustain with others the relation of giving and receiving, there is wisdom, since instead of hatred comes wisdom—the peaceful fruit resulting from an interchange of views.

Ver. 11 Wealth by means of fraud always becomes less;

But he that increaseth it by labour gains always more.

We punctuate הֶון־מֵהַבֵּל (with *Makkeph*, as in Ven. 1521, Antw. 1582, Frank.-on-the-Oder 1595, Gen. 1618, Leyden 1662), not הֶון מֵהַבֵּל (as other editions, and *e.g.* also Löwenstein); for the meaning is not that the wealth becomes less by הַבֵּל (Targ., but not the Syr.), or that it is less than הַבֵּל (Umbreit), but הֶון־מֵהַבֵּל is one idea: wealth proceeding from הַבֵּל; but הַבֵּל, properly a breath (Theod. ἀπὸ ἀτμοῦ or ἀτμίδος), then appearance without reality (Aquila, ἀπὸ ματαιότητος), covers itself here by that which we call swindle, *i.e.* by morally unrestrained fraudulent and deceitful speculation in contrast to solid and real gain. The translations: ἐπισπουδαζομένη μετὰ ἀνομίας (LXX.), ὑπερσπουδαζομένη (Symmachus, *Quinta*<sup>1</sup>),

<sup>1</sup> [A fragment of an anonymous translation, so called from the place it holds in Origen's *Hexapla*.]

*festinata* (Jerome), do not necessarily suppose the phrase מְהֵלָּה = מְהֵלָּה, xx. 21 *Kerî*, for wealth which comes מְהֵלָּה is obtained in a windy (unsubstantial) manner and as if by storm, of which the proverb holds good: “*so gewonnen so zerronnen*” (= quickly come, quickly go). מְהֵלָּה needs neither to be changed into that unhebraic מְהֵלָּה (Hitzig) nor into the cognate מְהֵלָּה (Ewald), but yet inferior to מְהֵלָּה in the content of its idea. The contrast of one who by fraud and deception quickly arrives at wealth is one who brings it together in his hand, ἐπὶ χειρός (*Venet.*), i.e. always as often as he can bear it in his hand and bring it forth (Ewald, Bertheau, Elster, and Lagarde), or according to the measure of the hand, κατὰ χεῖρα (which means “according to external ability”), so that על, which is applied to the formation of adverbs, e.g. Ps. xxxi. 24 (Hitzig),—by both explanations על-יד has the meaning of “gradually,”—is used as in the post-bib. Hebr. יד על יד = מעט מעט, e.g. *Schabbath* 156a (*vid.* Aruch under על) (distinguish from ביד = with thought, intentionally, *Berachoth* 52b). There is scarcely a word having more significations than יד. Connected with על, it means at one time side or place, at another mediation or direction; that which is characteristic here is the omission of the pronoun (על-ידיו, על-ידו). The LXX. translates יד על יד with the unrestrained freedom which it allows to itself by μετ’ εὐσεβείας, and has following πληθυνθήσεται another line, δίκαιος οἰκτεῖρει καὶ κιχρᾷ (from Ps. xxxvii. 26).

The figures of paradise in vers. 12 and 14 require us to take along with them the intermediate verse (13).

Ver. 12 Deferred waiting maketh the heart sick,  
And a tree of life is a wish accomplished.

Singularly the LXX. *Κρείσσων ἐναρχόμενος βοηθῶν καρδίᾳ*, followed by the Syr. (which the Targ. transcribes<sup>1</sup>): Better is he who begins to help than he who remains in hesitating expectation, by which תחלת is doubled, and is derived once from תחיל, to wait, and the second time from תחל, to begin. If the LXX., with its imitators, deteriorates to such a degree proverbs so clear, beautiful, and inviolable, what may one expect from it in the case of those not easily understood! מִשֶּׁה signifies also, Isa. xviii. 2, to be widely extended (cf. Arab. *meshak*), here in the sense of time, as נִמְשָׁה, to prolong, Isa. xiii. 22, and post-bib. מִשֶּׁה הַיָּמִין, the course of time.

<sup>1</sup> That the Targum of the Proverbs is a Jewish elaboration of the Peshito text, *vid.* Nöldeke in *Merx' Archiv*, Bd. ii. pp. 246–49.

Regarding תְּהִלָּה, *vid.* at x. 28, where as xi. 27 תְּקִיָּה, here תְּהִלָּה, as also Ps. lxxviii. 29 of the object of the wish, and with בּוֹא in the sense of being fulfilled (cf. Josh. xxi. 43), as there with הִבִּיא in the sense of accomplishing or performing. Extended waiting makes the heart sick, causes heart-woe (מַחֲלָה, *part. fem. Hiph.* of חָלָה, to be slack, feeble, sick; R. חָל, to loosen, to make loose); on the contrary, a wish that has been fulfilled is a tree of life (cf. p. 32), of a quickening and strengthening influence, like that tree of paradise which was destined to renew and extend the life of man.

Ver. 13 Whoever despiseth the word is in bonds to it,  
And he that feareth the commandment is rewarded.

The word is thought of as ordering, and thus in the sense of the commandment, *e.g.* 1 Sam. xvii. 19, Dan. ix. 23, 25. That which is here said is always true where the will of a man has subordinated itself to the authoritative will of a superior, but principally the proverb has in view the word of God, the מִצְוָה κατ' ἐξ. as the expression of the divine will, which (vi. 3) appears as the secondary, with the תּוֹרָה, the general record of the divine will. Regarding בּוֹא of contemptuous, spiteful opposition, *vid.* at vi. 30, cf. xi. 12. Joël (*vid.* p. 136, *note*) records the prevailing tradition, for he translates: "Whoever despises advice rushes into destruction; whoever holds the commandment in honour is perfect." But that יִשְׁלָם is to be understood neither of perfection nor of peace (LXX. and Jerome), but means *compensabitur* (here not in the sense of punishment, but of reward), we know from xi. 31. The translation also of יִהְיֶה לוֹ by "he rushes into destruction" (LXX. καταφθαρήσεται, which the Syr.-Hexap. repeats; Luther, "he destroys himself;" the Venet. οὐχ η̄χθησεται οἱ, *periet sibi*) fails, for one does not see what should have determined the poet to choose just this word, and, instead of the ambiguous *dat. ethicus*, not rather to say יִהְיֶה נֶפֶשׁוֹ. So also this יִהְיֶה is not with Gesenius to be connected with הָבַל = Arab. *khabl*, *corrumperere*, but with חָבַל = Arab. *habl*, *ligare*, *obligare*. Whoever places himself contemptuously against a word which binds him to obedience will nevertheless not be free from that word, but is under pledge until he redeem the pledge by the performance of the obedience refused, or till that higher will enforce payment of the debt withheld by visiting with punishment. Jerome came near the right interpretation: *ipse se in futurum obligat*; Abulwalîd refers to Ex. xxii. 25; and Parchon, Rashi, and others paraphrase: מִשְׁכָּן יִתְמַשְׁכֵּן עָלָיו,

he is confiscated as by mortgage. Schultens has, with the correct reference of the לַ not to the contemner, but to the word, well established and illustrated this explanation: he is pledged by the word, Arab. *marhwan* (*rahyn*), viz. *pigneratus pænæ* (Livius, xxix. 36). Ewald translates correctly: he is pledged to it; and Hitzig gives the right explanation: “A הַבְּלָה [a pledge, cf. xx. 16] is handed over to the offended law with the הַבְּוֹלָה [the bad conduct] by the despiser himself, which lapses when he has exhausted the forbearance, so that the punishment is inflicted.” The LXX. has another proverb following ver. 13 regarding υἱὸς δόλιος and οἰκέτης σοφός; the Syr. has adopted it; Jerome has here the proverb of the *animæ dolosæ* (*vid.* at ver. 9).

Ver. 14 The doctrine of the wise man is a fountain of life,  
To escape the snares of death.

An *integral* distich, *vid.* p. 8 of the Introduction. Essentially like 14a, x. 11 says, “a fountain of life is the mouth of the righteous.” The figure of the fountain of life with the teleological לְסוֹר וְגוֹ' (the ל of the end and consequence of the action) is repeated xiv. 27. The common non-biblical figure of the *laquei mortis* leads also to the idea of death as יָקוּשׁ [a fowler], Ps. xci. 3. If it is not here a mere formula for the dangers of death (Hitzig), then the proverb is designed to state that the life which springs from the doctrine of the wise man as from a fountain of health, for the disciple who will receive it, communicates to him knowledge and strength, to know where the snares of destruction lie, and to hasten with vigorous steps away when they threaten to entangle him.

Four proverbs follow, whose connection appears to have been occasioned by the sound of their words (ברע . . . בדעת, כל . . . שכל) (ריש . . . רשע).

Ver. 15 Fine prudence produceth favour;

But the way of the malicious is uncultivated.

Regarding טוֹב שְׂכָל (thus to be punctuated, without *Makkeph* with *Munach*, after Codd. and old editions), *vid.* p. 84; for the most part it corresponds with that which in a deep ethical sense we call fine culture. Regarding יָתֵן, *vid.* at x. 10: it is not used here, as there, impersonally, but has a personal subject: he brings forth, causes. Fine culture, which shows men how to take the right side and in all circumstances to strike the right key, exercises a kindly heart-winning influence, not merely, as would be expressed by יִמְצָא הֵן, to the benefit of its possessor, but, as is expressed by

יָתֵן הָן, such as removes generally a partition wall and brings men closer to one another. The אֵיתָן [*perennis*], touching it both for the eye and the ear, forms the contrast to יָתֵן הָן. This word, an elative formation from יָתֵן = יָתֵן, denotes that which stretches itself far, and that with reference to time: that which remains the same during the course of time. "That which does not change in time, continuing the same, according to its nature, strong, firm, and thus אֵיתָן becomes the designation of the enduring and the solid, whose quality remains always the same." Thus Orelli, *Die hebr. Synonyme der Zeit u. Ewigkeit*, 1871. But that in the passage before us it denotes the way of the בְּנֵי־הָאָדָם as "endlessly going forward," the explanation of Orelli, after Böttcher (*Collectanea*, p. 135), is withdrawn by the latter in the new *Aehrenlese* (where he reads רֵיב אֵיתָן, "constant strife"). And נָחַל אֵיתָן (Deut. xxi. 4) does not mean "a brook, the existence of which is not dependent on the weather and the season of the year," at least not in accordance with the traditional meaning which is given *Sota* ix. 5 (cf. the Gemara), but a stony valley; for the Mishna says: אֵיתָן כְּמִשְׁמַעוֹ קָשָׁה, i.e. אֵיתָן is here, according to its verbal meaning, equivalent to קָשָׁה (hard). We are of the opinion that here, in the midst of the discussion of the law of the עֹלָה עֲרוּפָה (the ritual for the atonement of a murder perpetrated by an unknown hand), the same meaning of the אֵיתָן is certified which is to be adopted in the passage before us. Maimuni<sup>1</sup> (in *Sota* and *Hilchoth Rozeach* ix. 2) indeed, with the Mishna and Gemara, thinks the meaning of a "strong rushing wâdy" to be compatible; but קָשָׁה is a word which more naturally denotes the property of the ground than of a river, and the description, Deut. xxi. 4: in a נָחַל אֵיתָן, in which there is no tillage and sowing, demands for נָחַל here the idea of the valley, and not primarily that of the valley-brook. According to this tradition, the Targum places a תְּקִיפָא in the Peshito translation of 15b, and the *Venet.* translates, after Kimchi, ὁδὸς δὲ ἀνταρτῶν (of ἀνταρτῆς from ἀνταίρειν) ἰσχυρά. The fundamental idea of remaining like itself, continuing, passes over into the idea of the firm, the hard, so that אֵיתָן is a word that interchanges with סֹלֶעַ, Num. xxiv. 21, and serves as a figurative designation of the rocky mountains, Jer. xlix. 19, and the rocky framework of the earth, Mic. vi. 2. Thus the meaning of hardness (πετρῶδες, Matt. xiii. 5) connects itself with

<sup>1</sup> [= *R. Moses b. Maimun* = *Rambam*, so called by the Jews from the initial letters of his name = *Maimonides*, d. 1204.]

the word, and at the same time, according to Deut. xxi. 4, of the uncultivable and the uncultivated. The way of the בְּנֵי־אִם, the treacherous (*vid.* p. 84), *i.e.* the manner in which they transact with men, is stiff, as hard as stone, and repulsive; they follow selfish views, never placing themselves in sympathy with the condition of their neighbour; they are without the tenderness which is connected with fine culture; they remain destitute of feeling in things which, as we say, would soften a stone. It is unnecessary to give a catalogue of the different meanings of this אִתָּן, such as *vorago* (Jerome), a standing bog (Umbreit), an ever trodden way (Bertheau), etc.; Schultens offers, as frequently, the relatively best: *at via perfidorum pertinacissime tensum*; but יִתֵּן does not mean to strain, but to extend. The LXX. has between 15a and 15b the interpolation: τὸ δὲ γινῶναι νόμον διαβολᾶς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὴς.

Ver. 16 Every prudent man acteth with understanding;  
But a fool spreadeth abroad folly.

Hitzig reads, with the Syr. (but not the Targ.) and Jerome, כָּל (*omnia agit*), but contrary to the Hebr. syntax. The כָּל־ is not feeble and useless, but means that he always acts בְּרָעָה, *mit Bedacht* [with judgment] (*opp.* בְּבִלְיָ רָעָה, *inconsulto*, Deut. iv. 42, xix. 4), while on the contrary the fool displays folly. xii. 23 and xv. 2 serve to explain both members of the verse. *Bedächtigkeit* [judgment] is just knowledge directed to a definite practical end, a clear thought concentrated on a definite point. יִקְרָא, he calls out, and יִבִּיעַ, he sputters out, are parallels to יִפְרֹשׂ. Fleischer: פָּרַשׁ, *expandit* (*opp.* Arab. *tawy*, *intra animum colibuit*), as a cloth or paper folded or rolled together, cf. Schiller's<sup>1</sup>—

“He spreads out brightly and splendidly  
The enveloped life.”

There lies in the word something derisive: as the merchant unrolls and spreads out his wares in order to commend them, so the fool does with his foolery, which he had enveloped, *i.e.* had the greatest interest to keep concealed within himself—he is puffed up therewith.

Ver. 17 A godless messenger falls into trouble;  
But a faithful messenger is a cordial.

The traditional text, which the translations also give (except Jerome, *nuntius impij*, and leaving out of view the LXX., which

<sup>1</sup> [“*Er breitet es heiter und glänzend aus,  
Das zusammengewickelte Leben.*”]

makes of ver. 17 a history of a foolhardy king and a wise messenger), has not מְלֹאֲךָ, but מְלֹאֲךָ; the Masora places the word along with מְלֹאֲךָ, Gen. xlviii. 16. And יַפֵּל is likewise testified to by all translators; they all read it as *Kal*, as the traditional text punctuates it; Luther alone departs from this and translates the *Hiph.*: “a godless messenger bringeth misfortune.” Indeed, this conj. יַפֵּל presses itself forward; and even though one read יַפֵּל, the sense intended by virtue of the parallelism could be no other than that a godless messenger, because no blessing rests on his godlessness, stumbles into disaster, and draws him who gave the commission along with him. The connection מְלֹאֲךָ רִשָּׁע is like אָדָם רִשָּׁע, xi. 7 (cf. the fem. of this adj., Ezek. iii. 18). Instead of בָּרַע is בָּרַעָה, xvii. 20, xxviii. 14, parallels (cf. also xi. 5) which the punctuators may have had in view in giving the preference to *Kal*. With מְלֹאֲךָ, from לֹאֲךָ, R. לָךְ, to make to go = to send, is interchanged צִיר, from צָוַר, to turn, whence to journey (cf. Arab. *sar*, to become, to be, as the vulg. “to be to Dresden = to journey” is used). The connection צִיר אֲמוּנִים (cf. the more simple צִיר אֲמוּנָה, xxv. 13) is like xiv. 15, עֵר אֲמוּנִים; the *pluralet.* means faithfulness in the full extent of the idea. Regarding מְרַפָּא, the means of healing, here of strength, refreshment, *vid.* iv. 22, xii. 18.

Ver. 18 Poverty and shame (to him) who rejecteth correction;  
But he who regardeth reproof is honoured.

We are neither to supply אִישׁ before יָרִישׁ וְקָלֹן (or more correctly, *abstr. pro concr.*, as רָמְיָה, xii. 27), nor לְ before פֹּרַע, as Gesenius (*Lehrgeb.* § 227a) does; nor has the *part.* פֹּרַע the value of a hypothetical clause like xviii. 13, Job xli. 18, although it may certainly be changed into such without destroying the meaning (Ewald, Hitzig); but “poverty and shame is he who is without correction,” is equivalent to, poverty and shame is the conclusion or lot of him who is without correction; it is left to the hearer to find out the reference of the predicate to the subject in the sense of the quality, the consequence, or the lot (cf. *e.g.* x. 17, xiii. 1, xiv. 35).<sup>1</sup> Regarding פֹּרַע, *vid.* p. 73. The Latin expression corresponding is: *qui detrectat disciplinam*. He who rejects the admonition and correction of his parents, his pastor, or his friend, and refuses every counsel to duty as a burdensome moralizing, such an one must at last gather wisdom by means of injury if he is at

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* regarding the strong demand which the Hebr. style makes on hearer and reader, my *Gesch. der jüdischen Poesie* (1863), p. 189.

all wise : he grows poorer in consequence of missing the right rule of life, and has in addition thereto to be subject to disgrace through his own fault. On the contrary, to him who has the disgrace to deserve reproof, but who willingly receives it, and gives it effect, the disgrace becomes an honour, for not to reject reproof shows self-knowledge, humility, and good-will ; and these properties in the judgment of others bring men to honour, and have the effect of raising them in their position in life and in their calling.

Two pairs of proverbs regarding fools and wise men, ranged together by catchwords.

Ver. 19 Quickened desire is sweet to the soul,

And it is an abomination to fools to avoid evil.

A synthetic distich (*vid.* p. 8), the first line of which, viewed by itself, is only a feebler expression of that which is said in 12*b*, for תַּאֲוָה נְהִיָּה is essentially of the same meaning as תַּאֲוָה בָּאָה, not the desire that has just arisen and is not yet appeased (Umbreit, Hitzig, Zöckler), which when expressed by a *part.* of the same verb would be הִנָּה (= אֲשֶׁר הִיָּתָה), but the desire that is appeased (Jerome, Luther, also *Venet.* ἐφῆσις γενομένη, *i.e.* after Kimchi : in the fulfilling of past desire ; on the contrary, the Syr., Targ. render the phrase נִאָּוָה of becoming desire). The *Niph.* נְהִיָּה denotes not the passing into a state of being, but the being carried out into historical reality, *e.g.* Ezek. xxi. 12, xxxix. 8, where it is connected with בָּאָה ; it is always the expression of the completed fact to which there is a looking back, *e.g.* Judg. xx. 3 ; and this sense of the *Niph.* stands so fast, that it even means to be done, finished (brought to an end), to be out, to be done with anything, *e.g.* Dan. ii. 1.<sup>1</sup> The sentence, that fulfilled desire does good to the soul, appears commonplace (Hitzig) ; but it is comprehensive enough on the ground of Heb. xi. to cheer even a dying person, and conceals the ethically significant truth that the blessedness of vision is measured by the degree of the longing of faith. But the application of the clause in its

<sup>1</sup> We have said, p. 215, that a *Niph.* in which the peculiar causative meaning of the *Hiph.* would be rendered passively is without example ; we must here with נְהִיָּה add, that the *Niph.* of intransitive verbs denotes the entrance into the condition expressed by the *Kal*, and may certainly be regarded, according to our way of thinking, as passive of the *Ilphil* (Gesen. § 51, 2). But the old language shows no נְהִיָּה to which נְהִיָּה (Arab. *ânhaway*, in Mutenebbi) stood as passive ; in the Arab. also the seventh form, rightly regarded, is always formed from the first, *vid.* Fleischer's *Beiträge*, u.s.w., in the *Sitzungs-Bericht. d. Sächs. Gesellschaft d. Wiss.* 1863, p. 172 f.

pairing with 19b acquires another aspect. On this account, because the desire of the soul is pleasant in its fulfilment, fools abhor the renouncing of evil, for their desire is directed to that which is morally worthless and blameworthy, and the endeavour, which they closely and constantly adhere to, is to reach the attainment of this desire. This subordinate proposition of the conclusion is unexpressed. The pairing of the two lines of the proverb may have been occasioned by the resemblance in sound of תועבת and תאוה. סור is *n. actionis*, like xvi. 17, cf. 6. Besides, it is to be observed that the proverb speaks of fools and not of the godless. Folly is that which causes that men do not break free from evil, for it is the deceit of sinful lust which binds them fast thereto.

Ver. 20 Whoever goes with wise men, becomes wise ;

And whoever has intercourse with fools, becomes base.

Regarding the significance of this proverb in the history of the religion and worship of Israel, *vid.* p. 39. We have translated 20a after the *Kerî*; the translation according to the *Chethîb* is: "go with wise men and become wise" (cf. viii. 33), not הִלֹךְ, for the connection of the (meant imperatively) *infin. absol.* with an imper. (meant conclusively) is not tenable; but הִלֹךְ is an imper. form established by הִלְכוּ, Jer. li. 50 (cf. הִלֹךְ = לָכַת, Num. xxii. 14), and appears to have been used with such shades of conception as here of intercourse and companionship for לָךְ. Regarding יָרוּעַ, *vid.* at xi. 15; there it meant *malo afficietur*, here it means *malus (pejor) fiet*. The *Venet.* (contrary to Kimchi, who explains by *frangetur*) rightly has *κακωθήσεται*. There is here a play upon words; רָעָה means to tend (a flock), also in general to be considerate about anything (xv. 14, Isa. xlv. 20), to take care of anything with the accusative of the person (xxviii. 7, xxix. 3), to hold intercourse with any one: he who by preference seeks the society of fools, himself becomes such (Jerome, *similis efficietur*), or rather, as יָרוּעַ expresses, he comes always morally lower down. "A wicked companion leads his associate into hell."

Ver. 21 Evil pursueth sinners,

And the righteous is repaid with good.

To תִּרְדֵּף of the punishment which follows after sinners at their heels, cf. Nah. i. 8. Greek art gives wings to Nemesis in this sense. To translate 21b, with Löwenstein, "The pious, the good rewards them," is untenable, for טוֹב, the good (*e.g.* xi. 27), never appears personified, only טוֹב, goodness, Ps. xxiii. 6, according to

which the LXX. τοὺς δὲ δίκαιους καταλήψεται (ישי) ἀγαθά. Still less is טוב meant personally, as the *Venet.* τὰ δὲ δίκαια ἀποδώσει χρηστός, which probably means: righteous conduct will a good one, viz. God, reward. טוב is an attribute of God, but never the name of God. So the verb יָשָׁם, after the manner of verbs of educating and leading (עשה, גמל, עבר), is connected with a double accusative. The Syr., Targum, and Jerome translate passively, and so also do we; for while we must think of God in the *retribuet*, yet the proverb does not name Him any more than at xii. 14, cf. x. 24; it is designedly constructed, placing Him in the background, with vague generality: the righteous will one, will they, reward with good—this expression, with the most general personal subject, almost coincides with one altogether passive.

Ver. 22 The good man leaveth behind him for his children's children,  
And the wealth of the sinner is laid up for the just.

As a commencing word, טוב signifies in the *Mishle* for the most part *bonum* (*præ*); but here, as at xii. 2, cf. xxii. 9, xiv. 4, it signifies *bonus*. As the expression that God is טוב (Ps. xxv. 8, etc.) of the O. T. is equivalent to the N. T. that He is ἀγάπη, so that man who in his relation to others is determined by unselfish love is טוב for the good man [*der Gütige*], i.e. the man who is willing to communicate all good is truly good, because the essence of צדקה, righteousness of life, is love. Such an one suffers no loss by his liberality, but, according to the law, xi. 25, by which a dispenser of blessings is at the same time also a recipient of blessings, he has only gain, so that he makes his children's children to inherit, i.e. leaves behind him an inheritance extending even to his grandchildren (*vid.* regarding הִנְחִיל, p. 182; here trans. as containing its object in itself, as at Deut. xxxii. 8: to make to inherit, to place in possession of an inheritance). The sinner, on the contrary (חוטא sing. to חַטָּאִים, ἀμαρτωλοί), loses his wealth, it is already destined to pass over to the righteous who is worthy of it, and makes use (cf. Job xxvii. 17) of that which he possesses in accordance with the will and appointment of God—a revelation of justice appertaining to time, the exceptions to which the old limited doctrine of requital takes no notice of. חֵיל, strength, then like our "*Vermögen*" (cf. *opes*, *facultates*), that by means of which one is placed in circumstances to accomplish much (Fl.); cf. regarding the fundamental idea *contorquere*, *compingere*, p. 226, also regarding צָמַן, properly *condensare*, then *condere*, p. 61.

Connected with ver. 22 there now follow two proverbs regarding sustenance, with one intervening regarding education.

Ver. 23 The poor man's fresh land gives food in abundance,  
And many are destroyed by iniquity.

The Targ. and Theodotion (μέγας) translate רב, but the Masora has רב־ with short *Kametz*, as xx. 6, Eccles. i. 8 (cf. Kimchi under רבב). The rendering: *multitudo cibi est ager pauperum*, makes the produce the property of the field (= *frugum fertilis*). נִיר is the new field (*novale* or *novalis*, viz. *ager*), from נָיַר, to make arable, fruitful; properly to raise up, viz. by grubbing and freeing of stones (סִקֵּל). But why, asks Hitzig, just the new field? As if no answer could be given to this question, he changes נִיר into נִיב, and finds in 23a the description of a *rentier*, "a great man who consumes the income of his capital." But how much more intelligible is the new field of the poor man than these capitals (רְאשִׁים) with their *per cents* (נִיב)! A new field represents to us severe labour, and as belonging to a poor man, a moderate field, of which it is here said, that notwithstanding its freshly broken up fallow, it yet yields a rich produce, viz. by virtue of the divine blessing, for the proverb supposes the *ora et labora*. Regarding רְאשִׁים = רְאשִׁים, vid. at x. 4. Jerome's translation, *patrum* (properly, heads), follows a false Jewish tradition. In the antithesis, 23b, one is tempted to interpret שׁ in the sense of viii. 21 [substance, wealth], as Schultens, *opulentia ipsa raditur quum non est moderamen*, and Euchel: that which is essentially good, badly managed, goes to ruin. But שׁ and וְשׁ at the beginning of a proverb, or of a line of a proverb, in every case means *est qui*. That a wealthy person is meant, the contrast shows. נִסְפָּה, which denotes anything taken away or gathered up, has the same meaning here as at 1 Sam. xxvii. 1: *est qui* (Fl. *quod*, but the parallel does not demand this) *abripitur*, i.e. *quasi turbine auferatur et perdatur*; the word reminds us of סוּפָה, whirlwind, but in itself it means only something smooth and altogether carried off. The בּ is here as at Gen. xix. 15; elsewhere בְּלֹא מִשְׁפָּט means with injustice (properly, not-right), xvi. 8, Jer. xxii. 13, Ezek. xxii. 29; here it is not the בּ of the means, but of the mediate cause. While the (industrious and God-fearing) poor man is richly nourished from the piece of ground which he cultivates, many a one who has incomparably more than he comes by his unrighteousness down to a state of beggary, or even lower: he is not only in poverty, but along with this his honour, his freedom, and the very life of his person perish.

Ver. 24 He that spareth his rod hateth his son,

And he who loveth him visits him early with correction.

The pædagogic rule of God, iii. 12, avails also for men, xxiii. 13 f., xxix. 15. The rod represents here the means of punishment, the *patria potestas*. He who spareth or avoideth this, and who does this even from love, has yet no true right love for his son; he who loveth him correcteth him early. With ἐπιμελῶς παιδεύει of the LXX. (cf. Sir. xxx. 1, ἐνδελεχῆσαι μάστιγας) the thought is in general indicated, but the expression is not explained. Many erroneously regard the suffix of שָׁחַר as referring to the object immediately following (de Dieu, Ewald, Bertheau, Zöckler); Hitzig, on the contrary, rightly remarks, that in this case we should expect the words to be, after v. 22 (cf. Ex. ii. 6), אֶת־הַמִּסָּר. He himself, without any necessity, takes שָׁחַר in the sense of the Arab. *skhar*, *compescere*. Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* ii. 2. 402) is right in saying that “שָׁחַר is connected with a double accusative as elsewhere קָרַם occurs; and the meaning is, that one ought much more to anticipate correction than restrain it where it is necessary.” שָׁחַר means to go out early to anything (*vid.* p. 73), according to which a Greek rendering is ὀρθρίζει (*Venet.* ὀρθριεῖ) ἀντὶ παιδείαν: *maturat ei castigationem = mature eum castigat* (Fl.). שָׁחַר does not denote the early morning of the day (as Rashi, לַבֹּקֶר), but the morning of life (as Euchel, בַּשָּׁחַר יָמִי). “The earlier the fruit, the better the training.” A father who truly wishes well to his son keeps him betimes under strict discipline, to give him while he is yet capable of being influenced the right direction, and to allow no errors to root themselves in him; but he who is indulgent toward his child when he ought to be strict, acts as if he really wished his ruin.

Ver. 25 The righteous has to eat to the satisfying of his soul;

But the body of the godless must suffer want.

Jerome translates תַּחֲסַר freely by *insaturabilis* (he has want = has never enough), but in that case we would have expected תַּחֲסִיר תַּחֲסִיר; also in 25a עֵר־שָׂבַע would have been used. We have thus before us no commendation of temperance and moderation in contrast to gluttony, but a statement regarding the diversity of fortune of the righteous and the godless—another way of clothing the idea of x. 3. שָׂבַע is a segolate form, thus an infin. formation, formally different from the similar שָׂבַע, iii. 10. Regarding בָּטֶן, *vid. Psychol.* p. 265 f.; it is a nobler word than “*Bauch*” [belly], for it denotes not the external arch, but, like κοιλία (R. בֶּטֶן, *concauus*), the inner

body, here like xviii. 20, as that which receives the nourishment and changes it in *succum et sanguinem*. That God richly nourishes the righteous, and on the contrary brings the godless to want and misery, is indeed a rule with many exceptions, but understood in the light of the N. T., it has deep inward everlasting truth.

Chap. xiv. The division of chapters here corresponds to a new commencement made in ver. 1. This proverb reminds us of the allegorical conclusion of the Introduction, and appears, since it is older, to have suggested it (*vid.* p. 34). The three proverbs 1-3 form a beautiful *trifolium*: wise management, God-fearing conduct, and wise silence, with their threefold contraries.

Ver. 1 The wisdom of the woman buildeth her house,  
And folly teareth it down with its own hands.

Were it חֲכָמוֹת נָשִׁים, after. Judg. v. 29, cf. Isa. xix. 11, then the meaning would be: the wise among women, each of them buildeth her house. But why then not just חֲכָמָה אִשָּׁה, as 2 Sam. xiv. 2, cf. Ex. xxxv. 25? The Syr., Targum, and Jerome write *sapiens mulier*. And if the whole class must be spoken of, why again immediately the individualizing in בְּנִיתָהּ? The LXX. obliterated that by its ὠκοδόμησαν. And does not אִילָת [folly] in the contrasted proverb (1b) lead us to conclude on a similar abstract in 1a? The translators conceal this, for they translate אִילָת personally. Thus also the Venet. and Luther; אִילָת is, says Kimchi, an adj. like עִוְרָה, *cæca*. But the linguistic usage does not point אִילָת with אִילָת to any אִיל. It is true that a fem. of אִיל does not occur; there is, however, also no place in which אִילָת may certainly present itself as such. Thus also חֲכָמוֹת must be an abstr.; we have shown at i. 20 how חֲכָמוֹת, as neut. plur., might have an abstr. meaning. But since it is not to be perceived why the poet should express himself so singularly, the punctuation חֲכָמוֹת is to be understood as proceeding from a false supposition, and is to be read חֲכָמָה, as at ix. 1 (especially since this passage rests on the one before us). Fleischer says: "to build the house is figuratively equivalent to, to regulate well the affairs of a house, and to keep them in a good condition; the contrary, to tear down the house, is the same contrast as the Arab. 'amârat âlbyt and kharab albyt. Thus *e.g.* in Burckhardt's *Sprüche*. 217, *harret sabret bythâ 'amârat*, a good woman (*ein braves Weib*) has patience (with her husband), and thereby she builds up her house (at the same time an example of the use of the preterite in like general sentences for individual-

izing); also No. 430 of the same work: 'amârat âlbyť wla kharâbt, it is becoming to build the house, not to destroy it; cf. in the *Thousand and One Nights*, where a woman who had compelled her husband to separate from her says: âna âlty 'amalt hadhâ barwĥy wâkhrnt byty bnfsy. Burckhardt there makes the remark: 'amârat âlbyť denotes the family placed in good circumstances—father, mother, and children all living together happily and peacefully." This conditional relation of the wife to the house expresses itself in her being named as house-wife (cf. *Hausehre* [= honour of a house] used by Luther, Ps. lxxviii. 13), to which the Talmudic רְבִיתִי (= *uxor mea*) answers; the wife is noted for this, and hence is called עֵקֶר הַבַּיִת, the root and foundation of the house; *vid.* Buxtorf's *Lex.* col. 301. In truth, the oneness of the house is more dependent on the mother than on the father. A wise mother can, if her husband be dead or neglectful of his duty, always keep the house together; but if the house-wife has neither understanding nor good-will for her calling, then the best will of the house-father cannot hinder the dissolution of the house, prudence and patience only conceal and mitigate the process of dissolution—folly, viz. of the house-wife, always becomes more and more, according to the degree in which this is a caricature of her calling, the ruin of the house.

Ver. 2 He walketh in his uprightness who feareth Jahve,  
And perverse in his ways is he that despiseth Him.

That which syntactically lies nearest is also that which is intended; the ideas standing in the first place are the predicates. Wherein it shows itself, and whereby it is recognised, that a man fears God, or stands in a relation to Him of indifference instead of one of fear and reverence, shall be declared: the former walketh in his uprightness, *i.e.* so far as the consciousness of duty which animates him prescribes; the latter in his conduct follows no higher rule than his own lust, which drives him sometimes hither and sometimes thither. הוֹלֵךְ בְּיִשְׁרוֹ (cf. יִשְׁרָהּ הוֹלֵךְ, Mic. ii. 7) is of kindred meaning with הוֹלֵךְ בְּחַמּוֹ (xxviii. 6), and הוֹלֵךְ בְּכַחַו, Isa. lvii. 2. The connection of נִלְוֹ דְּרָכָיו follows the scheme of 2 Kings xviii. 37, and not 2 Sam. xv. 32, Ewald, § 288c. If the second word, which particularizes the idea of the first, has the reflexive suff. as here, then the accusative connection, or, as ii. 15, the prepositional, is more usual than the genitive. Regarding לָח, *flectere, inclinare* (a word common to the author of i.–ix.), *vid.* at ii. 15. With

בִּזְיוֹהוּ, cf. 1 Sam. ii. 30; the suffix without doubt refers to God, for בִּזְיוֹהוּ is the word that stands in parallel contrast to יִרְאֵה ה'.

Ver. 3 In the mouth of the fool is a switch of pride;

But the lips of the wise preserve them.

The noun חֶטֶר (Aram. חוּטְרָא, Arab. *khitr*), which besides here occurs only at Isa. xi. 1, meaning properly a brandishing (from חָטַר = Arab. *khatr*, to brandish, to move up and down or hither and thither, whence *álkhttâr*, the brandisher, poet. the spear), concretely, the young elastic twig, the switch, *i.e.* the slender flexible shoot. Luther translates, "fools speak tyrannically," which is the briefer rendering of his earlier translation, "in the mouth of the fool is the sceptre of pride;" but although the Targum uses חוּטְרָא of the king's sceptre and also of the prince's staff, yet here for this the usual Hebr. שֵׁבֶט were to be expected. In view of Isa. xi. 1, the nearest idea is, that pride which has its roots in the heart of the fool, grows up to his mouth. But yet it is not thus explained why the representation of this proceeding from within stops with חֶטֶר (cf. xi. 30). The *βακτηρία ὑβρεως* (LXX., and similarly the other Greek versions) is either meant as the rod of correction of his own pride (as *e.g.* Abulwalîd, and, among the moderns, Bertheau and Zöckler) or as chastisement for others (Syr., Targum: the staff of reviling). Hitzig is in favour of the former idea, and thinks himself warranted in translating: a rod for his back; but while גִּיּוֹה is found for גִּיּוֹהָה, we do not (cf. under Job xli. 7: a pride are the, etc.) find גִּיּוֹהָה for גִּיּוֹה, the body, or גִּי, the back. But in general it is to be assumed, that if the poet had meant חֶטֶר as the means of correction, he would have written גִּיּוֹהָתוֹ. Rightly Fleischer: "The tongue is often compared to a staff, a sword, etc., in so far as their effects are ascribed to it; we have here the figure which in Rev. i. 16 passes over into plastic reality." Self-exaltation (R. גָּא, to strive to be above) to the delusion of greatness is characteristic of the fool, the אֵוִיל [godless], not the כֶּסֶּיל [stupid, dull]—Hitzig altogether confounds these two conceptions. With such self-exaltation, in which the mind, morally if not pathologically diseased, says, like Nineveh and Babylon in the prophets, I am alone, and there is no one with me, there is always united the scourge of pride and of disgrace; and the meaning of 3b may now be that the lips of the wise protect those who are exposed to this injury (Ewald), or that they protect the wise themselves against such assaults (thus most interpreters).

But this reference of the *eos* to others lies much more remote than at xii. 6; and that the protection of the wise against injury inflicted on them by words is due to their own lips is unsatisfactory, as in this case, instead of *Bewahrung* [*custodia*], we would rather expect *Vertheidigung* [*defensio*], *Dämpfung* [damping, extinguishing], *Niederduckung* [stooping down, accommodating oneself to circumstances]. But also it cannot be meant that the lips of the wise preserve them from the pride of fools, for the thought that the mouth preserves the wise from the sins of the mouth is without meaning and truth (cf. the contrary, xiii. 3). Therefore Arama interprets the verb as jussive: the lips = words of the wise mayest thou keep, i.e. take to heart. And the *Venet.* translates: *χείλη δὲ σοφῶν φυλάξεις αὐτά*, which perhaps means: the lips of the wise mayest thou consider, and that not as a prayer, which is foreign to the gnome, but as an address to the hearer, which e.g. xx. 19 shows to be admissible. But although in a certain degree of similar contents, yet 3a and 3b clash. Therefore it appears to us more probable that the subject of 3b is the חכמה contained in חכמים; in vi. 22 wisdom is also the subject to תשמר עליך without its being named. Thus: while hurtful pride grows up to the throat of the fool, that, viz. wisdom, keeps the lips of the wise, so that no word of self-reflection, especially none that can wound a neighbour, escapes from them. The form תשמורם is much more peculiar than ישפוטו, Ex. xviii. 26, and תעבירי, Ruth ii. 8, for the latter are obscured forms of ישפוטו and תעבירי, while on the contrary the former arises from תשמורם.<sup>1</sup> If, according to the usual interpretation, we make שפתי the subject, then the construction follows the rule, Gesen. § 146, 2. The LXX. transfers it into Greek: *χείλη δὲ σοφῶν φυλάσσει αὐτούς*. The probable conjecture, that תשמורם is an error in transcription for תשמורנה אִתָּם (this is found also in Luzzatto's *Gramm.* § 776; and Hitzig adduces as other examples of such transpositions of the ו Jer. ii. 25, xvii. 23, Job xxvi. 12, and Josh ii. 4, ותצפנו for ותצפן), we do not acknowledge, because it makes the lips the subject with an exclusiveness the justification of which is doubtful to us.

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* regarding these forms with *š* instead of the simple *Sheva*, Kimchi, *Michlol* 20ab. He also remarks that these three forms with *š* are all *Mara*; this is the case also in a remarkable manner with ישפוטו, *vid. Michlol* 21b; *Livjath Chen* ii. 9; and particularly Heidenheim, in his edition of the *Pentateuch* entitled *Me'or Enajim*, under Ex. xviii. 26.

Ver. 4. The switch and the preserving, ver. 3, may have given occasion to the collector, amid the store of proverbs before him, now to present the agricultural figure :

Without oxen the crib is empty ;

But rich increase is by the strength of the plough-ox.

This is a commendation of the breeding of cattle, but standing here certainly not merely as useful knowledge, but as an admonition to the treatment in a careful, gentle manner, and with thankful recompense of the ox (xii. 10), which God has subjected to man to help him in his labour, and more generally, in so far as one seeks to gain an object, to the considerate adoption of the right means for gaining it. אֲלָפִים (from אָלַף, to cling to) are the cattle giving themselves willingly to the service of men (poet. equivalent to בִּקְרִים). שׁוֹר (תור, Arab. *thwr*), Ved. *sthûras*, is the Aryan-Semitic name of the plough-ox. The noun אֲבוֹם (= אָבוֹם like אֲטוֹן, אֲמִין) denotes the fodder-trough, from אָבַם, to feed, and thus perhaps as to its root-meaning related to φάτνη (πάτνη), and may thus also designate the receptacle for grain where the corn for the provender or feeding of the cattle is preserved—מִאֲבוֹם, Jer. i. 26, at least has this wider signification of the granary ; but there exists no reason to depart here from the nearest signification of the word : if a husbandman is not thoughtful about the care and support of the cattle by which he is assisted in his labour, then the crib is empty—he has nothing to heap up ; he needs not only fodder, but has also nothing. בָּר (in pause בֶּר), clean (synon. נָקִי, cf. at xi. 26), corresponds with our *baar* [bare] = *bloss* [nudus]. Its derivation is obscure. The בֶּ, 4b, is that of the mediating cause : by the strength of the plough-ox there is a fulness of grain gathered into the barn (תְּבוּאוֹת, from בּוֹא, to gather in, anything gathered in). רֶב־ is the inverted בָּר. Striking if also accidental is the frequency of the א and ב in ver. 4. This is continued in ver. 5, where the collector gives two proverbs, the first of which commences with a word beginning with א, and the second with one beginning with ב :

Ver. 5 A faithful witness does not speak untruth ;

But a lying witness breathes out falsehoods.

The right vocalization and sequence of the accents is בִּקְשׁ לֵץ חֲכָמָה (ק with *Tsere* and the servile *Mahpach*, חֲכָמָה with *Munach*, because the following *Athnach*-word has not two syllables before the tone). As in 5a עַד אֲמוֹנִים, so in 5b עַד שֹׁקֵר is the subject. Different is the relation of subject and predicate in the second line of the

parallel proverbs, ver. 25, xix. 5. With 5a cf. צִיר אֲמוֹנִים, xiii. 17; and regarding יָפִי (one who breathes out), *vid.* at vi. 19, xii. 17.

Ver. 6 In vain the scorner seeketh wisdom;

But to the man of understanding knowledge is easy.

The general sentence is concrete, composed in the common historical form. Regarding וְאִי, *necquidquam*, *vid.* at xiii. 4. The participle נִקְלָה is here neut. for נִקְלָה, something which makes itself easy or light. The frivolous man, to whom truth is not a matter of conscience, and who recognises no authority, not even the Supreme, never reaches to truth notwithstanding all his searching, it remains veiled to him and far remote; but to the man of understanding, who knows that the fear of God and not estrangement from God leads to truth, knowledge is an easy matter—he enters on the right way to this end, he brings the right receptivity, brings to bear on it the clear eye, and there is fulfilled to him the saying, “To him that hath it is given.”

Three proverbs regarding fools:

Ver. 7 Go from the presence of a foolish man,

And surely thou hast not known lips of knowledge;

*i.e.* surely hast not brought into experience that he possesses lips which express experimental knowledge, or: surely thou must confess on reflection that no prudent word has come forth from his mouth. If 7b were intended to assign a motive, then the expression would be בִּי בִלְתִּירַע or וּבִלְתִּירַע (Isa. xlv. 9), according to which Aquila and Theodotion translate, καὶ οὐ μὴ γινῶσκῃς. נֶגֶד is the sphere of vision, and מִנֶּגֶד denotes either away from the sphere of vision, as *e.g.* Isa. i. 16, or, inasmuch as מִן is used as in מֵעַל, מִתַּחַת, and the like: at a certain distance from the sphere of vision, but so that one keeps the object in sight, Gen. xxi. 16. לְ נֶגֶד denotes, as the inverted expression Deut. xxviii. 66 shows, over against any one, so that he has the object visibly before him, and מִנֶּגֶד לְ, Judg. xx. 34, from the neighbourhood of a place where one has it in view. So also here: go away from the *vis-à-vis* (*vis = visûs*) of the foolish man, if thou hast to do with such an one; whence, 7b, follows what he who has gone away must on looking back say to himself. בִּלְ (with the pret. as *e.g.* Isa. xxxiii. 23) expresses a negative with emphasis. Nolde and others, also Fleischer, interpret 7b relatively: *et in quo non cognoveris labia scientiæ*. If וּבִלְתִּירַע were the expression used, then it would be explained after ix. 13, for the idea of the foolish man is extended: and of such an one as absolutely

knows not how to speak anything prudent. But in **וְכַל-יִדְעָתָּה** the relative clause intended must be indicated by the added **בְּנֵי**: and of such an one in whom . . . Besides, in this case **וְכַל** (*vid.* Ps. xxxv. 15) would have been nearer than **וְכָל**. The LXX. has modified this proverb, and yet has brought out nothing that is correct; not only the Syr., but also Hitzig follows it, when he translates, "The foolish man hath everything before him, but lips of knowledge are a receptacle of knowledge" (**וְכָלִי רֵעֵת**). It racks one's brains to find out the meaning of the first part here, and, as Böttcher rightly says, who can be satisfied with the "lips of knowledge" as the "receptacle of knowledge"?

Ver. 8 The wisdom of the prudent is to observe his way,  
And the folly of fools is deceit.

The nearest idea is that of self-deceit, according to which the LXX., Syr., and Jerome render the word error ("*Irrsal*"). But **מִרְמָה** is nowhere else used of self-deception, and moreover is not the suitable word for such an idea, since the conception of the *dolus malus* is constantly associated with it. Thus the contrast will be this: the wisdom of the prudent shows itself in this, that he considers his conduct (**הִבִּין** as vii. 7, cf. Ps. v. 2), *i.e.* regulates it carefully, examining and considering (xiii. 16) it according to right and duty; and that on the contrary the folly of fools shows itself in this, that they aim at the malevolent deception of their neighbour, and try all kinds of secret ways for the gaining of this end. The former is wisdom, because from the good only good comes; the latter is folly or madness, because deception, however long it may sneak in darkness, yet at last comes to light, and recoils in its destructive effects upon him from whom it proceeds.

Ver. 9 The sacrificial offering of fools mocketh;  
But between upright men there is good understanding.

We may not give to the *Hiph.* **הִלִּין** any meaning which it nowhere has, as, to excuse (Kimchi), or to come to an agreement by mediation (Schultens). So we may not make **אֲוִילִים** the subject (Targ., Symmachus, Jerome, Luther, "fools make sport with sin"), for one is persuaded that **אֲוִילִים** is equivalent to **כָּל אֶחָד מִן הָאֲוִילִים** (Immanuel, Meiri, and others), which would be more admissible if we had **מִלִּין** (*vid.* iii. 35), or if **יִלִּין** did not immediately follow (*vid.* xxviii. 1). Aquila and Theodotion rightly interpret the relation of the component parts of the sentence: *ἄφρονες χλευάζει πλημμέλεια*; and this translation of **שִׁחַ** also is correct if we take *πλημμέλεια* in

the sense of a *θυσία περὶ πλημμελείας* (Sir. vii. 31), in which the Judæo-Hellenic actually uses it (*vid.* Schleusner's *Lex.*). The idea of sacrificial offering is that of expiation: it is a penitential work, it falls under the prevailing point of view of an ecclesiastical punishment, a *satisfactio* in a church-disciplinary sense; the forgiveness of sins is conditioned by this, (1) that the sinner either abundantly makes good by restitution the injury inflicted on another, or in some other way bears temporal punishment for it, and (2) that he willingly presents the sacrifices of rams or of sheep, the value of which the priest has to determine in its relation to the offence (by a tax-scale from 2 shekels upwards). The *Torâ* gives accurately the offences which are thus to be atoned for. Here, with reference to 9b, there particularly comes into view the offence against property (Lev. v. 20 ff.) and against female honour (Lev. xix. 20–22). Fools fall from one offence into another, which they have to atone for by the presentation of sacrificial offerings; the sacrificial offering mocketh them (הלִיץ with *accus.-object*, as xix. 28, Ps. cxix. 51), for it equally derides them on account of the self-inflicted loss, and on account of the efforts with which they must make good the effects of their frivolity and madness; while on the contrary, among men of upright character, רָצוֹן, a relation of mutual favour, prevails, which does not permit that the one give to the other an indemnity, and apply the *Asham*-[אָשָׁם = trespass-offering] *Torâ*. Symmachus rightly: καὶ ἀνάμεισον εὐθέων εὐδοκία. But the LXX. confuses this proverb also. Hitzig, with the Syr., follows it and translates:

The tents of the foolish are in punishment overthrown [*verfällt*];

The house of the upright is well-pleasing [*wolgefällt*].

Is not this extravagant [*ungereimt* = not rhymed] in spite of the rhyme? These אהלי [tents] extracted from אוילים, and this בית [house] formed out of בין, are nothing but an aimless and tasteless flourish.

Four proverbs of joy and sorrow in the present and the future:

Ver. 10 The heart knoweth the trouble of its soul,

And no stranger can intermeddle with its joy.

The accentuation לֵב יָדַע seems to point out יָדַע as an adjective (Löwenstein: a feeling heart), after 1 Kings iii. 9, or genit. (of a feeling heart); but Cod. 1294 and the Jemen Cod., and others, as well as the editions of Jablonsky and Michaelis, have לֵב with *Rebia*, so that this is by itself to be taken as the subject (cf. the accentuation xv. 5a and under at 16a). מֵרַח has the ר with *Dagesh*,

and consequently the short *Kametz* (*Michlol* 63b), like שֶׁרֶךְ iii. 8, cf. פִּרְתָּהּ, Judg. vi. 28, and on the contrary בִּרְתָּה, Ezek. xvi. 4; it is the fem. of *mōr* = *morr*, from מָרַר, *adstringere*, *amarum esse*. Regarding לֵב, in contradistinction to נַפְשׁ, *vid. Psychol.* p. 251. "All that is meant by the Hellenic and Hellenistic νοῦς, λόγος, συνείδησις, θυμός, is comprehended in καρδία, and all by which the בֶּשֶׁר and נַפְשׁ are affected comes in לֵב into the light of consciousness."

The first half of the proverb is clear: the heart, and only it, *i.e.* the man in the centre of his individuality, knows what brings bitterness to his soul, *i.e.* what troubles him in the sphere of his natural life and of the nearest life-circle surrounding him. It thus treats of life experiences which are of too complex a nature to be capable of being fully represented to others, and, as we are wont to say, of so delicate a nature that we shrink from uncovering them and making them known to others, and which on this account must be kept shut up in our own hearts, because no man is so near to us, or has so fully gained our confidence, that we have the desire and the courage to pour out our hearts to him from their very depths. Yet the saying, "Every one knows where the shoe pinches him" (1 Kings viii. 38), stands nearer to this proverb; here this expression receives a psychological, yet a sharper and a deeper expression, for the knowledge of that which grieves the soul is attributed to the heart, in which, as the innermost of the soul-corporeal life, it reflects itself and becomes the matter-of-fact of the reflex consciousness in which it must shut itself up, but also for the most part without external expression. If we now interpret לֹא יִתְעַרֵּב as prohibitive, then this would stand (with this exception, that in this case אֵל instead of לֹא is to be expected) in opposition, certainly not intended, to the exhortation, Rom. xii. 15, "Rejoice with them that do rejoice," and to the saying, "Distributed joy is doubled joy, distributed sorrow is half sorrow;" and an admonition to leave man alone with his joy, instead of urging him to distribute it, does not run parallel with 10a. Therefore we interpret the fut. as *potentialis*. As there is a soul-sorrow of the man whose experience is merely a matter of the heart, so there is also a soul-joy with which no other (*vid. regarding יָר*, p. 135, and cf. here particularly Job xix. 27) intermeddleth (בִּי הִתְעַרֵּב like Ps. cvi. 35), in which no other can intermeddle, because his experience, as *e.g.* of blessed spiritual affection or of benevolent feeling, is purely of a personal nature, and admits of no participation (cf. on ἔκρυσσε, Matt. xiii. 44), and

thus of no communication to others. Elster well observes: "By this thought, that the innermost feelings of a man are never fully imparted to another man, never perfectly cover themselves with the feelings of another, yea, cannot at all be fully understood by another, the worth and the significance of each separate human personality is made conspicuous, not one of which is the example of a species, but each has its own peculiarity, which no one of countless individuals possesses. At the same time the proverb has the significance, that it shows the impossibility of a perfect fellowship among men, because one never wholly understands another. Thereby it is indicated that no human fellowship can give true salvation, but only the fellowship with God, whose love and wisdom are capable of shining through the most secret sanctuary of human personality." Thus also Dächsel (but he interprets 10*b* admonitorily): "Each man is a little world in himself, which God only fully sees through and understands. His sorrow appertaining to his innermost life, and his joy, another is never able fully to transfer to himself. Yea, the most sorrowful of all experiences, the most inward of all joys, we possess altogether alone, without any to partipate with us."

Ver. 11 The house of the wicked is overthrown;  
But the tent of the upright flourishes.

In the cogn. proverb, xii. 7, line 2 begins with וְיֵית, but here the apparently firmly-founded house is assigned to the godless, and on the contrary the tent, easily destroyed, and not set up under the delusion of lasting for ever, is assigned to the righteous. While the former is swept away without leaving a trace behind (Isa. xiv. 23), the latter has blossoms and shoots (הַפְּרִיָּה) as inwardly transitive, like Job xiv. 9, Ps. xcii. 14); the household of such remains not only preserved in the same state, but in a prosperous, happy manner it goes forward and upward.

Ver. 12 There is a way that seemeth right to one,  
But the end thereof are the ways of death.

This is literally repeated in xvi. 25. The rightness is present only as a phantom, for it arises wholly from a terrible self-deception; the man judges falsely and goes astray when, without regard to God and His word, he follows only his own opinions. It is the way of estrangement from God, of fleshly security; the way of vice, in which the blinded thinks to spend his life, to set himself to fulfil his purposes; but the end thereof (אֶחָרֶיֶתָהּ) with neut.

fem.: the end of this intention, that in which it issues) are the ways of death. He who thus deceives himself regarding his course of life, sees himself at last arrived at a point from which every way which now further remains to him leads only down to death. The self-delusion of one ends in death by the sentence of the judge, that of another in self-murder; of one in loathsome disease, of another in a slow decay under the agony of conscience, or in sorrow over a henceforth dishonoured and distracted life.

Ver. 13 Even in the midst of laughter the heart experiences sadness;  
And to it, joy, the end is sorrow.

Every human heart carries the feeling of disquiet and of separation from its true home, and of the nothingness, the transitoriness of all that is earthly; and in addition to this, there is many a secret sorrow in every one which grows out of his own corporeal and spiritual life, and from his relation to other men; and this sorrow, which is from infancy onward the lot of the human heart, and which more and more deepens and diversifies itself in the course of life, makes itself perceptible even in the midst of laughter, in spite of the mirth and merriment, without being able to be suppressed or expelled from the soul, returning always the more intensely, the more violently we may have for a time kept it under and sunk it in unconsciousness. Euchel cites here the words of the poet, according to which 13a is literally true:

“No, man is not made for joy;  
Why weep his eyes when in heart he laughs?”<sup>1</sup>

From the fact that sorrow is the fundamental condition of humanity, and forms the background of laughter, it follows, 13b, that in general it is not good for man to give himself up to joy, viz. sensual (worldly), for to it, joy, the end (the issue) is sorrow. That is true also of the final end, which according to that saying, *μακάριοι οἱ κλαίοντες νῦν ὅτι γελάσετε*, changes laughter into weeping, and weeping into laughter. The correction *אַחֲרֵית הַשִּׂמְחָה* (Hitzig) presses upon the *Mishle* style an article in such cases rejected, and removes a form of expression of the Hebr. *syntaxis ornata*, which here, as at Isa. xvii. 6, is easily obviated, but which is warranted by a multitude of other examples, *vid.* at xiii. 4 (also v. 22), and cf. Philippi's *Status Const.* p. 14 f., who regards the second word, as here *שִׂמְחָה*, after the Arab., as accus. But in cases like *שִׂמְחָה*

<sup>1</sup> “Nein, der Mensch ist zur Freude nicht gemacht,  
Darum weint sein Aug' wenn er herzlich lacht.”

שָׁקַר, although not in cases such as Ezra ii. 62, the accus. rendering is tenable, and the Arab. does not at all demand it.<sup>1</sup> In the old Hebr. this *solutio* of the *st. constr.* belongs to the elegances of the language; it is the precursor of the vulgar post-bibl. אַחֲרֵיתָהּ שֶׁל־שִׁמְחָה. That the Hebr. may also retain a gen. where more or fewer parts of a sentence intervene between it and its governing word, is shown by such examples as Isa. xlvi. 9, xlix. 7, lxi. 7.<sup>2</sup>

There follows a series of proverbs which treat of the wicked and the good, and of the relation between the foolish and the wise:

Ver. 14 He that is of a perverse heart is satisfied with his own ways;  
And a good man from himself.

We first determine the subject conception. סוֹג לֵב (one turning aside τῆς καρδίας or τὴν καρδίαν) is one whose heart is perverted, נָסוּג, turned away, viz. from God, Ps. xlv. 19. The Book of Proverbs contains besides of this verb only the name of dross (*recedanea*) derived from it; סוֹג, separated, drawn away, is such a half passive as סוּר, Isa. xlix. 21, שׁוּב, Mic. ii. 8, etc. (Olsh. § 245a). Regarding אִישׁ טוֹב, *vid.* at xii. 2, cf. xiii. 22: a man is so called whose manner of thought and of action has as its impulse and motive self-sacrificing love. When it is said of the former that he is satisfied with his own ways, viz. those which with heart turned away from God he enters upon, the meaning is not that they give him peace or bring satisfaction to him (Löwenstein), but we see from i. 31, xviii. 20, that this is meant recompensatively: he gets, enjoys the reward of his wandering in estrangement from God. It is now without doubt seen that 14b expresses that wherein the benevolent man finds his reward. We will there-

<sup>1</sup> Regarding the supplying (*ibdāl*) of a foregoing genitive or accus. pronoun of the third person by a definite or indefinite following, in the same case as the substantive, Samachschari speaks in the *Mufassal*, p. 94 ss., where, as examples, are found: *raeituhu Zeidan*, I have seen him, the Zeid; *marartu bihi Zeidin*, I have gone over with him, the Zeid; *saraftu wugûhahâ awwalihâ*, in the flight I smote the heads of the same, their front rank. *Vid.* regarding this anticipation of the definite idea by an indefinite, with explanations of it, Fleischer's *Maḳḳarî, Additions et Corrections*, p. xl. col. 2, and Dieterici's *Mutanabbi*, p. 341, l. 13.

<sup>2</sup> These examples moreover do not exceed that which is possible in the Arab., *vid.* regarding this omission of the *mudâf*, where this is supplied from the preceding before a genitive, Samachschari's *Mufassal*, p. 34, l. 8-13. Perhaps לֶחֶםְךָ, Obad. ver. 7, of thy bread = the (men) of thy bread, is an example of the same thing.

fore not explain (after iv. 15, cf. Num. xvi. 26, 2 Sam. xix. 10) : the good man turns himself away from him, or the good man stands over him (as Jerome, *Venet.*, after Eccles. v. 7) ;—this rendering gives no contrast, or at least a halting one. The מן of מַעְלִי must be parallel with that of מִדְּרָכָיו. From the LXX., ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν διανοημάτων αὐτοῦ, the Syr. rightly : from the fruit (religiousness) of his soul ; the Targ. : from his fruit. Buxtorf, against Cappellus, has already perceived that here no other phrase but the explanation of מַעְלִי by *ex eo quod penes se est* lies at the foundation. We could, after vii. 14, also explain : from that which he perceives as his obligation (duty) ; yet that other explanation lies proportionally nearer, but yet not so that we refer the suffix to the blackslider of 14a : in it (his fate) the good man is satisfied, for this contrast also halts, the thought is not in the spirit of the Book of Proverbs (for xxix. 16b does not justify it) ; and in how totally different a connection of thought מַעְלִי is used in the Book of Proverbs, is shown by xxiv. 17b ; but generally the Scripture does not use שָׂבַע of such satisfaction, it has, as in 14a, also in 14b, the recompensative sense, according to the fundamental principle, δ ἐὰν σπείρῃ ἄνθρωπος τοῦτο καὶ θερίσει (Gal. vi. 7). The suffix refers back to the subject, as we say : נִפְשִׁי עָלַי, רוּחִי עָלַי (*Psychol.* p. 152). But considerations of an opposite kind also suggest themselves. Everywhere else מַעַל refers not to that which a man has within himself, but that which he carries without ; and also that מַעְלִי can be used in the sense of מִשְׁעָלָיו, no evidence can be adduced : it must be admitted to be possible, since the writer of the Chronicles (2 Chron. i. 4) ventures to use בְּהֵכֵן. Is מַעְלִי thus used substantively : by his leaves (Aben Ezra and others) ? If one compares xi. 28 with Ps. i. 3, this explanation is not absurd ; but why then did not the poet rather use מִפְּרִי ? We come finally to the result, that מַעְלִי, although it admits a connected interpretation, is an error of transcription. But the correction is not יַמְעָלָיו (Elster) nor יַמְעַלְלָיו (Cappellus), for עָלִים and עֲלָלִים, deeds, are words which do not exist ; nor is it יַמְפַּעְלָיו (Bertheau) nor יַמְנַמְלָיו (Ewald), but יַמְפַּעְלָיו (which Cappellus regarded, but erroneously, as the LXX. phrase) ; for (1) throughout almost the whole O. T., from Judg. ii. 19 to Zech. i. 18, מַעֲלִים and דְּרָכִים are interchangeable words, and indeed almost an inseparable pair, cf. particularly Jer. xvii. 10 ; and (2) when Isaiah (iii. 10) says, כִּי־טוֹב בְּיַפְרִי מַעֲלֵיהֶם יֵאָבְלוּ, this almost sounds like a prophetic paraphrase of the second line

of the proverb, which besides by this emendation gains a more rhythmical sound and a more suitable compass.<sup>1</sup>

Ver. 15 The simple believeth every word ;  
But the prudent takes heed to his step.

We do not translate, "every thing," for "word" and faith are correlates, Ps. cvi. 24, and פְּתִי is the non-self-dependent who lets himself be easily persuaded by the talk of another (*vid.* p. 56) : he believes every word without proving it, whether it is well-meant, whether it is true, whether it is salutary and useful, so that he is thus, without having any firm principle, and without any judgment of his own, driven about hither and thither ; the prudent, on the other hand, considers and marks his step, that he may not take a false step or go astray, he proves his way (8a), he takes no step without thought and consideration (בִּין or הִבִּין with ל, to consider or reflect upon anything, Ps. lxxiii. 17, cf. xxxiii. 15)—he makes sure steps with his feet (Heb. xii. 13), without permitting himself to waver and sway by every wind of doctrine (Eph. iv. 14).

Ver. 16 The wise feareth and departeth from evil ;  
But the fool loseth his wits and is regardless.

Our editions have יִרָא with *Munach*, as if הָכֵם יִרָא were a substantive with its adjective ; but Cod. 1294 has הָכֵם with *Rebia*, and thus it must be : הָכֵם is the subject, and what follows is its complex predicate. Most interpreters translate 16b : the fool is over-confident (Zöckler), or the fool rushes on (Hitzig), as also Luther : but a fool rushes wildly through, *i.e.* in a daring, presumptuous manner. But הִתְעַבֵּר denotes everywhere nothing else than to fall into extreme anger, to become heated beyond measure, xxvi. 17 (cf. xx. 2), Deut. iii. 26, etc. Thus 16a and 16b are fully contrasted. What is said of the wise will be judged after Job i. 1, cf. Ps. xxxiv. 15, xxxvii. 27 : the wise man has fear, viz. fear of God, or rather, since האֱלֹהִים is not directly to be supplied, that careful, thoughtful, self-mistrusting reserve which flows from the reverential awe of God ; the fool, on the contrary, can neither rule nor bridle his affections, and without any just occasion falls into passionate excitement. But on the other side he is self-confident, regardless, secure ; while the wise man avoids the evil, *i.e.* carefully goes out of its way, and in N. T. phraseology "works out his own salvation with fear and trembling."

<sup>1</sup> As here an ל too few is written, so at Isa. xxxii. 1 (וְלִשְׂרִים) and Ps. lxxiv. 14 (לְצִיִּים) one too many.

Ver. 17. This verse, as if explanatory of *מהעבר*, connects itself with this interpretation of the contrasts, corresponding to the general *usus loquendi*, and particularly to the *Mishle* style.

One who is quick to anger worketh folly,  
And a man of intrigues is hated.

Ewald finds here no right contrast. He understands *איש מזמה* in a good sense, and accordingly corrects the text, substituting for *ישנא*, *ישנא* (*ישנא*), for he translates: but the man of consideration bears (properly smooths, viz. his soul). On the other hand it is also to be remarked, that *איש מזמה*, when it occurs, is not to be understood necessarily in a good sense, since *מזמה* is used just like *מזמות*, at one time in a good and at another in a bad sense, and that we willingly miss the "most complete sense" thus arising, since the proverb, as it stands in the Masoretic text, is good Hebrew, and needs only to be rightly understood to let nothing be missed in completeness. The contrast, as Ewald seeks here to represent it (also Hitzig, who proposes *שנא*: the man of consideration remains quiet; Syr. *ramys*, circumspect), we have in ver. 29, where the *μακρόθυμος* stands over against the *ὀξύθυμος* (*הס* or *הס*) of the breathing of anger through the nose, cf. Theocritus, i. 18: *καὶ οἱ αἰὲ δριμεία χολὰ ποτὶ ῥινὶ κάθηται*). Here the contrast is different: to the man who is quick to anger, who suddenly gives expression to his anger and displeasure, stands opposed the man of intrigues, who contrives secret vengeance against those with whom he is angry. Such a deceitful man, who contrives evil with calculating forethought and executes it in cold blood (cf. Ps. xxxvii. 7), is hated; while on the contrary the noisy lets himself rush forward to inconsiderate, mad actions, but is not hated on that account; but if in his folly he injures or disgraces himself, or is derided, or if he even does injury to the body and the life of another, and afterwards with terror sees the evil done in its true light, then he is an object of compassion. Theodotion rightly: (*ἀνὴρ δὲ διαβουλιῶν μισηθήσεται*, and Jerome: *vir versutus odiosus est* (not the Venet. *ἀνὴρ βδελυγμῶν*, for this signification has only *הק*, and that in the sing.); on the contrary, the LXX., Syr., Targum, and Symmachus incorrectly understand *איש מזמות* in *bonam partem*.

Ver. 18 The simple have obtained folly as an inheritance;  
But the prudent put on knowledge as a crown.

As a parallel word to *יִבְתָּרִי* (after the Masora defective), also in the sense of Arab. *âkthar*, *multiplicare*, *abundare* (from Arab.

*kathura*, to be much, perhaps<sup>1</sup> properly comprehensive, encompassing), would be appropriate, but it is a word properly Arabic. On the other hand, inappropriate is the meaning of the Heb.-Aram. בָּתַר, to wait (properly waiting to surround, to go round any one, cf. *manere aliquem* or *aliquod*), according to which Aquila, ἀναμενοῦσιν, and Jerome, *expectabunt*. Also הִכְתִּיר, to encompass in the sense of to embrace (LXX. κρατήσουσιν), does not suffice, since in the relation to נָחַל one expects an idea surpassing this. Certainly there is a heightening of the idea in this, that the *Hiph.* in contradistinction to נָחַל would denote an object of desire spontaneously sought for. But far stronger and more pointed is the heightening of the idea when we take יִכְתֹּר as the denom. of כָּתַר (Gr. κίταρις, κίδαρις, Babyl. כדר, *cudur*, cf. כְּדִיר, a rounding, *sphæra*). Thus Theodotion, στεφθήσονται. The *Venet.* better actively, ἐστέψαντο (after Kimchi: ישימו הדעת ככתר על ראשם), the Targ., Jerome, Luther (but not the Syr., which translates נָחַל by “to inherit,” but יִכְתֹּר by μεριούνται, which the LXX. has for נָחַל). The bibl. language has also (Ps. cxlii. 8) הִכְתִּיר in the denom. signification of to place a crown, and that on oneself; the non-bibl. has מִכְתִּיר (like the bibl. מַעֲטִיר) in the sense of distributor of crowns,<sup>2</sup> and is fond of the metaphor כתר הדעת, crown of knowledge. With those not self-dependent (*vid.* regarding the plur. form of כָּתַר, p. 56), who are swayed by the first influence, the issue is, without their willing it, that they become habitual fools: folly is their possession, i.e. their property. The prudent, on the contrary, as ver. 15 designates them, have thoughtfully to ponder their step to gain knowledge as a crown (cf. הָעֵשִׂיר, to gain riches, הַפְּרִיחַ, 11b, to gain flowers, Gesen. § 53, 2). Knowledge is to them not merely an inheritance, but a possession won, and as such remains with them a high and as it were a kingly ornament.

Ver. 19 The wicked must bow before the good,

And the godless stand at the doors of the righteous.

The good, viz. that which is truly good, which has love as its principle, always at last holds the supremacy. The good men who manifest love to men which flows from love to God, come finally forward, so that the wicked, who for a long time played the part of lords,

<sup>1</sup> According to rule the Hebr. כ becomes in Arab. ك, as in Aram. כ; but *kthar* might be from *ktar*, an old verb rarely found, which derivata with the idea of encircling (wall) and of rounding (bunch) point to.

<sup>2</sup> *Vid. Wissenschaft, Kunst, Judenthum* (1838), p. 240.

bow themselves willingly or unwillingly before them, and often enough it comes about that godless men fall down from their prosperity and their places of honour so low, that they post themselves at the entrance of the stately dwelling of the righteous (xiii. 22), waiting for his going out and in, or seeking an occasion of presenting to him a supplication, or also as expecting gifts to be bestowed (Ps. xxxvii. 25). The poor man Lazarus *πρὸς τὸν πνλῶνα* of the rich man, Luke xvi. 20, shows, indeed, that this is not always the case on this side of the grave. *הַשֵּׁ* has, according to the Masora (cf. Kimchi's *Wörterbuch* under *הַשֵּׁ*), the ultima accented; the accentuation of the form *הַשֵּׁ* wavers between the *ult.* and the *penult.* Olsh. p. 482 f., cf. Gesen. 68, *Anm.* 10. The substantival clause 19b is easily changed into a verbal clause: they come (Syr.), appear, stand (incorrectly the Targ.: they are judged in the gates of the righteous).

Three proverbs on the hatred of men:

Ver. 20 The poor is hated even by his neighbour;  
But of those who love the rich there are many.

This is the old history daily repeating itself. Among all people is the saying and the complaint:

*Donec eris felix multos numerabis amicos,  
Tempora si fuerint nubilia solus eris.*<sup>1</sup>

The Book of Proverbs also speaks of this lamentable phenomenon. It is a part of the dark side of human nature, and one should take notice of it, so that when it goes well with him, he may not regard his many friends as all genuine, and when he becomes poor, he may not be surprised by the dissolution of earlier friendship, but may value so much the higher exceptions to the rule. The connection of the passive with *שָׂ* of the subject (cf. xiii. 13), as in the Greek with the dative, is pure Semitic; sometimes it stands with *וּ*, but in the sense of *ἀπό*, Cant. iii. 10, before the influence of the West led to its being used in the sense of *ὑπό* (Ges. § 143, 2); *שָׂ*, is hated (Cod. 1294: *שָׂ*), connects with the hatred which is directed against the poor also the indifference which makes him without sympathy, for one feels himself troubled by him and ashamed.

Ver. 21 Whoever despiseth his neighbour committeth sin;

But whoever hath compassion on the suffering—blessings on him!

One should regard every human being, especially such as God has

<sup>1</sup> Ovid, *Trist.* i. 8.

placed near to him, as a being having the same origin, as created in the image of God, and of the same lofty destination, and should consider himself as under obligation to love him. He who despiseth his neighbour (write כָּדֹר with *Metheg*, and *vid.* regarding the constr. with dat. object. vi. 30, cf. xi. 12, xiii. 13) sins in this respect, that he raises himself proudly and unwarrantably above him; that the honour and love he shows to him he measures not by the rule of duty and of necessity, but according to that which is pleasing to himself; and in that he refuses to him that which according to the ordinance of God he owes him. In ver. 21b the *Chethîb* עֲנִיִּים and the *Kerî* עֲנִיִּים (*vid.* at Ps. ix. 13) interchange in an inexplicable way; עָנִי is the bowed down (cf. Arab. *ma'nuww*, particularly of the prisoner, from 'ana, fut. *ya'nuw*, to bow, bend), עָנִי (Arab. 'anin, with the art. *âl'niy*, from the intrans. 'aniya, to be bowed down) the patient bearer who in the school of suffering has learned humility and meekness. One does not see why the *Kerî* here exchanges that passive idea for this ethical one, especially since, in proving himself to be מְחַוֵּן (compassionate) (for which elsewhere the *part.* *Kal* חוֹנֵן, xiv. 31, xix. 17, xxviii. 8), one must be determined only by the needy condition of his neighbour, and not by his (the neighbour's) moral worthiness, the want of which ought to make him twofold more an object of our compassion. All the old translators, from the LXX. to the *Venet.* and Luther, on this account adopt the *Chethîb*.

Ver. 22. The proverb terminating (ver. 21) with אֲשֶׁרֵי (cf. xvi. 20) is now followed by one not less singularly formed, commencing with הֵלֵא (cf. viii. 1).

Will they not go astray who devise evil,

And are not mercy and truth to those who devise good?

The *part.* חֹרֵשׁ signifies both the plougher and the artisan; but on this account to read with Hitzig both times חֹרָשִׁי, *i.e.* *machinatores*, is nothing less than advisable, since there is connected with this metaphorical חֹרֵשׁ, as we have shown at iii. 29, not only the idea of fabricating, but also that of ploughing. Just so little is there any reason for changing with Hitzig, against all old translators, יִתְעוּ into יִרְעוּ: will it not go ill with them . . .; the fut. יתעו (cf. Isa. lxiii. 17) is not to be touched; the perf. תעו (*e.g.* Ps. lviii. 4) would denote that those who contrive evil are in the way of error, the fut. on the contrary that they will fall into error (cf. xii. 26 with Job xii. 24). But if הֵלֵא יתעו is the expression of the result which shall

certainly come to such, then 22*b* stands as a contrast adapted thereto: and are not, on the contrary, mercy and truth those who contrive that which is good, *i.e.* (for that which befalls them, as xiii. 18*a*, cf. xiv. 35*b*, is made their attribute) are they not an object of mercy and truth, viz. on the part of God and of men, for the effort which proceeds from love and is directed to the showing forth of good is rewarded by this, that God and men are merciful to such and maintain truth to them, stand in truth to them; for חֶסֶד וְאֱמֶת is to be understood here, as at iii. 3, neither of God nor of men exclusively, but of both together: the wicked who contrive evil lose themselves on the way to destruction, but grace and truth are the lot of those who aim at what is good, guarded and guided by which, they reach by a blessed way a glorious end.

There now follows a considerable series of proverbs (vers. 23–31) which, with a single exception (ver. 24), have all this in common, that one or two key-words in them begin with מ.

Ver. 23 In all labour there is gain,

But idle talk leadeth only to loss.

Here the key-words are מוֹתֵר and מַחְסֹר (parallel xxi. 5, cf. with xi. 24), which begin with מ. עֵצֶב is labour, and that earnest and unwearied, as at x. 22. If one toils on honestly, then there always results from it something which stands forth above the endeavour as its result and product, *vid.* at Job xxx. 11, where it is shown how יָתֵר, from the primary meaning to be stretched out long, acquires the meaning of that which hangs over, shoots over, copiousness, and gain. By the word of the lips, on the contrary, *i.e.* purposeless and inoperative talk (דְּבַר שְׁפָתַיִם) as Isa. xxxvi. 5, cf. Job xi. 2), nothing is gained, but on the contrary there is only loss, for by it one only robs both himself and others of time, and wastes strength, which might have been turned to better purpose, to say nothing of the injury that is thereby done to his soul; perhaps also he morally injures, or at least discomposes and wearies others.

Ver. 24 It is a crown to the wise when they are rich;

But the folly of fools remains folly.

From xii. 4, 31, xvii. 6, we see that עֲטֶרֶת חֲכָמִים is the predicate. Thus it is the riches of the wise of which it is said that they are a crown or an ornament to them. More than this is said, if with Hitzig we read, after the LXX., עֲרָמָם, their prudence, instead of עֲשָׂרָם. For then the meaning would be, that the wise need no

other crown than that which they have in their prudence. But yet far more appropriately "riches" are called the crown of a wise man when they come to his wisdom; for it is truly thus that riches, when they are possessed along with wisdom, contribute not a little to heighten its influence and power, and not merely because they adorn in their appearance like a crown, or, as we say, surround as with a golden frame, but because they afford a variety of means and occasions for self-manifestation which are denied to the poor. By this interpretation of 24*a*, 24*b* comes out also into the light, without our requiring to correct the first אֱלֵלָה, or to render it in an unusual sense. The LXX. and Syr. translate the first אֱלֵלָה by διατριβή (by a circumlocution), the Targ. by *gloria*, fame—we know not how they reach this. Schultens in his *Com.* renders: *crassa opulencia elumbium crassities*, but in his *Animadversiones* he combines the first אֱלֵלָה with the Arab. *awwale*, precedence, which Gesen. approves of. But although the meaning to be thick (properly *coalescere*) appertains to the verbal stem אָל as well as the meaning to be before (Arab. *âl*, *âwila*, *wâl*), yet the Hebr. אֱלֵלָה always and everywhere means only folly,<sup>1</sup> from the fundamental idea *crassities* (thickness). Hitzig's אֱלֵלָה (which denotes the consequence with which the fool invests himself) we do not accept, because this word is Hitzig's own invention. Rather לֵיִית is to be expected: the crown with which fools adorn themselves is folly. But the sentence: the folly of fools is (and remains) folly (Symmachus, Jerome, *Venet.*, Luther), needs the emendation as little as xvi. 22*b*, for, interpreted in connection with 24*a*, it denotes that while wisdom is adorned and raised up by riches, folly on the other hand remains, even when connected with riches, always the same, without being either thereby veiled or removed,—on the contrary, the fool, when he is rich, exhibits his follies always more and more. C. B. Michaelis compares Lucian's *simia est simia etiamsi aurea gestet insignia*.

Ver. 25 A witness of truth delivereth souls;

But he who breathes out lies is nothing but deception.

When men, in consequence of false suspicions or of false accusations, fall into danger of their lives (דִּינֵי נַפְשׁוֹת is the designation in the later language of the law of a criminal process), then a tongue

<sup>1</sup> Ewald's derivation of אֱלֵלָה from אֵל = אֵל, null, vain, is not much better than Heidenheim's from אֱלֵל: one who says "perhaps" = a sceptic, *vid.* p. 59, *note*.

which, pressed by conscientiousness and not deterred by cowardice, will utter the truth, saves them. But a false tongue, which as such (*vid.* 5*b*) is a יִפֹּת כּוֹזֵבִים (after the Masora at this place יִפֹּת defective), *i.e.* is one who breathes out lies (*vid.* regarding יִפֹּת at vi. 19), is mere deception (LXX., without reading מְרִמָּה [as Hitzig does]: δόλιος). In xii. 17 מְרִמָּה is to be interpreted as the object. accus. of יָגִיד carried forward, but here to carry forward מַצִּיל (Arama, Löwenstein) is impracticable—for to deliver deceit = the deceiver is not expressed in the Hebr.—מרמה is, as possibly also xii. 16 (LXX. δόλιος), without אִישׁ or עַד being supplied, the pred. of the substantival clause: such an one is deception (in bad Latin, *dolositas*), for he who utters forth lies against better knowledge must have a malevolent, deceitful purpose.

Ver. 26 In the fear of Jahve lies a strong ground of confidence,  
And the children of such an one have a refuge.

The so-called *essentia* stands here, as at Ps. lxxviii. 5, lv. 19, Isa. xxvi. 4, before the subject idea; the clause: in the fear of God exists, *i.e.* it is and proves itself, as a strong ground of confidence, does not mean that the fear of God is something in which one can rely (Hitzig), but that it has (xxii. 19, Jer. xvii. 7, and here) an inheritance which is enduring, unwavering, and not disappointing in God, who is the object of fear; for it is not faith, nor anything else subjective, which is the rock that bears us, but this Rock is the object which faith lays hold of (cf. Isa. xxviii. 16). Is now the יִלְכְּזֵנִי to be referred, with Ewald and Zöckler, to ה' ? It is possible, as we have discussed at Gen. vi. 1 f.; but in view of parallels such as xx. 7, it is not probable. He who fears God entails in the Abrahamic way (Gen. xviii. 19) the fear of God on his children, and in this precious paternal inheritance they have a מְחָסֶה (not מְחַסֶּה, and therefore to be written with Masoretic exactness מְחָסֶּה), a fortress or place of protection, a refuge in every time of need (cf. Ps. lxxi. 5–7). Accordingly, יִלְכְּזֵנִי refers back to the 'יֵאָה', to be understood from 'בִּירְאָת ה' (LXX., Luther, and all the Jewish interpreters), which we find not so doubtful as to regard on this account the explanation after Ps. lxxiii. 15, cf. Deut. xiv. 1, as necessary, although we grant that such an introduction of the N. T. generalization and deepening of the idea of sonship is to be expected from the Chokma.

Ver. 27 The fear of Jahve is a fountain of life,  
To escape the snares of death.

There springs up a life which makes him who carries in himself (cf. John iv. 14, *ἐν αὐτῷ*) this welling life, penetrating and strong of will to escape the snares (write after the Masora מִמִּקְשֵׁי *defective*) which death lays, and which bring to an end in death—a repetition of xiii. 4 with changed subject.

Ver. 28 In the multitude of the people lies the king's honour;

And when the population diminishes, it is the downfall of his glory.

The honour or the ornament (*vid.* regarding הָרָר, *tumere, ampliari*, the root-word of הָרָר and הִרְרָה at Isa. lxiii. 1) of a king consists in this, that he rules over a great people, and that they increase and prosper; on the other hand, it is the ruin of princely greatness when the people decline in number and in wealth. Regarding מִהֲרָה, *vid.* at x. 14. בְּאַפִּים signifies prepositionally “without” (properly, by non-existence), *e.g.* xxvi. 20, or adverbially “groundless” (properly, for nothing), Isa. lii. 4; here it is to be understood after its contrast בְּרֵב: in the non-existence, but which is here equivalent to in the ruin (cf. אָפַם, the form of which in conjunction is אַפִּים, Gen. xlvii. 15), lies the misfortune, decay, ruin of the principedom. The LXX. *ἐν δὲ ἐκλείψει λαοῦ συντριβή δυνάστου*. Certainly רִזּוֹן (from רָזַן, Arab. *razuna*, to be powerful) is to be interpreted personally, whether it be after the form בָּגֹז with a fixed, or after the form יִקָּשׁ with a changeable *Kametz*; but it may also be an abstract like שָׁלוֹם (= Arab. *selām*), and this we prefer, because in the personal signification רִזּוֹן, viii. 15, xxxi. 4, is used. We have not here to think of רִזּוֹן (from רָהַךְ), consumption (the *Venet.* against Kimchi, *πενίας*); the choice of the word also is not determined by an intended amphibology (Hitzig), for this would be meaningless.

Ver. 29 He that is slow to anger is rich in understanding;

But he that is easily excited carries off folly.

אָרַךְ אַפִּים (constr. of אָרַךְ) is he who puts off anger long, viz. the outbreak of anger, הִתְאַרְרִיף, xix. 11, *i.e.* lets it not come in, but shuts it out long (*μακρόθυμος* = *βραδὺς εἰς ὀργήν*, Jas. i. 19); and קָצַר-רוּחַ, he who in his spirit and temper, viz. as regards anger (for רוּחַ denotes also the breathing out and snorting, Isa. xxv. 4, xxxiii. 11), is short, *i.e.* (since shortness of time is meant) is rash and suddenly (cf. quick to anger, *præceps in iram*, 17a) breaks out with it, not ὀλιγόψυχος (but here ὀξύθυμος), as the LXX. translate 17a. The former, who knows how to control his affections, shows himself

herein as “great in understanding” (cf. 2 Sam. xxiii. 20), or as a “man of great understanding” (Lat. *multus prudentiâ*); the contrary is he who suffers himself to be impelled by his affections into hasty, inconsiderate action, which is here expressed more actively by מְרִים אֵילָה. Does this mean that he bears folly to the view (Luther, Umbreit, Bertheau, Elster, and others)? But for that idea the *Mishle* style has other expressions, xii. 23, xiii. 16, xv. 2, cf. xiv. 17. Or does it mean that he makes folly high, i.e. shows himself highly foolish (LXX., Syr., Targum, Fleischer, and others)? But that would be expressed rather by הִרְבָּה or הִגְדִּיל. Or is it he heightens folly (Löwenstein, Hitzig)? But the remark that the angry ebullition is itself a gradual heightening of the foolish nature of such an one is not suitable, for the cholerick man, who lets the evenness of his disposition be interrupted by a breaking forth of anger, is by no means also in himself a fool. Rashi is right when he says, מְפַרֵּשָׁה לְחֻלְקוֹ, i.e. (to which also Fleischer gives the preference) *aufert pro portione sua stultitiam*. The only appropriate parallel according to which it is to be explained, is iii. 35. But not as Ewald: he lifts up folly, which lies as it were before his feet on his life’s path; but: he takes off folly, in the sense of Lev. vi. 8, i.e. he carries off folly, receives a portion of folly; for as to others, so also to himself, when he returns to calm blood, that which he did in his rage must appear as folly and madness.

Ver. 30 A quiet heart is the life of the body,  
But covetousness is rottenness in the bones.

Heart, soul, flesh, is the O. T. trichotomy, Ps. lxxxiv. 3, xvi. 9; the heart is the innermost region of the life, where all the rays of the bodily and the soul-life concentrate, and whence they again unfold themselves. The state of the heart, i.e. of the central, spiritual, soul-inwardness of the man, exerts therefore on all sides a constraining influence on the bodily life, in the relation to the heart the surrounding life. Regarding לֵב מְרִפָּה, *vid.* at xii. 18, p. 262. Thus is styled the quiet heart, which in its symmetrical harmony is like a calm and clear water-mirror, neither interrupted by the affections, nor broken through or secretly stirred by passion. By the close connection in which the corporeal life of man stands to the moral-religious determination of his intellectual and mediately his soul-life—this threefold life is as that of one personality, essentially one—the body has in such quiet of spirit the best means

of preserving the life which furthers the well-being, and co-operates to the calming of all its disquietude; on the contrary, passion, whether it rage or move itself in stillness, is like the disease in the bones (xii. 4), which works onward till it breaks asunder the framework of the body, and with it the life of the body. The plur. **בְּשָׂרִים** occurs only here; Böttcher, § 695, says that it denotes the whole body; but **בְּשָׂר** also does not denote the half, **בְּשָׂרִים** is the surrogate of an *abstr.*: the body, *i.e.* the bodily life in the totality of its functions, and in the entire manifoldness of its relations. Ewald translates bodies, but **בָּשָׂר** signifies not the body, but its material, the animated matter; rather cf. the Arab. *âbshâr*, “corporeal, human nature,” but which (leaving out of view that this plur. belongs to a later period of the language) has the parallelism against it. Regarding **קִנְאָה** (jealousy, zeal, envy, anger) Schul-tens is right: *affectus inflammans æstuque indignationis fervidus*, from **קָנָא**, Arab. *kanâ*, to be high red.

Ver. 31 He who oppresseth the poor reproacheth his Maker;

And whosoever is merciful to the poor, it is an honour to him.

Line first is repeated in xvii. 5a somewhat varied, and the relation of the idea in 31b is as xix. 17a, according to which **וּמִכְבָּדוֹ** is the predicate and **הוּנָה אֲבִיוֹ** the subject (Symmachus, Targ., Jerome, Venet., Luther), not the reverse (Syr.); **הוּנָה** is thus not the 3 per. *Po.* (LXX.), but the *part. Kal* (for which 21b has the *part. Po.* **מְחוּנָה**). The predicates **הִרְף עֲשָׂהוּ** (*vid.* regarding the perf. Gesen. § 126, 3) and **וּמִכְבָּדוֹ** follow one another after the scheme of the *Chiasmus*. **עֲשָׂהוּ** has *Munach* on the first syllable, on which the tone is thrown back, and on the second the *עמרה* sign (*vid. Torah Emeth*, p. 21), as *e.g.* **פִּנְיָה**, xvii. 14, and **אֶהְיֶה**, xvii. 19. The showing of forbearance and kindness to the poor arising from a common relation to one Creator, and from respect towards a personality bearing the image of God, is a conception quite in the spirit of the Chokma, which, as in the Jahve religion it becomes the universal religion, so in the national law it becomes the human (*vid.* p. 41). Thus also Job xxxi. 15, cf. iii. 9 of the Epistle of James, which in many respects has its roots in the Book of Proverbs. Matt. xxv. 40 is a New Testament side-piece to 31b.

Ver. 32. This verse also contains a key-word beginning with **ו**, but pairs acrostically with the proverb following:

When misfortune befalls him, the godless is overthrown;  
But the righteous remains hopeful in his death.

When the subject is רָעָה connected with רָשָׁע (the godless), then it may be understood of evil thought and action (Eccles. vii. 15) as well as of the experience of evil (*e.g.* xiii. 21). The LXX. (and also the Syr., Targ., Jerome, and *Venet.*) prefers the former, but for the sake of producing an exact parallelism changes בְּמוֹתוֹ [in his death] into בְּתַמּוֹ [in his uprightness], reversing also the relation of the subject and the predicate: ὁ δὲ πεποιθὼς τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ὁσιότητι (the Syr.: in this, that he has no sin; Targ.: when he dies) δίκαιος. But no Scripture word commends in so contradictory a manner self-righteousness, for the verb חָסָה never denotes self-confidence, and with the exception of two passages (Judg. ix. 15, Isa. xxx. 2), where it is connected with בָּצַל, is everywhere the exclusive (*vid.* Ps. cxviii. 8 f.) designation of confidence resting itself in God, even without the בָּה, as here and at Ps. xvii. 7. The parallelism leads us to translate בָּרַעַתוֹ, not on account of his wickedness, but with Luther, in conformity with בְּמוֹתוֹ, in his misfortune, *i.e.* if it befall him. Thus Jeremiah (xxiii. 12) says of the sins of his people: בְּאֶפְלָה יִדְּחוּ, in the deep darkness they are driven on (*Niph.* of רָחַח = רָחַח), and xxiv. 16 contains an exactly parallel thought: the godless stumble בָּרַעַה, into calamity. Ewald incorrectly: in his calamity the wicked is overthrown—for what purpose then the pronoun? The verb רָחַח frequently means, without any addition, “to stumble over heaps,” *e.g.* Ps. xxxv. 5, xxxvi. 13. The godless in his calamity is overthrown, or he fears in the evils which befall him the intimations of the final ruin; on the contrary, the righteous in his death, even in the midst of extremity, is comforted, *viz.* in God in whom he confides. Thus understood, Hitzig thinks that the proverb is not suitable for a time in which, as yet, men had not faith in immortality and in the resurrection. Yet though there was no such revelation then, still the pious in death put their confidence in Jahve, the God of life and of salvation—for in Jahve<sup>1</sup> there was for ancient Israel the beginning, middle, and end of the work of salvation—and believing that they were going home to Him, committing their spirit into His hands (Ps. xxxi. 6), they fell asleep, though without any explicit knowledge, yet not without the hope of eternal life. Job also knew that (xxvii. 8 ff.) between the death of those estranged from God and of those who feared God there was not only an external, but a deep essential distinction; and now

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* my *Bibl.-prophet. Theol.* (1845), p. 268, cf. *Bibl. Psychologie* (1861), p. 410, and *Psalmen* (1867), p. 52 f., and elsewhere.

the Chokma opens up a glimpse into the eternity heavenwards, xv. 24, and has formed, xii. 28, the expressive and distinctive word אֶל־מֵת, for immortality, which breaks like a ray from the morning sun through the night of the *Sheol*.

Ver. 33 Wisdom rests in the heart of the man of understanding ;  
But in the heart of fools it maketh itself known.

Most interpreters know not what to make of the second line here. The LXX. (and after it the Syr.), and as it appears, also Aquila and Theodotion, insert *οὐ* ; the Targ. improves the Peshito, for it inserts אֵלֶּה (so that xii. 23, xiii. 16, and xv. 2 are related). And Abulwalid explains : in the heart of fools it is lost ; Euchel : it reels about ; but these are imaginary interpretations resting on a misunderstanding of the passages, in which יָדַע means to come to feel, and הוֹרִיעַ to give to feel (to punish, correct). Kimchi rightly adheres to the one ascertained meaning of the words, according to which the *Venet.* μέσον δὲ ἀφρόνων γγνωσθήσεται. So also the translation of Jerome : *et indoctos quosque (quoque) erudiet*, is formed, for he understands the “and is manifest among fools” (Luther) not merely, as C. B. Michaelis, after the saying : *opposita juxta se posita magis elucescunt*, but of a becoming manifest, which is salutary to these. Certainly בִּקְרֵב can mean among = in the circle of, xv. 31 ; but if, as here and *e.g.* Jer. xxxi. 31, בִּקְרֵב is interchanged with בִּלְבָב, and if חֲכָמָה בִּקְרֵב is the subject spoken of, as 1 Kings iii. 28, then בִּקְרֵב does not mean among (in the midst of), but in the heart of the fool. According to this, the Talmud rightly, by comparison with the current proverb (*Mezîa* 85*b*) : אֶסְתִּירָא בִלְגִינָא קִישׁ קִישׁ קָרִיא : a stater in a flaggon cries *Kish, Kish*, *i.e.* makes much clatter. In the heart of the understanding wisdom rests, *i.e.* remains silent and still, for the understanding feels himself personally happy in its possession, endeavours always the more to deepen it, and lets it operate within ; on the contrary, wisdom in the heart of the fools makes itself manifest : they are not able to keep to themselves the wisdom which they imagine they possess, or the portion of wisdom which is in reality theirs ; but they think, as it is said in Persius : *Scire tuum nihil est nisi scire hoc te sciat alter*. They discredit and waste their little portion of wisdom (instead of thinking on its increase) by obtrusive ostentatious babbling.

Two proverbs follow regarding the state and its ruler :

Ver. 34 Righteousness exalteth a nation,  
And sin is a disgrace to the people.

The Hebr. language is richer in synonyms of "the people" than the German. גוי (formed like the non-bibl. מוי, water, and גוי, corporeality, from גוה, to extend itself from within outward; cf. ix. 3, גוי, x. 13, גוי) is, according to the *usus loq.*, like *natio* the people, as a mass swollen up from a common origin, and עם, 28a (from עמם, to bind), the people as a confederation held together by a common law; לאם (from לאם, to unite, bind together) is the mass (multitude) of the people, and is interchanged sometimes with גוי, Gen. xxv. 23, and sometimes with עם, ver. 28. In this proverb, לאמים stands indeed intentionally in the plur., but not גוי, with the plur. of which גוים, the idea of the non-Israelitish nations, too easily connects itself. The proverb means all nations without distinction, even Israel (cf. under Isa. i. 4) not excluded. History everywhere confirms the principle, that not the numerical, nor the warlike, nor the political, nor yet the intellectual and the so-called civilized greatness, is the true greatness of a nation, and determines the condition of its future as one of progress; but this is its true greatness, that in its private, public, and international life, צדקה, i.e. conduct directed by the will of God, according to the norm of moral rectitude, rules and prevails. Righteousness, good manners, and piety are the things which secure to a nation a place of honour, while, on the contrary, חטאת, sin, viz. prevailing, and more favoured and fostered than contended against in the consciousness of the moral problem of the state, is a disgrace to the people, i.e. it lowers them before God, and also before men who do not judge superficially or perversely, and also actually brings them down. רומם, to raise up, is to be understood after Isa. i. 2, cf. xxiii. 4, and is to be punctuated תרומם, with *Munach* of the penult., and the העמרה-sign with the *Tsere* of the last syllable. Ben-Naphtali punctuates thus: תרומם. In 34b all the artifices of interpretation (from Nachmani to Schultens) are to be rejected, which interpret חסר as the *Venet.* (ἔλεος δὲ λαῶν ἀμαρτία) in its predominant Hebrew signification. It has here, as at Lev. xx. 17 (but not Job vi. 14), the signification of the Syr. *chesdho*, *opprobrium*; the Targ. חסר, or more frequently חסר, as among Jewish interpreters, is recognised by Chanan'el and Rashbam. That this חסר is not foreign to the *Mishle* style, is seen from the fact that חסר, xxv. 10, is used in the sense of the Syr. *chasedh*. The synon. Syr. *chasam*, *invidere*, *obtrectare*, shows that these verbal stems are formed from the R. חס, *stringere*, to strike. Already it is in some

measure perceived how חָסַד, Syr. *chasadh*, Arab. *hasada*, may acquire the meaning of violent love, and by the mediation of the jealousy which is connected with violent love, the signification of grudging, and thus of reproach and of envy; yet this is more manifest if one thinks of the root-signification *stringere*, in the meaning of loving, as referred to the subject, in the meanings of disgrace and envy, as from the subject directed to others. Ewald (§ 51c) compares חָסַל and חָסַר, Ethiop. *chasra*, in the sense of *carpere*, and on the other side חָסָה in the sense of “to join;” but חָסָה does not mean to join (*vid.* Ps. ii. 12), and instead of *carpere*, the idea more closely connected with the root is that of *stringere*, cf. *stringere folia ex arboribus* (Cæsar), and *stringere* (to diminish, to squander, strip) *rem ingluvie* (Horace, Sat. i. 2. 8). The LXX. has here read חָסַר (xxviii. 22), diminution, decay, instead of חָסָה (shame); the *quid pro quo* is not bad, the Syr. accepts it, and the *miseros facit* of Jerome, and Luther’s *verderben* (destruction) corresponds with this phrase better than with the common traditional reading which Symmachus rightly renders by *δνείδος*.

Ver. 35 The king’s favour is towards a prudent servant,  
And his wrath visits the base.

Regarding the contrasts מְשִׁכִּיל and מְבִישׁ, *vid.* at x. 5; cf. xii. 4. The substantival clause 35a may mean: the king’s favour has (possesses) . . . , as well as: it is imparted to, an intelligent servant; the arrangement of the words is more favourable to the latter rendering. In 35b the gender of the verb is determined by attraction after the pred., as is the case also at Gen. xxxi. 8, Job xv. 31, Ewald, § 317c. And “his wrath” is equivalent to is the object of it, cf. 22b, xiii. 18, and in general, p. 282. The syntactical character of the clause does not permit the supplying of לְ from 35a. Luther’s translation proceeds only apparently from this erroneous supposition.

Chap. xv. 1-6. We take these verses together as forming a group which begins with a proverb regarding the good and evil which flows from the tongue, and closes with a proverb regarding the treasure in which blessing is found, and that in which no blessing is found.

Ver. 1 A soft answer turneth away wrath,  
And a bitter word stirreth up anger.

In the second line, the common word for anger (אָר, from the breathing with the nostrils, xiv. 17) is purposely placed, but in

the first, that which denotes anger in the highest degree (חַמָּה from חָם, cogn. חָמָם, Arab. *hamiya*, to glow, like שָׁנָה from שָׁן): a mild, gentle word turns away the heat of anger (*excandescitiam*), puts it back, cf. xxv. 15. The *Dagesh* in דָּהִי follows the rule of the דְּחִיק, i.e. of the close connection of a word terminating with the accented הָ, הֶ, הִ with the following word (*Michlol* 63b). The same is the meaning of the Latin proverb:

*Frangitur ira gravis  
Quando est responsio suavis.*

The דְּבַר-עֶצֶב produces the contrary effect. This expression does not mean an angry word (Ewald), for עֶצֶב is not to be compared with the Arab. *ghadab*, anger (Umbreit), but with Arab. *'adb*, cutting, wounding, paining (Hitzig), so that דְּבַר מַעֲצִיב is meant in the sense of Ps. lxxviii. 40: a word which causes pain (LXX. *λυπηρός*, Theod. *πονικός*), not after the meaning, a word provoking to anger (Gesenius), but certainly after its effect, for a wounding word "makes anger arise." As one says of anger שָׁב, "it turns itself" (e.g. Isa. ix. 11), so, on the other hand, עָלָה, "it rises up," Eccles. x. 4. The LXX. has a third line, ὀργὴ ἀπόλλυσι καὶ φρονίμους, which the Syr. forms into a distich by the repetition of xiv. 32b, the untenableness of which is at once seen.

Ver. 2. The *πραΰτης σοφίας* (Jas. iii. 13) commended in ver. 1 is here continued:

The tongue of the wise showeth great knowledge,  
And the mouth of fools poureth forth folly.

As הִיטִיב נָנָה, Isa. xxiii. 16, means to strike the harp well, and הִיטִיב לָבֵת, xxx. 29, to go along merrily, so הִיטִיב דָּעַת, to know in a masterly manner, and here, where the subject is the tongue, which has only an instrumental reference to knowledge: to bring to light great knowledge (cf. 7a). In 2b the LXX. translate στόμα δὲ ἀφρόνων ἀναγγέλλει κακά. From this Hitzig concludes that they read דָּעוֹת as 28b, and prefers this phrase; but they also translated in xiii. 16, xiv. 28, xxvi. 11, אֵלֶּה by κακίαν, for they interpreted the unintelligible word by combination with עֲלִילָה, and in xii. 23 by ἀραῖς, for they thought they had before them אֵלֶּה (from אֵלֶּה).

Ver. 3 The eyes of Jahve are in every place,  
Observing the evil and the good.

The connection of the dual עֵינַיִם with the plur. of the adjective, which does not admit of a dual, is like vi. 17, cf. 18. But the first line is a sentence by itself, to which the second line gives a

closer determination, as showing how the eyes of God are everywhere (cf. 2 Chron. xvi. 9, after Zech. iv. 10) abroad over the whole earth, viz. beholding with penetrating look the evil and the good (חֵץ, to hold to, to observe, cf. ἐπιβλέποντες, Sir. xxiii. 19), i.e. examining men whether they are good or evil, and keeping them closely before His eyes, so that nothing escapes him. This universal inspection, this omniscience of God, has an alarming but also a comforting side. The proverb seeks first to warn, therefore it speaks first of the evil.

Ver. 4 Gentleness of the tongue is a tree of life;

But falseness in it is a wounding to the spirit.

Regarding מַרְפֵּס, *vid.* at xii. 18, and regarding סֶלֶף, at xi. 3; this latter word we derive with Fleischer from סָלַף, to subvert, overthrow, but not in the sense of “violence, *asperitas*, in as far as violent speech is like a stormy sea,” but of perversity, *perversitas* (*Venet.* λογότης), as the contrast to truthfulness, rectitude, kindness. Gentleness characterizes the tongue when all that it says to a neighbour, whether it be instruction or correction, or warning or consolation, it says in a manner without rudeness, violence, or obtrusiveness, by which it finds the easiest and surest acceptance, because he feels the goodwill, the hearty sympathy, the humility of him who is conscious of his own imperfection. Such gentleness is a tree of life, whose fruits preserve life, heal the sick, and raise up the bowed down. Accordingly, שֶׁבֶר בְּרוּחַ is to be understood of the effect which goes forth from perversity or falseness of the tongue upon others. Fleischer translates: *asperitas autem in ea animum vulnerat*, and remarks, “שֶׁבֶר בְּרוּחַ, *abstr. pro concreto*. The verb שֶׁבַר, and the *n. verbale* שֶׁבֶר derived from it, may, in order to render the meaning tropical, govern the prep. בְּ, as the Arab. *kaser baklby*, he has broken my heart (opp. Arab. *jabar baklaby*), cf. בְּפִנּוּי, xxi. 29, *vid. De Glossis Habichtianis*, p. 18; yet it also occurs with the accus., Ps. lxix. 21, and the corresponding gen. שֶׁבֶר רוּחַ, Isa. lxv. 14.” In any case, the breaking (deep wounding) is not meant in regard to his own spirit, but to that of the neighbour. Rightly Luther: but a lying (tongue) makes heart-sorrow (elsewhere, a false one troubles the cheerful); Euchel: a false tongue is soul-wounding; and the translation of the year 1844: falsehood is a breach into the heart. Only for curiosity’s sake are two other interpretations of 4a and 4b mentioned: the means of safety to the tongue is the tree of life, i.e. the *Tōra* (*Eiachin* 15b); and: per-

versity suffers destruction by a breath of wind, after the proverb, *כל שיש בו נסות רוח רוח קימעא שוברתו*, a breath of wind breaks a man who is puffed up<sup>1</sup> (which Meîri presents for choice, *vid.* also Rashi, who understands רוח of the storm of judgment). The LXX. translates, in 4b, a different text: *ὁ δὲ συντηρῶν αὐτὴν πλησθήσεται πνεύματος*; but the *יִשְׁבַּע רוּחַ* here supposed cannot mean “to be full of spirit,” but rather “to eat full of wind.” Otherwise the Syr. and Targ.: and he who eateth of his own fruit is satisfied (Heb. *וְאִכַּל מִפְּרִי יִשְׁבַּע*),—an attempt to give to the phrase *יִשְׁבַּע* a thought correct in point of language, but one against which we do not give up the Masoretic text.

Ver. 5 A fool despiseth his father's correction;  
But he that regardeth reproof is prudent.

We may with equal correctness translate: he acts prudently (after 1 Sam. xxiii. 22); and, he is prudent (after xix. 25). We prefer, with Jerome, *Venet.*, and Luther, the latter, against the LXX., Syr., and Targ., because, without a doubt, the *יָעִר* is so thought of at xix. 25: the contrast is more favourable to the former. It is true that he who regardeth reproof is not only prudent, but also that he is prudent by means of observing it. With line first cf. i. 7 and i. 30, and with line second, xii. 1. Luther translates: the fool calumniates . . .; but of the meanings of abuse (properly *pungere*) and scorn, the second is perhaps here to be preferred.

Ver. 6 The house of the righteous is a great treasure-chamber;  
But through the gain of the wicked comes trouble.

The constrast shows that *חֵסֶן* does not here mean force or might (LXX., Syr., Targ., Jerome, and *Venet.*), which generally this derivative of the verb *חָסַן* never means, but store, fulness of possession, prosperity (Luther: in the house of the righteous are goods enough), in this sense (cf. xxvii. 24) placing itself, not with the Arab. *hasuna*, to be firm, fastened (Aram. *ܚܫܢܐ*, *חֵסֶן*), but with Arab. *khazan*, to deposit, to lay up in granaries, whence our “Magazin.” *חֵסֶן* may indeed, like *חֵיל*, have the meaning of riches, and *חֵסֶן* does actually mean, in the Jewish-Aram., to possess, and the *Aphel* *אֶחְסֵן*, to take into possession (*κρατεῖν*); but the constant use of the noun *חֵסֶן* in the sense of store, with the kindred idea of laying up, *e.g.* Jer. xx. 5, and of the *Niph.* *נִחְסַן*, which means, Isa. xxiii. 18, with *נִאֲצָר*, “to be magazined,” gives countenance to the

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Duke's *Rabbinische Blumenlese*, p. 176, where the rendering is somewhat different.

idea that **חֶסֶן** goes back to the primary conception, *recondere*, and is to be distinguished from **חֶסֶן**, **חֶסֶן**, and other derivatives after the fundamental conception. We may not interpret **בֵּית**, with Fleischer, Bertheau, and Zöckler, as accus.: in the house (cf. **בֵּית**, viii. 2), nor prepositionally as *chez* = *casa*; but: "the house of the righteous is a great store," equivalent to, the place of such. On the contrary, destruction comes by the gain of the wicked. It is impossible that **נֶעְבְּרַת** can have the house as the subject (Löwenstein), for **בֵּית** is everywhere *mas*. Therefore Abulwalîd, followed by Kimchi and the *Venet.* (*ᾠλεθρος*), interprets **נֶעְבְּרַת** as subst., after the form of the Mishnic **נִבְרַכַּת**, a pool, cf. **נִחְרָצָה**, peremptorily decided, decreed; and if we do not extinguish the **ב** of **וּבְתִבּוּאָתָא** (the LXX. according to the second translation of this doubly-translated distich, Syr., and Targ.), there remains then nothing further than to regard **נֶעְבְּרַת** either as subst. neut. overturned = overthrow (cf. such part. nouns as **מוֹעֲקָה**, **מוֹסְרָה**, but particularly **נִסְבָּה**, 2 Chron. x. 15), or as impers. neut. pass: it is overthrown = there is an overthrow, like **נִשְׁעָרָה**, Ps. l. 3: it is stormed = a storm rages. The gain of the wicked has overthrow as its consequence, for the greed of gain, which does not shrink from unrighteous, deceitful gain, destroys his house, **עֵבֶר בֵּיתוֹ**, ver. 27 (*vid.* regarding **עֵבֶר**, xi. 29). Far from enriching the house, such gain is the cause of nothing but ruin. The LXX., in its first version of this distich, reads, in 6a, **בְּרִבּוֹת צָרָה** (*ἐν πλεοναζούσῃ δικαιοσύνῃ*), and in 6b, **וּבְתִבּוּאָתָא רָשָׁע נֶעְבְּרָה** (and together with the fruit the godless is rooted out, *ὁλόρριζοι ἐκ γῆς ἀπολοῦνται*); for, as Lagarde has observed, it confounds **עֵבֶר** with **עָקַר** (to root, *privativ*: to root up).

Vers. 7–17. A second series which begins with a proverb of the power of human speech, and closes with proverbs of the advantages and disadvantages of wealth.

Ver. 7 The lips of the wise spread knowledge;

But the direction is wanting to the heart of fools.

It is impossible that **לֹא-כֵן** can be a second object. accus. dependent on **יִזְרֶי** (*dispergunt*, not *יִצְרֶי*, xx. 28; *φυλάσσουσι*, as Symmachus translates): but the heart of fools is unrighteous (error or falsehood) (Hitzig after Isa. xvi. 6); for then why were the lips of the wise and the heart of the fools mentioned? **לֹא-כֵן** also does not mean *οὐχ οὕτως* (an old Greek anonymous translation, Jerome, Targ., *Venet.*, Luther): the heart of the fool is quite different from the heart of the wise man, which spreads abroad knowledge

(Zöckler), for it is not heart and heart, but lip and heart, that are placed opposite to each other. Better the LXX. οὐκ ἀσφαλής, and yet better the Syr. *lo kinîn* (not right, sure). We have seen, at xi. 19, that כָּן as a participial adj. means standing = being, continuing, or also standing erect = right, i.e. rightly directed, or having the right direction; כָּן יִצְדָּקָה means there conducting oneself rightly, and thus genuine rectitude. What, after 7a, is more appropriate than to say of the heart of the fool, that it wants the receptivity for knowledge which the lips of the wise scatter abroad? The heart of the fool is not right, it has not the right direction, is crooked and perverse, has no mind for wisdom; and that which proceeds from the wise, therefore, finds with him neither estimation nor acceptance.

Ver. 8 The sacrifice of the godless is an abhorrence to Jahve;  
But the prayer of the upright is His delight.

Although the same is true of the prayer of the godless that is here said of their sacrifice, and of the sacrifice of the righteous that is here said of their prayer (*vid.* xxviii. 9, and cf. Ps. iv. 6 with Ps. xxvii. 6), yet it is not by accident that here (line first = xxi. 27) the sacrifice is ascribed to the godless and the prayer to the upright. The sacrifice, as a material and legally-required performance, is much more related to dead works than prayer freely completing itself in the word, the most direct expression of the personality, which, although not commanded by the law, because natural to men, as such is yet the soul of all sacrifices; and the Chokma, like the Psalms and Prophets, in view of the ceremonial service which had become formal and dead in the *opus operatum*, is to such a degree penetrated by the knowledge of the incongruity of the offering up of animals and of plants, with the object in view, that a proverb like "the sacrifice of the righteous is pleasing to God" never anywhere occurs; and if it did occur without being expressly and unavoidably referred to the legal sacrifice, it would have to be understood rather after Ps. li. 18 f. than Ps. li. 20 f., rather after 1 Sam. xv. 22 than after Ps. lxvi. 13-15. זֶבַח, which, when it is distinguished from עֹלָה, means (cf. vii. 14) the sacrifice only in part coming to the altar, for the most part applied to a sacrificial feast, is here the common name for the bloody, and, *per synecdochen*, generally the legally-appointed sacrifice, consisting in external offering. The לְרִצֵּן, Lev. i. 3, used in the *Tôra* of sacrifices, is here, as at Ps. xix. 15, transferred to prayer. The

fundamental idea of the proverb is, that sacrifices well-pleasing to God, prayers acceptable to God (that are heard, xv. 29), depend on the relations in which the heart and life of the man stand to God.

Ver. 9. Another proverb with the key-word תועבת (to'ebah):

An abomination to Jahve is the way of the godless;  
But He loveth him who searcheth after righteousness.

The manner and rule of life is called the way. מִרְדֵּף is the heightening of דֶּרֶךְ, xxi. 21, and can be used independently in *bonam*, as well as in *malam partem* (xi. 19, cf. xiii. 21). Regarding the form יִאֲרֹב, *vid.* Fleischer in *Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitsch.* xv. 382.

Ver. 10 Sharp correction is for him who forsaketh the way;  
Whoever hateth instruction shall die.

The way, thus absolute, is the God-pleasing right way (ii. 13), the forsaking of which is visited with the punishment of death, because it is that which leadeth unto life (x. 17). And that which comes upon them who leave it is called מוֹסֵר רָע, *castigatio dura*, as much as to say that whoever does not welcome instruction, whoever rejects it, must at last receive it against his will in the form of peremptory punishment. The sharp correction (cf. Isa. xxviii. 28, 19b) is just the death under which he falls who accepts of no instruction (v. 23), temporal death, but that as a token of wrath which it is not for the righteous (xiv. 32).

Ver. 11 The underworld [Sheol] and the abyss are before Jahve;  
But how much more the hearts of the children of men!

A syllogism, a *minori ad majus*, with אֵף כִּי (LXX. *πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ*, *Venet. μάλλον οὖν*), like xii. 32.<sup>1</sup> אֲבִדוֹן has a meaning analogous to that of *τάρταρος* (cf. *ταρταροῦν*, 2 Pet. ii. 4, to throw down into the *τάρταρος*), which denotes the lowest region of Hades (שְׂאוֹל תַּחְתִּית or ש' תַּחְתִּיתָהּ), and also in general, Hades. If אֲבִדוֹן and מוֹת are connected, Job xxxvii. 22, and if אֲבִדוֹן is the parallel word to קֶבֶר, Ps. lxxxviii. 12, or also to שְׂאוֹל, as in the passage similar to this proverb, Job xxvi. 6 (cf. xxxviii. 17): "Sheôl is naked before

<sup>1</sup> In Rabbin. this concluding form is called קֶל וְחָמָר (light and heavy over against one another), and דִּין (judgment, viz. from premisses, thus conclusion), *κατ' ἐξ.* Instead of the biblical אֵף כִּי, the latter form of the language has כָּל-שֶׁכֶּן (all speaks for it that it is so), עַל-אֲחַת כְּמָה וְכְמָה (so much the more), אֵינוּ דִין, or also קֶל וְחָמָר (a *minori ad majus* = *quanto magis*); *vid.* the Hebr. *Römerbrief*, p. 14.

Him, and Abaddon has no covering;" since אַבְדֹן is the general name of the underworld, including the grave, *i.e.* the inner place of the earth which receives the body of the dead, as the kingdom of the dead, lying deeper, does the soul. But where, as here and at xxvii. 10, שְׁאֹל and אַבְדֹן stand together, they are related to each other, as ᾗδης and τάρταρος or ἄβυσσος, Rev. ix. 11 : אַבְדֹן is the lowest hell, the place of deepest descent, of uttermost destruction. The conclusion which is drawn in the proverb proceeds from the supposition that in the region of creation there is nothing more separated, and by a wide distance, from God, than the depth, and especially the undermost depth, of the realm of the dead. If now God has this region in its whole compass wide open before Him, if it is visible and thoroughly cognisable by Him (נִגַּד, *acc. adv.* : *in conspectu*, from נִגַּד, *eminere, conspicuum esse*),—for He is also present in the underworld, Ps. cxxxix. 8,—then much more will the hearts of the children of men be open, the inward thoughts of men living and acting on the earth being known already from their expressions. Man sees through man, and also himself, never perfectly; but the Lord can try the heart and prove the reins, Jer. xvii. 10. What that means this proverb gives us to understand, for it places over against the hearts of men nothing less than the depths of the underworld in eternity.

Ver. 12 The scorner liketh not that one reprove him,  
To wise men he will not go.

The *inf. absol.*, abruptly denoting the action, may take the place of the object, as here (cf. Job ix. 18, Isa. xlii. 24), as well as of the subject (xxv. 27, Job vi. 25). Thus הוֹכִיחַ is (ix. 7) construed with the dat. obj. Regarding the probable conclusion which presents itself from passages such as xv. 12 and xiii. 20, as to the study of wisdom in Israel, *vid.* p. 39. Instead of אָל, we read, xiii. 20 (cf. xxii. 24), אֶת־; for לָכַח אֶת־ means to have intercourse with one, to go a journey with one (Mal. ii. 6, cf. Gen. v. 24, but not 2 Sam. xv. 22, where we are to translate with Keil), according to which the LXX. has here μετὰ δὲ σοφῶν οὐχ ὁμιλήσει. The mocker of religion and of virtue shuns the circle of the wise, for he loves not to have his treatment of that which is holy reproved, nor to be convicted of his sin against truth; he prefers the society where his frivolity finds approbation and a response.

Ver. 13 A joyful heart maketh the countenance cheerful;  
But in sorrow of the heart the spirit is broken.

The expression of the countenance, as well as the spiritual *habitus* of a man, is conditioned by the state of the heart. A joyful heart maketh the countenance טוב, which means friendly, but here happy-looking = cheerful (for טוב is the most general designation of that which makes an impression which is pleasant to the senses or to the mind); on the contrary, with sorrow of heart (עֲצֵבָה, constr. of עֲצָבָה, x. 10, as הִטָּאת = הִטָּאת, from הִטָּאָה) there is connected a stricken, broken, downcast heart; the spiritual functions of the man are paralyzed; self-confidence, without which energetic action is impossible, is shattered; he appears discouraged, whereby רוּחַ is thought of as the power of self-consciousness and of self-determination, but לֵב, as our "*Gemüt*" [*animus*], as the oneness of thinking and willing, and thus as the seat of determination, which decides the intellectual-corporeal life-expression of the man, or without being able to be wholly restrained, communicates itself to them. The בּ of וּבְעֲצָבָה is, as xv. 16 f., xvi. 8, xvii. 1, meant in the force of being together or along with, so that רוּחַ נִכְאָה do not need to be taken separate from each other as subject and predicate: the sense of the noun-clause is in the בּ, as *e.g.* also vii. 23 (it is about his life, *i.e.* it concerns his life). Elsewhere the crushed spirit, like the broken heart, is equivalent to the heart despairing in itself and prepared for grace. The heart with a more clouded mien may be well, for sorrow has in it a healing power (Eccles. vii. 3). But here the matter is the general psychological truth, that the corporeal and spiritual life of man has its regulator in the heart, and that the condition of the heart leaves its stamp on the appearance and on the activity of the man. The translation of the רוּחַ נִכְאָה by "oppressed breath" (Umbreit, Hitzig) is impossible; the breath cannot be spoken of as broken.

Ver. 14 The heart of the understanding seeketh after knowledge,  
And the mouth of fools practiseth folly.

Luther interprets רָעָה as metaphor. for to govern, but with such ethical conceptions it is metaphor. for to be urgently circumspect about anything (*vid.* xiii. 20), like Arab. *ra'y* and *r'áyt*, intentional, careful, concern about anything. No right translation can be made of the *Chethib* פָּנִי, which Schultens, Hitzig, Ewald, and Zöckler prefer; the predicate can go before the פָּנִי, after the Semitic rule in the fem. of the sing., 2 Sam. x. 9, cf. Job xvi. 16,

*Chethib*, but cannot follow in the masc. of the sing.; besides, the operations of his look and aspect are ascribed to his face, but not spiritual functions as here, much more to the mouth, *i.e.* to the spirit speaking through it. The heart is within a man, and the mouth without; and while the former gives and takes, the latter is always only giving out. In xviii. 15, where a synonymous distich is formed from the antithetic distich, the ear, as hearing, is mentioned along with the heart as appropriating. נָבוֹן is not an adj., but is gen., like צַדִּיק, 28a (opp. וְפִי). חָכָם, xvi. 23. The φιλοσοφία of the understanding is placed over against the μωρολογία of the fools. The LXX. translates καρδία ὀρθὴ ζητεῖ αἰσθησιν (cf. xiv. 10, καρδία ἀνδρὸς αἰσθητικῆς); it uses this word after the Hellenistic *usus loq.* for דַּעַת, of experimental knowledge.

Ver. 15 All the days of the afflicted are evil;

But he who is of a joyful heart hath a perpetual feast.

Regarding עָנִי (the afflicted), *vid.* 21b. They are so called on whom a misfortune, or several of them, press externally or internally. If such an one is surrounded by ever so many blessings, yet is his life day by day a sad one, because with each new day the feeling of his woe which oppresses him renews itself; whoever, on the contrary, is of joyful heart (gen. connection as xi. 13, xii. 8), such an one (his life) is always a feast, a banquet (not מִשְׁתֶּה, as it may be also pointed, but מִשְׁתָּה and תַּמִּיד thus *adv.*, for it is never adj.; the post-bib. usage is עוֹלוֹת תַּמִּיד for תַּמִּידִין). Hitzig (and also Zöckler) renders 15b: And (the days) of one who is of a joyful heart are . . . Others supply לוֹ (cf. xxvii. 7b), but our rendering does not need that. We have here again an example of that attribution (Arab. *isnād*) in which that which is attributed (*musnad*) is a condition (*hal*) of a logical subject (the *musnad ilēhi*), and thus he who speaks has this, not in itself, but in the sense of the condition; the inwardly cheerful is feasts evermore, *i.e.* the condition of such an one is like a continual festival. The true and real happiness of a man is thus defined, not by external things, but by the state of the heart, in which, in spite of the apparently prosperous condition, a secret sorrow may gnaw, and which, in spite of an externally sorrowful state, may be at peace, and be joyfully confident in God.

Ver. 16 Better is little with the fear of Jahve,  
Than great store and trouble therewith.

The כ in both cases the LXX. rightly renders by μετά. How

מְרוּמָה (elsewhere of wild, confused disorder, extreme discord) is meant of store and treasure, Ps. xxxix. 7 shows: it is restless, covetous care and trouble, as the contrast of the quietness and contentment proceeding from the fear of God, the noisy, wild, stormy running and hunting about of the slave of mammon. Theodotion translates the word here, as Aquila and Symmachus elsewhere, by words which correspond (*φαγέδαινα* = *φάγαινα* or *ἀχορτασία*) with the Syr. יַעֲנֻתָא, greed or insatiability.

Ver. 17 Better a dish of cabbage, and love with it,  
Than a fatted ox together with hatred.

With בו is here interchanged שָׁם, which, used both of things and of persons, means to be there along with something. Both have the *Dag. forte conj.*, cf. to the contrary, Deut. xxx. 20, Mic. i. 11, Deut. xi. 22; the punctuation varies, if the first of the two words is a *n. actionis* ending in ה־. The dish (portion) is called אֶרְחָה, which the LXX. and other Greek versions render by *ξενισμός*, entertainment, and thus understand it of that which is set before a guest, perhaps rightly so, for the Arab. *árrakh* (to date, to determine), to which it is compared by Gesenius and Dietrich, is equivalent to *warrh*, a denom. of the name of the moon. Love and hatred are, according to circumstances, the disposition of the host, or of the participant, the spirit of the family:

*Cum dat oluscula mensa minuscula pace quietâ,  
Ne pete grandia lautaque prandia lite repleta.*

Two proverbs of two different classes of men, each second line of which terminates with a catchword having a similar sound (וָאֵרָךְ, וָאֵרָח).

Ver. 18 A passionate man stirreth up strife,  
And one who is slow to anger allayeth contention.

xxviii. 25a and xxix. 22a are variations of the first line of this proverb. The *Pih.* גָּרָה occurs only these three times in the phrase גָּרָה מְרוֹן, R. גָּר, to grind, thus to strike, to irritate, cogn. to (but of a different root from) the verb עוֹרֵר, to excite, x. 12, and תִּרְחֵר, to set on fire, xxvi. 21, cf. שָׂלַח, vi. 14. Regarding חָמָה, *vid.* xv. 1; we call such a man a “hot-head;” but the biblical conception nowhere (except in the Book of Daniel) places the head in connection with spiritual-psychical events (*Psychologie*, p. 254). Regarding אָרָה אַפַּיִם, *vid.* xiv. 29; the LXX. (which contains a translation of this proverb, and after it of a variation) translates *μακρόθυμος δὲ καὶ τὴν μέλλουσαν καταπραΰνει*, i.e. (as the Syr. render it) he suppresses

the strife in its origin, so that it does not break out. But both are true: that he who is slow to anger, who does not thus easily permit himself to become angry, allayeth the strife which one enters into with him, or into which he is drawn, and that he prevents the strife, for he places over against provoking, injurious conduct, patient gentleness (מְרִיבָא, Eccles. x. 4).

Ver. 19 The way of the slothful is as hedged with thorns;  
But the path of the righteous is paved.

Hitzig misses the contrast between עָצֵל (slothful) and יֵשָׁרִים (upright), and instead of the slothful reads עָרִיץ, the tyrannical. But is then the slothful יֵשָׁר? The contrast is indeed not that of contradiction, but the slothful is one who does not act uprightly, a man who fails to fulfil the duty of labour common to man, and of his own special calling. The way of such an one is בְּמִשְׁכַּת חֶרֶק, like a fencing with thorns (from חֶרֶק, R. חר, to be pointed, sharp, distinguished from Arab. *hadk*, to surround, and in the meaning to fix with the look, denom. of *khadakt*, the apple of the eye), so that he goes not forwards, and sees hindrances and difficulties everywhere, which frighten him back, excusing his shunning his work, his remissness of will, and his doing nothing; on the contrary, the path of those who wait truly and honestly on their calling, and prosecute their aim, is raised up like a skilfully made street, so that unhindered and quickly they go forward (סָלִילָה, R. סל, *aggerare*, cf. Jer. xviii. 15 with Isa. xlix. 11, and iv. 8, סָלִיל, which was still in use in the common language of Palestine in the second cent., *Rosch haschana*, 26b).

This collection of Solomonic proverbs began, x. 1, with a proverb having reference to the observance of the fourth commandment,<sup>1</sup> and a second chief section, xiii. 1, began in the same way. Here a proverb of the same kind designates the beginning of a third chief section. That the editor was aware of this is shown by the homogeneity of the proverbs, xv. 19, xii. 28, which form the conclusion of the first and second sections. We place together first in this new section, vers. 20–23, in which (with the exception of ver. 25) the יִשְׂמַח [maketh glad] of the first (x. 1) is continued.

Ver. 20 A wise son maketh a glad father,  
And a fool of a man despiseth his mother.

<sup>1</sup> [The *fifth* commandment of the Westminster Shorter Catechism is named as the *fourth* in Luther's catechism.]

Line first = x. 1. The gen. connection of כְּסִיל אָדָם (here and at xxi. 20) is not superlative [the most foolish of men], but like פָּרָא אָדָם, Gen. xvi. 12; the latter: a man of the wild ass kind; the former: a man of the fool kind, who is the exemplar of such a sort among men. Piety acting in willing subordination is wisdom, and the contrary exceeding folly.

Ver. 21 Folly is joy to him that is devoid of understanding;  
But a man of understanding goeth straight forward.

Regarding חֶסֶד-לֵב, *vid.* at vi. 32 (cf. *libīb*, which in the Samaritan means "dearly beloved," in Syr. "courageous," in Arab. and Aethiop. *cordatus*); אִישׁ תְּבוּנָה, x. 23, and יֵשֶׁר, with the accus. of the way, here of the going, iii. 6 (but not xi. 5, where the going itself is not the subject). In consequence of the contrast, the meaning of 21a is different from that of x. 23, according to which sin is to the fool as the sport of a child. Here אֲוֵלָת is folly and buffoonery, drawing aside in every kind of way from the direct path of that which is good, and especially from the path of one's duty. This gives joy to the fool; he is thereby drawn away from the earnest and faithful performance of the duties of his calling, and thus wastes time and strength; while, on the contrary, a man of understanding, who perceives and rejects the vanity and unworthiness of such trifling and such nonsense, keeps the straight direction of his going, *i.e.* without being drawn aside or kept back, goes straight forward, *i.e.* true to duty, prosecutes the end of his calling. לֵבָת is accus., like xxx. 29, Mic. vi. 8.

Ver. 22 A breaking of plans where no counsel is;  
But where many counsellors are they come to pass.

On the other side it is also true according to the proverbs, "*so viel Köpfe so viel Sinne*" [*quot homines, tot sententiæ*], and "*viel Rath ist Unrath*" [*ne quid nimis*], and the like. But it cannot become a rule of morals not to accept of counsel that we may not go astray; on the contrary, it is and remains a rule of morals: not stubbornly to follow one's own heart (head), and not obstinately to carry out one's own will, and not in the darkness of wisdom to regard one's own plans as unimproveable, and not needing to be examined; but to listen to the counsel of intelligent and honest friends, and, especially where weighty matters are in hand, not affecting one's own person, but the common good, not to listen merely to one counsellor, but to many. Not merely the organism of the modern state, but also of old the Mosaic arrangement of

the Israelitish community, with its representative organization, its courts and councils, rested on the acknowledged justice and importance of the saying uttered in xi. 14, and here generalized. **הִפֵּר**, *infin. abs. Hiph.* of **פָּרַר**, to break, with the accus. following, stands here, like **הִפִּיךָ**, xii. 7, instead of the finite: the thoughts come to a fracture (failure), *irrita fiunt consilia*. **סֹדֶר** (= **יִסֹּד**, cf. **נוֹסֵד**, Ps. ii. 2) means properly the being brought close together for the purpose of secret communication and counsel (cf. Arab. *sâwada*, to press close together = to walk with one privately). The LXX.: their plans are unexecuted, *οἱ μὴ τιμῶντες συνέδρια*, literally Symmachus, *διασκεδάζονται λογισμοὶ μὴ ὄντος συμβουλίου*. **תִּקְוָם** has, after Jer. iv. 14, li. 29, **מִחֲשָׁבוֹת** as subject. The LXX. (besides perverting **בָּרַב** [by a multitude] into **בָּלָב** [*ἐν καρδίαις*]), the Syr., and Targ. introduce **עֲצָה** (xix. 21) as subject.

Ver. 23 A man has joy by the right answer of his mouth;  
And a word in its season, how fair is it!

If we translate **מַעֲנֶה** only by "answer," then 23a sounds as a praise of self-complaisance; but it is used of true correspondence (xxix. 19), of fit reply (Job xxxii. 3, 5), of appropriate answer (cf. 28a, xvi. 1). It has happened to one in his reply to hit the nail on its head, and he has joy from that (**שָׂמַח בְּ** **שְׂמִיחָהּ** after **בְּ**, e.g. xxiii. 24), and with right; for the reply does not always succeed. A reply like this, which, according to circumstances, stops the mouth or bringeth a kiss (xxiv. 26), is a fortunate throw, is a gift from above. The synonymous parallel line measures that which is appropriate, not to that which is to be answered, but from a general point of view as to its seasonableness; **עֵת** (= **עֵדָת** from **יָעַר**) is here "the ethically right, becoming time, determined by the laws of wisdom (moral)" (*vid.* Orelli, *Synonyma der Zeit u. Ewigkeit*, p. 48), cf. **עַל-אֶפְנֵי** (translated by Luther "in its time"), xxv. 11. With **מֶה-טוֹב**, cf. xvi. 16; both ideas lie in it: that such a word is in itself well-conditioned and successful, and also that it is welcome, agreeable, and of beneficial influence.

Four proverbs of fundamentally different doctrines:

Ver. 24 The man of understanding goeth upwards on a way of life,  
To depart from hell beneath.

The way of life is one, v. 6, Ps. xvi. 11 (where, notwithstanding the want of the article, the idea is logically determined), although in itself forming a plurality of **אֲרָחוֹת**, ii. 19. "A way of life," in the translation, is equivalent to a way which is a way of life.

לְמַעַלָּה, upwards (as Eccles. iii. 21, where, in the doubtful question whether the spirit of a man at his death goes upwards, there yet lies the knowledge of the alternative), belongs, as the parallel מְשָׁאֵל מָטָה shows, to אֶרֶץ חַיִּים as virtual adj.: a way of life which leads upwards. And the לְ of לְמַשְׁכָּלִי is that of possession, but not as of quiet possession (such belongs to him), but as personal activity, as in הִרְדֵּה לוֹ, he has a journey = he makes a journey, finds himself on a journey, 1 Kings xviii. 27; for לְמַעַן סוֹר is not merely, as לְסוֹר, xiii. 14, xiv. 27, the expression of the end and consequence, but of the subjective object, *i.e.* the intention, and thus supposes an activity corresponding to this intention. The O. T. reveals heaven, *i.e.* the state of the revelation of God in glory, yet not as the abode of saved men; the way of the dying leads, according to the O. T. representation, downwards into Sheôl; but the translations of Enoch and Elijah are facts which, establishing the possibility of an exception, break through the dark monotony of that representation, and, as among the Greeks the mysteries encouraged *ἡδυστέρας ἐλπίδας*, so in Israel the Chokma appears pointing the possessor of wisdom upwards, and begins to shed light on the darkness of Sheôl by the new great thoughts of a life of immortality, thus of a *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* (xii. 28) (*Psychologie*, p. 407 ff.), now for the first time becoming prominent, but only as a foreboding and an enigma. The idea of the Sheôl opens the way for a change: the gathering place of all the living on this side begins to be the place of punishment for the godless (vii. 27, ix. 18); the way leading upwards, *εἰς τὴν ζωὴν*, and that leading downwards, *εἰς τὴν ἀπώλειαν* (Matt. vii. 13 f.), come into direct contrast.

Ver. 25 The house of the proud Jahve rooteth out,  
And He establisheth the landmark of the widow.

The power unnamed in יִסְחֵי, ii. 22 (cf. xiv. 11a), is here named יִסְחֵי יְהוָה (thus to be pointed with *Mercha* and *Pasek* following). יִצָּב is the abbreviated fut. form which the elevated style, *e.g.* Deut. xxxii. 8, uses also as indic.,—a syntactical circumstance which renders Hitzig's correction יִצָּב superfluous. It is the border of the land-possession of the widows, removed by the נָאִים (LXX. *ὑβριστῶν*), that is here meant. The possession of land in Israel was secured by severe punishment inflicted on him who removed the "landmark" (Deut. xix. 14, xxvii. 17), and the Chokma (xxii. 28; Job xxiv. 2) as well as the prophets (*e.g.* Hos. v. 10)

inculcate the inviolability of the borders of the possession, as the guardian of which Jahve here Himself appears.

Ver. 26 An abomination to Jahve are evil thoughts;  
But gracious words are to Him pure.

Not personally (Luther: the plans of the wicked) but neutrally is רָע here meant as at ii. 14, and in אִשָּׁת רָע, vi. 24 (cf. Pers. *merdi nîku*, man of good = good man), *vid.* Friedr. Philippi's *Status Constr.* p. 121. Thoughts which are of a bad kind and of a bad tendency, particularly (what the parallel member brings near) of a bad disposition and design against others, are an abomination to God; but, on the contrary, pure, viz. in His eyes, which cannot look upon iniquity (Hab. i. 13), are the אֲמֵרֵי-נֶעֱם, words of compassion and of friendship toward men, which are (after 26a) the expression of such thoughts, thus sincere, benevolent words, the influence of which on the soul and body of him to whom they refer is described, xvi. 24. The Syr., Targ., Symmachus, Theodotion, and the *Venet.* recognise in וְטַהוּרִים the pred., while, on the contrary, the LXX., Jerome, and Luther (who finally decided for the translation, "but the pure speak comfortably") regard it as subject. But that would be an attribution which exceeds the measure of possibility, and for which אֲמֵרִים or רִבְרִי must be used; also the parallelism requires that טַהוּרִים correspond with ה' תועבת. Hence also the reference of וְטַהוּרִים to the judgment of God, which is determined after the motive of pure untainted law; that which proceeds from such, that and that only, is pure, pure in His sight, and thus also pure in itself.

Ver. 27 Whoever does service to [*servit*] avarice troubleth his own house;  
But he that hateth gifts shall live.

Regarding בָּצַע בָּצַע, *vid.* at i. 19, and regarding עֲכָר בֵּיתוֹ, xi. 29, where it is subject, but here object.; xxviii. 16b is a variation of 27b. מַתָּנוֹת are here gifts in the sense of Eccles. vii. 7, which pervert judgment, and cause respect of persons. The LXX. from this point mingles together a series of proverbs with those of the following chapter.

Two proverbs regarding the righteous and the wicked:

Ver. 28 The heart of the righteous considereth how to answer right,  
And the mouth of the godless poureth forth evil.

Instead of לַעֲנוֹת, the LXX. (Syr. and Targ.) imagines אֲמוּנוֹת, πίστεις; Jerome translates, but falsely, *obedientiam* (from עָנָה, to bend oneself); Meîri thinks on לַעֲנָה, wormwood, for the heart of

the righteous revolves in itself the misery and the vanity of this present life; Hitzig corrects this verse as he does the three preceding: the heart of the righteous thinks on עֲנֻוֹת, a plur. of verb עָנָה, which, except in this correction, does not exist. The proverb, as it stands, is, in fineness of expression and sharpness of the contrast, raised above such manglings. Instead of the righteous, the wise might be named, and instead of the godless, fools (cf. 2b); but the poet places the proverb here under the point of view of duty to neighbours. It is the characteristic of the righteous that he does not give the reins to his tongue; but as Luther has translated: the heart of the righteous considers [*tichtet* from *dictare*, frequently to speak, here carefully to think over] what is to be answered, or rather, since מְהִלָּעֲנוֹת is not used, he thinks thereupon to answer rightly, for that the word עָנָה is used in this pregnant sense is seen from 23a. The godless, on the contrary, are just as rash with their mouth as the righteous are of a thoughtful heart: their mouth sputters forth (*effutit*) evil, for they do not first lay to heart the question what may be right and just in the case that has arisen.

Ver. 29 Jahve is far from the godless;

But the prayer of the righteous He heareth.

Line second is a variation of 8b. God is far from the godless, viz. as Polychronius remarks, *non spatii intercapedine, sed sententiæ diversitate*; more correctly: as to His gracious presence—חָלַץ מֵהֶם, He has withdrawn Himself from them, Hos. x. 6, so that if they pray, their prayer reaches not to Him. The prayer of the righteous, on the contrary, He hears, He is graciously near to them, they have access to Him, He listens to their petitions; and if they are not always fulfilled according to their word, yet they are not without an answer (Ps. cxlv. 18).

Two proverbs regarding the eye and the ear:

Ver. 30 The light of the eye rejoiceth the heart,

And a good message maketh the bones fat.

Hitzig corrects also here: מְרֵאָה עֵינִים, that which is seen with the eyes, viz. after long desire; and certainly מְרֵאָה עֵינִים can mean not only that which the eyes see (Isa. xi. 3), but also this, that the eyes do see. But is it true what Hitzig says in justification of his correction, that מֵאֹר never means light, or ray, or brightness, but lamp (*φωστήρ*)? It is true, indeed, that מֵאֹר עֵינִים cannot mean a cheerful sight (Luther) in an objective sense (LXX. θεωρῶν

ὄφθαλμὸς καλός), as a verdant garden or a stream flowing through a landscape (Rashi), for that would be מְרֻצָּה מֵאֵיר עֵינַיִם, and “brightness which the eyes see” (Bertheau); the genitive connection certainly does not mean: the מאור is not the light from without presenting itself to the eyes, but, like אור עֵינַיִם (Ps. xxxviii. 11) and similar expressions, the light of the eye itself [bright or joyous eyes]. But מאור does not mean alone the body of light, but also the illumination, Ex. xxxv. 14 and elsewhere, not only that which (ὁ, τι) gives light, but also this, that (ὅτι) light arises and is present, so that we might translate it here as at Ps. xc. 8, either the brightness, or that which gives light. But the clear brightness of one’s own eye cannot be meant, for then that were as much as to say that it is the effect, not that it is the cause, of a happy heart, but the brightness of the eyes of others that meet us. That this gladdens the heart of him who has a sight of it is evident, without any interchanging relation of the joy-beaming countenance, for it is indeed heart-gladdening to a man, to whom selfishness has not made the χαίρειν μετὰ χαϊρόντων impossible, to see a countenance right joyful in truth. But in connection with xvi. 15, it lies nearer to think on a love-beaming countenance, a countenance on which joyful love to us mirrors itself, and which reflects itself in our heart, communicating this sense of gladness. The ancient Jewish interpreters understand מאור עֵינַיִם of the enlightening of the eye of the mind, according to which Euchel translates: “clear intelligence;” but Rashi has remarked that that is not the explanation of the words, but the Midrash. That, in line second of this synonymous distich, שְׂמוּעָה טוֹבָה, does not mean *alloquium humanum* (Fl.), nor a good report which one hears of himself, but a good message, is confirmed by xxv. 25; שְׂמוּעָה as neut. *part. pass.* may mean that which is heard, but the comparison of שְׂבוּעָה, יְשׁוּעָה, stamps it as an abstract formation like נִצְלָה, נִצְלָה (נִצְלָה), according to which the LXX. translates it by ἀκοή (in this passage by φήμη). Regarding רִשָּׁן, richly to satisfy, or to refresh, a favourite expression in the *Mishle*, *vid.* at xi. 25, xiii. 4.

Ver. 31 An ear which heareth the doctrine of life  
Keeps itself in the circle of the wise.

As, vi. 33, הוֹכָחוֹת מוֹסֵר means instructions aiming at discipline, so here תּוֹכַחַת חַיִּים means instructions which have life as their end, *i.e.* as showing how one may attain unto true life; Hitzig’s חָכְם, for חַיִּים, is a fancy. Is now the meaning this, that the ear

which willingly hears and receives such doctrine of life will come to dwell among the wise, *i.e.* that such an one (for  $\text{לְיִשְׁרָאֵל}$  is *synecdoche partis pro persona*, as Job xxix. 11) will have his residence among wise men, as being one of them, *inter eos sedem firmam habebit iisque annumerabitur* (Fl.)? By such a rendering, one is surprised at the harshness of the synecdoche, as well as at the circumstantiality of the expression (cf. xiii. 20,  $\text{לְיִשְׁרָאֵל}$ ). On the contrary, this corresponds with the thought that one who willingly permits to be said to him what he must do and suffer in order that he may be a partaker of life, on this account remains most gladly in the circle of the wise, and there has his appropriate place. The “passing the night” ( $\text{לַיְלָה}$ , cogn.  $\text{לַיְלָה}$ , Syr. Targ.  $\text{בּוֹת}$ , Arab. *bât*) is also frequently elsewhere the designation of prolonged stay, *e.g.* Isa. i. 21.  $\text{בְּקֶרֶב}$  is here different in signification from that it had in xiv. 23, where it meant “in the heart.” In the LXX. this proverb is wanting. The other Greek translations have  $\text{oûs akououn élégchous zôhês én mésw sofôn aulischêsetai}$ . Similarly the Syr., Targ., Jerome, Venet., and Luther, admitting both renderings, but, since they render in the fut., bringing nearer the idea of prediction (Midrash :  $\text{זוכה לישב בישיבת חכמים}$ ) than of description of character.

Two proverbs with the catchword  $\text{מוֹסֵר}$  :

Ver. 32 He that refuseth correction lightly values his soul ;  
But he that heareth reproof getteth understanding.

Regarding  $\text{מוֹסֵר}$  פּוֹרֵעַ, *vid.* xiii. 18, cf. i. 25, and  $\text{מוֹסֵר נַפְשׁוֹ}$ , viii. 36.  $\text{נַפְשׁוֹ}$  contains more than the later expression  $\text{עַצְמוֹ}$ , self ; it is equivalent to  $\text{חַיֵּי}$  (Job ix. 21), for the  $\text{נַפֿשׁ}$  is the bond of union between the intellectual and the corporeal life. The despising of the soul is then the neglecting, endangering, exposing of the life ; in a word, it is suicide (10*b*). xix. 8*a* is a variation derived from this distich : “He who gains understanding loves his soul,” according to which the LXX. translate here  $\text{ἀγαπᾷ ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ}$ .  $\text{לֵב}$  the Midrash explains by  $\text{חכמה שנחננה בלב}$  ; but the correct view is, that  $\text{לֵב}$  is not thought of as a formal power, but as operative and carried into effect in conformity with its destination.

Ver. 33 The fear of Jahve is a discipline to wisdom,  
And before honour is humility.

We may regard  $\text{יִרְאַת ה'}$  (the fear of Jahve) also as pred. here. The fear of Jahve is an educational maxim, and the end of education of the Chokma ; but the phrase may also be the subject, and by such a rendering Luther's parallelism lies nearer : “The fear

of the Lord is discipline to wisdom ;” the fear of God, viz. continually exercised and tried, is the right school of wisdom, and humility is the right way to honour. Similar is the connection מוֹסֵר הַשִּׁבְלִי, discipline binds understanding to itself as its consequence, i. 3. Line second repeats itself, xviii. 12, “Pride comes before the fall.” Luther’s “And ere one comes to honour, he must previously suffer,” renders עָנִי rather than עֲנָה. But the Syr. reverses the idea: the honour of the humble goeth before him, as also one of the anonymous Greek versions: *προπορεύεται δὲ ταπεινοῖς δόξα*. But the *δόξα* comes, as the above proverb expresses it, afterwards. The way to the height lies through the depth, the depth of humility under the hand of God, and, as עֲנָה expresses, of self-humiliation.

Four proverbs of God, the disposer of all things:

Chap. xvi. 1 Man’s are the counsels of the heart ;

But the answer of the tongue cometh from Jahve.

Gesen., Ewald, and Berthéau incorrectly understand 1b of hearing, i.e. of a favourable response to what the tongue wishes ; 1a speaks not of wishes, and the gen. after מַעֲנֶה (answer) is, as at xv. 23, Mic iii. 7, and also here, by virtue of the parallelism, the *gen. subjecti*. xv. 23 leads to the right sense, according to which a good answer is joy to him to whom it refers : it does not always happen to one to find the fitting and effective expression for that which he has in his mind ; it is, as this cog. proverb expresses it, a gift from above (*δοθήσεται*, Matt. x. 19). But now, since מַעֲנֶה neither means answering, nor yet in general an expression (Euchel) or report (Löwenstein), and the meaning of the word at 4a is not here in question, one has to think of him whom the proverb has in view as one who has to give a reason, to give information, or generally—since עֲנָה, like *ἀμείβεσθαι*, is not confined to the interchange of words—to solve a problem, and that such an one as requires reflection. The scheme (project, premeditation) which he in his heart contrives, is here described as מַעְרָבִי-לֵב, from עָרַב, to arrange, to place together, metaphorically of the reflection, i.e. the consideration analyzing and putting a matter in order. These reflections, seeking at one time in one direction, and at another in another, the solution of the question, the unfolding of the problem, are the business of men ; but the answer which finally the tongue gives, and which here, in conformity with the pregnant sense of מַעֲנֶה (*vid.* at xv. 23, 28), will be regarded as right, appropriate, effective, thus generally the satisfying reply to the demand placed before him, is from God. It

is a matter of experience which the preacher, the public speaker, the author, and every man to whom his calling or circumstances present a weighty, difficult theme, can attest. As the thoughts pursue one another in the mind, attempts are made, and again abandoned; the state of the heart is somewhat like that of chaos before the creation. But when, finally, the right thought and the right utterance for it are found, that which is found appears to us, not as if self-discovered, but as a gift; we regard it with the feeling that a higher power has influenced our thoughts and imaginings; the confession by us, *ἡ ἰκανότης ἡμῶν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ* (2 Cor. iii. 5), in so far as we believe in a living God, is inevitable.

Ver. 2 Every way of a man is pure in his own eyes;  
But a weigher of the spirits is Jahve.

Variations of this verse are *xxi. 2*, where *יִשָּׁר* for *יָרָה* (according to the root-meaning: pricking in the eyes, *i.e.* shining clear, then: without spot, pure, *vid.* Fleischer in Levy's *Chald. Wörterbuch*, i. 424), *לְבוֹת* for *רוּחוֹת*, and *כָּל-יִרְרָה* for *כָּל-יִרְרָה*, whereupon here without synallage (for *כָּל* means the totality), the singular of the pred. follows, as *Isa. lxiv. 10*, *Ezek. xxxi. 15*. For the rest, cf. with *2a*, *xiv. 12*, where, instead of the subj. *בְּעֵינַי*, is used *לִפְנֵי*, and with *2b*, *xxiv. 12*, where God is described by *הָיָה לְבוֹת*. The verb *הָיָה* is a secondary formation from *הָיָה* (*vid.* Hupfeld on *Ps. v. 7*), like *הָיָה* from Arab. *tyakn* (to be fast, sure), the former through the medium of the reflex. *הִתְכַּוֵּן*, the latter of the reflex. Arab. *aitkn*; *הָיָה* means to regulate (from *regula*, a rule), to measure off, to weigh, here not to bring into a condition right according to rule (*Theodotion*, *ἐδράζων*, *stabiliens*, *Syr. Targ.* מְחַזֵּק, *Venet.* καταρτίζει; *Luther*, "but the Lord maketh the heart sure"), but to measure or weigh, and therefore to estimate rightly, to know accurately (*Jerome*, *spirituum ponderator est Dominus*). The judgment of a man regarding the cause of life, which it is good for him to enter upon, lies exposed to great and subtle self-deception; but God has the measure and weight, *i.e.* the means of proving, so as to value the spirits according to their true moral worth; his investigation goes to the root (cf. *κριτικός*, *Heb. iv. 12*), his judgment rests on the knowledge of the true state of the matter, and excludes all deception, so that thus a man can escape the danger of delusion by no other means than by placing his way, *i.e.* his external and internal life, in the light of the word of God, and desiring for himself the all-penetrating test of the Searcher of hearts (*Ps.*

cxxxix. 23 f.), and the self-knowledge corresponding to the result of this test.

Ver. 3 Roll on Jahve thy works,

So thy thoughts shall prosper.

The proverbs vers. 1–3 are wanting in the LXX.; their absence is compensated for by three others, but only externally, not according to their worth. Instead of לָא, the Syr., Targ., and Jerome read לָא, *revela*, with which the לָא, Ps. xxxvii. 5, cf. lv. 23, interchanging with לָא (here and at Ps. xxii. 9), does not agree; rightly Theodotion, κύλισον ἐπὶ κύριον, and Luther, “commend to the Lord thy works.” The works are here, not those that are executed, Ex. xxiii. 16, but those to be executed, as Ps. xc. 17, where בִּינֵן, here the active to בִּינֵן, which at iv. 26 as jussive meant to be placed right, here with ו of the consequence in the *apodosis imperativi*: to be brought about, and to have continuance, or briefly: to stand (cf. xii. 3) as the contrast of disappointment or ruin. We should roll on God all matters which, as obligations, burden us, and on account of their weight and difficulty cause us great anxiety, for nothing is too heavy or too hard for Him who can overcome all difficulties and dissolve all perplexities; then will our thoughts, viz. those about the future of our duty and our life-course, be happy, nothing will remain entangled and be a failure, but will be accomplished, and the end and aim be realized.

Ver. 4 Jahve hath made everything for its contemplated end;

And also the wicked for the day of evil.

Everywhere else מַעֲנֶה means answer (*Venet.* πρὸς ἀπόκρισιν αὐτοῦ), which is not suitable here, especially with the absoluteness of the כָּל; the Syr. and Targ. translate, *obedientibus ei*, which the words do not warrant; but also *propter semet ipsum* (Jerome, Theodotion, Luther) give to 4b no right parallelism, and, besides, would demand לְמַעַנִּי or לְמַעַנְהוּ. The punctuation לְמַעַנְהוּ, which is an anomaly (cf. בְּנִבְרָתָהּ, Isa. xxiv. 2, and בְּעֶרְיִנִי, Ezra x. 14), shows (Ewald) that here we have, not the prepositional לְמַעַן, but ל with the subst. מַעַנֶה, which in derivation and meaning is one with the form מַעַן abbreviated from it (cf. מַעַל, מַעַר), similar in meaning to the Arab. *ma'anyn*, aim, intention, object, and end, and mind, from 'atay, to place opposite to oneself a matter, to make it the object of effort. Hitzig prefers לְמַעַנְהוּ, but why not rather לְמַעַנְהוּ, for the proverb is not intended to express that all that God has made serve a purpose (by which one is reminded of the arguments for the existence of

God from final causes, which are often prosecuted too far), but that all is made by God for its purpose, *i.e.* a purpose premeditated by Him, that the world of things and of events stands under the law of a plan, which has in God its ground and its end, and that also the wickedness of free agents is comprehended in this plan, and made subordinate to it. God has not indeed made the wicked as such, but He has made the being which is capable of wickedness, and which has decided for it, viz. in view of the "day of adversity" (Eccles. vii. 14), which God will cause to come upon him, thus making His holiness manifest in the merited punishment, and thus also making wickedness the means of manifesting His glory. It is the same thought which is expressed in Ex. ix. 16 with reference to Pharaoh. A *prædestinatio ad malum*, and that in the supralapsarian sense, cannot be here taught, for this horrible dogma (*horribile quidem decretum, fateor*, says Calvin himself) makes God the author of evil, and a ruler according to His sovereign caprice, and thus destroys all pure conceptions of God. What Paul, Rom. ix., with reference to Ex. ix. 16, wishes to say is this, that it was not Pharaoh's conduct that determined the will of God, but that the will of God is always the *antecedens*: nothing happens to God through the obstinacy and rebellion of man which determines Him to an action not already embraced in the eternal plan, but also such an one must against his will be subservient to the display of God's glory. The apostle adds ver. 22, and shows that he recognised the factor of human self-determination, but also as one comprehended in God's plan. The free actions of men create no situation by which God would be surprised and compelled to something which was not originally intended by Himself. That is what the above proverb says: the wicked also has his place in God's order of the world. Whoever frustrates the designs of grace must serve God in this, ἐνδείξασθαι τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ γνωρίσαι τὸ δυνατόν αὐτοῦ (Rom. ix. 22).

Here follow three proverbs of divine punishment, *expiatio* [Versöhnung] and *reconciliatio* [Versöhnung].

Ver. 5 An abomination to Jahve is every one who is haughty;

The hand for it [assuredly] he remains not unpunished.

Proverbs thus commencing we already had at xv. 9, 26. גָּבַהּ is a metaplastic connecting form of גָּבַהּ; on the contrary, גָּבַהּ, 1 Sam. xvi. 7, Ps. ciii. 11, means being high, as גָּבַהּ, height; the form underlying גָּבַהּ is not גָּבַהּ (as Gesen. and Olshausen write it), but גָּבַהּ. In 5b, xi. 21a is repeated. The translators are per-

plexed in their rendering of יָד לַיָּד. Fleischer: *ab ætate in ætatem non* (i.e. *nullo unquam tempore futuro*) *impunis erit.*

Ver. 6 By love and truth is iniquity expiated,

And through the fear of Jahve one escapes from evil—

literally, there comes (as the effect of it) the escaping of evil (סָר, *n. actionis*, as xiii. 19), or rather, since the evil here comes into view as to its consequences (xiv. 27, xv. 24), this, that one escapes evil. By חֶסֶד וְאֱמֶת are here meant, not the *χάρις καὶ ἀλήθεια* of God (Bertheau), but, like xx. 28, Isa. xxxix. 8, love and faithfulness in the relation of men to one another. The ב is both times that of the mediating cause. Or is it said neither by what means one may attain the expiation of his sins, nor how he may attain to the escaping from evil, but much rather wherein the true reverence for Jahve, and wherein the right expiation of sin, consist? Thus von Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* i. 595. But the ב of בַּחֶסֶד is not different from that of בְּיִשְׁתָּה, Isa. xxvii. 9. It is true that the article of justification is falsified if good works enter as *causa meritoria* into the act of justification, but we of the evangelical school teach that the *fides quâ justificat* is indeed inoperative, but not the *fides quæ justificat*, and we cannot expect of the O. T. that it should everywhere distinguish with Pauline precision what even James will not or cannot distinguish. As the law of sacrifice designates the victim united with the blood in the most definite manner, but sometimes also the whole transaction in the offering of sacrifice even to the priestly feast as serving לְכֹהֵן, Lev. x. 17, so it also happens in the general region of ethics: the objective ground of reconciliation is the decree of God, to which the blood in the typical offering points, and man is a partaker of this reconciliation, when he accepts, in penitence and in faith, the offered mercy of God; but this acceptance would be a self-deception, if it meant that the blotting out of the guilt of sin could be obtained in the way of imputation without the immediate following thereupon of a blotting of it out in the way of sanctification; and therefore the Scriptures also ascribe to good works a share in the expiation of sin in a wider sense—namely, as the proofs of thankful (Luke vii. 47) and compassionate love (*vid.* at x. 2), as this proverb of love and truth, herein according with the words of the prophets, as Hos. vi. 6, Mic. vi. 6–8. He who is conscious of this, that he is a sinner, deeply guilty before God, who cannot stand before Him if He did not deal with him in mercy instead of justice, according to the pur-

pose of His grace, cannot trust to this mercy if he is not zealous, in his relations to his fellow-men, to practise love and truth; and in view of the fifth petition of the Lord's Prayer, and of the parable of the unmerciful steward rightly understood, it may be said that the love which covers the sins, x. 12, of a neighbour, has, in regard to our own sins, a covering or atoning influence, for "blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy." That "love and truth" are meant of virtues practised from religious motives, 6b shows; for, according to this line, by the fear of Jahve one escapes evil. The fear of Jahve is subjection to the God of revelation, and a falling in with the revealed plan of salvation.

Ver. 7 If Jahve has pleasure in the ways of a man,  
He reconciles even his enemies to him—

properly (for הַשְׁלִים is here the causative of the transitive, Josh. x. 1): He brings it about that they conclude peace with him. If God has pleasure in the ways of a man, *i.e.* in the designs which he prosecutes, and in the means which he employs, he shows, by the great consequences which flow from his endeavours, that, even as his enemies also acknowledge, God is with him (*e.g.* Gen. xxvi. 27 f.), so that they, vanquished in heart (*e.g.* 2 Sam. xix. 9 f.), abandon their hostile position, and become his friends. For if it is manifest that God makes Himself known, bestowing blessings on a man, there lies in this a power of conviction which disarms his most bitter opponents, excepting only those who have in selfishness hardened themselves.

Five proverbs of the king, together with three of righteousness in action and conduct:

Ver. 8 Better is a little with righteousness,  
Than rich revenues with unrighteousness.

The cogn. proverb xv. 16 commences similarly. Of רֶב תְּבוּאוֹת, multitude or greatness of income, *vid.* xiv. 4: "unrighteous wealth profits not." The possessor of it is not truly happy, for sin cleaves to it, which troubles the heart (conscience), and because the enjoyment which it affords is troubled by the curses of those who are injured, and by the sighs of the oppressed. Above all other gains rises ἡ εὐσέβεια μετ' αὐταρκείας (1 Tim. vi. 6).

Ver. 9 The heart of man deviseth his way;  
But Jahve directeth his steps.

Similar to this is the German proverb: "*Der Mensch denkt, Gott lenkt*" [=our "man proposes, God disposes"], and the Arabic

*el-'abd* (הַעֲבָד = man) *judebbir wallah jukaddir*; Latin, *homo proponit, Deus disponit*; for, as Hitzig rightly remarks, 9b means, not that God maketh his steps firm (*Venet.*, Luther, Umbreit, Bertheau, Elster), but that He gives direction to him (Jerome, *dirigere*). Man deliberates here and there (הִשָּׁב, intens. of הִשָּׁב, to calculate, reflect) how he will begin and carry on this or that; but his short-sightedness leaves much out of view which God sees; his calculation does not comprehend many contingencies which God disposes of and man cannot foresee. The result and issue are thus of God, and the best is, that in all his deliberations one should give himself up without self-confidence and arrogance to the guidance of God, that one should do his duty and leave the rest, with humility and confidence, to God.

Ver. 10 Oracular decision (belongeth) to the lips of the king;

In the judgment his mouth should not err.

The first line is a noun clause; דְּכִסָּה, as subject, thus needs a distinctive accent, and that is here, after the rule of the sequence of accents, and manuscript authority (*vid. Torath Emeth*, p. 49), not *Mehuppach legarme*, as in our printed copies, but *Dechi* (דְּכִסָּה). Jerome's translation: *Divinatio in labiis regis, in judicio non errabit os ejus*, and yet more Luther's: "his mouth fails not in judgment," makes it appear as if the proverb meant that the king, in his official duties, was infallible; and Hitzig (Zöckler agreeing), indeed, finds here expressed the infallibility of the theocratic king, and that as an actual testimony to be believed, not only as a mere political fiction, like the phrase, "the king can do no wrong." But while this political fiction is not strange even to the Israelitish law, according to which the king could not be brought before the judgment, that testimony is only a pure imagination. For as little as the N. T. teaches that the Pope, as the legitimate *vicarius* of Christ, is infallible, *cum ex cathedra docet*, so little does the O. T. that the theocratic king, who indeed was the legitimate *vicarius Dei*, was infallible *in judicio ferendo*. Yet Ewald maintains that the proverb teaches that the word of the king, when on the seat of justice, is an infallible oracle; but it dates from the first bright period of the strong uncorrupted kingdom in Israel. One may not forget, says Dächsel also, with von Gerlach, that these proverbs belong to the time of Solomon, before it had given to the throne sons of David who did evil before the Lord. Then it would fare ill for the truth of the proverb—the course of history would

falsify it. But in fact this was never maintained in Israel. Of the idolizing flattering language in which, at the present day, rulers in the East are addressed, not a trace is found in the O. T. The kings were restrained by objective law and the recognised rights of the people. David showed, not merely to those who were about him, but also to the people at large, so many human weaknesses, that he certainly appeared by no means infallible; and Solomon distinguished himself, it is true, by rare kingly wisdom, but when he surrounded himself with the glory of an oriental potentate, and when Rehoboam began to assume the tone of a despot, there arose an unhallowed breach between the theocratic kingdom and the greatest portion of the people. The proverb, as Hitzig translates and expounds it: "a divine utterance rests on the lips of the king; in giving judgment his mouth deceives not," is both historically and dogmatically impossible. The choice of the word קָדַשׁ (from קָדַשׁ, R. קָדַשׁ, to make fast, to take an oath, to confirm by an oath, *incantare*, *vid.* at Isa. iii. 2), which does not mean prediction (Luther), but speaking the truth, shows that 10a expresses, not what falls from the lips of the king in itself, but according to the judgment of the people: the people are wont to regard the utterances of the king as oracular, as they shouted in the circus at Cæsarea of King Agrippa, designating his words as *θεοῦ φωνὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπων* (Acts xii. 22). Hence 10b supplies an earnest warning to the king, viz. that his mouth should not offend against righteousness, nor withhold it. לֹא יִמְעַל is meant as warning (Umbreit, Bertheau), like לֹא תִבָּזֵז, xxii. 24, and ב in יִמְעַל is here, as always, that of the object; at least this is more probable than that יִמְעַל stands without object, which is possible, and that ב designates the situation.

Ver. 11 The scale and balances of a right kind are Jahve's;  
His work are the weights of the bag.

Regarding מִשְׁכָּל, *statera*, a level or steelyard (from מִשָּׁל, to make even), *vid.* iv. 26; מִאֲזִנִּים (from אָזַן, to weigh), *libra*, is another form of the balance: the shop-balance furnished with two scales. אֲבָנִים are here the stones that serve for weights, and כֶּסֶף, which at i. 14 properly means the money-bag, money-purse (*cf.* vii. 20), is here, as at Mic. vi. 11, the bag in which the merchant carries the weights. The genit. מִשְׁפָּט belongs also to מִשְׁכָּל, which, in our edition, is pointed with the disjunctive *Mehuppach legarme*, is rightly accented in Cod. 1294 (*vid. Torah Emeth*, p. 50) with the con-

junctive *Mehuppach*. מִשְׁפָּט, as 11*b* shows, is not like מִרְפָּה, the word with the principal tone; 11*a* says that the balance thus, or thus constructed, which weighs accurately and justly, is Jahve's, or His arrangement, and the object of His inspection, and 11*b*, that all the weight-stones of the bag, and generally the means of weighing and measuring, rest upon divine ordinance, that in the transaction and conduct of men honesty and certainty might rule. This is the declared will of God, the lawgiver; for among the few direct determinations of His law with reference to trade this stands prominent, that just weights and just measures shall be used, Lev. xix. 36, Deut. xxv. 13-16. The expression of the poet here frames itself after this law; yet ה' is not exclusively the God of positive revelation, but, as agriculture in Isa. xxviii. 29, cf. Sirach vii. 15, so here the invention of normative and normal means of commercial intercourse is referred to the direction and institution of God.

Ver. 12 It is an abomination to kings to commit wickedness,  
For by righteousness the throne is established.

As 10*b* uttered a warning to the king, grounded on the fact of 10*a*, so 12*a* indirectly contains a warning, which is confirmed by the fact 12*b*. It is a fact that the throne is established by righteousness (יִצְחָק as expressive of a rule, like הִיכָן, Isa. xvi. 5, as expressive of an event); on this account it is an abomination to kings immediately or mediately to commit wickedness, *i.e.* to place themselves in despotic self-will above the law. Such wicked conduct shall be, and ought to be, an abhorrence to them, because they know that they thereby endanger the stability of their throne. This is generally the case, but especially was it so in Israel, where the royal power was never absolutistic; where the king as well as the people were placed under God's law; where the existence of the community was based on the understood equality of right; and the word of the people, as well as the word of the prophets, was free. Another condition of the stability of the throne is, after xxv. 5, the removal of godless men from nearness to the king. Rehoboam lost the greater part of his kingdom by this, that he listened to the counsel of the young men who were hated by the people.

Ver. 13. History is full of such warning examples, and therefore this proverb continues to hold up the mirror to princes.

Well-pleasing to kings are righteous lips,  
And whoever speaketh uprightly is loved.

Rightly the LXX. ἀγαπᾶ, individ. plur., instead of the plur. of *genus*, מְלָכִים; on the contrary, Jerome and Luther give to the sing. the most general subject (one lives), in which case it must be distinctly said, that that preference of the king for the people who speak out the truth, and just what they think, is shared in by every one. צֶדֶק, as the property of the שֹׁפֵטִי, accords with the Arab. *sidk*, truth as the property of the *lasân* (the tongue or speech). יִשְׁרָיִם, from יִשְׂרָאֵל, means *recta*, as נְגִידִים, *principalia*, viii. 6, and רִיקִים, *inania*, xii. 11. יִשְׂרָיִם, Dan. xi. 10, neut. So neut. וְיִשְׂרָאֵל, Ps. cxi. 8; but is rather, with Hitzig and Riehm, to be read וְיִשְׂרָאֵל. What the proverb says cannot be meant of all kings, for even the house of David had murderers of prophets, like Manasseh and Joiakim; but in general it is nevertheless true that noble candour, united with true loyalty and pure love to the king and the people, is with kings more highly prized than mean flattery, seeking only its own advantage, and that, though this (flattery) may for a time prevail, yet, at last, fidelity to duty, and respect for truth, gain the victory.

Ver. 14 The wrath of the king is like messengers of death;

But a wise man appeaseth him.

The clause: the wrath of the king is many messengers of death, can be regarded as the attribution of the effect, but it falls under the point of view of likeness, instead of comparison: if the king is angry, it is as if a troop of messengers or angels of death went forth to visit with death him against whom the anger is kindled; the plur. serves for the strengthening of the figure: not one messenger of death, but at the same time several, the wrinkled brow, the flaming eye, the threatening voice of the king sends forth (Fleischer). But if he against whom the wrath of the king has thus broken forth is a wise man, or one near the king who knows that ὁργὴ ἀνδρὸς δικαιοσύνην Θεοῦ οὐ κατεργάζεται (Jas. i. 20), he will seek to discover the means (and not without success) to cower or to propitiate, *i.e.* to mitigate and appease, the king's anger. The Scripture never uses כִּפֶּה, so that God is the object (*expiare Deum*), because, as is shown in the *Comm. zum Hebräerbrief*, that were to say, contrary to the *decorum divinum*, that God's holiness or wrath is covered, or its energy bound, by the offering up of sacrifices or of things in which there is no inherent virtue of atonement, and which are made the means of reconciliation only by the accommodative arrangement of God. On the contrary,

כָּפַר is used here and at Gen. xxxii. 21 of covering = reconciling (propitiating) the wrath of a man.

Ver. 15 In the light on the king's countenance there is life,  
And his favour is as a cloud of the latter rains.

Hitzig regards אֹר as the *inf.* (cf. iv. 18), but one says substantively אֹר פָּנָי, Job xxix. 24, etc., and in a similar sense מֵאֹר עֵינַיִם, xv. 30; light is the condition of life, and the exhilaration of life, wherefore אֹר הַחַיִּים, Ps. lvi. 14, Job xxxiii. 30, is equivalent to a fresh, joyous life; in the light of the king's countenance is life, means that life goes forth from the cheerful approbation of the king, which shows itself in his face, viz. in the showing of favour, which cheers the heart and beautifies the life. To speak of liberality as a shower is so common to the Semitic, that it has in Arab. the general name of *nadnâ*, rain. 15b conforms itself to this. מֶלֶקוֹשׁ (cf. Job xxix. 23) is the latter rain, which, falling about the spring equinox, brings to maturity the barley-harvest; on the contrary, מוֹרָה (יֹרֶה) is the early rain, which comes at the time of ploughing and sowing; the former is thus the harvest rain, and the latter the spring rain. Like a cloud which discharges the rain that mollifies the earth and refreshes the growing corn, is the king's favour. The noun עֵב, thus in the *st. constr.*, retains its *Kametz*. *Michlol* 191b. This proverb is the contrast to ver. 14. xx. 2 has also the anger of the king as its theme. In xix. 12 the figures of the darkness and the light stand together as parts of one proverb. The proverbs relating to the king are now at an end. Ver. 10 contains a direct warning for the king; ver. 12 an indirect warning, as a conclusion arising from 12b (cf. xx. 28, where יִצְרִי is not to be translated *tueantur*; the proverb has, however, the value of a *nota bene*). Ver. 13 in like manner presents an indirect warning, less to the king than to those who have intercourse with him (cf. xxv. 5), and vers. 14 and 15 show what power of good and evil, of wrath and of blessing, is given to a king, whence so much the greater responsibility arises to him, but, at the same time also, the duty of all to repress the lust to evil that may be in him, and to awaken and foster in him the desire for good.

Five proverbs regarding wisdom, righteousness, humility, and trust in God, forming, as it were, a succession of steps, for humility is the virtue of virtues, and trust in God the condition of all salvation. Three of these proverbs have the word טוֹב in common.

Ver. 16 To gain wisdom, how much better is it than gold ;

And to attain understanding to be preferred to silver.

Commendation of the striving after wisdom (understanding) with which all wisdom begins, for one gains an intellectual possession not by inheritance, but by acquisition, iv. 7. A similar "parallel-comparative clause" (Fl.), with the interchange of טוב and נבחר, is xxii. 1, but yet more so is xxi. 3, where נבחר, as here, is neut. pred. (not, as at viii. 10 and elsewhere, adj.), and עשה, such an anomalous form of the *inf. constr.* as here קנה, Gesen. § 75, Anm. 2; in both instances it could also be regarded as the *inf. absol.* (cf. xxv. 27) (*Lehrgebäude*, § 109, Anm. 2); yet the language uses, as in the case before us, the form נלה only with the force of an *abl.* of the gerund, as עשו occurs Gen. xxxi. 38; the *inf.* of verbs ל'ה as *nom.* (as here), *genit.* (Gen. i. 20), and *accus.* (Ps. ci. 3), is always either נלות or נלה. The meaning is not that to gain wisdom is more valuable than gold, but that the gaining of wisdom exceeds the gaining of gold and silver, the common *comparatio decurtata* (cf. Job xxviii. 18). Regarding קרין, *vid.* at iii. 14.

Ver. 17 The path of the righteous is the avoiding of evil,

And he preserveth his soul who giveth heed to his way.

The meaning of מִסְלָה, occurring only here in the Proverbs, is to be learned from xv. 19. The attribution denotes that wherein the way they take consists, or by which it is formed; it is one, a straight and an open way, *i.e.* unimpeded, leading them on, because they avoid the evil which entices them aside to the right and the left. Whoever then gives heed to his way, preserveth his soul (שֹׁמֵר, as xiii. 3, on the contrary xxv. 5, subj.), that it suffer not injury and fall under death, for סור מרע and סור ממוקשי מות, xiv. 27, are essentially the same. Instead of this distich, the LXX. has three distichs; the thoughts presented in the four superfluous lines are all already expressed in the one distich. Ewald and Hitzig find in this addition of the LXX. a component part of the original text.

Ver. 18 Pride goeth before destruction,

And haughtiness cometh before a fall.

The contrast is לפני כבוד ענוה, xv. 33, according to which the "haughtiness comes before a fall" in xviii. 22 is expanded into the antithetic distich. שֹׁכֵךְ means the fracture of the limbs, destruction of the person. A Latin proverb says, "*Magna cadunt, inflata*

*crepant, tumefacta premuntur.*"<sup>1</sup> Here being dashed in pieces and overthrown correspond. שִׁבֵּר means neither bursting (Hitzig) nor shipwreck (Ewald). כָּשָׁלוֹן (like בִּטְחוֹן, זָכוֹן, etc.), from כָּשַׁל or נִכְשַׁל, to totter, and hence, as a consequence, to come to ruin, is a ἄπαξ λεγ. This proverb, which stands in the very centre of the Book of Proverbs, is followed by another in praise of humility.

Ver. 19 Better in humility to dwell among sufferers,  
Than to divide spoil among the proud.

The form שָׁפַל is here not *adj.* as xxix. 23 (from שָׁפַל, like חָסַר, vi. 32, from חָסַר), but *inf.* (like Eccles. xii. 14, and חָסַר, defectio, x. 21). There existed here also no proper reason for changing עֲנִיִּים (*Chethîb*) into עֲנִיִּים; Hitzig is right in saying that עֲנִי may also be taken in the sense of עָנָה [the idea "sufferer" is that which mediates], and that here the inward fact of humility and the outward of dividing spoil, stand opposed to one another. It is better to live lowly, *i.e.* with a mind devoid of earthly pride (*Demut* [humility] comes from *dēo* with the deep *e*, *diu*, servant), among men who have experience of the vanity of earthly joys, than, intoxicated with pride, to enjoy oneself amid worldly wealth and greatness (cf. Isa. ix. 2).

Ver. 20 He that giveth heed to the word will find prosperity;  
And he that trusteth in Jahve, blessed is he!

The "word" here is the word κατ' ἐξ., the divine word, for מִשְׁבֵּר is the contrast of בָּז לְדָבָר, xiii. 13a, cf. Neh. viii. 13. טוב is meant, as in xvii. 20, cf. xiii. 21, Ps. xxiii. 6; to give heed to God's word is the way to true prosperity. But at last all depends on this, that one stand in personal fellowship with God by means of faith, which here, as at xxviii. 25, xxix. 25, is designated after its specific mark as *fiducia*. The Mashal conclusion אֲשֶׁר־י occurs, besides here, only at xiv. 21, xxix. 18.

Four proverbs of wisdom with eloquence:

Ver. 21 The wise in heart is called prudent,  
And grace of the lips increaseth learning.

Elsewhere (i. 5, ix. 9) הוֹסִיף לִקְחָהּ means more than to gain learning, *i.e.* erudition in the ethico-practical sense, for sweetness of the lips (*dulcedo orationis* of Cicero) is, as to learning, without significance, but of so much the greater value for teaching; for grace of

<sup>1</sup> An expression of similar meaning is אַחֲרֵי דְרָגָה תִּבְרֵי = after *Darga* (to rise up) comes *tebîr* (breaking = destruction); cf. Zunz, in Geiger's *Zeitschrift*, vi. 315 ff.

expression, and of exposition, particularly if it be not merely rhetorical, but, according to the saying *pectus disertus facit*, coming out of the heart, is full of mind, it imparts force to the instruction, and makes it acceptable. Whoever is wise of heart, *i.e.* of mind or spirit (לֵב = the N. T. *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα*), is called, and is truly, נָבִיא [learned, intelligent] (Fleischer compares to this the expression frequent in Isaiah, “to be named” = to be and appear to be, the Arab. *du’ay lah*); but there is a gift which highly increases the worth of this understanding or intelligence, for it makes it fruitful of good to others, and that is grace of the lips. On the lips (x. 13) of the intelligent wisdom is found; but the form also, and the whole manner and way in which he gives expression to this wisdom, is pleasing, proceeding from a deep and tender feeling for the suitable and the beneficial, and thus he produces effects so much the more surely, and beneficently, and richly.

Ver. 22 A fountain of life is understanding to its possessor;  
But the correction of fools is folly.

Oetinger, Bertheau, and others erroneously understand מוֹסֵר of the education which fools bestow upon others; when fools is the subject spoken of, מוֹסֵר is always the education which is bestowed on them, vii. 22, i. 7; cf. v. 23, xv. 5. Also מוֹסֵר does not here mean education, *disciplina*, in the moral sense (Symmachus, *ἐννοια*; Jerome, *doctrina*): that which fools gain from education, from training, is folly, for מוֹסֵר is the contrast to מְקוֹר חַיִּים, and has thus the meaning of correction or chastisement, xv. 10, Jer. xxx. 14. And that the fruits of understanding (xii. 8, cf. שִׁבְלֵי טוֹב, fine culture, xiii. 15) represented by מְקוֹר חַיִּים (*vid.* x. 11) will accrue to the intelligent themselves, is shown not only by the contrast, but also by the expression: *Scaturigo vitæ est intellectus prædicatorum eo*, of those (=to those) who are endowed therewith (the LXX. well, τοῖς κεκτημένοις). The man of understanding has in this intellectual possession a fountain of strength, a source of guidance, and a counsel which make his life secure, deepen, and adorn it; while, on the contrary, folly punishes itself by folly (cf. to the form, xiv. 24), for the fool, when he does not come to himself (Ps. cvii. 17–22), recklessly destroys his own prosperity.

Ver. 23 The heart of the wise maketh his mouth wise,  
And learning mounteth up to his lips.

Regarding הַשִּׁבְלִי as causative: to put into the possession of intelligence, *vid.* at Gen. iii. 6. Wisdom in the heart produceth intelli-

gent discourse, and, as the parallel member expresses it, learning mounteth up to the lips, *i.e.* the learning which the man taketh into his lips (xxii. 18 ; cf. Ps. xvi. 4) to communicate it to others, for the contents of the learning, and the ability to communicate it, are measured by the wisdom of the heart of him who possesses it. One can also interpret הוֹסִיף as *extens. increasing*: the heart of the wise increaseth, *i.e.* spreads abroad learning, but then בְּשִׁפְתָּיו (Ps. cxix. 13) would have been more suitable; עַל־שִׁפְתָּיו calls up the idea of learning as hovering on the lips, and thus brings so much nearer, for הוֹסִיף, the meaning of the exaltation of its worth and impression.

Ver. 24 A honeycomb are pleasant words,  
Sweet to the soul, and healing to the bones.

Honeycomb, *i.e.* honey flowing from the צֶנֶף, the comb or cell (*favus*), is otherwise designated, Ps. xix. 11. מְתוֹק, with מִרְפָּא (*vid.* p. 132), is *neut.* אִמְרֵי־נֶעֱם are, according to xv. 26, words which love suggests, and which breathe love. Such words are sweet to the soul of the hearer, and bring strength and healing to his bones (xv. 30); for מִרְפָּא is not only that which restores soundness, but also that which preserves and advances it (cf. *θεραπεία*, Rev. xxii. 2).

A group of six proverbs follows, four of which begin with אִישׁ, and five relate to the utterances of the mouth.

Ver. 25 There is a way which appears as right to a man ;  
But the end thereof are the ways of death.

This verse = xiv. 12.

Ver. 26 The hunger of the labourer laboureth for him,  
For he is urged on by his mouth.

The Syr. translates: the soul of him who inflicts woe itself suffers it, and from his mouth destruction comes to him; the Targ. brings this translation nearer the original text (כִּיפָא, humiliation, instead of אֲבָרָא, destruction); Luther translates thus also, violently abbreviating, however. But עָמַל (from עָמַל, Arab. *'amila*, to exert oneself, *laborare*) means, like *laboriosus*, labouring as well as enduring difficulty, but not, as *πονω τινα*, causing difficulty, or (Euchel) occupied with difficulty. And labour and the mouth stand together, denoting that man labours that the mouth may have somewhat to eat (cf. 2 Thess. iii. 10; נִפְּשׁ, however, gains in this connection the meaning of *ψυχὴ ὀρεκτικὴ*, and that of desire after nourishment, *vid.* at vi. 30, x. 3). אִכְלָה also joins itself to this circle

of ideas, for it means to urge (Jerome, *compulit*), properly (related to כָּפַף, *incurvare*, כָּפַף כָּפַף, to constrain, necessitate), to bow down by means of a burden. The Aramæo-Arab. signification, to saddle (Schultens: *clitellas imposuit ei os suum*), is a secondary denom. (*vid.* at Job xxxiii. 7). The *Venet.* well renders it after Kimchi: ἐπεὶ κύπτει ἐπ' αὐτὸν τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ. Thus: the need of nourishment on the part of the labourer works for him (*dat. commodi* like Isa. xl. 20), *i.e.* helps him to labour, for (not: if, εἰ, as Rashi and others) it presses upon him; his mouth, which will have something to eat, urges him. It is God who has in this way connected together working and eating. The curse *in sudore vultus tui comedes panem* conceals a blessing. The proverb has in view this reverse side of the blessing in the arrangement of God.

Ver. 27 A worthless man diggeth evil;

And on his lips is, as it were, scorching fire.

Regarding בִּלְעֵל אִישׁ, *vid.* vi. 12, and regarding בָּרַה, to dig round, or to bore out, *vid.* at Gen. xlix. 5, l. 5; here the figure, “to dig for others a pit,” xxvi. 27, Ps. vii. 16, etc.: to dig evil is equivalent to, to seek to prepare such for others. צָרַת Kimchi rightly explains as a form similar to קִשְׁבַּת; as a subst. it means, Lev. xiii. 23, the mark of fire (the healed mark of a carbuncle), here as an adj. of a fire, although not flaming (אֵשׁ לְהִבָּה, Isa. iv. 5, etc); yet so much the hotter, and scorching everything that comes near to it (from צָרַב, to be scorched, cogn. שָׂרַב, to which also שָׂרַף is perhaps related as a stronger power, like *comburare* to *adurare*). The meaning is clear: a worthless man, *i.e.* a man whose disposition and conduct are the direct contrast of usefulness and piety, uses words which, like an iron glowing hot, scorches and burns; his tongue is φλογιζομένη ὑπὸ τῆς γέεννης (Jas. iii. 6).

Ver. 28 A man of falsehood scattereth strife,

And a backbiter separateth confidential friends.

Regarding תְּהַפְּכוֹת (מִדְּבָר) אִישׁ, *vid.* ii. 12, and יִשְׁלַח מִדָּוָן, vi. 14; the thought of 28b is found at vi. 19. נִרְנָן (with ך minuscule, which occurs thrice with the terminal *Nun*) is a *Niphal* formation from רָנַן, to murmur (cf. נִזְיֵר, from יָזַר), and denotes the whisperer, viz. the backbiter, ψιθύρος, Sir. v. 14, ψιθυριστής, *susurro*; the Arab. *nyrj* is abbreviated from it, a verbal stem of נִרְגַּנָּה (cf. Aram. *norgo*, an axe, Arab. *naurag*, a threshing-sledge = מִוֶּרֶג) cannot be proved. Aquila is right in translating by τουθρυστής, and Theodotion by γόγγυσος, from רָנַן, *Niphal*. נִרְנָן, γογγύζειν. Regarding

אֱלֵי, confidential friend, *vid.* p. 82; the sing., as xviii. 9, is used in view of the mutual relationship, and מִפְּרִיר proceeds on the separation of the one, and, at the same time, of the other from it. Luther, in translating by “a slanderer makes princes disagree,” is in error, for אֱלֵי, φύλαρχος, is not a generic word for prince.

Ver. 29 A man of violence enticeth his neighbour,  
And leadeth him in a way which is not good.

Cf. Gen. iv. 8. The subject is not moral enticement, but enticement to some place or situation which facilitates to the violent man the carrying out of his violent purpose (misdemeanour, robbery, extortion, murder). הָמָס (here with אִישׁ at iii. 31) is the injustice of club-law, the conduct of him who puts his superior power in godless rudeness in the place of God, Hab. i. 11, cf. Job xii. 6. “A way not good” (cf. Ps. xxxvi. 5) is the contradictory contrast of the good way: one altogether evil and destructive.

Ver. 30 He who shutteth his eyes to devise falsehood;  
He who biteth his lips bringeth evil to pass.

A physiognomical *Caveto*. The ἀπ. λεγ. עֲצָה is connected with עֲצָה, Isa. xxxiii. 15 (Arab. transp. *ghamd*), *comprimere*, formed from it. Regarding קֶרֶן of lips or eyes, *vid.* p. 144; the biting of the lips is the action of the deceitful, and denotes scorn, malice, knavery. The perf. denotes that he who is seen doing this has some evil as good as accomplished, for he is inwardly ready for it; Hitzig suitably compares 1 Sam. xx. 7, 33. Our editions (also Löwenstein) have בִּלָּה, but the Masora (*vid. Mas. finalis*, p. 1) numbers the word among those which terminate in א, and always writes בִּלָּא.

We now take together a series of proverbs, xvi. 31–xvii. 5, beginning with עֲטָרָה.

Ver. 31 A bright diadem is a hoary head,  
In the way of righteousness it is found—

namely, this bright diadem, this beautiful crown (iv. 8), which silver hair is to him who has it as the result of his advanced age (xx. 29), for “thou shalt rise up before the hoary head,” Lev. xix. 32; and the contrast of an early death is to die in a good old age, Gen. xv. 15, etc., but a long life is on one side a self-consequence, and on another the promised reward of a course of conduct regulated by God’s will, God’s law, and by the rule of love to God and love to one’s neighbour. From the N. T. standpoint that is also so far true, as in all the world there is no better established means of prolonging life than the avoidance of evil; but the clause corre-

sponding to the O. T. standpoint, that evil punishes itself by a premature death, and that good is rewarded by long life, has indeed many exceptions arising from the facts of experience against it, for we see even the godless in their life of sin attaining to an advanced old age, and in view of the veiled future it appears only as a one-sided truth, so that the words, Wisd. iv. 9, "discretion is to man the right grey hairs, and an unstained life is the right old age," which is mediated by life experiences, such as Isa. lvii. 1 f., stand opposed to the above proverb as its reversed side. That old Solomonic proverb is, however, true, for it is not subverted; and, in contrast to self-destroying vice and wickedness; calling forth the judgment of God, it is and remains true, that whoever would reach an honoured old age, attains to it in the way of a righteous life and conduct.

Ver. 32 Better one slow to anger than a hero in war;

And whoever is master of his spirit, than he who taketh a city.

Regarding אִתָּךְ אִפְסִים, *vid.* xiv. 29, where קִצְרֵרוּת was the parallel of the contrast. The comparison is true as regards persons, with reference to the performances expressed, and (since warlike courage and moral self-control may be united in one person) they are properly those in which the טוב determines the moral estimate. In *Pirke Aboth* iv. 1, the question, "Who is the hero?" is answered by, "he who overcomes his desire," with reference to this proverb, for that which is here said of the ruling over the passion of anger is true of all affections and passions.

"Yet he who reigns within himself, and rules  
Passions, desires, and fears, is more a king;  
Which every wise and virtuous man attains."<sup>1</sup>

On the other side, the comparison is suggested:

Break your head, not so sore;  
Break your will—that is more.<sup>2</sup>

Ver. 33 One casts the lot into the lap;  
But all its decision cometh from Jahve.

The *Tóra* knows only in one instance an ordeal (a judgment of God) as a right means of proof, Num. v. 12–31. The lot is nowhere ordained by it, but its use is supported by a custom running parallel with the Mosaic law; it was used not only in private life,

<sup>1</sup> Milton's *Paradise Regained*, ii. 466–8.

<sup>2</sup> "Zerbrich den Kopf dir nicht so sehr;  
Zerbrich den Willen—das ist mehr."—MATTH. CLAUDIUS.

but also in manifold ways within the domain of public justice, as well as for the detection of the guilty, Josh. vii. 14 f., 1 Sam. xiv. 40–42. So that the proverb xviii. 18 says the same thing of the lot that is said in the Epistle to the Hebrews, vi. 16, of the oath. The above proverb also explains the lot for an ordeal, for it is God who directs and orders it that it fall out thus and not otherwise. A particular sanction of the use of the lot does not lie in this, but it is only said, that where the lot is cast, all the decision that results from it is determined by God. That is in all cases true; but whether the challenging of the divine decision in such a way be right in this or that case is a question, and in no case would one, on the contrary, venture to make the person of the transgressor discoverable by lot, and let it decide regarding human life. But antiquity judged this matter differently, as *e.g.* the Book of Jonah (chap. i.) shows; it was a practice, animated by faith, in God's government of the world, which, if it did not observe the boundary between faith and superstition, yet stood high above the unbelief of the "Enlightenment." Like the Greek *κόλπος*, קֶיץ (from קָיָץ, Arab. *ḥak*, *khak*, to encompass, to stretch out) means, as it is commonly taken, *gremium* as well as *sinus*, but the latter meaning is the more sure; and thus also here it is not the lap as the middle of the body, so that one ought to think on him who casts the lot as seated, but also not the lap of the garment, but, like vi. 27, cf. Isa. xl. 11, the swelling, loose, external part of the clothing covering the bosom (the breast), where the lot covered by it is thrown by means of shaking and changing, and whence it is drawn out. The construction of the passive הִטָּל (from טָל = Arab. *tall*, to throw along) with the object. accus. follows the old scheme, Gen. iv. 18, and has its reason in this, that the Semitic passive, formed by the change of vowels, has not wholly given up the governing force of the active. מִשְׁפָּט signifies here decision as by the Urim and Thummim, Num. xxvii. 21, but which was no lot-apparatus.

xvii. 1. A comparative proverb with טוב, pairing with xvi. 32:

Better a dry piece of bread, and quietness therewith,  
Than a house full of slain beasts with unquietness.

Similar to this in form and contents are xv. 16 f. and xvi. 8. פֶּתַח חֵרֶבָה is a piece of bread (פֶּתַח, fem., as xxiii. 8) without savoury drink (Theodotion, *καθ' ἐαυτόν*, *i.e.* nothing with it), cf. Lev. vii. 10, a meat-offering without the pouring out of oil. זִבְחִים are not sacrificial gifts (Hitzig), but, as always, slain animals, *i.e.* either

offerings or banquets of slain beasts; it is the old name of the שלמים (cf. Ex. xviii. 12, xxiv. 5; Prov. vii. 14), part of which only were offered on the altar, and part presented as a banquet; and זֶבַח (in contradist. to מִבְּחָ, ix. 2, Gen. xliii. 16) denotes generally any kind of consecrated festival in connection with the worship of God, 1 Sam. xx. 29; cf. Gen. xxxi. 54. "Festivals of hatred" are festivals with hatred. מִלֵּא is part. with object.-accus.; in general מִלֵּא forms a constructive, מִלֵּא occurs only once (Jer. vi. 11), and מִלֵּא not at all. We have already, vii. 14, remarked on the degenerating of the *shelamîm* feasts; from this proverb it is to be concluded that the merriment and the excitement bordering on intoxication (cf. with Hitzig, 1 Sam. i. 13 and 3), such as frequently at the *Kirmsen* merry-makings (*vid.* p. 164), brought quarrels and strife, so that the poor who ate his dry bread in quiet peace could look on all this noise and tumult without envy.

Ver. 2 A prudent servant shall rule over the degenerate son;  
And he divides the inheritance among the brethren.

Regarding the contrasts of מִשְׁכִּיל and מְבִישׁ, *vid.* at x. 5, xiv. 35. The printed editions present בֶּן־מְבִישׁ in genit. connection: a son of the scandalous class, which is admissible (*vid.* p. 79 and p. 330); but Cod. 1294 and Cod. *Jaman*,<sup>1</sup> Erf. No. 2, 3, write בֶּן־מְבִישׁ (with *Tsere* and *Munach*), and that is perhaps right, after x. 5, xvii. 25. The futures have here also a fut. signification: they say to what it will come. Grotius remarks, with reference to this: *manumissus tutor filiis relinquetur*; יחלֵק tutorio officio. But if he is a conscientious, unselfish tutor, he will not enrich himself by property which belongs to another; and thus, though not without provision, he is yet without an inheritance. And yet the supplanting of the degenerate is brought about by this, that he loses his inheritance, and the intelligent servant steps into his place. Has one then to suppose that the master of the house makes his servant a co-heir with his own children, and at the same time names him as his executor? That were a bad anachronism. The idea of the διαθήκη was, at the time when this proverb was coined, one unknown—Israelitish antiquity knows only the intestate right of inheritance, regulated by lineal and gradual succession. Then, if one thinks of the degenerate son, that he is disowned by the father, but that the intelligent servant is not rewarded during the life of his master for his true

<sup>1</sup> The Cod. brought by Sappir from Jemen (*vid.* p. 295), of which there is an account in the preface to the edition of *Isaiah* by Baer and me.

services, and that, after the death of the master, to such a degree he possesses the esteem and confidence of the family, that he it is who divides the inheritance among the brethren, *i.e.* occupies the place amongst them of distributor of the inheritance, not: takes a portion of the inheritance, for חֵלֶק has not the double meaning of the Lat. *participare*; it means to divide, and may, with נָתַן, mean “to give a part of anything” (Job xxxix. 17); but, with the accus., nothing else than to distribute, *e.g.* Josh. xviii. 2, where it is to be translated: “whose inheritance had not yet been distributed (not yet given to them).” Jerome, *hæreditatem dividet*; and thus all translators, from the LXX. to Luther.

Ver. 3 The fining-pot for silver, and the furnace for gold;  
And a trier of hearts is Jahve.

An emblematical proverb (*vid.* p. 9), which means that Jahve is for the heart what the smelting-pot (from צָרַף, to change, particularly to melt, to refine) is for silver, and what the smelting furnace (כּוּר, from בּוּר, R. כּר, to round, Ex. xxii. 20) is for gold, that Jahve is for the heart, viz. a trier (בַּחֲן, to grind, to try by grinding, here as at Ps. vii. 10) of their nature and their contents, for which, of the proof of metals, is elsewhere (xvi. 2, xxi. 2, xxiv. 12) used the word (cf. בַּחֲן, the essay-master, Jer. vi. 7) תִּכְנֶן, weigher, or דּוּרֵשׁ, searcher (1 Chron. xxviii. 9). Wherever the subject spoken of is God, the searcher of hearts, the plur. לִבִּיּוֹת, once לִבְבוֹת, is used; the form לִבְבִּים occurs only in the *status conjunctus* with the suffix. In xxvii. 21 there follow the two figures, with which there is formed a *priamel* (*vid.* p. 13), as at xxvi. 3, another *tertium comparationis*.

Ver. 4 A profligate person giveth heed to perverse lips;  
Falsehood listeneth to a destructive tongue.

The meaning, at all events, is, that whoever gives ear with delight to words which are morally reprobate, and aimed at the destruction of neighbours, thereby characterizes himself as a profligate. Though מִרְעַע is probably not pred. but subj., yet so that what follows does not describe the מִרְעַע (the profligate hearkens . . .), but stamps him who does this as a מִרְעַע (a profligate, or, as we say: only a profligate . . .). מִרְעַע, for מִרְעַע, is warranted by Isa. ix. 16, where מִרְעַע (not מִרְעַע, according to which the *Venet.* here translates ἀπὸ κακοῦ) is testified to not only by correct codd. and editions, but also by the Masora (cf. *Michlol* 116*b*). הִקְשִׁיב (from קָשַׁב, R. קש, to stiffen, or, as we say, to prick, viz. the ear) is generally united with לְ

or אָל, but, as here and at xxix. 12, Jer. vi. 19, also with עַל אָן, wickedness, is the absolute contrast of a pious and philanthropic mind; הָוָה, from הוֹה, not in the sense of eagerness, as x. 3, xi. 6, but of yawning depth, abyss, catastrophe (*vid.* at Ps. v. 10), is equivalent to entire destruction—the two genitives denote the property of the lips and the tongue (*labium nequam, lingua perniciosum*), on the side of that which it instrumentally aims at (*cf.* Ps. xxxvi. 4, lii. 4): practising mischief, destructive plans. שָׁקֵר beginning the second line is generally regarded as the subj. parallel with מַרְע, as Luther, after Jerome, “A wicked man gives heed to wicked mouths, and a false man listens willingly to scandalous tongues.” It is possible that שָׁקֵר denotes incarnate falsehood, as רָמִיָּה, xii. 27, incarnate slothfulness, *cf.* מְרַמֶּה, xiv. 25, and perhaps also xii. 17; צָדִיק, Ps. lviii. 2, תּוֹשֵׁבָה, Mic. vi. 9; יֹצֵר כְּמוֹתָיִם, Isa. xxvi. 13, etc., where, without supplying אִישׁ (אָנִשׁ), the property stands instead of the person possessing that property. The clause, that falsehood listeneth to a deceitful tongue, means that he who listens to it characterizes himself thereby, according to the proverb, *simile simili gaudet*, as a liar. But only as a liar? The punctuation before us, which represents מַרְע by *Dechi* as subj., or also pred., takes שָׁקֵר מוֹיִן as obj. with מוֹיִן as its governing word, and why should not that be the view intended? The representation of the obj. is an inversion less bold than Isa. xxii. 2, viii. 22, and that עַל here should not be so closely connected with the verb of hearing, as 4a lies near by this, that הִקְשִׁיב עַל is elsewhere found, but not הִאָּזִין עַל. Jewish interpreters, taking שָׁקֵר as obj., try some other meaning of מוֹיִן than *auscultans*; but neither וָזָן, to approach, nor וָזָן, to arm (*Venet.* ψεύδους ὁπλίζει), gives a meaning suitable to this place. מוֹיִן is equivalent to מִאָּזִין. As אִשָּׁא, Job xxxii. 11, is contracted into אִשָּׁ, so must מִאָּזִין, if the character of the part. shall be preserved, become מוֹיִן, mediated by מִיִּזִּין.

Ver. 5 He that mocketh the poor reproacheth his Maker ;

He that rejoiceth over calamity remains not unpunished.

Line first is a variation of xiv. 31a. God is, according to xxii. 2, the creator of the poor as well as of the rich. The poor, as a man, and as poor, is the work of God, the creator and governor of all things; thus, he who mocketh the poor, mocketh Him who called him into existence, and appointed him his lowly place. But in general, compassion and pity, and not joy (שִׂמְחָה), commonly

with לְ, of the person, *e.g.* Obad. ver. 12, the usual formula for ἐπιχαιρεκακία), is appropriate in the presence of misfortune (אִי, from אָוֶר, to be heavily burdened), for such joy, even if he on whom the misfortune fell were our enemy, is a *peccatum mortale*, Job xxxi. 29 f. There is indeed a hallowed joy at the actual revelation in history of the divine righteousness; but this would not be a hallowed joy if it were not united with deep sorrow over those who, accessible to no warning, have despised grace, and, by adding sin to sin, have provoked God's anger.

Ver. 6. With this verse this series of proverbs closes as it began :

A diadem of the old are children's children,  
And the glory of children are their parents.

Children are a blessing from God (Ps. cxxvii., cxxviii.); thus, a family circle consisting of children and grandchildren (including great-grandchildren) is as a crown of glory surrounding the grey-haired patriarch; and again, children have glory and honour in their parents, for to have a man of an honoured name, or of a blessed memory, as a father, is the most effective commendation, and has for the son, even though he is unlike his father, always important and beneficial consequences. In 6b a fact of experience is expressed, from which has proceeded the rank of inherited nobility recognised among men—one may abnegate his social rights, but yet he himself is and remains a part of the moral order of the world. The LXX. has a distich after ver. 4 [the Vatican text places it after ver. 6]: "The whole world of wealth belongs to the faithful, but to the unfaithful not even an obolus." Lagarde supposes that ὁλος ὁ κόσμος τῶν χρημάτων is a translation of שְׁפַעַת יְתֵר, instead of שְׁפַת יְתֵר, 7a. But this ingenious conjecture does not amount to the regarding of this distich as a variation of ver. 7.

The proverbs following, 7–10, appear to be united acrostically by the succession of the letters ש (ש, ש) and ת.

Ver. 7 It does not become a fool to speak loftily,  
How much less do lying lips a noble!

As at Isa. xxxii. 5 f., נָבֵל and נָרִיב are placed opposite to one another; the latter is the nobly magnanimous man, the former the man who thinks foolishly and acts profligately, whom it does not become to use lofty words, who thereby makes the impression of his vulgarity so much the more repulsive (cf. Job ii. 10). שְׁפַת יְתֵר (not יְתֵר, for the word belongs to those which retain their *Pathach*

or *Segol, in pausa*) is neither elevated (soaring) (Ewald) nor diffuse (Jo. Ernst Jungius in Oetinger: *lingua dicax ac sermonem ultra quam decorum verbis extendere solita*), rather imperative (Bertheau), better presumptuous (Hitzig) words, properly words of superfluity, *i.e.* of superabundant self-consciousness and high pretension (cf. the transitive bearing of the Arab. *watr* with *ὑβρίζειν*, from *ὑπέρ*, Aryan *upar*, *Job*, p. 363). Rightly Meîri, שפת נאווה ושורה. It produces a disagreeable impression, when a man of vulgar mind and of rude conduct, instead of keeping himself in retirement, makes himself of importance, and weighty in a shameless, impudent manner (cf. Ps. xii. 9, where זלות, *vilitas*, in a moral sense); but yet more repulsive is the contrast, when a man in whom one is justified in expecting nobility of mind, in accordance with his life-position and calling, degrades himself by uttering deceitful words. Regarding the אף כי, concluding *a minori ad majus*, we have already spoken at xi. 31, xv. 11. R. Ismael, in *Bereschith Rabba*, at xliv. 8, reckons ten such conclusions *a minori ad majus* in the Scriptures, but there are just as many *quanto magis*. The right accentuation (*e.g.* in Cod. 1294) is here אף כִּי־לִנְדִיב, transformed from אף כִּי־לִנְדִיב, according to *Accentuationssystem*, xviii. 2.

Ver. 8 The gift of bribery appears a jewel to its receiver ;  
Whitherso'er he turneth himself he acteth prudently.

How 8b is to be understood is shown by 1 Sam. xiv. 47, cf. Josh. i. 7; the *quoque se vertit, prudenter rem agit*, has accordingly in both sentences the person meant by בָּעָלָיו as subject, not the gift (Hitzig), of which יַשְׁכִּיל, "it maketh prosperous," is not said, for הַשְׁכִּיל means, used only of persons, prudent, and therefore successful, fortunate conduct. Such is said of him who has to give (Luther): he presses through with it whithersoever he turns. But the making of בָּעָלָיו the subj. does not accord with this: this means [gift] to one who has to give, appears to open doors and hearts, not merely as a golden key, it is truly such to him. Thus בָּעָלָיו, as at iii. 27, will be meant of him to whom the present is brought, or to whom a claim thereto is given. But שָׂחָד means here not the gift of seasonable liberality (Zöckler), but, as always, the gift of bribery, *i.e.* a gift by which one seeks to purchase for himself (xvii. 23) preference on the part of a judge, or to mitigate the displeasure of a high lord (xxi. 14); here (for one does not let it depend merely on the faithfulness of another to his duty) it is

that by which one seeks to secure an advantage to himself. The proverb expresses a fact of experience. The gift of bribery, to which, as to a well-known approved means, הַשֹּׁחַד refers, appears to him who receives and accepts it (Targ.) as a stone of pleasantness, a charming, precious stone, a jewel (*Juwél* from *joie* = *gaudium*); it determines and impels him to apply all his understanding, in order that he may reach the goal for which it shall be his reward. What he at first regarded as difficult, yea, impossible, that he now prudently carries out, and brings to a successful conclusion, wherever he turns himself, overcoming the seemingly insurmountable hindrances; for the enticement of the gift lifts him, as with a charm, above himself, for covetousness is a characteristic feature of human nature—*pecunia obediunt omnia* (Eccles. x. 19, Vulg.).

Ver. 9 He covereth transgressions who seeketh after love,

And he who always brings back a matter separateth friends.

The pred. stands first in the simple clause with the order of the words not inverted. That מַכְסֶּה פֶּשַׁע is also to be interpreted here as pred. (cf. 19a) is shown by x. 12, according to which love covereth all transgressions. We write מַכְסֶּה-פֶּשַׁע with *Dag. forte conjunctivum* of פ (as of ב in Ezek. xviii. 6), and *Gaja* with the *Sheva*, according to the *Meth.-Setzung*, § 37; the punctuation פֶּשַׁע מַכְסֶּה also occurs. What the expression “to seek love” here means, is to be judged, with Hitzig, after Zeph. ii. 3, 1 Cor. xiv. 1. It is in no case equivalent to seek to gain the love of another, rather to seek to preserve the love of men towards one another, but it is to be understood not after 9b, but after x. 12: he seeks to prove love who does not strike on the great bell when his neighbour has sinned however grievously against him, does not in a scandal-loving manner make much ado about it, and takes care not thereby to widen the breach between men who stand near to one another, but endeavours by a reconciling, soothing, rectifying influence, to mitigate the evil, instead of making it worse. He, on the contrary, who repeats the matter (שָׁנָה with ב of the obj., to come back with something, as xxvi. 11), *i.e.* turns always back again to the unpleasant occurrence (Theodotion, δευτερῶν ἐν λόγῳ; Symmachus, δευτερῶν λόγον, as Sir. vii. 14, xix. 7), divides friends (*vid.* xvi. 28), for he purposely fosters the strife, the disharmony, ill-will, and estrangement which the offence produced; while the noble man, who has love for his motive and his aim, by prudent silence contributes to bring the offence and the division which it occasioned into forgetfulness.

Ver. 10 One reproof maketh more impression on a wise man  
Than if one reckoned a hundred to the fool

One of the few proverbs which begin with a future, *vid.* xii. 26, p. 265. It expresses what influence there is in one reproof with a wise man (מִבֵּן, viii. 9); נָעָרָה is the reproof expressed by the post-bibl. נִיפָּה, as the lowest grade of disciplinary punishment, *admonitio*, connected with warning. The verbal form חַח is the reading of the LXX. and Syr. (συντρίβει ἀπειλή καρδίαν φρονίμου) for they read חַח נָעָרָה לְב מִבֵּן, derived from חָחָה, and thus חָחָה (from *Hiph.* חָחָה); thus Luther: reproof alarms more the intelligent, but חַח with ב of the obj. is not Hebr.; on the contrary, the reading of the LXX. is in accordance with the usage of the language, and, besides, is suitable. It is, however, first to be seen whether the traditional text stands in need of this correction. As *fut. Niph.* חָחָה, apart from the ult. accent. to be expected, gives no meaning. Also if one derives it from חָחָה, to snatch away, to take away, it gives no appropriate thought; besides, חַח is construed with the object. accus., and the *fut. Apoc.*, in itself strange here, must be pointed either חָחָה or חָחָה (after חָחָה) (Böttcher, *Lehrb.* ii. p. 413). Thus חָחָה, as at Job xxi. 13, Jer. xxi. 13, will be *fut. Kal* of חָחָה = יָחָח, Ps. xxxviii. 3 (Theodotion, Targ., Kimchi). With this derivation, also, חָחָה is to be expected; the reference in the *Handwörterbuch* to Gesen. *Lehrgebäude*, § 51, 1, Anm. 1, where, in an extremely inadequate way, the retrogression of the tone (נָכֹח אָחֹר) is spoken of, is altogether inappropriate to this place; and Böttcher's explanation of the ult. tone from an intended expressiveness is ungrammatical; but why should not חָחָה, from נָחָה, with its first syllable originating from contraction, and thus having the tone, be *Milel* as well as *Milra*, especially here, where it stands at the head of the sentence? With ב connected with it, נָחָה means: to descend into anything, to penetrate; Hitzig appropriately compares *altius in pectus descendit* of Sallust, *Jug.* 11. Jerome rightly, according to the sense: *plus proficit*, and the *Venet.* ἀνεῖ (read ονεῖ) ἀπειλή τῷ συνίοντι. In 10b מִבֵּן (cf. Dent. xxv. 3; 2 Cor. xi. 24) is to be supplied to מִבֵּן, not מִבֵּן (an hundred times, which may be denoted correctly by מִבֵּן as well as מִבֵּן, Eccles. viii. 12). With the wise (says a Talmudic proverb) a sign does as much as with the fool a stick does. Zehner, in his *Adagia sacra* (1601), cites Curtius (vii. 4): *Nobilis equus umbra quoque virgæ regitur, ignavus ne calcari quidem concitari potest.*

Five proverbs of dangerous men against whom one has to be on his guard :

Ver. 11 The rebellious seeketh only after evil,

And a cruel messenger is sent out against him.

It is a question what is subj. and what obj. in 11a. It lies nearest to look on מְרִי as subj., and this word (from מָרָה, *stringere*, to make oneself exacting against any, to oppose, ἀντιτείνειν) is appropriate thereto ; it occurs also at Ezek. ii. 7 as *abstr. pro concreto*. That it is truly subj. appears from this, that בִּקֵּשׁ רָע, to seek after evil (cf. xxix. 10; 1 Kings xx. 7, etc.), is a connection of idea much more natural than בִּקֵּשׁ מְרִי [to seek after rebellion]. Thus אֵף will be logically connected with רָע, and the reading אֵף מְרִי will be preferred to the reading אֵף-מְרִי ; אֵף (corresponding to the Arab. *âinnama*) belongs to those particles which are placed before the clause, without referring to the immediately following part of the sentence, for they are much more regarded as affecting the whole sentence (*vid.* xiii. 10) : the rebellious strives after nothing but only evil. Thus, as neut. obj. רָע is rendered by the Syr., Targ., Venet., and Luther ; on the contrary, the older Greek translators and Jerome regard רָע as the personal subject. If now, in reference to rebellion, the discourse is of a מְלֶאכֶת אֶבְרִי, we are not, with Hitzig, to think of the demon of wild passions unfettered in the person of the rebellious, for that is a style of thought and of expression that is modern, not biblical ; but the old unpoetic yet simply true remark remains : *Loquendi formula inde petita quod regis aut summi magistratus minister rebelli supplicium nunciat infligitque.* מְלֶאכֶת is *n. officii*, not *naturæ*. Man as a messenger, and the spiritual being as messenger, are both called מְלֶאכֶת. Therefore one may not understand מְלֶאכֶת אֶבְרִי, with the LXX., Jerome, and Luther, directly and exclusively of an angel of punishment. If one thinks of Jahve as the Person against whom the rebellion is made, then the idea of a heavenly messenger lies near, according to Ps. xxxv. 5 f., lxxviii. 49 ; but the proverb is so meant, that it is not the less true if an earthly king sends out against a rebellious multitude a messenger with an unlimited commission, or an officer against a single man dangerous to the state, with strict directions to arrest him at all hazards. אֶבְרִי we had already at xii. 10 ; the root קִשׁ means, to be dry, hard, without feeling. The fut. does not denote what may be done (Bertheau, Zöckler), which is contrary to the parallelism, the order of the words, and the style of

the proverb, but what is done. And the relation of the clause is not, as Ewald interprets it, "scarcely does the sedition seek out evil when an inexorable messenger is sent." Although this explanation is held by Ewald as "unimprovable," yet it is incorrect, because  $\text{אֵל}$  in this sense demands, *e.g.* Gen. xxvii. 3, the perf. (strengthened by the *infin. intensivus*). The relation of the clause is, also, not such as Böttcher has interpreted it: a wicked man tries only scorn though a stern messenger is sent against him, but not because such a messenger is called  $\text{אֶבְרִי}$ , against whom this "trying of scorn" helps nothing, so that it is not worth being spoken of; besides,  $\text{שָׁלַח}$  or  $\text{מִשְׁלַח}$  would have been used if this relation had been intended. We have in 11a and 11b, as also *e.g.* at xxvi. 24, xxviii. 1, two clauses standing in internal reciprocal relation, but syntactically simply co-ordinated; the force lies in this, that a messenger who recognises no mitigating circumstances, and offers no pardon, is sent out against such an one.

Ver. 12 Meet a bear robbed of one of her whelps,  
Only not a fool in his folly.

The name of the bear, as that of the cow, Job xxi. 10, Ps. cxliv. 14, preserves its masculine form, even when used in reference to sexual relationship (Ewald, § 174b); the *ursa catulis orbata* is proverbially a raging beast. How the abstract expression of the action  $\text{פָּגַשׁ}$  [to meet], here as *e.g.* Ps. xvii. 5, with the subj. following, must sound as finite (*occurrat*, may always meet), follows from  $\text{וְאֵל־יִפְגֹּשׁ} = \text{וְאֵל}$  (*non autem occurrat*).  $\text{פָּגַשׁ}$  has on the last syllable *Mehuppach*, and *Zin-norith* on the preceding open syllable (according to the rule, *Accent-system*, vi. § 5d).<sup>1</sup>  $\text{בְּאַוְלָתוֹ}$ , in the state of his folly, *i.e.* when he is in a paroxysm of his anger, corresponds with the conditional noun-adjective  $\text{שֹׁכֵחַ}$ , for folly morbidly heightened is madness (cf. Hos. xi. 7; *Psychol.* p. 291 f.).

Ver. 13 He that returneth evil for good,  
From his house evil shall not depart.

If ingratitude appertains to the sinful manifestations of ignoble selfishness, how much more sinful still is black ingratitude, which recompenses evil for good! ( $\text{מְשִׁיב}$ , as 1 Sam. xxv. 21, syn.  $\text{נָמַל}$ , to requite, iii. 30, xxxi. 12;  $\text{שָׁלַם}$ , to reimburse, xx. 22). Instead of  $\text{חַמִּישׁ}$ , the *Kerî* reads  $\text{חָמוּשׁ}$ ; but that this verb, with a middle vowel, may be  $\text{ע'}$  as well as  $\text{ע''}$ , Ps. lv. 2 shows.

<sup>1</sup> In the *Torath Emeth*, p. 18, the word is irregularly represented as *Milel*—a closed syllable with *Cholem* can suffer no retrogression of the tone.

Ver. 14 As one letteth out water is the beginning of a strife;  
But cease thou from such strife ere it comes to showing teeth.

The meaning of this verb פָּטַר is certain: it means to break forth; and transitively, like Arab. *fatr*, to bring forth from a cleft, to make to break forth, to let go free (Theodotion, ἀπολύων; Jerome, *dimittit*; Venet. ἀφίεις). The LXX., since it translates by ἐξουσίαν δίδωσι, thinks on the juristic signification, which occurs in the Chronicles: to make free, or to declare so; but here פּוֹטֵר מַיִם (*vid.* regarding the *Metheg* at xiv. 31, p. 311) is, as Luther translates, one who tears away the dam from the waters. And ראשית מְדוֹן is not accus. dependent on פּוֹטֵר, to be supplied (Hitzig: he unfetters water who the beginning of strife, viz. unfetters); but the part is used as at x. 17: one who unfetters the water is the beginning of strife, i.e. he is thus related to it as when one . . . This is an addition to the free use of the part. in the language of the Mishna, where one would expect the *infin.*, e.g. בְּזוֹרֵעַ (= בְּזֹרַעַ), if one sows, בְּמִזִּיר (= בְּזֹרֵחַ), of wantonness. It is thus unnecessary, with Ewald, to interpret פּוֹטֵר as neut., which lets water go = a water-outbreak; פּוֹטֵר is meant personally; it represents one who breaks through a water-dam, withdraws the restraint of the water, opens a sluice, and then emblematically the proverb says: thus conditioned is the beginning of a strife. Then follows the warning to let go such strife (הֲרִיב, with the article used in the more elevated style, not without emphasis), to break from it, to separate it from oneself ere it reach a dangerous height. This is expressed by לִפְנֵי הַתְּנַלֵּעַ, a verb occurring only here and at xviii. 1, xx. 3, always in the *Hithpa.* The Targum (misunderstood by Gesenius after Buxtorf; *vid.* to the contrary, Levy, under the word צִרִי II.) translates it at xviii. 1, xx. 3, as the Syr., by “to mock,” also Aquila, who has at xx. 3, ἐξυβρισθήσεται, and the LXX. at xviii. 1, ἐπονείδιστος ἔσται, and Jerome, who has this in all the three passages, render the *Hithpa.* in this sense, passively. In this passage before us, the Targ., as Hitzig gives it, translates, “before it heats itself,” but that is an error occasioned by Buxtorf; *vid.* on the contrary, Levy, under the word קִרִּי (κύριος); this translation, however, has a representative in Haja Gaon, who appeals for גָּלַע, to glow, to *Nidda* viii. 2.<sup>1</sup> Elsewhere the LXX., at xx. 3, συμπλέκεται (where Jerome, with the amalgamation of the two significations, *miscentur contumeliis*); Kimchi and others gloss it by התערב, and, according to this, the Venet. translates, πρὸ τοῦ

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Simon Nascher's *Der Gaon Haja u. seine geist. Thätig.* p. 15.

συνχυθῆναι (τῇν ἔριν); Luther, "before thou art mingled therein." But all these explanations of the word: *insultare*, *excandescere*, and *commisceri*, are etymologically inadmissible. Bertheau's and Zöckler's "roll itself forth" is connected at least with a meaning rightly belonging to the R. גל. But the Arab. shows, that not the meaning *volvere*, but that of *retegere* is to be adopted. Aruch<sup>1</sup> for *Nidda* viii. 2 refers to the Arab., where a wound is designated as *יכולה להפלוץ ולהוציא דם*, i.e. as breaking up, as it were, when the crust of that which is nearly healed is broken off (Maimuni glosses the word by *להתקלף*, were uncrusted), and blood again comes forth. The meaning *retegere* requires here, however, another distinction. The explanation mentioned there by Aruch: before the strife becomes public to thee, i.e. approaches thee, is not sufficient. The verbal stem גלע is the stronger power of גלה, and means laying bare; but here, not as there, in the Mishna of a wound covered with a crust. The Arab. *jal'* means to quarrel with another, properly to show him the teeth, the *Poël* or the tendency-stem from *jal'a*, to have the mouth standing open, so that one shows his teeth; and the Syr. *glas*, with its offshoots and derivatives, has also this meaning of *ringi*, opening the mouth to show, i.e. to make bare the teeth. Schultens has established this explanation of the words, and Gesenius further establishes it in the *Thesaurus*, according to which Fleischer also remarks, "גלע, of showing the teeth, the exposing of the teeth by the wide opening of the mouth, as happens in bitter quarrels." But הריב does not agree with this. Hitzig's translation, "before the strife shows its teeth," is as modern as in ver. 11 is the passion of the unfettered demon, and Fleischer's *prius vero quam exacerbetur rixa* renders the *Hithpa.* in a sense unnecessarily generalized for xviii. 1 and xx. 3. The accentuation, which separates *להתגלע* from הריב by *Rebia Mugrash*, is correct. One may translate, as Schultens, *antequam dentes stringantur*, or, since the *Hithpa.* has sometimes a reciprocal signification, e.g. Gen. xlii. 1, Ps. xli. 8: ere one reciprocally shows his teeth. Hitzig unjustly takes exception to the inversion הריב בטש. Why should not the object precede, as at Hos. xii. 15, the בטש, placed with emphasis at the end? The same inversion for a like reason occurs at Eccles. v. 6.

<sup>1</sup> [Vid. p. 109, note.]

Ver. 15 He that acquitteth the guilty and condemneth the righteous—  
An abomination to Jahve are they both.

The proverb is against the partisan judge who is open to bribery, like xxiv. 24, cf. Isa. v. 23, where, with reference to such, the announcement of punishment is emphatically made. רָשָׁע and צַדִּיק, in a forensic sense, are equivalent to *sons (reus)* and *insons*. נֶם (cf. the Arab. *jmy'na*, altogether, but particularly the Pers. *ham* and the Turkish *dkhy* standing wholly thus in the numeral) is here, as at Gen. xxvii. 45, equivalent to יְחֻדִּי, Jer. xlvi. 12 (in its unions = united). Whoever pronounces sentence of justification on the guilty, appears as if he must be judged more mildly than he who condemns the guiltless, but both the one and the other alike are an abhorrence to God.

We take vers. 16-21 together. This group begins with a proverb of the heartless, and ends with one of the perverse-hearted; and between these there are not wanting noticeable points of contact between the proverbs that follow one another.

Ver. 16 Why the ready money in the hand of the fool;  
To get wisdom when he has yet no heart?

The question is made pointed by וְהֵ, thus not: why the ready money when . . . ? Is it to obtain wisdom?—the whole is but one question, the reason of which is founded in וְלֵב אֵין (thus to be accented with *Mugrash* going before).<sup>1</sup> The fool, perhaps, even makes some endeavours, for he goes to the school of the wise, to follow out their admonitions, קִנְיָה חֲכָמָה (iv. 5, etc.), and it costs him something (iv. 7), but all to no purpose, for he has no heart. By this it is not meant that knowledge, for which he pays his *honorarium*, remains, it may be, in his head, but goes not to his heart, and thus becomes an unfruitful theory; but the heart is equivalent to the understanding (*vid.* p. 174), in the sense in which the heart appears as the previous condition to the attainment of wisdom (xviii. 15), and as something to be gained before all (xv. 32), viz. understanding, as the fitting intellectual and practical *habitus* to the reception, the

<sup>1</sup> If we write וְלֵב with *Makkeph*, then we have to accentuate לְקִנְיָה חֲכָמָה with *Tarcha Munach*, because the *Silluk* word in this writing has not two syllables before the tone. This sequence of accents is found in the Codd. Ven. 1521, 1615, Basel 1619, while most editions have לְקִנְיָה חֲכָמָה וְלֵב-אֵין, which is false. But according to MSS. we have וְלֵב without *Makkeph*, and that is right according to the *Makkeph* rules of the metrical *Accentuationssystem*; *vid. Torah Emeth*, p. 40.

appropriation, and realization of wisdom, the ability rightly to comprehend the fulness of the communicated knowledge, and to adopt it as an independent possession, that which the Greek called *νοῦς*, as in that "golden proverb" of Democrates: πολλοὶ πολυμαθεὲς νοῦν οὐκ ἔχουσι, or as in Luke xxiv. 25, where it is said that the Lord opened τὸν νοῦν of His disciples to understand the Scriptures. In the LXX. a distich follows ver. 16, which is made up of 19*b* and 20*b*, and contains a varied translation of these two lines.

Ver. 17 At all times the right friend shows himself loving;  
And as a brother is he born for adversity.

Brother is more than friend, he stands to one nearer than a friend does, Ps. xxxv. 14; but the relation of a friend may deepen itself into a spiritual, moral brotherhood, xviii. 24, and there is no name of friend that sounds dearer than אָח, 2 Sam. i. 26. 17*a* and 17*b* are, according to this, related to each other climactically. The friend meant in 17*a* is a true friend. Of no other is it said that he loves בְּכָל-עֵת, *i.e.* makes his love manifest; and also the article in הָרֵעַ not only here gives to the word more body, but stamps it as an ideal-word: the friend who corresponds to the idea of such an one.<sup>1</sup> The *inf.* of the *Hiph.*, in the sense "to associate" (Ewald), cannot therefore be הָרֵעַ, because רֵעַ is not derived from רָעַע, but from רָעָה. Thus there exists no contrast between 17*a* and 17*b*, so that the love of a friend is thought of, in contradistinction to that of a brother, as without permanency (Fl.); but 17*b* means that the true friend shows himself in the time of need, and that thus the friendship becomes closer, like that between brothers. The statements do not refer to two kinds of friends; this is seen from the circumstance that אָח has not the article, as הָרֵעַ has. It is not the subj. but pred., as אָדָם, Job xi. 12: sooner is a wild ass born or born again as a man. The meaning of הָיָלָה there, as at Ps. lxxxvii. 5 f., borders on the notion of *regenerari*; here the idea is not essentially much less, for by the saying that the friend is born in the time of need, as a brother, is meant that he then for the first time shows himself as a friend, he receives the right status or baptism of such an one, and is, as it were, born into personal brotherly relationship to the sorely-tried friend. The translation *comprobatur* (Jerome) and *erfunden* [is found out] (Luther) obliterates the peculiar and

<sup>1</sup> The Arab. grammarians say that the article in this case stands, *ʿastfrâgh khsânas âljas*, as an exhaustive expression of all essential properties of the genus, *i.e.* to express the full ideal realization of the idea in that which is named

thus intentional expression, for נולד is not at all a metaphor used for passing into the light—the two passages in Proverbs and in Job have not their parallel. לְצָרָה is not equivalent to בְּצָרָה (cf. Ps. ix. 10, x. 1), for the interchange of the prep. in 17a and 17b would then be without any apparent reason. But Hitzig's translation also: as a brother he is born of adversity, is impossible, for לְ after נולד and ילד always designates that for which the birth is an advantage, not that from which it proceeds. Thus לְ will be that of the purpose: for the purpose of the need,—not indeed to suffer (Job v. 7) on account of it, but to bear it in sympathy, and to help to bear it. Rightly Fleischer: *frater autem ad ærumnam (sc. levandam et removendam) nascitur*. The LXX. gives this sense to the ל: ἀδελφοὶ δὲ ἐν ἀνάγκαις χρήσιμοι ἔστωσαν, τοῦτο γὰρ χάριν γεννῶνται.

Ver. 18 A man void of understanding is he who striketh hands,  
Who becometh surety with his neighbour.

Cf. vi. 1–5, where the warning against suretyship is given at large, and the reasons for it are adduced. It is incorrect to translate (Gesen., Hitzig, and others) לְפָנַי רַעְיוֹ, with the LXX., Jerome, the Syr., Targ., and Luther, “for his neighbour;” to become surety for any one is לְ עֵרֶב, vi. 1, or, with the object. accus., xi. 15, another suitable prep. is בְּעֵר; but לְפָנַי never means *pro* (ὑπέρ), for at 1 Sam. i. 16 it means “to the person,” and 2 Sam. iii. 31, “before Abner’s corpse (bier).” רַעְיוֹ is thus here the person with whom the suretyship is entered into; he can be called the רַע of him who gives bail, so much the more as the reception of the bail supposes that both are well known to each other. Here also Fleischer rightly translates: *apud alterum (sc. creditorem pro debitore)*.

Ver. 19 He loveth sin who loveth strife;  
He who maketh high his doors seeketh destruction.

A synthetic distich (*vid.* p. 10). Böttcher finds the reason of the pairing of these two lines in the relationship between a mouth and a door (cf. Mic. vii. 5, פֶּתַחַי פִּיהַ). Hitzig goes further, and supposes that 19b figuratively expresses what boastfulness brings upon itself. Against Geier, Schultens, and others, who understand פֶּתַח directly of the mouth, he rightly remarks that הַגְבִּיחַ פֶּה is not heard of, and that הַגְדִּיל פֶּה would be used instead. But the two lines harmonize, without this interchangeable reference of *os* and *ostium*. *Zanksucht* [quarrelsomeness] and *Prunksucht* [ostentation] are related as the symptoms of selfishness. But both bear

their sentence in themselves. He who has pleasure in quarrelling has pleasure in evil, for he commits himself to the way of great sinning, and draws others along with him; and he who cannot have the door of his house high enough and splendid enough, prepares thereby for himself, against his will, the destruction of his house. An old Hebrew proverb says, *כל העוסק בבנין יתמסכן*, *ædificandi nimis studiosus ad mendicitatem redigitur*. Both parts of this verse refer to one and the same individual, for the *insanum ædificandi studium* goes only too often hand in hand with unjust and heartless litigation.

Ver. 20 He that is of a false heart findeth no good;

And he that goeth astray with his tongue falleth into evil.

Regarding *עָקַשׁ-לֵב*, *vid.* xi. 20. In the parallel member, *נִהַפֵּךְ בְּלִשְׁוֹנוֹ* is he who twists or winds (*vid.* at ii. 12) with his tongue, going about concealing and falsifying the truth. The phrase *וְנִהַפֵּךְ* (the connecting form before a word with a prep.) is syntactically possible, but the Masora designates the word, in contradistinction to *וְנִהַפֵּךְ*, pointed with *Pathach*, Lev. xiii. 16, with *לִית* as *unicum*, thus requires *וְנִהַפֵּךְ*, as is also found in Codd. The contrast of *רָעָה* is here *טוֹב*, also neut., as xiii. 21, cf. xvi. 20, and *רָע*, xiii. 17.

The first three parts of the old Solomonic Book of Proverbs ((1) x. 1–xii. 28; (2) xiii. 1–xv. 19; (3) xv. 20–xvii. 20) are now followed by the fourth part. We recognise it as striking the same keynote as x. 1. In xvii. 21 it resounds once more, here commencing a part; there, x. 1, beginning the second group of proverbs. The first closes, as it begins, with a proverb of the fool.

Ver. 21 He that begetteth a fool, it is to his sorrow;

And the father of a fool hath no joy.

It is admissible to supply *יָלְדוּ*, developing itself from *יָלַד*, before *לְחֹנֶה לוֹ* (*vid.* regarding this passive formation, at x. 1, cf. xiv. 13), as at Isa. lxvi. 3, *מָעֵלָה* (Fl.: *in mærorem sibi genuit h. e. ideo videtur genuisse ut sibi mærorem crearet*); but not less admissible is it to interpret *לְחֹנֶה לוֹ* as a noun-clause corresponding to the *וְלֹא-יִשְׁמַח* (thus to be written with *Makkeph*): it brings grief to him. According as one understands this as an expectation, or as a consequence, *יָלַד*, as at xxiii. 24, is rendered either *qui gignit* or *qui genuit*. With *נָבֵל*, seldom occurring in the Book of Proverbs (only here and at ver. 7), *בָּסִיל*, occurring not unfrequently, is interchanged. Schultens rightly defines the latter etymologically:

*marcidus h. e. qui ad virtutem, pietatem, vigorem omnem vitæ spiritualis medullitus emarcuit*; and the former: *elumbis et mollitie segnitieve fractus*, the intellectually heavy and sluggish (cf. Arab. *kasal*, laziness; *kaslân*, the lazy).<sup>1</sup>

Ver. 22 A joyful heart bringeth good recovery;  
And a broken spirit drieth the bones.

The heart is the centre of the individual life, and the condition and the tone of the heart communicates itself to this life, even to its outermost circumference; the spirit is the power of self-consciousness which, according as it is lifted up or broken, also lifts up or breaks down the condition of the body (*Psychol.* p. 199), *vid.* the similar contrasted phrases לֵב שָׁמֵחַ and רִיחַ נִבְּאָה, xv. 13. The ἄπ. λεγ. נִהָה (here and there in Codd. incorrectly written נִיָּה) has nothing to do with the Arab. *jihat*, which does not mean sight, but direction, and is formed from *wjah* (whence *wajah*, sight), like עֲרָה, congregation, from וָעַר (וָעַר). The Syr., Targ. (perhaps also Symmachus: ἀγαθύνει ἡλικίαν; Jerome: *ætatem floridam facit*; Luther: makes the life *lüstig* [cheerful]) translate it by body; but for this נִיָּה (נִיָּה) is used, and that is a word of an entirely different root from נִהָה. To what verb this refers is shown by Hos. v. 13: וְלֹא-יִנְהָה מָכַם מָזוֹר, and healed not for you her ulcerous wound. מָזוֹר is the compress, *i.e.* the bandage closing up the ulcer, then also the ulcer-wound itself; and נִהָה is the contrary of עָלָה, *e.g.* Jer. viii. 22; it means the removing of the bandage and the healing of the wound. This is confirmed by the Syr. *gho*, which in like manner is construed with *min*, and means to be delivered from something (*vid.* Bernstein's *Lex. Syr.* to Kirsch's *Chrestomathie*). The Aethiop. quadriliteral *gâhgêh*, to hinder, to cause to cease, corresponds to the causative Syr. *agahish*. Accordingly נִהָה means to be in the condition of abatement, mitigation, healing; and נִהָה (as synonym of בִּנְהָה, Neh. iii. 19, with which Parchon combines it), *levamen, levatio*, in the sense of bodily healing (LXX. εὐεκτηεῖν ποιεῖ; Venet., after Kimchi, ἀγαθυνεῖ

<sup>1</sup> Nöldeke's assertion (Art. *Orion* in Schenkel's *Bibel-Lexicon*) that the Arab. *kasal* corresponds to the Hebr. בָּשַׁל proceeds from the twofold supposition, that the meaning to be lazy underlies the meaning to totter (*vid.* also Dietrich in Gesenius' *Heb. Wörterbuch*), and that the Hebr. ס must correspond with the Arab. ش. The former supposition is untenable, the latter is far removed (cf. *e.g.* בָּשַׁל and *kursî*, סִפֵּר and *sifr*, מִסְכֵּן and *miskîn*). The verb בָּשַׁל, Aram. בָּשַׁל, is unknown in the Arab.

θεραπείαν); and הַיָּטִיב גָּהָה (cf. xv. 2) denotes, to bring good improvement, to advance powerfully the recovery. Schultens compares the Arab. *jahy*, *nitescere*, *disserenari*, as Menahem has done גָּהָה, but this word is one of the few words which are explained exclusively from the Syriac (and Æthiop.). גָּרַם (here and at xxv. 15) is the word interchanging with עָצַם, xv. 30, xvi. 24.

Ver. 23 Bribery from the bosom the godless receiveth,  
To pervert the ways of justice.

Regarding שָׂחָר, *vid.* xvii. 8. The idea of this word, as well as the clause containing the purpose, demand for the רָשָׁע a high judicial or administrative post. The bosom, חֵק (חֵיק), is, as xvi. 23, that of the clothing. From the bosom, מִחֵק, where it was kept concealed, the gift is brought forth, and is given into the bosom, בְּחֵק, xxi. 14, of him whose favour is to be obtained—an event taking place under four eyes, which purposely withdraws itself from the observation of any third person. Since this is done to give to the course of justice a direction contrary to rectitude, the giver of the bribe has not right on his side; and, under the circumstances, the favourable decision which he purchases may be at once the unrighteous sentence of a צָרִיק, accusing him, or accused by him, xviii. 5.

Ver. 24 The understanding has his attention toward wisdom;  
But the eyes of a fool are on the end of the earth.

Many interpreters explain, as Eichel:

“The understanding finds wisdom everywhere;  
The eyes of the fool seek it at the end of the world.”

Ewald refers to Deut. xxx. 11–14 as an unfolding of the same thought. But although it may be said of the fool (*vid.* on the contrary, xv. 14) that he seeks wisdom, only not at the right place, as at xiv. 6, of the mocker that he seeks wisdom but in vain, yet here the order of the words, as well as the expression, lead us to another thought: before the eyes of the understanding (אֶת־פָּנָי, as Gen. xxxiii. 18, 1 Sam. ii. 11, and frequently in the phrase נִרְאָה 'אֶת־פָּנָי ה', *e.g.* 1 Sam. i. 22) wisdom lies as his aim, his object, the end after which he strives; on the contrary, the eyes of the fool, without keeping that one necessary thing in view, wander in *alia omnia*, and roam about what is far off, without having any fixed object. The fool is everywhere with his thoughts, except where he ought to be. Leaving out of view that which lies nearest, he loses himself in *aliena*. The understanding has an ever present

theme in wisdom, which arrests his attention, and on which he concentrates himself; but the fool flutters about fantastically from one thing to another, and that which is to him precisely of least importance interests him the most.

The series of proverbs, ver. 25–xviii. 2, begins and closes in the same way as the preceding, and only ver. 26 stands by itself without apparent connection.

Ver. 25. This verse begins connecting itself with ver. 21:

A grief to his father is a foolish son,  
And a bitter woe for her that bare him.

The *ἀπ. λεγ.* מָרַר is formed from מָרַר (to be bitter, properly harsh), as מָרָם from מָרַם. The Syr. and Targ. change the subst. into participles; some codd. also have מָרַר (after the forms מָחַל, מָסַב, מָפַר, מָרַע), but as may be expected in 25*a*, מָרָעִים. The dat. obj. instead of the accus. may be possible; the verse immediately following furnishes a sufficient example of this.

Ver. 26 Also to inflict punishment on the righteous is not good;

This, that one overthrows the noble on account of his rectitude.

Does the נָם [also] refer to a connection from which the proverb is separated? or is it tacitly supposed that there are many kinds of worthless men in the world, and that one from among them is brought forward? or is it meant, that to lay upon the righteous a pecuniary punishment is also not good? None of all these. The proverb must have a meaning complete in itself; and if pecuniary punishment and corporeal punishment were regarded as opposed to one another, 26*b* would then have begun with אֵף כִּי (*quanto magis percutere ingenuos*). Here it is with נָם as at xx. 11, and as with אֵף at 11*a*, and נָם at xiii. 10: according to the sense, it belongs not to the word next following, but to לְצַדִּיק; and עֲנִשׁ (whence *inf.* עֲנִישׁ, as xxi. 11, with the *ā* in ע, cf. also אָבַר, xi. 10, for אָבַר) means here not specially to inflict a pecuniary fine, but generally to punish, for, as in *mulctare*, the meaning is generalized, elsewhere with the accus., Deut. xxii. 19, here to give to any one to undergo punishment. The ruler is the servant of God, who has to preserve rectitude, εἰς ὀργὴν τῷ τὸ κακὸν πράσσοντι (Rom. xiii. 14). It is not good when he makes his power to punish to be felt by the innocent as well as by the guilty.

In 26*b*, instead of הַכּוֹת, the proverb is continued with לְהַכּוֹת; לְאַרְמוֹב, which is to be supplied, takes the *inf.* alone when it precedes, and the *inf.* with לְ when it follows, xviii. 5, xxviii. 21,

xxi. 9 (but cf. xxi. 19). מַכּוֹת is the usual word for punishment by scourging, Deut. xxv. 1-3, cf. 2 Cor. xi. 24, N. T. *μαστιγοῦν*, *δέρειν*, Rabb. מַכּוֹת, strokes, or מַלְקוֹת from מַלָּךְ, *vapulare*, to receive stripes. נְדִיבִים are here those noble in disposition. The idea of נְדִיב fluctuates between *generosus* in an outward and in a moral sense, wherefore עַל-יִשָּׁר, or rather עַל-יִישָׁר, is added; for the old editions, correct mss., and e.g. also Soncin. 1488, present עַל (vid. Norzi). Hitzig incorrectly explains this, "against what is due" (יִשָּׁר, as xi. 24); also Ps. xciv. 20, עַל-יִחָק does not mean *κατὰ προστάγματος* (Symmachus), but *ἐπὶ προστάγματι* (LXX. and Theod.), on the ground of right = *prætextu juris* (Vatabl.). Thus עַל-יִישָׁר means here neither against nor beyond what is due, but: on the ground of honourable conduct, making this (of course mistakenly) a lawful title to punishment; Aquila, *ἐπὶ εὐθύτητι*, cf. Matt. v. 10, *ἔνεκεν δικαιοσύνης*. Besides, for עַל after הִכָּה, the causal signification lies nearest Num. xxii. 32, cf. Isa. i. 5 (עַל-מֵה, on account of anything). If the power of punishment is abused to the punishing of the righteous, yea, even to the corporeal chastisement of the noble, and their straight, i.e. conscientious, firm, open conduct, is made a crime against them, that is not good—it is perversion of the idea of justice, and an iniquity which challenges the penal rectitude of the Most High (Eccles. v. 7 [8]).

Ver. 27 He that keepeth his words to himself hath knowledge,  
And the cool of temper is a man of understanding.

The first line here is a variation of x. 19b. The phrase יָדַע דַּעַת (here and at Dan. i. 4) means to possess knowledge (*novisse*); more frequently it is יָדַע בִּינָה, e.g. iv. 1, where יָדַע has the inchoative sense of *noscere*. In 27b the *Kerî* is יִקְר־רוּחַ. Jerome translates it *pretiosi spiritus*, the Venet. *τίμιος τὸ πνεῦμα*. Rashi glosses יִקְר here, as at 1 Sam. iii. 1, by מְנוּעַ (thus to be read after codd.), *retentus spiritu*; most interpreters remark that the spirit here comes into view as expressing itself in words. It is scarcely correct to say that יִקְר דְּבָרִים could designate one who is sparing in his words, but יִקְר־רוּחַ is, according to the fundamental conception of the verb יִקְר, *gravis spiritu* (Schultens), of a dignified, composed spirit; it is a quiet seriousness proceeding from high conscientiousness, and maintaining itself in self-control, which is designated by this word. But the *Chethîb* יִקְר־רוּחַ presents almost the same description of character. קָר from קָרַר (of the same root as יִקְר) means to be firm, unmoveable, *καρτερόν εἶναι*, hence to be congealed,

frozen, cold (cf. *frigus* with *rigere*, *rigor*), figuratively to be cold-blooded, passionless, quiet, composed (Fl.); cf. post-bibl. קָרַח רוּחַ (Arab. *kurrat 'ain*), cooling = refreshing, ἀνάψυξις (Acts iii. 20).<sup>1</sup> Whether we read יָקָר or קָר, in any case we are not to translate *rarus spiritu*, which, apart from the impossibility of the expression, makes 27b almost a tautological repetition of the thought of 27a. The first line recommends bridling of the tongue, in contrast to inconsiderate and untimely talk; the second line recommends coldness, i.e. equanimity of spirit, in contrast to passionate heat.

Ver. 28 continues the same theme, the value of silence:

Even a fool, when he keeps silence, is counted wise;  
When he shutteth his mouth, discreet.

The subj. as well as the pred. of the first line avail for the second. חָטַם, *obturare*, *occludere*, usually of closing the ear, is here transferred to the mouth. The *Hiph.* הִחָרִישׁ means *mutum agere* (cf. Arab. *khars*, *mutum esse*), from חָרַשׁ, which, like *κωφός*, passes from the meaning *surdus* to that of *mutus* (Fl.). The words of Job xiii. 5, and also those of Alexander: *si tacuisses sapiens mansisses*, are applicable to fools. An Arab. proverb says, "silence is the covering of the stupid." In the epigrammatical hexameter,

παῖς τις ἀπαίδεντος φρονιμώτατός ἐστι σιωπῶν,

the word σιωπῶν has the very same syntactical position as these two participles.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "He has made my eye glowing" (*askhn*, cf. שִׁהַיִן) is in Arab. equivalent to "he has deeply troubled me." The eye of the benevolent is *bârid*, and in the Semitic manner of expression, with deep psychological significance, it is said that the tears of sorrow are hot, but those of joy cold.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. C. Schulze's *Die bibl. Sprichwörter* (1860), p. 60 f.









BIBLICAL COMMENTARY

ON THE

PROVERBS OF SOLOMON

BY

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TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

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### THE OLDER BOOK OF PROVERBS, I.-XXIV. (*continued*).

	PAGE
FIRST COLLECTION OF SOLOMONIC PROVERBS, x.-xxii. 16 ( <i>continued</i> ).	
CHAPTER xviii. Exhortations to Fidelity and other Social Virtues,	1
CHAPTER xix. Exhortation to Humility and Gentleness, . . . . .	18
CHAPTER xix. 26. Beginning of the Fourth Principal Part of the Solomonic Collection, . . . . .	36
CHAPTER xx. Exhortations against Drunkenness, Slothfulness, Quarrelsomeness, etc., . . . . .	39
CHAPTER xxi. Exhortations to the Exercise of Justice, Patience, and Submission to God, . . . . .	62
CHAPTER xxii. 1-16. Admonitions as to the Obtaining and Pre- serving of a Good Name, . . . . .	83
FIRST APPENDIX TO THE FIRST COLLECTION OF SOLOMONIC PROVERBS, xxii. 17-xxiv. 22, . . . . .	95-140
CHAPTER xxii. 17-21. Admonition to lay to heart the " Words of the Wise," . . . . .	95
CHAPTER xxii. 22-29. Proverbs regarding the Treatment of the Poor, . . . . .	99
CHAPTER xxiii. Warnings against Avarice, Intemperance, and Licentiousness, . . . . .	103
CHAPTER xxiv. 1-22. Warnings against Fellowship with the Wicked and Foolish, . . . . .	125
SECOND APPENDIX TO THE FIRST SOLOMONIC COLLECTION, xxiv. 23-34, . . . . .	140-148
CHAPTER xxiv. 23-29. Admonition to Right Conduct toward others, . . . . .	141
CHAPTER xxiv. 30-34. Warning against Slothfulness—a Mashal Ode, . . . . .	146

SECOND COLLECTION OF SOLOMONIC PROVERBS (WHICH THE  
MEN OF HEZEKIAH COLLECTED), XXV.-XXIX.

	PAGE
CHAPTER xxv. Admonition to Kings and their Subjects as to the Fear of God and the Practice of Righteousness, . . . . .	149
CHAPTER xxvi. Warnings against Folly, Indolence, and Malice, . . . . .	173
CHAPTER xxvii. 1-8. Warnings against unseemly Boasting and Anger, . . . . .	198
CHAPTER xxvii. 9. Proverbs of the Value of Friendship, . . . . .	204
CHAPTER xxvii. 14. The Contentious Woman, . . . . .	210
CHAPTER xxvii. 17. The Influence of Mutual Intercourse, . . . . .	212
CHAPTER xxvii. 23-27. Exhortation to Rural Industry—a Mashal Ode, . . . . .	218
CHAPTER xxviii. Warnings against Unscrupulous, Unlawful Dealings, . . . . .	221
CHAPTER xxix. Divers Ethical Proverbs: Warnings against Stubbornness, Flattery, Wrath, etc., . . . . .	240
FIRST APPENDIX TO THE SECOND SOLOMONIC COLLECTION OF PROVERBS, xxx., . . . . .	260
CHAPTER xxx. 1-6. The "Words of Agur"—his Confession of a Fruitless Search for Wisdom, . . . . .	260
CHAPTER xxx. 7-9. A Mashal Ode—a Prayer for a Middle State between Poverty and Riches, . . . . .	280
CHAPTER xxx. 11-14. A Priamel—a Wicked Generation, . . . . .	284
CHAPTER xxx. 15, 16. Four Insatiable Things, . . . . .	287
CHAPTER xxx. 17. The Eye that mocketh, . . . . .	293
CHAPTER xxx. 18-20. Four Incomprehensible Things, . . . . .	295
CHAPTER xxx. 21-23. Four Intolerable Things, . . . . .	299
CHAPTER xxx. 24-28. Four Things that are Small and yet Wise, . . . . .	301
CHAPTER xxx. 29-31. Four Creatures that are stately in going, . . . . .	305
SECOND APPENDIX TO THE SECOND SOLOMONIC COLLECTION OF PROVERBS, xxxi. 1-9, . . . . .	314
CHAPTER xxxi. 1-9. The "Words of Lemuel"—his Mother's Counsel for Kings, . . . . .	314
THIRD APPENDIX TO THE SECOND SOLOMONIC COLLECTION OF PROVERBS, xxxi. 10-31, . . . . .	325
An Alphabetical Poem ("A Golden A B C for Women") in praise of a Virtuous Matron, . . . . .	326
NOTE.—The Proverbs peculiar to the Alexandrine Translation, . . . . .	342

## ABBREVIATIONS.

[THE usual abbreviations of words and phrases are adopted throughout this work, and will readily be understood by the reader. The mark of abbreviation in Hebrew words is a stroke like an acute accent after a letter, as *e.g.* 'תֵּר for תֵּרוֹמוֹת, xxix. 4; and in Hebrew sentences, 'וּגוֹ for וְגוֹמַר *et complens* = etc., as *e.g.* at xxx. 4.]



# THE BOOK OF PROVERBS

FIRST COLLECTION OF SOLOMONIC PROVERBS.—

CHAP. X.-XXII. 16. (CONTINUED.)



HAP. XVIII. 1. This series of proverbs now turns from the fool to the separatist:

The separatist seeketh after his own pleasure;

Against all that is beneficial he showeth his teeth.

The reflexive נִפְרָד has here the same meaning as the Rabbinical פָּרַשׁ מִן־הַעֲבוּר, to separate oneself from the congregation, *Aboth* ii. 5; נִפְרָד denotes a man who separates himself, for he follows his own counsel, Arab. *mnfrd* (*mtfrrd*) *brâyh*, or *jhys almhl* (*seorsum ab aliis secedens*). Instead of לְתַאֲוָה, Hitzig, after Jerome, adopts the emendation לְתַאֲנָה, “after an occasion” (a pretext), and by נִפְרָד thinks of one pushed aside, who, thrown into opposition, seeks to avenge himself. But his translation of 1b, “against all that is fortunate he gnasheth his teeth,” shows how much the proverb is opposed to this interpretation. נִפְרָד denotes one who willingly (*Judg.* iv. 11), and, indeed, obstinately withdraws himself. The construction of יִבְקֹשׁ with לְ (also *Job* x. 6) is explained by this, that the poet, giving prominence to the object, would set it forward: a pleasure (תַּאֲוָה, as Arab. *hawan*, unstable and causeless direction of the mind to something, pleasure, freak, caprice), and nothing else, he goes after who has separated himself (Fl.); the effort of the separatist goes out after a pleasure, *i.e.* the enjoyment and realization of such; instead of seeking to conform himself to the law and ordinance of the community, he seeks to carry out a separate view, and to accomplish some darling plan: *libidinem sectatur sui cerebri homo*. With this 1b accords.

תוֹשִׁיָּה (*vid.* at ii. 7) is concretely that which furthers and profits. Regarding הִתְנַלֵּעַ, *vid.* at xvii. 14. Thus putting his subjectivity in the room of the common weal, he shows his teeth, places himself in fanatical opposition against all that is useful and profitable in the principles and aims, the praxis of the community from which he separates himself. The figure is true to nature: the polemic of the schismatic and the sectary against the existing state of things, is for the most part measureless and hostile.

Ver. 2 The fool hath no delight in understanding;  
But only that his heart may reveal itself therein.

The verb הִפִּיץ forms the fut. יִהְיֶיץ as well as יִתְפִּיץ; first the latter from הִפִּיץ, with the primary meaning, to bow, to bend down; then both forms as intransitive, to bend oneself to something, to be inclined to something, Arab. *'t.f.* (Fl.). תְּבוּנָה is here the intelligence which consists in the understanding of one's own deficiency, and of that which is necessary to meet it. The inclination of the fool goes not out after such intelligence, but (כִּי אִם; according to Ben-Naphtali, כִּי-אִם) only that his heart, *i.e.* the understanding which he thinks that he already possesses, may reveal itself, show itself publicly. He thinks thereby to show himself in his true greatness, and to render a weighty service to the world. This loquacity of the fool, proceeding from self-satisfaction, without self-knowledge, has already, xii. 23, and often, been reprimanded.

The group beginning with ver. 3 terminates in two proverbs (vers. 6 and 7), related to the concluding verse of the foregoing:

Ver. 3 If a godless man cometh, then cometh also contempt;  
And together with disgrace, shame.

J. D. Michaelis, and the most of modern critics, read רָשָׁע; then, contempt etc., are to be thought of as the consequences that follow godlessness; for that קָלֹן means (Hitzig) disgracefulness, *i.e.* disgraceful conduct, is destitute of proof; קָלֹן always means disgrace as an experience. But not only does the Masoretic text punctuate רָשָׁע, but also all the old translators, the Greek, Aramaic, and Latin, have done so. And is it on this account, because a coming naturally seems to be spoken of a person? The "pride cometh, then cometh shame," xi. 2,

was in their recollection not less firmly, perhaps, than in ours. They read רָשָׁע, because בּוֹ does not fittingly designate the first of that which godlessness effects, but perhaps the first of that which proceeds from it. Therefore we adhere to the opinion, that the proverb names the fiends which appear in the company of the godless wherever he goes, viz. first בּוֹ, contempt (Ps. xxxi. 19), which places itself haughtily above all due subordination, and reverence, and forbearance; and then, with the disgrace [*turpitude*], קָלֹן, which attaches itself to those who meddle with him (Isa. xxii. 18), there is united the shame, חֲרָפָה (Ps. xxxix. 9), which he has to suffer from him who has only always expected something better from him. Fleischer understands all the three words in the passive sense, and remarks, “קָלֹן וְחֲרָפָה, a more artificial expression for עִם-קָלֹן חֲרָפָה, in the Turkish quite common for the copula *wāw*, e.g. *swylh tbrāk*, earth and water, *'wrtylh ār*, the man and the woman.” But then the expression would be tautological; we understand בּוֹ and חֲרָפָה of that which the godless does to others by his words, and קָלֹן of that which he does to them by his conduct. By this interpretation, עִם is more than the representative of the copula.

Ver. 4 Deep waters are the words from a man's mouth,  
A bubbling brook, a fountain of wisdom.

Earlier, we added to *hominis* the supplement *sc. sapientis*, but then an unnecessary word would be used, and that which is necessary omitted. Rather it might be said that אִישׁ is meant in an ideal sense; but thus meant, אִישׁ, like גִּבּוֹר, denotes the valiant man, but not man as he ought to be, or the man of honour; and besides, a man may be a man of honour without there being said of him what this proverb expresses. Ewald comes nearer the case when he translates, “deep waters are the heart-words of many.” Heart-words—what an unbiblical expression! The LXX., which translates *λόγος ἐν καρδίᾳ*, has not read דְּבַר לְבַי, but דְּבַר בְּלִב (as xx. 5, עֵצָה בְּלִב). But that “of many” is certainly not a right translation, yet right in so far as אִישׁ (as at xii. 14) is thought of as made prominent: the proverb expresses, in accordance with the form of narrative proverbs which present an example, what occurs in actual life, and is observed. Three different things are said of the words

from a man's mouth: they are deep waters, for their meaning does not lie on the surface, but can be perceived only by penetrating into the secret motives and aims of him who speaks; they are a bubbling brook, which freshly and powerfully gushes forth to him who feels this flow of words, for in this brook there never fails an always new gush of living water; it is a fountain or well of wisdom, from which wisdom flows forth, and whence wisdom is to be drawn. Hitzig supposes that the distich is antithetic; מִיָּם עֲמֻקִּים, or rather מִיָּם עֲמֻקִּים, "waters of the deep," are cistern waters; on the contrary, "a welling brook is a fountain of wisdom." But עֲמֻק means deep, not deepened, and deep water is the contrast of shallow water; a cistern also may be deep (cf. xxii. 14), but deep water is such as is deep, whether it be in the ocean or in a ditch. 4b also does not suggest a cistern, for thereby it would be indicated that the description, דְּבַר־חַיִּים, is not here continued; the "fountain of wisdom" does not form a proper parallel or an antithesis to this subject, since this much rather would require the placing in contrast of deep and shallow, of exhausted (drained out) and perennial. And: the fountain is a brook, the well a stream—who would thus express himself! We have thus neither an antithetic nor a synonymous (LXX. after the phrase ἀναπηδῶν, Jerome, *Venet.*, Luth.), but an integral distich (*vid.* vol. i. p. 8) before us; and this leads us to consider what depths of thought, what riches of contents, what power of spiritual and moral advancement, may lie in the words of a man.

Ver. 5 To favour the person of the godless is not good,  
And to oppress the righteous in judgment.

As ver. 4 has one subject, so ver. 5 has one predicate. The form is the same as xvii. 26. שָׂאת פָּנַי (cf. xxiv. 23), προσωποληψία, *acceptio personæ*, is this, that one accepts the פָּנַי, *i.e.* the personal appearance of any one (πρόσωπον λαμβάνει), *i.e.* regards it as acceptable, respectable, agreeable, which is a thing in itself not wrong; but in a judge who ought to determine according to the facts of the case and the law, it becomes sinful partiality. הַטּוֹת, in a forensic sense, with the accus. of the person, may be regarded in a twofold way: either as a turning aside, מִדֶּיךָ, Isa. x. 2, from following and attaining unto the right, or as an oppressing, for the phrase הִטָּה מִשְׁפָּט [to pervert justice] (cf.

xvii. 23) is transferred to the person who experiences the oppression = perversion of the law; and this idea perhaps always underlies the expression, wherever, as *e.g.* Mal. iii. 5, no addition brings with it the other. Under xvii. 15 is a fuller explanation of לא-טוב.

Ver. 6 The lips of the fool engage in strife,  
And his mouth calleth for stripes.

We may translate: the lips of the fool cause strife, for בוא ב, to come with anything, *e.g.* Ps. lxvi. 13, is equivalent to bring it (to bring forward), as also: they engage in strife; as one says בוא בְּרָמִים: to be engaged in bloodshed, 1 Sam. xxv. 26. We prefer this *intransitive* (*ingerunt se*), with Schultens and Fleischer. יבא for תבאנה, a *synallage generis*, to which, by means of a "self-deception of the language" (Fl.), the apparent masculine ending of such duals may have contributed. The stripes which the fool calleth for (קרא ל, like ii. 3) are such as he himself carries off, for it comes *a verbis ad verbera*. The LXX.: his bold mouth calleth for death (פיו ההמה מות יקרא); למלהמות has, in codd. and old editions, the *Mem raphatum*, as also at xix. 29; the sing. is thus מנהלום, like מנעול to מנעולי, for the *Mem dagessatum* is to be expected in the inflected מנהלם, by the passing over of the *ō* into *ū*.

Ver. 7 The mouth of the fool is to him destruction,  
And his lips are a snare to his soul.

As ver. 6 corresponds to xvii. 27 of the foregoing group, so this ver. 7 corresponds to xvii. 28. Regarding מותהלו, *vid.* xiii. 3. Instead of פִּי בָסִיל, is to be written פִּי-כַסִּיל, according to *Torath Emeth*, p. 40, Cod. 1294, and old editions.

A pair of proverbs regarding the flatterer and the slothful:

Ver. 8 The words of the flatterer are as dainty morsels,  
And they glide down into the innermost parts.

An "analogy, with an epexégesis in the second member" (Fl.), which is repeated in xxvi. 22. Ewald, Bertheau, Hitzig, and others, are constrained to interpret והם as introducing a contrast, and in this sense they give to מתלהמים all kinds of unwarrantable meanings. Ewald translates: as burning (להם, cogn. להב), and offers next: as whispering (להם, cogn. נהם, רעם); Ch. B. Michaelis, Bertheau, and others: as sporting (להם, cogn. להה); Hitzig: like soft airs (להם, cogn. Arab. *hillam*, *flaccus*,

*laxus*). All these interpretations are without support. The word לָהֶם has none of all these significations; it means, as the Arab. *lahima* warrants, *deglutire*. But Böttcher's explanation also: "as swallowed down, because spoken with reserve," proceeds, like those others, from the supposed syntactically fine yet false supposition, that 8b is an antithetic "*dennoch*" [*tamen*]. In that case the poet would have written וְהֵם יִרְדּוּ (cf. וְהוּא, as the beginning of a conditional clause, iii. 29, xxiii. 3). But וְהוּא, וְהֵם, with the finite following, introduces neither here nor at Deut. xxxiii. 3, Judg. xx. 34, Ps. xcv. 10, cf. Gen. xliii. 23, a conditional clause. Thus 8b continues the clause 8a by one standing on the same line; and thus we do not need to invent a meaning for בְּמַתְלֵהִים, which forms a contrast to the penetrating into the innermost parts. The relation of the parts of the proverb is rightly given by Luther:

The words of the slanderer are stripes,  
And they go through the heart of one.

He interprets לָהֶם as transposed from הֵלֶם (Rashi and others); but stripes cannot be called מַתְלֵהִים—they are called, 6b, מַהֲלָמוֹת. This interpretation of the word has always more support than that of Symmachus: ὡς ἀκέρατοι; Jerome: *quasi simplicia*; Aquila, xxvi. 22: γοητικοί; which last, as also that of Capellus, Clericus, and Schultens: *quasi numine quodam afflata*, seems to support itself on the Arab. *âhm* iv. *inspirare*. But in reality *âhm* does not mean *afflare*; it means *deglutire*, and nothing else. The Jewish lexicographers offer nothing worth considering; Kimchi's הִלָּקִים, according to which the *Venet.* translates μαλθακιζόμενοι, is fanciful; for the Talm. הִלָּם, striking = hitting, suitable, standing well, furnishes no transition to "smooth" and "soft." Immanuel compares *âhm* = בָּלַע; and Schultens, who is followed by Gesenius and others, has already, with perfect correctness, explained: *tanquam quæ avidissime inglutiantur*. Thus also Fleischer: things which offer themselves to be eagerly gulped down, or which let themselves be thus swallowed. But in this way can one be truly just to the *Hithpa.*? The Arab. *âlthm* (stronger form, *âltk*, according to which van Dyk translates *mthl ukam hlwt*, like sweet morsels) means to swallow into oneself, which is not here appro-

pritate. The *Hithpa.* will thus have here a passive signification : things which are greedily swallowed. Regarding נִרְנָן from נָרַן, *vid.* at xvi. 28. וְהֵם refers to the words of the flatterer, and is emphatic, equivalent to *æque illa, etiam illa, or illa ipsa.* יִרְר is here connected with the obj. accus. (cf. i. 12) instead of with אֵל, vii. 27. חֲדָרֵי, *penetralia*, we had already at vii. 27; the root-word is (Arab.) *khdr*, to seclude, to conceal, different from *hdr*, *demittere*, and *hchr* (cogn. חִזַּר), to finish, *circumire*. בֶּטֶן is the inner part of the body with reference to the organs lying there, which mediate not only the life of the body, but also that of the mind,—in general, the internal part of the personality. The LXX. does not translate this proverb, but has in its stead xix. 15, in a different version, however, from that it gives there; the Syr. and the Targ. have thereby been drawn away from the Hebr. text.

Ver. 9 He also who showeth himself slothful in his business,  
Is a brother to him who proceedeth to destroy.

The *Hithpa.* הִתְרַפָּה signifies here, as at xxiv. 10, to show oneself slack, lazy, negligent. מְלָאכָה is properly a commission for another, as a king has a messenger, ambassador, commissioner to execute it; here, any business, whether an undertaking in commission from another, or a matter one engages in for himself. He who shows himself slack therein, produces in his way, viz. by negligence, destruction, as truly as the בֹּעֵל מְשַׁחֵת, who does it directly by his conduct. Thus one is named, who is called, or who has his own delight in it, to destroy or overthrow. Jerome, incorrectly limiting: *sua opera dissipantis.* Hitzig well compares Matt. xii. 30. In the variation, xxviii. 24b, the destroyer is called אִישׁ מְשַׁחֵת, the connection of the words being adject.; on the contrary, the connection of בֹּעֵל מְשַׁחֵת is genit. (cf. xxii. 24, xxiii. 2, etc.), for מְשַׁחֵת as frequently means that which destroys = destruction. Von Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* ii. 2, 403) understands 'אִישׁ מ' of the street robber, 'בֹּעֵל מ' of the captain of robbers; but the designation for the latter must be 'שָׂר מ', though at 1 Kings xi. 24 he is called by the name שָׂר נִדָּר. The form of the word in the proverb here is more original than at xxviii. 24. There חֵבֶר [companion] is used, here אָח [brother], a general Semitic name of him who, or of that which, is in any way related to another, cf. Job xxx. 29. Fleischer com-

pares the Arab. proverb: *álshbht ákht alkhtyât*, scepticism is the sister of sin.

Two proverbs, of the fortress of faith, and of the fortress of presumption:

Ver. 10 A strong tower is the name of Jahve:

The righteous runneth into it, and is high.

The name of Jahve is the Revelation of God, and the God of Revelation Himself, the creative and historical Revelation, and who is always continually revealing Himself; His name is His nature representing itself, and therefore capable of being described and named, before all the *Tetragramm*, as the *Anagramm* of the overruling and inworking historical being of God, as the *Chiffre* of His free and all-powerful government in grace and truth, as the self-naming of God the Saviour. This name, which is afterwards interwoven in the name Jesus, is מְגִד־לְעוֹ (Ps. lxi. 4), a strong high tower bidding defiance to every hostile assault. Into this the righteous runneth, to hide himself behind its walls, and is thus lifted (*perf. consec.*) high above all danger (cf. יִשָּׁנָה, xxix. 25). רָוַן אֵל means, Job xv. 26, to run against anything, רָוַן, *seq. acc.*, to invest, blockade anything, רָוַן בְּ, to hasten within; Hitzig's conjecture, יָרוּם [riseth up high], instead of יָרוּן, is a freak. בְּ רָוַן is speedily בְּ בוא, the idea the same as Ps. xxvii. 5, xxxi. 21.

Ver. 11 The possession of the righteous is his strong fort,

And is like a high wall in his imagination.

Line first = x. 15a. שָׂכָה מִשְׁכָּתָהּ from שָׂכָה, Chald. סָכָא (whence after *Megilla* 14a, יִסְכָּה, she who looks), R. שָׂךְ, cogn. וָךְ, to pierce, to fix, means the image as a medal, and thus also intellectually: image (conception, and particularly the imagination) of the heart (Ps. lxxiii. 7), here the fancy, conceit; Fleischer compares (Arab.) *tšwwr*, to imagine something to oneself, French *se figurer*. Translators from the LXX. to Luther incorrectly think on שָׂכָה (סָכָה), to entertain; only the *Venet.* is correct in the rendering: *ἐν φαντασίᾳ αὐτοῦ*; better than Kimchi, who, after Ezra viii. 12, thinks on the chamber where the riches delighted in are treasured, and where he fancies himself in the midst of his treasures as if surrounded by an inaccessible wall.

We place together vers. 12–19, in which the figure of a secure fortress returns:

Ver. 12. This proverb is connected with the preceding of the rich man who trusts in his mammon.

Before destruction the heart of man is haughty;  
And humility goeth before honour.

Line first is a variation of xvi. 18a, and line second is similar to xv. 33b.

Ver. 13 If one giveth an answer before he heareth,  
It is to him as folly and shame.

The *part.* stands here differently from what it does at xiii. 18, where it is subj., and at xvii. 14, where it is pred. of a simple sentence; it is also here, along with what appertains to it in accordance with the Semitic idiom, subj. to 13b (one who answers . . . is one to whom this . . .); but, in accordance with our idiom, it becomes a hypothetical antecedent (cf. vol. i. p. 282). For "to answer" one also uses הָשִׁיב without addition; but the original full expression is הָשִׁיב דָּבָר, *reddere verbum, referre dictum* (cf. עָנָה דָּבָר, Jer. xlv. 20, absol. in the cogn., xv. 28a); דָּבָר one may not understand of the word to which, but of the word with which, the reply is made. הָיָא לוֹ comprehends the meaning: it avails to him (*ducitur ei*), as well as it reaches to him (*est ei*). In Agricola's *Fünfhundert Sprüchen* this proverb is given thus: *Wer antwortet ehe er höret, der zaiget an sein torhait vnd wirdt ze schanden* [he who answers before he hears shows his folly, and it is to him a shame]. But that would require the word to be יָבוֹשׁ, *pudescet*; פְּלִמָּה (הָיָא לוֹ) means that it becomes to him a ground of merited disgrace. "פְּלִמָּה", properly wounding, i.e. shame (like *atteinte à son honneur*), from פָּלַם (cogn. הָלַם), to strike, hit, wound" (Fl.). Sirach (xi. 8) warns against such rash talking, as well as against the rudeness of interrupting others.

Ver. 14 The spirit of a man beareth his sickness;  
But a broken spirit, who can bear it?

The breath of the Creator imparting life to man is spoken of as *spiritus spirans*, רוּחַ (רוּחַ חַיִּים), and as *spiritus spiratus*, נֶפֶשׁ (נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה); the spirit (*animus*) is the primary, and the soul (*anima*) the secondary principle of life; the double gender of רוּחַ is accounted for thus: when it is thought of as the primary, and thus in a certain degree (*vid. Psychol.* p. 103 ff.) the manly principle, it is mas. (Gen. vi. 3; Ps. li. 12, etc.). Here the

change of gender is in the highest degree characteristic, and אִישׁ also is intentionally used (cf. 1 Sam. xxvi. 15) instead of אָדָם, 16a: the courageous spirit of a man which sustains or endures (בְּלִבָּל, R. בל, *comprehendere, prehendere*; Luther, "who knows how to contain himself in his sufferings;" cf. Ps. li. 12, "may the free Spirit hold me") the sickness [*Siechthum*] (we understand here "siech" in the old meaning = *sick*) with self-control, is *generis masculini*; while, on the contrary, the רוּחַ נְבִיאָה (as xv. 13, xvii. 22), brought down from its manliness and superiority to disheartened passivity, is *genere feminino* (cf. Ps. li. 12 with ver. 19). Fleischer compares the Arab. proverb, *thbât âlnfs bâlghdhâ thbât alrwḥ balghnâ*, the soul has firmness by nourishment, the spirit by music.<sup>1</sup> The question מִי יִשְׁאָנָה is like Mark ix. 50: if the salt becomes tasteless, wherewith shall one season it? There is no seasoning for the spice that has become insipid. And for the spirit which is destined to bear the life and fortune of the person, if it is cast down by sufferings, there is no one to lift it up and sustain it. But is not God the Most High the lifter up and the bearer of the human spirit that has been crushed and broken? The answer is, that the manly spirit, 14a, is represented as strong in God; the discouraged, 14b, as not drawing from God the strength and support he ought to do. But passages such as Isa. lxvi. 2 do not bring it near that we think of the רוּחַ נְבִיאָה as alienated from God. The spirit is נִשְׁאָה, the bearer of the personal and natural life with its functions, activities, and experiences. If the spirit is borne down to powerless and helpless passivity, then within the sphere of the human personality there is no other sustaining power that can supply its place.

Ver. 15 The heart of a man of understanding gaineth knowledge,  
And the ear of the wise seeketh after knowledge.

נָבוֹן may be also interpreted as an adj., but we translate it here as at xiv. 33, because thus it corresponds with the parallelism; cf. לֵב צָדִיק, xv. 28, and לֵב חָכָם, xvi. 23, where the adj. interpretation is excluded. The gaining of wisdom is, after xvii. 16,

<sup>1</sup> In the Arab. language, influenced by philosophy, رُوح, the *anima vitalis*, and نَفْس, the *anima rationalis*, are inverted; *vid.* Baudissin's *Translationis antiquæ Arab. libri Jobi quæ supersunt* (1870), p. 34.

referred to the heart: a heart vigorous in embracing and receiving it is above all necessary, and just such an one possesses the נבון, which knows how to value the worth and usefulness of such knowledge. The wise, who are already in possession of such knowledge, are yet at the same time constantly striving to increase this knowledge: their ear seeks knowledge, eagerly asking where it is to be found, and attentively listening when the opportunity is given of מִצָּא, obtaining it.

Ver. 16 The gift of a man maketh room for him,  
And bringeth him before the great.

That מָתֵן may signify intellectual endowments, Hitzig supposes, but without any proof for such an opinion. Intellectual ability as the means of advancement is otherwise designated, xxii. 29. But Hitzig is right in this, that one mistakes the meaning of the proverb if he interprets מָתֵן in the sense of שָׁחַד (*vid.* at xvii. 8): מָתֵן is an indifferent idea, and the proverb means that a man makes free space, a free path for himself, by a gift, *i.e.* by this, that he shows himself to be agreeable, pleasing where it avails, not niggardly but liberal. As a proverb expresses it:

*Mit dem Hut in der Hand  
Kommt man durchs ganze Land*

[with hat in hand one goes through the whole land], so it is said here that such liberality brings before the great, *i.e.* not: furnishes with introductions to them; but helps to a place of honour near the great, *i.e.* those in a lofty position (cf. לִפְנֵי, xxii. 29; עם, Ps. cxiii. 8). It is an important part of practical wisdom, that by right liberality, *i.e.* by liberal giving where duty demands it, and prudence commends it, one does not lose but gains, does not descend but rises; it helps a man over the difficulties of limited, narrow circumstances, gains for him affection, and helps him up from step to step. The *ā* of מָתֵן is, in a singular way (cf. מִתְּנָה, מִתְּנִית), treated as unchangeable.

Ver. 17 He that is first in his controversy is right;  
But there cometh another and searcheth him thoroughly—

an exhortation to be cautious in a lawsuit, and not to justify without more ado him who first brings forward his cause, and supports it by reasons, since, if the second party afterwards search into the reasons of the first, they show themselves un-

tenable. הָרֵאשׁוֹן בְּרִיבוֹ are to be taken together; the words are equivalent to אִשֶּׁר יָבֵא בְּרֵאשׁוֹנָה : *qui prior cum causa sua venit*, i.e. *eam ad judicem defert* (Fl.). הָרֵאשׁוֹן may, however, also of itself alone be *qui prior venit*; and בְּרִיבוֹ will be taken with צָדִיק: *justus qui prior venit in causa sua (esse videtur)*. The accentuation rightly leaves the relation undecided. Instead of יָבֵא (יָבֵא) the *Kerî* has יָבֵא, as it elsewhere, at one time, changes the fut. into the perf. with ו (e.g. xx. 4, Jer. vi. 21); and, at another time, the perf. with ו into the fut. (e.g. Ps. x. 10, Isa. v. 29). But here, where the *perf. consec.* is not so admissible, as vi. 11, xx. 4, the fut. ought to remain unchanged. רֵעָהוּ is the other part, synon. with בְּעַל דִּין חֲבֵרוֹ, *Sanhedrin 7b*, where the אֲזָהָרָה לְבֵית־דִּין (admonition for the court of justice) is derived from Deut. i. 16, to hear the accused at the same time with the accuser, that nothing of the latter may be adopted beforehand. This proverb is just such an *audiatur et altera pars*. The *status controversiæ* is only brought fairly into the light by the hearing of the *altera pars*: then comes the other and examines him (the first) to the very bottom. חָקֵר, elsewhere with the accus. of the thing, e.g. רִיב, thoroughly to search into a strife, Job xxix. 16, is here, as at xxviii. 11, connected with the accus. of the person: to examine or lay bare any one thoroughly; here, so that the misrepresentations of the state of the matter might come out to view along with the reasons assigned by the accuser.

Ver. 18 The lot allayeth contentions,

And separateth between the mighty,

i.e. erects a partition wall between them—those contending (הַפְּרִיר בֵּין, as at 2 Kings ii. 11, cf. Arab. *frk byn*); עֲצוּמִים are not opponents who maintain their cause with weighty arguments (עֲצָמוֹת, Isa. xli. 21), *qui argumentis pollent* (vid. Rashi), for then must the truth appear in the *pro et contra*; but mighty opponents, who, if the lot did not afford a seasonable means of reconciliation, would make good their demands by blows and by the sword (Fl.). Here it is the lot which, as the judgment of God, brings about peace, instead of the *ultima ratio* of physical force. The proverb refers to the lot what the Epistle to the Hebrews, vi. 16, refers to the oath, vid. at xvi. 33. Regarding מְדַיִּנִּים and its altered forms, vid. vol. i. p. 145.

Ver. 19 A brother toward whom it has been acted perfidiously resists more than a strong tower ;

And contentions are like the bar of a palace.

Luther rightly regarded the word נִשָּׁע, according to which the LXX., Vulg., and Syr. translated *frater qui adjuvatur a fratre*, as an incorrect reading; one would rather expect אֵחַ מְנִישֵׁי, “a brother who stands by,” as Luther earlier translated; and besides, נִשָּׁע does not properly mean *adjuvari*, but *salvari*. His translation—

*Ein verletzt Bruder helt herter denn eine feste Stad,  
Und Zanck helt herter, denn rigel am Palast*

[a brother wounded resisteth more than a strong city, and strife resisteth more than bolts in the palace], is one of his most happy renderings. מְקַרִּיתָעו in itself only means ὑπὲρ πόλιν ὀχυράν (*Venet.*); the noun-adjective (cf. Isa. x. 10) to be supplied is to be understood to עו הוּא : עו הוּא or קִשָּׁה הוּא (Kimchi). The *Niph.* נִשָּׁע occurs only here. If one reads נִשָּׁע, then it means one who is treated falsely = נִשָּׁע בּוֹ, like the frequently occurring קָמִי, my rising up ones = קָמִים עָלַי, those that rise up against me; but Codd. (also Baer's *Cod. jaman.*) and old editions have נִשָּׁע, which, as we have above translated, gives an impersonal attributive clause; the former: *frater perfidiose tractatus* (Fl.: *mala fide offensus*); the latter: *perfide actum est, scil. בּוֹ in eum = in quem perfide actum*. אֵחַ is, after xvii. 17, a friend in the highest sense of the word; פֶּשַׁע means to break off, to break free, with בּ or עַל of him on whom the action terminates. That the פֶּשַׁע is to be thought of as אֵחַ of the אֵחַ נִשָּׁע is obvious; the translation, “brothers. who break with one another” (Gesen.), is incorrect: אֵחַ is not collective, and still less is נִשָּׁע a *reciprocum*. The relation of אֵחַ is the same as that of אֶלְיָהוּ, xvi. 28. The Targum (improving the Peshito) translates אֶחָא רְמַתְעֵי מִן אֶחָי, which does not mean: a brother who renounces (Hitzig), but who is treated wickedly on the part of, his brother. That is correct; on the contrary, Ewald's “a brother resists more than . . .” proceeds from a meaning of פֶּשַׁע which it has not; and Bertheau gives, with Schultens, an untenable<sup>1</sup> reflexive meaning to the

<sup>1</sup> Among the whole Heb. synon. for sinning, there exists no reflexive *Niph.*; and also the Arab. *fak* has no ethical signification. נִסְכָּל only, in the sense of fool, is found.

*Niph.* (which as denom. might mean "covered with crime," *Venet.* *πλημμεληθείς*), and, moreover, one that is too weak, for he translates, "a brother is more obstinate than . . ." Hitzig corrects *אָהוּ פִּשֵּׁעַ*, to shut up sin = to hold it fettered; but that is not correct Heb. It ought to be *עָצַר*, *כָּבַשׁ*, or *רָרוּת*. In 19*a* the force of the substantival clause lies in the *כֵּן* (more than, *i.e.* harder = more difficult to be gained), and in 19*b* in the *פֶּן*; cf. Mic. vii. 4, where they are interchanged. The parallelism is synonymous: strifes and lawsuits between those who had been friends form as insurmountable a hindrance to their reconciliation, are as difficult to be raised, as the great bars at the gate of a castle (Fl.). The point of comparison is not only the weight of the cross-beam (from *בָּרָה*, crosswise, across, to go across the field), but also the shutting up of the access. Strife forms a partition wall between such as once stood near each other, and so much thicker the closer they once stood.

With ver. 19, the series of proverbs which began with that of the flatterer closes. The catchword *אָח*, which occurred at its commencement, 9*b*, is repeated at its close, and serves also as a landmark of the group following 20-24. The proverb of the breach of friendship and of contentions is followed by one of the reaction of the use of the tongue on the man himself.

Ver. 20 Of the fruit which a man's mouth bringeth is his heart satisfied;  
By the revenue of his lips is he filled.

He will taste in rich measure of the consequences not merely of the good (xii. 14, cf. xiii. 2), but of whatever he has spoken. This is an oxymoron like Matt. xv. 11, that not that which goeth into the mouth, but that which cometh out of it, defileth a man. As at John iv. 34 the conduct of a man, so here his words are called his *βρῶμα*. Not merely the conduct (i. 31, Isa. iii. 10), but also the words are fruit-bringing; and not only do others taste of the fruit of the words as of the actions of a man, whether they be good or bad, but above all he himself does so, both in this life and in that which is to come.

Ver. 21 Death and life are in the power of the tongue;  
And whoever loveth it shall eat its fruit.

The hand, *יָד*, is so common a metaphor for power, that as here a hand is attributed to the tongue, so *e.g.* Isa. xlvii. 14 to the flame, and Ps. xlix. 16 to Hades. Death and life is the great alternative

which is placed, Deut. xxx. 15, before man. According as he uses his tongue, he falls under the power of death or attains to life. All interpreters attribute, 21*b*, וְאֶהְבֵּיהָ to the tongue: *qui eam (linguam) amant vescentur* (וְאֶהְבֵּיהָ, distrib. sing., as iii. 18, 35, etc.) *fructu ejus*. But "to love the tongue" is a strange and obscure expression. He loves the tongue, says Hitzig, who loves to babble. Euchel: he who guards it carefully, or: he who takes care of it, *i.e.* who applies himself to right discourse. Combining both, Zöckler: who uses it much, as εὐλογῶν or κακολογῶν. The LXX. translates, οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες αὐτῆς, *i.e.* אֲחֻזֶיהָ; but אָחַז means *prehendere* and *tenere*, not *cohibere*, and the tongue kept in restraint brings forth indeed no bad fruit, but it brings no fruit at all. Why thus? Does the suffix of וְאֶהְבֵּיהָ, perhaps like viii. 17, *Chethûb*, refer to wisdom, which, it is true, is not named, but which lies everywhere before the poet's mind? At xiv. 3 we ventured to make חַכְמָה the subject of 3*b*. Then 21*b* would be as a miniature of viii. 17–21. Or is וְאֶהְבֵּיהָ a mutilation of וְאֶהְבֵּי יְהוָה: and he who loves Jahve (Ps. xcvi. 10) enjoys its (the tongue's) fruit?

Ver. 22 Whoso hath found a wife hath found a good thing,  
And hath obtained favour from Jahve.

As וְאֶהְבֵּיהָ, 21*b*, reminds us of viii. 17, so here not only 22*b*, but also 22*a* harmonizes with viii. 35 (cf. xii. 2). A wife is such as she ought to be, as ver. 14, אִישׁ, a man is such as he ought to be; the LXX., Syr., Targ., and Vulgate supply *bonam*, but "gnomic brevity and force disdains such enervating adjectives, and cautious limitations of the idea" (Fl.). Besides, אִשָּׁה טוֹבָה in old Hebr. would mean a well-favoured rather than a good-dispositioned wife, which later idea is otherwise expressed, xix. 14, xxxi. 10. The *Venet.* rightly has γυναικα, and Luther *ein Ehefrau*, for it is a married woman that is meant. The first מֵצָא is *perf. hypotheticum*, Gesen. § 126, Anm. 1. On the other hand, Eccles. vii. 26, "I found, מוֹצֵא אֲנִי, more bitter than death the woman," etc.; wherefore, when in Palestine one married a wife, the question was wont to be asked: מֵצָא אוֹ מוֹצֵא, has he married happily (after מֵצָא of the book of Proverbs) or unhappily (after מוֹצֵא of Ecclesiastes) (*Jebamoth* 63*b*)?<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Tendlauer's *Sprichwörter u. Redensarten deutsch-jüdischer Vorzeit* (1860), p. 235.

The LXX. adds a distich to ver. 22, "He that putteth away a good wife putteth away happiness; and he that keepeth an adulteress, is foolish and ungodly." He who constructed this proverb [added by the LXX.] has been guided by מִצָּא to מוֹצִיא (Ezra x. 3); elsewhere ἐκβάλλειν (γυναῖκα), Gal. iv. 30, Sir. xxviii. 15, is the translation of יָרַשׁ. The Syr. has adopted the half of that distich, and Jerome the whole of it. On the other hand, vers. 23, 24, and xix. 1, 2, are wanting in the LXX. The translation which is found in some Codd. is that of Theodotion (*vid.* Lagarde).

Ver. 23 The poor uttereth suppliant entreaties;  
And the rich answereth rudenesses.

The oriental proverbial poetry furnishes many parallels to this. It delights in the description of the contrast between a suppliant poor man and the proud and avaricious rich man; *vid. e.g.* Samachschari's *Goldene Halsbänder*, No. 58. תַּחֲנוּנִים, according to its meaning, refers to the *Hithpa.* הִתְחַנֵּן, *misericordiam alicujus pro se imploravit*; cf. the old vulgar "*barmen*," *i.e.* to seek to move others to *Erbarmen* [compassion] (רחמים). עוֹז, *dura*, from עָז (synon. קָשָׁה), hard, fast, of bodies, and figuratively of an unbending, hard, haughty disposition, and thence of words of such a nature (Fl.). Both nouns are accus. of the object, as Job xl. 27, תַּחֲנוּנִים with the parallel רְבוֹת. The proverb expresses a fact of experience as a consolation to the poor to whom, if a rich man insults him, nothing unusual occurs, and as a warning to the rich that he may not permit himself to be divested of humanity by mammon. A hard wedge to a hard clod; but whoever, as the Scripture saith, grindeth the poor by hard stubborn-hearted conduct, and grindeth his bashful face (Isa. iii. 15), challenges unmerciful judgment against himself; for the merciful, only they shall obtain mercy, αὐτοὶ ἐλεηθῇσονται (Matt. v. 7).

Ver. 24 A man of many friends cometh off a loser;  
But there is a friend more faithful than a brother.

Jerome translates the commencing word by *vir*, but the Syr., Targ. by אִישׁ, which is adopted by Hitzig, Böttcher, and others. But will a German poet use in one line "*itzt*" [same as *jetzt* = now], and in the next "*jetzt*"? and could the Hebrew poet prefer to אִישׁ its rarer, and here especially not altogether unam-

biguous form שׂא (cf. to the contrary, Eccles. vii. 15)? We write שׂא, because the Masora comprehends this passage, with 2 Sam. xiv. 19, Mic. vi. 10, as the ג' סבירין י׃, i.e. as the three, where one ought to expect שׂ, and is thus exposed to the danger of falling into error in writing and reading; but erroneously שׂא is found in all these three places in the *Masora magna* of the Venetian Bible of 1526; elsewhere the Masora has the *defectiva scriptio* with like meaning only in those two other passages. While שׂא = שׂ, or properly שׂ, with equal possibility as שׂא,<sup>1</sup> and it makes no material difference in the meaning of 24a whether we explain: there are friends who serve to bring one to loss: or a man of many friends comes to loss,—the *inf.* with ל is used in substantival clauses as the expression of the most manifold relations, Gesen. § 132, Anm. 1 (cf. at Hab. i. 17), here in both cases it denotes the end, as e.g. Ps. xcii. 8, to which it hastens with many friends, or with the man of many friends. It is true that שׂא (like בַּעַל) is almost always connected only with genitives of things; but as one says אִישׁ אֱלֹהִים: a man belongs to God, so may one also say אִישׁ רַעִים: a man belongs to many friends; the common language of the people may thus have named a man, to whom, because he has no definite and decided character, the rule that one knows a man by his friends is not applicable, a so-called every-man's-friend, or all-the-world's-friend. Theodotion translates ἀνὴρ ἐταιριῶν τοῦ ἐταιρεύσασθαι; and thus also the Syr., Targ., and Jerome render (and among the moderns, Hitzig) הִתְרַעַע as reflexive in the sense of to cherish social intercourse; but this reflexive is הִתְרַעַע, xxii. 24. That הִתְרַעַע is either *Hithpa.* of רַעַע, to exult, Ps. lx. 10, lxv. 14, according to which the *Venet.* translates (contrary to Kimchi) ὥστε ἀλαλάζειν: such an one can exult, but which is not true, since, according to 24b, a true friend outweighs the many; or it is *Hithpa.* of רַעַע, to be wicked, sinful (Fl.: *sibi perniciem paraturus est*); or, which we prefer, warranted by Isa. xxiv. 19, of רַעַע, to become brittle (Böttcher and others)—which not only gives a good sense, but also a similar alliteration with רַעִים, as iii. 29, xiii. 20. In contradistinction to רַעַע, which is a general,

<sup>1</sup> One sees from this interchange how softly the י was uttered; cf. Wellhausen's *Text der Bb. Samuel* (1871) (Preface). Kimchi remarks that we say אֶקְטַל for אֶקְטַל, because we would otherwise confound it with אֶקְטַל.

and, according to the usage of the language (*e.g.* 17*b*), a familiar idea, the true friend is called, in the antithetical parallel member, אֱהָב (xxvii. 6); and after xvii. 17, רֵבֶקֶת מֵאָח, one who remains true in misfortune. To have such an one is better than to have many of the so-called friends; and, as appears from the contrast, to him who is so fortunate as to have one such friend, there comes a blessing and safety. Immanuel has given the right explanation: "A man who sets himself to gain many friends comes finally to be a loser (סוֹפוֹ לְהִשָּׁבֵר), for he squanders his means, and is impoverished in favour of others." And Schultens: *At est amicus agglutinatus præ fratre. Rarum et carum esse genus insinuatur, ac proinde intimam illam amicitiam, quæ conglutinet compingatque corda, non per multos spargendam, sed circumspecte et ferme cum uno tantum ineundam.* Thus closes this group of proverbs with the praise of friendship deepened into spiritual brotherhood, as the preceding, ver. 19, with a warning against the destruction of such a relation by a breach of trust not to be made good again.

Chap. xix. The plur. רָעִים, xviii. 24, is emphatic and equivalent to רָעִים רַבִּים. The group 1-4 closes with a proverb which contains this catchword. The first proverb of the group comes by שִׁפְתָּיו into contact with xviii. 20, the first proverb of the preceding group.

Ver. 1 Better a poor man walking in his innocence,  
Than one with perverse lips, and so a fool.

The contrast, xxviii. 6, is much clearer. But to correct this proverb in conformity with that, as Hitzig does, is unwarrantable. The Syr., indeed, translates here as there; but the Chald. assimilates this translation to the Heb. text, which Theodotion, and after him the Syro-Hexapl., renders by ὑπὲρ στρεβλόχειλον ἄφρονος. But does 1*a* form a contrast to 1*b*? Fleischer remarks: "From the contrast it appears that he who is designated in 1*b* must be thought of as עשיר [rich]; and Ewald, "Thus early the ideas of a rich man and of a fool, or a despiser of God, are connected together." Saadia understands כסיל [a fool], after Job xxxi. 24, of one who makes riches his בְּסֵל [confidence]. Euchel accordingly translates: the false man, although he builds himself greatly up, viz. on his riches. But כסיל designates the intellectually slothful, in whom the flesh outweighs the mind.

And the representation of the rich, which, for 1b certainly arises out of 1a, does not amalgamate with כסיל, but with עֲקֵשׁ שִׁפְתָיו. Arama is on the right track, for he translates: the rich who distorts his mouth (cf. vol. i. p. 143), for he gives to the poor suppliant a rude refusal. Better Zöckler: a proud man of perverse lips and haughty demeanour. If one with haughty, scornful lips is opposed to the poor, then it is manifestly one not poor who thinks to raise himself above the poor, and haughtily looks down on him. And if it is said that, in spite of this proud demeanour, he is a fool, then this presents the figure of one proud of his wealth, who, in spite of his emptiness and *nequitia*, imagines that he possesses a greatness of knowledge, culture, and worth corresponding to the greatness of his riches. How much better is a poor man than such an one who walketh (*vid.* on חם, vol. i. p. 79) in his innocence and simplicity, with his pure mind wholly devoted to God and to that which is good!—his poverty keeps him in humility which is capable of no malicious conduct; and this pious blameless life is of more worth than the pride of wisdom of the distinguished fool. There is in contrast to עֲקֵשׁוֹת a simplicity, ἀπλότης, of high moral worth; but, on the other side, there is also a simplicity which is worthless. This is the connecting thought which introduces the next verse.

Ver. 2 The not-knowing of the soul is also not good,

And he who hasteneth with the legs after it goeth astray.

Fleischer renders נֶפֶשׁ as the subj. and לֹא-טוֹב as neut. pred.: in and of itself sensual desire is not good, but yet more so if it is without foresight and reflection. With this explanation the words must be otherwise accentuated. Hitzig, in conformity with the accentuation, before us: if desire is without reflection, it is also without success. But where נֶפֶשׁ denotes desire or sensuality, it is always shown by the connection, as *e.g.* xxiii. 2; here נֶפֶשׁ, referring to the soul as knowing (cf. Ps. cxxxix. 14), excludes this meaning. But נֶפֶשׁ is certainly *gen. subjecti*; Luzzatto's "self-knowledge" is untenable, for this would require דַּעַת נֶפֶשׁוֹ; Meîri rightly glosses דַּעַת נֶפֶשׁ by שִׂכְלָה. After this Zöckler puts Hitzig's translation right in the following manner: where there is no consideration of the soul, there is no prosperity. But that also is incorrect, for it would require אֵין-טוֹב; לֹא-טוֹב is always pred., not a substantival clause.

Thus the proverb states that בלא־דעת נפש is not good, and that is equivalent to היות בלא־דעת נפש (for the subject to לא־טוב is frequently, as *e.g.* xvii. 26, xviii. 5, an infinitive); or also: בלא־דעת נפש is a virtual noun in the sense of the not-knowing of the soul; for to say לא־דעת was syntactically inadmissible, but the expression is בלא־דעת, not בלי דעת (בבלי), because this is used in the sense unintentionally or unexpectedly. The גם which begins the proverb is difficult. If we lay the principal accent in the translation given above on “not good,” then the placing of גם first is a *hyperbaton* similar to that in xvii. 26, xx. 11; cf. אף, xvii. 11; רק, xiii. 10, as if the words were: if the soul is without knowledge, then also (*eo ipso*) it is destitute of anything good. But if we lay the principal accent on the “also,” then the meaning of the poet is, that ignorance of the soul is, like many other things, not good; or (which we prefer without on that account maintaining<sup>1</sup> the original connection of ver. 1 and ver. 2), that as on the one side the pride of wisdom, so on the other ignorance is not good. In this case גם belongs more to the subject than to the predicate, but in reality to the whole sentence at the beginning of which it stands. To hasten with the legs (אף, as xxviii. 20) means now in this connection to set the body in violent agitation, without direction and guidance proceeding from the knowledge possessed by the soul. He who thus hastens after it without being intellectually or morally clear as to the goal and the way, makes a false step, goes astray, fails (*vid.* viii. 36, where הִטָּא is the contrast to מִצָּא).

Ver. 3 The foolishness of a man overturneth his way,  
And his heart is angry against Jahve.

Regarding סלף, *vid.* at xi. 3; also the Arab. signification “to go before” proceeds from the root conception *pervertere*, for first a letting precede, or preceding (*e.g.* of the paying before the delivery of that which is paid for: *salaf*, a pre-numbering, and then also: advanced money), consisting in the reversal of the

<sup>1</sup> The old interpreters and also the best Jewish interpreters mar the understanding and interpretation of the text, on the one side, by distinguishing between a nearest and a deeper meaning of Scripture (דרך נגלה and דרך נסתר); on the other by this, that they suppose an inward connection of all the proverbs, and expend useless ingenuity in searching after the connection. The former is the method especially adopted by Immanuel and Meiri, the latter has most of all been used by Arama.

natural order, is meant. The way is here the way of life, the walking: the folly of a man overturns, *i.e.* destroys, his life's-course; but although he is himself the fabricator of his own ruin, yet the ill-humour (וַעַר, *æstuate*, *vid.* at Ps. xi. 6) of his heart turns itself against God, and he blames (LXX. essentially correct: αἰτιᾶται) God instead of himself, *viz.* his own madness, whereby he has turned the grace of God into lasciviousness, cast to the winds the instruction which lay in His providences, and frustrated the will of God desiring his good. A beautiful paraphrase of this parable is found at Sir. xv. 11–20; cf. Lam. iii. 39.

Ver. 4 Wealth bringeth many friends ;

But the reduced—his friend separateth himself.

The very same contrast, though otherwise expressed, we had at xiv. 20. Regarding הָן, *vid.* vol. i. p. 63. לָל is the tottering, or he who has fallen into a tottering condition, who has no resources, possesses no means. The accentuation gives *Mugrash* to the word (according to which the Targ. translates), for it is not the subject of יִפְרֹד: the reduced is separated (*pass. Niph.*) by his misfortunes, or must separate himself (*reflex. Niph.*) from his friend (מִרְעָהוּ, as Eccles. iv. 4, *præ socio suo*); but subject of the virtual pred. מִרְעָהוּ יִפְרֹד: the reduced—his friend (מִרְעָהוּ, as ver. 7) separates himself, *i.e.* (according to the nature of the Semitic substantival clause) he is such (of such a fate) that his friend sets himself free, whereby מִמֶּנִּי may be omitted as self-obvious; נִפְרֹד means one who separates himself, xviii. 1. If we make לָל the subject of the *separatur*, then the initiative of the separation from the friend is not expressed.

In vers. 5 and 9 we have the introductory proverb of two groups, the former of which, in its close as well as its beginning, cannot be mistaken.

Ver. 5 A lying witness remaineth not unpunished ;

And he who breathes out lies escapeth not.

Regarding יָפִיחַ, *vid.* vol. i. p. 148: as here we read it of false witness at vi. 19, xiv. 5, 25. לֹא יִנָּקָה occurs four times before, the last of which is at xvii. 5. The LXX. elsewhere translates יִפִּיחַ כּוֹבֵיִם by ἐκκαλεῖν ψευδῆ, to kindle lies; but here by ὁ δὲ ἐγκαλῶν ἀδίκως, and at ver. 9 by ὃς δ' ἂν ἐκκαύσῃ κακίαν, both

times changing only because  $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\eta\varsigma$  goes before, and instead of  $\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\eta$ , the choice of a different rendering commended itself.

Ver. 6 Many stroke the cheeks of the noble ;

And the mass of friends belongeth to him who gives.

The phrase 'פָּגַעַת פְּנֵי פֶלֶא' signifies to stroke the face of any one, from the fundamental meaning of the verb פָּגַעַת, to rub, to stroke, Arab. *khala*, with which the Heb., meaning to be sick, weak (*viribus attritum esse*), and the Arabic: to be sweet (properly *lavem et politum, glabrum esse, or palatum demulcere, leniter stringere, contrast asperum esse ad gustum*), are connected (Fl.). The object of such insinuating, humble suing for favour is the נָרִיב (from נָרַב, *instigare*), the noble, he who is easily incited to noble actions, particularly to noble-mindedness in bestowing gifts and in doing good, or who feels himself naturally impelled thereto, and spontaneously practises those things ; cf. the Arab. *krym, nobilis* and *liberalis* (Fl.), and at Job xxi. 28; parall. אִישׁ מִתֵּן, a man who gives willingly, as אִישׁ חָמָה, xv. 18, one who is easily kindled into anger. Many (רַבִּים, as Job xi. 19) stroke the face of the liberal (Lat. *caput mulcent* or *demulcent*); and to him who gives willingly and richly belongs כָּל-הָרֵעַ, the mass (the totality) of good friends, cf. xv. 17 ; there the art. of הָרֵעַ, according to the manner of expression of the Arab. grammarians, stood for "the exhaustion of the characteristic properties of the genus": the friend who corresponds to the nature (the idea) of such an one; here it stands for "the comprehension of the individuals of the genus;" all that is only always friend. It lies near with Ewald and Hitzig to read וְכֹל רֵעַ (and every one is friend . . .) (כֹּל = כָּל, as Jer. viii. 10, etc.); but why could not כָּל-הָרֵעַ be used as well as כָּל-הָאָדָם, perhaps with the sarcastic appearance which the above translation seeks to express? The LXX. also had וְכָל הָרֵעַ in view, which it incorrectly translates  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma \delta\epsilon \acute{o}\varsigma \kappa\alpha\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ , whereby the Syr. and the Targ. are led into error ; but מִתֵּן is not one and the same with שָׂחַד, *vid.* xviii. 6. On the contrary, there certainly lies before us in ver. 7 a mutilated text. The tristich is, as we have shown, vol. i. p. 15, open to suspicion; and the violence which its interpretation needs in order to comprehend it, as a formal part of 7*ab*, places it beyond a doubt, and the LXX. confirms it that 7*c* is the remainder of a distich, the half of which is lost.

Ver. 7ab. We thus first confine our attention to these two lines,—

All the brethren of the poor hate him ;

How much more do his friends withdraw themselves from him ?

Regarding **כִּי**, *quanto magis*, *vid.* at xi. 31, xv. 11, xvii. 7. In a similar connection xiv. 20 spake of hatred, *i.e.* the cooling of love, and the manifesting of this coldness. The brethren who thus show themselves here, unlike the friend who has become a brother, according to xvii. 17, are brothers-german, including kindred by blood relation. **כֵּל** has *Mercha*, and is thus without the *Makkeph*, as at Ps. xxxv. 10 (*vid.* the Masora in Baer's *Liber Psalmorum*, 1861, p. 133). Kimchi (*Michlol* 205a), Norzi, and others think that *cāl* (with **קָמַץ רַחַב**) is to be read as at Isa. xl. 12, where **וְכָל** is a verb. But that is incorrect. The case is the same as with **אֵת**, iii. 12; Ps. xlvii. 5, lx. 2. As here *ē* with *Mercha* remains, so *ō* with *Mercha* in that twice occurring **וְכָל**; that which is exceptional is this, that the accentuated **כָּל** is written thus twice, not as the usual **כָּל**, but as **כָּל** with the *Makkeph*. The ground of the exception lies, as with other peculiarities, in the special character of metrical accentuation; the *Mercha* represents the place of the *Makkeph*, and **—** thus remains in the unchanged force of a *Kametz-Chatuph*. The plur. **רַעֲיוֹ** does not stamp **מְרַעֲיוֹ** as the defectively written plur.; the suffix *ēhu* is always sing., and the sing. is thus, like **הָרַע**, 6b, meant collectively, or better: generally (in the sense of kind), which is the linguistic usage of these two words, 1 Sam. xxx. 26; Job xlii. 10. But it is worthy of notice that the Masoretic form here is not **מְרַעֲיוֹ**, but **מְרַעֲיוֹ**, with *Sheva*. The Masora adds to it the remark **לִית**, and accordingly the word is thus written with *Sheva* by Kimchi (*Michlol* 202a and *Lex.* under the word **רַעַה**), in Codd., and older editions. The *Venet.*, translating by *ἀπὸ τοῦ φίλου αὐτοῦ*, has not noticed that. But how? Does the punctuation **מְרַעֲיוֹ** mean that the word is here to be derived from **מְרַע**, *maleficus*? Thus understood, it does not harmonize with the line of thought. From this it is much more seen that the punctuation of the inflected **מְרַע**, *amicus*, fluctuates. This word **מְרַע** is a formation so difficult of comprehension, that one might almost, with Olshausen, § 210; Böttcher, § 794; and Lagarde, regard the **מ** as the partitive **מִן**, like the French

*des amis* (cf. Eurip. *Med.* 560: πένητα φεύγει πᾶς τις ἐκποδὼν φίλος), or: something of friend, a piece of friend, while Ewald and others regard it as possible that מרע is abbreviated from מרעה. The punctuation, since it treats the *Tsere* in מרעהו, 4b<sup>1</sup> and elsewhere, as unchangeable, and here in מרעהו as changeable, affords proof that in it also the manner of the formation of the word was incomprehensible.

Ver. 7c Seeking after words which are vain.

If now this line belongs to this proverb, then מרעה must be used of the poor, and לא־המה, or לו־המה (*vid.* regarding the 15 *Kerîs*, לו־ for לא, at Ps. c. 3), must be the attributively nearer designation of the אמרים. The meaning of the *Kerî* would be: he (the poor man) hunts after mere words, which—but no actions corresponding to them—are for a portion to him. This is doubtful, for the principal matter, that which is not a portion to him, remains unexpressed, and the לו־המה [to him they belong] affords only the service of guarding one against understanding by the אמרים the proper words of the poor. This service is not in the same way afforded by לא־המה [they are not]; but this expression characterizes the words as vain, so that it is to be interpreted according to such parallels as Hos. xii. 2: words which are not, *i.e.* which have nothing in reality corresponding to them, *verba nihili*, *i.e.* the empty assurances and promises of his brethren and friends (Fl.). The old translators all<sup>2</sup> read לא, and the Syr. and Targ. translate not badly: מלוי לא שריר; Symmachus, ῥήσεις ἀνυπάρκτοις. The expression is not to be rejected: לא־היה sometimes means to come to לא, *i.e.* to nothing, Job vi. 21, Ezek. xxi. 32, cf. Isa. xv. 6; and לא־הוא, he is not = has no reality, Jer. v. 12, לא־המה, may thus mean words which are nothing (vain). But how can it be said of the poor whom everything forsakes, that one dismisses him with words behind which there is nothing, and now also that he pursues such words? The former supposes always a sympathy, though it be a feigned one,

<sup>1</sup> In vol. i. p. 266, we have acknowledged מרעהו, from מרע, friend, only for xix. 7; but at xix. 4 we have also found *amicus ejus* more probable than *ab amico suo* (= מן רעהו).

<sup>2</sup> Lagarde erroneously calls Theodotion's ῥήσεις οὐκ ἀντῶ a translation of the *Kerî*; οὐκ is, however, לא, and instead of ἀντῶ the expression ἀντῶν, which is the translation of המה, is also found.

which is excluded by שׂנאֵהוּ [they hate him] and קָרָהּ [withdraw themselves]; and the latter, spoken of the poor, would be unnatural, for his purposed endeavour goes not out after empty talk, but after real assistance. So 7c: pursuing after words which (are) nothing, although in itself not falling under critical suspicion, yet only of necessity is connected with this proverb regarding the poor. The LXX., however, has not merely one, but even four lines, and thus two proverbs following 7b. The former of these distichs is: "Εννοια ἀγαθὴ τοῖς εἰδόσιν αὐτὴν ἐγγιεῖ, ἀνὴρ δὲ φρόνιμος εὐρήσει αὐτήν; it is translated from the Hebr. (עֲנוּיָא אֲגָאֹתָהּ, v. 2 = חִמְיָהּ), but it has a meaning complete in itself, and thus has nothing to do with the fragment 7c. The second distich is: 'Ο πολλὰ κακοποιῶν τελεσιουργεῖ κακίαν, ὃς δὲ ἐρεθίζει λόγους οὐ σωθήσεται. This ὃς δὲ ἐρεθίζει λόγους is, without doubt, a translation of מְרַדֵּם (7c); λόγους is probably a corruption of λόγοις (thus the Complut.), not, he who pursueth words, but he who incites by words, as Homer (*Il.* iv. 5 f.) uses the expression ἐρεθίζέμεν ἐπέεσσι. The concluding words, οὐ σωθήσεται, are a repetition of the Heb. לֹא יִמְלֹךְ (cf. LXX. xix. 5 with xxviii. 26), perhaps only a conjectural emendation of the unintelligible הָמָה לֹא. Thus we have before us in that ὁ πολλὰ κακοποιῶν, κ.τ.λ., the line lost from the Heb. text; but it is difficult to restore it to the Heb. We have attempted it, vol. i. p. 15. Supposing that the LXX. had before them הָמָה לֹא, then the proverb is—

“He that hath many friends is rewarded with evil,  
Hunting after words which are nothing;”

*i.e.* since this his courting the friendship of as many as possible is a hunting after words which have nothing after them and come to nothing.

Ver. 8 He that getteth understanding loveth his soul,  
And he that values reasonableness will acquire good;

or, more closely, since this would be the translation of טוֹב יִמְצָא, xvi. 20, xvii. 20: so it happens, or it comes to this, that he acquires good (= הֵיךָ לְמַצָּא); the *inf.* with ל is here, as at xviii. 24, the expression of a *fut. periphrasticum*, as in the Lat. *consecuturus est*. Regarding קִנְיָה־לֵב, *vid.* xv. 32, and שִׁמְרֵ תְבוּנָה, vol. i. p. 119. That the deportment of men is either care for

the soul, or the contrary of that, is a thought which runs through the Book of Proverbs.

The group of proverbs (vers. 9–16) now following begins and closes in the same way as the preceding.

Ver. 9 A lying witness doth not remain unpunished,  
And one who breathes out lies perisheth,

or goeth to ruin, for אָבַר (R. בָּר, to divide, separate) signifies to lose oneself in the place of the separated, the dead (Arab. in the infinite). In ver. 5, instead of this ἀπολείται (LXX.), the negative οὐ σωθήσεται is used, or as the LXX. there more accurately renders it, οὐ διαφεύξεται.

Ver. 10 Luxury becometh not a fool ;  
How much less a servant to rule over princes.

Thus also with לֹא נִאָוָה (3 p. *Pil. non decet*, cf. the adj. xxvi. 1) xvii. 7 begins. כִּי נִאָוָה rises here, as at ver. 7, *a minori ad majus*: how much more is it unbecoming = how much less is it seemly. The contrast in the last case is, however, more rugged, and the expression harsher. “A fool cannot bear luxury: he becomes by it yet more foolish; one who was previously a humble slave, but who has attained by good fortune a place of prominence and power, from being something good, becomes at once something bad: an insolent *sceleratus*” (Fl.). Agur, xxx. 22 f., describes such a *homo novus* as an unbearable calamity; and the author of the Book of Ecclesiastes, written in the time of the Persian domination, speaks, x. 7, of such. The LXX. translates, καὶ ἐὰν οὐκ ἐκτέης ἀρξήται μεθ’ ὑβρεως δυναστεύειν, rendering the phrase בְּשָׂרִים by μεθ’ ὑβρεως, but all other translators had בְּשָׂרִים before them.

Ver. 11 The discretion of a man maketh him long-suffering,  
And it is a glory for him to be forbearing toward transgression.

The Syr., Targum, Aquila, and Theodotion translate האַרִיךְ אָפוּ by μακροθυμία, and thus read הָאֲרִיךְ; but Rashi, Kimchi, and others remark that הָאֲרִיךְ is here only another vocalization for הָאֲרִיךְ, which is impossible. The Venet. also translates: Νοῦς ἀνθρώπου μακυνεῖ τὸν θυμὸν ἐαυτοῦ; the correct word would be αὐτοῦ: the discretion (*intellectus* or *intelligentia*; vid. regarding שָׂכַל, iii. 4) of a man extends his anger, i.e. brings it about that it continues long before it breaks out (vid. xiv. 29). One does not stumble at the perf. in view of ver. 7, xviii. 8, xvi. 26, and

the like; in the proverbial style the fut. or the particip. is more common. In the synonymous parallel member, תַּפְאַרְתּוֹ points to man as such: it is an honour to him to pass by a transgression (particularly that which affects himself), to let it go aside, *i.e.* to forbear revenge or punishment (cf. Arab. *tjâwz 'aly*); thus also the divine *πάρεσις* (Rom. iii. 25) is designated by Mic. vii. 18; and in Amos vii. 8, viii. 2, עֲבַר stands absol. for the divine remission or passing by, *i.e.* unavenging of sin.

Ver. 12 A murmuring as of a lion is the wrath of the king,  
And as dew on plants is his favour.

Line 1 is a variation of xx. 2a; line 2a of xvi. 15b. זַעַף is not the being irritated against another, but generally ill-humour, fretfulness, bad humour; the murmuring or growling in which this state of mind expresses itself is compared to that of a lion which, growling, prepares and sets itself to fall upon its prey (*vid.* Isa. v. 29, cf. Amos iii. 4). Opposed to the זַעַף stands the beneficial effect of the רִצּוֹן, *i.e.* of the pleasure, the delight, the satisfaction, the disposition which shows kindness (LXX. τὸ ἱλαρὸν αὐτοῦ). In the former case all are afraid; in the latter, everything lives, as when the refreshing dew falls upon the herbs of the field. The proverb presents a fact, but that the king may mirror himself in it.

Ver. 13 A foolish son is destruction for his father,  
And a continual dropping are the contentions of a wife.

Regarding הָוִית, *vid.* at xvii. 4, cf. x. 3. Line 2a is expanded, xxvii. 15, into a distich. The dropping is טֹרַד, properly striking (cf. Arab. *tirad*, from *tarad* III., hostile assault) when it pours itself forth, stroke (drop) after stroke = constantly, or with unbroken continuity. Lightning-flashes are called (*Jer Berachoth*, p. 114, Shitmir's ed.) טורדין, *opp.* מַפְסִיקִין, when they do not follow in intervals, but constantly flash; and *b. Bechoroth* 44a; דומעות, weeping eyes, דולפות, dropping eyes, and טורדות, eyes always flowing, are distinguished. An old interpreter (*vid.* R. Ascher in *Pesachim* II. No. 21) explains טֹרַד דָּלָף by: "which drops, and drops, and always drops." An Arab proverb which I once heard from Wetzstein, says that there are three things which make our house intolerable: *âltakk* (= *âldhal*f), the trickling through of rain; *âlnakk*, the contention of the wife; and *âlbakk*, bugs.

Ver. 14 House and riches are a paternal inheritance,  
But from Jahve cometh a prudent wife.

House and riches (*opulentia*), which in themselves do not make men happy, one may receive according to the law of inheritance; but a prudent wife is God's gracious gift, xviii. 22. There is not a more suitable word than מְשֻׁבֶּלֶת (fem. of מְשֻׁבֵּל) to characterize a wife as a divine gift, making her husband happy. שֵׁבֶל (הַשֵּׁבֶל) is the property which says: "I am named modesty, which wears the crown of all virtues."<sup>1</sup>

Ver. 15 Slothfulness sinketh into deep sleep,  
And an idle soul must hunger.

Regarding תִּרְדֵּמָה and its root-word רָדַם, *vid.* at x. 5. הָפִיל, to befall, to make to get, is to be understood after Gen. iii. 21; the obj. עַל-הָאָדָם, viz. הָעֵצָא, is naturally to be supplied. In 15*b* the fut. denotes that which will certainly happen, the inevitable. In both of its members the proverb is perfectly clear; Hitzig, however, corrects 15*a*, and brings out of it the meaning, "slothfulness gives tasteless herbs to eat." The LXX. has two translations of this proverb, here and at xviii. 8. That it should translate רמיה by ἀνδρόγυνος was necessary, as Lagarde remarks, for the exposition of the "works of a Hebrew Sotades." But the Hebrew literature never sunk to such works, wallowing in the mire of sensuality, and ἀνδρόγυνος is not at all thus enigmatical; the Greek word was also used of an effeminate man, a man devoid of manliness, a weakling, and was, as the LXX. shows, more current in the Alexandrine Greek than elsewhere.

Ver. 16 He that keepeth the commandment keepeth his soul;  
He that taketh no heed to his ways dies.

As at vi. 23, cf. Eccles. viii. 5, מִצְוָה is here the commandment of God, and thus obligatory, which directs man in every case to do that which is right, and warns him against that which is wrong. And בִּזְיוֹה דְרַבְּבִי (according to the Masora with *Tsere*, as in Codd. and old editions, not בִּזְיוֹה) is the antithesis of נִצֵּר דְרַבּוֹ, xvi. 17. To despise one's own way is equivalent to, to regard it as worth no consideration, as no question of conscience whether one should enter upon this way or that. Hitzig's

<sup>1</sup> The LXX. translates: παρὰ δὲ κυρίου ἀρμόζεται γυνὴ ἀνδρί. Here as often (*vid.* my *Jesurun*) the Arab. *usus loquendi* makes itself felt in the idiom of the LXX., for *shâkl* means ἀρμόζειν.

reading, פִּזֵּר, "he that scattereth his ways," lets himself be drawn by the manifold objects of sensuality sometimes in one direction and sometimes in another, is supported by Jer. iii. 13, according to which it must be מִפִּזֵּר; the conj. is not in the style of the Book of Proverbs, and besides is superfluous. The LXX., which is fond of a *quid pro quo*—it makes, 13b, a courtesan offering a sacrifice she had vowed of the wages of sin of the quarrelsome woman—has here, as the Heb. text: ὁ καταφρονῶν τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ὁδῶν ἀπολείται. Thus after the *Kerî* יָמָה, as also the Targ., Syro-Hexap., and Luther; on the contrary, the Syr., Jerome, the *Venet.* adopt the *Chethîb* יָמָה: he will become dead, i.e. dies no natural death. The *Kerî* is more in the spirit and style of the Book of Proverbs (xv. 10, xxiii. 13, x. 21).

Vers. 17–21. These verses we take together. But we have no other reason for making a pause at ver. 21, than that ver. 22 is analogous to ver. 17, and thus presents itself to us as an initial verse.

Ver. 17 He lendeth to Jahve who is compassionate to the lowly,  
And his bounty He requites to him.

As at xiv. 31, חֲנוּן is *part. Kal.* The Masoretically exact form of the word is חֲנוּן (as וְאֶחָד, xx. 14) with *Mercha* on the first syllable, on which the tone is thrown back, and the העמדה on the second. The Roman legal phrase, *mutui datione contrahitur obligatio*, serves to explain the fundamental conception of לָוֶה, *mutuo accipere*, and הֶלֶה, *mutuum dare* (vid. xxii. 7). The construction, Ex. xxii. 24, "to make any one bound as a debtor, *obligare*," lies at the foundation of the genitive connection מִלֹּהֶּה ה' (not מִלֹּהֶּה). With 17b cf. xii. 14, where the subject of יָשִׁיב (*Kerî*) remains in the background. גָּמְלוֹ (not גִּמְלוֹ) is here his work done in the sense of good exhibited. "Love," Hedinger once said, "is an imperishable capital, which always bears interest." And the Archbishop Walther: *nam Deo dat qui dat inopibus, ipse Deus est in pauperibus*. Dr. Jonas, as Dächsel relates, once gave to a poor man, and said, "Who knows when God restores it!" There Luther interposed: "As if God had not long ago given it beforehand!" This answer of Luther meets the abuse of this beautiful proverb by the covetous.

Ver. 18. This proverb brings to view once more the pedagogic character of this Older Book of Proverbs:

Correct thy son, for yet there is hope;  
But go not too far to kill him.

That בִּי is meant relatively, as at xi. 15, is seen from Job xi. 18, xiv. 7; Jer. xxxi. 16 f.; בִּי-יֵשׁ תִּקְוָה is the usual expression for *etenim spes est*. Though a son show obstinacy, and manifest a bad disposition, yet there is hope in the training of the youth of being able to break his self-will, and to wean him from his bad disposition; therefore his education should be carried forward with rigorous exactness, but in such a way that wisdom and love regulate the measure and limits of correction: *ad eum interficiendum animam ne tollas (animum ne inducas)*. נִפְשֶׁךָ is not the subject, for in that case the word would have been הִנָּשָׂךְ (2 Kings xiv. 10). It is the object: To raise the soul to something is equivalent to, to direct his desire to it, to take delight in it. The teacher should not seek correction as the object, but only as the means; he who has a desire after it, to put the child to death in the case of his guilt, changes correction into revenge, permits himself to be driven by passion from the proper end of correction, and to be pushed beyond its limits. The LXX. translates freely εἰς δὲ ὑβρις, for ὑβρις is unrestrained abuse, מוֹסֵר אֲבוּרִי as Immanuel glosses. Besides, all the ancients and also the Venet. translate הִמִּיתוֹ as the inf. of הִמִּית. But Oettinger (for he translates: lift not thy soul to his cry, for which Euchel: let not his complaining move thy compassion) follows the derivation from הָמָה suggested by Kimchi, Meïri, and Immanuel, and preferred by Ralbag, so that הִמִּיתוֹ after the form בִּבִּית is equivalent to הָמָתוֹ. But leaving out of view that הָמָה means *strepere*, not *lamentari*, and that נִשָּׂא נֶפֶשׁ means attention, not desire, xxiii. 13 points out to us a better interpretation.

Ver. 19. Another proverb with נִשָּׂא :

A man of excessive wrath must suffer punishment;

For if thou layest hold of it, hindering it, thou makest it only worse.

The LXX., Syr., and Targ. translate as if the words were נִבְרַח חָמָה (as בָּעַל חָמָה, xxix. 22). Theodotion, the Venet., and Luther render the Kerî נִדְלִי; Jerome's *impatiens* is colourless. The Chethîb גִּל gives no appropriate meaning. The Arab. *jaril* means *lapidosus* (whence גִּוֶּרֶל, cf. Aram. פָּפָא = ψῆφος), and Schultens translates accordingly *aspero scruposus iracundiæ*, which is altogether after the manner of his own heavy style.

Ewald translates נָרַל as derived from the Arab *jazył, largus, grandis*; but the possibility of the passing over of ר into ז, as maintained by Ewald and also by Hitzig, or the reverse, is physiologically undemonstrable, and is confirmed by no example worthy of mention. Rather it may be possible that the Heb. had an adj. נָרַל or נָרַל in the sense of stony, gravel-like, hard as gravel, but tow rather than gravel would be appropriate to חֲמָה. Hitzig corrects נָמַל חֲמָה, “who acts in anger;” but he says שָׁלַם חֲמָה, to recompense anger, Isa. lix. 18; נָמַל חֲמָה is without support. This correction, however, is incomparably more feasible than Böttcher’s, “moderate inheritance bears expiation;” חֲמָה = חֲמָאָה must mean not only thick [curdled] milk, but also moderation, and Böttcher finds this “sound.” From all these instances one sees that נָרַל is an error in transcription; the *Kerî* נָרַל-חֲמָה rightly improves it, a man is thus designated whose peculiarity it is to fall into a high degree of passionate anger (חֲמָה נָרַלָה, Dan. xi. 44): such an one has to bear עֲנִשׁ, a fine, i.e. to compensate, for he has to pay compensation or smart-money for the injury suffered, as e.g. he who in strife with another pushes against a woman with child, so that injury befalls her, Ex. xxi. 22. If we compare this passage with 2 Sam. xiv. 6, there appears for הָצִיל the meaning of taking away of the object (whether a person or a thing) against which the passionate hothead directs himself. Therewith the meaning of וְעוֹד הוֹכֵף accords. The meaning is not that, הָצִיל, once is not enough, but much rather must be repeated, and yet is without effect; but that one only increases and heightens the חֲמָה thereby. It is in vain to seek to spare such a violent person the punishment into which he obstinately runs; much more advisable is it to let him rage till he ceases; violent opposition only makes the evil the greater. With כִּי אָם, “denn wenn” [for then], cf. ii. 3, “ja wenn” [yea if], and with וְעוֹד in the conclusion, Job xiv. 7 (a parallelism syntactically more appropriate than Ps. cxxxix. 18).

Ver. 20 Hearken to counsel, and receive instruction,

That thou mayest become wise afterwards.

The rule of morals, xii. 15b, receives here the parænetic tone which is the keynote of the introduction i.-ix. Löwenstein translates: that thou mayest finally become wise. But בְּאַחֲרִיתָהּ corresponds rather to our “hinfort” [*posthac*] than to “end-

*lich*" [finally]. He to whom the warning is directed must break with the self-willed, undisciplined ראשית [beginning] of his life, and for the future (τὸν ἐπίλοιπον ἐν σαρκὶ χρόνον, 1 Pet. iv. 2) become wise. The relative contrast between the two periods of life is the same as at Job viii. 7.

Ver. 21 Many are the thoughts in a man's heart;  
But Jahve's counsel, that stands.

In תְּקוּמָה lies, as at Isa. xl. 8, both: that the counsel of God (His plan of the world and of salvation) is accomplished and comes into actual fact, and that it continues. This counsel is the true reality elevated above the checkered manifoldness of human purposes, aims, and subjectivities, which penetrates and works itself out in history. The thoughts of a man thus gain unity, substance, endurance, only in so far as he subjects himself to this counsel, and makes his thoughts and actions conformable and subordinate to this counsel.

Ver. 22. The series makes a new departure with a proverb regarding the poor (cf. ver. 17):

A man's delight is his beneficence;  
And better is a poor man than a liar.

The right interpretation will be that which presses upon תַּאֲוָה no strange meaning, and which places the two parts of the verse in an inner mutual relation ethically right. In any case it lies nearer to interpret תַּאֲוָה, in relation to man, actively than passively: that which makes man worthy of desire (Rashi), adorns and distinguishes him (Kimchi, Aben-Ezra); or, that which is desired by man, is above all things sought for (Luzzatto); and, in like manner, the Heb. meaning for חֶסֶד lies nearer than the Aram. (*vid.* xiv. 34): the pleasure of a man is his disgrace (Rab-bag). Thus Bertheau's translation: the desire of a man is his *charitas*, must mean: that which brings to a man true joy is to act amiably. But is that, thus generally expressed, true? And if this were the thought, how much more correctly and distinctly would it be expressed by שְׂמֵחָה לְאָדָם עֲשׂוֹת חֶסֶד (cf. xxi. 15)! Hitzig is rightly reminded by חסדו of the Pharisee who thanks God that he is not as other men; the word ought to have been חסד to remove every trace of self-satisfaction. Hitzig therefore proposes from the LXX. and the Vulgate the text-correction מִתְּבוּיָה, and translates, "from the revenue of a man is his kind

gift;" and Ewald, who is satisfied with תְּבוּאָה, "the gain of a man is his pious love." The latter is more judicious: חסד (love) distributed is in reality gain (according to ver. 17); but 22*b* corresponds rather with the former: "better is he who from want does not give תְּבוּאָה, than he who could give and says he has nothing." But was there then need for that καρπός of the LXX.? If a poor man is better than a lord given to lying,—for אִישׁ with שׁ is a man of means and position,—*i.e.* a poor man who would give willingly, but has nothing, than that man who will not give, and therefore lies, saying that he has nothing; then 22*a* means that the will of a man (cf. תְּאוֹת, xi. 23) is his doing good (*vid.* regarding חֶסֶד, at iii. 3), *i.e.* is its soul and very essence. Euchel, who accordingly translates: the philanthropy of a man consists properly in his goodwill, rightly compares the Rabbinical proverb, אֶחָד הַמְרַבֵּה וְאֶחָד הַמִּמְעִיט וּבְלֹבֵד, שִׁיתָבוֹן, *i.e.* one may give more or less, it all depends on the intention, the disposition.

Ver. 23 The fear of Jahve tendeth to life;

Satisfied, one spendeth the night, not visited by evil.

The first line is a variation of xiv. 27*a*. How the fear of God thus reacheth to life, *i.e.* helps to a life that is enduring, free from care and happy, 23*b* says: the promises are fulfilled to the God-fearing, Deut. xi. 15 and Lev. xxvi. 6; he does not go hungry to bed, and needs fear no awakening in terror out of his soft slumber (iii. 24). With ו *explic.*, 23*a* is explained. לֹן שָׁבַע means to spend the night (the long night) hungry, as לֹן עָרוֹם, Job xxiv. 7, to pass the night in nakedness (cold). נִבְקֶר, of visitation of punishment, we read also at Isa. xxix. 6, and instead of בָּרַע, as it might be according to this passage, we have here the accus. of the manner placing the meaning of the *Niph.* beyond a doubt (cf. xi. 15, רָע, in an evil manner). All is in harmony with the matter, and is good Heb.; on the contrary, Hitzig's ingenuity introduces, instead of וּשְׁבַע, an unheard of word, וּשְׁרַע, "and he stretches himself." One of the Greeks excellently translates: καὶ ἐμπλησθεὶς αὐλισθήσεται ἄνευ ἐπισκοπῆς πονηρᾶς. The LXX., which instead of רָע, γνώσις, translates thus, רָע, discredits itself. The Midrash—Lagarde says of its translation—varies in colour like an opal. In other

words, it handles the text like wax, and forms it according to its own taste, like the Midrash with its "read not so, but so."

Ver. 24 The slothful hath thrust his hand into the dish ;  
He bringeth it not again to his mouth.

This proverb is repeated in a different form, xxvi. 15. The figure appears, thus understood, an hyperbole, on which account the LXX. understand by צִלְחָת the bosom or lap, κόλπον; Aquila and Symmachus understand by it the arm-pit, μασχάλην or μάλην; and the Jewish interpreters gloss it by קִיץ (Kimchi) or קרע החלוק, the slit (Ital. *fenditura*) of the shirt. But the domestic figure, 2 Kings xxi. 13, places before us a dish which, when it is empty, is wiped and turned upside down;<sup>1</sup> and that the slothful when he eats appears too slothful to bring his hand, *e.g.* with the rice or the piece of bread he has taken out of the dish, again to his mouth, is true to nature: we say of such a man that he almost sleeps when he eats. The fut. after the perf. here denotes that which is not done after the former thing, *i.e.* that which is scarcely and only with difficulty done; לוֹ . . . נִם may have the meaning of "yet not," as at Ps. cxxix. 2; but the sense of "not once" = *ne . . . quidem*, lies here nearer Deut. xxiii. 3.

Ver. 25 The scorner thou smitest, and the simple is prudent ;

And if one reprove the man of understanding, he gaineth knowledge  
Hitzig translates in a way that is syntactically inexact: smite the scorner, so the simple becomes prudent; that would have required at least the word וַיַּעַרְם: fut. and fut. connected by ו is one of many modes of expression for the simultaneous, discussed by me at Hab. iii. 10. The meaning of the proverb has a complete commentary at xxi. 11, where its two parts are otherwise expressed with perfect identity of thought. In regard to the לֹץ, with whom denunciation and threatening bear no fruit (xiii. 1, xv. 12), and perhaps even produce the contrary effect to that intended (ix. 7), there remains nothing

<sup>1</sup> While צִפְחָת, *ṣahfat*, in the sense of dish, is etymologically clear, for צִלְחָת, neither *ṣalah* (to be good for), nor *salakh* (to be deaf, mangy), offers an appropriate verbal meaning. The Arab. *zuluh* (large dishes) stands under *zalah* (to taste, of the tasting of food), but is scarcely a derivative from it. Only צָלַח, which in the meaning of good for, proceeding from the idea of penetrating through, has retained the root-meaning of cleft, furnishes for צִלְחָת and צִלְחָת a root-word in some measure useful.

else than to vindicate the injured truths by means of the private justice of corporal punishment. Such words, if spoken to the right man, in the right spirit, at the right time, may affect him with wholesome terrors; but even though he is not made better thereby, yet the simple, who listens to the mockeries of such not without injury, will thereby become prudent (gain  $\text{הָעֵרִים} = \text{עֲרָמָה}$ , prudence, as at xv. 5), *i.e.* either arrive at the knowledge that the mockery of religion is wicked, or guard himself against incurring the same repressive measures. In 25*b*  $\text{וְהוֹכַח}$  is neither inf. (Umbreit), which after xxi. 11*b* must be  $\text{וּבְהוֹכַח}$ , nor impr. (Targ., Ewald), which according to rule is  $\text{וְהוֹכַח}$ , but the hypothetic perf. (Syr.) with the most general subject (Merc., Hitzig): if one impart instruction to the (dat. obj. as ix. 7, xv. 2) man of understanding (*vid.* xvi. 21), then he acquires knowledge, *i.e.* gains an insight into the nature and value of that which one wishes to bring him to the knowledge of ( $\text{וְהָבִין דָּעַת}$ , as xxix. 7; cf. viii. 5). That which the deterring lesson of exemplary punishment approximately effects with the wavering, is, in the case of the man of understanding, perfectly attained by an instructive word.

We have now reached the close of the third chief section of the older Book of Proverbs. All the three sections begin with  $\text{בֶּן הָחָם}$ , x. 1, xiii. 1, xv. 20. The Introduction, i.-ix., dedicates this collection of Solomonic proverbs to youth, and the three beginnings accordingly relate to the relative duties of a son to his father and mother. We are now no longer far from the end, for xxii. 17 resumes the tone of the Introduction. The third principal part would be disproportionately large if it extended from xv. 1 to xxii. 15. But there does not again occur a proverb beginning with the words "son of man." We can therefore scarcely go wrong if we take xix. 26 as the commencement of a fourth principal part. The Masora divides the whole *Mishle* into eight *sedarim*, which exhibit so little knowledge of the true division, that the *parashas* (sections) x. 1, xxii. 17 do not at all find their right place.<sup>1</sup> The MSS., how-

<sup>1</sup> The 915 verses of the *Mishle*, according to the Masora, fall into eight *sedarim*, beginning as follows: i. 1, v. 18, ix. 12, xiv. 4, xviii. 10, xxii. 22, xxv. 13, xxviii. 16.

ever, contain evidences that this Hagiograph was also anciently divided into *parashas*, which were designated partly by spaces between the lines (*sethumoth*) and partly by breaks in the lines (*phethucoth*). In Baer's *Cod. Jamanensis*,<sup>1</sup> after vi. 19, there is the letter **ב** written on the margin as the mark of such a break. With vi. 20 (*vid. l.c.*) there indeed commences a new part of the introductory Mashal discourses. But, besides, we only seldom meet with<sup>2</sup> coincidences with the division and grouping which have commended themselves to us. In the MS. of the *Græcus Venetus*, xix. 11, 16, and 19 have their initial letters coloured red; but why only these verses, is not manifest. A comparison of the series of proverbs distinguished by such initials with the *Cod. Jaman.* and *Cod. II.* of the Leipzig City Library, makes it more than probable that it gives a traditional division of the *Mishle*, which may perhaps yet be discovered by a comparison of MSS.<sup>3</sup> But this much is clear, that a historico-literary reconstruction of the *Mishle*, and of its several parts, can derive no help from this comparison.

With xix. 26 there thus begins the fourth principal part of the Solomonic collection of proverbs introduced by i.-ix.

He that doeth violence to his father and chaseth his mother,  
Is a son that bringeth shame and disgrace.

The right name is given in the second line to him who acts as is described in the first. **שָׁדַד** means properly to barricade [*obstruere*], and then in general to do violence to, here: to ruin one both as to life and property. The part., which has the force of an attributive clause, is continued in the finite: *qui matrem fugat*; this is the rule of the Heb. style, which is not φιλομέτοχος, Gesen. § 134, Anm. 2. Regarding **מְבִישׁ**, *vid.* at x. 5; regarding the placing together of **הַבִּישׁ וְהַחֲפִיר**, *vid.* xiii. 5, where for **הַבִּישׁ**, to make shame, to be scandalous, the word **הַבְּאִישׁ**, which is radically different, meaning to bring into bad odour, is used. The putting to shame is in **בֹּאֵשׁ** (kindred with Arab.

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* the *Prefatio* to the Masoretico-Critical Edition of Isaiah by Baer and myself; Leipzig, 1872.

<sup>2</sup> There are spaces within the lines after i. 7, 9, 33, ii. 22, iii. 18, 35, v. 17, 23, vi. 4, 11, 15, 19 (here a **ב**), 35, viii. 21, 31, 35, ix. 18, xvii. 25, xviii. 9, xxii. 19, 27, xxiii. 14, xxiv. 22, 33, xxvi. 21, xxviii. 10, 16, xxix. 17, 27, xxx. 6, 9, 14, 17, 20, 23, 28, 33, xxxi. 9.

<sup>3</sup> *Vid.* Gebhardt's *Prolegomena* to his new edition of the *Versio Veneta*.

*báth*) thought of as *disturbatio* (cf. *σύγχυσις*) (cf. at Ps. vi. 11), in *חֵפֶר* (*khfr*) as *opertio* (cf. Cicero's *Cluent.* 20: *infamia et dedecore opertus*), not, as I formerly thought, with Fürst, as reddening, blushing (*vid.* Ps. xxxiv. 6). Putting to shame would in this connection be too weak a meaning for *מִחְפִּיר*. The pædagogic stamp which ver. 26 impresses on this fourth principal part is made yet further distinct in the verse that now follows.

Ver. 27 Cease, my son, to hear instruction,  
To depart from the words of knowledge.

Oetinger correctly: cease from hearing instruction if thou wilt make no other use of it than to depart, etc., *i.e.* cease to learn wisdom and afterwards to misuse it. The proverb is, as Ewald says, as "bloody irony;" but it is a dissuasive from hypocrisy, a warning against the self-deception of which Jas. i. 22-24 speaks, against heightening one's own condemnation, which is the case of that servant who knows his lord's will and does it not, Luke xii. 47. *חֵרַל*, in the meaning to leave off doing something further, is more frequently construed with *ל* *seq. infin.* than with *מן* (cf. *e.g.* Gen. xi. 8 with 1 Kings xv. 21); but if we mean the omission of a thing which has not yet been begun, then the construction is with *ל*, Num. ix. 13. Instead of *לִשְׁנוֹת*, there might have been also used *מִלִּשְׁנוֹת* (omit rather . . . than . . .), and *לִמְעַן שְׁנוֹת* would be more distinct; but as the proverb is expressed, *לִשְׁנוֹת* is not to be mistaken as the subord. *infin.* of purpose. The LXX., Syr., Targ., and Jerome do violence to the proverb. Luther, after the example of older interpreters: instruction, that which leads away from prudent learning; but *musar* always means either discipline weaning from evil, or education leading to good.

Ver. 28 A worthless witness scoffeth at right;

And the mouth of the godless swalloweth up mischief.

The Mosaic law does not know the oath of witnesses; but the adjuring of witnesses to speak the truth, Lev. iv. 1, places a false statement almost in the rank of perjury. The *מִשְׁפָּט*, which legally and morally binds witnesses, is just their duty to state the matter in accordance with truth, and without deceitful and malicious reservation; but a worthless witness (*vid.* regarding *בִּלְעֵל*, vi. 12) despiseth what is right (*יָרַי* with accus.-

obj. like xiv. 9), *i.e.* scornfully disregards this duty. Under 28b Hitzig remarks that בָּלַע only in *Kal* means to devour, but in *Piel*, on the contrary, to absorb = annihilate; therefore he reads with the LXX. and Syr. דִּין [justice] instead of מִסְחָה [mischief]: the mouth of the wicked murders that which is right, properly, swallows down his feeling of right. But בָּלַע interchanges with בָּלַע in the sense of swallowing only, without the connected idea of annihilation; cf. בָּבֶלַע for the continuance [duration] of a gulp = for a moment, Num. iv. 20 with Job vii. 29; and one can thus understand 28b without any alteration of the text after Job xv. 16; cf. xx. 12–15, as well as with the text altered after Isa. iii. 12, by no means so that one makes מִן the subject: mischief swallows up, *i.e.* destroys, the mouth of the wicked (Rashi); for when “mouth” and “to swallow” stand connected, the mouth is naturally that which swallows, not that which is swallowed (cf. Eccles. x. 12: the mouth of the fool swallows, *i.e.* destroys, him). Thus 28b means that wickedness, *i.e.* that which is morally perverse, is a delicious morsel for the mouth of the godless, which he eagerly devours; to practise evil is for him, as we say, “*ein wahrer Genuss*” [a true enjoyment].

Ver. 29 Judgments are prepared for scorers,  
And stripes for the backs of fools.

שְׁפָטִים never means punishment which a court of justice inflicts, but is always used of the judgments of God, even although they are inflicted by human instrumentality (*vid.* 2 Chron. xxiv. 24); the singular, which nowhere occurs, is the segolate *n. act.* שָׁפַט = שָׁפוט, 2 Chron. xx. 9, plur. שְׁפָטִים. Hitzig's remark: “the judgment may, after ver. 25, consist in stripes,” is misleading; the stroke, הֶכּוֹת, there is such as when, *e.g.*, a stroke on the ear is applied to one who despises that which is holy, which, under the circumstances, may be salutary; but it does not fall under the category of *shephuthim*, nor properly under that of מַהֲלָמוֹת. The former are providential chastisements with which history itself, or God in history, visits the despiser of religion; the latter are strokes which are laid on the backs of fools by one who is instructing them, in order, if possible, to bring them to thought and understanding. נִכּוֹן, here inflected as *Niph.*, is used, as Job xv. 23, as meaning to be placed in readiness, and thus to be surely imminent. Regarding *mahalūmoth*, *vid.* at xviii. 6.

Chap. xx. 1. This proverb warns against the debauchery with which free-thinking is intimately associated.

Wine is a mocker, mead boisterous;

And no one who is overtaken thereby is wise.

The article stands with יין. Ewald maintains that in x.-xxii. 6 the article occurs only here and at xxi. 31, and that it is here, as the LXX. shows, not original. Both statements are incorrect. The article is found, *e.g.*, at xix. 6, xviii. 18, 17, and here the personification of "wine" requires it; but that it is wanting to שכר shows how little poetry delights in it; it stands once for twice. The effects of wine and mead (שכר from שָׁכַר, to stop, obstruct, become stupid) are attributed to these liquors themselves as their property. Wine is a mocker, because he who is intoxicated with it readily scoffs at that which is holy; mead is boisterous (cf. הוֹמָיָה, vii. 11), because he who is inebriated in his dissolute madness breaks through the limits of morality and propriety. He is unwise who, through wine and the like, *i.e.* overpowered by it (cf. 2 Sam. xiii. 28), staggers, *i.e.* he gives himself up to wine to such a degree that he is no longer master of himself. At v. 19 we read, שָׁנָה בְּ, of the intoxication of love; here, as at Isa. xxviii. 7, of the intoxication of wine, *i.e.* of the passionate slavish desire of wine or for wine. The word "*Erpicht*" [*avidissimus*], *i.e.* being indissolubly bound to a thing, corresponds at least in some degree to the idea. Fleischer compares the French : *être fou de quelque chose*. Isa. xxviii. 7, however, shows that one has to think on actual staggering, being overtaken in wine.

Ver. 2 A roaring as of a lion is the terror of the king;

And he that provoketh him forfeiteth his life.

Line first is a variation of xix. 12. The terror which a king spreads around (מֶלֶךְ, *gen. subjecti.*, as, *e.g.*, at Job ix. 34 and generally) is like the growling of a lion which threatens danger. The thought here suggested is that it is dangerous to arouse a lion. Thus מְחַעֲבֵרֵי does not mean: he who is angry at him (*Venet.* : *χολούμενος αὐτῷ*), but he who provokes him (LXX., Syr., Targ., Jerome, Luther). הִתְעַבֵּר signifies, as we saw at xiv. 16, to be in a state of excessive displeasure, extreme anger. Here the meaning must be: he who puts him into a state of anger (LXX., *ὁ παροξύνων αὐτόν*, in other versions with the

addition of *καὶ ἐπιμιγνύμενος*, who conducts himself familiarly towards him = *מתערבו*). But can *mitharvo* have this meaning? That the *Hithpa.* of transitive stems, e.g. *הִתְחַנַּן* (1 Kings viii. 59) and *הִשְׁתַּמֵּר* (Mic. vi. 16), is construed with the accus. of that which any one performs for himself (cf. Ewald's *Gramm. Arab.* § 180), is not unusual; but can the *Hithpa.* of the intrans. *עבר*, which signifies to fall into a passion, "express with the accusative the passion of another excited thereby" (Ewald, § 282a)? There is no evidence for this; and Hitzig's conjecture, *מתעברו* (*Tiphel* of the Targ. *תעבור = עברה*), is thus not without occasion. But one might suppose that *התעבר*, as the reflexive of a *Piel* or *Hiphil* which meant to be put into a state of anger, may mean to draw forth the anger of any one, as in Arab., the viiith form (*Hithpa.*) of *hadr*, to be present, with the accus. as reflexive of the ivth form, may mean: *sibi aliquid præsens sistere*. Not so difficult is *הָטָא* with the accus. of that which is missing, *vid.* viii. 36 and Hab. ii. 10.

Ver. 3 It is an honour to a man to remain far from strife;  
But every fool showeth his teeth.

Or better: whoever is a fool *quisquis amens*, for the emphasis does not lie on this, that every fool, *i.e.* every single one of this sort, contends to the uttermost; but that whoever is only always a fool finds pleasure in such strife. Regarding *התנלע*, *vid.* xvii. 14, xviii. 1. On the contrary, it is an honour to a man to be peaceable, or, as it is here expressed, to remain far from strife. The phrase may be translated: to desist from strife; but in this case the word would be pointed *נִשְׁבַּת*, which Hitzig prefers; for *נִשְׁבַּת* from *נָשַׁבַּת* means, 2 Sam. xxiii. 7, annihilation (the termination of existence); also Ex. xxi. 19, *נִשְׁבַּתוּ* does not mean to be keeping holy day; but to be sitting, *viz.* at home, in a state of incapability for work. Rightly Fleischer: "יֵשֵׁב מֵן", like Arab. *k'ad san*, to remain sitting quiet, and thus to hold oneself removed from any kind of activity." He who is prudent, and cares for his honour, not only breaks off strife when it threatens to become passionate, but does not at all enter into it, keeps himself far removed from it.

Ver. 4 At the beginning of the harvest the sluggard plougheth not;  
And so when he cometh to the reaping-time there is nothing.

Many translators (Symmachus, Jerome, Luther) and inter-

preters (e.g. Rashi, Zöckler) explain: *propter frigus*; but חָרַף is, according to its verbal import, not a synon. of קָר and צָנָה, but means gathering = the time of gathering (synon. אָסִיף), from חָרַף, *carpere*,<sup>1</sup> as harvest, the time of the *καρπίζειν*, the plucking off of the fruit; but the harvest is the beginning of the old Eastern agricultural year, for in Palestine and Syria the time of ploughing and sowing with the harvest or early rains (יֹרֶה = חָרַף, Neh. vii. 24; Ezra ii. 18) followed the fruit harvest from October to December. The כֵּן is thus not that of cause but of time. Thus rendered, it may mean the beginning of an event and onwards (e.g. 1 Sam. xxx. 25), as well as its termination and onwards (Lev. xxvii. 17): here of the harvest and its ingathering and onwards. In 4b, the *Chethîb* and *Kerî* vary as at xviii. 17. The *fut.* יִשְׁאַל would denote what stands before the sluggard; the *perf.* יִשְׁאַל places him in the midst of this, and besides has this in its favour, that, interpreted as *perf. hypotheticum*, it makes the absence of an object to שְׁאַל more tenable. The *Chethîb*, יִשְׁאַל, is not to be read after Ps. cix. 10: he will beg in harvest—in vain (Jerome, Luther), to which Hitzig well remarks: Why in vain? Amid the joy of harvest people dispense most liberally; and the right time for begging comes later. Hitzig conjecturally arrives at the translation:

“A pannier the sluggard provideth not;  
Seeketh to borrow in harvest, and nothing cometh of it.”

But leaving out of view the “pannier,” the meaning “to obtain something as a loan,” which שְׁאַל from the connection may bear, is here altogether imaginary. Let one imagine to himself an indolent owner of land, who does not trouble himself about the tilling and sowing of his fields at the right time and with diligence, but leaves this to his people, who do only as much as is commanded them: such an one asks, when now the harvest-time has come, about the ingathering; but he receives the answer, that the land has lain unploughed, because he had not commanded it to be ploughed. When he asks, there is nothing, he asks in vain (וְאֵין, as at xiv. 6, xiii. 4). Meiri rightly explains מִחָרַף by מִתְחַלֵּת זֶמֶן הַחֲרִישָׁה, and 4b by: “so then, when he asks at harvest time, he will find nothing;” on the other

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Fleischer in Levy's *Chald. Wörterbuch*, i. 426.

hand, the LXX. and Aram. think on חרף, *carpere conviciis*, as also in Codd. here and there is found the meaningless מחרף.

Ver. 5 The purpose in the heart of a man is deep water ;  
But a man of understanding draweth it out.

“Still waters are deep.” Like such deep waters (xviii. 4) is that which a man hath secretly (Isa. xxix. 15) planned in his heart. He keeps it secret, conceals it carefully, craftily misleads those who seek to draw it out ; but the man of תבונה, *i.e.* one who possesses the right criteria for distinguishing between good and bad, true and false, and at the same time has the capacity to look through men and things, draws out (the *Venet.* well, ἀνέλξει) the secret עצה, for he penetrates to the bottom of the deep water. Such an one does not deceive himself with men, he knows how to estimate their conduct according to its last underlying motive and aim ; and if the purpose is one that is pernicious to him, he meets it in the process of realization. What is here said is applicable not only to the subtle statesman and the general, but also to the pragmatist historian and the expositor, as, *e.g.*, of a poem such as the book of Job, the idea of which lies like a pearl at the bottom of deep water.

Ver. 6 Almost every one meeteth a man who is gracious to him ;  
But a man who standeth the test, who findeth such an one ?

As צִיר אֱמוּנִים, xiii. 17, signifies a messenger in whom there is confidence, and עֵר אֱמוּנִים, xiv. 5, a witness who is altogether truthful, so אִישׁ אֱמוּנִים is a man who remains true to himself, and maintains fidelity toward others. Such an one it is not easy to find ; but patrons who make promises and awaken expectations, finally to leave in the lurch him who depends on them—of such there are many. This contrast would proceed from 6a also, if we took קָרָא in the sense of to call, to call or cry out with ostentation : *multi homines sunt quorum suam quisque humanitatem proclamant* (Schelling, Fleischer, Ewald, Zöckler, and also, *e.g.*, Meîri). But אִישׁ חֲסִידוֹ is certainly to be interpreted after xi. 17, Isa. lvii. 1. Recognising this, Hitzig translates : many a man one names his dear friend ; but in point of style this would be as unsuitable as possible. Must יִקְרָא then mean *vocat* ? A more appropriate parallel word to מִצָּא is קָרָא = קָרָה, according to which, with Oetinger, Heidenheim, Euchel, and Löwenstein, we explain : the greater part of

men meet one who shows himself to them (to this or that man) as אִישׁ חָסֵד, a man well-affectioned and benevolent; but it is rare to find one who in his affection and its fruits proves himself to be true, and actually performs that which was hoped for from him. Luther translates, with the Syr. and Targ. after Jerome: *Viel Menschen werden From gerhümbt* [many men are reputed pious]; but if יִקְרָא were equivalent to יִקְרָא, then אִישׁ חָסֵד ought to have been used instead of חָסֵד. The LXX. read ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἰσχυρὸς, man is something great, and a compassionate man is something precious; but it costs trouble to find out a true man. The fundamental thought remains almost the same in all these interpretations and readings: love is plentiful; fidelity, rare; therefore חָסֵד, of the right kind, after the image of God, is joined to אֱמֶת.

Ver. 7 He who in his innocence walketh as one upright,  
Blessed are his children after him!

We may not take the first line as a separate clause with צַדִּיק, as subject (Van Dyk, Elster) or predicate (Targ.); for, thus rendered, it does not appropriately fall in as parallel to the second line, because containing nothing of promise, and the second line would then strike in at least not so unconnectedly (cf. on the contrary, x. 9, xiv. 25). We have before us a substantial clause, of which the first line is the complex subject. But Jerome, the *Venet.*, and Luther erroneously: the just man walking in his innocence; this placing first of the adj. is in opposition to the Hebr. syntax. We must, if the whole is to be interpreted as nom., regard צַדִּיק as permutative: one walking in his innocence, a righteous one. But, without doubt, *tsedek* is the accus. of the manner; in the manner of one righteous, or in apposition: as one righteous; cf. Job xxxi. 26 with Mic. ii. 7. Thus Hitzig rightly also refers to these two passages, and Ewald also refers to xxii. 11, xxiv. 15. To walk in his innocence as a righteous man, is equivalent to always to do that which is right, without laying claim to any distinction or making any boast on that account; for thereby one only follows the impulse and the direction of his heart, which shows itself and can show itself not otherwise than in unreserved devotion to God and to that which is good. The children after him are not the children after his death (Gen. xxiv. 67); but, according

to Deut. iv. 40, cf. Job xxi. 21, those who follow his example, and thus those who come after him; for already in the lifetime of such an one, the benediction begins to have its fulfilment in his children.

The following group begins with a royal proverb, which expresses what a king does with his eyes. Two proverbs, of the seeing eye and the necessary opening of the eyes, close it.

Ver. 8 A king sitting on the seat of justice,  
Scattereth asunder all evil with his eyes.

Excellently the *Venet.* ἐπὶ θρόνου δίκης, for כִּסֵּא־דִין is the name of the seat of rectitude (the tribunal), as the “throne of grace,” Heb. iv. 17, is the name of the *capporeth* as the seat of mercy; the seat of the judge is merely called כִּסֵּא; on the other hand, כִּסֵּא־דִין is the contrast of כִּסֵּא הַיוֹשֵׁב, Ps. xciv. 20: the seat from which the decision that is in conformity with what is right (cf., e.g., Jer. v. 28) goes forth, and where it is sought. As little here as at ver. 26 is there need for a characterizing adj. to *melek*; but the LXX. hits the meaning for it, understands such to דִין: ὅταν βασιλεὺς δίκαιος καθίσῃ ἐπὶ θρόνου. By the “eyes” are we then to understand those of the mind: he sifts, *dignoscit*, with the eyes of the mind all that is evil, i.e. distinguishes it subjectively from that which is not evil? Thus Hitzig by a comparison of Ps. xi. 4, cxxxix. 3 (where Jerome has *eventilasti*, the Vulg. *investigasti*). Scarcely correctly, for it lies nearer to think on the eyes in the king’s head (*vid.* xvi. 15); in that case: to winnow (to sift) means to separate the good and the bad, but first mediately: to exclude the bad; finally, ver. 26 leads to the conclusion that מְצָרֶה is to be understood, not of a subjective, but of an actual scattering, or separating, or driving away. Thus the penetrating, fear-inspiring eyes of the king are meant, as Immanuel explains: בְּרֵאִיַּת עֵינָיו מְבַרֵּחַם מִפְּנֵי וּמִפּוֹר אוֹתָם בְּכָל פִּיֶּאֶה. But in this explanation the personal rendering of מְצָרֶה is incorrect; for *mezareh*, meant of the driving asunder of persons, requires as its object a plur. (cf. 26a). *Col-ra* is understood as neut. like v. 14. Before the look of a king to whom it belongs to execute righteousness and justice (Isa. xvi. 5), nothing evil stands; criminal acts and devices seen through, and so also judged by these eyes, are broken up and scattered to all the winds, along with the danger that thereby threatened

the community. It is the command: "put away the evil" (Deut. xiii. 6 [5]), which the king carries into effect by the powerful influence of his look. With *col-ra* there is connected the thought that in the presence of the heavenly King no one is wholly free from sin.

Ver. 9 Who can say I have made my heart clean,  
I am pure from my sins?

It is the same thought that Solomon expresses in his prayer at the consecration of the temple, 1 Kings viii. 46: there is no man who sinneth not. To cleanse his heart (as Ps. lxxiii. 13), is equivalent to to empty it, by self-examination and earnest effort after holiness, of all impure motives and inclinations; *vid.* regarding זכה, to be piercing, shining brightly, cloudlessly pure, Fleischer in Levy's *Chald. Wörterbuch*, i. 424. The consequence of נִכּוֹת is, becoming pure; and the consequence of נִכּוֹת לִב, *i.e.* of the purifying of the heart, the being pure from sinful conduct: I have become pure from my sins, *i.e.* from such as I might fall into by not resisting temptations; the suffix is not understood as actual, but as potential, like Ps. xviii. 24. No one can boast of this, for man's knowledge of himself and of his sins remains always limited (Jer. xvii. 9 f.; Ps. xix. 13); and sin is so deeply rooted in his nature (Job xiv. 4, xv. 14–16), that the remains of a sinful tendency always still conceal themselves in the folds of his heart, sinful thoughts still cross his soul, sinful inclinations still sometimes by their natural force overcome the moral resistance that opposes them, and stains of all kinds still defile even his best actions.

Ver. 10. This proverb passes sentence of condemnation against gross sins in action and life.

Diverse stones, diverse measures—

An abomination to Jahve are they both.

The stones are, as at xi. 1, xvi. 11, those used as weights. Stone and stone, ephah and ephah, means that they are of diverse kinds, one large and one small (the LXX., in which the sequence of the proverbs from ver. 10 is different, has μέγα καὶ μικρόν), so that one may be able deceitfully to substitute the one for the other. אִפֶּה (from אָפָה, to bake) may originally have been used to designate such a quantity of meal as supplied a family of moderate wants; it corresponds to the *bath* (Ezek.

xliv. 11) as a measure for fluids, and stands here synecdochically instead of all the measures, including, *e.g.*, the *cor*, of which the *ephah* was a tenth part, and the *seah*, which was a third part of it. 10b = xvii. 5, an echo of Lev. xix. 36; Deut. xxv. 13-16. Just and equal measure is the demand of a holy God; the contrary is to Him an abhorrence.

Ver. 11 Even a child maketh himself known by his conduct,  
Whether his disposition be pure and whether it be right.

If מַעַלְל may be here understood after the use of עוֹלֵל, to play, to pass the time with anything, then נֶכֶד refers thereto: even by his play (Ewald). But granting that מַעַלְל [children], synon. with נֶכֶד, had occasioned the choice of the word מַעַלְל (*vid.* Fleischer on Isa. iii. 4), yet this word never means anything else than work, an undertaking of something, and accomplishing it; wherefore Böttcher proposes מַעַלְלָיו, for מַעַלְל may have meant play, in contradistinction to מַעַל. This is possible, but conjectural. Thus *gam* is not taken along with *b'amalalav*. That the child also makes himself known by his actions, is an awkward thought; for if in anything else, in these he must show what one has to expect from him. Thus *gam* is after the syntactical method spoken of at xvii. 26, xix. 2, to be referred to נֶכֶד (also the child, even the child), although in this order it is referred to the whole clause. The verb נָכַר is, from its fundamental thought, to perceive, observe from an ἐναντιόσημον: to know, and to know as strange, to disown (*vid.* under Isa. iii. 9); the *Hithpa.* elsewhere signifies, like (Arab.) *tankkar*, to make oneself unknowable, but here to make oneself knowable; Symmachus, ἐπιγνωρισθήσεται, Venet. γνωσθήσεται. Or does the proverb mean: even the child dissembles in his actions (Oetinger)? Certainly not, for that would be a statement which, thus generally made, is not justified by experience. We must then interpret 11b as a direct question, though it has the form of an indirect one: he gives himself to be known, viz. whether his disposition be pure and right. That one may recognise his actions in the conduct of any one, is a platitude; also that one may recognise his conduct in these, is not much better. פָּעַל is therefore referred by Hitzig to God as the Creator, and he interprets it in the sense of the Arab. *khulk*, being created = *natura*. We also in this way explain יִצְרָנִי, Ps.

ciii. 14, as referable to God the יָצַר; and that *poal* occurs, e.g. Isa. i. 31, not merely in the sense of action, but also in that of performance or structure, is favourable to this interpretation. But one would think that *poal*, if thus used in the sense of the nature of man, would have more frequently occurred. It everywhere else means action or work. And thus it is perhaps also here used to denote action, but regarded as habitual conduct, and according to the root-meaning, moral disposition. The N. T. word ἔργον approaches this idea in such passages as Gal. vi. 4. It is less probable that 11b is understood with reference to the future (Luther and others); for in that case one does not see why the poet did not make use of the more intelligible phrase אִם זֶה וְיִשָּׁר יִהְיֶה פְעָלִי. It is like our (Germ.) proverb: *Was ein Haken werden will krümmt sich bald* [what means to become a hook bends itself early]; or: *Was ein Dörnchen werden will spitzt sich bei Zeiten*<sup>1</sup> [what means to become a thorn sharpens itself early], and to the Aram. בּוֹצֵין בּוֹצֵין מִקְטִיפָה יִדְעַ = that which will become a gourd shows itself in the bud, *Berachoth* 48a.

Ver. 12 The hearing ear and the seeing eye—  
Jahve hath created them both.

*Löwenstein*, like the LXX.: the ear hears and the eye sees—it is enough to refer to the contrary to ver. 10 and xvii. 15. In itself the proverb affirms a fact, and that is its *sensus simplex*; but besides, this fact may be seen from many points of view, and it has many consequences, none of which is to be rejected as contrary to the meaning: (1.) It lies nearest to draw the conclusion, *viâ eminentiæ*, which is drawn in Ps. xciv. 9. God is thus the All-hearing and the All-seeing, from which, on the one side, the consolation arises that everything that is seen stands under His protection and government, xv. 3; and on the other side, the warning, *Aboth* ii. 1: "Know what is above thee; a Seeing eye and a Hearing ear, and all thy conduct is marked in His book." (2.) With this also is connected the sense arising out of the combination in Ps. xl. 7: man ought then to use the ear and the eye in conformity with the design which they are intended to subserve, according to

<sup>1</sup> A similar comparison from *Bereschith Rabba*, vid. *Duke's Rabbin. Blumenlese*, p. 126.

the purpose of the Creator (Hitzig compares xvi. 4); it is not first applicable to man with reference to the natural, but to the moral life: he shall not make himself deaf and blind to that which it is his duty to hear and to see; but he ought also not to hear and to see with pleasure that from which he should turn away (Isa. xxxiii. 15),—in all his hearing and seeing he is responsible to the Creator of the ear and the eye. (3.) One may thus interpret “hearing” and “seeing” as commendable properties, as Fleischer suggests from comparison of xvi. 11: an ear that truly hears (the word of God and the lessons of Wisdom) and an eye that truly sees (the works of God) are a gift of the Creator, and are (Arab.) *lillhi*, are to be held as high and precious. Thus the proverb, like a polished gem, may be turned now in one direction and now in another; it is to be regarded as a many-sided fact.

Ver. 13 Love not sleep, lest thou become poor;  
Open thine eyes, and have enough to eat.

What is comprehended in the first line here is presented in detail in vi. 9–11. The *fut. Niph.* of רָשָׁה, to become poor (cf. x. 4), is formed metaplastically from יָרַשׁ, xxiii. 21, xxx. 9, as at 1 Sam. ii. 7; Hitzig compares (Arab.) *ryth*, which, however, means to loiter or delay, not to come back or down. The R. רָשׁ signifies either to be slack without support (cf. רָלַ), or to desire (cf. אֶרְבֵּי, Arab. *fkyr*, properly *hiscens*, R. פָּקַח, as in פָּקַח, to open widely, which here follows). Regarding the second imper. 13*b*, *vid.* iii. 4: it has the force of a consequence, *Las deine augen wacker sein, So wirstu brots gnug haben* (Luth.) [Let thine eyes be open, so shalt thou have bread enough]. With these two proverbs of the eyes, the group beginning with ver. 8 rounds itself off.

The following group has its natural limit at the new point of departure at ver. 20, and is internally connected in a diversity of ways.

Ver. 14 “Bad, bad!” saith the buyer;  
And going his way, he boasteth then.

Luther otherwise:

“Bad, bad!” saith one if he hath it;  
But when it is gone, then he boasteth of it.

This rendering has many supporters. Geier cites the words of the Latin poet :

“*Omne bonum præsens minus est, sperata videntur Magna.*”

Schultens quotes the proverbs τὸ παρὸν βαρύ and *Præsentia laudato*, for with Luther he refers לו ואול to the present possession (אול, as 1 Sam. ix. 7 = (Arab.) *zâl*, to cease, to be lost), and translates: *at dilapsum sibi, tum demum pro splendido celebrat*. But by this the *Hithpa.* does not receive its full meaning; and to extract from הקונה the idea to which לו ואול refers, if not unnecessary, is certainly worthless. *Hakkoneh* may also certainly mean the possessor, but the possessor by acquisition (LXX. and the *Venet.* ὁ κτώμενος); for the most part it signifies the possessor by purchase, the buyer (Jerome, *emptor*), as correlate of מכר, Isa. xxiv. 2; Ezek. iv. 12. It is customary for the buyer to undervalue that which he seeks to purchase, so as to obtain it as cheaply as possible; afterwards he boasts that he has bought that which is good, and yet so cheap. That is an every-day experience; but the proverb indirectly warns against conventional lying, and shows that one should not be startled and deceived thereby. The subject to לו ואול is thus the buyer; אול with לו denotes, more definitely even than הלך לו, going from thence, *s'en aller*. Syntactically, the punctuation לו ואול [and he takes himself off] (*perf. hypoth.*, Ewald, 357a) would have been near (Jerome: *et cum recesserit*); but yet it is not necessary, with Hitzig, thus to correct it. The poet means to say: making himself off, he then boasts. We cannot in German place the “*alsdann*” [then] as the אָ here, and as also, *e.g.* at 1 Sam. xx. 12; but Theodotion, in good Greek: καὶ πορευθεὶς τότε καυχήσεται. We may write לו ואול with *Mercha* on the antepenult, on which the accent is thrown back, cf. חִינֵן, xix. 17, but not לו; for the rule for *Dagesh* does not here, with the retrogression of the tone, come into application, as, *e.g.*, in אֹכֵל לֶחֶמִי, Ps. xli. 10. Singularly the Syr. and Targ. do not read רַע רַע, but לִרַע, and couple ver. 15 with 14. In the LXX., vers. 14–19 are wanting.

Ver. 15 There is indeed gold, and many pearls;

But a precious treasure are lips full of knowledge.

In order to find a connection between this proverb and that which precedes, we need only be reminded of the parable of

the merchantman who sought goodly pearls, Matt. xiii. 45 f. The proverb rises to a climax: there is gold, and there are pearls in abundance, the one of which has always a higher value than the other; but intelligent lips are above all such jewels—they are a precious treasure, which gold and all pearls cannot equal. In a similar manner the N. T. places the one pearl above the many goodly pearls. So might רַעַת (*chokma*) be called the pearl above all pearls (iii. 15, viii. 11); but the lips as the organ of knowledge are fittingly compared with a precious vessel, a vessel of more precious substance than gold and pearls are.

Ver. 16 Take from him the garment, for he hath become surety for another;

And for strangers take him as a pledge.

The same proverb xxvii. 13, where קָח, with the usual aphæresis, here interchanges with it the fuller form לָקַח, which is also found at Ezek. xxxvii. 16. To this imperative חַבְּלֵהוּ is parallel: take him as a pledge (Theodotion, Jerome, the *Venet.* and Luther); it is not a substantive: his pledge (Targ.), which would require the word חַבְּלוֹ (חַבְּלוֹ); nor is it to be read with the Syr. חַבְּלֵהוּ, one pledges him; but it is imperative, not however of the *Piel*, which would be חַבְּלֵהוּ, and would mean “destroy him;” but, as Aben Ezra rightly, the imperative of *Kal* of חָבַל, to take as a pledge, Ex. xxii. 25, for חַבְּלֵהוּ without any example indeed except חַנְּנִי, Ps. ix. 14; cf. lxxx. 16. The first line is clear: take his garment, for he has become good for another (cf. xi. 15), who has left him in the lurch, so that he must now become wise by experience. The second line also is intelligible if we read, according to the *Chethîb*, נָכְרִים (Jerome, the *Venet.*), not נְכָרִים, as Schultens incorrectly points it, and if we interpret this plur. like בָּנִים, Gen. xxi. 7, with Hitzig following Luther, as plur. of the category: take him as a pledge, hold fast by his person, so as not to suffer injury from strange people for whom he has become surety. But the *Kerî* requires נְכָרִיָּה (according to which Theodotion and the Syr., and, more distinctly still than these, the Targ. translates), and thus, indeed, it stands written, xxvii. 13, without the *Kerî*, thus *Bathra* 173b reads and writes also here. Either נְכָרִיָּה is a strange woman, a prostitute, a *maitresse* for whom the unwise has made himself

surety, or it is neut. for *aliena res* (LXX. xxvii. 13, τὰ ἀλλότρια), a matter not properly belonging to this unwise person. We regard נכרים in this passage as original. בער coincides with vi. 26: it does not mean ἀντί, but ὑπέρ; “for strange people” is here equivalent to for the sake of, on account of strange people (χάριν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, as the *Venet.* translates it).

Ver. 17 Sweet to a man is the bread of deceit;

Yet at last his mouth is full of gravel.

“Bread of deceit” is not deceit itself, as that after which the desire of a man goes forth, and that for which he has a relish (thus, *e.g.*, Immanuel and Hitzig); but that which is not gained by labour, and is not merited. Possession (*vid.* iv. 17) or enjoyment (ix. 17) obtained by deceit is thus called, as לֶחֶם בְּזָבִים, xxiii. 3, denotes bread; but for him who has a relish for it, it is connected with deceit. Such bread of lies is sweet to a man, because it has come to him without effort, but in the end not only will he have nothing to eat, but his tongue, teeth, and mouth will be injured by small stones; *i.e.* in the end he will have nothing, and there will remain to him only evil (Fleischer). Or: it changes itself (Job xx. 14) at last into gravel, of which his mouth is filled full, as we might say, “it lies at last in his stomach like lead.” חֲצִץ is the Arab. *ḥatny*, gravel (Hitzig, *grien* = *gries*, coarse sand, grit), R. חץ, *scindere*. Similarly in Arab. *ḥajar*, a stone, is used as the image of disappointed expectations, *e.g.* the adulterer finds a stone, *i.e.* experiences disappointment.

Ver. 18 Plans are established by counsel,

And with prudent government make war.

From the conception of a thought, practically influencing the formation of our own life and the life of the community, to its accomplishment there is always a long way which does not lead to the end unless one goes forward with counsel and strength combined, and considers all means and eventualities. The *Niph.* of כָּן means, in a passive sense: to be accomplished or realized (Ps. cxli. 2). The clause 18a is true for times of war as well as for times of peace; war is disastrous, unless it is directed with strategic skill (*vid.* regarding תְּחִלָּה, i. 5). Grotius compares the proverb, Γινώμαι πλέον κρατοῦσιν ἢ σθένος χειρῶν. In xxiv. 6, the necessity of counsel is also referred to the case of war. Ewald would read [the infin.] עָשָׂה, or

עֲשֵׂה: with management it is that one carries on war. But why? Because to him the challenge to carry on war appears to be contrary to the spirit of proverbial poetry. But the author of the proverb does certainly mean: if thou hast to carry on war, carry it on with the skill of a general; and the imper. is protected by xxiv. 6 against that infin., which is, besides, stylistically incongruous.

Ver. 19 He that goeth out gossiping revealeth a secret;  
And with the babbler have nothing to do.

Luther otherwise (like Hitzig)—

Be not complicated with him who revealeth a secret,  
And with the slanderer, and with the false (better: loquacious) mouth,  
so that לְ and the warning apply to the threefold description, a rendering which Kimchi also, and Immanuel, and others at least suggest. But in connection with xi. 13, the first line has the force of a *judicium*, which includes the warning to entrust nothing to a babbler which ought to be kept silent. Write פִּוֹלָה פֹּד, as found in Codd. and old Edd., with *Munach* on the *penultima*, on which the tone is thrown back, and *Dagesh* to ם, after the rule of the דְּחִיק (Gesen. § 20, 2a), altogether like קוֹנֶה לֵב, xv. 32. 19b the *Venet.* translates after the first meaning of the word by Kimchi, τῷ ἀπαταιῶνι τοῖς χείλεσι, to him who slanders and befools, for it thus improves Theodotion's τῷ ἀπατῶντι τὰ χεῖλη αὐτοῦ. But פִּתָּה means, Job v. 2, —cf. Hos. vii. 11,—not him who befools another, but him who is befooled, is slandered, by another (Aben Ezra: שִׁפְתָּהוּ אֲחֵרִים), with which שִׁפְתָּי here does not agree. But now he who is easily befooled is called פִּתָּה, as being open to influence (susceptible), *patens*; and if this particip. is used, as here, transitively, and, on account of the object שִׁפְתָּי standing near cannot possibly be equivalent to מִפְּתָה, the usage of the language also just noticed is against it, then it means *patefaciens* or *dilatans* (cf. הִפְתָּה, Gen. ix. 27, Targ. אֶפְתִּי = הִרְחִיב), and places itself as synon. to בִּשָּׁן, xiii. 3; thus one is called who does not close his mouth, who cannot hold his mouth, who always idly babbles, and is therefore, because he can keep nothing to himself, a dangerous companion. The Complut. rightly translates: μετὰ πλατύνοντος τὰ ἑαυτοῦ μὴ μίχθητι χεῖλη.

The following group begins, for once more the aim of this older Book of Proverbs becomes prominent, with an inculcation of the fourth<sup>1</sup> commandment.

Ver. 20 He that curseth his father and his mother,  
His light is extinguished in midnight darkness.

The divine law, Ex. xxi. 17, Lev. xx. 9, condemns such an one to death. But the proverb does not mean this sentence against the criminal, which may only seldom be carried into execution, but the fearful end which, because of the righteousness of God ruling in history, terminates the life of such an unnatural son (xxx. 17). Of the godless, it has already been said that their light is extinguished, xiii. 9, there is suddenly an end to all that brightened, *i.e.* made happy and embellished their life; but he who acts wickedly (קָלַל, R. קָל, *levem esse*, synon. הִקְלִיף, Deut. xxvii. 16), even to the cursing of his father and mother, will see himself surrounded by midnight darkness (Symmachus, σκοτομήνη, moonless night), not: he will see himself in the greatest need, forsaken by divine protection (Fleischer), for Jansen rightly: *Lux et lucerna in scripturis et vitæ claritatem et posteritatem et prosperitatem significat.* The apple of the eye, אֵישׁוֹן, of darkness (*vid.* vii. 9), is that which forms the centre or centralization of darkness. The Syr. renders it correctly by *bobtho*, pupil [of the eye], but the Targ. retains the אֵישׁוֹן of the *Keri*, and renders it in Aram. by אֶתְחֵן, which Rashi regards as an infin., Parchon as a particip. after the form עֲרִיךְ; but it may be also an infin. substantive after the form עֲוִיחַ, and is certainly nothing else than the abbreviated and vocally obscured אֵישׁוֹן. For the Talm. אֵישׁוֹן, to be hard, furnishes no suitable idea; and the same holds true of אֵישׁוֹנִי, times, Lev. xv. 25 of the Jerusalem Targ.; while the same abbreviation and the same passing over of *o* into *u* represents this as the inflected אֵישׁוֹן (= עֲחֵ). There is also no evidence for a verb אֵישׁוֹן, to be black, dark; the author of Aruch interprets אֵישׁוֹנָא, *Bereschith Rabba*, c. 33, with reference to the passage before us, of a dark bathing apartment, but only tentatively, and אֵישׁוֹן is there quoted as the Targ. of אֵל, Gen. xix. 8, which the text lying before us does not ratify. *Ishon* means the little man (in the eye), and neither the blackness

<sup>1</sup> *i.e.* The *fifth* according to the arrangement of the Westminster Confession.]

(Buxtorf and others) nor the point of strength, the central point (Levy) of the eye.<sup>1</sup>

Ver. 21 An inheritance which in the beginning is obtained in haste,  
Its end will not be blessed.

The partic. מְבַחֵל may, after Zech. xi. 8, cf. Syr. *ܚܒܠܐ*, *nauseans*, mean "detested," but that affords here no sense; rather it might be interpreted after the Arab. *bajila*, to be avaricious, "gotten by avarice, niggardliness," with which, however, neither נַחֲלָה, inheritance, nor, since avarice is a chronic disease, בְּרֵאשׁוֹנָה agrees. On the contrary, the *Kerî* מְבַחֵלָת [hastened] perfectly agrees, both linguistically (*vid.* xxviii. 22; cf. xiii. 11) and actually; for, as Hitzig remarks, the words following ver. 20 fully harmonize with the idea of an inheritance, into the possession of which one is put before it is rightly due to him; for a son such as that, the parents may live too long, and so he violently deprives them of the possession (cf. xix. 26); but on such a possession there rests no blessing. Since the *Piel* may mean to hasten, Esth. ii. 9, so מְבַחֵל may mean hastened = speedy, Esth. viii. 14, as well as made in haste. All the old interpreters adopt the *Kerî*; the Aram. render it well by מְסַרְהֵב, from מְסַרְהֵב, overturned; and Luther, like Jerome, *hæreditas ad quam festinatur*.

Ver. 22 Say not: I will avenge the evil;  
Hope in Jahve, so will He help thee.

Men ought always to act toward their neighbours according to the law of love, and not according to the *jus talionis*, xxiv. 29; they ought not only, by requiting good with evil (xvi. 13; Ps. vii. 5a, xxxv. 12), not to transgress this law of requital, but they ought to surpass it, by also recompensing not evil with evil (*vid.* regarding שָׁלֵם, and *synon.* to xvii. 13); and that is what the proverb means, for 22b supposes injustice suffered, which might stir up a spirit of revenge. It does not, however, say that men ought to commit the taking of vengeance to God; but, in the sense of Rom. xii. 17-19, 1 Pet. iii. 9, that, renouncing all dependence on self, they ought to commit their deliverance out of the distress into which they have fallen, and their vindication, into the hands of God; for the promise is not that He will avenge them, but that

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Fleischer in Levy's *Chald. Wörterbuch*, i. 419.

He will help them. The jussive וַיִּשַׁע (write וַיִּשַׁע, according to *Metheg-setzung*, § 42, with *Gaja* as הַעֲמִידָה, with the *y* to secure distinct utterance to the final guttural) states as a consequence, like, *e.g.*, 2 Kings v. 10, what will then happen (Jerome, Luther, Hitzig) if one lets God rule (Gesen. § 128, 2c); equally possible, syntactically, is the rendering: that He may help thee (LXX., Ewald); but, regarded as a promise, the words are more in accordance with the spirit of the proverb, and they round it off more expressively.

Ver. 23 An abomination to Jahve are two kinds of weights;  
And deceitful balances are not good.

A variant to ver. 10, xi. 1. The pred. לֹא-טוֹב (xvii. 26, xviii. 5, xix. 3) is conceived of as neut.; they are not good, much rather bad and pernicious, for the deceiver succeeds only in appearance; in reality he fails.

Ver. 24 The steps of a man depend on Jahve;  
And a man—how can he understand his way?

Line first is from Ps. xxxvii. 23, but there, where the clause has the verbal predicate בִּוְיָנִי, the meaning is that it is the gracious assistance of God, by virtue of which a man takes certain steps with his feet, while here we have before us a variation of the proverb "*der Mensch denkt, Gott lenkt*" [= man proposes, God disposes], xvi. 9, Jer. x. 23; for מֶן, as at 2 Sam. iii. 37, Ps. cxviii. 23, denotes God in general as conditioning, as the ultimate cause. Man is indeed free to turn himself hither or thither, to decide on this course of conduct or on that, and is therefore responsible for it; but the relations co-operating in all his steps as the possible and defining conditions are God's contrivance and guidance, and the consequences which are connected with his steps and flow therefrom, lie beyond the power of man,—every one of his steps is a link of a chain, neither the beginning nor the end of which he can see; while, on the other hand, God's knowledge comprehends the beginning, middle, and end, and the wisdom of God ruling in the sphere of history, makes all human activity, the free action of man, subservient to his world-plan. The question, which has a negative answer, is applicable to man: what, *i.e.* how shall he understand his way? מֶן is like, *e.g.*, Ex. x. 26, Job ix. 2, xix. 28, accus., and fluctuates between the functions of a governed accusative: What

does he understand . . . (Job xi. 8) and an adv.: how, *i.e.* how so little, how even not, for it is the מה of the negative question which has become in (Arab.) *mā* a word of negation. The way of a man is his life's-course. This he understands in the present life only relatively, the true unravelling of it remains for the future.

Ver. 25 It is a snare to a man to cry out hastily "holy;"

And first after vows to investigate.

Two other interpretations of the first line have been proposed. The snare of a man devours, *i.e.* destroys the holy; but then מוֹקֵשׁ אֲדָם must be an expression of an action, instead of an expression of an endurance, which is impossible. The same is true against the explanation: the snare of a man devours, *i.e.* consumes, eats up the holy, which as such is withdrawn from common use. Jerome with his *devotare sanctos*, and Luther with his *das Heilige lestern* [to calumniate the holy], give to לִיעַ = בִּלַּע a meaning which loses itself in the arbitrary. Accordingly, nothing is to be done with the meaning καταπίεται (Aquila, the *Venet.*). But יָלַע will be the abbreviated fut. of לִיעַ (from יָלַע), or לָעַע (יָלַע), Job vi. 3 = (Arab.) *lughâ temere loqui (proloqui)*; and קִדֵּשׁ (after Hitzig: consecration, which is contrary to usage) is like κορβάν, Mark vii. 11, the exclamation to which one suddenly gives utterance, thereby meaning that this or that among his possessions henceforth no longer belongs to him, but is consecrated to God, and thus ought to be delivered up to the temple. Such a sudden vow and halting deference to the oath that has been uttered is a snare to a man, for he comes to know that he has injured himself by the alienation of his property, which he has vowed beyond that which was due from him, or that the fulfilling of his vow is connected with difficulties, and perhaps also to others, with regard to whom its disposal was not permitted to him, is of evil consequences, or it may be he is overcome by repentance and is constrained to break his oath. The LXX. hits the true meaning of the proverb with rare success: Παγὶς ἀνδρὶ ταχύ τι τῶν ἰδίων ἀγιάσαι, μετὰ δὲ τὸ εὐξασθαι μετανοεῖν γίνεται. נִדְרִים is plur. of the category (cf. 16b *Chethîb*), and בִּקֵּר, as 2 Kings xvi. 15, Arab. *bakr*, *examinare, inquirere*, means to subject to investigation, viz. whether he ought to observe, and might observe, a vow such as this, or whether he

might not and ought not rather to renounce it (Fleischer). Viewed syntactically, 25a is so difficult, that Bertheau, with Hitzig, punctuates יִלַּע; but this substantive must be formed from a verb יָלַע (cf. Hab. iii. 13), and this would mean, after (Arab.) *wala'*, "to long eagerly for," which is not suitable here. The punctuation shows יִלַּע as the 3d. fut. What interpreters here say of the doubled accent of the word arises from ignorance: the correct punctuation is יִלַּע, with *Gaja* to ע, to give the final guttural more force in utterance. The poet appears to place in the foreground: "a snare for a man," as a *rubrum*; and then continuing the description, he cries out suddenly "holy!" and after the vow, he proceeds to deliberate upon it. Fleischer rightly: *post vota inquisiturus est (in ea) = יִהְיֶה לְבָקֶר*; *vid.* at Hab. i. 17, which passage Hitzig also compares as syntactically very closely related.

Ver. 26 A wise king winnoweth the godless,  
And bringeth over them the wheel.

A variant to xx. 8, but here with the following out of the figure of the winnowing. For אֹפֶן with מִזְרָה is, without doubt, the wheel of the threshing-cart, עֲגִלָּה, Isa. xxviii. 27 f.; and thus with מִזְרָה, the winnowing fork, מִזְרָה is to be thought of; *vid.* a description of them along with that of the winnowing shovel, רֶחֶת, in Wetzstein's *Excursus* to Isa., p. 707 ff. We are not to think of the punishment of the wheel, which occurs only as a terrible custom of war (*e.g.* Amos i. 3). It is only meant that a wise king, by sharp and vigorous procedure, separates the godless, and immediately visits them with merited punishment, as he who works with the winnowing shovel gives the chaff to the wind. Most ancient interpreters think on אֹפֶן (from אָפַן, *vertere*) in its metaphorical meaning: *τρόπος* (thus also Löwenstein, he deals with them according to merit), or the wheel of fortune, with reference to the constellations; thus, misfortune (Immanuel, Meîri). Arama, Oetinger, and others are, however, on the right track.

With a proverb of a light that was extinguished, ver. 20 began the group; the proverb of God's light, which here follows, we take as the beginning of a new group.

Ver. 27 A candle of Jahve is the soul of man,  
Searching through all the chambers of the heart.

If the O. T. language has a separate word to denote the self-conscious personal human spirit in contradistinction to the spirit of a beast, this word, according to the usage of the language, as Reuchlin, in an appendix to Aben Ezra, remarks, is נִשְׁמָה; it is so called as the principle of life breathed immediately by God into the body (*vid.* at Gen. ii. 7, vii. 22). Indeed, that which is here said of the human spirit would not be said of the spirit of a beast: it is "the mystery of self-consciousness which is here figuratively represented" (Elster). The proverb intentionally does not use the word נִפְּשׁ, for this is not the power of self-consciousness in man, but the medium of bodily life; it is related secondarily to נִשְׁמָה (רוח), while נִשְׁמַת נִיִּים (רוח) is used, נִפְּשׁ חַיִּים is an expression unheard of. Hitzig is in error when he understands by נִשְׁמָה here the soul in contradistinction to the spirit, and in support of this appeals to an expression in the *Cosmography* of *Kazwîni*: "the soul (Arab. *âl-nefs*) is like the lamp which moves about in the chambers of the house;" here also *en-nefs* is the self-conscious spirit, for the Arab. and post-bibl. Heb. terminology influenced by philosophy reverses the biblical usage, and calls the rational soul נִפְּשׁ, and, on the contrary, the animal soul נִשְׁמָה רוח (*Psychologie*, p. 154). הִפֵּשׁ is the particip. of הִפֵּשׁ, Zeph. i. 12, without distinguishing the *Kal* and *Piel*. Regarding הִרְרִי-בָטֶן, LXX. ταμεία κοιλίας, *vid.* at xviii. 8: בָּטֶן denotes the inner part of the body (R. בִּט, to be deepened), and generally of the personality; cf. Arab. *bâṭn âl-rûḥ*, the interior of the spirit, and xxii. 18, according to which Fleischer explains: "A candle of Jahve, *i.e.* a means bestowed on man by God Himself to search out the secrets deeply hid in the spirit of another." But the candle which God has kindled in man has as the nearest sphere of illumination, which goes forth from it, the condition of the man himself—the spirit comprehends all that belongs to the nature of man in the unity of self-consciousness, but yet more: it makes it the object of reflection; it penetrates, searching it through, and seeks to take it up into its knowledge, and recognises the problem proposed to it, to rule it by its power. The proverb is thus to be ethically understood: the spirit is that which penetrates that which is within, even into its many secret corners and folds, with its self-testing and self-knowing light

—it is, after Matt. vi. 22, the inner light, the inner eye. Man becomes known to himself according to his moral as well as his natural condition in the light of the spirit; “for what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him?” says Paul, 1 Cor. ii. 11. With reference to this Solomonic proverb, the seven-branched candlestick is an ancient symbol of the soul, *e.g.* on the Jewish sepulchral monuments of the Roman *viâ Portuensis*. Our texts present the phrase נֵר יְהוָה; but the Talm. *Pesachim* 7b, 8a, the *Pesikta* in part 8, the Midrash *Othijoth de-Rabbi Akiba*, under the letter נ, Alphasi (ר"ף) in *Pesachim*, and others, read נֵר אֱלֹהִים; and after this phrase the Targum translates, while the Syr. and the other old versions render by the word “Lord” (*Venet.* ὁ δυνάστης), and thus had יְהוָה before them.

Ver. 28 Love and truth guard the king;  
And he supports his throne by love.

We have not in the German [nor in the Eng.] language a couple of words that completely cover חֶסֶד וְאֵמֶת; when they are used of God, we translate them by grace and truth [*Gnade u. Wahrheit*], Ps. xl. 12 (יִצְרוּנִי); when of men, by love and truth [*Liebe u. Treue*], xvi. 6; and when of the two-sided divine forces, by kindness and truth, iii. 3. Love and truth are the two good spirits that guard the king. If it is elsewhere said that the king's throne is supported “with judgment and with justice,” Isa. ix. 6 [7]; here, on the other side, we see that the exercise of government must have love as its centre; he has not only to act on the line of right, שְׁוֵרַת הַדִּין; but, as the later proverb says, in such a way, that within this circle his conduct is determined by the central motive of love. In this sense we give the king not only the title of *Grossmächtigster* [most high and mighty], but also that of “*Allernädigster*” [most gracious], for the king can and ought to exercise grace before other men; the virtue of condescension establishes his throne more than the might of greatness.

Ver. 29 The ornament of young men is their strength;  
And the honour of the old is grey hairs.

Youth has the name בְּחוּר (different from בְּחֹר, chosen), of the maturity (R. בַּחַר, cogn. בָּנָר, whence Mishn. בְּנִירוֹת, manhood, in contradistinction to נַעֲרִיּוֹת) into which he enters from

the bloom of boyhood; and the old man is called זָקֵן (Arab. *dhikn*, as Schultens says, *a mento pendulo*, from the hanging chin זָקֵן, (Arab.) *dhakan*, chin, beard on the chin). To stand in the fulness of fresh unwasted strength is to youth, as such, an ornament (תִּפְאַרֶת, cf. פֶּאֶרֶז, blooming colour of the countenance); on the contrary, to the old man who has spent his strength in the duties of his office, or as it is said at xvi. 31, "in the way of righteousness," grey hairs (שֵׂיבָה, from שָׁב, Arab. *shâb*, *canescere*) give an honourable appearance (הִרָר, from הָרַר, *turgidum*, *amplum esse*, *vid.* at Isa. lxiii. 1).

Ver. 30 Cutting wounds cleanse away evil,  
And reach the inner parts of the body.

The two words for wounds in line first stand in the *st. constr.*; חֲבוּרָה (from חָבַר, to be bound around with stripes, to be striped) is properly the streak, the stripe; but is here heightened by פָּצַע (from פָּצַע, to cleave, split, tear open), beyond the idea of the stripe-wound: tearing open the flesh, cuts tearing into the flesh. The pred. is after the *Kerî* תְּמָרוֹק; but this substantive, found in the Book of Esther, where it signifies the purification of the women for the harem (according to which, *e.g.*, Ahron B. Joseph explains כִּמוֹ תְּמָרוֹק לְנָשִׁים שֶׁהוּא יָפָה לָהֶם), is syntactically hard, and scarcely original. For if we explain with Kimchi: wounds of deep incision find their cleansing (cure) by evil, *i.e.* by means which bring suffering (according to which, probably the *Venet.* μώλωπες τραύματος λάμψουσιν ἐν κακῷ), then תְּמָרוֹק, with the pronoun pointing back, one would have expected. But the interpretation of בִּרְע, of severe means of cure, is constrained; that which lies nearest, however, is to understand רַע of evil. But if, with this understanding of the word, we translate: *Vibices plagarum sunt lustratio quæ adhibetur malo* (Fleischer), one does not see why בִּרְע, and not rather gen. רַע, is used. But if we read after the *Chethîb* תְּמָרִיק, then all is syntactically correct; for (1.) that the word תְּמָרִיקָה, or תְּמָרִיקוֹ, is not used, is in accordance with a well-known rule, Gesen. § 146, 3; and (2.) that תְּמָרִיק is connected, not directly with an accus. obj., but with ב, has its analogy in הִתְעָה בְּ, Jer. xlii. 2, הִשְׁרִישׁ בְּ, Job xxxi. 12, and the like, and besides has its special ground in the metaphorical character of the cleansing. Thus, *e.g.*, one uses Syr. ܠܥܠܝ of external misleading; but with

ב of moral misleading (Ewald, § 217, 2); and Arab. اشاد of erecting a building; but with ב of the intellectual erection of a memorial (monument). It is the so-called *Bâ-álmojáz*; vid. de Sacy's *Chrest. Arab.* i. 397. The verb מָרַק means in Talm. also, "to take away" (a metaph. of *abstergere*; cf. Arab. *marak*, to wipe off<sup>1</sup>); and that meaning is adopted, *Schabbath* 33a, for the interpretations of this proverb: stripes and wounds a preparedness for evil carries away, and sorrow in the innermost part of the body, which is explained by דרוקן (a disease appearing in diverse forms; cf. "*Drachenschuss*," as the name of an animal disease); but granting that the biblical מָרַק may bear this meaning, the ב remains unaccountable; for we say מָרַק לְעֵבְרָה, for to prepare oneself for a transgression (sin of excess), and not בְּעֵבְרָה. We have thus to abide by the primary meaning, and to compare the proverb, *Berachoth* 5a: "afflictive providences wash away all the transgressions of a man." But the proverb before us means, first at least, not the wounds which God inflicts, but those which human educational energy inflicts: deep-cutting wounds, i.e. stern discipline, leads to the rubbing off of evil, i.e. rubs it, washes it, cleanses it away. It may now be possible that in 30b the subject idea is permutatively continued: *et verbera penetralium corporis* (thus the *Venet.*: πληγαὶ τῶν ταμειῶν τοῦ γαστροῦ), i.e. *quorum vis ad intimos corporis et animi recessus penetrat* (Fleischer). But that is encumbered, and חֲרִיבָטָן (cf. ver. 27, xviii. 8), as referring to the depths to which stern corporal discipline penetrates, has not its full force. וּמְכוֹת is either a particip.: and that as touching (*ferientes*) the inner chambers of the body, or חֲרִיבָטָן is with the ב, or immediately, the second object of תְּמַרֵּק to be supplied: and strokes (rub off, cleanse, make pure) the innermost part. Jerome and the Targ. also supply ב, but erroneously, as designating place: *in secretioribus ventris*, relatively better the LXX. and Syr.: εἰς ταμειῶν κοιλίας. Luther hits the sense at least, for he translates:

One must restrain evil with severe punishment,  
And with hard strokes which one feels.

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Dozy's *Lettre à M. Fleischer* (1871), p. 198.

Chap. xxi. 1. The group, like the preceding one, now closes with a proverb of the king.

A king's heart in Jahve's hand is like brooks of water ;  
He turneth it whithersoever He will.

Brook and canal (the *Quinta* : ὑδραγωγοί) are both called נַחַל, or נָחַל, Job xx. 17, Arab. *falaj* (from נָחַל, to divide, according to which Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, διαρέσεις; Venet. διανομαί; Jerome, *divisiones*); *Jákút* has the explanation of the word : “*falaj* is the name given to flowing water, particularly the brook from a spring, and every canal which is led from a spring out over flat ground.” Such brooks of water are the heart of a king, *i.e.* it is compared to such, in Jahve's hand. The second line contains the point of comparison : He inclines it, gives to it the direction (נָחַל, causat. of נָחַל, Num. xxi. 15) toward whatever He will (נָחַל denotes willing, as a bending and inclining, viz. of the will; *vid.* at xviii. 2). Rightly Hitzig finds it not accidental that just the expression “brooks of water” is chosen as the figure for tractableness and subjection to government. In Isa. xxxii. 2, the princes of Judah are compared to “rivers of water in a dry place” with reference to the exhaustion of the land during the oppression of the Assyrian invasion ; the proverb has specially in view evidences of kindness proceeding from the heart, as at xvi. 15 the favour of the king is compared to clouds of latter rain emptying themselves in beneficent showers, and at xix. 12 to the dew refreshing the plants. But the speciality of the comparison here is, that the heart of the king, however highly exalted above his subjects, and so removed from their knowledge he may be, has yet One above it by whom it is moved by hidden influences, *e.g.* the prayer of the oppressed ; for man is indeed free, yet he acts under the influence of divinely-directed circumstances and divine operations ; and though he reject the guidance of God, yet from his conduct nothing results which the Omniscient, who is surprised by nothing, does not make subservient to His will in the world-plan of redemption. Rightly the Midrash : God gives to the world good or bad kings, according as He seeks to bless it or to visit it with punishment ; all decisions that go forth from the king's mouth come לכתחלה, *i.e.* in their

first commencement and their last reason they come from the Holy One.

The next group extends from ver. 2 to ver. 8, where it closes as it began.

Ver. 2 Every way of a man is right in his own eyes;  
But a weigher of hearts is Jahve.

A proverb similar to xvi. 2 (where  $\text{יִשָּׁר}$  for  $\text{יָרָה}$ ,  $\text{וְיָדָה}$  for  $\text{יָדָה}$ ,  $\text{לִבּוֹת}$  for  $\text{רוּחוֹת}$ ). God is also, xvii. 3, called a trier,  $\text{בִּחֵן}$ , of hearts, as He is here called a weigher,  $\text{תִּכָּן}$ . The proverb indirectly admonishes us of the duty of constant self-examination, according to the objective norm of the revealed will of God, and warns us against the self-complacency of the fool, of whom xii. 15 says (as Trimberg in "*Renner*"): "all fools live in the pleasant feeling that their life is the best," and against the self-deception which walks in the way of death and dreams of walking in the way of life, xiv. 12 (xvi. 25).

Ver. 3 To practise justice and right  
Hath with Jahve the pre-eminence above sacrifice.

We have already (vol. i. p. 42) shown how greatly this depreciation of the works of the ceremonial *cultus*, as compared with the duties of moral obedience, is in the spirit of the Chokma ; cf. also at xv. 8. Prophecy also gives its testimony, e.g. Hos. vi. 7, according to which also here (cf. xx. 8b with Isa. ix. 8) the practising of  $\text{צִדְקָה וּמִשְׁפָּט}$  (sequence of words as at Gen. xviii. 19, Ps. xxxiii. 5, elsewhere  $\text{צִדְקָה וּמִשְׁפָּט}$ , and yet more commonly  $\text{מִשְׁפָּט וְצִדְקָה}$ ) does not denote legal rigour, but the practising of the *justum et æquum*, or much rather the *æquum et bonum*, thus in its foundation conduct proceeding from the principle of love. The *inf.*  $\text{עֲשֵׂה}$  (like  $\text{קָנָה}$ , xvi. 16) occurs three times (here and at Gen. i. 20; Ps. ci. 3); once  $\text{עָשָׂה}$  is written (Gen. xxxi. 18), as also in the *inf. absol.* the form  $\text{עֲשֵׂה}$  and  $\text{עָשָׂה}$  interchange (*vid.* Norzi at Jer. xxii. 4); once  $\text{עָשָׂהוּ}$  for  $\text{עֲשֵׂהוּ}$  (Ex. xviii. 18) occurs in the *status conjunctus*.

Ver. 4 Loftiness of eyes and swelling of heart—  
The husbandry of the godless is sin.

If  $\text{נֵר}$ , in the sense of light, gives a satisfactory meaning, then one might appeal to 1 Kings xi. 36 (cf. 2 Sam. xxi. 17), where  $\text{נֵר}$  appears to signify lamp, in which meaning it is once (2 Sam. xxii. 29) written  $\text{נֵיר}$  (like  $\text{חֵיק}$ ); or since  $\text{נֵיר} = \text{נֵר}$  (ground-form,

*nawir*, lightening) is as yet certainly established neither in the Heb. nor Syr., one might punctuate נֵר instead of נִר, according to which the Greeks, Aram., and Luther, with Jerome, translate. But of the lamp of the godless we read at xiii. 9 and elsewhere, that it goeth out. We must here understand by נֵר the brilliant prosperity (Bertheau and others) of the wicked, or their “proud spirit flaming and flaring like a bright light” (Zöckler), which is contrary to the use of the metaphor as found elsewhere, which does not extend to a prosperous condition. We must then try another meaning for נֵר; but not that of yoke, for this is not Heb., but Aram.-Arab., and the interpretation thence derived by Lagarde: “Haughtiness and pride; but the godless for all that bear their yoke, viz. sin,” seeks in vain to hide behind the “for all that” the breaking asunder of the two lines of the verse. In Heb. נֵר means that which lightens (burning) = lamp, נֹר, the shining (that which burns) = fire, and נִיר, xiii. 23, from נִיר, to plough up (Targ. 1 Sam. viii. 12, נִמְנֵר = לְחַרֵּשׁ) the fresh land, i.e. the breaking up of the fallow land; according to which the Venet. as Kimchi: νέωμα ἀσεβῶν ἀμαρτία, which as Ewald and Elster explain: “where a disposition of wicked haughtiness, of unbridled pride, prevails, there will also sin be the first-fruit on the field of action; נֵר, *novale*, the field turned up for the first time, denotes here the first-fruits of sin.” But why just the first-fruits, and not the fruit in general? We are better to abide by the field itself, which is here styled נֵר, not שָׂדֶה (or as once in Jer. xxxix. 10, יֵב); because with this word, more even than with שָׂדֶה, is connected the idea of agricultural work, of arable land gained by the digging up or the breaking up of one or more years’ fallow ground (cf. *Pea* ii. 1, נִיר, Arab. *sikāk*, opp. בֹּר, Arab. *būr*, *Menachoth* 85a, שְׂדֵה מְנִירוֹת, a fresh broken-up field, *Erachin* 29b, נֵר, opp. הַבֵּיר, to let lie fallow), so that נֵר רְשָׁעִים may mean the cultivation of the fields, and generally the husbandry, i.e. the whole conduct and life of the godless. נֵר is here ethically metaph., but not like Hos. x. 12, Jer. iv. 3, where it means a new moral commencement of life; but like חָרַשׁ, *arare*, Job iv. 8, Hos. x. 13; cf. Prov. iii. 29. רָחַב is not adj. like xxviii. 25, Ps. ci. 5, but infin. like חָסַר, x. 21; and accordingly also רוּם is not adj. like חוּם, or past like סוּג, but infin. like Isa. x. 12. And תָּטַאת is the

pred. of the complex subject, which consists of רוֹם עֵינַיִם, a haughty looking down with the eyes, רֵחַב־לֵב, breadth of heart, i.e. excess of self-consciousness, and נֶר רִשְׁעִים taken as an *asyn-deton summativum*: pride of look, and making oneself large of heart, in short, the whole husbandry of the godless, or the whole of the field cultivated by them, with all that grows thereon, is sin.

Ver. 5 The striving of the diligent is only to advantage.

And hastening all [excessive haste] only to loss;

or in other words, and agreeably to the Heb. construction:

The thoughts of the industrious are (reach) only to gain,

And every one who hastens—it (this his hastening) is only to loss.

*Vid.* at xvii. 21. At x. 4, Luther translates “the hand of the diligent,” here “the plans of an expert [*endelichen*],” i.e. of one actively striving (xxii. 29, *endelich* = מְהִיר) to the end. The אָץ, hastening overmuch, is contrasted with the diligent; Luther well: but he who is altogether too precipitant. Everywhere else in the Proverbs אָץ has a closer definition with it, wherefore Hitzig reads אָצֵר, which must mean: he who collects together; but אָץ along with חֲרוֹץ is perfectly distinct. The thought is the same as our “*Eile mit Weile*” [= *festina lente*], and Goethe’s

*Wie das Gestirn ohne Hast,*

*Aber ohne Rast*

*Drehe sich jeder*

*Um die eigne Last.*

“Like the stars, without haste but without rest, let every one carry about his own burden,” viz. of his calling that lies upon him. The fundamental meaning of אָץ is to throng, to urge (Ex. v. 13), here of impatient and inconsiderate rashness. While on the side of the diligent there is nothing but gain, such haste brings only loss; over-exertion does injury, and the work will want care, circumspection, and thoroughness. In the Book of Proverbs, the contrasts “gain” and “loss” frequently occur, xi. 24, xiv. 23, xxii. 16: profit (the increase of capital by interest), opp. loss (of capital, or of part thereof), as commercial terms.

Ver. 6 The gaining of treasures by a lying tongue

Is a fleeting breath of such as seek death.

One may, at any rate, after the free manner of gnomic resem-

blances and comparisons, regard "fleeting breath" and "such as seek death" as two separated predicates: such gain is fleeting breath, so those who gain are seeking death (Caspari's *Beiträge zu Jes.* p. 53). But it is also syntactically admissible to interpret the words rendered "seekers of death" as gen.; for such interruptions of the *st. constr.*, as here by נָרַף [fleeting], frequently occur, *e.g.* Isa. xxviii. 1, xxxii. 13; 1 Chron. ix. 13; and that an idea, in spite of such interruption, may be thought of as gen., is seen from the Arab.<sup>1</sup> But the text is unsettled. Symmachus, Syr., Targ., the *Venet.*, and Luther render the phrase מְבַקְשֵׁי [seekers]; but the LXX. and Jerome read מִקְשֵׁי [snares] (cf. 1 Tim. vi. 9); this word Rashi also had before him (*vid.* Norzi), and Kennicott found it in several Codd. Bertheau prefers it, for he translates: . . . is fleeting breath, snares of death; Ewald and Hitzig go further, for, after the LXX., they change the whole proverb into: הָבֵל רִיחַ אֶל-מִקְשֵׁי מוֹת (בְּמִקְשֵׁי), with פָּעַל in the first line. But διώκει of the LXX. is an incorrect rendering of נָרַף, which the smuggling in of the ἐπὶ (παγίδας θανάτου) drew after it, without our concluding therefrom that אֶל-מִקְשֵׁי, or לְמִקְשֵׁי (Lagarde), lay before the translators; on the contrary, the word which (Cappellus) lay before them, מִקְשֵׁי, certainly deserves to be preferred to מְבַקְשֵׁי: the possession is first, in view of him who has gotten it, compared to a fleeting (נָרַף, as Isa. xlii. 2) breath (cf. *e.g.* smoke, Ps. lxviii. 3), and then, in view of the inheritance itself and its consequences, is compared to the snares of death (xiii. 14, xiv. 27); for in פָּעַל (here equivalent to עֲשִׂוֹת, *acquisitio*, Gen. xxxi. 1; Deut. viii. 17) lie together the ideas of him who procures and of the thing that is procured or effected (*vid.* at xx. 11).

Ver. 7 The violence of the godless teareth them away,  
For they have refused to do what is right.

The destruction which they prepare for others teareth or draggeth them away to destruction, by which wicked conduct brings punishment on itself; their own conduct is its own executioner (cf. i. 19); for refusing to practise what is right,

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Friedr. Philippi's *Status constructus*, p. 17, Anm. 3; and cf. there-with such constructions as (Arab.) *mān'u faḍlah ālmahtāji*, *i.e.* a refuser of the needy, his beneficence = one who denies to the needy his beneficence.

they have pronounced judgment against themselves, and fallen under condemnation. Rightly Jerome, *detrahent*, with Aquila, *κατασπάσει* = *j'gurrem* (as Hab. i. 15), from גָּרַר; on the contrary, the LXX. incorrectly, *ἐπιξενωθήσεται*, from גָּרַר, to dwell, to live as a guest; and the *Venet.*, as Luther, in opposition to the *usus loq.*: *δεδίδεται* (fut. of *δεδίσσασθαι*, to terrify), from גָּרַר, to dread, fear, which also remains intrans., with the accus. following, Deut. xxxii. 27. The Syr. and the Targ. freely: robbery (Targ. רִבּוּנָא, perhaps in the sense of usury) will seize them, viz. in the way of punishment. In Arab. *jarr* (*jariyratn*) means directly to commit a crime; not, as Schultens explains, *admittere crimen pœnam trahens*, but *attrahere* (*arripere*), like (Arab.) *jany* (*jinâyatn*), *contrahere crimen*; for there the crime is thought of as violent usurpation, here as wicked accumulation.

Ver. 8 Winding is the way of a man laden with guilt;  
But the pure—his conduct is right.

Rightly the accentuation places together “the way of a man” as subject, and “winding” as predicate: if the poet had wished to say (Schultens, Bertheau) “one crooked in his way” (*quoad viam*), he would have contented himself with the phrase נִחַשׁוֹת דֶּרֶךְ. But, on the other hand, the accentuation is scarcely correct (the second *Munach* is a transformed *Mugrash*), for it interprets וְנִ as a second pred.; but וְנִ is adj. to אִישׁ. As הַפְּכָכָה (synon. פְּתִילָה, עֲקֵלְקֵל) is a *hapax leg.*, so also *vazar*, which is equivalent to (Arab.) *mawzwr*, *crimine onustus*, from *wazira*, *crimen committere*, properly to charge oneself with a crime. The ancient interpreters have, indeed, no apprehension of this meaning before them; the LXX. obtain from the proverb a thought reminding us of Ps. xviii. 27, in which *vazar* does not at all appear; the Syr. and Targ. translate as if the *vav* of *vazar* introduces the conclusion: he is a barbarian (*nuchrojo*); Luther: he is crooked; Jerome also sets aside the syntax: *perversa via viri aliena est*; but, syntactically admissible, the *Venet.* and Kimchi, as the Jewish interpreters generally, *διαστροφωτάτη ὁδὸς ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἀλλόκοτος*. Fleischer here even renounces the help of the Arab., for he translates: *Tortuosa est via viri criminibus onusti, qui autem sancte vivit, is recte facit*; but he adds thereto the remark that “*vazar* thus explained, with Cappellus, Schultens,

and Gesenius, would, it is true, corresponding to the Arab. *wazar*, have first the abstract meaning of a verbal noun from *wazira*;<sup>1</sup> the old explanation is therefore perhaps better: *tortuosa est via viri et deflectens* (scil. a recta linea, thus *devia est*), when the 'viri' is to be taken in the general sense of 'many, this and that one;' the closer definition is reflected from the וִי of the second clause." But (1) וִי as an adj. signifies *peregrinus*; one ought thus rather to expect וִי, degenerated, corrupt, although that also does not rightly accord; (2) the verbal noun also, e.g. 'all, passes over into a subst. and adj. signification (the latter without distinction of number and gender); (3) וִי, after its adj. signification, is related to (Arab.) *wazyr*, as וִי is to *hakym*, וִי to *rahyb*; it is of the same form as וִי, with which it has in common its derivation from a root of similar meaning, and its ethical signification. In 8b, וִי is rightly accented as subj. of the complex pred. וִי is the pure in heart and of a good conscience. The laden with guilt (guilty) strikes out all kinds of crooked ways; but the pure needs no stealthy ways, he does not stand under the pressure of the bondage of sin, the ban of the guilt of sin; his conduct is straightforward, directed by the will of God, and not by cunning policy. Schultens: *Integer vitæ scelerisque purus non habet cur vacillet, cur titubet, cur sese contorqueat*. The choice of the designation וִי [and the pure] may be occasioned by וִי (Hitzig); the expression 8b reminds us of xx. 11.

The group now following extends to ver. 18, where a new one begins with a variation of its initial verse.

Ver. 9 Better to sit on the pinnacle of a house-roof,  
Than a contentious wife and a house in common.

We have neither to supplement the second line: than with a contentious wife . . . (Symmachus, Theodotion, Jerome, Luther), nor: than that one have a contentious . . . ; but the meaning is, that sitting on the roof-top better befits one, does better than a quarrelsome wife and a common house (rightly the Targ. and Venet.), i.e. in a common house; for the connecting together of the wife and the house by *vav* is a Semitic

<sup>1</sup> The *n. act* formed from *wazara* is *wazr*, *wizr*, *wizat*. These three forms would correspond to the Heb. *věžer*, *věžer*, and *zěřeth* (z'räh, cf. *rěděth*, *r'dah*, Gen. xlv. 3).

*hendiadys*, a juxtaposition of two ideas which our language would place in a relation of subordination (Fleischer). This *hendiadys* would, indeed, be scarcely possible if the idea of the married wife were attached to אִשָּׁה; for that such an one has with her husband a "house of companionship, i.e. a common house," is self-evident. But may it not with equal right be understood of the imperious positive mother-in-law of a widower, a splenetic shrewish aunt, a sickly female neighbour disputing with all the world, and the like? A man must live together with his wife in so far as he does not divorce her; he must then escape from her; but a man may also be constrained by circumstances to live in a house with a quarrelsome mother-in-law, and such an one may, even during the life of his wife, and in spite of her affection, make his life so bitter that he would rather, in order that he might have rest, sit on the pinnacle or ridge of a house-roof. פִּנָּה is the battlement (Zeph. i. 16) of the roof, the edge of the roof, or its summit; he who sits there does so not without danger, and is exposed to the storm, but that in contrast with the alternative is even to be preferred; he sits alone. Regarding the *Chethîb* מְרוֹנִים, *Kerî* מְרִינִים, *vid.* at vi. 14; and cf. the figures of the "continual dropping" for the continual scolding of such a wife, embittering the life of her husband, xix. 13.

Ver. 10 The soul of the godless hath its desire after evil;  
His neighbour findeth no mercy in his eyes.

The interchange of perf. and fut. cannot be without intention. Löwenstein renders the former as *perf. hypotheticum*: if the soul of the wicked desires anything evil . . .; but the רָשָׁע wishes evil not merely now and then, but that is in general his nature and tendency. The perf. expresses that which is actually the case: the soul of the wicked has its desire directed (write אֲוִתָּהּ with *Munach*, after Codd. and old Ed., not with *Makkeph*) toward evil, and the fut. expresses that which proceeds from this: he who stands near him is not spared. יָחַן is, as at Isa. xxvi. 10, *Hoph.* of הִיָּן, to incline, viz. oneself, compassionately toward any one, or to bend to him. But in what sense is בְּעֵינָי added? It does not mean, as frequently, e.g. ver. 2, according to his judgment, nor, as at xx. 8, vi. 13: with his eyes, but is to be understood after the phrase מָצָא חַן בְּעֵינָי: his neighbour finds no

mercy in his eyes, so that in these words the sympathy ruling within him expresses itself: "his eyes will not spare his friends," *vid.* Isa. xiii. 18.

Ver. 11 When the scorner is punished, the simple is made wise;  
And when insight is imparted to a wise man, he receives  
knowledge.

The thought is the same as at xix. 25. The mocker at religion and virtue is incorrigible, punishment avails him nothing, but yet it is not lost; for as a warning example it teaches the simple, who might otherwise be easily drawn into the same frivolity. On the other hand, the wise man needs no punishment, but only strengthening and furtherance: if "instruction" is imparted to him, he embraces it, makes it his own *רָעַת*; for, being accessible to better insight, he gains more and more knowledge. De Dieu, Bertheau, and Zöckler make "the simple" the subject also in 11b: and if a wise man prospers, he (the simple) gains knowledge. But *הַשְׁכִּיל* <sup>ל</sup>, used thus impersonally, is unheard of; wherefore Hitzig erases the <sup>ל</sup> before *הָכֵם*: if a wise man has prosperity. But *הַשְׁכִּיל* does not properly mean to have prosperity, but only mediately: to act with insight, and on that account with success. The thought that the simple, on the one side, by the merited punishment of the mocker; on the other, by the intelligent prosperous conduct of the wise, comes to reflection, to reason, may indeed be entertained, but the traditional form of the proverb does not need any correction. *הַשְׁכִּיל* may be used not only transitively: to gain insight, Gen. iii. 6, Ps. ii. 10, and elsewhere, but also causatively: to make intelligent, with the accus. following, xvi. 23, Ps. xxxii. 8, or: to offer, present insight, as here with the dat.-obj. following (cf. xvii. 26). Instead of *בְּעֵינֶיךָ*, the *Kametz* of which is false, Codd. and good Edd. have, rightly, *בְּעֵינֶיךָ*. Hitzig, making "the wise" the subject to *בְּהַשְׁכִּיל* (and accordingly "the scorner" would be the subject in 11a), as a correct consequence reads *בְּעֵינֶיךָ* = *בְּהַשְׁכִּיל*. For us, with that first correction, this second one also fails. "Both *infinitivi constr.*," Fleischer remarks, "are to be taken passively; for the Semitic infin., even of transitive form, as it has no designation of gender, time, and person, is an indeterminate *modus*, even in regard to the *generis verbi* (Act. and

Pass.)”<sup>1</sup> To this proverb with *u-behaskil* there is connected the one that follows, beginning with *maskil*.

Ver. 12 A righteous One marketh the house of the godless;  
He hurleth the godless to destruction.

If we understand by the word צַדִּיק a righteous man, then 12a would introduce the warning which he gives, and the unexpressed subject of 12b must be God (Umbreit). But after such an *introitus*, יהוה ought not to be wanting. If in 12a “the righteous man” is the subject, then it presents itself as such also for the second parallel part. But the thought that the righteous, when he takes notice of the house of the godless, shows attention which of itself hurls the godless into destruction (Löwenstein), would require the sing. רשע in the conclusion; also, instead of מַסְכֵּל the fut. יַסְכֵּל would have been found; and besides, the judicial סֵלָה (*vid.* regarding this word at xi. 3, xix. 3) would not be a suitable word for this confirmation in evil. Thus by צַדִּיק the proverb means God, and מַסְכֵּל has, as at xxii. 12, Job xii. 19, this word as its subject. “A righteous One” refers to the All-righteous, who is called, Job xxxiv. 17, “the All-just One,” and by Rashi, under the passage before us, צַדִּיקוֹ שֶׁל-עוֹלָם. Only do not translate with Bertheau and Zöckler: The Righteous One (All-righteous), for (1) this would require הַצַּדִּיק, and (2) הַצַּדִּיק is never by itself used as an attributive designation of God. Rightly, Fleischer and Ewald: a Righteous One, viz. God. It is the indetermination which seeks to present the idea of the great and dreadful: a Righteous One, and such a Righteous One!<sup>2</sup> הַשֶּׁבִּיל with על, xvi. 20, or אֵל, Ps. xli. 2, Neh. viii. 13, here with לְ, signifies to give attention to anything, to look attentively on it. The two participles stand in the same line: *animum advertit . . . evertit*. Hitzig changes

<sup>1</sup> The Arab. National Grammarians, it is true, view the matter otherwise. When *katlu zydn*, the putting to death of Zeid, is used in the sense of Zeid's becoming dead, according to their view the *fā'l* (the *gen. subjecti*) is omitted; the full expression would be *katlu 'amrn zaydnâ*. Since now *'amrn* is omitted, *zaydn* has in the *gen.* form taken the place of the *fā'l*, but this *gen.* is the representative of the *acc. objecti*. Without thus going round about, we say: it is the *gen. objecti*.

<sup>2</sup> The Arabs call this indetermination *âlnkrt lall'zym wallthwyl*. *Vid.* under Ps. ii. 12.

רָשָׁע into לְבִיתוֹ, and makes רָשָׁע the subject of 12b; but the proverb as it lies before us is far more intelligible.

Ver. 13 He that stoppeth his ear at the cry of the poor—  
He also calls and is not heard.

Only the merciful find mercy, Matt. v. 7; the unmerciful rich man, who has no ear for the cry of the רָלָה, i.e. of him who is without support and means of subsistence, thus of one who is needing support, will also remain unheard when he himself, in the time of need, calls upon God for help. Cf. the parable of the unmerciful servant of the merciful king, Matt. xviii. 23 ff. מִן in מִן־עֲקָתָהּ, as Isa. xxiii. 15, Gen. iv. 13, xxvii. 1; no preposition of our [German] language [nor English] expresses, as Fleischer here remarks, such a fulness of meaning as this מִן does, to which, after a verb of shutting up such as אָטַם (cf. xvii. 28), the Arab. عَن would correspond, e.g. *â'my 'n âltryk*: blind, so that he does not see the way.

Ver. 14 A gift in secret turneth away anger;  
And a bribe into the bosom violent wrath.

Hitzig reads with Symmachus, the Targ., and Jerome, יִכְבֶּה, and translates: "extinguishes anger;" but it does not follow that they did read יִכְבֶּה; for the Talm. Heb. כִּפֶּה signifies to cover by turning over, e.g. of a vessel, *Sanhedrin* 77a, which, when it is done to a candle or a fire, may mean its extinction. But כִּפֶּה of the post-bibl. Heb. also means to bend, and thence to force out (Aram. כִּפֶּה, כִּפֶּי), according to which Kimchi hesitates whether to explain: overturns = smothers, or: bends = forces down anger. The *Venet.* follows the latter signification: κάμψει (for Villoison's καλύψει rests on a false reading of the ms.). But there is yet possible another derivation from the primary signification, *curvare, flectere, vertere*, according to which the LXX. translates ἀνατρέπει, for which ἀποτρέπει would be yet better: כִּפֶּה, to bend away, to turn off, ἀρκεῖν, *arcere*, altogether like the Arab. (compared by Schultens) *kfâ*, and *kfy*, ἀρκεῖν, to prevent, whence, e.g., *ikfîni hada*: hold that away from me, or: spare me that (Fleischer); with the words *hafika sharran* (Lat. *defendaris semper a malo*) princes were anciently saluted; *kfy* signifies "to suffice," because enough is there, where there is a keeping off of want. Accordingly we translate: *Donum clam acceptum avertit iram*, which also the

Syr. meant by *mephadka* (מִפְּדָקָא). This verb is naturally to be supplied to 14*b*, which the LXX. has recognised (it translates: but he who spares gifts, excites violent anger). Regarding שָׁחַד, *vid.* at xvii. 8; and regarding בָּחַק, at xvii. 23. Also here חָק (חֵיק = חֵיק), like Arab. *jayb*, 'ubb, حُب, denotes the bosom of the garment; on the contrary, (Arab.) *hijr*, *hidn*, حِجْر, is more used of that of the body, or that formed by the drawing together of the body (*e.g.* of the arm in carrying a child). A present is meant which one brings with him concealed in his bosom; perhaps 13*b* called to mind the judge that took gifts, Ex. xxiii. 8 (Hitzig).

Ver. 15 It is a joy to the just to do justice,  
And a terror for them that work iniquity.

To act according to the law of rectitude is to these as unto death; injustice has become to them a second nature, so that their heart strives against rectitude of conduct; it also enters so little into their plan of life, and their economy, that they are afraid of ruining themselves thereby. So we believe, with Hitzig, Elster, Zöckler, and Luther, this must be explained in accordance with our interpretation of x. 29. Fleischer and others supplement the second parallel member from the first: וּפָעַל אֲנִי מַחְתָּה לַפְּעִיל אֲנִי; others render 15*b* as an independent sentence: ruin falls on those who act wickedly. But that ellipsis is hard and scarcely possible; but in general מַחְתָּה, as contrasted correlate to שִׁמְחָה, can scarcely have the pure objective sense of ruin or destruction. It must mean a revolution in the heart. Right-doing is to the righteous a pleasure (*cf.* x. 23); and for those who have אֲנִי, and are devoid of moral worth, and thus simply immoral as to the aim and sphere of their conduct, right-doing is something which alarms them: when they act in conformity with what is right, they do so after an external impulse only against their will, as if it were death to them.

Ver. 16 A man who wanders from the way of understanding,  
Shall dwell in the assembly of the dead.

Regarding הִשְׁכִּיל, *vid.* i. 3; and regarding רַפְּאִים, ii. 18. The verb נָח means to repose, to take rest, Job iii. 13, and to dwell anywhere, xiv. 33; but originally like (Arab.) *nakh* and *hadd*, to lay oneself down anywhere, and there to come to rest; and that is the idea which is here connected with נָח, for the figura-

tive description of יֹאֲבֵר or יָמוּת is formed after the designation of the subject, 16a : he who, forsaking the way of understanding, walks in the way of error, at length comes to the assembly of the dead ; for every motion has an end, and every journey a goal, whether it be one that is self-appointed or which is appointed for him. Here also it is intimated that the way of the soul which loves wisdom and follows her goes in another direction than earthwards down into hades ; hades and death, its background appear here as punishments, and it is true that as such one may escape them.

Ver. 17 He who loveth pleasure becometh a man of want ;  
He who loveth wine and oil doth not become rich.

In Arab. *samh* denotes the joyful action of the "cheerful giver," 2 Cor. ix. 7 ; in Heb. the joyful affection ; here, like *farah*, pleasure, delight, festival of joy. Jerome: *qui diligit epulas*. For feasting is specially thought of, where wine was drunk, and oil and other fragrant essences were poured (cf. xxvii. 9 ; Amos vi. 6) on the head and the clothes. He who loves such festivals, and is commonly found there, becomes a man of want, or suffers want (cf. Judg. xii. 2, אִישׁ רִיב, a man of strife) ; such an one does not become rich (הַעֲשִׂיר, like x. 4, = עֲשָׂה עֶשֶׂר, Jer. xvii. 11) ; he does not advance, and thus goes backwards.

Ver. 18 The godless becometh a ransom for the righteous ;  
And the faithless cometh into the place of the upright.

The thought is the same as at xi. 8. An example of this is, that the same world-commotion which brought the nations round Babylon for its destruction, put an end to Israel's exile : Cyrus, the instrument in God's hands for inflicting punishment on many heathen nations, was Israel's liberator, Isa. xliii. 3. Another example is in the exchange of places by Haman and Mordecai, to which Rashi refers. כֶּפֶר is equivalent to λύτρον, ransom ; but it properly signifies price of atonement, and generally, means of reconciliation, which covers or atones for the guilt of any one ; the poll-tax and "oblations" also, Ex. xxx. 15 f., Num. xxxi. 50, are placed under this point of view, as blotting out guilt : if the righteousness of God obtains satisfaction, it makes its demand against the godless, and lets the righteous go free ; or, as the substantival clause 18b expresses,

the faithless steps into the place of the upright, for the wrath passes by the latter and falls upon the former. Regarding בּוֹיָר, *vid.* ii. 22. Thus, in contrast to the יָשָׁר, he is designated, who keeps faith neither with God nor man, and with evil intention enters on deceitful ways,—the faithless, the malicious, the assassin.

Ver. 19. With this verse, a doublet to ver. 9 (xxv. 24), the collector makes a new addition; in ver. 29 he reaches a proverb which resembles the closing proverb of the preceding group, in its placing in contrast the רָשָׁע and יָשָׁר;—

It is better to dwell in a waste land,  
Than a contentious wife and vexation.

The corner of the roof, Hitzig remarks, has been made use of, and the author must look further out for a lonely seat. But this is as piquant as it is devoid of thought; for have both proverbs the same author, and if so, were they coined at the same time? Here also it is unnecessary to regard מֵאִשָּׁת as an abbreviation for מְשֻׁבַּת עִם אִשָּׁת. Hitzig supplies שָׁכֵן, by which אִשָּׁת, as the accus.-obj., is governed; but it is not to be supplied, for the proverb places as opposite to one another dwelling in a waste land (read שָׁכַבְתָּ בְּאַרְץ-מִדְבָּר, with Codd. and correct Ed.) and a contentious wife (*Chethîb*, מְדוֹנִים; *Kerî*, מְדִינִים) and vexation, and says the former is better than the latter. For וְכָעַם [and vexation] is not, as translated by the ancients, and generally received, a second governed genitive to אִשָּׁת, but dependent on מִן, follows “contentious woman” (cf. 9*b*): better that than a quarrelsome wife, and at the same time vexation.

Ver. 20 Precious treasure and oil are in the dwelling of the wise;  
And a fool of a man squanders it.

The wise spares, the fool squanders; and if the latter enters on the inheritance which the former with trouble and care collected, it is soon devoured. The combination אוֹצֵר נְחָמָד וְשֶׁמֶן [desirable treasure and oil] has something inconcinna, wherefore the accentuation places אוֹצֵר by itself by *Mehuppach Legarmeh*; but it is not to be translated “a treasure of that which is precious, and oil,” since it is punctuated אוֹצֵר, and not אוֹצֵר; and besides, in that case מִחֲמָדִים would have been used instead of נְחָמָד. Thus by אוֹצֵר, a desirable and splendid capital in gold and things of value (Isa. xxiii. 18; Ps. xix. 11); and by שֶׁמֶן, mentioned by

way of example, stores in kitchen and cellar are to be thought of, which serve him who lives luxuriously, and afford noble hospitality,—a fool of a man (בְּסִיל אָדָם, as at xv. 20), who finds this, devours it, *i.e.* quickly goes through it, makes, in short, a *tabula rasa* of it; cf. בָּלַע, Isa. xxviii. 4, with בָּלַע, 2 Sam. xx. 26, and Prov. xix. 28. The suffix of בִּלְעָנִי refers back to אוֹצֵר as the main idea, or distributively also both to the treasure and the oil. The LXX. (θησαυρὸς ἐπιθυμητὸς) ἀναπαύσεται ἐπὶ στόματος σοφοῦ, *i.e.* בָּפֶה חָכָם, according to which Hitzig corrects; but the fool, he who swallows down “the precious treasure with a wise mouth,” is a being we can scarcely conceive of. His taste is not at all bad; why then a fool? Is it perhaps because he takes more in than he can at one time digest? The reading of the LXX. is corrected by 20b.

Ver. 21 He that followeth after righteousness and kindness  
Will obtain life, righteousness, and honour.

How we are to render צְדָקָה וְחֶסֶד is seen from the connection of xxi. 3 and Hos. vi. 7: *tsedakah* is conduct proceeding from the principle of self-denying compassionate love, which is the essence of the law, Mic. vi. 8; and *hēsēd* is conduct proceeding from sympathy, which, placing itself in the room of another, perceives what will benefit him, and sets about doing it (cf. *e.g.* Job vi. 14: to him who is inwardly melted [disheartened] חֶסֶד is due from his neighbour). The reward which one who strives thus to act obtains, is designated 21b by הַיִּים and כְּבוֹד. Honour and life stand together, xxii. 4, when עֵשֶׂר precedes, and here צְדָקָה stands between, which, viii. 18, Ps. xxiv. 5, is thought of as that which is distributed as a gift of heaven, Isa. xlv. 8, which has glory in its train, Isa. lviii. 8; as Paul also says, “Whom He justified, them He also glorified.” The LXX. has omitted *tsedakah*, because it can easily appear as erroneously repeated from 21a. But in reality there are three good things which are promised to those who are zealous in the works of love: a prosperous life, enduring righteousness, true honour. Life as it proceeds from God, the Living One, righteousness as it avails the righteous and those doing righteously before God, honour or glory (Ps. xxix. 3) as it is given (Ps. lxxxiv. 12) by the God of glory. Cf. with צְדָקָה, x. 2, and with צִדְקָה, especially Jas. ii. 13, κατακαυχᾶται ἔλεος κρίσεως.

Ver. 22 A wise man scaleth a city of the mighty ;  
And casteth down the fortress in which they trusted.

Eccles. ix. 14 f. is a side-piece to this, according to which a single wise man, although poor, may become the deliverer of a city besieged by a great army, and destitute of the means of defence. עָלָה, *seq. acc.*, means to climb up, Joel ii. 7 ; here, of the scaling of a fortified town, viz. its fortress. עוֹ is that which makes it עוֹר, Isa. xxvi. 1 : its armour of protection, which is designated by the genit. מִבְּטָחָהּ, as the object and ground of their confidence. The vocalization מִבְּטָחָהּ, for *mibtachcha* (cf. Jer. xlviii. 13 with Job xviii. 14), follows the rule Gesen. § 27,

Anm. 2b. The suff., as in לֹא־תִנָּהּ, Isa. xxiii. 17, is lightened, because of its *mappik*, *Michlol* 30b ; *vid.* regarding the various grounds of these *formæ raphatæ pro mappicatis*, Böttcher, § 418. If a city is defended by ever so many valiant men, the wise man knows the point where it may be overcome, and knows how to organize the assault so as to destroy the proud fortress. With וַיִּרֶר, he brings to ruin, cf. עֵר וְרָחַם, Deut. xx. 20.

Ver. 23 He that guardeth his mouth and his tongue,  
Keepeth his soul from troubles.

xiii. 3 resembles this. He guardeth his mouth who does not speak when he does better to be silent ; and he guardeth his tongue who says no more than is right and fitting. The troubles comprehend both external and internal evils, hurtful incidents and (נִפְשׁ) צָרוֹת לֵב, Ps. xxv. 17, xxxi. 8, *i.e.* distress of conscience, self-accusation, sorrow on account of the irreparable evil which one occasions.

Ver. 24 A proud and arrogant man is called mocker (free-spirit) ;  
One who acteth in superfluity of haughtiness.

We have thus translated (vol. i. p. 39) : the proverb defines almost in a formal way an idea current from the time of Solomon : לֵץ (properly, the distorter, *vid.* i. 7) is an old word ; but as with us in the west since the last century, the names of *free-thinkers* and *esprits forts* (cf. Isa. xlvi. 12) have become current for such as subject the faith of the Church to destructive criticism, so then they were called לְצִים, who mockingly, as men of full age, set themselves above revealed religion and prophecy (Isa. xxviii. 9) ; and the above proverb gives the meaning of

this name, for it describes in his moral character such a man. Thus we call one **זָר**, haughty, and **זָר יָהִיר**, i.e. destroying himself, and thus thoughtlessly haughty, who **בְּעֶבְרֵת זָרָן** acts in superfluity or arrogance (*vid.* at xi. 23) of haughtiness; for not only does he inwardly raise himself above all that is worthy of recognition as true, of faith as certain, of respect as holy; but acting as well as judging frivolously, he shows reverence for nothing, scornfully passing sentence against everything. Abulwalîd (*vid.* Gesen. *Thes.*) takes **יָהִיר** in the sense of obstinate; for he compares the Arab. *jahr* (*jahar*), which is equivalent to *lijâj*, constancy, stubbornness. But in the Targ. and Talm. (*vid.* at Hab. ii. 5, Levy's Chald. *Wörterb.* under **יָהִיר**) **יָהִיר** in all its offshoots and derivations has the sense of pride; we have then rather to compare the Arab. *istaihara*, to be insane (= *dhahb 'aklh*, *mens ejus alienata est*), perhaps also to *hajjir*, *mutahawwir*, being overthrown, *præceps*, so that **יָהִיר** denotes one who by his *ὑπερφρονεῖν* is carried beyond all *σωφρονεῖν* (*vid.* Rom. xii. 3), one who is altogether mad from pride. The Syr. *madocho* (Targ. **מַדִּיחָא**), by which **יָהִיר** (Targ. **יָהִיר**) is rendered here and at Hab. ii. 5, is its synonym; this word also combines in itself the ideas foolhardy, and of one acting in a presumptuous, mad way; in a word, of one who is arrogant. Schultens is in the right way; but when he translates by *tumidus mole cava ruens*, he puts, as it is his custom to do, too much into the word; *tumidus*, puffed up, presents an idea which, etymologically at least, does not lie in it. The Venet.: *ἀκρατὴς θρασὺς βωμολόχος τοῦνομά οἱ*, which may be translated: an untractable reckless person we call a fool [*homo ineptus*], is not bad.

Ver. 25 The desire of the slothful killeth him;

For his hands refuse to be active.

The desire of the **עָצֵל**, Hitzig remarks, goes out first after meat and drink; and when it takes this direction, as hunger, it kills him indeed. But in this case it is not the desire that kills him, but the impossibility of satisfying it. The meaning is simply: the inordinate desire after rest and pleasure kills the slothful; for this always seeking only enjoyment and idleness brings him at last to ruin. **תַּאֲוָה** means here, as in *Kibroth ha-tava*, Num. xi. 34, inordinate longing after enjoyments. The proverb is connected by almost all interpreters (also Ewald,

Bertheau, Hitzig, Elster, Zöckler) as a tetrastich with ver. 25: he (the slothful) always eagerly desires, but the righteous giveth and spareth not. But (1) although צַדִּיק, since it designates one who is faithful to duty, might be used particularly of the industrious (cf. xv. 19), yet would there be wanting in 26a וְאִין, xiii. 4, cf. xx. 4, necessary for the formation of the contrast; (2) this older Book of Proverbs consists of pure distichs; the only tristich, xix. 7, appears as the consequence of a mutilation from the LXX. Thus the pretended tetrastich before us is only apparently such.

Ver. 26 One always desireth eagerly;

But the righteous giveth and holdeth not back.

Otherwise Fleischer: *per totum diem avet avidus, i.e. avarus*; but that in הַתְּאֻנָּה הַתְּאֻנָּה the verb is connected with its inner obj. is manifest from Num. xi. 4; it is the mode of expression which is called in the Greek syntax *schema etymologicum*, and which is also possible without an adj. joined to the obj., as in the ὕβρις θ' ὑβρίζεις (Eurip. *Herc. fur.* 706), the Arab. *mārāhu miryatn*: he had a strife with him. Euchel impossibly: necessities will continually be appeased, which would have required הַתְּאֻנָּה or מַתְאֻנָּה. The explanation also cannot be: each day presents its special demand, for כָּל-הַיּוֹם does not mean each day, but the whole day, *i.e.* continually. Thus we render הַתְּאֻנָּה with the most general subject (in which case the national grammarians supply הַמַּתְאֻנָּה): continually one longs longing, *i.e.* there are demands, solicitations, wishes, importunate petitions; but still the righteous is not embarrassed in his generosity, he gives as unceasingly (cf. Isa. xiv. 6, lviii. 1) as one asks. Thus the pref. is explained, which is related hypothetically to the fut. following: though one, etc.

Ver. 27 The sacrifice of the godless is an abomination;

How much more if it is brought for evil!

Line first = xv. 8a. Regarding the syllogistic כִּי אֵין, *vid.* xii. 31, xv. 11; regarding זָמָה, crime, particularly the sin of lewdness (from זָמַם, to press together, to collect the thoughts upon something, to contrive, cf. *raffinement de la volupté*), at x. 23. זָמָה is too vaguely rendered in the LXX. by παρονόμως, falsely by Jerome, *ex scelere* (cf. ἐξ ἀδίκου, Sir. xxxi. 18, with Mal. i. 13). The כִּי is not meant, as at Ezek. xxii. 11, of the

way and manner; for that the condition of life of the רשע is not a pure one, is not to be supposed. It is as Hitzig, rightly, that of price: for a transgression, *i.e.* to atone for it; one is hereby reminded, that he who had intercourse with a betrothed bondmaid had to present an *ascham* [trespass-offering], Lev. xix. 20–22. But frequently enough would it occur that rich sensualists brought trespass-offerings, and other offerings, in order thereby to recompense for their transgressions, and to purchase for themselves the connivance of God for their dissolute life. Such offerings of the godless, the proverb means, are to God a twofold and a threefold abomination; for in this case not only does the godless fail in respect of repentance and a desire after salvation, which are the conditions of all sacrifices acceptable to God, but he makes God directly a minister of sin.

Ver. 28 A false witness shall perish;

But he who heareth shall always speak truth.

The LXX. translate 28*b* by ἀνὴρ δὲ φυλασσόμενος λαλήσει. Cappellus supposes that they read לנצר for לנצח, which, however, cannot mean “taking care.” Hitzig further imagines שמח for שמע, and brings out the meaning: “the man that rejoiceth to deliver shall speak.” But where in all the world does נצר mean “to deliver”? It means, “to guard, preserve;” and to reach the meaning of “to deliver,” a clause must be added with מן, as מרע. When one who speaks lies (עַרְבָּיִם), and a man who hears (אִישׁ שׁוֹמֵעַ), *plene*, and with the orthophonic Dagesh), are contrasted, the former is one who fancifully or malevolently falsifies the fact, and the latter is one who before he speaks hears in order that he may say nothing that he has not surely heard. As לֵב שֹׁמֵעַ, 1 Kings iii. 9, means an obedient heart, so here אִישׁ שׁוֹמֵעַ means a man who attentively hears, carefully proves. Such an one will speak לִנְצַח, *i.e.* not: according to the truth, and not: for victory (Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, εἰς νῆκος), *i.e.* so that accomplishes it (Oetinger); for the Heb. נִצַּח has neither that Arab. nor this Aram. signification; but, with the transference of the root meaning of radiating or streaming over, to time, continuous existence (*vid.* Orelli, *Synonyma der Zeit und Ewigkeit*, pp. 95–97), thus: he will speak for continuance, *i.e.* either: without ever requiring

to be silent, or, which we prefer: so that what he says stands; on the contrary, he who testifies mere fictions, *i.e.* avers that they are truth, is destroyed (28a=xix. 9b, cf. 5): he himself comes to nothing, since his testimonies are referred to their groundlessness and falsity; for שֶׁקֶר אֵין לוֹ רַגְלִים, the lie has no feet on which it can stand, it comes to nothing sooner or later.

Ver. 29. Another proverb with אִישׁ:—

A godless man showeth boldness in his mien;  
But one that is upright—he proveth his way.

The *Chethîb* has יָבִין; but that the upright directeth, *dirigit*, his way, *i.e.* gives to it the right direction (cf. 2 Chron. xxvii. 6), is not a good contrast to the boldness of the godless; the *Kerî*, הַבֵּן הַרְבֵּי, deserves the preference. Aquila, Symmachus, the Syr., Targ., and *Venet.* adhere to the *Chethîb*, which would be suitable if it could be translated, with Jerome, by *corrigit*; Luther also reads the verb with כ, but as if it were יָבִין (whoever is pious, his way will stand)—only the LXX. render the *Kerî* (συνιᾶν); as for the rest, the ancients waver between the *Chethîb* הַבֵּן הַרְבֵּי and the *Kerî* הַרְבֵּי: the former refers to manner of life in general; the latter (as at iii. 31 and elsewhere) to the conduct in separate cases; thus the one is just as appropriate as the other. In the circumstantial designation אִישׁ רָשָׁע (cf. xi. 7) we have the stamp of the distinction of different classes of men peculiar to the Book of Proverbs. הָעֹץ (to make firm, defiant) had, vii. 13, פָּנִים as accus.; the פָּ here is not that used in metaphoristic expressions instead of the accus. obj., which we have spoken of at xv. 4, xx. 30, but that of the means; for the face is thought of, not as the object of the action, but, after Gesen. § 138. 1, as the means of its accomplishment: the godless makes (shows) firmness, *i.e.* defiance, accessibility to no admonition, with his countenance; but the upright considers, *i.e.* proves (xiv. 8), his way. בֵּין (הַבֵּין) means a perceiving of the object in its specific peculiarity, an understanding of its constituent parts and essential marks; it denotes knowing an event analytically, as הַשְׁכִּיל, as well as synthetically (cf. Arab. *shakl*), and is thus used as the expression of a perception, which apprehends the object not merely immediately, but closely examines into its circumstances.

If we further seek for the boundaries, the proverbs regarding the rich and the poor, xxii. 2, 7, 16, present themselves as such, and this the more surely as xxii. 16 is without contradiction the terminus. Thus we take first together xxi. 30–xxii. 2.

Ver. 30 No wisdom and no understanding,  
And no counsel is there against Jahve.

The expression might also be 'לִפְנֵי ה' ; but the predominating sense would then be, that no wisdom appears to God as such, that He values none as such. With לִנְגִיד the proverb is more objective : there is no wisdom which, compared with His, can be regarded as such (cf. 1 Cor. iii. 19), none which can boast itself against Him, or can at all avail against Him (לִנְגִיד, as Dan. x. 12 ; Neh. iii. 37) ; whence it follows (as Job xxviii. 28) that the wisdom of man consists in the fear of God the Alone-wise, or, which is the same thing, the All-wise. Immanuel interprets חִכְמָה of theology, תְּבוּנָה of worldly science, עֵצָה of politics ; but חִכְמָה is used of the knowledge of truth, *i.e.* of that which truly is and continues ; תְּבוּנָה of criticism, and עֵצָה of system and method ; *vid.* at i. 2, viii. 14, from which latter passage the LXX. has substituted here נְבוּרָה instead of תְּבוּנָה. Instead of 'לִנְגִיד ה' it translates πρὸς τὸν ἀσεβῆ, *i.e.* for that which is 'נִגַד against Jahve.

Ver. 31 The horse is harnessed for the day of battle ;  
But with Jahve is the victory,

*i.e.* it remains with Him to give the victory or not, for the horse is a vain means of victory, Isa. xxxiii. 17 ; the battle is the Lord's, 1 Sam. xvii. 47, *i.e.* it depends on Him how the battle shall issue ; and king and people who have taken up arms in defence of their rights have thus to trust nothing in the multitude of their war-horses (סוּסִים, horses, including their riders), and generally in their preparations for the battle, but in the Lord (cf. Ps. xx. 8, and, on the contrary, Isa. xxxi. 1). The LXX. translates הַתְּשׁוּעָה by ἡ βοήθεια, as if the Arab. name of victory, *naṣr*, proceeding from this fundamental meaning, stood in the text ; הַתְּשׁוּעָה (from יָשַׁע, Arab. *ws'*, to be wide, to have free space for motion) signifies properly prosperity, as the contrast of distress, oppression, slavery, and victory (cf. *e.g.* Ps. cxliv. 10, and יְשׁוּעָה, 1 Sam. xiv. 45). The post-bibl. Heb. uses נִצָּח

(נִצָּחֹן) for victory ; but the O. T. Heb. has no word more fully covering this idea than תְּשׁוּעָה (יְשׁוּעָה).<sup>1</sup>

Chap. xxii. 1 A good name has the preference above great riches ;  
For more than silver and gold is grace.

The proverb is constructed chiasmically; the commencing word נִבְחָר (cf. xxi. 3), and the concluding word טוֹב, are the parallel predicates; rightly, none of the old translators have been misled to take together טוֹב הָיָה, after the analogy of שְׂכָל טוֹב, iii. 14, xiii. 15. שֵׁם also does not need טוֹב for nearer determination; the more modern idiom uses שֵׁם טוֹב,<sup>2</sup> the more ancient uses שֵׁם alone (e.g. Eccles. vii. 1), in the sense of ὄνομα καλόν (thus here LXX.); for being well known (renowned) is equivalent to a name, and the contrary to being nameless (Job xxx. 8); to make oneself a name, is equivalent to build a monument in honour of oneself; possibly the derivation of the word from שָׁמָּה, to be high, prominent, known, may have contributed to this meaning of the word *sensu eximio*, for שֵׁם has the same root word as שְׂמִים. Luther translates שֵׁם by *Das Gerücht* [rumour, fame], in the same pregnant sense; even to the present day, *renom*, *renommée*, *riputazione*, and the like, are thus used. The parallel הָיָה signifies grace and favour (being beloved); grace, which brings favour (xi. 16); and favour, which is the consequence of a graceful appearance, courtesy, and demeanour (e.g. Esth. ii. 15).

Ver. 2 The rich and the poor meet together ;  
The creator of them all is Jahve.

From this, that God made them all, *i.e.* rich and poor in the totality of their individuals, it follows that the meeting together is His will and His ordinance; they shall in life push one against another, and for what other purpose than that this relation-

<sup>1</sup> In the old High German, the word for war is *urlag* (*urlac*), fate, because the issue is the divine determination, and *nôt* (as in "*der Nibelunge Not*"), as binding, confining, restraint; this *nôt* is the correlate to תְּשׁוּעָה, victory; מִלְחָמָה corresponds most to the French *guerre*, which is not of Romanic, but of German origin: the *Werre*, *i.e.* the *Gewirre* [complication, confusion], for נִלָּחֵם signifies to press against one another, to be engaged in close conflict; cf. the Homeric *κλόνος* of the turmoil of battle.

<sup>2</sup> e.g. *Aboth* iv. 17: there are three crowns: the crown of the Tōra, the crown of the priesthood, and the crown of royalty; but כְּתָר שֵׁם טוֹב, the crown of a good name, excels them all.

ship of mutual intercourse should be a school of virtue: the poor shall not envy the rich (iii. 31), and the rich shall not despise the poor, who has the same God and Father as himself (xiv. 31, xvii. 5; Job xxxi. 15); they shall remain conscious of this, that the intermingling of the diversities of station is for this end, that the lowly should serve the exalted, and the exalted should serve the lowly. xxix. 13 is a variation; there also for both, but particularly for the rich, lies in the proverb a solemn warning.

The group of proverbs beginning here terminates at ver. 7, where, like the preceding, it closes with a proverb of the rich and the poor.

Ver. 3 The prudent seeth the evil, and hideth himself;  
But the simple go forward, and suffer injury.

This proverb repeats itself with insignificant variations, xxvii. 12. The *Kerî* וַיִּסְתֵּר makes it more conformable to the words there used. The *Chethîb* is not to be read וַיִּסְתֵּר, for this *Kal* is *inusit.*, but וַיִּפְתֹּר, or much rather וַיִּפְתֵּר, since it is intended to be said what immediate consequence on the part of a prudent man arises from his perceiving an evil standing before him; he sees, *e.g.*, the approaching overthrow of a decaying house, or in a sudden storm the fearful flood, and betimes betakes himself to a place of safety; the simple, on the contrary, go blindly forward into the threatening danger, and must bear the punishment of their carelessness. The *fut. consec.* 3*a* denotes the hiding of oneself as that which immediately follows from the being observant; the two *perf.* 3*b*, on the other hand, with or without ׀, denote the going forward and meeting with punishment as occurring contemporaneously (cf. Ps. xlviii. 6, and regarding these diverse forms of construction, at Hab. iii. 10). "The interchange of the sing. and plur. gives us to understand that several or many simple ones are found for one prudent man" (Hitzig). The *Niph.* of עָנַשׁ signifies properly to be punished by pecuniary fine (Ex. xxi. 22) (cf. the post-bibl. עָנַשׁ, to threaten punishment, which appears to have arisen from *censere*, to estimate, to lay on taxes); here it has the general meaning of being punished, viz. of the self-punishment of want of foresight.

Ver. 4 The reward of humility is the fear of Jahve,  
Is riches, and honour, and life.

As עֲנִיָּה-צֶדֶק, Ps. xlv. 5, is understood of the two virtues, meekness and righteousness, so here the three Göttingen divines (Ewald, Bertheau, and Elster), as also Dunasch, see in עֲנִיָּה יִרְאַת ה' an asyndeton; the poet would then have omitted *vav*, because instead of the copulative connection he preferred the appositional (Schultens: *præmium mansuetudinis quæ est reverentia Jehovæ*) or the permutative (the reward of humility; more accurately expressed: the fear of God). It is in favour of this interpretation that the verse following (ver. 5) also shows an asyndeton. Luther otherwise: where one abides in the fear of the Lord; and Oetinger: the reward of humility, endurance, calmness in the fear of the Lord, is . . .; Fleischer also interprets יִרְאַת ה' as xxi. 4, חֲטָאת (lucerna impiorum vitiosa), as the accus. of the nearer definition. But then is the nearest-lying construction: the reward of humility is the fear of God, as all old interpreters understand 4a (e.g. Symmachus, ὕστερον πραύτητος φόβος κυρίου), a thought so incomprehensible, that one must adopt one or other of these expedients? On the one side, we may indeed say that the fear of God brings humility with it; but, on the other hand, it is just as conformable to experience that the fear of God is a consequence of humility; for actually to subordinate oneself to God, and to give honour to Him alone, one must have broken his self-will, and come to the knowledge of himself in his dependence, nothingness, and sin; and one consequence by which humility is rewarded, may be called the fear of God, because it is the root of all wisdom, or as is here said (cf. iii. 16, viii. 18), because riches, and honour, and life are in its train. Thus 4a is a concluded sentence, which in 4b is so continued, that from 4a the predicate is to be continued: the reward of humility is the fear of God; it is at the same time riches . . . Hitzig conjectures יִרְאוּת ה', the beholding Jahve; but the *visio Dei* (beatifica) is not a dogmatic idea thus expressed in the O. T. עָקַב denotes what follows a thing, from עָקַב, to tread on the heels (Fleischer); for עָקַב (Arab. 'akib) is the heels, as the incurvation of the foot; and עָקַב, the consequence (cf. Arab. 'akb, 'ukb, posteritas), is mediated through the *v. denom.* עָקַב, to tread on the heels, to follow on the heels (cf.

denominatives, such as Arab. *batn*, *zahr*, 'ân, עַי, to strike the body, the back, the eye).

Ver. 5 Thorns, snares, are on the way of the crooked;

He that guardeth his soul, let him keep far from them.

Rightly the *Venet.* ἄκανθαι παγίδες ἐν ὁδῷ στρεβλοῦ. The meaning of צָנִים (plur. of צָן, or צֶנֶז, the same as צִנְיָנִים) and פָּחִים (from פָּח, Arab. *fah*), stands fast, though it be not etymologically verified; the placing together of these two words (the LXX. obliterating the asyndeton: τρίβλος καὶ παγίδες) follows the scheme שְׂמֵשׁ יִרָח, Hab. iii. 11. The עֲקֵשׁ-לֵב (perverse of heart, crooked, xvii. 20, xi. 20) drives his crooked winding way, corresponding to his habit of mind, which is the contrast and the perversion of that which is just, a way in which there are thorns which entangle and wound those who enter thereon, snares which unexpectedly bring them down and hold them fast as prisoners; the hedge of thorns, xv. 19, was a figure of the hindrances in the way of the wicked themselves. The thorn and snares here are a figure of the hindrances and dangers which go forth from the deceitful and the false in the way of others, of those who keep their souls, *i.e.* who outwardly and morally take heed to their life (xvi. 17, xiii. 3, pred. here subj.), who will keep, or are disposed to keep, themselves from these thorns, these snares into which the deceitful and perverse-hearted seek to entice them.

Ver. 6 Give to the child instruction conformably to His way;

So he will not, when he becomes old, depart from it.

The first instruction is meant which, communicated to the child, should be עַל-פִּי, after the measure (Gen. xliii. 7 = post-bibl. לְפִי and כְּפִי) of his way, *i.e.* not: of his calling, which he must by and by enter upon (Bertheau, Zöckler), which דִּרְכוֹ of itself cannot mean; also not: of the way which he must keep in during life (*Kidduschin* 30a); nor: of his individual nature (Elster); but: of the nature of the child as such, for דִּרְכּוֹ is the child's way, as *e.g.* *derek col-haarets*, Gen. xix. 31, the general custom of the land; *derek Mitsrâyim*, Isa. x. 24, the way (the manner of acting) of the Egyptians. The instruction of youth, the education of youth, ought to be conformed to the nature of youth; the matter of instruction, the manner of instruction, ought to regulate itself according to the stage of

life, and its peculiarities; the method ought to be arranged according to the degree of development which the mental and bodily life of the youth has arrived at. The verb *הִנִּיחַ* is a denominative like *עָקַב*, ver. 4; it signifies to affect the taste, *הִנִּיחַ* (= *הִנִּיחַ*), in the Arab. to put date syrup into the mouth of the suckling; so that we may compare with it the saying of Horace, [Ep. i. 2, 69]: *Quo semel est imbuta recens servabit odorem Testa diu*. In the post-bibl. Heb. *הִנִּיחַ* denotes that which in the language of the Church is called *catechizatio*; *סֵפֶר (לִנְעָר) הִנִּיחַ* is the usual title of the catechisms. It is the fundamental and first requisite of all educational instruction which the proverb formulates, a suitable motto for the lesson-books of pedagogues and catechists. *מִמֶּנּוּ* [from it] refers to that training of youth, in conformity with his nature, which becomes a second nature, that which is imprinted, inbred, becomes accustomed. Ver. 6 is wanting in the LXX.; where it exists in MSS. of the LXX., it is supplied from Theodotion; the Complut. translates independently from the Heb. text.

Ver. 7 A rich man will rule over the poor,

And the borrower is subject to the man who lends.

“This is the course of the world. As regards the sing. and plur. in 7a, there are many poor for one rich; and in the Orient the rule is generally in the hands of one” (Hitzig). The fut. denotes how it will and must happen, and the substantival clause 7b, which as such is an expression of continuance (Arab. *thabât*, i.e. of the remaining and continuing), denotes that contracting of debt brings naturally with it a slavish relation of dependence. *לֹוֶה*, properly he who binds himself to one *se ei obligat*, and *מִלְוֶה*, as xix. 17 (*vid. l.c.*), *qui alterum (mutui datione) obligat*, from *לָוָה*, Arab. *lwy*, to wind, turn, twist round (*cog. root laff*), whence with Fleischer is also to be derived the Aram. *לָוָה*, “into connection;” so *אַל*, properly “pushing against,” refers to the radically related *אַלָּה* (= *וְלָה*), *contiguum esse*. *אִישׁ מִלְוֶה* is one who puts himself in the way of lending, although not directly in a professional manner. The pred. precedes its subject according to rule. Luther rightly translates: and he who borrows is the lender’s servant, whence the pun on the proper names: “Borghart [= the borrower] is Lehnhart’s [= lender’s] servant.”

The group now following extends to the end of this first collection of Solomon's proverbs; it closes also with a proverb of the poor and the rich.

Ver. 8 He that soweth iniquity shall reap calamity;  
And the rod of his fury shall vanish away.

"Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap" (Gal. vi. 7); he that soweth good reapeth good, xi. 18; he that soweth evil reapeth evil, Job iv. 8; cf. Hos. x. 12 f. עֲוֹלָה is the direct contrast of צִדְקָה or יֵשֶׁר (e.g. Ps. cxxv. 3, cvii. 42), proceeding from the idea that the good is right, i.e. straight, *rectum*; the evil, that which departs from the straight line, and is crooked. Regarding מַסָּה, which means both perversity of mind and conduct, as well as destiny, calamity, *vid.* xii. 21. That which the poet particularly means by עֲוֹלָה is shown in 8b, viz. unsympathizing tyranny, cruel misconduct toward a neighbour. שֶׁבֶט עֲבָרָתוֹ is the rod which he who soweth iniquity makes another to feel in his anger. The saying, that an end will be to this rod of his fury, agrees with that which is said of the despot's sceptre, Isa. xiv. 5 f.; Ps. cxxv. 3. Rightly Fleischer: *baculus insolentiae ejus consumetur h. e. facultas qua pollet alios insolenter tractandi evanescet*. Hitzig's objection, that a rod does not vanish away, but is broken, is answered by this, that the rod is thought of as brandished; besides, one uses מַלְאָה of anything which has an end, e.g. Isa. xvi. 4. Other interpreters understand "the rod of his fury" of the rod of God's anger, which will strike the עֲוֹלָה and מַלְאָה, as at Ezek. v. 13; Dan. xii. 7: "and the rod of His punishment will surely come" (Ewald, and similarly Schultens, Euchel, Umbreit). This thought also hovers before the LXX.: πληγήν δὲ ἔργων αὐτοῦ (עֲבָרָתוֹ) συντελέσει (מַלְאָה). But if the rod of punishment which is appointed for the unrighteous be meant, then we would have expected מַלְאָה. Taken in the future, the מַלְאָה of the שֶׁבֶט is not its *confectio* in the sense of completion, but its termination or annihilation; and besides, it lies nearer after 8a to take the suffix of עֲבָרָתוֹ subjectively (Isa. xiv. 6, xvi. 6) than objectively. The LXX. has, after ver. 8, a distich:—

ἄνδρα ἱλαρὸν καὶ δότῃν εὐλογεῖ ὁ θεός,  
ματαιότητα δὲ ἔργων αὐτοῦ συντελέσει.

The first line (2 Cor. ix. 7) is a variant translation of 9a (cf. xxi. 17), the second (וְשֵׁא עֲבָרָתוֹ) is a similar rendering of 8b.

Ver. 9 He who is friendly is blessed ;  
Because he giveth of his bread to the poor.

The thought is the same as at xi. 25. מִוֶּחַ (thus to be written without *Makkeph*, with *Munach* of the first word, with correct Codd., also 1294 and *Jaman*), the contrast of רַע, xxiii. 6, xxii. 22, i.e. the envious, evil-eyed, ungracious (post-bibl. also צַר), is one who looks kindly, is good-hearted, and as ἡλαρὸς δότης, shows himself benevolent. Such gentleness and kindness is called in the Mishna מִוֶּחַ (Aboth ii. 13), or עֵין יָפֶה. Such a friend is blessed, for he has also himself scattered blessings (cf. נִסְחָה, xi. 25, xxi. 13); he has, as is said, looking back from the blessing that has happened to him, given of his bread (Luther, as the LXX., with partitive genitive: *seines brots* [= of his bread]) to the poor; cf. the unfolding of this blessing of self-denying love, Isa. viii. The LXX. has also here another distich:

Νίκην καὶ τιμὴν περιποιεῖται ὁ δῶρα δούς,  
Τὴν μέντοι ψυχὴν ἀφαιρεῖται τῶν κεκτημένων.

The first line appears a variant translation of xix. 6b, and the second of i. 19b, according to which selfishness, in contrast to liberality, is the subject to be thought of. Ewald translates the second line:

And he (who distributes gifts) conquers the soul of the recipients.

But κεκτημένος = בַּעַל (בְּעָלִים) signifies the possessor, not the recipient of anything as a gift, who cannot also be here meant because of the μέντοι.

Ver. 10 Chase away the scorner, and contention goeth out,  
And strife and reproach rest.

If in a company, a circle of friends, a society (LXX. ἔκβαλε ἐκ συνεδρίου), a wicked man is found who (*vid.* the definition of רָלָ, xxi. 24) treats religious questions without respect, moral questions in a frivolous way, serious things jestingly, and in his scornful spirit, his passion for witticism, his love of anecdote, places himself above the duty of showing reverence, veneration, and respect, there will arise ceaseless contentions and conflicts. Such a man one ought to chase away; then there will immediately go forth along with him dispeace (מִדָּפֶה), there will then be rest from strife and disgrace, viz. of the strife which such a one draws forth, and the disgrace which it brings on the

society, and continually prepares for it. קָלֹן is commonly understood of the injury, abuse, which others have to suffer from the scoffer, or also (thus Fleischer, Hitzig) of the *opprobria* of the contentious against one another. But קָלֹן is not so used; it means always disgrace, as something that happens, an experience, *vid.* at xviii. 3. The praise of one who is the direct contrast of a לָץ is celebrated in the next verse.

Ver. 11 He that loveth heart-purity,

Whose is grace of lips, the king is his friend.

Thus with Hitzig, it is to be translated not: he who loveth with a pure heart,—we may interpret טָהוֹר־לֵב syntactically in the sense of *puritate cordis* or *purus corde* (Rabag, Ewald, after xx. 7), for that which follows אֶהְבֵּה and is its supplement has to stand where possible as the accus. of the object; thus not: *qui amat puritatem cordis, gratiosa erunt labia ejus* (de Dieu, Geier, Schultens, C. B. Michaelis, Fleischer), for between heart-purity and graciousness of speech there exists a moral relation, but yet no necessary connection of sequence; also not: he who loves purity of heart, and grace on his lips (Aben Ezra, Schelling, Bertheau), for “to love the grace of one’s own lips” is an awkward expression, which sounds more like reprehensible self-complacency than a praiseworthy endeavour after gracious speech. Excellently Luther:

“He who has a true heart and amiable speech,  
The king is his friend.”

טָהוֹר־לֵב is not adjectival, but substantival; טָהוֹר is thus not the constr. of the mas. טָהוֹר, as Job xvii. 10, but of the segolate טָהַר, or (since the ground-form of נָבִיא, 1 Sam. xvi. 7, may be נָבִיא as well as נָבִיא) of the neut. טָהוֹר, like קָדֵשׁ, Ps. xlvi. 5, lxv. 5: that which is pure, the being pure = purity (Schultens). הָן שְׂפָתָיו (gracefulness of his lips) is the second subject with the force of a relative clause, although not exactly thus thought of, but: one loving heart-purity, gracefulness on his lips—the king is his friend. Ewald otherwise: “he will be the king’s friend,” after the scheme xiii. 4; but here unnecessarily refined. A counsellor and associate who is governed by a pure intention, and connects therewith a gentle and amiable manner of speech and conversation, attaches the king to himself; the king is the רֵעָה (רֵעַ), the friend of such an one, and he also is “the friend

of the king," 1 Kings iv. 5. It is a Solomonic proverb, the same in idea as xvi. 13. The LXX., Syr., and Targ. introduce after אלה the name of God; but 11b does not syntactically admit of this addition. But it is worth while to take notice of an interpretation which is proposed by Jewish interpreters: the friend of such an one is a king, *i.e.* he can royally rejoice in him and boast of him. The thought is beautiful; but, as the comparison of other proverbs speaking of the king shows, is not intended.

Ver. 12 The eyes of Jahve preserve knowledge;  
So He frustrateth the words of the false.

The phrase "to preserve knowledge" is found at v. 2; there, in the sense of to keep, retain; here, of protecting, guarding; for it cannot possibly be said that the eyes of God keep themselves by the rule of knowledge, and thus preserve knowledge; this predicate is not in accord with the eyes, and is, as used of God, even inappropriate. On the other hand, after "to preserve," in the sense of watching, guarding a concrete object is to be expected, cf. Isa. xxvi. 3. We need not thus with Ewald supply יִדְרֹעַ; the ancients are right that דַּעַת, knowledge, stands metonymically for אִישׁ (Meîri), or אֲנָשִׁי (Aben Ezra), or יֹדְעֵי דַעַת (Arama); Schultens rightly: *Cognitio veritatis ac virtutis practica fertur ad homines eam colentes ac præstantes*. Where knowledge of the true and the good exists, there does it stand under the protection of God. 12b shows how that is meant, for there the perf. is continued in the second *consec. modus* (*fut. consec.*): there is thus protection against the assaults of enemies who oppose the knowledge which they hate, and seek to triumph over it, and to suppress it by their crooked policy. But God stands on the side of knowledge and protects it, and consequently makes vain the words (the outspoken resolutions) of the deceitful. Regarding סָלַף (סִלְפָּה), *vid.* xi. 3 and xix. 3. The meaning of סָלַף דְּבָרֵי is here essentially different from that in Ex. xxiii. 8, Deut. xvi. 19: he perverteth their words, for he giveth them a bearing that is false, *i.e.* not leading to the end. Hitzig reads רַעוּת [wickedness] for דַּעַת, which Zöckler is inclined to favour: God keeps the evil which is done in His eyes, and hinders its success; but "to observe wickedness" is an ambiguous, untenable expression; the only passage that can be quoted in favour

of this "to observe" is Job vii. 20. The word רָעַת, handed down without variation, is much rather justified.

Ver. 13 The sluggard saith, "A lion is without,  
I shall be slain in the midst of the streets."

Otherwise rendered, xxvi. 13. There, as here, the perf. אָמַר has the meaning of an abstract present, Gesen. § 126. 3. The activity of the industrious has its nearest sphere at home; but here a work is supposed which requires him to go forth (Ps. civ. 3) into the field (Prov. xxiv. 27). Therefore חוּץ stands first, a word of wide signification, which here denotes the open country outside the city, where the sluggard fears to meet a lion, as in the streets, *i.e.* the rows of houses forming them, to meet a רֹצֵחַ (מְרַצֵּחַ), *i.e.* a murder from motives of robbery or revenge. This strong word, properly to destroy, crush, Arab. *radkh*, is intentionally chosen: there is designed to be set forth the ridiculous hyperbolical pretence which the sluggard seeks for his slothfulness (Fleischer). Luther right well: "I might be murdered on the streets." But there is intentionally the absence of אֵילִי [perhaps] and of פֶּן [lest]. Meiri here quotes a passage of the moralists: מְמוֹפְתֵי הָעֵצֶל הַנְּבוּאָה (prophesying) belongs to the evidences of the sluggard; and Euchel, the proverb העֵצֶלִים מְתַנְבְּאִים (the sluggard's prophecy), *i.e.* the sluggard acts like a prophet, that he may palliate his slothfulness.

Ver. 14 A deep pit is the mouth of a strange woman;  
He that is cursed of God falleth therein.

The first line appears in a different form as a synonymous distich, xxiii. 27. The LXX. translate στόμα παρανόμου without certainly indicating which word they here read, whether רָע (iv. 14), or רָשָׁע (xxix. 12), or גֵּלּוּ (iii. 32). xxiii. 27 is adduced in support of זָרוּת (*vid.* ii. 16); זָנוּת (harlots) are meant, and it is not necessary thus to read with Ewald. The mouth of this strange woman or depraved Israelitess is a deep ditch (שְׁוֹחַת עֲמֻקָּה, otherwise עֲמֻקָּה, as xxiii. 27a, where also occurs עֲמֻקָּה<sup>1</sup>), namely, a snare-pit into which he is enticed by her wanton words; the man who stands in fellowship with God is

<sup>1</sup> The text to Immanuel's *Comment.* (Naples 1487) has in both instances עֲמֻקָּה.

armed against this syren voice ; but the 'ה זעם, *i.e.* he who is an object of the divine זעם (*Venet. κεχολωμένος τῷ ὀντωτῇ*), indignation, punishing evil with evil, falls into the pit, yielding to the seduction and the ruin. Schultens explains 'ה זעם by, *is in quem despumat indignabundus* ; but the meaning *despumat* is not substantiated ; זעם, cf. Arab. *zaghm*, is probably a word which by its sound denoted anger as a hollow roaring, and like pealing thunder. The LXX. has, after ver. 14, three tedious moralizing lines.

Ver. 15 Folly is bound to the heart of a child ;  
The rod of correction driveth it forth.

Folly, *i.e.* pleasure in stupid tricks, silly sport, and foolish behaviour, is the portion of children as such ; their heart is as yet childish, and folly is bound up in it. Education first driveth forth this childish, foolish nature (for, as Menander says :

Ὁ μὴ δαρεῖς ἄνθρωπος οὐ παιδεύεται),

and it effects this when it is unindulgently severe : the שִׁבֵּט מוֹסֵר (*vid.* xxiii. 13) removeth אֲוִלָּה from the heart, for it imparts intelligence and makes wise (xxix. 15). The LXX. is right in rendering 16a : ἄνοια ἐξήπται (from ἐξάπτειν) καρδίας νέου ; but the Syr. has “here mangled the LXX., and in haste has read ἀνοία ἐξίπταται : folly makes the understanding of the child fly away” (Lagarde).

Ver. 16 Whosoever oppresseth the lowly, it is gain to him ;  
Whosoever giveth to the rich, it is only loss.

It is before all clear that לְהַרְבוֹת and לְמַחֲסוֹר, as at xxi. 5, לְמוֹתָר and לְמַחֲסוֹר, are contrasted words, and form the conclusions to the participles used, with the force of hypothetical antecedents. Jerome recognises this : *qui calumniatur pauperem, ut augeat divitias suas, dabit ipse ditiori et egebit*. So Rashi, who by עשיר thinks on heathen potentates. Proportionally better Euchel, referring עשק and נִתָּן, not to one person, but to two classes of men : he who oppresses the poor to enrich himself, and is liberal toward the rich, falls under want. The antithetic distich thus becomes an integral one,—the antithesis manifestly intended is not brought out. This may be said also against Bertheau, who too ingeniously explains : He who oppresses the poor to enrich himself gives to a rich man, *i.e.* to himself, the

enriched, only to want, *i.e.* only to lose again that which he gained unrighteously. Ralbag is on the right track, for he suggests the explanation: he who oppresses the poor, does it to his gain, for he thereby impels him to a more energetic exercise of his strength; he who gives to the rich man does it to his own loss, because the rich man does not thank him for it, and still continues to look down on him. But if one refers לו to the poor, then it lies nearer to interpret אך למחסור of the rich: he who gives presents to the rich only thereby promotes his sleepy indolence, and so much the more robs him of activity (Elster); for that which one gives to him is only swallowed up in the whirlpool of his extravagance (Zöckler). Thus Hitzig also explains, who remarks, under 17a: "Oppression produces reaction, awakens energy, and thus God on the whole overrules events" (Ex. i. 12). Similarly also Ewald, who thinks on a mercenary, unrighteous rich man: God finally lifts up the oppressed poor man; the rich man always becoming richer, on the contrary, is "punished for all his wickedness only more and more." But with all these explanations there is too much read between the lines. Since אך למחסור (xi. 24, xxi. 5) refers back to the subject: himself to mere loss, so also will it be here; and the LXX., Symmachus, Jerome (cf. also the Syr. *auget malum suum*) are right when they also refer לו, not to the poor man, but to the oppressor of the poor. We explain: he who extorts from the poor enriches himself thereby; but he who gives to the rich has nothing, and less than nothing, thereby—he robs himself, has no thanks, only brings himself by many gifts lower and lower down. In the first case at least, 17a, the result corresponds to the intention; but in this latter case, 17b, one gains only bitter disappointment.

## FIRST APPENDIX TO THE FIRST COLLECTION OF SOLOMONIC PROVERBS.—XXII. 17-XXIV. 22.

The last group of distiches, beginning with x. 1, closed at xxii. 16 with a proverb of the poor and the rich, as that before the last, *vid.* at xxii. 7. In xxii. 17 ff., the law of the distich form is interrupted, and the tone of the introductory Mashals is again perceptible. Here begins an appendix to the older Book of Proverbs, introduced by these Mashals. *Vid.* regarding the style and proverbial form of this introduction, at pages 4 and 16 of vol. i.

xxii. 17-21, forming the introduction to this appendix, are these Words of the Wise:

- Ver. 17 Incline thine ear and hear the words of the wise,  
And direct thine heart to my knowledge!  
18 For it is pleasant if thou keep them in thine heart;  
Let them abide together on thy lips.  
19 That thy trust may be placed in Jahve,  
I have taught thee to-day, even thee!  
20 Have not I written unto thee choice proverbs,  
Containing counsels and knowledge,  
21 To make thee to know the rule of the words of truth,  
That thou mightest bring back words which are truth to them  
that send thee?

From x. 1 to xxii. 16 are the "Proverbs of Solomon," and not "The Words of the Wise;" thus the above *παράλειψις* is not an epilogue, but a prologue to the following proverbs. The perfects הוֹרַעְתִּי and כְּתַבְתִּי refer, not to the Solomonian proverbial discourses, but to the appendix following them; the preface commends the worth and intention of this appendix, and uses perfects because it was written after the forming of the collection. The author of this preface (*vid.* pp. 23, 36, vol. i.) is no other than the author of i.-ix. The הֵט (with *Mehuppach*, after *Thorath Emeth*, p. 27) reminds us of iv. 20, v. 1. The phrase שִׁית לִב, *animum advertere*, occurs again in the second appendix, xxiv. 32. נָעִים is repeated at xxiii. 8, xxiv. 4; but נָעִים with נָעִים is common in the preface, i.-ix. בִּי-נָעִים contains, as at Ps. cxxxv. 3, cxlvii. 1, its subject in itself. בִּי-תִשְׁמְרֵם is not this subject: this that thou preservest them, which would have required rather the infin. שְׁמֹרֵם (Ps. cxxxiii. 1) or לְשָׁמְרֵם; but it

supposes the case in which appears that which is amiable and praiseworthy: if thou preservest them in thy heart, *i.e.* makest them thoughtfully become thy mental possession. The suffix ם— refers to the Words of the Wise, and mediately also to לְדַעְתִּי, for the author designates his practical wisdom רַעְתִּי, which is laid down in the following proverbs, which, although not composed by him, are yet penetrated by his subjectivity. Regarding בָּטֶן, which, from meaning the inner parts of the body, is transferred to the inner parts of the mind, *vid.* under xx. 27. The clause 18*b*, if not dependent on כִּי, would begin with וַיִּבְנֵי. The absence of the copula and the antecedence of the verb bring the optative rendering nearer. Different is the syntactical relation of v. 2, where the infin. is continued in the fin. The *fut. Niph.* יִבְנֵי, which, iv. 27, meant to be rightly placed, rightly directed, here means: to stand erect, to have continuance, *stabilem esse*. In ver. 19, the fact of instruction precedes the statement of its object, which is, that the disciple may place his confidence in Jahve, for he does that which is according to His will, and is subject to His rule. מִכְּטָחָךְ, in Codd. and correct editions with *Pathach* (*vid. Michlol* 184*b*); the ה is as virtually doubled; *vid.* under xxi. 22. In 19*b* the accentuation הַיּוֹם הוֹדַעְתִּיךָ הַיּוֹם is contrary to the syntax; Codd. and old editions have rightly הַיּוֹם הוֹדַעְתִּיךָ אַתָּה, for אַתָּה אַתָּה is, after Gesen. § 121. 3, an emphatic repetition of the “thee;” אַתָּה, like נָם, xxiii. 15; 1 Kings xxi. 19. Hitzig knows of no contrast which justifies the emphasis. But the prominence thus effected is not always of the nature of contrast (cf. Zech. vii. 5, have ye truly fasted to me, *i.e.* to serve me thereby), here it is strong individualizing; the *te etiam te* is equivalent to, thee as others, and thee in particular. Also that, as Hitzig remarks, there does not appear any reason for the emphasizing of “to-day,” is incorrect: הַיּוֹם is of the same signification as at Ps. xcv. 7; the reader of the following proverbs shall remember later, not merely in general, that he once on a time read them, but that he to-day, that he on this definite day, received the lessons of wisdom contained therein, and then, from that time forth, became responsible for his obedience or his disobedience.

In 20*a* the *Chethib* שלשום denotes no definite date; besides,

this word occurs only always along with *תָּמוּל* (אַתְמוּל). Umbreit, Ewald, Bertheau, however, accept this “formerly (lately),” and suppose that the author here refers to a “Book for Youths,” composed at an earlier period, without one seeing what this reference, which had a meaning only for his contemporaries, here denotes. The LXX. reads *בְּתִבְתָּ*, and finds in 20a, contrary to the syntax and the *usus loq.*, the exhortation that he who is addressed ought to write these good doctrines thrice (*τρισσῶς*) on the tablet of his heart; the Syr. and Targ. suppose the author to say that he wrote them three times; Jerome, that he wrote them threefold—both without any visible meaning, since threefold cannot be equivalent to *manchfaltiglich* (Luther) [= several times, in various ways]. Also the *Kerî* *שְׁלִישִׁים*, which without doubt is the authentic word, is interpreted in many unacceptable ways; Rashi and Elia Wilna, following a Midrash explanation, think on the lessons of the Law, the Prophets, and the Hagiographa; Arama, on those which are referable to three classes of youth; Malbim (as if here the author of the whole Book of Proverbs, from i. to xxxi., spake), on the supposed three chief parts of the *Mishle*; Dächsel better, on i.–ix., as the product of the same author as this appendix. Schultens compares Eccles. iv. 12, and translates *triplici filo nexa*. Kimchi, Meîri, and others, are right, who gloss *שְׁלִישִׁים* by *דְּבָרִים נִכְבָּדִים*, and compare *נְגִידִים*, viii. 6; accordingly the *Veneta*, with the happy *quid pro quo*, by *τρισμέγιστα*. The LXX. translates the military *שְׁלִישִׁים* by *τριστάτης*; but this Greek word is itself obscure, and is explained by Hesychius (as well as by Suidas, and in the *Etymologicum*) by *Regii satellites qui ternas hastas manu tenebant*, which is certainly false. Another Greek, whom Angellius quotes, says, under Ex. xv. 4, that *τριστάτης* was the name given to the warriors who fought from a chariot, every three of whom had one war-chariot among them; and this appears, according to Ex. xiv. 7, xv. 4, to be really the primary meaning. In the period of David we meet with the word *שְׁלִישִׁים* as the name of the heroes (the *Gibbôrîm*) who stood nearest the king. The *shalish*-men form the *élite* troops that stood highest in rank, at whose head stood two triads of heroes, —Jashobeam at the head of the first trias, and thus of the *shalish*-men generally; Abishai at the head of the second trias,

who held an honourable place among the *shalish*-men, but yet reached not to that first trias, 2 Sam. xxiii. 8 ff. (= 1 Chron. xi. 11 ff.). The name הַשְּׁלִישִׁים (*Apoc.* 2 Sam. xxiii. 8, הַשְּׁלִישִׁי, and ver. 13, 1 Chron. xxvii. 6, incorrectly הַשְּׁלִישִׁים) occurs here with reference to the threefold division of this principal host; and in regard to the use of the word in the time of Pharaoh, as well as in the time of the kings, it may be granted that *shalish* denoted the Three-man (*triumvir*), and then generally a high military officer; so that שְׁלִישִׁים here has the same relation to נְגִידִים, viii. 6, as *ducalia* to *principalia*. The name of the chief men (members of the chief troop) is transferred to the chief proverbs, as, Jas. ii. 8, that law which stands as a king at the head of all the others is called the "royal law;" or, as Plato names the chief powers of the soul, μέρη ἡγεμόνες. As in this Platonic word-form, so *shalishim* here, like *negidim* there, is understood neut., cf. under viii. 6, and רִיקִים, xii. 11; יִשְׂרִים, xvi. 13. The ב of בְּמַעְצוֹת (occurring at i. 31 also) Fleischer rightly explains as the ב of uniting or accompanying: chief proverbs which contain good counsels and solid knowledge.

In the statement of the object in ver. 21, we interpret that which follows לְהוֹרִיעֶנָּה not permutat.: *ut te docerem recta, verba vera* (Fleischer); but קִשְׁט (ground-form to קִשָּׁט, Ps. lx. 6) is the bearer of the threefold idea: *rectitudinem*, or, better, *regulam verborum veritatis*. The (Arab.) verb *kasita* means to be straight, stiff, inflexible (synon. צָרָק, to be hard, tight, proportionately direct); and the name *kist* denotes not only the right conduct, the right measure (*quantitas justa*), but also the balance, and thus the rule or the norm. In 21b, אֲמָרִים אֱמֶת (as e.g. Zech. i. 13; *vid.* Philippi, *Status Constr.* p. 86 f.) is equivalent to אֲמָרִי אֱמֶת; the author has this second time intentionally chosen the appositional relation of connection: words which are truth; the idea of truth presents itself in this form of expression more prominently. Impossible, because contrary to the *usus loq.*, is the translation: *ut respondeas verba vera iis qui ad te mittunt* (Schultens, Fleischer), because שְׁלַח, with the accus. following, never means "to send any one." Without doubt הָשִׁיב and שְׁלַח stand in correlation to each other: he who lets himself be instructed must be supposed to be in circumstances to bring home, to those that sent him out to learn, doctrines which are

truth, and thus to approve himself. The subject spoken of here is not a right answer or a true report brought back to one giving a commission; and it lies beyond the purpose and power of the following proverbs to afford a universal means whereby persons sent out are made skilful. The שְׁלִיחִים [senders] are here the parents or guardians who send him who is to be instructed to the school of the teacher of wisdom (Hitzig). Yet it appears strange that he who is the learner is just here not addressed as "my son," which would go to the support of the expression, "to send to school," which is elsewhere unused in Old Hebrew, and the שְׁלִיחֵי of another are elsewhere called those who make him their *mandatar*, x. 26, xxv. 13; 2 Sam. xxiv. 13. The reference to the parents would also be excluded if, with Norzi and other editors, לְשַׁלְּחֵי were to be read instead of לְשַׁלְּחֵי (the *Venet.* 1521, and most editions). Therefore the phrase לְשַׁלְּחֵי, which is preferred by Ewald, recommends itself, according to which the LXX. translates, τοῖς προβαλλομένοις σοι, which the Syro-Hexap. renders<sup>1</sup> by לְהַנִּין דְּאַחֲרֵיךְ לְךָ אֲחֵרָתָא, i.e. to those who lay problems before thee (*vid.* Lagarde). The teacher of wisdom seeks to qualify him who reads the following proverbs, and permits himself to be influenced by them, to give the right answer to those who question him and go to him for counsel, and thus to become himself a teacher of wisdom.

After these ten lines of preliminary exhortation, there now begins the collection of the "Words of the Wise" thus introduced. A tetrastich which, in its contents, connects itself with the last proverb of the Solomonic collection, xxii. 16, forms the commencement of this collection:

- Ver. 22 Rob not the lowly because he is lowly;  
 And oppress not the humble in the gate.  
 23 For Jahve will conduct their cause,  
 And rob their spoilers of life.

Though it may bring gain, as said xxii. 16a, to oppress the לַי, the lowly or humble, yet at last the oppressor comes to ruin. The poet here warns against robbing the lowly because he

<sup>1</sup> The Syr. *n. fem.* *awchda* (אַחַדָּה, Ps. xlix. 5, Targ.) is equivalent to Heb. חִידָה, from (Syr.) *achd*, אַחַד = אָחַז, Neh. vii. 3, to shut up, properly, to lay hold on and retain; the Arab. *akhdhat* means magic, incantation; as seizing and making fast.

is lowly, and thus without power of defence, and not to be feared; and against doing injustice to the עָנִי, the bowed down, and therefore incapable of resisting in the gate, *i.e.* in the court of justice. These poor men have not indeed high human patrons, but One in heaven to undertake their cause: Jahve will conduct their cause (יָרִיב רִיבָם), as at xxiii. 10), *i.e.* will undertake their vindication, and be their avenger. דָּכָא (דָּכָה), Aram. and Arab. *dakk* (cf. דָּקַק, (Arab.) *dakk*), signifies to crush anything so that it becomes broad and flat, figuratively to oppress, synonym. עָשָׂק (Fleischer). The verb קָבַע has, in Chald. and Syr., the signification to stick, to fix (according to which Aquila here translates καθηλοῦν, to nail; Jerome, *configere*); and as root-word to קָבַעַת, the signification to be arched, like (Arab.) *kab'*, to be humpbacked; both significations are here unsuitable. The connection here requires the meaning to rob; and for Mal. iii. 8 also, this same meaning is to be adopted, robbery and taking from one by force (Parchon, Kimchi), not: to deceive (Köhler, Keil), although it might have the sense of robbing by withholding or refraining from doing that which is due, thus of a sacrilege committed by omission or deception. The Talm. does not know the verb קָבַע in this meaning; but it is variously found as a dialectic word for גָּוַל.<sup>1</sup> Schultens' etymological explanation, *capitium injicere* (after (Arab.) *kab'*, to draw back and conceal the head), is not satisfactory. The construction, with the double accus., follows the analogy of הִקְבִּהוּ נַפְשׁ and the like, Gesen. § 139. 2. Regarding the sing. נַפֵּשׁ, even where several are spoken of, *vid.* under i. 19.

Another tetrastich follows:

<sup>1</sup> Thus *Rosch ha-schana* 26b: Levi came once to N.N. There a man came to meet him, and cried out קָבַעַן פִּלְנִיָּא. Levi knew not what he would say, and went into the Madrash-house to ask. One answered him: He is a robber (גָּוֹל) said that one to thee; for it is said in the Scriptures (Mal. iii. 8), "Will a man rob God?" etc. (*vid.* *Wissenschaft Kunst Judenthum*, p. 243). In the Midrash, שׁוֹחֵר טוֹב, to Ps. lvii., R. Levi says that אַתָּה קִיבַע לִי is used in the sense of אַתָּה גָּוֹל לִי. And in the Midrash *Tanchuma*, P. תְּרוּמָה, R. Levi answers the question, "What is the meaning of קָבַע, Mal. iii. 8?"—It is an Arabic expression. An Arabian, when he wishes to say to another מָה אַתָּה גָּוֹל לִי, says instead of it, מָה אַתָּה קִוְבַּע לִי. Perhaps קָבַע is cogn. to קָבַץ; the R. קָב coincides in several groups of languages (also the Turkish *keb*) with the Lat. *capere*.

Ver. 24 Have no intercourse with an angry man,  
 And with a furious man go thou not;  
 25 Lest thou adopt his ways,  
 And bring destruction upon thy soul.

The *Piel* רָעָה, Judg. xiv. 20, signifies to make or choose any one as a friend or companion (רָעָה, רָע); the *Hithpa.* הִתְרַעָה (cf. at xviii. 24), to take to oneself (for oneself) any one as a friend, or to converse with one; אֶל-הִשָּׁתַע sounds like אֶל-הִתְרַעָה, Isa. xli. 10, with *Pathach* of the closed syllable from the apocope. The angry man is called בָּעַל אֵף, as the covetous man בָּעַל נָפֶשׁ, xxiii. 2, and the mischievous man בָּעַל מְזֻמּוֹת, xxiv. 8; *vid.* regarding בָּעַל at i. 19 and xviii. 9. אִישׁ חֲמוֹת is related superlat. to אִישׁ חָמָה, xv. 18 (cf. xxix. 22), and signifies a hot-head of the highest degree. לֹא תָבוֹא is meant as warning (cf. xvi. 10b). בּוֹא אִתּוֹ, or בּוֹא עִמָּו, Ps. xxvi. 4, to come along with one, is equivalent to go into fellowship or companionship with one, which is expressed by הֵלַךְ אִתּוֹ, xiii. 20, as בּוֹא בְּ means, Josh. xxiii. 7, 12, to enter into communion with one, *venire in consuetudinem*. This בּוֹא אִתּוֹ is not a trace of a more recent period of the language. Also תִּלְמֵד, *discas*, cannot be an equivalent for it: Heb. poetry has at all times made use of Aramaisms as elegancies. אָלַף, Aram. אֲלַף, יָלַף, Arab. *âlifa*, signifies to be entrusted with anything = to learn (*Piel* אָלַף, to teach, Job xv. 15, and in Elihu's speeches), or also to become confidential with one (whence אֲלִיף, companion, confidant, ii. 17); this אָלַף is never a Heb. prose word; the bibl. אֲלִיף is only used at a later period in the sense of teacher. אֲרָחוֹת are the ways, the conduct (ii. 20, etc.), or manner of life (i. 19) which any one enters upon and follows out, thus manners as well as lot, condition. In the phrase "to bring destruction," לָקַח is used as in our phrase *Schaden nehmen* [to suffer injury]; the ancient language also represented the forced entrance of one into a state as a being laid hold on, *e.g.* Job xviii. 20, cf. Isa. xiii. 8; here מוֹקֵשׁ is not merely equivalent to danger (Ewald, falsely: that thou takest not danger for thy soul), but is equivalent to destruction, sin itself is a snare (xxix. 6); to bring a snare for oneself is equivalent to suffer from being ensnared. Whosoever comes into a near relation with a passionate, furious man, easily accommodates himself to his manners, and, hurried forward by

him and like him to outbreaks of anger, which does that which is not right before God, falls into ruinous complications.

A third distich follows :

Ver. 26 Be not among those who strike hands,  
Among those who become surety for loans.

27 If thou hast nothing to pay,  
Why shall he take away thy bed from under thee?

To strike hands is equivalent to, to be responsible to any one for another, to stake one's goods and honour for him, vi. 1, xi. 15, xvii. 18,—in a word, ערב, *seq. acc.*, to pledge oneself for him (Gen. xliii. 9), or for the loan received by him, משאָה, Deut. xxiv. 10 (from השָׂה, with ב, of the person and accus. of the thing: to lend something to one on interest). The proverb warns against being one of such sureties (write בערבים with Cod. 1294, and old impressions such as the Venice, 1521), against acting as they do; for why wouldest thou come to this, that when thou canst not pay (שָׁלַם, to render a full equivalent reckoning, and, generally, to pay, vi. 31),<sup>1</sup> he (the creditor) take away thy bed from under thee?—for, as xx. 16 says, thus improvident suretyships are wont to be punished.

A fourth proverb—a distich—beginning with the warning אַל:

Ver. 28 Remove not the perpetual landmark  
Which thy ancestors have set up.

28a=xxiii. 10a. Regarding the inviolability of boundaries established by the law, *vid.* at xv. 25. גְּבוּל עוֹלָם denotes “the boundary mark set up from ancient times, the removal of which were a double transgression, because it is rendered sacred by its antiquity” (*Orelli*, p. 76). סָגַ = נָסַג signifies to remove back, *Hiph.* to shove back, to move away. אָשַׁר has the meaning of (ὄριον) ὄ, τι, *quippe quod*. Instead of עוֹלָם, the *Mishna* reads, *Pea* v. 6, עוֹלָם, which in the Jerusalem Gemara one Rabbi understands of those brought up out of Egypt, another of the

<sup>1</sup> After Ben-Asher, the pointing is אֶם-אֵין-לָהּ; while, on the contrary, Ben-Naphtali prefers אֶם-אֵין-לָהּ; *vid.* my *Genesis* (1869), pp. 74 (under i. 3) and 81. So, without any bearing on the sense, Ben-Asher points לְמַח with *Tarcha*, Ben-Naphtali with *Mercha*.

poor; for “to rise” (in the world) is a euphemism (לָשׁוֹן כְּבוֹד) for “to come down” (be reduced in circumstances).<sup>1</sup>

After these four proverbs beginning with אַל, a new series begins with the following tristich:

Ver. 29 Seest thou a man who is expert in his calling—  
Before kings may he stand;  
Not stand before obscure men;

i.e., he can enter into the service of kings, and needs not to enter into the service of mean men = he is entitled to claim the highest official post. חָזִיתָ, in xxvi. 12 = xxix. 20, interchanging with רָאִיתָ, is *perf. hypotheticum* (cf. xxiv. 10, xxv. 16): *si videris*; the conclusion which might begin with דַּע כִּי expresses further what he who sees will have occasion to observe. Rightly Luther: *Sihestu einen Man endelich* (vid. at xxi. 5) *in seinem geschafft*, u.s.w. [=seest thou a man expert in his business, etc.]. מְהִיר denotes in all the three chief dialects one who is skilful in a matter not merely by virtue of external artistic ability, but also by means of intellectual mastery of it. הִתְיַצַּב לִפְנֵי, to enter on the situation of a servant before any one; cf. Job i. 6, ii. 1. עָמַד לִפְנֵי, 1 Sam. xvi. 21, 1 Kings x. 8. Along with the pausal form יִתְיַצַּב, there is also found in Codd. the form יְתִיצַב (the ground-form to יִתְיַצַּב, whence that pausal form is lengthened), which Ben-Bileam defends, for he reckons this word among “the pathachized pausal forms.” חֲשֻׁבִּים, in contrast to מְלָכִים, are the *obscuri* = *ignobiles*. The Targ. translate the Heb. וַיֵּל and אָבִיוֹן by חֲשֻׁבִּים and חֲשֻׁבִּים. Kimchi compares Jer. xxxix. 10, where הָעַם הַדְּלִים is translated by חֲשֻׁבִּים (cf. 2 Kings xxiv. 14, xxv. 12). חֲלָפָה (חֲלָפָה) is the old Heb. synonym in Ps. x. The poet seems here to transfer the Aram. *usus loq.* into the Heb.

Ver. 29, which speaks of a high position near the king, is appropriately followed by a hexastich referring to the slipperiness of the smooth ground of the king's court.

- xxiii. 1 When thou sittest to eat with a ruler,  
Consider well whom thou hast before thee.  
2 And put thy knife to thy throat  
If thou art a man of good appetite.  
3 Be not lustful after his dainties,  
Because it is deceitful food.

<sup>1</sup> As an analogical example, סִנִּי נְהוֹר, seeing clearly = blind.

The ל of לֶחֶם is that of end: *ad cibum capiendum*, thus as one invited by him to his table; in prose the expression would be לֶחֶם; לֶאֱכֹל לֶחֶם, to eat, is poet., iv. 17, ix. 5. The fut. תִּבְנֶה clothes the admonition in the form of a wish or counsel; the *infin. intens.* בֵּן makes it urgent: consider well him whom thou hast before thee, viz. that he is not thine equal, but one higher, who can destroy thee as well as be useful to thee. With וְשַׁמַּת the jussive construction begun by תִּבְנֶה is continued. Zöckler and Dächsel, after Ewald and Hitzig, translate incorrectly: thou puttest . . ., the *perf. consec.* after an imperf., or, which is the same thing, a fut. meant optatively (*e.g.* Lev. xix. 18 with לֹא, and also ver. 34 without לֹא) continues the exhortation; to be thus understood, the author ought to have used the expression וְשַׁמַּת שִׁבְיָן and not וְשַׁמַּת שִׁבְיָן. Rightly Luther: “and put a knife to thy throat,” but continuing: “wilt thou preserve thy life,” herein caught in the same mistake of the idea with Jerome, the Syr., and Targ., to which נֶפֶשׁ here separates itself. שִׁבְיָן (סִבְיָן) (Arab. with the assimilated *a sikkîn*, plur *sekâkîn*, whence *sekâkîni*, cutler) designates a knife (R. סִךְ שֶׁךְ, to stick, *vid.* at Isa. ix. 10). לֹעַץ, from לָעַץ, to devour, is the throat; the word in Aram. signifies only the cheek, while Lagarde seeks to interpret בִּלְעָדָה infinitively in the sense of (Arab.) *bulw'ak*, if thou longest for (from *wla*); but that would make 2b a tautology. The verb לָעַץ (cf. Arab. *l'al*, to pant for) shows for the substantive the same primary meaning as *glutus* from *glutire*, which was then transferred from the inner organ of swallowing (Kimchi, בית הבליעה, Parchon: אֶסּוֹפָגוֹס, *œsophagus*) to the external. “Put a knife to thy throat, is a proverbial expression, like our: the knife stands at his throat; the poet means to say: restrain thy too eager desire by means of the strongest threatening of danger—threaten as it were death to it” (Fleischer). In נֶפֶשׁ, בְּעַל נֶפֶשׁ means, as at xiii. 2, desire, and that desire of eating, as at vi. 30. Rightly Rashi: if thou art greedy with hunger, if thou art a glutton; cf. Sir. xxxiv. (xxxi.) 12, “If thou sittest at a great table, then open not widely thy throat (φάρυγγα), and say not: There is certainly much on it!” The knife thus denotes the restraining and moderating of too good an appetite.

In 3a the punctuation fluctuates between תַּחֲוִי (*Michlol*

131a) and חֲתָאֵי; the latter is found in Cod. 1294, the Erfurt 2 and 3, the Cod. *Jaman.*, and thus it is also to be written at ver. 6 and xxiv. 1; וַיִּחָאֵי, 1 Chron. xi. 17 and Ps. xlv. 12, Codd. and older Edd. (e.g. Complut. 1517, Ven. 1515, 1521) write with *Pathach*. מִמְעֻמּוֹת, from טַעַם, signifies savoury dishes, dainties, like (Arab.) *dhwâkt*, from *dhâk* (to taste, to relish); cf. *sapores*, from *sapere*, in the proverb: the tit-bits of the king burn the lips (*vid.* Fleischer, *Ali's Hundred Proverbs*, etc., pp. 71, 104). With וַיִּחָאֵי begins, as at iii. 29, a conditioning clause: since it is, indeed, the bread of deceit (the connection like עֵרֶב־בָּקִים, xxi. 28), food which, as it were, deceives him who eats it, i.e. appears to secure for him the lasting favour of princes, and often enough herein deceives him; cf. the proverb by Burckhardt and Meidani: whoever eats of the sultan's soup burns his lips, even though it may be after a length of time (Fleischer). One must come near to a king, says Calovius, hitting the meaning of the proverb, as to a fire: not too near, lest he be burned; nor too remote, so that he may be warmed therewith.

All the forms of proverbs run through these appended proverbs. There now follows a pentastich:

- Ver. 4 Do not trouble thyself to become rich;  
Cease from such thine own wisdom.  
5 Wilt thou let thine eyes fly after it, and it is gone?  
For it maketh itself, assuredly it maketh itself wings,  
Like an eagle which fleeth toward the heavens.

The middle state, according to xxx. 8, is the best: he who troubleth himself (cf. xxviii. 20, hasteth) to become rich, placeth before himself a false, deceitful aim. יַעַץ is essentially one with (Arab.) *waji'a*, to experience sorrow, *dolere*, and then signifies, like *πνεῖν* and *κάμνειν*, to become or to be wearied, to weary or trouble oneself, to toil and moil (Fleischer). The בִּינָה (cf. iii. 5) is just wisdom, prudence directed towards becoming rich; for striving of itself alone does not accomplish it, unless wisdom is connected with it, which is not very particular in finding out means in their moral relations; but is so much the more crafty, and, as we say, speculative. Rightly Aquila, the *Venet.*, Jerome, and Luther: take not pains to become rich. On the contrary, the LXX. reads אַל תִּגַּע לְהַעֲשִׂיר, stretch not thyself (if thou art poor) after a rich man; and the Syr. and Targ. אַל תִּגַּע לְהַעֲשִׂיר,

draw not near to the rich man ; but, apart from the uncertainty of the expression and the construction in both cases, poetry, and proverbial poetry too, does not prefer the article ; it never uses it without emphasis, especially as here must be the case with it not elided. These translators thought that *בו ונו*, ver. 5, presupposed a subject expressed in ver. 4 ; but the subject is not *הַעֲשִׂיר*, but the *עֶשֶׂר* [riches] contained in *לְהַעֲשִׂיר*. The self-intelligible *it* [in “ it maketh wings,” etc.] is that about which trouble has been taken, about which there has been speculation. That is a deceitful possession ; for what has been gained by many years of labour and search, often passes away suddenly, is lost in a moment. To let the eyes fly after anything, is equivalent to, to direct a (flying) look toward it : wilt thou let thine eyes rove toward the same, and it is gone ? *i.e.*, wilt thou expose thyself to the fate of seeing that which was gained with trouble and craft torn suddenly away from thee ? Otherwise Luther, after Jerome : Let not thine eyes fly after that which thou canst not have ; but apart from the circumstance that *בו ואֵיננו* cannot possibly be understood in the sense of *ad opes quas non potes habere* (that would have required *בְּאִשֶּׁר אֵיננו*), in this sense after the analogy of *נִשָּׂא נֶפֶשׁ אֶל (ל)*, the end aimed at would have been denoted by *לוֹ* and not by *בו*. Better Immanuel, after Rashi : if thou doublest, *i.e.* shuttest (by means of the two eyelids) thine eyes upon it, it is gone, *i.e.* has vanished during the night ; but *עוֹף*, *duplicare*, is Aram. and not Heb. Rather the explanation is with Chajûg, after Isa. viii. 22f. : if thou veilest (darkenest) thine eyes, *i.e.* yieldest thyself over to carelessness ; but the noun *עִפְעָפָה* shows that *עוֹף*, spoken of the eyes, is intended to signify to fly (to rove, flutter). Hitzig too artificially (altering the expression to *לְהַעֲשִׂיר*) : if thou faintest, art weary with the eyes toward him (the rich patron), he is gone,—which cannot be adopted, because the form of a question does not accord with it. Nor would it accord if *ואֵיננו* were thought of as a conclusion : “ dost thou let thy look fly toward it ? It is gone ;” for what can this question imply ? The *ו* of *ואֵיננו* shows that this word is a component part of the question ; it is a question *illa nakar*, *i.e.* in rejection of the subject of the question : wilt thou cast thy look upon it, and it is gone ? *i.e.*, wilt thou experience instant loss of that which is gained by labour and acquired

by artifice? On בו, cf. Job vii. 8. 'עֵינַי וְגו', "thou directest thine eyes to me: I am no more." We had in xii. 19 another mode of designating [viz. till I wink again] an instant. The *Chethîb* 'הָתַעֲיָהּ וְגו' is syntactically correct (cf. xv. 22, xx. 30), and might remain. The *Kerî* is mostly falsely accentuated הָתַעֲיָהּ, doubly incorrectly; for (1) the tone never retreats from a shut syllable terminating in *i*, e.g. לְהִכָּן, Isa. xl. 20; בְּהִכָּן, 1 Chron. i. 4; אֶכָּן, Job xxiii. 8; and (2) there is, moreover, wanting here any legitimate occasion for the retrogression of the tone; thus much rather the form הִתְעַיָּהּ (with *Mehuppach* of the last, and *Zinnorith* of the preceding open syllable) is to be adopted, as it is given by Opitz, Jablonsky, Michaelis, and Reineccius.

The subject of 5*b* is, as of 5*a*, riches. That riches take wings and flee away, is a more natural expression than that the rich patron flees away,—a quaint figure, appropriate however at Nah. iii. 16, where the multitude of craftsmen flee out of Nineveh like a swarm of locusts. עָשָׂה has frequently the sense of *acquirere*, Gen. xii. 5, with לו, *sibi acquirere*, 1 Sam. xv. 1; 1 Kings i. 15; Hitzig compares *Silius Ital.* xvi. 351: *sed tum sibi fecerat alas*. The *inf. intensivus* strengthens the assertion: it will certainly thus happen.

In 5*c* all unnecessary discussion regarding the *Chethîb* וְעִי is to be avoided, for this *Chethîb* does not exist; the *Masora* here knows only of a simple *Chethîb* and *Kerî*, viz. וְעִי (read וְעִי), not of a double one (וְעִי), and the word is not among those which have in the middle a *ʾ*, which is to be read like ו. The manuscripts (e.g. also the Bragadin. 1615) have וְעִי, and the *Kerî* וְעִי; it is one of the ten words registered in the *Masora*, at the beginning of which a *ʾ* is to be read instead of the written ו. Most of the ancients translate with the amalgamation of the *Kerî* and the *Chethîb*: and he (the rich man, or better: the riches) flees heavenwards (Syr., Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, Jerome, and Luther). After the *Kerî* the *Venet.* renders: ὡς ἀετὸς πτήσεται τοῖς οὐρανοῖς (viz. ὁ πλοῦτος). Rightly the Targ.: like an eagle which flies to heaven (according to which also it is accentuated), only it is not to be translated "*am Himmel*" [to heaven], but "*gen Himmel*" [towards

heaven]: הַשָּׁמַיִם is the accusative of direction—the eagle flies heavenward. Bochart, in the *Hierozyicon*, has collected many parallels to this comparison, among which is the figure in Lucian's *Timon*, where Pluto, the god of wealth, comes to one limping and with difficulty; but going away, outstrips in speed the flight of all birds. The LXX. translates ὥσπερ ἀετοῦ καὶ ὑποστρέφει εἰς τὸν οἶκον τοῦ προεστηκότος αὐτοῦ. Hitzig accordingly reads וְשָׁב לְבֵית מְשֻׁבּוֹ, and he (the rich patron) withdraws from thee to his own steep residence. But ought not οἶκος τοῦ προεστηκότος αὐτοῦ to be heaven, as the residence of Him who administers wealth, i.e. who gives and again takes it away according to His free-will?

There now follows a proverb with unequally measured lines, perhaps a heptastich:

- Ver. 6 Eat not the bread of the jealous,  
 And let not thyself lust after his dainties;  
 7 For as one who calculates with himself, so is he:  
 "Eat and drink," saith he to thee;  
 But his heart is not with thee.  
 8 Thy morsel which thou hast enjoyed wilt thou cast up,  
 And hast lost thy pleasant words.

As טוֹב עֵין, xxii. 9, *benignus oculo*, denotes the pleasantness and joy of social friendship; so here (cf. Deut. xv. 9; Matt. xv. 15) רָע עֵין, *malignus oculo*, the envy and selfishness of egoism seeking to have and retain all for itself. The LXX. ἀνδρὶ βασκάνῳ, for the look of the evil eye, עֵין רָע, עֵינָא בִישָׁא (cattivo occhio), refers to enchantment; cf. βασκαίνειν, *fascinare*, to bewitch, to enchant, in modern Greek, to envy, Arab. 'an, to eye, as it were, whence ma'jûn, ma'in, hit by the piercing look of the envious eye, *invidia*, as Apuleius says, *letali plaga percussus* (Fleischer). Regarding תַּתְּאוֹ with *Pathach*, vid. the parallel line 3a. 7a is difficult. The LXX. and Syr. read שֵׁעַר [hair]. The Targ. renders תַּרְעָא רָמָא, and thus reads שֵׁעַר [fool], and thus brings together the soul of the envious person and a high portal, which promises much, but conceals only deception behind (Rablag). Joseph ha-Nakdan reads<sup>1</sup> שֵׁעַר with *sin*; and Rashi, retaining the *schîn*, compares the "sour figs," Jer. xxix. 17.

<sup>1</sup> In an appendix to *Ochla We-Ochla*, in the University Library at Halle, he reads שֵׁעַר, but with פְּלִיגָא [doubtful] added.

According to this, Luther translates : like a ghost (a monster of lovelessness) is he inwardly; for, as it appears in שָׁעַר, the goat-like spectre שָׁעַר hovered before him. Schultens better, because more in conformity with the text : *quemadmodum suam ipsius animam abhorret* (i.e. as he does nothing to the benefit of his own appetite) *sic ille (erga alios multo magis)*. The thought is appropriate, but forced. Hitzig for once here follows Ewald; he does not, however, translate : “like as if his soul were divided, so is it;” but : “as one who is divided in his soul, so is he;” but the verb שָׁעַר, to divide, is inferred from שָׁעַר, gate = division, and is as foreign to the extra-bibl. *usus loq.* as it is to the bibl. The verb שָׁעַר signifies to weigh or consider, to value, to estimate. These meanings Hitzig unites together : *in similitudinem arioli et conjectoris æstimat quod ignorat*, perhaps meaning thereby that he conjecturally supposes that as it is with him, so it is with others : he dissembles, and thinks that others dissemble also. Thus also Jansen explains. The thought is far-fetched, and does not cover itself by the text. The translation of the *Venet.* also : ὡς γὰρ ἐμέτρησεν ἐν ψυχῇ οἱ οὕτως ἐστίν (perhaps : he measures to others as penuriously as to himself), does not elucidate the text, but obscures it. Most moderns (Bertheau, Zöckler, Dächsel, etc.) : as he reckons in his soul, so is he (not as he seeks to appear for a moment before thee). Thus also Fleischer : *quemadmodum reputat apud se, ita est* (sc. *non ut loquitur*), with the remark that שָׁעַר (whence שָׁעַר, measure, market value, Arab. *si'r*), to measure, to tax so as to determine the price, to reckon; and then like חשב, in general, to think, and thus also Meîri with the neut. rendering of *ita est*. But why this circumlocution in the expression? The poet ought in that case just to have written כִּי לֹא כִמוֹ רִבֵּר, *for he is not as he speaks with his mouth*. If one read שָׁעַר (Symmachus, *εἰκάζων*), then we have the thought adapted to the portrait that is drawn; for like one calculating by himself, so is he, i.e. he is like one who estimates with himself the value of an object; for which we use the expression : he reckons the value of every piece in thy mouth. However, with this understanding the punctuation also of שָׁעַר as finite may be retained and explained after Isa. xxvi. 18 : for as if he reckoned in his soul, so is he; but in this the perf. is

inappropriate; by the particip. one reaches the same end<sup>1</sup> by a smoother way. True, he says to thee: eat and drink (Song v. 1b), he invites thee with courtly words; but his heart is not with thee (בֹּל, like xxiv. 23): he only puts on the appearance of joy if thou partakest abundantly, but there lurks behind the mask of liberal hospitality the grudging niggardly calculator, who poisons thy every bite, every draught, by his calculating, grudging look. Such a feast cannot possibly do good to the guest: thy meal (פַּת, from פָּתַח; cf. κλᾶν τὸν ἄρτον, Aram. פָּרַס לַחֲמַא, to divide and distribute bread, whence פָּרַגַם, to receive aliment, is derived) which thou hast eaten thou wilt spue out, i.e. wilt vomit from disgust that thou hast eaten such food, so that that which has been partaken of does thee no good. פָּתַר is also derived from פָּתַה:<sup>2</sup> has he deceived thee (with his courtly words), but with this אֶכְלֶה, which, as the *Makkeph* rightly denotes, stands in an attributive relation to פַּתַּר, does not agree. תְּקִיאָנָה is *Hiph.* of קִוָּא, as transitive: to make vomiting; in Arab. the fut. *Kal* of *ka* terminates in *î*. The fair words which the guest, as the *perf. consec.* expresses, has lavished, are the words of praise and thanks in which he recognises the liberality of the host appearing so hospitable. Regarding the penult. accenting of the *perf. consec.* by *Mugrasch*, as xxx. 9, *vid.* under Ps. xxvii. 1. Pinsker (*Babyl.-Hebr. Punktations-system*, p. 134) conjectures that the line 8b originally formed the concluding line of the following proverb. But at the time of the LXX. (which erroneously expresses תִּשְׁחַת) it certainly stood as in our text.

Ver. 9. Another case in which good words are lost:

Speak not to the ears of a fool,  
For he will despise the wisdom of thy words.

<sup>1</sup> We may write הוּא בֵּין: the *Mehuppach* (*Jethib*) sign of the *Olewejored* standing between the two words represents also the place of the *Makkeph*; *vid.* *Thorath Emeth*, p. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Immanuel makes so much of having recognised the verb in this פָּתַר (and has he persuaded thee), that in the concluding part of his *Divan* (entitled *Machberoth Immanuel*), which is an imitation of Dante's *Divina Commedia*, he praises himself on this account in the paradise of King Solomon, who is enraptured by this explanation, and swears that he never meant that word otherwise.

To speak in the ears of any one, does not mean to whisper to him, but so to speak that it is distinctly perceived. כָּסִיל, as we have now often explained, is the intellectually heavy and dull, like *pinguis* and *tardus*; Arab. *balyd*, clumsy, intellectually immoveable (cf. *bld*, the place where one places himself firmly down, which one makes his point of gravity). The heart of such an one is covered over (Ps. cxix. 70), as with grease, against all impressions of better knowledge; he has for the knowledge which the words spoken design to impart to him, no susceptibility, no mind, but only contempt. The construction בִּמְחָלָא has been frequently met with from vi. 30.

The following proverb forms a new whole from component parts of xxii. 28 and xxii. 22 f. :

- Ver. 10 Remove not ancient landmarks;  
And into the fields of orphans enter thou not.  
11 For their Saviour is a mighty one;  
He will conduct their cause against thee.

בִּמְחָלָא separates itself here to the meaning of *injuste invadere et occupare*; French, *empiéter sur son voisin*, advance not into the ground belonging to thy neighbour (Fleischer). If orphans have also no *goel* among their kindred (Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, ἀγγιστεύς) to redeem by purchase (Lev. xxv. 25) their inheritance that has passed over into the possession of another, they have another, and that a mighty Saviour, *Redemptor*, who will restore to them that which they have lost,—viz. God (Jer. l. 34),—who will adopt their cause against any one who has unjustly taken from them.

The following proverb warrants us to pause here, for it opens up, as a compendious echo of xxii. 17-21, a new series of proverbs of wisdom :

- Ver. 12 Apply thine heart to instruction,  
And thine ear to the utterances of knowledge.

We may, according as we accent in לְמוֹסֵר the divine origin or the human medium, translate, *offer disciplinæ* (Schultens), or *adhibe ad disciplinam cor tuum* (Fleischer). This general admonition is directed to old and young, to those who are to be educated as well as to those who are educated. First to the educator :

- Ver. 13 Withhold not correction from the child ;  
           For thou wilt beat him with the rod, and he will not die.  
 14 Thou beatest him with the rod,  
           And with it deliverest his soul from hell.

The exhortation, 13*a*, presupposes that education by word and deed is a duty devolving on the father and the teacher with regard to the child. In 13*b*, וְיִּ is in any case the relative conjunction. The conclusion does not mean: so will he not fall under death (destruction), as Luther also would have it, after Deut. xix. 21, for this thought certainly follows ver. 14; nor after xix. 18: so may the stroke not be one whereof he dies, for then the author ought to have written אֶל־תִּמְוֶיָּתוֹ; but: he will not die of it, *i.e.* only strike if he has deserved it, thou needest not fear; the bitter medicine will be beneficial to him, not deadly. The אָהָה standing before the double clause, ver. 14, means that he who administers corporal chastisement to the child, saves him spiritually; for שָׁאוֹל does not refer to death in general, but to death falling upon a man before his time, and in his sins, *vid.* xv. 24, *cf.* viii. 26.

The following proverb passes from the educator to the pupil:

- Ver. 15 My son, if thine heart becometh wise,  
           My heart also in return will rejoice;  
 16 And my reins will exult  
           If thy lips speak right things.

Wisdom is inborn in no one. A true Arab. proverb says, "The wise knows how the fool feels, for he himself was also once a fool;"<sup>1</sup> and folly is bound up in the heart of a child, according to xxii. 15, which must be driven out by severe discipline. 15*b*, as many others, *cf.* xxii. 19*b*, shows that these "words of the wise" are penetrated by the subjectivity of an author; the author means: if thy heart becomes wise, so will mine in return, *i.e.* corresponding to it (*cf.* וַיֵּם, Gen. xx. 6), rejoice. The thought of the heart in ver. 15 repeats itself in ver. 16, with reference to the utterance of the mouth. Regarding מִישָׁרִים,

<sup>1</sup> The second part of the saying is, "But a fool knows not how a wise man feels, for he has never been a wise man." I heard this many years ago, from the mouth of the American missionary Schaufler, in Constantinople.

*vid.* i. 5. Regarding the “reins,” בְּלִיֹּת (perhaps from בָּלָה, to languish, Job xix. 21), with which the tender and inmost affections are connected, *vid.* *Psychologie*, p. 268 f.

The poet now shows how one attains unto wisdom—the beginning of wisdom is the fear of God :

Ver. 17 Let not thine heart strive after sinners,  
But after the fear of Jahve all the day.

18 Truly there is a future,  
And thy hope shall not come to naught.

The LXX., Jerome, the *Venet.*, and Luther, and the Arab. interpreters, render 17*b* as an independent clause : “but be daily in the fear of the Lord.” That is not a substantival clause (cf. xxii. 7), nor can it be an interjectional clause, but it may be an elliptical clause (Fleischer : from the prohibitive אַל-תִּקְנֵא is to be taken for the second parallel member the *v. subst.* lying at the foundation of all verbs); but why had the author omitted הֵיָה? Besides, one uses the expressions, to act (עָשָׂה), and to walk (הֵלֵךְ) in the fear of God, but not the expression to be (הִיָה) in the fear of God. Thus בִּירְאָתָם, like בְּהַשְׁאִיָם, is dependent on אַל-תִּקְנֵא; and Jerome, who translates : *Non æmuletur cor tuum peccatores, sed in timore Domini esto tota die*, ought to have continued : *sed timorem Domini tota die*; for, as one may say in Latin : *æmulari virtutes*, as well as *æmulari aliquem*, so also in Heb. קִנְאָה, of the envying of those persons whose fortune excites to dissatisfaction, because one has not the same, and might yet have it, iii. 31, xxiv. 1, 19, as well as of emulation for a thing in which one might not stand behind others : envy not sinners, envy much rather the fear of God, *i.e.* let thyself be moved with eager desire after it when its appearance is presented to thee. There is no O. T. parallel for this, but the Syr. *tan* and the Greek *ζηλοτυποῦν* are used in this double sense. Thus Hitzig rightly, and, among the moderns, Malbim; with Aben Ezra, it is necessary to take בִּירְאָתָה for בְּאִישׁ יִרְאָתָה, this proverb itself declares the fear of God to be of all things the most worthy of being coveted.

In ver. 18, Umbreit, Elster, Zöckler, and others interpret the כִּי as assigning a reason, and the אִם as conditioning : for when the end (the hour of the righteous judgment) has come; Bertheau better, because more suitable to the וְשֵׁנִי and the אֶתְרִית : when an

end (an end adjusting the contradictions of the present time) comes, as no doubt it will come, then thy hope will not be destroyed; but, on the other hand, the succession of words in the conclusion (*vid.* at iii. 34) opposes this; also one does not see why the author does not say directly *בִּי יֵשׁ אַחֲרַיִת*, but expresses himself thus conditionally.<sup>1</sup> If *אִם* is meant hypothetically, then, with the LXX. *ἐὰν γὰρ τηρήσης αὐτὰ ἔσται σοι ἔκγονα*, we should supply after it *הַשְׂמֶרְנָה*, that had fallen out. Ewald's: much rather there is yet a future (Dächsel: much rather be happy there is . . .), is also impossible; for the preceding clause is positive, not negative. The particles *אִם בִּי*, connected thus, mean: for if (*e.g.* Lam. iii. 32); or also relatively: that if (*e.g.* Jer. xxvi. 15). After a negative clause they have the meaning of "unless," which is acquired by means of an ellipsis; *e.g.* Isa. lv. 10, it turns not back thither, unless it has watered the earth (it returns back not before then, not unless this is done). This "unless" is, however, used like the Lat. *nisi*, also without the conditioning clause following, *e.g.* Gen. xxviii. 17, *hic locus non est nisi domus Dei*. And hence the expression *אִם בִּי*, after the negation going before, acquires the meaning of "but," *e.g.* 17*b*: let not thy heart be covetous after sinners, for thou canst always be zealous for the fear of God, *i.e.* much rather for this, but for this. This pleonasm of *אִם* sometimes occurs where *בִּי* is not used confirmatively, but affirmatively: the "certainly if" forms the transition, *e.g.* 1 Kings xx. 6 (*vid.* Keil's *Comm. l.c.*), whose "if" is not seldom omitted, so that *אִם בִּי* has only the meaning of an affirmative "certainly," not "truly no," which it may also have, 1 Sam. xxv. 34, but "truly yes." Thus *אִם בִּי* is used Judg. xv. 7; 2 Sam. xv. 21 (where *אִם* is omitted by the *Keri*); 2 Kings v. 20; Jer. li. 14; and thus it is also meant here, 18*a*, notwithstanding that *אִם בִּי*, in its more usual signification, "besides only, but, *nisi*," precedes, as at 1 Sam. xxi. 6, cf. 5. The objection by Hitzig, that with this explanation: "certainly there is a future," vers. 18 and 17 are at variance, falls to the ground, if one reflects on the Heb. idiom, in which the affirmative signification of *בִּי* is interpene-

<sup>1</sup> The form *אִם בִּי* does not contradict the connection of the two particles. This use of the *Makkeph* is general, except in these three instances: Gen. xv. 4; Num. xxxv. 33; Neh. ii. 2.

trated by the confirmative. **אַחֲרֵי־כֵן** used thus pregnantly, as here (xxiv. 14), is the glorious final issue; the word in itself designates the end into which human life issues (cf. Ps. xxxvii. 37 f.); here, the end crowning the preceding course. Jeremiah (xxix. 11) in this sense connects **אַחֲרֵי־כֵן** ותקוה [end and expectation]. And what is here denied of the **תְּקִיָּה**, the hope (not as certain Jewish interpreters dream, the thread of life) of him who zealously strives after the fear of God, is affirmed, at Ps. xxxvii. 38, of the godless: the latter have no continuance, but the former have such as is the fulfilling of his hope.

Among the virtues which flow from the fear of God, temperance is made prominent, and the warning against excess is introduced by the general exhortation to wisdom:

- Ver. 19 Hear thou, my son, and become wise,  
 And direct thy heart straight forward on the way.  
 20 And be not among wine-drinkers,  
 And among those who devour flesh;  
 21 For the drunkard and glutton become poor,  
 And sleepiness clotheth in rags.

The **אַחֲרֵי־כֵן**, connected with **שָׁמַע**, imports that the speaker has to do with the hearer altogether by himself, and that the latter may make an exception to the many who do not hear (cf. Job xxxiii. 33; Jer. ii. 31). Regarding **אֲשֶׁר**, to make to go straight out, *vid.* at iv. 14; the *Kal*, ix. 6, and also the *Piel*, iv. 14, mean to go straight on, and, generally, to go. The way merely, is the one that is right in contrast to the many byways. Fleischer: "the way *sensu eximio*, as the Oriental mystics called the way to perfection merely (Arab.) *âlatryk*; and him who walked therein, *âlsâlak*, the walker or wanderer."<sup>1</sup> **אֶל-תְּהִי בְּ**, as at xxii. 26, the "Words of the Wise," are to be compared in point of style. The degenerate and perverse son is more clearly described, Deut. xxi. 20, as **זוֹלֵל וְסָבָא**. These two characteristics the poet distributes between 20a and 20b. **סָבָא** means to drink (whence **סָבָא**, drink = wine, Isa. i. 22) wine or other intoxicating drinks; Arab. *sabâ*, *vinum potandi causa emere*. To the **יָיִן**, here added, **בָּשָׂר** in the parallel member corresponds, which

<sup>1</sup> Rashi reads **בִּרְדָּךְ לִבְךָ** (walk), in the way of thy heart (which has become wise), and so Heidenheim found it in an old ms.; but **בִּרְדָּךְ** is equivalent to **בִּרְדָּךְ בִּינָה**, ix. 6.

consequently is not the fleshly body of the gluttons themselves, but the prepared flesh which they consume at their luxurious banquets. The LXX. incorrectly as to the word, but not contrary to the sense, "be no wine-bibber, and stretch not thyself after *picknicks* (συμβολαῖς), and buying in of flesh (κρεῶν τε ἀγορασμοῖς)," whereby זָלִל is translated in the sense of the Aram. זָבַי (Lagarde). זָלִל denotes, intransitively, to be little valued (whence זָוִל, *opp.* יָקָר, Jer. xv. 19), transitively to value little, and as such to squander, to lavish prodigally; thus: *qui prodigi sunt carnis sibi*; לָמוֹ is *dat. commodi*. Otherwise Gesenius, Fleischer, Umbreit, and Ewald: *qui prodigi sunt carnis suæ*, who destroy their own body; but the parallelism shows that flesh is meant wherewith they feed themselves, not their own flesh (בָּשָׂר לָמוֹ, like חֲמַת־לָמוֹ, Ps. lviii. 5), which, *i.e.* its health, they squander. זָלִל also, in phrase used in Deut. xxi. 20 (cf. with Hitzig the formula φάγος καὶ οἰνοπότης, Matt. xi. 19), denotes not the dissolute person, as the sensualist, πορνόκοπος (LXX.), but the συμβολοκόπος (Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion), κρεωβόρος (Venet.), זָלִל בָּסָר (Onkelos), *i.e.* flesh-eater, ravenous person, glutton, in which sense it is rendered here, by the Syr. and Targ., by אָסוּט (אָסוּט), *i.e.* ἄσωτος. Regarding the metaplastic fut. *Niph.* יִרָשׁ (LXX. πτωχέψει), *vid.* at xx. 13, cf. xi. 25. נִימָה (after the form of בּוֹשָׁה, רִוּנָה, צוּרָה) is drowsiness, lethargy, long sleeping, which necessarily follows a life of riot and revelry. Such a slothful person comes to a bit of bread (xxi. 17); and the disinclination and unfitness for work, resulting from night revelry, brings it about that at last he must clothe himself in miserable rags. The rags are called קָרַע and ῥάκος, from the rending (tearing), Arab. *ruk'at*, from the patching, mending. Lagarde, more at large, treats of this word here used for rags.

The *parainesis* begins anew, and the division is open to question. Vers. 22-24 can of themselves be independent distichs; but this is not the case with ver. 25, which, in the resumption of the address and in expression, leans back on ver. 22. The author of this appendix may have met with vers. 23 and 24 (although here also his style, as conformed to that of i. 9, is noticeable, cf. 23b with i. 2), but vers. 22 and 25 are the form which he has given to them.

Thus 22-25 are a whole :—

- Ver. 22 Hearken to thy father, to him who hath begotten thee,  
And despise not thy mother when she has grown old.  
23 Buy the truth, and sell it not,  
Wisdom and discipline and understanding.  
24 The father of a righteous man rejoiceth greatly;  
(And) he that is the father of a wise man—he will rejoice.  
25 Let thy father and thy mother be glad;  
And her that bare thee exult.

The ostastich begins with a call to childlike obedience, for *לְשִׁמְעָהּ*, to listen to any one, is equivalent to, to obey him, *e.g.* Ps. lxxxi. 9, 14 (cf. “hearken to his voice,” Ps. xcv. 7). *זֶה יִקְרֶךְ* is a relative clause (cf. Deut. xxxii. 18, without *זֶה* or *אֲשֶׁר*), according to which it is rightly accentuated (cf. on the contrary, Ps. lxxviii. 54). 22*b*, strictly taken, is not to be translated *neve contemne cum senuerit matrem tuam* (Fleischer), but *cum senuerit mater tua*, for the logical object to *אֶל-תִּבְחוּ* is attracted as subj. of *וְקִנְיָה* (Hitzig). There now follows the exhortation comprehending all, and formed after iv. 7, to buy wisdom, *i.e.* to shun no expense, no effort, no privation, in order to attain to the possession of wisdom; and not to sell it, *i.e.* not to place it over against any earthly possession, worldly gain, sensual enjoyment; not to let it be taken away by any intimidation, argued away by false reasoning, or prevailed against by enticements into the way of vice, and not to become unfaithful to it by swimming with the great stream (Ex. xxiii. 2); for truth, *אֱמֶת*, is that which endures and proves itself in all spheres, the moral as well as the intellectual. In 23*b*, in like manner as i. 3, xxii. 4, a threefold object is given to *קִנְיָה* instead of *אֱמֶת*: there are three properties which are peculiar to truth, the three powers which handle it: *חִכְמָה* is knowledge solid, pressing into the essence of things; *מוֹסֵר* is moral culture; and *בִּינָה* the central faculty of proving and distinguishing (*vid.* i. 3-5). Now ver. 24 says what consequences are for the parents when the son, according to the exhortation of 23, makes truth his aim, to which all is subordinated. Because in *אֱמֶת* the ideas of practical and theoretical truth are inter-connected. *צִדִּיק* and *חֶכֶם* are also here parallel to one another. The *Chethib* of 24*a* is *נִוֵּל יָגִיל*, which Schultens finds tenable in view of (Arab.) *jal*, fut. *jajûlu* (to turn round; Heb. to turn oneself for joy)

but the Heb. *usus loq.* knows elsewhere only *יָגִיל יָגִיל*, as the *Kerî* corrects. The LXX., misled by the *Chethîb*, translates *καλῶς ἐκτρέφει* (incorrect *ἐκτροφήσει*), i.e. *יַגְדֵּל יַגְדֵּל*. In 24b, *חַיִּי* is of the nature of a pred. of the conclusion (cf. Gen. xxii. 24; Ps. cxv. 7), as if the sentence were: has one begotten a wise man, then (cf. xvii. 21) he has joy of him; but the *Kerî* effaces this *Vav apodosi*s, and assigns it to *יִלְד* as *Vav copul.*—an unnecessary mingling of the syntactically possible, more emphatic expression. This proverbial whole now rounds itself off in ver. 25 by a reference to ver. 22,—the Optative here corresponding to the Impr. and Prohib. there: let thy father and thy mother rejoice (LXX. *εὐφρανέσθω*), and let her that bare thee exult (here where it is possible the Optat. form *וְתִגֵּל*).

Vers. 26–28. This hexastich warns against unchastity. What, in i.–ix., extended discourses and representations exhibited to the youth is here repeated in miniature pictures. It is the teacher of wisdom, but by him Wisdom herself, who speaks:

- Ver. 26 Give me, my son, thine heart;  
 And let thine eyes delight in my ways.  
 27 For the harlot is a deep ditch,  
 And the strange woman a narrow pit.  
 28 Yea, she lieth in wait like a robber,  
 And multiplieth the faithless among men

We have retained Luther's beautiful rendering of ver. 26,<sup>1</sup> in which this proverb, as a warning word of heavenly wisdom and of divine love, has become dear to us. It follows, as Symmachus and the *Venet.*, the *Chethîb* *תְּרַצֵּנָה* (for *תְּרַצֵּינָה*, like Ex. ii. 16; Job v. 12), the stylistic appropriateness of which proceeds from xvi. 7, as on the other hand the *Kerî* *תְּצַרְנָה* (cf. 1 Sam. xiv. 27) is supported by xxii. 12, cf. v. 2. But the correction is unnecessary, and the *Chethîb* sounds more affectionate, hence it is with right defended by Hitzig. The ways of wisdom are ways of correction, and particularly of chastity, thus placed over against "the ways of the harlot," vii. 24 ff. Accordingly the exhortation, ver. 26, verifies itself; warning, by ver. 27, cf. xxii. 14, where *עֲמָקָה* was written, here as at Job xii. 22, with the long vowel *עֲמוּקָה* (*עֲמָקָה*). *בְּאֵר צָרָה* interchanges

<sup>1</sup> The right punctuation of 26a is *תְּנֶה-בְּנִי לִבִּי*, as it is found in the editions: Ven. 1615; Basel 1619; and in those of Norzi and Michaelis.

with שִׁוְהָ עֲמוּקָה, and means, not the fountain of sorrow (Löwenstein), but the narrow pit. בָּאֵר is fem. gen., xxvi. 21 f., and צָר means narrow, like *étroit* (old French, *estreit*), from *strictus*. The figure has, after xxii. 14, the mouth of the harlot in view. Whoever is enticed by her syren voice falls into a deep ditch, into a pit with a narrow mouth, into which one can more easily enter than escape from. Ver. 28 says that it is the artifice of the harlot which draws a man into such depth of wickedness and guilt. With אָף, which, as at Judg. v. 29, belongs not to הָיָא but to the whole sentence, the picture of terror is completed. The verb חָתַף (whence Arab. *hataf*, death, natural death) means to snatch away. If we take חָתַף as *abstr.*: a snatching away, then it would here stand elliptically for חָתַף (בָּעַל) אִישׁ (בָּעַל), which in itself is improbable (*vid.* vii. 22, עָכָם) and also unnecessary, since, as מִלֵּךְ, עֶבֶד, הֶלֶךְ, etc. show, such *abstracta* can pass immediately into *concreta*, so that חָתַף thus means the person who snatches away, *i.e.* the street robber, *latro* (cf. חָטַף, (Arab.) *khataf*, Ps. x. 9, rightly explained by Kimchi as cogn.). In 28b, הוֹסִיף cannot mean *abripit* (as LXX., Theodotion, and Jerome suppose), for which the word תִּסְפֶּה (תִּסְפֶּה) would have been used.<sup>1</sup> But this verbal idea does not harmonize with the connection; הוֹסִיף means, as always, *addit* (*auget*), and that here in the sense of *multiplicat*. The same thing may be said of בּוֹנִים as is said (xi. 15) of תּוֹקְעִים. Hitzig's objection, "הוֹסִיף, to multiply, with the accusative of the person, is not at all used," is set aside by xix. 4. But we may translate: the faithless, or: the breach of faith she increases. Yet it always remains a question whether בָּאָדָם is dependent on בּוֹנִים, as Eccles. viii. 9, cf. 2 Sam. xxiii. 3, on the verb of ruling (Hitzig), or whether, as frequently בָּאָדָם, *e.g.* Ps. lxxviii. 60, it means *inter homines* (thus most interpreters). Uncleanliness leads to faithlessness of manifold kinds: it makes not only the husband unfaithful to his wife, but also the son to his parents, the scholar to his teacher and pastor, the servant (cf. the case of Potiphar's wife) to his master. The adulteress, inasmuch as she entices now one and now another into her net, increases the

<sup>1</sup> The Targ. translates 28b (here free from the influence of the Peshito) in the Syro-Palestinian idiom by וְצָאָר אֲבִינְיָא יִשְׁבְּרִי, *i.e.* she seizes thoughtless sons.

number of those who are faithless towards men. But are they not, above all, faithless towards God? We are of opinion that not *בוגרים*, but *תוסיף*, has its complement in *בארם*, and needs it: the adulteress increases the faithless among men, she makes faithlessness of manifold kinds common in human society. According to this, also, it is accentuated; *ובוגרים* is placed as object by *Mugrasch*, and *בארם* is connected by *Mercha* with *תוסיף*.

Vers. 29–35. The author passes from the sin of uncleanness to that of drunkenness; they are nearly related, for drunkenness excites fleshly lust; and to wallow with delight in the mire of sensuality, a man, created in the image of God, must first brutalize himself by intoxication. The *Mashal* in the number of its lines passes beyond the limits of the distich, and becomes a *Mashal ode*.

Ver. 29 Whose is woe? Whose is grief?

Whose are contentions, whose trouble, whose wounds  
without cause?

Whose is dimness of eyes?

30 Theirs, who sit late at the wine,  
Who turn in to taste mixed wine.

31 Look not on the wine as it sparkleth red,  
As it showeth its gleam in the cup,  
Glideth down with ease.

32 The end of it is that it biteth like a serpent,  
And stingeth like a basilisk.

33 Thine eyes shall see strange things,  
And thine heart shall speak perverse things;

34 And thou art as one lying in the heart of the sea,  
And as one lying on the top of a mast.

35 "They have scourged me—it pained me not;  
They have beaten me—I perceived it not.

When shall I have wakened from sleep?

Thus on I go, I return to it again."

The repeated *למי*<sup>1</sup> asks who then has to experience all that; the answer follows in ver. 30. With *אוי*, the *אבוי* occurring only here accords; it is not a substantive from *אָבָה* (whence *אָבִין*) after the form of *צָהָק*, in the sense of *egestas*; but, like the former [*אוי*], an interjection of sorrow (*Venet.* *τίνι αἰ*, *τίνι φεῦ*). Regarding *מְרִינִים* (*Chethlîb מְרִוּנִים*), *vid.* at vi. 14.

<sup>1</sup> We punctuate *למי אוי*, for that is Ben Asher's punctuation, while that of his opponent Ben Naphtali is *למי־אוי*. *Vid. Thorath Emeth*, p. 33.

שִׁיחַ signifies (*vid.* at vi. 22) meditation and speech, here sorrowful thought and sorrowful complaint (1 Sam. i. 16; Ps. lv. 18; cf. הָגִיג, הִגָּה), *e.g.* over the exhausted purse, the neglected work, the anticipated reproaches, the diminishing strength. In the connection פָּעֲעִים חֲנָם (cf. Ps. xxxv. 19) the accus. adv. חֲנָם (French *gratuitement*) represents the place of an adjective: strokes which one receives without being in the situation from necessity, or duty to expect them, strokes for nothing and in return for nothing (Fleischer), wounds for a long while (Oetinger). חֲכָלֶלֶת עֵינַיִם is the darkening (clouding) of the eyes, from חָכַל, to be firm, closed, and transferred to the sensation of light: to be dark (*vid.* at Gen. xlix. 12; Ps. x. 8); the copper-nose of the drunkard is not under consideration; the word does not refer to the reddening, but the dimming of the eyes, and of the power of vision. The answer, ver. 30, begins, in conformity with the form of the question, with ל (write לְמַאֲחָרִים, with *Gaja* to ל, according to *Metheg-Setzung*, § 20, *Michlol* 46b): pain, and woe, and contention they have who tarry late at the wine (cf. Isa. v. 11), who enter (*viz.* into the wine-house, Eccles. ii. 4, the house of revelry) “to search” mingled drink (*vid.* at ix. 2; Isa. v. 22). Hitzig: “they test the mixing, as to the relation of the wine to the water, whether it is correct.” But לְחַקֹּר is like גִּבּוֹרִים, Isa. v. 22, meant in mockery: they are heroes, *viz.* heroes in drinking; they are searchers, such, namely, as seek to examine into the mixed wine, or also: thoroughly and carefully taste it (Fleischer).

The evil consequences of drunkenness are now registered. That one may not fall under this common sin, the poet, ver. 31, warns against the attraction which the wine presents to the sight and to the sense of taste: one must not permit himself to be caught as a prisoner by this enticement, but must maintain his freedom against it. הִתְאָדָם, to make, *i.e.* to show oneself red, is almost equivalent to הִתְאָרָם; and more than this, it presents the wine as itself co-operating and active by its red play of colours (Fleischer). Regarding the *antiptosis* (*antiphonesis*): Look not on the wine that is . . ., *vid.* at Gen. i. 3; yet here, where רָאָה means not merely “to see,” but “to look at,” the case is somewhat different. In 31b, one for the most part assumes that עֵינֹו signifies the eye of the wine, *i.e.* the pearls which play

on the surface of the wine (Fleischer). And, indeed, Hitzig's translation, after Num. xi. 7: when it presents its appearance in the cup, does not commend itself, because it expresses too little. On the other hand, it is saying too much when Böttcher maintains that עֵין never denotes the mere appearance, but always the shining aspect of the object. But used of wine, עֵין appears to denote not merely aspect as such, but its gleam, glance; not its pearls, for which עֵינִי would be the word used, but shining glance, by which particularly the bright glance, as out of deep darkness, of the Syro-Palestinian wine is thought of, which is for the most part prepared from red (blue) grapes, and because very rich in sugar, is thick almost like syrup. Jerome translates עֵינוּ well: (*cum splenduerit in vitro*) *color ejus*. But one need not think of a glass; Böttcher has rightly said that one might perceive the glittering appearance also in a metal or earthen vessel if one looked into it. The *Chethâb* כֶּתִיב is an error of transcription; the *Midrash* makes the remark on this, that כֶּתִיבִים fits the wine merchant, and כֶּבוֹם the wine drinker. From the pleasure of the eye, 31c passes over to the pleasures of the taste: (that, or, as it) goeth down smoothly (Luther); the expression is like Eccles. vii. 10. Instead of הֶלֶךְ (like *jâry*, of fluidity) there stands here הִתְהַלֵּךְ, commonly used of pleasant going; and instead of לְמִישְׁרִים with ל, the norm בְּמִישְׁרִים with ב of the manner; directness is here easiness, facility (Arab. *jusr*); it goes as on a straight, even way unhindered and easily down the throat.<sup>1</sup>

Ver. 32 shows how it issues with the wine, viz. with those who immoderately enjoy it. Is אֲחֵרֵיתוֹ [its end] here the subject, as at v. 4? We must in that case interpret יִשָּׁה and יִפְרֹשׁ as attributives, as the Syr. and Targ. translate the latter, and Ewald both. The issue which it brings with it is like the serpent which bites, etc., and there is nothing syntactically opposed to this (cf. *e.g.* Ps. xvii. 12); the future, in contradistinction to the participle, would not express properties, but intimations of facts. But the end of the wine is not like a serpent, but like the bite of a serpent. The wine itself, and

<sup>1</sup> The English version is, "when it moveth itself aright," which one has perceived in the phenomenon of the tears of the wine, or of the movement in the glass. *Vid. Ausland*, 1869, p. 72.

independent of its consequences, is in and of itself like a serpent. In accordance with the matter, *אחריתו* may be interpreted, with Hitzig (after Jerome, *in novissimo*), as *acc. adverb.* = *באחריתו*, Jer. xvii. 11. But why did not the author more distinctly write this word 'בא? The syntactic relation is like xxix. 21: *אחריתו* is after the manner of a substantival clause, the subject to that which follows as its virtual predicate: "its end is: like a serpent it biteth = this, that it biteth like a serpent." Regarding *צַפֵּעִי*, *serpens regulus* (after Schultens, from *צַפַּע* = (Arab.) *saf'*, to breathe out glowing, scorching), *vid.* at Isa. vii. 8. The *Hiph.* *הפריש* Schultens here understands of the division of the liver, and Hitzig, after the LXX., Vulgate, and *Venet.*, of squirting the poison; both after the Arab. *farth*. But *הפריש*, Syr. *afrés*, also signifies, from the root-idea of dividing and splitting, to sting, *poindre*, *pointer*, as Rashi and Kimchi gloss, whence the Aram. *פָּרֵשׁ*, an ox-goad, with which the ancients connect *פרש* (of the spur), the name for a rider, *eques*, and also a horse (cf. on the contrary, Fleischer in Levy, *W. B.* ii. 574); a serpent's bite and a serpent's sting (Lat. *morsus*, *ictus*, Varro: *cum pepugerit colubra*) are connected together by the ancients.<sup>1</sup>

The excited condition of the drunkard is now described. First, ver. 33 describes the activity of his imagination as excited to madness. It is untenable to interpret *זרות* here with Rashi, Aben Ezra, and others, and to translate with Luther: "so shall thine eyes look after other women" (*circumspicient mulieres impudicas*, Fleischer, for the meaning to perceive, to look about for something, to seek something with the eyes, referring to Gen. xli. 33). For *זרות* acquires the meaning of *mulieres impudicæ* only from its surrounding, but here the parallel *תהפכות* (perverse things) directs to the neut. *aliena* (cf. xv. 28, *רעות*), but not merely in the sense of unreal things (Rabag, Meîri), but: strange, *i.e.* abnormal, thus bizarre, mad, dreadful things. An old Heb. parable compares the changing circumstances which wine produces with the man-

<sup>1</sup> However, we will not conceal it, that the post-bibl. Heb. does not know *הפריש* in the sense of to prick, sting (the *Midrash* explains the passage by *מיתה בין מיתה לחיים*, *i.e.* it cuts off life); and the Nestorian Knanishu of Superghan, whom I asked regarding *aphrish*, knew only of the meanings "to separate" and "to point out," but not "to sting."

ner of the lamb, the lion, the swine, the monkey; here juggles and phantoms of the imagination are meant, which in the view and fancy of the drunken man hunt one another like monkey capers. Moreover, the state of the drunken man is one that is separated from the reality of a life of sobriety and the safety of a life of moderation, 34a: thou act like one who lies in the heart of the sea. Thus to lie in the heart, *i.e.* the midst, of the sea as a ship goes therein, xxx. 19, is impossible; there one must swim; but swimming is not lying, and to think on a situation like that of Jonah, i. 5, one must think also of the ship; but *שָׁכַב* does not necessarily mean "to sleep," and, besides, the sleep of a passenger in the cabin on the high sea is of itself no dangerous matter. Rightly Hitzig: in the depth of the sea (cf. Jonah ii. 4)—the drunken man, or the man overcome by wine (Isa. xxviii. 7), is like one who has sunk down into the midst of the sea; and thus drowned, or in danger of being drowned, he is in a condition of intellectual confusion, which finally passes over into perfect unconsciousness, cut off from the true life which passes over him like one dead, and in this condition he has made a bed for himself, as *שָׁכַב* denotes. With *בִּלְבָּב בְּרֹאשׁ* stands in complete contrast: he is like one who lies on the top of the mast. *הַיָּל*, after the forms *הַיָּל*, *הַיָּל*, is the sail-yard fastened by ropes, *הַיָּל* (Isa. xxxiii. 23). To lay oneself down on the sail-yard happens thus to no one, and it is no place for such a purpose; but as little as one can quarter him who is on the ridge of the roof, in the *Alja*, because no one is able to lie down there, so little can he in the bower [*Mastkorb*] him who is here spoken of (Böttcher). The poet says, but only by way of comparison, how critical the situation of the drunkard is; he compares him to one who lies on the highest sail-yard, and is exposed to the danger of being every moment thrown into the sea; for the rocking of the ship is the greater in proportion to the height of the sail-yard. The drunkard is, indeed, thus often exposed to the peril of his life; for an accident of itself not great, or a stroke, may suddenly put an end to his life.

Ver. 35. The poet represents the drunken man as now speaking to himself. He has been well cudgelled; but because insensible, he has not felt it, and he places himself now where he will

sleep out his intoxication. Far from being made temperate by the strokes inflicted on him, he rejoices in the prospect, when he has awaked out of his sleep, of beginning again the life of drunkenness and revelry which has become a pleasant custom to him. הָלָה means not only to be sick, but generally to be, or to become, affected painfully; cf. Jer. v. 3, where הָלָה is not the 3d pl. mas. of הָלָה, but of הָלָה. The words מָתִי אֶקְיִן are, it is true, a cry of longing of a different kind from Job vii. 4. The sleeping man cannot forbear from yielding to the constraint of nature: he is no longer master of himself, he becomes giddy, everything goes round about with him, but he thinks with himself: Oh that I were again awake! and so little has his appetite been appeased by his sufferings, that when he is again awakened, he will begin where he left off yesterday, when he could drink no more. מָתִי is here, after Nolde, Fleischer, and Hitzig, the relative *quando* (*quum*); but the bibl. *usus loq.* gives no authority for this. In that case we would have expected הִקְיִצוֹתִי instead of אֶקְיִן. As the interrog. מָתִי is more animated than the relat., so also אֶבְקֶשׁנִי is more animated (1 Sam. ii. 3) than אֶבְקֶשׁ. The suffix of אֶבְקֶשׁנִי refers to the wine: raised up, he will seek that which has become so dear and so necessary to him.

After this divergence (in vers. 29–35) from the usual form of the proverb, there is now a return to the tetrastich:

- xxiv. 1 Envy not evil men,  
And desire not to have intercourse with them.  
2 For their heart thinketh of violence,  
And their lips speak mischief.

The warning, not to envy the godless, is also found at iii. 31, xxiii. 17, xxiv. 19, but is differently constructed in each of these passages. Regarding תְּתַאֲוִי with *Pathach*, *vid.* at xxiii. 3. אֲנָשֵׁי רָעָה (cf. רָע, xxviii. 5) are the wicked, *i.e.* such as cleave to evil, and to whom evil clings. The warning is grounded in this, that whoever have intercourse with such men, make themselves partners in greater sins and evil: for their heart broodeth (write שָׂד, *Munach Dechê*) violence, *i.e.* robbery, plunder, destruction, murder, and the like. With שָׂד (in the *Mishle* only here and at xxi. 7, cf. שָׂדָר, xix. 26) connects itself elsewhere הָמָס, here (cf. Hab. i. 3) עָמַל, *labor, molestia*, *viz.* those

who prepare it for others by means of slanderous, crafty, uncharitable talk.

Vers. 3, 4. The warning against fellowship with the godless is followed by the praise of wisdom, which is rooted in the fear of God.

Ver. 3 By wisdom is the house builded,  
And by understanding is it established.  
4 And by knowledge shall the chambers be filled  
With all manner of precious and pleasant goods.

What is meant by the "building of the house" is explained at xiv. 1. It is wisdom, viz. that which originates from God, which is rooted in fellowship with Him, by which every household, be it great or small, prospers and attains to a successful and flourishing state; בִּינָה, as parallel word to בְּנָה (iii. 19; Hab. ii. 12), is related to it as *statuere* to *extruere*; the *Hithpal* (as at Num. xxi. 17) means to keep oneself in a state of continuance, to gain perpetuity, to become established. That יִמְלֹאֵי by *Athnach* has not passed over into the pausal יִמְלֹאֵי, arises from this, that the *Athnach*, by the poetical system of accents, has only the force of the prose accent *Takef*; the clause completes itself only by 4b; the pausal form on that account also is not found, and it is discontinued, because the *Athnach* does not produce any pausal effect (*vid.* at Ps. xlv. 6). The form of expression in ver. 4 is like i. 13, iii. 10. But the חֲדָרִים, of storerooms (LXX. as Isa. xxvi. 20, ταμεία), and נְעִים, like xxii. 18, xxiii. 8, is peculiar to this collection.

Vers. 5, 6. The praise of wisdom is continued: it brings blessings in the time of peace, and gives the victory in war.

Ver. 5 A wise man is full of strength;  
And a man of understanding sheweth great power.  
6 For with wise counsel shalt thou carry on successful war;  
And safety is where counsellors are not wanting.

The ב of בָּעוֹז (thus with *Pathach* in old impressions, Cod. 1294, Cod. *Jaman.*, and elsewhere with the Masoretic note לִית וּמְלָא) introduces, as that of בִּפְתָּ, Ps. xxix. 4, the property in which a person or thing appears; the article (cf. הָעוֹבִים, ii. 13, Gesen. § 35, 2A) is that of gender. The parallel מֵאֲמֵן כֹּחַ, a Greek translates by ὑπὲρ κραταιὸν ἰσχυῖ = מֵאֲמֵן כֹּחַ (Job ix. 4; Isa. xl. 26). But after 5a it lies nearer that the poet means

to express the power which lies in wisdom itself (Eccles. vii. 19), and its superiority to physical force (xxi. 22); the LXX., Syr., and Targ. also, it is true, translate 5a as if מַעֲזוֹ (*præ potente*) were the words used. מַעֲזוֹ means to strengthen the strength, and that is (Nah. ii. 2) equivalent to, to collect the strength (to take courage), here and at Amos ii. 14, to show strong (superior) strength. The reason is gathered from xx. 18b and xi. 14b. The לִי here added, Hitzig is determined to read תַּעֲשֶׂה: for with prudent counsel the war shall be carried out by thee. The construction of the passive with לִי of the subject is correct in Heb. (*vid.* at xiv. 20) as well as in Aram.,<sup>1</sup> and עֲשֶׂה frequently means, in a pregnant sense: to complete, to carry out, to bring to an end; but the phrase מִלְחָמָה means always to carry on war, and nothing further. לִי is the *dat. commod.*, as in לִי נִלְחָם, to wage war (to contend) for any one, *e.g.* Ex. xiv. 14. Instead of בָּרַב, the LXX. reads בָּלֵב; regarding γεωργίου μεγάλου for מאמץ כח, without doubt a corrupt reading, *vid.* Lagarde.

Till now in this appendix we have found only two distichs (*vid.* vol. i. p. 17); now several of them follow. From this, that wisdom is a power which accomplishes great things, it follows that it is of high value, though to the fool it appears all too costly.

Ver. 7 Wisdom seems to the fool to be an ornamental commodity;  
He openeth not his mouth in the gate.

Most interpreters take חֲכָמוֹת for רִמּוֹת (written as at 1 Chron. vi. 58; cf. Zech. xiv. 10; רָאשׁ, Prov. x. 4; קֶאֱם, Hos. x. 14), and translate, as Jerome and Luther: "Wisdom is to the fool too high;" the way to wisdom is to him too long and too steep, the price too costly, and not to be afforded. Certainly this thought does not lie far distant from what the poet would say; but why does he say חֲכָמוֹת, and not חֲכָמָה? This חֲכָמוֹת is not a numerical plur., so as to be translated with the *Venet.*: μετέωροι τῇ ἀφροῖ αἱ ἐπιστήμαι; it is a plur., as Ps. xlix. 4 shows; but, as is evident from the personification and the construction, i. 20, one inwardly multiplying and heightening, which is related to חֲכָמָה as science or the contents of knowledge is to knowledge. That this plur. comes here into view

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Nöldeke's *Neusyrische Gram.* p. 219, *Anm.*, and p. 416.

as in i.-ix. (*vid.* vol. i. p. 34), is definitely accounted for in these chapters by the circumstance that wisdom was to be designated, which is the *mediatrix* of all wisdom; here, to be designated in intentional symphony with ראמות, whose plur. ending *ōth* shall be for that very reason, however, inalienable. Thus ראמות will be the name of a costly foreign *bijouterie*, which is mentioned in the Book of Job, where the unfathomableness and inestimableness of wisdom is celebrated; *vid.* Job xxvii. 18, where we have recorded what we had to say at the time regarding this word. But what is now the meaning of the saying that wisdom is to the fool a pearl or precious coral? Joël Brill explains: "The fool uses the sciences like a precious stone, only for ornament, but he knows not how to utter a word publicly." This is to be rejected, because ראמות is not so usual a trinket or ornament as to serve as an expression of this thought. The third of the comparison lies in the rarity, costliness, unattainableness; the fool despises wisdom, because the expenditure of strength and the sacrifices of all kinds which are necessary to put one into the possession of wisdom deter him from it (Rashi). This is also the sense which the expression has when ראמות = רמות; and probably for the sake of this double meaning the poet chose just this word, and not גביש, פנינים, or any other name, for articles of ornament (Hitzig). The Syr. has incorrectly interpreted this play upon words: *sapientia abjecta stulto*; and the Targumist: the fool grumbles (מתרעם) against wisdom.<sup>1</sup> He may also find the grapes to be sour because they hang too high for him; here it is only said that wisdom remains at a distance from him because he cannot soar up to its attainment; for that very reason he does not open his mouth in the gate, where the council and the representatives of the people have their seats: he has not the knowledge necessary for being associated in counselling, and thus must keep silent; and this is indeed the most prudent thing he can do.

Ver. 8. From wisdom, which is a moral good, the following proverb passes over to a kind of σοφία δαιμονιώδης:

He that meditateth to do evil,  
We call such an one an intriguer.

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<sup>1</sup> This explanation is more correct than Levy's: he lifts himself up (boasts) with wisdom.

A verbal explanation and definition like xxi. 24 (cf. vol. i. p. 40), formed like xvi. 21 from נָבֹן. Instead of בַּעַל-מְזִמּוֹת [lord of mischief] in xii. 2, the expression is אִישׁ מ' (cf. at xxii. 24). Regarding מְזִמּוֹת in its usual sense, *vid.* v. 2. Such definitions have of course no lexicographical, but only a moral aim. That which is here given is designed to warn one against gaining for himself this ambiguous title of a refined (cunning, *versutus*) man; one is so named whose schemes and endeavours are directed to the doing of evil. One may also inversely find the turning-point of the warning in 8b: "he who projects deceitful plans against the welfare of others, finds his punishment in this, that he falls under public condemnation as a worthless intriguer" (Elster). But מְזִמּוֹת is a ῥῆμα μέσον, *vid.* v. 2; the title is thus equivocal, and the turning-point lies in the bringing out of his kernel: מְחַשֵּׁב לְהָרַע = meditating to do evil.

Ver. 9. This proverb is connected by זֶמָה with ver. 8, and by אָוִיל with ver. 7; it places the fool and the mocker over against one another.

The undertaking of folly is sin;

And an abomination to men is the scorner.

Since it is certain that for 9b the subject is "the scorner," so also "sin" is to be regarded as the subject of 9a. The special meaning *flagitium*, as xxi. 27, זָמָה will then not have here, but it derives it from the root-idea "to contrive, imagine," and signifies first only the collection and forthputting of the thoughts towards a definite end (Job xvii. 11), particularly the refined preparation, the contrivance of a sinful act. In a similar way we speak of a sinful beginning or undertaking. But if one regards sin in itself, or in its consequences, it is always a contrivance or desire of folly (*gen. subjecti*), or: one that bears on itself (*gen. qualitatis*) the character of folly; for it disturbs and destroys the relation of man to God and man, and rests, as Socrates in *Plato* says, on a false calculation. And the mocker (the mocker at religion and virtue) is תּוֹעֵבַת לְאָדָם. The form of combination stands here before a word with לְ, as at Job xviii. 2, xxiv. 5, and frequently. But why does not the poet say directly תּוֹעֵבַת אָדָם? Perhaps to leave room for the double sense, that the mocker is not only an abomination to men, viz. to the better disposed; but also, for he makes others err as to

their faith, and draws them into his frivolous thoughts, becomes to them a cause of abomination, *i.e.* of such conduct and of such thoughts as are an abomination before God (xv. 9, 26).

Ver. 10. The last of these four distichs stands without visible connection :

Hast thou shown thyself slack in the day of adversity,  
Then is thy strength small.

The perf. 10a is the hypothetic, *vid.* at xxii. 29. If a man shows himself remiss (xviii. 9), *i.e.* changeable, timorous, incapable of resisting in times of difficulty, then shall he draw therefrom the conclusion which is expressed in 10b. Rightly Luther, with intentional generalization, "he is not strong who is not firm in need." But the address makes the proverb an earnest admonition, which speaks to him who shows himself weak the judgment which he has to pronounce on himself. And the *paronomasia* צָרָה and צָר may be rendered, where possible, "if thy strength becomes, as it were, pressed together and bowed down by the difficulty just when it ought to show itself (*viz.* לְהִתְחַיֵּב לָךְ), then it is limited, thou art a weakling." Thus Fleischer accordingly, translating: *si segnis fueris die angustiae, angustae sunt vires tuae*. Hitzig, on the contrary, corrects after Job vii. 11, רִנָּה, "*Klemm (klamm) ist dein Mut*" [= strait is thy courage]. And why? Of כֹּחַ [strength], he remarks, one can say כָּשֶׁל [it is weak] (Ps. xxxi. 11), but scarcely צָר [strait, straitened]; for force is exact, and only the region of its energy may be wide or narrow. To this we answer, that certainly of strength in itself we cannot use the word כֹּחַ in the sense here required; the confinement (limitation) may rather be, as with a stream, Isa. lix. 19, the increasing (heightening) of its intensity. But if the strength is in itself anything definite, then on the other hand its expression is something linear, and the force in view of its expression is that which is here called צָר, *i.e.* not extending widely, not expanding, not inaccessible. צָר is all to which narrow limits are applied. A little strength is limited, because it is little also in its expression.

Now, again, we meet with proverbs of several lines. The first here is a hexastich :

Ver. 11 Deliver them that are taken to death,  
And them that are tottering to destruction, oh stop them !

12 If thou sayest, "We knew not of it indeed,"—

It is not so : The Weigher of hearts, who sees through it,  
And He that observeth thy soul, He knoweth it,  
And requiteth man according to his work.

If **אם** is interpreted as a particle of adjuration, then **אם-תחשוך** is equivalent to : I adjure thee, forbear not (cf. Neh. xiii. 25 with Isa. lviii. 1), viz. that which thou hast to do, venture all on it (LXX., Syr., Jerome). But the parallelism requires us to take together **מָטִים לְהָרִג** (such as with tottering steps are led forth to destruction) as object along with **אם-תחשוך**, as well as **לְקַחִים לַמָּוֶת** (such as from their condition are carried away to death, cf. Ex. xiv. 11) as object to **הַצֵּל**, in which all the old interpreters have recognised the *imper.*, but none the *infin.* (*eripere . . . ne cesses*, which is contrary to Heb. idiom, both in the position of the words and in the construction). **אם** also is not to be interpreted as an interrogative ; for, thus expressed, *an retinetis* ought rather to have for the converse the meaning : thou shalt indeed not do it ! (cf. *e.g.* Isa. xxix. 16.) And **אם** cannot be conditional : *si prohibere poteris* (Michaelis and others), for the fut. after **אם** has never the sense of a potential. Thus **אם** is, like **לִי**, understood in the sense of *utinam*, as it is used not merely according to later custom (Hitzig), but from ancient times (cf. *e.g.* Ex. xxxii. 32 with Gen. xxiii. 13). **בִּי-חַאֲמַר** (reminding<sup>1</sup> us of the same formula of the Rabbinical writings) introduces an objection, excuse, evasion, which is met by **הִלֵּא** ; introducing "so say I on the contrary," it is of itself a reply, *vid.* Deut. vii. 17 f. **וְהָ** we will not have to interpret personally (LXX. *τοῦτον*) ; for, since ver. 11 speaks of several of them, the neut. rendering (Syr., Targ., Venet., Luther) in itself lies nearer, and **וְהָ**, *hoc*, after **יִדַע**, is also in conformity with the *usus loq.* ; *vid.* at Ps. lvi. 10. But the neut. **וְהָ** does not refer to the moral obligation expressed in ver. 11 ; to save human life when it is possible to do so, can be unknown to no one, wherefore Jerome (as if the words of the text were **אִין לֵאלֹהִי יִדְנִי וְהָ**) : *vires non suppetunt*. **וְהָ** refers to the fact that men are led to the tribunal ; only thus is explained the change of **יִדְעִי**, which was to be expected, into **יִדְעֵנִי** : the objection is, that one certainly did not know, viz. that matters had come to an

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* my *hebräischen Römerbrief*, p. 14 f.

extremity with them, and that a short process will be made with them. To this excuse, with pretended ignorance, the reply of the omniscient God stands opposed, and suggests to him who makes the excuse to consider: It is not so: the Searcher of hearts (*vid.* at xvi. 2), He sees through it, viz. what goes on in thy heart, and He has thy soul under His inspection (נִצֵּר, as Job vii. 20; LXX. καὶ ὁ πλάσας; וְיִצֵּר, which Hitzig prefers, for he thinks that נִצֵּר must be interpreted in the sense of to guard, preserve; Luther rightly); He knows, viz., how it is with thy mind, He looks through it, He knows (cf. for both, Ps. cxxxix. 1-4), and renders to man according to his conduct, which, without being deceived, He judges according to the state of the heart, out of which the conduct springs. It is to be observed that ver. 11 speaks of one condemned to death generally, and not expressly of one innocently condemned, and makes no distinction between one condemned in war and in peace. One sees from this that the Chokma generally has no pleasure in this, that men are put to death by men, not even when it is done legally as punishment for a crime. For, on the one side, it is true that the punishment of the murderer by death is a law proceeding from the nature of the divine holiness and the inviolability of the divine ordinance, and the worth of man as formed in the image of God, and that the magistrate who disowns this law as a law, disowns the divine foundation of his office; but, on the other side, it is just as true that thousands and thousands of innocent persons, or at least persons not worthy of death, have fallen a sacrifice to the abuse or the false application of this law; and that along with the principle of recompensative righteousness, there is a principle of grace which rules in the kingdom of God, and is represented in the O. T. by prophecy and the Chokma. It is, moreover, a noticeable fact, that God did not visit with the punishment of death the first murderer, the murderer of the innocent Abel, his brother, but let the principle of grace so far prevail instead of that of law, that He even protected his life against any avenger of blood. But after that the moral ruin of the human race had reached that height which brought the Deluge over the earth, there was promulgated to the post-diluvians the word of the law, Gen. ix. 6, sanctioning this inviolable right of putting

to death by the hand of justice. The conduct of God regulates itself thus according to the aspect of the times. In the Mosaic law the greatness of guilt was estimated not externally (cf. Num. xxxv. 31), but internally, a very flexible limitation in its practical bearings. And that under certain circumstances grace might have the precedence of justice, the parable having in view the pardon of Absalom (2 Sam. xiv.) shows. But a word from God, like Ezek. xviii. 23, raises grace to a principle, and the word with which Jesus (John viii. 11) dismisses the adulteress is altogether an expression of this purpose of grace passing beyond the purpose of justice. In the later Jewish commonwealth, criminal justice was subordinated to the principle of predominating compassion; practical effect was given to the consideration of the value of human life during the trial, and even after the sentence was pronounced, and during a long time no sentence of death was passed by the Sanhedrim. But Jesus, who was Himself the innocent victim of a fanatical legal murder, adjudged, it is true, the supremacy to the sword; but He preached and practised love, which publishes grace for justice. He was Himself incarnate Love, offering Himself for sinners, the Mercy which Jahve proclaims by Ezek. xviii. 23. The so-called Christian state [*"Civitas Dei"*] is indeed in manifest opposition to this. But Augustine declares himself, on the supposition that the principle of grace must penetrate the new era, in all its conditions, that began with Christianity, for the suspension of punishment by death, especially because the heathen magistrates had abused the instrument of death, which, according to divine right, they had control over, to the destruction of Christians; and Ambrosius went so far as to impress it as a duty on a Christian judge who had pronounced the sentence of death, to exclude himself from the Holy Supper. The magisterial control over life and death had at that time gone to the extreme height of bloody violence, and thus in a certain degree it destroyed itself. Therefore Jansen changes the proverb (ver. 11) with the words of Ambrosius into the admonition: *Quando indulgentia non nocet publico, eripe intercessionem, eripe gratia tu sacerdos, aut tu imperator eripe subscriptionem indulgentiæ*. When Samuel Romilly's Bill to abolish the punishment of death for a theft amounting to the sum of

five shillings passed the English House of Commons, it was thrown out by a majority in the House of Lords. Among those who voted against the Bill were one archbishop and five bishops. Our poet here in the Proverbs is of a different mind. Even the law of Sinai appoints the punishment of death only for man-stealing. The Mosaic code is incomparably milder than even yet the *Carolina*. In expressions, however, like the above, a true Christian spirit rules the spirit which condemns all blood-thirstiness of justice, and calls forth to a crusade not only against the inquisition, but also against such unmerciful, cruel executions even as they prevailed in Prussia in the name of law in the reign of Friedrich Wilhelm I., the Inexorable.

Vers. 13, 14. The proverb now following stands in no obvious relation with the preceding. But in both a commencement is made with two lines, which contain, in the former, the principal thought; in this here, its reason:

- Ver. 13 My son, eat honey, for it is good,  
 And honeycomb is sweet to thy taste.  
 14 So apprehend wisdom for thy soul:  
 When thou hast found it, there is a future,  
 And thy hope is not destroyed.

After its nearest fundamental thought, טוֹב, Arab. *tejjib*, means that which smells and tastes well; honey (דְּבַשׁ, from דָּבַשׁ, to be thick, consistent) has, besides, according to the old idea (*e.g.* in the Koran), healing virtue, as in general bitterness is viewed as a property of the poisonous, and sweetness that of the wholesome. וְנֶפֶת is second accus. dependent on אֲכָלָהּ, for honey and honeycomb were then spoken of as different; נֶפֶת (from נָפַת, to pour, to flow out) is the purest honey (virgin-honey), flowing of itself out of the comb. With right the accentuation takes 13*b* as independent, the substantival clause containing the reason, "for it is good:" honeycomb is sweet to thy taste, *i.e.* applying itself to it with the impression of sweetness; עַל, as at Neh. ii. 5; Ps. xvi. 6 (Hitzig).

In the 14*a* of 14*a*, it is manifest that ver. 13 is not spoken for its own sake. To apprehend wisdom, is elsewhere equivalent to, to receive it into the mind, i. 2, Eccles. i. 17 (*cf.* רָעַת בִּינָה, iv. 1, and frequently), according to which Böttcher also here

explains : learn to understand wisdom. But כֵּן unfolds itself in 14<sup>bc</sup> : even as honey has for the body, so wisdom has for the soul, beneficent wholesome effects. דַּעַת הַכֶּמֶה is thus not absolute, but is meant in relation to these effects. Rightly Fleischer : *talem reputa* ; Ewald : *sic (talem) scito sapientiam (esse) animæ tuæ*, know, recognise wisdom as something advantageous to thy soul, and worthy of commendation. Incorrectly Hitzig explains אִם-מֵצֵאתָ, “if the opportunity presents itself.” Apart from this, that in such a case the words would rather have been כִּי תִמְצָא, to find wisdom is always equivalent to, to obtain it, to make it one’s own, iii. 13, viii. 35 ; cf. ii. 5, viii. 9. דַּעַת<sup>1</sup> stands for דַּעַת, after the form יָדָה ; שָׁבָה (after Böttcher, § 396, not without the influence of the following commencing sound), cf. the similar transitions of יָ into יַ placed together at Ps. xx. 4 ; the form דַּעַת is also found, but דַּעַת is the form in the *Cod. Hilleli*,<sup>2</sup> as confirmed by Moses Kimchi in *Comm.*, and by David Kimchi, *Michlol* 101<sup>b</sup>. With וַיֵּשׁ begins the apodosis (LXX., Jerome, Targ., Luther, Rashi, Ewald, and others). In itself, וַיֵּשׁ (cf. Gen. xlvii. 6) might also continue the conditional clause ; but the explanation, *si inveneris (eam) et ad postremum ventum erit* (Fleischer, Bertheau, Zöckler), has this against it, that וַיֵּשׁ אַחֲרַיִת does not mean : the end comes, but : there is an end, xxiii. 18 ; cf. xix. 18 ; here : there is an end for thee, viz. an issue that is a blessed reward. The promise is the same as at xxiii. 18. In our own language we speak of the hope of one being cut off ; (Arab.) *jaz’a*, to be cut off, is equivalent to, to give oneself up to despair.

Ver. 15 Lie not in wait, oh wicked man, against the dwelling of the righteous ;

Assault not his resting-place.

16 For seven times doth the righteous fall and rise again,

But the wicked are overthrown when calamity falls on them.

The אָרֵב [lying in wait] and שֹׁדֵד [practising violence], against which the warning is here given, are not directed, as at i. 11, xix. 26, immediately against the person, but against the dwell-

<sup>1</sup> Write דַּעַת with *Illuj* after the preceding *Legarmeh*, like 12<sup>b</sup>, הָוֵא (*Thorath Emeth*, p. 28).

<sup>2</sup> Vid. Strack’s *Prolegomena critica in V. T.* (1872), p. 19.

ing-place and resting-place (רִבְיָן, *e.g.* Jer. 1. 6, as also נִוָּה, iii. 33) of the righteous, who, on his part, does injustice and wrong to no one; the warning is against coveting his house, Ex. xx. 17, and driving him by cunning and violence out of it. Instead of רִשָּׁע, Symmachus and Jerome have incorrectly read רִשָּׁע, and from this misunderstanding have here introduced a sense without sense into ver. 15; many interpreters (Löwenstein, Ewald, Elster, and Zöckler) translate with Luther appositionally: as a wicked man, *i.e.* "with mischievous intent," like one stealthily lurking for the opportunity of taking possession of the dwelling of another, as if this could be done with a good intent: רִשָּׁע is the vocative (Syr., Targ., Venet.: ἀσεβής), and this address (cf. Ps. lxxv. 5 f.) sharpens the warning, for it names him who acts in this manner by the right name. The reason, 16*a*, sounds like an echo of Job v. 19. שִׁבַּע signifies, as at Ps. cxix. 164, seven times; cf. מֵאָה, xvii. 10. וְקָם (not וְקָם) is *perf. consec.*, as וְקָם, *e.g.* Gen. iii. 22: and he rises afterwards (notwithstanding), but the transgressors come to ruin; בְּרָעָה, if a misfortune befall them (cf. xiv. 32), they stumble and fall, and rise no more.

Vers. 17, 18. Warning against a vindictive disposition, and joy over its satisfaction.

Ver. 17 At the fall of thine enemy rejoice not,  
And at his overthrow let not thine heart be glad;  
18 That Jahve see it not, and it be displeasing to Him,  
And He turns away His anger from Him.

The *Chethib*, which in itself, as the plur. of category, אוֹיְבֶיךָ, might be tolerable, has 17*b* against it: with right, all interpreters adhere to the *Kerî* אוֹיְבֶיךָ (with *i* from *ē* in doubled close syllable, as in the like *Kerî*, 1 Sam. xxiv. 5). וְבִבְשָׁלוּ, for וְבִבְשָׁלוּ, is the syncope usual in the *inf. Niph.* and *Hiph.*, which in *Niph.* occurs only once with the initial guttural (as בִּעְטָה) or half guttural (לִרְאוֹת). וְרָע is not adj. here as at 1 Sam. xxv. 3, but *perf.* with the force of a *fut.* (Symmachus: καὶ μὴ ἀρέσῃ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ). The proverb extends the duty of love even to an enemy; for it requires that we do good to him and not evil, and warns against rejoicing when evil befalls him. Hitzig, indeed, supposes that the noble morality which is expressed in ver. 17 is limited to a moderate extent by the motive assigned in 18*b*. Certainly the poet means to say that God could easily

give a gracious turn for the better, as to the punishment of the wicked, to the decree of his anger against his enemy; but his meaning is not this, that one, from joy at the misfortune of others, ought to desist from interrupting the process of the destruction of his enemy, and let it go on to its end; but much rather, that one ought to abstain from this joy, so as not to experience the manifestation of God's displeasure thereat, by His granting grace to him against whom we rejoice to see God's anger go forth.<sup>1</sup>

Vers. 19, 20. Warning against envying the godless for their external prosperity :

Be not enraged on account of evil-doers,  
 Envy not the godless ;  
 20 For the wicked men shall have no future,  
 The light of the godless is extinguished.

Ver. 19 is a variation of Ps. xxxvii. 1 ; cf. also iii. 21 (where with בל־דרכו following the traditional תבחר is more appropriate than תתחר, which Hupfeld would here insert). תתחר is *fut. apoc.* of התחרה, to be heated (to be indignant), distinguished from the תִּחַר, to be jealous. The ground and occasion of being enraged, and on the other side, of jealousy or envy, is the prosperity of the godless, Ps. lxxiii. 3 ; cf. Jer. xii. 1. This anger at the apparently unrighteous division of fortune, this jealousy at the success in which the godless rejoice, rest on short-sightedness, which regards the present, and looks not on to the end. אַחֲרֵית, merely as in the expression 'יש אחר', 14b (cf. Ps. xxxvii. 37), always denotes the happy, glorious issue indemnifying for past sufferings. Such an issue the wicked man has not ; his light burns brightly on this side, but one day it is extinguished. In 20b is repeated xiii. 9 ; cf. xx. 20.

Vers. 21, 22. A warning against rebellious thoughts against God and the king :

My son, honour Jahve and the king,  
 And involve not thyself with those who are otherwise disposed ;  
 22 For suddenly their calamity ariseth,  
 And the end of their years, who knoweth it ?

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<sup>1</sup> This proverb, according to *Aboth* iv. 24, was the motto of that Samuel with the surname הקטן, who formulated ברכת המינים (the interpolation in the Schemone-Esre prayer directed against the schismatics) : he thus distinguished between private enemies and the enemies of the truth.

The verb שָׁנָה, proceeding from the primary idea of folding (*complicare, duplicare*), signifies transitively to do twice, to repeat, xvii. 9, xxvi. 11, according to which Kimchi here inappropriately thinks on relapsing; and intransitively, to change, to be different, Esth. i. 7, iii. 8. The Syr. and Targ. translate the word שָׁנָה, fools; but the *Kal* (מַעְמוֹ) שָׁנָה occurs, indeed, in the Syr., but not in the Heb., in the meaning *alienata est (mens ejus)*; and besides, this meaning, *alieni*, is not appropriate here. A few, however, with Saadia (cf. *Deutsch-Morgenländische Zeitschr.* xxi. 616), the dualists (Manichees), understand it in a dogmatic sense; but then שֹׁנִים must be denom. of שָׁנָה, while much more it is its root-word. Either שֹׁנִים means those who change, *novantes = novarum rerum studiosi*, which is, however, exposed to this objection, that the Heb. שָׁנָה, in the transitive sense to change, does not elsewhere occur; or it means, according to the *usus loq.*, *diversos = diversum sentientes* (C. B. Michaelis and others), and that with reference to 21a: הַמְּמָרִים רַבְרִיהֶם וּמִצּוֹתָם (Meîri, Immanuel), or מְשֻׁנִּים מִנְהַג הַחֻכְמָה (Ahron b. Joseph). Thus they are called (for it is a common name of a particular class of men) dissidents, oppositionists, or revolutionaries, who recognise neither the monarchy of Jahve, the King of kings, nor that of the earthly king, which perhaps Jerome here means by the word *detractoribus* (= *detractatoribus*). The *Venet.* incorrectly, εὐς τοῖς μισοῦσι, i.e. שֹׁנִים. With ב at xiv. 10, הִתְעַרְב meant to mix oneself up with something, here with עַם, to mix oneself with some one, i.e. to make common cause with him.

The reason assigned in ver. 22 is, that although such persons as reject by thought and action human and divine law may for a long time escape punishment, yet suddenly merited ruin falls on them. אֵי is, according to its primary signification, weighty, oppressive misfortune, *vid.* i. 27. In יָקִים it is thought of as hostile power (Hos. x. 14); or the rising up of God as Judge (e.g. Isa. xxxiii. 10) is transferred to the means of executing judgment. פִּיר (= פִּיר of פֹּר or פִּיר, Arab. *fâd*, fut. *jafûdu* or *jafîdu*, a stronger power of *bâd*, cogn. אָבַד) is destruction (Arab. *feid, fid*, death); this word occurs, besides here, only thrice in the Book of Job. But to what does שְׁנִיָּהם refer? Certainly not to Jahve and the king (LXX., Schultens, Umbreit, and Bertheau),

for in itself it is doubtful to interpret the genit. after פִּיר as designating the subject, but improper to comprehend God and man under one cipher. Rather it may refer to two, of whom one class refuse to God, the other to the king, the honour that is due (Jerome, Luther, and at last Zöckler); but in the foregoing, two are not distinguished, and the want of reverence for God, and for the magistrates appointed by Him, is usually met with, because standing in interchangeable relationship, in one and the same persons. Is there some misprint then in this word? Ewald suggests שְׁנִיָּהֶם, *i.e.* of those who show themselves as שְׂוֹנִים (*altercatores*) towards God and the king. In view of קְטִיָּהֶם, Ex. xxxii. 25, this brevity of expression must be regarded as possible. But if this were the meaning of the word, then it ought to have stood in the first member (אִיר (שְׁנִיָּהֶם), and not in the second. No other conjecture presents itself. Thus שְׁנִיָּהֶם is perhaps to be referred to the שְׂוֹנִים, and those who engage with them: join thyself not with the opposers; for suddenly misfortune will come upon them, and the destruction of both (of themselves and their partisans), who knows it? But that also is not satisfactory, for after the address שְׁנִיָּהֶם was to have been expected, 22*b*. Nothing remains, therefore, but to understand שְׁנִיָּהֶם, with the Syr. and Targ., as at Job xxxvi. 11; the proverb falls into rhythms פִּיר and פְּהֶאֱם and שְׂוֹנִים and שְׁנִיָּהֶם. But "the end of their year" is not equivalent to the hour of their death (Hitzig), because for this פִּירָם (cf. Arab. *feid* and *fīd*, death) was necessary; but to the expiring, the vanishing, the passing by of the year during which they have succeeded in maintaining their ground and playing a part. There will commence a time which no one knows beforehand when all is over with them. In this sense, "who knoweth," with its object, is equivalent to "suddenly ariseth," with its subject. In the LXX., after xxiv. 22, there follow one distich of the relations of man to the word of God as deciding their fate, one distich of fidelity as a duty towards the king, and the duty of the king, and one pentastich or hexastich of the power of the tongue and of the anger of the king. The Heb. text knows nothing of these three proverbs. Ewald has, *Jahrb.* xi. 18 f., attempted to translate them into Heb., and is of opinion that they are worthy of being regarded as original

component parts of i.-xxix., and that they ought certainly to have come in after xxiv. 22. We doubt this originality, but recognise their translation from the Heb. Then follows in the LXX. the series of Proverbs, xxx. 1-14, which in the Heb. text bear the superscription of "the Words of Agur;" the second half of the "Words of Agur," together with the "Words of Lemuel," stand after xxiv. 34 of the Heb. text. The state of the matter is this, that in the copy from which the Alexandrines translated the Appendix xxx.-xxxi. 9, stood half of it, after the "Words of the Wise" [which extend from xxii. 17 to xxiv. 22], and half after the supplement headed "these also are from wise men" [xxiv. 23-34], so that only the proverbial ode in praise of the excellent matron [xxxi. 10] remains as an appendix to the Book of Hezekiah's collection, xxv.-xxix.

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#### SECOND SUPPLEMENT TO THE FIRST SOLOMONIC COLLECTION.—XXIV. 23-34.

There now follows a brief appendix to the older Book of Proverbs, bearing the superscription, 23*a*, "*These also are from wise men,*" i.e. also the proverbs here following originate from wise men. The old translators (with the exception of Luther) have not understood this superscription; they mistake the *Lamed auctoris*, and interpret the ל as that of address: also these (proverbs) I speak to wise men, *sapientibus* (LXX., Syr., Targ., Jerome, *Venet.*). The formation of the superscription is like that of the Hezekiah collection, xxv. 1, and from this and other facts we have concluded (*vid.* vol. i. pp. 26, 27) that this second supplement originated from the same source as the extension of the older Book of Proverbs, by the appending of the more recent, and its appendices. The linguistic complexion of the proverbs here and there resembles that of the first appendix (cf. 29*b* with 12*d*, and נָעִים, 25*a*, with נָעִים, xxii. 18, xxiii. 8, xxiv. 4); but, on the other hand, 23*b* refers back to xxviii. 21 of the Hezekiah collection, and in ver. 33*f*. is repeated vi. 10*f*. This appendix thus acknowledges

its secondary character; the poet in minute details stands in the same relation to the Solomonic Mashal as that in which in general he stands to the author of the Introduction, i.-ix. That 23*b* is not in itself a proverb, we have already (vol. i. p. 6) proved; it is the first line of a hexastich (*vid.* vol. i. p. 16).

Vers. 23*b*-25. The curse of partiality and the blessing of impartiality:

Respect of persons in judgment is by no means good:

24 He that saith to the guilty, "Thou art in the right,"  
Him the people curse, nations detest.

25 But to them who rightly decide, it is well,  
And upon them cometh blessing with good.

Partiality is either called שָׂאת פָּנִים, xviii. 5, respect to the person, for the partisan looks with pleasure on the פָּנִי, the countenance, appearance, personality of one, by way of preference; or הִפְרָה פָּנִים, as here and at xxviii. 21, for he places one person before another in his sight, or, as we say, has a regard to him; the latter expression is found in Deut. i. 17, xvi. 19. הִפְרָה (*vid.* xx. 11) means to regard sharply, whether from interest in the object, or because it is strange. בָּל Heidenheim regards as weaker than לֹא; but the reverse is the case (*vid.* vol. i. p. 204), as is seen from the derivation of this negative (= *balj*, from בָּלָה, to melt, to decay); thus it does not occur anywhere else than here with the pred. adj. The two supplements delight in this בָּל, xxii. 29, xxiii. 7, 35. The thesis 23*b* is now confirmed in vers. 24 and 25, from the consequences of this partiality and its opposite: He that saith (אָמַר, with *Mehuppach Legarmeh* from the last syllable, as rightly by Athias, Nissel, and Michaelis, *vid. Thorath Emeth*, p. 32) to the guilty: thou art right, *i.e.* he who sets the guilty free (for רָצַע and צָדִיק have here the forensic sense of the post-bibl. חָיַב and צָדִיק), him they curse, etc.; cf. the shorter proverb, xvii. 15, according to which a partial, unjust judge is an abomination to God. Regarding נָקַב (קָבַב) here and at xi. 26, Schultens, under Job iii. 8, is right; the word signifies *figere*, and hence to distinguish and make prominent by distinguishing as well as by branding; cf. *defigere*, to curse, properly, to pierce through. Regarding יָעַם, *vid.* at xxii. 14. לָאָמַם and עָמַם (from עָמַם and לָאָם, which both mean to bind and combine) are plur. of categ.: not merely

individuals, not merely families, curse such an unrighteous judge and abhor him, but the whole people in all conditions and ranks of society; for even though such an unjust judge bring himself and his favourites to external honour, yet among no people is conscience so blunted, that he who absolves the crime and ennobles the miscarriage of justice shall escape the *vox populi*. On the contrary, it goes well (יָנַעַם, like ii. 10, ix. 17, but here with neut. indef. subj. as יֵיטֵב, Gen. xii. 13, and frequently) with those who place the right, and particularly the wrong, fully to view; מוֹכִיחַ is he who mediates the right, Job ix. 33, and particularly who proves, censures, punishes the wrong, ix. 7, and in the character of a judge as here, Amos v. 10; Isa. xxix. 21. The genitive connection בְּרֶפֶת-טוֹב is not altogether of the same signification as יַיִן הַטוֹב, wine of a good sort, Song vii. 10, and אִשָּׁת רָע, a woman of a bad kind, vi. 24, for every blessing is of a good kind; the gen. טוֹב thus, as at Ps. xxi. 4, denotes the contents of the blessing; cf. Eph. i. 3, “with all spiritual blessings,” in which the manifoldness of the blessing is presupposed.

Ver. 26. Then follows a distich with the watchword נִבְחִים :

He kisseth the lips

Who for the end giveth a right answer.

The LXX., Syr., and Targ. translate: one kisseth the lips who, or: of those who . . .; but such a meaning is violently forced into the word (in that case the expression would have been שִׁפְתֵּי מְשִׁיבִים or שִׁפְתֵּי מְשִׁיב). Equally impossible is Theodotion's *χείλεσι καταφιληθήσεται*, for יָשָׁק cannot be the fut. *Niph.* Nor is it: lips kiss him who . . . (Rashi); for, to be thus understood, the word ought to have been לְמִשִּׁיב. מְשִׁיב is naturally to be taken as the subj., and thus it supplies the meaning: he who kisseth the lips giveth an excellent answer, viz. the lips of him whom the answer concerns (Jerome, *Venet.*, Luther). But Hitzig ingeniously, “the words reach from the lips of the speaker to the ears of the hearer, and thus he kisses his ear with his lips.” But since to kiss the ear is not a custom, not even with the Florentines, then a welcome answer, if its impression is to be compared to a kiss, is compared to a kiss on the lips. Hitzig himself translates: he commends himself with the lips who . . .; but נִשָּׁק may mean to join oneself, Gen.

xli. 40, as kissing is equivalent to the joining of the lips; it does not mean intrans. to cringe. Rather the explanation: he who joins the lips together . . .; for he, viz. before reflecting, closed his lips together (suggested by Meîri); but נִשֵּׁק, with שִׁפְתִּים, brings the idea of kissing, *labra labris jungere*, far nearer. This prevails against Schultens' *armatus est (erit) labia*, besides נִשֵּׁק, certainly, from the primary idea of connecting (laying together) (*vid.* Ps. lxxviii. 9), to equip (arm) oneself therewith; but the meaning arising from thence: with the lips he arms himself . . . is direct nonsense. Fleischer is essentially right, *Labra osculatur (i.e. quasi osculum oblatum reddit) qui congrua respondet*. Only the question has nothing to do with a kiss; but if he who asks receives a satisfactory answer, an enlightening counsel, he experiences it as if he received a kiss. The Midrash incorrectly remarks under דְּבָרִים נְכֻחִים, “words of merited denunciation,” according to which the Syr. translates. Words are meant which are corresponding to the matter and the circumstances, and suitable for the end (*cf.* viii. 9). Such words are like as if the lips of the inquirer received a kiss from the lips of the answerer.

Ver. 27. Warning against the establishing of a household where the previous conditions are wanting:

Set in order thy work without,  
And make it ready for thyself beforehand in the fields,—  
After that then mayest thou build thine house.

The interchange of בְּחֹץ and בְּשָׂדֶה shows that by מְלָאכַת הַשָּׂדֶה field-labour, 1 Chron. xxvii. 26, is meant. הַכֵּן, used of arrangement, procuring, here with מְלָאכָה, signifies the setting in order of the work, viz. the cultivation of the field. In the parallel member, עֲתִידָה, carrying also its object, in itself is admissible: make preparations (LXX., Syr.); but the punctuation עֲתִידָה (Targ., *Venet.*; on the other hand, Jerome and Luther translate as if the words were וְעִתְדָה הַשָּׂדֶה) is not worthy of being contended against: set it (the work) in the fields in readiness, *i.e.* on the one hand set forward the present necessary work, and on the other hand prepare for that which next follows; thus: do completely and circumspectly what thy calling as a husbandman requires of thee,—then mayest thou go to the building and building up of thy house (*vid.* at ver. 3,

xiv. 1), to which not only the building and setting in order of a convenient dwelling, but also the bringing home of a housewife and the whole setting up of a household belongs; prosperity at home is conditioned by this—one fulfils his duty without in the fields actively and faithfully. One begins at the wrong end when he begins with the building of his house, which is much rather the result and goal of an intelligent discharge of duty within the sphere of one's calling. The *perf.*, with ו after a date, such as אָחֵר, מָעַט, עוֹר, and the like, when things that will or should be done are spoken of, has the fut. signification of a *perf. consec.*, Gen. iii. 5; Ex. xvi. 6 f., xvii. 4; Ewald, § 344b.

Ver. 28. Warning against unnecessary witnessing to the disadvantage of another:

Never be a causeless witness against thy neighbour;  
And shouldest thou use deceit with thy lips?

The phrase עֵר־הֵנָּם does not mean a witness who appears against his neighbour without knowledge of the facts of the case, but one who has no substantial reason for his giving of testimony; הֵנָּם means groundless, with reference to the occasion and motive, iii. 30, xxiii. 29, xxvi. 2. Other designations stood for false witnesses (LXX., Syr., Targ.). Rightly Jerome, the *Venet.*, and Luther, without, however, rendering the gen. connection עֵר־הֵנָּם, as it might have been by the adj.

In 28b, Chajûg derives וְהִפְתִּיתָ from פָּתַת, to break in pieces, to crumble; for he remarks it might stand, with the passing over of *ô* into *î*, for וְהִפְתִּיתָ [and thou wilt whisper]. But the ancients had no acquaintance with the laws of sound, and therefore with *naïve* arbitrariness regarded all as possible; and Böttcher, indeed, maintains that the *Hiphil* of פָּתַת may be הִפְתִּיתָ as well as הִפְתִּיתָ; but the former of these forms with *î* could only be metaplastically possible, and would be הִפְתִּיתָ (*vid.* Hitzig under Jer. xi. 20). And what can this *Hiph.* of פָּתַת mean? "To crumble" one's neighbours (Chajûg) is an unheard of expression; and the meanings, to throw out crumbs, viz. crumbs of words (Böttcher), or to speak with a broken, subdued voice (Hitzig), are extracted from the rare Arab. *fatâfit* (*fatafit*), for which the lexicographers note the meaning of a secret, moaning sound. When we see וְהִפְתִּיתָ standing along with בִּשְׁפָתֶיךָ, then

before all we are led to think of פתח [to open], xx. 19; Ps. lxxiii. 36. But we stumble at the interrog. הֲ, which nowhere else appears connected with ו. Ewald therefore purposes to read וְהִפְתִּיחַ [and will open wide] (LXX. μηδὲ πλατύνου): "that thou usest treachery with thy lips;" but from הפתח, to make wide open, Gen. ix. 27, "to use treachery" is, only for the flight of imagination, not too wide a distance. On הֲ, *et num*, one need not stumble; וְהִלֹּא, 2 Sam. xv. 35, shows that the connection of a question by means of ו is not inadmissible; Ewald himself takes notice that in the Arab. the connection of the interrogatives هَلْ and هَلْ with وَ and ف is quite common;<sup>1</sup> and thus he reaches the explanation: wilt thou befooled then by thy lips, *i.e.* pollute by deceit, by inconsiderate, wanton testimony against others? This is the right explanation, which Ewald hesitates about only from the fact that the interrog. הֲ comes in between the ו *consec.* and its *perf.*, a thing which is elsewhere unheard of. But this difficulty is removed by the syntactic observation, that the *perf.* after interrogatives has often the modal colouring of a conj. or optative, *e.g.* after the interrog. pronoun, Gen. xxi. 7, *quis dixerit*, and after the interrogative particle, as here and at 2 Kings xx. 9, *iveritne*, where it is to be supplied (*vid.* at Isa. xxxviii. 8). Thus: *et num persuaseris (deceperis) labiis tuis*, and shouldst thou practise slander with thy lips, for thou bringest thy neighbour, without need, by thy uncalled for rashness, into disrepute?

"It is a question, *âl'nakar* (cf. xxiii. 5), for which هَلْ (not هَلْ), in the usual Arab. interrogative: how, thou wouldest? one then permits the inquirer to draw the negative answer: "No, I will not do it" (Fleischer).

Ver. 29. The following proverb is connected as to its subject with the foregoing: one ought not to do evil to his neighbour without necessity; even evil which has been done to one must not be requited with evil:

Say not, "As he hath done to me, so I do to him:  
I requite the man according to his conduct."

<sup>1</sup> We use the forms *âwa*, *âba*, *âthûmm*, for we suppose the interrogative to the copula; we also say *fahad*, *vid. Mujaṣṣal*, p. 941.

On the ground of public justice, the *talio* is certainly the nearest form of punishment, Lev. xxiv. 19 f.; but even here the Sinaitic law does not remain in the retortion of the injury according to its external form (it is in a certain manner practicable only with regard to injury done to the person and to property), but places in its stead an atonement measured and limited after a higher point of view. On pure moral grounds, the *jus talionis* ("as thou to me, so I to thee") has certainly no validity. Here he to whom injustice is done ought to commit his case to God, xx. 22, and to oppose to evil, not evil but good; he ought not to set himself up as a judge, nor to act as one standing on a war-footing with his neighbour (Judg. xv. 11); but to take God as his example, who treats the sinner, if only he seeks it, not in the way of justice, but of grace (Ex. xxxiv. 6 f.). The expression 29b reminds of xxiv. 12. Instead of אָרָם, there is used here, where the speaker points to a definite person, the phrase לְאִישׁ. Jerome, the *Venet.*, and Luther translate: to each one, as if the word were vocalized thus, לְאִישׁ (Ps. lxii. 13).

A Mashal ode of the slothful, in the form of a record of experiences, concludes this second supplement (*vid.* vol. i. p. 17):

- Ver. 30 The field of a slothful man I came past,  
And the vineyard of a man devoid of understanding.  
31 And, lo! it was wholly filled up with thorns;  
Its face was covered with nettles;  
And its wall of stones was broken down.  
32 But I looked and directed my attention to it;  
I saw it, and took instruction from it:  
33 "A little sleep, a little slumber,  
A little folding of the hands to rest.  
34 Then cometh thy poverty apace,  
And thy want as an armed man."

The line 29b with לְאִישׁ is followed by one with אִישׁ. The form of the narrative in which this warning against drowsy slothfulness is clothed, is like Ps. xxxvii. 35 f. The distinguishing of different classes of men by אִישׁ and אָרָם (cf. xxiv. 20) is common in proverbial poetry. עֲבַרְתִּי, at the close of the first parallel member, retains its *Pathach* unchanged. The description: and, lo! (וְהִנֵּה), with *Pazer*, after *Thorath Emeth*, p. 34, Anm. 2) it was . . . refers to the vineyard, for נָדָר אֲבִנָּי

(its stone wall, like Isa. ii. 20, "its idols of silver") is, like Num. xxii. 24, Isa. v. 5, the fencing in of the vineyard. עָלָה כָּלוּ, *totus excreverat* (*in carduos*), refers to this as subject, cf. in Ausonius: *apex vitibus assurgit*; the Heb. construction is as Isa. v. 6, xxxiv. 13; Gesen. § 133, 1, Anm. 2. The sing. קָפָשׁוֹן of קָפָשׁוֹנוֹת does not occur; perhaps it means properly the weed which one tears up to cast it aside, for (Arab.) *kumâsh* is matter dug out of the ground.<sup>1</sup> The ancients interpret it by *urticæ*; and חָרָל, plur. חָרָלִים (as from חָרַל), R. חָר, to burn, appears, indeed, to be the name of the nettle; the botanical name (Arab.) *khullar* (beans, pease, at least a leguminous plant) is from its sound not Arab., and thus lies remote.<sup>2</sup> The Pual כָּפַס sounds like Ps. lxxx. 11 (cf. כָּפַס, Ps. lxxii. 20); the position of the words is as this passage of the Psalm; the Syr., Targ., Jerome, and the *Venet.* render the construction actively, as if the word were כָּפַס.

In ver. 32, Hitzig proposes to read וְאַחֲזָה: and I stopped (stood still); but אָחַז is trans., not only at Eccles. vii. 9, but also at ii. 15: to hold anything fast; not: to hold oneself still. And for what purpose the change? A contemplating and looking at a thing, with which the turning and standing near is here connected, manifestly includes a standing still; רָאִיתִי, after וְאַחֲזָה, is, as commonly after הִבֵּיתִי (*e.g.* Job xxxv. 5, cf. Isa. xlii. 18), the expression of a lingering looking at an object after the attention has been directed to it. In modern impressions, וְאַחֲזָה אֲנִכִּי are incorrectly accentuated; the old editions have rightly וְאַחֲזָה with *Rebîa*; for not וְאֵא אֲנִכִּי, but אֲנִכִּי אֵשִׁית are connected. In viii. 17, this prominence of the personal pronoun serves for the expression of reciprocity; elsewhere, as *e.g.* Gen. xxi. 24, 2 Kings vi. 3, and particularly, frequently in Hosea, this circumstantiality does not make the subject prominent, but the action; here the suitable extension denotes that he rightly makes his comments at leisure (Hitzig). שִׁית לִבִּי is, as at xxii. 17, the turning of attention and reflection;

<sup>1</sup> This is particularly the name of what lies round about on the ground in the Bedouin tents, and which one takes up from thence (from *kamash*, cogn. קָבַץ קָמַץ, *ramasser*, cf. the journal *המניח*, 1871, p. 287b); in modern Arab., linen and matter of all kinds; *vid. Boethor*, under *linge* and *étouffe*.

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps *ελαφα*, *vid. Lagarde's Gesamm. Abhandl.* p. 59.

elsewhere לָקַח מוֹכָר, to receive a moral, viii. 10, Jer. vii. 28, is here equivalent to, to abstract, deduce one from a fact, to take to oneself a lesson from it. In vers. 33 and 34 there is a repetition of vi. 9, 10. Thus, as ver. 33 expresses, the sluggard speaks to whom the neglected piece of ground belongs, and ver. 34 places before him the result. Instead of בְּמַהֲלָךְ of the original passage [vi. 9, 10], here מַחְהֲלָךְ, of the coming of poverty like an avenging Nemesis; and instead of וּמַחְסָרָךְ, here וּמַחְסָרֶיךָ (the Cod. *Jaman.* has it without the י), which might be the *plene* written pausal form of the sing. (*vid.* at vi. 3, cf. vi. 11), but is more surely regarded as the plur.: thy deficits, or wants; for to thee at one time this, and at another time that, and finally all things will be wanting. Regarding the variants רֵישֶׁךָ and רֵאשֶׁךָ (with א in the original passage, here in the borrowed passage with י), *vid.* at x. 4. בְּאֵשׁ מֶנֶן is translated in the LXX. by ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς δρομεύς (*vid.* at vi. 11); the Syr. and Targ. make from it a נַבְרָא טַבְלָרָא, *tabellarius*, a letter-carrier, coming with the speed of a courier.

## SECOND COLLECTION OF SOLOMONIC PROVERBS.—

### XXV.—XXIX.

The older Solomonic Book of Proverbs, with its introduction, i. 9, and its two supplements, (1) xxii. 17–xxiv. 22, (2) xxiv. 23–34, is now followed by a more modern Solomonic Book of Proverbs, a second extensive series of מְשָׁלֵי שְׁלֹמֹה, which the collector has introduced with the superscription:

xxv. 1 These also are proverbs of Solomon,

Which the men of Hezekiah the king of Judah have collected.

Hezekiah, in his concern for the preservation of the national literature, is the Jewish Pisistratos, and the “men of Hezekiah” are like the collectors of the poems of Homer, who were employed by Pisistratos for that purpose. נְסִיחָה is the subject, and in Cod. 1294, and in the editions of Bomberg 1515, Hartmann 1595, Nissel, Jablonsky, Michaelis, has *Dechî*. This title is like that of the second supplement, xxiv. 23. The form of the name חֻקְיָה, abbreviated from יְחֻקְיָהוּ (חֻקְיָהוּ), is not

favourable to the derivation of the title from the collectors themselves. The LXX. translates: *Αὐται αἱ παιδεῖαι Σαλωμῶντος αἱ ἀδιάκριτοι* (cf. Jas. iii. 17), *ὡς ἐξεγράψαντο οἱ φίλοι Ἐζεκίου*, for which Aquila has *ὡς μετήραν ἄνδρες Ἐζεκίου*, Jerome, *transtulerunt*. *הַעֲתִיק* signifies, like (Arab.) *nsah*, *נָסַח*, to snatch away, to take away, to transfer from another place; in later Heb. : to transcribe from one book into another, to translate from one language into another: to take from another place and place together; the Whence? remains undetermined: according to the anachronistic rendering of the Midrash *מגניזתם*, *i.e.* from the Apocrypha; according to Hitzig, from the mouths of the people; more correctly Euchel and others: from their scattered condition, partly oral, partly written. *Vid.* regarding *הַעֲתִיק*, Zunz, in *Deutsch-Morgenl. Zeitsch.* xxv. 147 f., and regarding the whole title, vol. i. pp. 5, 6; regarding the forms of proverbs in this second collection, vol. i. p. 17; regarding their relation to the first, and their end and aim, vol. i. pp. 25, 26. The first Collection of Proverbs is a Book for Youth, and this second a Book for the People.

Ver. 2. It is characteristic of the purpose of the book that it begins with proverbs of the king:

It is the glory of God to conceal a thing;

And the glory of the king to search out a matter.

That which is the glory of God and the glory of the king in itself, and that by which they acquire glory, stand here contrasted. The glory of God consists in this, to conceal a matter, *i.e.* to place before men mystery upon mystery, in which they become conscious of the limitation and insufficiency of their knowledge, so that they are constrained to acknowledge, Deut. xxix. 28, that "secret things belong unto the Lord our God." There are many things that are hidden and are known only to God, and we must be contented with that which He sees it good to make known to us.<sup>1</sup> The honour of kings, on the contrary, who as pilots have to steer the ship of the state (xi. 14), and as supreme judges to administer justice (1 Kings iii. 9), consists in this, to search out a matter, *i.e.* to place in the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. von Lasaulx, *Philosophie der Geschichte*, p. 128 f.: "God and Nature love to conceal the beginning of things."

light things that are problematical and subjects of controversy, in conformity with their high position, with surpassing intelligence, and, in conformity with their responsibility, with conscientious zeal. The thought that it is the glory of God to veil Himself in secrecy (Isa. lv. 15; cf. 1 Kings viii. 12), and of the king, on the contrary, not to surround himself with an impenetrable nimbus, and to withdraw into inaccessible remoteness,—this thought does not, immediately at least, lie in the proverb, which refers that which is concealed, and its contrary, not to the person, but to a matter. Also that God, by the concealment of certain things, seeks to excite to activity human research, is not said in this proverb; for 2*b* does not speak of the honour of wise men, but of kings; the searching out, 2*b*, thus does not refer to that which is veiled by God. But since the honour of God at the same time as the welfare of men, and the honour of the king as well as the welfare of his people, is to be thought of, the proverb states that God and the king promote human welfare in very different ways,—God, by concealing that which sets limits to the knowledge of man, that he may not be uplifted; and the king, by research, which brings out the true state of the matter, and thereby guards the political and social condition against threatening danger, secret injuries, and the ban of offences unatoned for. This proverb, regarding the difference between that which constitutes the honour of God and of the king, is followed by one which refers to that in which the honour of both is alike.

Ver. 3 The heavens in height, and the earth in depth,  
And the heart of kings are unsearchable.

This is a proverb in the priamel-form, *vid.* p. 13. The *praeambulum* consists of three subjects to which the predicate *אין חקר* [= no searching out] is common. “As it is impossible to search through the heavens and through the earth, so it is also impossible to search the hearts of common men (like the earth), and the hearts of kings (like the heavens)” (Fleischer). The meaning, however, is simple. Three unsearchable things are placed together: the heavens, with reference to their height, stretching into the impenetrable distance; the earth, in respect to its depth, reaching down into the immeasurable abyss; and the heart of kings—it is this third thing which the proverb

particularly aims at—which in themselves, and especially with that which goes on in their depths, are impenetrable and unsearchable. The proverb is a warning against the delusion of being flattered by the favour of the king, which may, before one thinks of it, be withdrawn or changed even into the contrary; and a counsel to one to take heed to his words and acts, and to see to it that he is influenced by higher motives than by the fallacious calculation of the impression on the view and disposition of the king. The ל in both cases is the expression of the reference, as *e.g.* at 2 Chron. ix. 22. וְאֶרְיָן, not = וְהָאֶרְיָן, but like Isa. xxvi. 19, lxv. 17, for וְאֶרְיָן, which generally occurs only in the *st. constr.*

There now follows an emblematic (*vid.* vol. i. p. 10) tetrastich :

- Ver. 4 Take away the dross from silver,  
 So there is ready a vessel for the goldsmith ;  
 5 Take away the wicked from the king,  
 And his throne is established by righteousness.

The form הָנוּ (cf. the *inf.* *Poal* הִנּוּ, Isa. lix. 13) is regarded by Schultens as showing a ground-form הָנוּ; but there is also found *e.g.* עָשׂוּ, whose ground-form is עָשִׂי; the verb הִנָּה, R. הָנוּ (whence Arab. *hajr*, *discedere*), cf. יָנָה (whence הִנָּה, *semovit*, 2 Sam. xx. 13 = Syr. *âwagy*, cf. Arab. *âwjay*, to withhold, to abstain from), signifies to separate, withdraw; here, of the separation of the פְּסִיגִים, the refuse, *i.e.* the dross (*vid.* regarding the *plena scriptio*, Baer's *krit. Ausg. des Jesaia*, under i. 22); the goldsmith is designated by the word צִרְיָה, from צָרַח, to turn, change, as he who changes the as yet drossy metal by means of smelting, or by purification in water, into that which is pure. In 5a הִנָּה is, as at Isa. xxvii. 8, transferred to a process of moral purification; what kind of persons are to be removed from the neighbourhood of the king is shown by Isa. i. 22, 23. Here also (as at Isa. *l.c.*) the emblem or figure of ver. 4 is followed in ver. 5 by its moral antitype aimed at. The punctuation of both verses is wonderfully fine and excellent. In ver. 4, וְצִרְיָה is not pointed וְצִרְיָה, but as the consecutive *modus* וְצִרְיָה; this first part of the proverb refers to a well-known process of art: the dross is separated from the silver (*inf. absol.*, as xii. 7, xv. 22), and so a vessel (utensil) proceeds from the goldsmith, for he

manufactures pure silver; the ל is here similarly used as the designation of the subject in the passive, xiii. 13, xiv. 20. In ver. 5, on the contrary, וַיִּבֹּן (וַיִּבֹּן) is not the punctuation used, but the word is pointed indicatively וַיִּבֹּן; this second part of the proverb expresses a moral demand (*inf. absol.* in the sense of the imperative, Gesen. § 131, 4b like xvii. 12, or an optative or concessive conjunction): let the godless be removed, לִפְנֵי מֶלֶךְ, *i.e.* not from the neighbourhood of the king, for which the words are מִלִּפְנֵי מֶלֶךְ; also not those standing before the king, *i.e.* in his closest neighbourhood (Ewald, Bertheau); but since, in the absolute, הָיָה, not an act of another in the interest of the king, but of the king himself, is thought of: let the godless be removed from before the king, *i.e.* because he administers justice (Hitzig), or more generally: because after that Psalm (ci.), which is the "mirror of princes," he does not suffer him to come into his presence. Accordingly, the punctuation is בְּצַדִּיק, not בְּצַדִּיק (xvi. 12); because such righteousness is meant as separates the רָשָׁע from it and itself from him, as Isa. xvi. 5 (*vid.* Hitzig), where the punctuation of בְּחַסֵּד denotes that favour towards Moab seeking protection. There now follows a second proverb with מֶלֶךְ, as the one just explained was a second with מַלְכִים: a warning against arrogance before kings and nobles.

- Ver. 6 Display not thyself before the king,  
 And approach not to the place of the great.  
 7 For better that one say to thee, "Come up hither,"  
 Than that they humble thee before a prince,  
 Whom thine eyes had seen.

The נְדָלִים are those, like xviii. 16, who by virtue of their descent and their office occupy a lofty place of honour in the court and in the state. נָדִיב (*vid.* under viii. 16) is the noble in disposition and the nobleman by birth, a general designation which comprehends the king and the princes. The *Hithpa.* הִתְהַדָּר is like the reflex forms xii. 9, xiii. 7, for it signifies to conduct oneself as הָרוּר or נְהָדָר (*vid.* xx. 29), to play the part of one highly distinguished. עָמַד has, 6b, its nearest signification: it denotes, not like נָצַב, standing still, but approaching to, *e.g.* Jer. vii. 2. The reason given in ver. 7 harmonizes with the rule of wisdom, Luke xiv. 10 f.: better is the saying to thee, *i.e.* that one say to thee (Ewald, § 304b), עֲלֶיךָ הָיָה (so the *Olewejored* is

to be placed), *προσανάβηθι ἀνώτερον* (thus in Luke), than that one humble thee *לִפְנֵי נָרִיב*, not: because of a prince (Hitzig), for *לִפְנֵי* nowhere means either *pro* (xvii. 18) or *propter*, but before a prince, so that thou must yield to him (cf. xiv. 19), before him whom thine eyes had seen, so that thou art not excused if thou takest up the place appropriate to him. Most interpreters are at a loss to explain this relative. Luther: "which thine eyes must see," and Schultens: *ut videant oculi tui*. Michaelis, syntactically admissible: *quem videre gestiverunt oculi tui*, viz. to come near to him, according to Bertheau, with the request that he receives some high office. Otherwise Fleischer: before the king by whom thou and thine are seen, so much the more felt is the humiliation when it comes upon one after he has pressed so far forward that he can be perceived by the king. But *נָרִיב* is not specially the king, but any distinguished personage whose place he who has pressed forward has taken up, and from which he must now withdraw when the right possessor of it comes and lays claim to his place. *אֲשֶׁר* is never used in poetry without emphasis. Elsewhere it is equivalent to *ὅντινα*, *quippe quem*, here equivalent to *ὄνπερ*, *quem quidem*. Thine eyes have seen him in the company, and thou canst say to thyself, this place belongs to him, according to his rank, and not to thee,—the humiliation which thou endurest is thus well deserved, because, with eyes to see, thou wert so blind. The LXX., Syr., Symmachus (who reads 8a, *לָרִב*, *εἰς πλῆθος*), and Jerome, refer the words "whom thine eyes had seen" to the proverb following; but *אֲשֶׁר* does not appropriately belong to the beginning of a proverb, and on the supposition that the word *לָרִב* is generally adopted, except by Symmachus, they are also heterogeneous to the following proverb:

Ver. 8 Go not forth hastily to strife,

That it may not be said, "What wilt thou do in the end thereof,

When now thy neighbour bringeth disgrace upon thee?"

9 Art thou striving with thy neighbour? strive with him,

But disclose not the secret of another;

10 That he who heareth it may not despise thee,

And thine evil name depart no more.

Whether *לָרִיב* in *לָרִיב* is *infin.*, as at Judg. xxi. 22, or *subst.*, as at

2 Chron. xix. 8, is not decided: *ad litigandum* and *ad litem* harmonize. As little may it be said whether in אֶל-תֵּצֵא [go not forth], a going out to the gate (court of justice), or to the place where he is to be met who is to be called to account, is to be thought of; in no respect is the sense metaphorical: let not thyself transgress the bounds of moderation, *ne te laisse pas emporter*; יֵצֵא לָרֹב is correlate to בּוֹא לָרֹב, Judg. xxi. 22. The use of פֶּן in 8b is unprecedented. Euchel and Löwenstein regard it as an *imper.*: reflect upon it (test it); but פֶּנָּה does not signify this, and the interjectional הִם does not show the possibility of an *imper.* *Kal* פֶּן, and certainly not פֶּן (פֶּנֶן). The conj. פֶּן is the connecting form of an original subst. (= *panj*), which signifies a turning away. It is mostly connected with the future, according to which Nolde, Oetinger, Ewald, and Bertheau explain מה *indefinite*, something, viz. unbecoming. In itself, it may, perhaps, be possible that פֶּן מה was used in the sense of *ne quid* (*Venet.* *μὴποτέ τι*); but “to do something,” for “to commit something bad,” is improbable; also in that case we would expect the words to be thus: פֶּן תַּעֲשֶׂה מֵה. Thus מה will be an interrogative, as at 1 Sam. xx. 10 (*vid.* Keil), and the expression is brachylogical: that thou comest not into the situation not to know what thou oughtest to do (Rashi: פֶּן תֵּבֵא לִירִי לֹא תֵדַע), or much rather anakoluth.; for instead of saying פֶּן-לֹא תֵדַע מֵה-לַּעֲשׂוֹת, the poet, shunning this unusual פֶּן, adopts at once the interrogative form: that it may not be said at the end thereof (viz. of the strife): what wilt thou do? (Umbreit, Stier, Elster, Hitzig, and Zöckler.) This extreme perplexity would occur if thy neighbour (with whom thou disputest so eagerly and unjustly) put thee to shame, so that thou standest confounded (בָּלֵם, properly to hurt, French *blessé*). If now the summons 9a follows this warning against going out for the purpose of strife: fight out thy conflict with thy neighbour, then רִיבֶךָ, set forth with emphasis, denotes not such a strife as one is surprised into, but that into which one is drawn, and the *tuam* in *causam tuam* is accented in so far as 9b localizes the strife to the personal relation of the two, and warns against the drawing in of an אֲחֵר, i.e. in this case, of a third person: and expose not the secret of another אֶל-תִּגְלֶה (after *Michlol* 130a, and Ben-Bileam, who places the word under the פ"פ תַּחֲתַּי בִּם, and

is vocalized with *Pathach* on ג, as is Cod. 1294, and elsewhere in correct texts). One ought not to bring forward in a dispute, as material of proof and means of acquittal, secrets entrusted to him by another, or secrets which one knows regarding the position and conduct of another; for such faithlessness and gossiping affix a stigma on him who avails himself of them, in the public estimation, ver. 10; that he who hears it may not blame thee (חַסֵּר = Aram. חַסֵּר, *vid.* under xiv. 34), and the evil report concerning thee continue without recall. Fleischer: *ne infamia tua non recedat i. e. nunquam desinat per ora hominum propagari*, with the remark, “in דִּבְרֵה, which properly means a stealthy creeping on of the rumour, and in שׁוֹב lies a (Arab.) *tarshyh*,” *i.e.* the two ideas stand in an interchangeable relation with a play upon the words: the evil rumour, once put in circulation, will not again retrace its steps; but, on the contrary, as Virgil says:

*Mobilitate viget viresque acquirit eundo.*

In fact, every other can sooner rehabilitate himself in the public estimation than he who is regarded as a prattler, who can keep no secret, or as one so devoid of character that he makes public what he ought to keep silent, if he can make any use of it in his own interest. In regard to such an one, the words are continually applicable, *hic niger est, hunc tu, Romane, caveto*, xx. 19. The LXX. has, instead of דִּבְרֵה 10b, read וּמִרִּיבָתָךְ, and translated it with the addition of a long appendix: “They quarrel, and hostilities will not cease, but will be to thee like death. Kindness and friendship deliver, let these preserve thee, that thou mayest not become one meriting reproaches (Jerome: *ne exprobrabilis fias*), but guard thy ways, εὐσυναλλάκτως.”

The first emblematical distich of this collection now follows:

Ver. 11 Golden apples in silver salvers.

A word spoken according to its circumstances.

The Syr. and Jerome vocalize דִּבְרֵה דִּבְרֵה, and the Targ. דִּבְרֵה דִּבְרֵה; both are admissible, but the figure and that which is represented are not placed in so appropriate a relation as by דִּבְרֵה דִּבְרֵה; the wonderfully penetrating expression of the text, which is rendered by the traditional *nikkud*, agrees here with the often occurring דִּבְרֵה (= מִדְבָּר), also its passive דִּבְרֵה. The defective

writing is like, *e.g.*, בָּטַח, Ps. cxii. 7, and gives no authority to prefer דָּבַר = מְדַבֵּר (Böttcher). That דָּבַר, corresponding to the plur. תַּבְרוּחַי, is not used, arises from this, that דָּבַר is here manifestly not a word without connection, but a sentence of motive, contents, and aim united. For עַל-אֲפָנָי, the meaning of בָּעָתָה presents itself from xv. 23, according to which, among the old interpreters, Symmachus, Jerome, and Luther render "at its time." Abulwalid compared the Arab. *âiffan* (*âibban*, also *'iffan*, whence *'aly 'iffanihi, justo tempore*), which, as Orelli has shown in his *Synon. der Zeitbegriffe*, p. 21 f., comes from the roots *af ab*, to drive (from within) going out, time as consisting of individual moments, the one of which drives on the other, and thus denotes time as a course of succession. One may not hesitate as to the prep. עַל, for אֲפָנִים would, like עָתוֹת, denote the circumstances, the relations of the time, and עַל would, as *e.g.* in עַל-פִּי and עַל-דְּבָרָתִי, have the meaning of *κατά*. But the form אֲפָנָי, which like הִפְנִי Lev. xvi. 12, sounds dualistic, appears to oppose this. Hitzig supposes that אֲפָנִים may designate the time as a circle, with reference to the two arches projecting in opposite directions, but uniting themselves together; but the circle which time describes runs out from one point, and, moreover, the Arab. names for time *âfaf*, *âifaf*, and the like, which interchange with *âiffan*, show that this does not proceed from the idea of circular motion. Ewald and others take for אֲפָנִי the meaning of wheels (the *Venet.*, after Kimchi, ἐπὶ τῶν τροχῶν αὐτῆς), whereby the form is to be interpreted as dual of אָפֶן = אוֹפֶן, "a word driven on its wheels,"—so Ewald explains: as the potter quickly and neatly forms a vessel on his wheels, thus a fit and quickly framed word. But דָּבַר signifies to drive cattle and to speak = to cause words to follow one another (cf. Arab. *syâk*, pressing on = flow of words), but not to drive = to fashion in that artisan sense. Otherwise Böttcher, "a word fitly spoken, a pair of wheels perfect in their motion," to which he compares the common people "in their jesting," and adduces all kinds of heterogeneous things partly already rejected by Orelli (*e.g.* the Homeric ἐπιτροχάδην, which is certainly no commendation). But "jesting" is not appropriate here; for what man conceives of human speech as a carriage, one only sometimes compares that of a babbler to a sledge, or says of him that he

shoves the cart into the mud.<sup>1</sup> Is it then thus decided that אֲפִי is a dual? It may be also like אֲשֶׁרִי, the plur. especially in the adverbial expression before us, which readily carried the abbreviation with it (*vid.* Gesen. *Lehrgebr.* § 134, Anm. 17). On this supposition, Orelli interprets אֲפִי from אָפִי, to turn, in the sense of turning about, circumstances, and reminds of this, that in the post.-bibl. Heb. this word is used as indefinitely as τρόπος, *e.g.* באופן מה, *quodammodo* (*vid.* Reland's *Analecta Rabbinica*, 1723, p. 126). This late Talm. usage of the word can, indeed, signify nothing as to the bibl. word; but that אֲפִי, abbreviated אֲפִי, can mean circumstances, is warranted by the synonym. אֲדִוֹת. Aquila and Theodotion appear to have thus understood it, for their ἐπὶ ἀρμόζουσιν αὐτῷ, which they substitute for the colourless οὕτως of the LXX., signifies: under the circumstances, in accordance therewith. So Orelli thus rightly defines: “אֲפִי denote the *âhwâl*, circumstances and conditions, as they form themselves in each turning of time, and those which are ascribed to דבר by the suffix are those to which it is proper, and to which it fits in. Consequently a word is commended which is spoken whenever the precise time arrives to which it is adapted, a word which is thus spoken at its time as well as at its place (*van Dyk, fay mahllah*), and the grace of which is thereby heightened.” Aben Ezra's explanation, על פנים, in the approved way, follows the opinion of Abulwalid and Parchon, that אֲפִי is equivalent to פָּנִי (cf. *aly wajhihi, sua ratione*), which is only so far true, that both words are derived from R. פָּן, to turn. In the figure, it is questionable whether by תְּפִיחֵי זָהָב, apples of gold, or gold-coloured apples, are meant (Luther: as pomegranates and citrons); thus oranges are meant, as at Zech. iv. 12. הַזָּהָב denotes golden oil. Since כֶּסֶף, besides, signifies a metallic substance, one appears to be under the necessity of thinking of apples of gold; cf. the brazen pomegranates. But (1) apples of gold of natural size and massiveness are obviously too great to make it probable that such artistic productions are meant; (2) the material of

<sup>1</sup> It is something different when the weaver's beam, *minwâl* in Arab., is metaph. for kind and manner: they are 'aly *minwâl wâhad*, is equivalent to they are of a like calibre, Arab. *kalib*, which is derived from καλοποιον (καλοποιον), a shoemaker's last.

the emblem is usually not of less value than that of which it is the emblem (Fleischer); (3) the Scriptures are fond of comparing words with flowers and fruits, x. 31, xii. 14, xiii. 2, xviii. 20, and to the essence of the word which is rooted in the spirit, and buds and grows up to maturity through the mouth and the lips, the comparison with natural fruits corresponds better in any case than with artificial. Thus, then, we interpret “golden apples” as the poetic name for oranges, *aurea mala*, the Indian name of which with reference to *or* (gold) was changed into the French name *orange*, as our *pomeranze* is equivalent to *pomum aurantium*. מִשְׁבִּית is the plur. of מִשְׁבִּית, already explained, xviii. 11; the word is connected neither with שָׁבַת, to twist, wreath (Ewald, with most Jewish interpreters<sup>1</sup>), nor with שָׁבַת, to pierce, *infigere* (Redslob, *vid.* under Ps. lxxiii. 7); it signifies medal or ornament, from שָׁבַת, to behold (cf. שְׁבִיחַ, *θέα* = *θέαμα*, Isa. ii. 6), here a vessel which is a delight to the eyes. In general the *Venet.* rightly, ἐν μορφώμασιν ἀργύρου; Symmachus and Theodotion, more in accordance with the fundamental idea, ἐν περιβλέπτοις ἀργύρου; the *Syr.* and *Targ.* specially: in vessels of embossed work (נִגְדִי, from נָגַד, to draw, to extend); yet more specially the *LXX.*, ἐν ὀρμίσκῳ σαρδίου, on a chain of cornelian stone, for which, perhaps, ἐν φορμίσκῳ (Jäger) ἀργυρίου, in a little silver basket, is the original phrase. Aquila, after *Bereschith rabba* c. 93, translates by μῆλα χρύσου ἐν δίσκοις ἀργυρίου. Jerome: *in lectis argenteis*, appears to have fallen into the error of taking מִשְׁבִּית for מִשְׁכָּב, *lectus*. Hitzig here emends a self-made ἄπαξ λεγ. Luther’s “golden apples in silver baskets” is to be preferred.<sup>2</sup> A piece of sculpture which represents fruit by golden little disks or points within groups of leaves is not meant,—for the proverb does not speak of such pretty little apples,—but golden oranges are meant. A word in accordance with the circumstances which

<sup>1</sup> On this proceeds also the beautiful interpretation by Maimuni in the preface to *More Nebuchim: Maskiyyôth sont des ciselures réticulaires*, etc., according to Munk’s translation from the Arab. text, *vid.* Kohut’s *Pers. Pentateuch-Uebers.* (1871), p. 356. Accordingly Jewish interpreters (e.g. Elia Wilna) understand under אֲפֻנִי the four kinds of writing: פֶּשֶׁט, רִמּוֹן, דְּרוֹשׁ, and סוּד, which are comprehended under the memorial word פֶּרֶדֶם.

<sup>2</sup> A favourite expression of Goethe’s, *vid.* Büchmann’s *Geflügelte Worte*, 1688.

occasion it, is like golden oranges which are handed round in silver salvers or on silver waiters. Such a word is, as adopting another figure we might say, like a well-executed picture, and the situation into which it appropriately fits is like its elegant frame. The comparison with fruit is, however, more significant; it designates the right word as a delightful gift, in a way which heightens its impression and its influences.

Ver. 12. Another proverb continues the commendation of the effective word; for it represents, in emblem, the interchangeable relation of speaker and hearer :

A golden earring and an ornament of fine gold—

A wise preacher to an ear that heareth ;

*i.e.*, as the former two ornaments form a beautiful *ensemble*, so the latter two, the wise preacher of morality and an attentive ear, form a harmonious whole : *עַל*, down upon, is explained by Deut. xxxii. 2. *נָזַם*, at xi. 12, standing along with *בָּאָהַךְ*, meant a ring for the nose; but here, as elsewhere, it means an earring (LXX., Jerome, *Venet.*), translated by the Syr. and Targ. by *קְרָשָׁא*, because it serves as a talisman. A ring for the nose<sup>1</sup> cannot also be here thought of, because this ornament is an emblem of the attentive ear: willingly accepted chastisement or instruction is an ear-ornament to him who hears (Stier). But the gift of the wise preacher, which consists in rightly dividing the word of truth, 2 Tim. ii. 15, is as an ornament for the neck or the breast *חֲלִי* (= Arab. *khaly*, fem. *חֲלִיָּה* = *hilyt*), of fine gold (*בְּתָם*, jewel, then particularly precious gold, from *בָּתַם*, Arab. *katam*, *recondere*).<sup>2</sup> The *Venet.* well : *κόσμος ἀπυρο-*

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Geiger's *Zeitschrift*, 1872, pp. 45–48, where it is endeavoured to be shown that *נָזַם*, as an earring, is rejected from the later biblical literature, because it had become “an object used in the worship of idols,” and that the word was used only of a ring for the nose as a permissible ornament, while *עָנִיל* was used for the earring. But that does not apply to the Solomonic era; for that, in the passage under review, *נָזַם* signifies a ring for the nose, is only a supposition of Geiger's, because it accords with his construction of history.

<sup>2</sup> Hitzig compares Arab. *kumêt*; but this means bayard, as Lagarde remarks, the Greek *κόμαιθος*; and if by *בְּתָם* gold foxes (gold money) are to be thought of, yet they have nothing whatever to do with bayards (red-brown horses); cf. Boehmer, *de colorum nominibus equinorum*, in his *Roman. Stud.* Heft 2, 1872, p. 285.

χρῦσον (fine gold); on the contrary (perhaps in want of another name for gold), כהם is translated, by the LXX. and Syr., by sardine; by the Targ., by emerald; and by Jerome, by *margaritum*.<sup>1</sup> It looks well when two stand together, the one of whom has golden earrings, and the other wears a yet more precious golden necklace—such a beautiful mutual relationship is formed by a wise speaker and a hearer who listens to his admonitions.

Ver. 13. The following comparative tristich refers to faithful service rendered by words:

Like the coolness of snow on a harvest day  
Is a faithful messenger to them that send him:  
He refresheth the soul of his master.

The coolness (צֶנֶה from צָנַן, צָנַן, to be cool) of snow is not that of a fall of snow, which in the time of harvest would be a calamity, but of drink cooled with snow, which was brought from Lebanon or elsewhere, from the clefts of the rocks; the peasants of Damascus store up the winter's snow in a cleft of the mountains, and convey it in the warm months to Damascus and the coast towns. Such a refreshment is a faithful messenger (*vid.* regarding צִיר, xiii. 17, here following קָצִיר as a kind of echo) to them that send him (*vid.* regarding this plur. at x. 26, cf. xxii. 21); he refreshes, namely (ו explicativum, as e.g. Ezek. xviii. 19, *etenim filius*, like the ו *et quidem*, Mal. i. 11, different from the ו of conditional clause xxiii. 3), the soul of his master; for the answer which he brings to his master refreshes him, as does a drink of snow-cooled water on a hot harvest day.

Ver. 14. This proverb relates to the word which promises much, but remains unaccomplished:

Clouds and wind, and yet no rain—  
A man who boasteth with a false gift.

Incorrectly the LXX. and Targ. refer the predicate contained in the concluding word of the first line to all the three subjects; and equally incorrectly Hitzig, with Heidenheim, interprets מַתַּת שֶׁקֶר, of a gift that has been received of which one boasts,

<sup>1</sup> Another Greek translates πίνωσις χρυσῶν. This πίνωσις is a philological mystery, the solution of which has been attempted by Bochart, Letronne, and Field.

although it is in reality of no value, because by a lying promise a gift is not at all obtained. But as לחם כזבים, xxiii. 3, is bread which, as it were, deceives him who eats it, so ממת שקר is a gift which amounts to a lie, *i.e.* a deceitful pretence. Rightly Jerome: *vir gloriosus et promissa non complens*. In the Arab. *salid*, which Fleischer compares, the figure 14*a* and its counterpart 14*b* are amalgamated, for this word signifies both a boaster and a cloud, which is, as it were, boastful, which thunders much, but rains only sparsely or not at all. Similar is the Arab. *khullab*, clouds which send forth lightning, and which thunder, but yet give no rain; we say to one, *magno promissor hiatus*: thou art (Arab.) *kabarakn khullabin*, *i.e.* as Lane translates it: "Thou art only like lightning with which is no rain." Schultens refers to this proverbial Arabic, *fulmen nubis infecundæ*. Liberality is called (Arab.) *nadnay*, as a watering, cf. xi. 25. The proverb belongs to this circle of figures. It is a saying of the German peasants, "*Wenn es sich wolket, so will es regnen*" [when it is cloudy, then there will be rain]; but according to another saying, "*nicht alle Wolken regnen*" [it is not every cloud that yields rain]. "There are clouds and wind without rain."

Three proverbs follow, which have this in common, that they exhort to moderation:

Ver. 15 By forbearance is a judge won over,  
And a gentle tongue breaketh the bone.

קָצִין (*vid.* vi. 7) does not denote any kind of distinguished person, but a judge or a person occupying a high official position. And פָּתָה does not here mean, to talk over or delude; but, like Jer. xx. 7, to persuade, to win over, to make favourable to one; for אָרַךְ אַפַּיִם (*vid.* xiv. 29) is dispassionate calmness, not breaking out into wrath, which finally makes it manifest that he who has become the object of accusation, suspicion, or of disgrace, is one who nevertheless has right on his side; for indecent, boisterous passion injures even a just cause; while, on the contrary, a quiet, composed, thoughtful behaviour, which is not embarrassed by injustice, either experienced or threatened, in the end secures a decision in our favour. "Patience overcomes" is an old saying. The soft, gentle tongue (cf. רַךְ, xv. 1) is the opposite of a passionate,

sharp, coarse one, which only the more increases the resistance which it seeks to overcome. "Patience," says a German proverb, "breaks iron;" another says, "Patience is stronger than a diamond." So here: a gentle tongue breaketh the bone (רַךָּ = עָצָה, as at xvii. 22), it softens and breaks to pieces that which is hardest. Sudden anger makes the evil still worse; long-suffering, on the contrary, operates convincingly; cutting, immoderate language, embitters and drives away; gentle words, on the contrary, persuade, if not immediately, yet by this, that they remain as it were unchangeable.

Ver. 16. Another way of showing self-control:

Hast thou found honey? eat thy enough,  
Lest thou be surfeited with it, and vomit it up.

Honey is pleasant, salutary, and thus to be eaten sparingly, xxiv. 13, but *ne quid nimis*. Too much is unwholesome, 27a: αὐτοῦ καὶ μέλιτος τὸ πλεόν ἐστὶ χολή, i.e. even honey enjoyed immoderately is as bitter as gall; or, as Freidank says: *des honges süeze erdriuzet sô mans ze viel geniuzet* [the sweetness of honey offends when one partakes too much of it]. Eat if thou hast found any in the forest or the mountains, רַךְ, thy enough (LXX. τὸ ἱκανόν; the Venet. τὸ ἀρκοῦν σοι), i.e. as much as appeases thine appetite, that thou mayest not become surfeited and vomit it out (וְהִקָּשְׁתָּ with *Tsere*, and נִקְשָׁה quiesc., as at 2 Sam. xiv. 10; vid. *Michlol* 116a, and *Parchon* under קָשָׁה). Fleischer, Ewald, Hitzig, and others, place vers. 16 and 17 together, so as to form an emblematic tetrastich; but he who is surfeited is certainly, in ver. 16, he who willingly enjoys, and in 17, he to whom it is given to enjoy without his will; and is not, then, ver. 16 a sentence complete in itself in meaning? That it is not to be understood in a purely dietetic sense (although thus interpreted it is a rule not to be despised), is self-evident. As one can suffer injury from the noblest of food if he overload his stomach therewith, so in the sphere of science, instruction, edification, there is an injurious overloading of the mind; we ought to measure what we receive by our spiritual want, the right distribution of enjoyment and labour, and the degree of our ability to change it *in succum et sanguinem*,—else it at last awakens in us dislike, and becomes an evil to us.

Ver. 17. This proverb is of a kindred character to the foregoing. "If thy comrade eats honey," says an Arabic proverb quoted by Hitzig, "do not lick it all up." But the emblem of honey is not continued in this verse:

Make rare thy foot in thy neighbour's house,  
Lest he be satiated with thee, and hate thee.

To make one's foot rare or dear from a neighbour's house is equivalent to: to enter it seldom, and not too frequently; הִקָּר includes in itself the idea of keeping at a distance (Targ. כָּלָה רִגְלָךְ; Symmachus, ὑπόστειλον; and another: φίμωσον πόδα σου), and מֵן has the sense of the Arab. 'an, and is not the comparative, as at Isa. xiii. 12: regard thy visit dearer than the house of a neighbour (Heidenheim). The proverb also is significant as to the relation of friend to friend, whose reciprocal love may be turned into hatred by too much intercourse and too great fondness. But רֵעֵךְ is including a friend, any one with whom we stand in any kind of intercourse. "Let him who seeks to be of esteem," says a German proverb, "come seldom;" and that may be said with reference to him whom his heart draws to another, and also to him who would be of use to another by drawing him out of the false way and guiding on the right path,—a showing of esteem, a confirming of love by visiting, should not degenerate into forwardness which appears as burdensome servility, as indiscreet self-enjoyment; nor into a restless impetuosity, which seeks at once to gain by force that which one should allow gradually to ripen.

Vers. 18–22. This group of proverbs has the word רֵעַ in each of them, connecting them together. The first of the group represents a false tongue:

Ver. 18 A hammer, and a sword, and a sharp arrow—

A man that beareth false witness against his neighbour.

An emblematic, or, as we might also say, an iconological proverb; for 18a is a *quodlibet* of instruments of murder, and 18b is the subscription under it: that which these weapons of murder accomplish, is done to his neighbour by a man who bears false witness against him—he ruins his estate, takes away his honour, but yet more: he murders him, at one time more grossly, at another time with more refinement; at one time slowly, at another time more quickly. מַפְיֵן, from פָּרַן, is equiva-

lent to מַפֵּץ, and מַפֵּץ from נִפֵּץ; the Syr. and Targ. have instead פְּרִיעָא (פְּרִיעָא) from פָּרַע = פָּצַע; the word פְּרִיעָא, on which Hitzig builds a conjecture, is an error of transcription (*vid.* Lagarde and Levy). The expression, 18b, is from the decalogue, Ex. xx. 16; Deut. v. 17. It is for the most part translated the same here as there: he who speaks against his neighbour as a false witness. But rightly the LXX., Jerome, the *Venet.*, and Luther: false testimony. As אֱלֹהִים signifies both that which is mighty = power, and Him who is mighty = God, so עֵר signifies both him who bears testimony and the testimony that is borne, properly that which repeats itself and thereby strengthens itself; accordingly we say עֵר עָנָה, to give testimony in reply,—viz. to the judge who asks,—or generally to offer testimony (even unasked); as well as עָנָה לְעֵר, Deut. xxxi. 21, *i.e.* as evidence (Jerome, *pro testimonio*). The prep. ב with this עָנָה has always the meaning of *contra*, also at 1 Sam. xii. 3; Gen. xxx. 33 is, however, open to question.

Ver. 19 A worthless tooth and an unsteady foot—

Trust in a faithless man in the day of need.

The form רָעָה (with *Mercha* on the antepenult), Isa. xxix. 19, takes the place of an *inf. absol.*; רָעָה here (about the tone syllable of which *Dechî* does not decide, thus without doubt *Milra*) is certainly not a subst.: tooth of breaking (Gesen.); for how strange such a designation of a worthless tooth! שֵׁן is indeed mas. in 1 Sam. xiv. 5, but it can also be used as fem., as רָגַל, which is for the most part fem., also occurs as mas., Böttch. § 650. Böttcher, in the new *Aehrenlese*, and in the *Lehrbuch*, takes רָעָה as fem. of an adj. רָע, after the form הָל; but הָל is not an adj., and does not form a fem., although it means not merely profanity, but that which is profane; this is true also of the Aram. הָל; for הָלָהָ, Esth. ii. 9, Targ., is a female name mistaken by Buxtorf. Are we then to read רָעָה, with Hitzig, after the LXX.?—an unimportant change. We interpret the traditional רָעָה, with Fleischer, as derived from רָעָעָה, from רָעָע, breaking to pieces (crumbling), in an intransitive sense. The form מוֹעֲדָה is also difficult. Böttcher regards it as also, *e.g.* Aben Ezra after the example of Gecatilia as *part. Kal.* = מוֹעֲדָה, “only on account of the pausal tone and the combination of the two letters מַע with *û* instead of *ô*.” But

this vocal change, with its reasons, is merely imaginary. מוֹעֵרֶת is the *part. Pual*, with the preformative מְ struck out, Ewald 169d. The objection that the *part. Pual* should be מְמוֹעֵר, after the form מְבַעֵר, does not prove anything to the contrary; for מוֹעֵרֶת cannot be the fem. so as not to coincide with the fem. of the *part. Kal.*, cf. besides to the long *û* the form without the Dagesh יוֹקְשִׁים, Eccles. ix. 12 = מִיִּקְשִׁים (Arnheim, *Gramm.* p. 139). רֵגֶל מוֹעֵרֶת is a leg that has become tottering, trembling. He who in a time of need makes a faithless man his ground of confidence, is like one who seeks to bite with a broken tooth, and which he finally crushes, and one who supports himself on a shaking leg, and thus stumbles and falls. The gen. connection מִבְּטָח בּוֹנֵר signifies either the ground of confidence consisting in a faithless man, or the confidence placed in one who is faithless. But, after the Masora, we are to read here, as at Ps. lxxv. 6, מִבְּטָח, which *Michlol* 184a also confirms, and as it is also found in the Venice 1525, Basel 1619, and in Norzi. This מִבְּטָח is constr. according to Kimchi, notwithstanding the *Kametz*; as also מִשְׁקָל, Ezra viii. 30 (after Abulwalîd, Kimchi, and Norzi). In this passage before us, מִבְּטָח בּוֹנֵר may signify a deceitful ground of confidence (cf. Hab. ii. 5), but the two other passages present a genit. connection of the words. We must thus suppose that the ׀ of מִבְּטָח and מִשְׁקָל, in these three passages, is regarded as fixed, like the *â* of the form (Arab.) *mif'âl*.

The above proverb, which connects itself with ver. 18, not only by the sound רע, but also by שֶׁן, which is assonant with שֶׁן, is followed by another with the catchword רע:

Ver. 20 He that layeth aside his coat on a day of frost, vinegar on nitre,

And he who welcomes with songs a dejected heart.

Is not this intelligible, sensible, ingenious? All these three things are wrong. The first is as wrong as the second, and the third, which the proverb has in view, is morally wrong, for one ought to weep with those that weep, Rom. xii. 15; he, on the contrary, who laughs among those who weep, is, on the most favourable judgment, a fool. That which is wrong in 20a, according to Böttcher in the *Aehrenlese*, 1849, consists in this, that one in severe cold puts on a fine garment. As if

there were not garments which are at the same time beautiful, and keep warm! In the new *Aehrenlese* he prefers the reading מְשִׁנָּה: if one changes his coat. But that surely he might well enough do, if the one were warmer than the other! Is it then impossible that מְעִדָּה, in the connection, means *transire faciens* = *removens*? The *Kal* עָרָה, *transiit*, occurs at Job xxviii. 8. So also, in the poetic style, הָעִדָּה might be used in the sense of the Aram. אַעְדִּי. Rightly Aquila, Symmachus, περιαιρῶν; the Venet. better, ἀφαιρούμενος (Mid.). בִּגְדֵי is an overcoat or mantle, so called from covering, as לְבִישׁ (R. לָב, to fasten, fix), the garment lying next the body, *vid.* at Ps. xxii. 19. Thus, as it is foolish to lay off upper clothing on a frosty day, so it is foolish also to pour vinegar on nitre; carbonic acid nitre, whether it be mineral (which may be here thought of) or vegetable, is dissolved in water, and serves diverse purposes (*vid.* under Isa. i. 25); but if one pours vinegar on it, it is destroyed. לֵב-רָע<sup>1</sup> is, at xxvi. 23 and elsewhere, a heart morally bad, here a heart badly disposed, one inclined to that which is evil; for שִׁיר is the contrast of קִינָה, and always the consequence of a disposition joyfully excited; the inconsistency lies in this, that one thinks to cheer a sorrowful heart by merry singing, if the singing has an object, and is not much more the reckless expression of an animated pleasure in view of the sad condition of another. שִׁיר עַל signifies, as at Job xxxiii. 27, to sing to any one, to address him in singing; cf. רִפָּר עַל, Jer. vi. 10, and particularly עַל-לֵב, Hos. ii. 16; Isa. xl. 2. The ב of בְּשִׁירִים is neither the partitive, ix. 5, nor the transitive, xx. 30, but the instrumental; for, as *e.g.* at Ex. vii. 20, the obj. of the action is thought of as its means (Gesen. § 138, Anm. 3\*); one sings “with songs,” for definite songs underlie his singing. The LXX., which the Syr., Targ., and Jerome more or less follow, has formed from this proverb one quite different: “As vinegar is hurtful to a wound, so an injury to the body makes the heart sorrowful; as the moth in clothes, and the worm in wood, so the sorrow of a man injures his heart.” The wisdom of this pair of proverbs is not worth much, and after all inquiry little or nothing comes of it. The Targ. at least preserves the

<sup>1</sup> The writing wavers between עַל לֵב-רָע (cf. עַל עַם-הָלַל) and עַל-לֵב רָע.

figure 20*b*: as he who pours vinegar (Syr. *chalo*) on nitre; the Peshito, however, and here and there also the Targum, has *jathro* (arrow-string) instead of *nethro* (nitre). Hitzig adopts this, and changes the tristich into the distich:

He that meeteth archers with arrow on the string,  
Is like him who singeth songs with a sad heart.

The Hebrew of this proverb of Hitzig's (מִרִּים קָרָה עַל־יָתֶר) is unhebraic, the meaning dark as an oracle, and its moral contents *nil*.

Ver. 21 If thine enemy hunger, feed him with bread;  
And if he thirst, give him water to drink.

Ver. 22 For thereby thou heapest burning coals on his head,  
And Jahve will recompense it to thee.

The translation of this proverb by the LXX. is without fault; Paul cites therefrom Rom. xii. 20. The participial construction of 22*a*, the LXX., rightly estimating it, thus renders: for, doing this, thou shalt heap coals on his head. The expression, "thou shalt heap" (σωρεύσεις), is also appropriate; for חָתָה certainly means first only to fetch or bring fire (*vid.* vi. 27); but here, by virtue of the *constructio prægna*ns with עַל, to fetch, and hence to heap up,—to pile upon. Burning pain, as commonly observed, is the figure of burning shame, on account of undeserved kindness shown by an enemy (Fleischer). But how burning coals heaped on the head can denote burning shame, is not to be perceived, for the latter is a burning on the cheeks; wherefore Hitzig and Rosenmüller explain: thou wilt thus bring on him the greatest pain, and appease thy vengeance, while at the same time Jahve will reward thy generosity. Now we say, indeed, that he who rewards evil with good takes the noblest revenge; but if this doing of good proceed from a revengeful aim, and is intended sensibly to humble an adversary, then it loses all its moral worth, and is changed into selfish, malicious wickedness. Must the proverb then be understood in this ignoble sense? The Scriptures elsewhere say that guilt and punishment are laid on the head of any one when he is made to experience and to bear them. Chrysostom and others therefore explain after Ps. cxi. 10 and similar passages, but thereby the proverb is morally falsified, and ver. 22 accords with ver. 21, which counsels not to the avenging of oneself,

but to the requital of evil with good. The burning of coals laid on the head must be a painful but wholesome consequence; it is a figure of self-accusing repentance (Augustine, Zöckler), for the producing of which the showing of good to an enemy is a noble motive. That God rewards such magnanimity may not be the special motive; but this view might contribute to it, for otherwise such promises of God as Isa. lviii. 8-12 were without moral right. The proverb also requires one to show himself gentle and liberal toward a needy enemy, and present a twofold reason for this: first, that thereby his injustice is brought home to his conscience; and, secondly, that thus God is well-pleased in such practical love toward an enemy, and will reward it;—by such conduct, apart from the performance of a law grounded in our moral nature, one advances the happiness of his neighbour and his own.

The next group of proverbs extends from ver. 23 to ver. 28.

Ver. 23 Wind from the north produceth rain;

And a secret tongue a troubled countenance.

The north is called צפון, from פָּצַח, to conceal, from the firmament darkening itself for a longer time, and more easily, like the old Persian *apâkhtara*, as (so it appears) the starless, and, like *aquilo*, the north wind, as bringing forward the black clouds. But properly the “fathers of rain” are, in Syria, the west and the south-west; and so little can צפון here mean the pure north wind, that Jerome, who knew from his own experience the changes of weather in Palestine, helps himself, after Symmachus (διαλύει βροχήν), with a *quid pro quo* out of the difficulty: *ventus aquilo dissipat pluvias*; the Jewish interpreters (Aben Ezra, Joseph Kimchi, and Meîri) also thus explain, for they connect together חולל, in the meaning חמנע, with the unintelligible חלילה (far be it!). But צפון may also, perhaps like ζόφος (*Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitsch.* xxi. 600 f.), standing not without connection therewith, denote the north-west; and probably the proverb emphasized the northern direction of the compass, because, according to the intention of the similitude, he seeks to designate such rain as is associated with raw, icy-cold weather, as the north wind (xxvii. 16, LXX., Sir. xliii. 20) brings along with it. The names of the winds are *gen. fem.*, e.g. Isa. xliii. 6. אַחֲזָה (Aquila, ὠδίνει;

cf. viii. 24, *ὠδονήθη*) has in Codd., *e.g.* the *Jaman.*, the tone on the penult, and with *Tsere Metheg* (*Thorath Emeth*, p. 21) serving as העמדה. So also the Arab. *nataj* is used of the wind, as helping the birth of the rain-clouds. Manifestly פָּנִים נֹעֲמִים, countenances manifesting extreme displeasure (*vid.* the *Kal* נָעַם, xxiv. 24), are compared to rain. With justice Hitzig renders פָּנִים, as *e.g.* John ii. 6, in the plur. sense; because, for the influence which the tongue slandering in secret (Ps. ci. 5) has on the slandered, the "sorrowful countenance" would not be so characteristic as for the influence which it exercises on the mutual relationships of men: the secret babblers, the confidential communication throwing suspicion, now on this one and now on that one, behind their backs, excites men against one another, so that one shows to another a countenance in which deep displeasure and suspicion express themselves.

Ver. 24 Better to sit on the top of a roof,  
Than a quarrelsome woman and a house in common.

A repetition of xxi. 9.

Ver. 25 Fresh water to a thirsty soul;  
And good news from a far country.

*Vid.* regarding the form of this proverb, vol. i. p. 9; we have a similar proverb regarding the influence of good news at xv. 30. Fresh cold water is called at Jer. xviii. 14 מֵיִם קָרִים; *vid.* regarding קָר, xviii. 27. "עֵיף, cogn. יָעַף and עֵיף, properly to become darkened, therefore figuratively like (Arab.) *gushiya 'alyh*, to become faint, to become feeble unto death, of the darkness which spreads itself over the eyes" (Fleischer).

This proverb, with the figure of "fresh water," is now followed by one with the figure of a "fountain":

Ver. 26 A troubled fountain and a ruined spring—  
A righteous man yielding to a godless man.

For the most part, in מָט one thinks of a yielding in consequence of being forced. Thus *e.g.* Fleischer: as a troubled ruined spring is a misfortune for the people who drink out of it, or draw from it, so is it a misfortune for the surrounding of the righteous, when he is driven from his dwelling or his possession by an unrighteous man. And it is true: the righteous can be compared to a well (מַעֵין, well-spring, from עָן, a well, as an eye of the earth, and מִקָּר, fountain, from קָר, R. קָר,

כר, to round out, to dig out), with reference to the blessing which flows from it to its surroundings (cf. x. 11 and John vii. 38). But the words "yielding to" (contrast "stood before," 2 Kings x. 4, or Josh. vii. 12), in the phrase "yielding to the godless," may be understood of a spontaneous as well as of a constrained, forced, wavering and yielding, as the expression in the Psalm בִּלְאִמּוֹט [non movebor, Ps. x. 6] affirms the certainty of being neither inwardly nor outwardly ever moved or shaken. The righteous shall stand fast and strong in God without fearing the godless (Isa. li. 12 f.), unmoveable and firm as a brazen wall (Jer. i. 17 f.). If, however, he is wearied with resistance, and from the fear of man, or the desire to please man, or from a false love of peace he yields before it, and so gives way,—then he becomes like to a troubled fountain (רַפֵּשׁ, cogn. רָמַם, Ezek. xxxiv. 18; Isa. xli. 25; Jerome: *fons turbatus pede*), a ruined spring; his character, hitherto pure, is now corrupted by his own guilt, and now far from being a blessing to others, his wavering is a cause of sorrow to the righteous, and an offence to the weak—he is useful no longer, but only injurious. Rightly Lagarde: "The verse, one of the most profound of the whole book, does not speak of the misfortune, but of the fall of the righteous, whose sin compromises the holy cause which he serves, 2 Sam. xii. 14." Thus also *e.g.* Löwenstein, with reference to the proverb *Sanhedrin* 92b: also in the time of danger let not a man disown his honour. Bachja, in his *Ethics*, referring to this figure, 26a, thinks of the possibility of restoration: the righteous wavers only for the moment, but at last he comes right (מַחְמוֹט וְעוֹלָה). But this interpretation of the figure destroys the point of the proverb.

Ver. 27. This verse, as it stands, is scarcely to be understood. The *Venet.* translates 27b literally: ἔπεινά τε δόξας αὐτῶν δόξα; but what is the reference of this בְּכֹדָם? Euchel and others refer it to men, for they translate: "to set a limit to the glory of man is true glory;" but the "glory of man" is denoted by the phrase בְּכֹד אָדָם, not by בְּכֹדָם; and, besides, חֶקֶר does not mean measure and limit. Oetinger explains: "To eat too much honey is not good; whereas the searching after their glory, viz. of pleasant and praiseworthy things, which are likened to honey, is glory, cannot be too much done,

and is never without utility and honour;" but how can כְּבֹדֶם be of the same meaning as כְּבֹד הַדְּבָרִים אֲשֶׁר or כְּבֹדֶם הַנִּמְשָׁלִים—such an abbreviation of the expression is impossible. Schultens, according to Rashi: *vestigatio gravitatis eorum est gravitas*, i.e. the searching out of their difficulty is a trouble; better Vitringa (since כְּבֹד nowhere occurs in this sense of *gravitas molesta ac pondere oppressura*): *investigatio præstantiæ eorum est gloriosa*; but Vitringa, in order to gain a connection to 27a, needs to introduce *etiamsi*, and in both explanations the reference of the כְּבֹדֶם is imaginary, and it by no means lies near, since the Scripture uses the word כְּבֹד of God, and His kingdom and name, but never of His law or His revelation. This also is an argument against Bertheau, who translates: the searching out of their glory (viz. of the divine law and revelation) is a burden, a strenuous occupation of the mind, since חָקֵר does not in itself mean searching out, and is equivocally, even unintelligibly, expressed, since כְּבֹד denotes, it is true, here and there, a great multitude, but never a burden (as כְּבֹד). The thought which Jerome finds in 27b: *qui scrutator est maiestatis opprimetur a gloria*, is judicious, and connects itself synonym. with 27a; but such a thought is unwarranted, for he disregards the suff. of כְּבֹדֶם, and renders כְּבֹד in the sense of difficulty (oppression). Or should it perhaps be vocalized כְּבֹדֶם (Syr., Targ., Theodotion, δέδοξασμένα = כְּבֹדוֹת)? Thus vocalized, Umbreit renders it in the sense of *honores*; Elster and Zöckler in the sense of *difficultates* (*difficilia*); but this plur., neither the biblical, nor, so far as I know, the post-bibl. usage of the word has ever adopted. However, the sense of the proverb which Elster and Zöckler gain is certainly that which is aimed at. We accordingly translate:

To surfeit oneself in eating honey is not good,

But as an inquirer to enter on what is difficult is honour.

We read כְּבֹדֶם instead of כְּבֹדֶם. This change commends itself far more than כְּבֹד מִכְּבֹד (וְחָקֵר), according to which Gesenius explains: *nimum studium honoris est sine honore*—impossible, for חָקֵר does not signify *nimum studium*, in the sense of striving, but only that of inquiry: one strives after honour, but does not study it. Hitzig and Ewald, after the example of J. D. Michaelis, Arnoldi, and Ziegler, betake themselves therefore to

the Arabic; Ewald explains, for he leaves the text unchanged: "To despise their honour (that is, of men) is honour (true, real honour);" Hitzig, for he changes the text like Gesenius: "To despise honour is more than honour," with the ingenious remark: To obtain an order [*insigne ordinis*] is an honour, but not to wear it then for the first time is its *bouquet*. Nowhere any trace either in Hebrew or in Aramaic is to be found of the verb חקר, to despise (to be despised), and so it must here remain without example.<sup>1</sup> Nor have we any need of it. The change of כְּבֹד into כְּבֹד is enough. The proverb is an antithetic distich; 27a warns against inordinate longing after enjoyments, 27b praises earnest labour. Instead of דְּבַשׁ הָרְבוֹת, if honey in the mass were intended, the words would have been דְּבַשׁ הָרְבֵּה (Eccles. v. 11; 1 Kings x. 10), or at least הָרְבוֹת דְּבַשׁ (Amos iv. 9); הָרְבוֹת can only be a *n. actionis*, and אָכַל דְּבַשׁ its inverted object (cf. Jer. ix. 4), as Böttcher has discerned: to make much of the eating of honey, to do much therein is not good (cf. ver. 16). In 27b Luther also partly hits on the correct rendering: "and he who searches into difficult things, to him it is too difficult," for which it ought to be said: to him it is an honour. כְּבֹד, viz. דְּבָרִים, signifies difficult things, as רִיקִים, xii. 11, vain things. The Heb. כָּבֵד, however, never means difficult to be understood or comprehended (although more modern lexicons say this),<sup>2</sup> but always only burdensome and heavy, *gravis*, not *difficilis*. כְּבֹד are also things of which the חָקַר, i.e. the fundamental searching into them (xviii. 17, xxv. 2 f.), costs an earnest effort, which perhaps, according to the first impression, appears to surpass the available strength (cf. Ex. xviii. 18). To overdo oneself in eating honey is not good; on the contrary, the searching into difficult subjects is nothing less than an eating of honey, but an honour. There is here a *paronomasia*. Fleischer translates it: *explorare gravia grave est*; but we render *grave*

<sup>1</sup> The Hebrew meaning *investigare*, and the equivalent Arabic *ḥakr*, *contemnere* (*contemptui esse*), are derivations from the primary meaning (R. חק): to go down from above firmly on anything, and thus to press in (to cut in), or also to press downward.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Sir. iii. 20 f. with Ben-Sira's Heb. text in my *Gesch. der jüd. Poesie*, p. 204 (vers. 30–32); nowhere does this adj. כָּבֵד appear here in this warning against meditating over the transcendental.

*est* not in the sense of *molestiam creat*, but *gravitatem parit* (weight = respect, honour).

Ver. 28. This verse, counselling restraint as to the spirit, is connected with the foregoing, which counsels to self-control as to enjoyment :

A city broken through, now without walls—

A man without self-control over his spirit.

A “city broken down” is one whose wall is “broken,” 2 Chron. xxxii. 5, whether it has met with breaches (פְּרָצִים), or is wholly broken; in the former case also the city is incapable of being defended, and it is all one as if it had no wall. Such a city is like a man “who hath no control over his own spirit” (for the accentuation of the Heb. words here, *vid. Thorath Emeth*, p. 10) : *cujus spiritui nulla cohibitio* (Schultens), *i.e. qui animum suum cohibere non potest* (Fleischer : עָצַר, R. צַר, to press together, to oppress, and thereby to hold back). As such a city can be plundered and laid waste without trouble, so a man who knows not to hold in check his desires and affections is in constant danger of blindly following the impulse of his unbridled sensuality, and of being hurried forward to outbreaks of passion, and thus of bringing unhappiness upon himself. There are sensual passions (*e.g.* drunkenness), intellectual (*e.g.* ambition), mingled (*e.g.* revenge); but in all of these a false *ego* rules, which, instead of being held down by the true and better *ego*, rises to unbounded supremacy.<sup>1</sup> Therefore the expression used is not לִפְנֵי שׁוֹ, but לְרוּחוֹ; desire has its seat in the soul, but in the spirit it grows into passion, which in the root of all its diversities is selfishness (*Psychol.* p. 199); self-control is accordingly the ruling of the spirit, *i.e.* the restraining (keeping down) of the false enslaved *ego*-life by the true and free, and powerful in God Himself.

xxvi. 1. There now follows a group of eleven proverbs of the fool; only the first of the group has after it a proverb of different contents, but of similar form :

As snow in summer, and rain in harvest;

So honour befiteth not a fool.

If there is snow in high summer (יָרֵב, to be glowing hot), it is contrary to nature; and if there is rain in harvest, it is (accord-

<sup>1</sup> *Vid. Drbal's Empirische Psychologie*, § 137.

ing to the alternations of the weather in Palestine) contrary to what is usually the case, and is a hindrance to the ingathering of the fruits of the field. Even so a fool and respect, or a place of honour, are incongruous things; honour will only injure him (as according to xix. 10, luxury); he will make unjust use of it, and draw false conclusions from it; it will strengthen him in his folly, and only increase it. נָאֶה (= נֶאֱוֶה) is the adj. to the *Pil.* נֶאֱוֶה, Ps. xciii. 5 (plur. נֶאֱוֶה); נֶאֱוֶה, xix. 10, and נֶאֱוֶה, xvii. 7, are also masc. and fem. of the adj., according to which, that which is said under xix. 10 is to be corrected. Symmachus and Theodotion have translated οὐκ ἐπρεψεν, and have therefore read נֶאֱוֶה. The root word is נָאֶה (as שָׁחָה to שִׁחָה) = נוֹה, to aim at something (*vid.* Hupfeld under Ps. xxiii. 2).

Ver. 2. This verse is formed quite in the same way as the preceding:

As the sparrow in its fluttering, as the swallow in its flying,  
So the curse that is groundless: it cometh not.

This passage is one of those fifteen (*vid.* under Ps. c. 3) in which the לָ of the text is changed by the *Kerî* into לוֹ; the Talm., Midrash, and Sohar refer this לוֹ partly to him who utters the curse himself, against whom also, if he is a judge, such inconsiderate cursing becomes an accusation by God; partly to him who is cursed, for they read from the proverb that the curse of a private person also (הַרְיוּט, ἡρώτης) is not wont to fall to the ground, and that therefore one ought to be on his guard against giving any occasion for it (*vid.* Norzi). But Aben Ezra supposes that לָ and לוֹ interchange, as much as to say that the undeserved curse falls on him (לוֹ) who curses, and does not fall (לָ) on him who is cursed. The figures in 2a harmonize only with לָ, according to which the LXX., the Syr., Targ., *Venet.*, and Luther (against Jerome) translate, for the principal matter, that the sparrow and the swallow, although flying out (xxvii. 8), return home again to their nest (Rabag), would be left out of view in the comparison by לוֹ. This emphasizes the fluttering and flying, and is intended to affirm that a groundless curse is a פֶּרֶחַ בְּאֵייר, aimless, *i.e.* a thing hovering in the air, that it fails and does not take effect. Most interpreters explain the two *Lameds* as declaring the destination: *ut passer (sc. natus est) ad vagandum*, as the sparrow, through

necessity of nature, roves about . . . (Fleischer). But from xxv. 3 it is evident that the *Lamed* in both cases declares the reference or the point of comparison : as the sparrow in respect to its fluttering about, etc. The names of the two birds are, according to Aben Ezra, like dreams without a meaning ; but the Romanic exposition explains rightly צפור by *passereau*, and דרור by *hirondelle*, for צפור (Arab. 'usfuwr), twitterer, designates at least preferably the sparrow, and דרור the swallow, from its flight shooting straight out, as it were radiating (*vid.* under Ps. lxxxiv. 4) ; the name of the sparrow, *dûrî* (found in court-yards), which Wetstein, after Saadia, compares to דרור, is etymologically different.<sup>1</sup> Regarding הָנֵם, *vid.* under xxiv. 28. Rightly the accentuation separates the words rendered, “ so the curse undeserved ” (קִלְלָה, after Kimchi, *Michlol* 79b, קִלְלָה), from those which follow ; לֹא תָבֵא is the explication of כֵּן : thus hovering in the air is a groundless curse—it does not come (בוא, like *e.g.* Josh. xxi. 43). After this proverb, which is formed like ver. 1, the series now returns to the “ fool.”

Ver. 3 A whip for the horse, a bridle for the ass,  
And a rod for the back of fools.

J. D. Michaelis supposes that the order should be reversed : a bridle for the horse, a whip for the ass ; but Arnoldi has here discovered the figure of speech *merismus* (*cf.* x. 1) ; and Hitzig, in the manner of the division, the rhythmical reason of the combination (*cf.* שֵׁם יִפֹּת וְהֵם for שֵׁם הֵם וִיפֹת) : whip and bridle belong to both, for one whips a horse (Neh. iii. 2) and also bridles him ; one bridles an ass (Ps. xxxii. 9) and also whips him (Num. xxii. 28 f.). As whip and bridle are both serviceable and necessary, so also serviceable and necessary is a rod, לִגְיוֹן כְּסִילִים, x. 13, xix. 29.

Ver. 4 Answer not the fool according to his folly,  
Lest thou thyself also become like unto him.

After, or according to his folly, is here equivalent to recognising the foolish supposition and the foolish object of his question, and thereupon considering it, as if, *e.g.*, he asked why the ignorant man was happier than the man who had much knowledge, or how one may acquire the art of making gold ; for “ a

<sup>1</sup> It is true that the Gemara to *Nega'im*, xiv. 1, explains the Mishnic צפורים דרור, “ house-birds,” for it derives דרור from דור, to dwell.

fool can ask more than ten wise men can answer." He who recognises such questions as justifiable, and thus sanctions them, places himself on an equality with the fool, and easily himself becomes one. The proverb that follows affirms apparently the direct contrary :

Ver. 5 Answer the fool according to his folly,  
Lest he regard himself as wise.

ענה כסיל (with *Makkeph*, and *Gaja*, and *Chatef*<sup>1</sup>) here stands opposed to אל-חען כסיל. The Gospel of John, *e.g.* v. 31, cf. viii. 31,<sup>2</sup> is rich in such apparently contradictory sayings. The *sic et non* here lying before us is easily explained; after, or according to his folly, is this second time equivalent to, as is due to his folly: decidedly and firmly rejecting it, making short work with it (returning a sharp answer), and promptly replying in a way fitted, if possible, to make him ashamed. Thus one helps him, perhaps, to self-knowledge; while, in the contrary case, one gives assistance to his self-importance. The Talmud, *Schabbath* 30*b*, solves the contradiction by referring ver. 4 to worldly things, and ver. 5 to religious things; and it is true that, especially in the latter case, the answer is itself a duty toward the fool, and toward the truth. Otherwise the Midrash: one ought not to answer when one knows the fool as such, and to answer when he does not so know him; for in the first instance the wise man would dishonour himself by the answer, in the latter case he would give to him who asks the importance appertaining to a superior.

Ver. 6 He cutteth off the feet, he drinketh injury,  
Who transacteth business by a fool.

He cutteth off, *i.e.* his own feet, as we say: he breaks his neck, *il se casse le cou*; Lat. *frangere brachium, crus, coxam; frangere navem* (Fleischer). He thinks to supplement his own two legs by those of the messenger, but in reality he cuts them off; for not only is the commission not carried out, but it is even badly carried out, so that instead of being refreshed (xiii.

<sup>1</sup> Thus after Ben Asher; while, on the contrary, Ben Naphtali writes ענה כסיל with *Munach*, *vid. Thorath Emeth*, p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> *Vid.* my dissertation on three little-observed passages in the Gospel of John, and their practical lessons, in the *Evang. luth. Kirchenzeitung*, 1869, Nos. 37, 38.

17, xxv. 13) by the quick, faithful execution of it, he has to swallow nothing but damage; cf. Job xxxiv. 7, where, however, drinking scorn is meant of another (LXX.), not his own; on the contrary, חָמָס here refers to injury suffered (as if it were חָמָסוֹ, for the suff. of חָמָס is for the most part objective); cf. the similar figures x. 26. So שְׁלַח בְּיָד, to accomplish anything by the mediation of another, cf. Ex. iv. 13; with רָכַר (רִכְרִים), 2 Sam. xv. 36. The reading מְקַצֶּה (Jerome, Luther, *claudus*) is unnecessary; since, as we saw, מְקַצֶּה includes it in the *sibi*. The Syr. reads, after the LXX. (the original text of which was ἐκ τῶν ποδῶν αὐτοῦ), מְקַצֶּה, for he errs, as also does the Targumist, in thinking that מְקַצֶּה can be used for מְקַצֵּן; but Hitzig adopts this reading, and renders: “from the end of the legs he swallows injury who sends messages by a fool.” The end of the legs are the feet, and the feet are those of the foolish messenger. The proverb in this form does not want in boldness, but the wisdom which Hitzig finds in it is certainly not mother-wit.<sup>1</sup> Böttcher, on his part, also with מְקַצֶּה, renders: “from the end of his feet he drinks in that which is bitter . . .” —that also is too artificial, and is unintelligible without the explanation of its discoverer. But that he who makes a fool his messenger becomes himself like unto one who cuts off his own legs, is a figure altogether excellent.

Ver. 7 The hanging down of the legs of a lame man;  
And a proverb in a fool's mouth.

With reference to the obscure רָלִי, the following views have been maintained:—(1) The form as punctuated appears directly as an imperative. Thus the LXX. translate, the original text of which is here: ἀφελοῦ πορείαν κυλλῶν (conj. Lagarde's) καὶ παροιμίαν ἐκ στόματος ἀφρόνων, which the Syr. (with its imitator, the Targ.) has rendered positively: “If thou canst give the power of (sound) going to the lame, then wilt thou also receive (prudent) words from the mouth of a fool.” Since Kimchi, רָלִי has been regarded by many as the softening of the *Imp. Piel* רָלִי, according to which the *Venet.* translates: ἐπάρατε

<sup>1</sup> The *Venet.* translates תַּתָּה by δυνος, so שִׁטָּה (the post-bibl. designation of a fool)—one of the many indications that this translator is a Jew, and as such is not confined in his knowledge of language only to the bibl. Hebrew.

κνήμας χωλοῦ; and Bertheau and Zöckler explain: always take away his legs from the lame, since they are in reality useless to him, just as a proverb in the mouth of the fool is useless,—something that without loss might be never there.” But why did not the poet write הָרִמּוֹ, or הָסִירוֹ, or קָחַ, or the like? לָקַח, to carry away, to dispense with, is Syriac (Targ. Jer. I., under Deut. xxxii. 50), but not Hebrew. And how meaningless is this expression! A lame man would withstand a surgeon (as he would a murderer) who would amputate his legs; for lame legs are certainly better than none, especially since there is a great distinction between a lame man (חֲסִיף, from חָסַף, *luxare*; cf. (Arab.) *fasah*, *laxare*, vid. Schultens) who halts or goes on crutches (2 Sam. iii. 29), and one who is maimed (paralytic), who needs to be carried. It comes to this, that by this rendering of 7a one must, as a consequence, with the LXX., regard לְשׁוֹן [and a proverb] as object. accus. parallel to רַגְלַי [legs]; but “to draw a proverb from one’s mouth” is, after xx. 5, something quite different from to tear a proverb away from him, besides which, one cannot see how it is to be caught. Rather one would prefer: *attollite crura claudi (ut incedat, et nihil promovebitis)*; but the וְ of חֲסִיף does not accord with this, and 7b does not connect itself with it. But the explanation: “take away the legs from a lame man who has none, at least none to use, and a proverb in the mouth of fools, when there is none,” is shattered against the “leg-taking-away,” which can only be used perhaps of frogs’ legs. (2) Symmachus translates: ἐξέλιπον κνήμαι ἀπὸ χωλοῦ; and Chajûg explains לָקַח as 3 pret. Kal, to which Kimchi adds the remark, that he appears to have found לָקַח, which indeed is noted by Norzi and J. H. Michaelis as a variant. But the Masoretic reading is לָקַח, and this, after Gesenius and Böttcher (who in this, without any reason, sees an Ephraimitic form of uttering the word), is a softened variation from לָקַח. Only it is a pity that this softening, while it is supported by *alius* = ἄλλος, *folium* = φύλλον, *faillir* = *fallere*, and the like, has yet not a single Hebrew or Semitic example in its favour. (3) Therefore Ewald finds, “all things considered,” that it is best to read לָקַח, “the legs are too loose for the lame man to use them.” But, with Dietrich, we cannot

concur in this, nor in the more appropriate translation: "the legs of the lame hang down loose," to say nothing of the clearly impossible: "high are the legs of the lame (one higher than the other)," and that because this form  $\text{נָלִי}$  for  $\text{נָלִי}$  also occurs without pause, Ps. lvii. 2, lxxiii. 2, cxxii. 6, Isa. xxi. 12; but although thus, as at Ps. xxxvi. 9, lxviii. 32, at the beginning of a clause, yet always only in connection, never at the beginning of an address. (4) It has also been attempted to interpret  $\text{רָלִי}$  as abstr., *e.g.* Euchel: "he learns from a cripple to dance, who seeks to learn proverbs from the mouth of a fool."  $\text{רָלִי שְׁקִים}$  must mean the lifting up of the legs = springing and dancing. Accordingly Luther translates:

"As dancing to a cripple,  
So does it become a fool to speak of wisdom."

The thought is agreeable, and according to fact; but these words do not mean dancing, but much rather, as the Arabic shows (*vid.* Schultens at xx. 5, and on the passage before us), a limping, waddling walk, like that of ducks, after the manner of a well-bucket dangling to and fro. And  $\text{רָלִי}$ , after the form  $\text{מָלַכְו}$ , would be an unheard-of Aramaism. For forms such as  $\text{שָׁחַו}$ , swimming, and  $\text{שָׁלַו}$ , security, Ps. xxx. 7, on which C. B. Michaelis and others rest, cannot be compared, since they are modified from *sachw*, *salw*, while in  $\text{רָלִי}$  the *û* ending must be, and besides the Aramaic  $\text{רָלִי}$  must in *st. constr.* be  $\text{רָלִיּוֹת}$ . Since none of these explanations are grammatically satisfactory, and besides  $\text{רָלִי} = \text{רָלַל} = \text{רָלַו}$  gives a parallel member which is heterogeneous and not conformable to the nature of an emblematical proverb, we read  $\text{רָלִי}$  after the forms  $\text{נָפְו}$ ,  $\text{נָפְוִי}$  (cf.  $\text{חָבְוִק}$ , vi. 10, xxiv. 33), and this signifies loose, hanging down, from  $\text{רָלַה}$ , to hang at length and loosely down, or transitively: to hang, particularly of the hanging down at length of the bucket-rope, and of the bucket itself, to draw water from the well. The  $\text{ן}$  is similar to that of Job xxviii. 4, only that here the connecting of the hanging down, and of that from which it hangs down, is clear. Were we to express the purely nominally expressed emblematical proverb in the form of a comparative one, it would thus stand as Fleischer translates it: *ut laxa et flaccida dependent (torpent) crura a claudo, sic sententia in ore stultorum (sc. torpet h. e. inutilis est)*. The fool can

as little make use of an intelligent proverb, or moral maxim (*dictum sententiosum*), as a lame man can of his feet; the word, which in itself is full of thought, and excellent, becomes halting, lame, and loose in his mouth (Schultens: *deformiter claudicat*); it has, as spoken and applied by him, neither hand nor foot. Strangely, yet without missing the point, Jerome: *quomodo pulcras frustra habet claudus tibias, sic indecens est in ore stultorum parabola*. The lame man possibly has limbs that appear sound; but when he seeks to walk, they fail to do him service,—so a *bon-mot* comes forth awkwardly when the fool seeks to make use of it. Hitzig's conjecture: as leaping of the legs on the part of a lame man . . ., Böttcher has already shown sufficient reasons for rejecting; leaping on the part of any one, for the leaping of any one, were a court style familiar to no poet.

Ver. 8. This proverb presents to us a new difficulty.

As one binds a stone in a sling,  
So is he who giveth honour to a fool.

This translation is warranted by tradition, and is in accordance with the actual facts. A sling is elsewhere called קָלָע; but that מַרְגָּמָה also in the passage before us signifies a sling (from מַרְגֵּם, to throw with stones = to stone or to throw stones = to sling, cf. Targ. Esth. v. 14 מַרְגֵּם, of David's slinging stones against Goliath), is supported by the LXX., Syr., and Targ. on the one side, and the Jewish Glossists on the other (Rashi: *fronde*, Ital. *frombola*). Rightly the LXX. renders כִּצְרוֹר as a verb: ὥς ἀποδεσμεύει; on the contrary, the Syr. and Targ. regard it as a substantive: as a piece of stone; but צִרֹר as a substantive does not mean a piece, as one would put into a sling to use as a weapon, but a grain, and thus a little piece, 2 Sam. xvii. 13; cf. Amos ix. 9. Erroneously Ewald: "if one binds to the sling the stone which he yet seeks to throw, then all his throwing and aiming are in vain; so it is in vain to give to a fool honour which does not reach him." If one seeks to sling a stone, he must lay the *lapis missilis* so in the sling that it remains firm there, and goes forth only by the strong force of the slinging; this fitting in (of the stone), so that it does not of itself fall out, is expressed by צִרֹר בְּ (cf.

xxx. 4; Job xxvi. 8). The giving is compared to the binding, the stones to the honour, and the sling to the fool: the fool is related to the honour which one confers on him, as the stone to the sling in which one lays it—the giving of honour is a slinging of honour. Otherwise (after Kimchi) the *Venet.* ὡς συνδεσμὸς λίθου ἐν λιθάδι, *i.e.* as Fleischer translates: *ut qui crumenam gemmarum plenam in acervum lapidum conjicit.* Thus also Ralbag, Ahron b. Josef, and others, and lastly Zöckler. The figure is in the form of an address, and מְרַגְמָה (from רָגַם, *accumulare, congerere, vid.* under Ps. lxvii. 28) might certainly mean the heaping of stones. But אֶבֶן is not used in the sense of יְקָרָה אֶבֶן (precious stone); also one does not see why one precious stone is not enough as the figure of honour, and a whole heap is named; but in the third place, בֵּן נוֹתֵן requires for כְּצִרּוֹר a verbal signification. Therefore Jerome translates: *sicut qui mittit lapidem in acervum Mercurii*; in this the echo of his Jewish teacher, for the Midrash thus explains literally: every one who gives honour to a fool is like one who throws a stone on a heap of stones consecrated to Mercury. Around the Hermes (ἑρμαί), *i.e.* pillars with the head of Mercury (*statuæ mercuriales* or *viales*), were heaps of stones (ἑρμακες), to which the passer-by was wont to throw a stone; it was a mark of honour, and served at the same time to improve the way, whose patron was Mercurius (מַרְקוּלִים). It is self-evident that this Græco-Roman custom to which the Talm. make frequent reference, cannot be supposed to have existed in the times of Solomon. Luther translates independently, and apparently rendering into German that *in acervum Mercurii*: that is as if one threw a precious stone on the “*Rabenstein*,” *i.e.* the heap of stones raised at the foot of the gallows. This heap of stones is more natural and suitable to the times of Solomon than the heap of stones dedicated to Mercury, if, like Gussetius, one understands מְרַגְמָה of a heap of stones, *supra corpus lapidatum*. But against this and similar interpretations it is enough to remark that כְּצִרּוֹר cannot signify *sicut qui mittit*. Had such a meaning been intended, the word would have been בְּהַשְׁלִיךְ or בְּמַשְׁלִיךְ. Still different is the rendering of Joseph Kimchi, Aben Ezra, and finally Löwenstein: as when one wraps up a stone in a piece of purple stuff. But אֶרְגָּמָן, purple, has nothing to do with the verb

רָנָם; it is, as the Aramaic אֲרִנָּה shows, a compound word; the supposition of a denom. מְרִנָּה thus proceeds from a false etymological supposition. And Hitzig's combination of מְרִנָּה with (Arab.) *munjam*, handle and beam of a balance (he translates: as a stone on the beam of a balance, *i.e.* lies on it), is nothing but refined ingenuity, since we have no need at all of such an Arab. word for a satisfactory clearing up of מְרִנָּה. We abide by the rendering of the sling. Böttcher translates: a sling that scatters; perhaps מְרִנָּה in reality denotes such a sling as throws many stones at once. Let that, however, be as it may: that he who confers a title of honour, a place of honour, and the like, on a fool, is like one who lays a stone in a sling, is a true and intelligibly formed thought: the fool makes the honour no honour; he is not capable of maintaining it; that which is conferred on him is uselessly wasted.

Ver. 9 A thorn goeth into the hand of a drunkard,  
And a proverb in a fool's mouth;

*i.e.*, if a proverb falls into a fool's mouth, it is as if a thorn entered into the hand of a drunken man; the one is as dangerous as the other, for fools misuse such a proverb, which, rightly used, instructs and improves, only to the wounding and grieving of another, as a drunken man makes use of the pointed instrument which he has possession of for coarse raillery, and as a welcome weapon of his strife. The LXX., Syr. (Targ.?), and Jerome interpret עָלָה in the sense of shooting up, *i.e.* of growing; Böttcher also, after xxiv. 31 and other passages, insists that the thorn which has shot up may be one that has not grown to perfection, and therefore not dangerous. But thorns grow not in the hand of any one; and one also does not perceive why the poet should speak of it as growing in the hand of a drunken man, which the use of the hand with it would only make worse. We have here עָלָה בְּיָדִי, *i.e.* it has come into my hand, commonly used in the *Mishna*, which is used where anything, according to intention, falls into one's hands, as well as where it comes accidentally and unsought for, *e.g.* *Nazir* 23a, מִי שֶׁנִּתְכוּן לַעֲלוֹת בִּידוֹ, he who designs to obtain swine's flesh and (accidentally) obtains lamb's flesh. Thus rightly Heidenheim, Löwenstein, and the *Venet.*: ἀκανθα ἀνέβη εἰς

χείρα μεθύοντος. חֹהֵם signifies a thorn bush, 2 Kings xiv. 9,<sup>1</sup> as well as a thorn, Song ii. 2, but where not the thorns of the rose, and indeed no rose at all, is meant. Luther thinks of the rose with the thorn when he explains: "When a drunkard carries and brandishes in his hand a thorn bush, he scratches more with it than allows the roses to be smelled—so a fool with the Scriptures, or a right saying, often does more harm than good." This paraphrase of Luther's interprets עֵלָה בִּיד more correctly than his translation does; on the other hand, the latter more correctly is satisfied with a thorn twig (as a thorn twig which pierces into the hand of a drunken man); the roses are, however, assumed contrary to the text. This holds good also against Wessely's explanation: "the Mashal is like a rose not without thorns, but in the mouth of a fool is like a thorn without a rose, as when a drunken man seeks to pluck roses and gains by his effort nothing but being pierced by thorns." The idea of roses is to be rejected, because at the time when this proverb was formed there were no roses in Palestine. The proverb certainly means that a right Mashal, *i.e.* an ingenious excellent maxim, is something more and better than a חֹהֵם (the prick as of the Jewish thorn, *Zizyphus vulgaris*, or the *Christus*-thorn, the *Ziz. spina Christi*); but in the mouth of a fool such a maxim becomes only a useless and a hurtful thing; for the fool so makes use of it, that he only embarrasses others and recklessly does injury to them. The LXX. translates מַשָּׁל by δουλεία, and the Aram. by שְׂטִייתָא; how the latter reached this "folly" is not apparent; but the LXX. vocalized מַשָּׁל, according to which Hitzig, at the same time changing שְׂבוּר into שְׂבוּר, translates: "thorns shoot up by the hand of the hireling, and tyranny by the mouth of fools." Although a hired labourer, yet, on this account, he is not devoid of conscience; thus 9a so corrected has something in its favour: one ought, as far as possible, to do all with his own hand; but the thought in 9b is far-fetched, and if Hitzig explains that want of judgment in the state councils creates despotism, so, on the other hand, xxiv. 7 says that the fool cannot give counsel in the gate, and therefore he holds his mouth.

<sup>1</sup> The plur. חֹהֵם, 1 Sam. xiii. 6, signifies not thorn bushes, but rock-splitting; in Damascus, *chôcha* means a little gate in the wing of a large door; *vid.* Wetstein's *Nordarabien*, p. 23.

Ver. 10. All that we have hitherto read is surpassed in obscurity by this proverb, which is here connected because of the resemblance of *ושכר* to *שכור*. We translate it thus, vocalizing differently only one word:

Much bringeth forth from itself all;

But the reward and the hirer of the fool pass away.

The LXX. translates *πολλὰ χειμάζεται πᾶσα σὰρξ ἀφρόνων* (all the flesh of fools suffers much), *συντριβήσεται γὰρ ἡ ἔκστασις αὐτῶν*, which is in Hebrew:

רַב מַחֲלֵל כָּל בֶּשֶׂר כַּסִּיל  
יִשְׁכַּר עֲבָרָתָם

An unfortunate attempt so to rectify the words that some meaning might be extracted from them. The first line of this translation has been adopted by the Syr. and Targ., omitting only the *כל*, in which the self-condemnation of this deciphering lies (for *בֶּשֶׂר כָּל* means elsewhere, humanity, not the whole body of each individual); but they translate the second line as if the words were:

יִשְׁכַּר עֲבָרָתָם

*i.e.*, and the drunken man sails over the sea (*עֲבָרִים* is separated into *עבר* ים, as *בְּבָקָרִים*, Amos vi. 12, is to be separated into *בְּבָקָר* ים); but what does that mean? Does it mean that to a drunkard (but *שְׂכָוִיר*, the drunken man, and not *סָכָא*, the drunkard, is used) nothing remains but to wander over the sea? or that the drunken man lets his imagination wander away over the sea, while he neglects the obligation that lies upon him? Symmachus and Theodotion, with the Midrash (Rashi) and Saadia (Kimchi), take *שכר* in 10b = *סָגֵר* (like Isa. xix. 10, *שָׁכַר* = embankment, cf. *סָכְרִין*, *Kelim*, xxiii. 5); the former translates by *καὶ ὁ φράσσων ἄφρονα ἐμφράσσει τὰς ὀργὰς αὐτοῦ*, the latter by *καὶ φιμῶν ἄφρονα φιμοῖ χόλους*, yielding to the imagination that *עֲבָרִים*, like *עֲבָרוֹת*, may be the plur. of *עֲבָרָה*, anger. Jerome punctuates *רב* as, xxv. 8, *רַב*, and interprets, as Symmachus and Theodotion, *שָׁכַר* both times = *סָגֵר*, translating: *Judicium determinat causas, et qui imponit stulto silentium iras mitigat*; but *רב* does not mean *judicium*, nor *מַחֲלֵל* *determinat*, nor *כָּל* *causas*. As Gussetius, so also Ralbag (in the first of his three explanations), Meîri, Elia

Wilna interpret the proverb as a declaration regarding quarrelsome persons: he causeth woe to all, and hireth fools, hireth transgressors, for his companions; but in that case we must read  $\text{רָב}$  for  $\text{רָב}$ ;  $\text{מְחֹלֵל}$ , bringing woe, would be either the *Po.* of  $\text{חָלַל}$ , to bore through, or *Pilel* of  $\text{חָלַל}$  ( $\text{חָלַל}$ ), to put into distress (as with pangs); but  $\text{עֲבָרִים}$ , transgressors = sinners, is contrary to the O. T. *usus loq.*, xxii. 3 (xxvii. 12) is falsely cited in its favour; besides, for  $\text{רָב}$  there should have been at least  $\text{אִישׁ רָב}$ , and why  $\text{וְשֹׁכֵר}$  is repeated remains inexplicable. Others take  $\text{מְחֹלֵל־כָּל}$  as the name of God, the creator of all men and things; and truly this is the nearest impression of these two words, for  $\text{חָלַל}$  is the usual designation for divine production, *e.g.* Ps. xc. 2. Accordingly Kimchi explains: The Lord is the creator of all, and He gives to fools and to transgressors their maintenance; but  $\text{עֲבָרִים}$ , transgressors, is Mishnic, not bibl.; and  $\text{שֹׁכֵר}$  means to hire, but not to supply with food. The proverb is thus incapable of presenting a thought like Matt. v. 45 (He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and on the good). Others translate: "The Lord is creator of all, and takes fools, takes idlers, into His service." Thus rendered, the proverb is offensive; wherefore Rashi, Moses Kimchi, Arama, and others regard the Mashal as in the mouth of fools, and thus they take vers. 9 and 10 together as a tetrastich. Certainly this second collection of proverbs contains also tetrastiches; but vers. 9 and 10 cannot be regarded as together forming a tetrastich, because  $\text{רָב}$  (which is valid against Kimchi also) cannot mean God the Lord:  $\text{רָב}$ , Lord, is unheard of in bibl. Heb., and at least the word  $\text{הָרַב}$  must be used for God. The *Venet.* on this account does not follow Kimchi, but translates, *Ἀρχὼν πλάττει πάντα, καὶ μισθοῦται μωρὸν καὶ μισθοῦται ὡς παραβάτης* (ought to have been *παραβάτας*); but who could this cunning man be? Perhaps the *Venet.* is to be understood, after Gecatilia (in Rashi): a great (rich) man performs all manner of things; but if he hires a fool, it is as if he hired the first best who pass along the way. But that  $\text{חָלַל}$  is used in the general sense of to execute, to perform, is without example, and improbable. Also the explanation: a ruler brings grief, *i.e.* severe oppression, upon all (Abulwalid, Immanuel, Aben Ezra, who, in his smaller grammar, explains  $\text{רָב} = \text{רָב}$  after Isa. xlix. 9;

C. B. Michaelis: *dolore afficit omnes*), does not recommend itself; for חולל, whether it be from חלל, Isa. li. 9 (to bore through), or from חיל, Ps. xxix. 9 (to bring on the pangs of birth), is too strong a word for hurting; also the clause, thus generally understood, is fortunately untrue. Translated as by Euchel: "the prominent persons destroy all; they keep fools in pay, and favour vagabonds,"—it sounds as if it had been picked up in an assembly of democrats. On the other hand, the proverb, as translated by Luther:

A good master maketh a thing right;  
But he who hireth a bungler, by him it is spoiled,

is worthy of the Book of Proverbs. The second line is here freely rendered, but it is also appropriate, if we abide closer by the words of the text, in this connection. Fleischer: *Magister (artifex peritus) effingit omnia* (i.e. *bene perficit quaecunque ei committuntur*); *qui autem stultum conducit, conducit transeuntes* (i.e. *idem facit ac si homines ignotos et forte transeuntes ad opus gravius et difficilius conduceret*). Thus also Gesenius, Böttcher, and others, who all, as Gecatilia above, explain עברים, τὸν τυχόντας, the first best. But we are reluctantly constrained to object to this thought, because רב nowhere in bibl. Hebrew signifies a master; and the ו of the second וְשִׂכָּר cannot bear that rendering, *ac si*. And if we leave it out, we nevertheless encounter a difficulty in חולל, which cannot be used of human production. Many Christian interpreters (Cocceius, Schultens, Schelling, Ewald, Bertheau, Stier, Zöckler) give to רב a meaning which is found in no Jewish interpreter, viz. *sagittarius*, from רַבֵּב (רָבֵב), Gen. xlix. 23 (and perhaps Ps. xviii. 15), after the forms צַר, שִׁיר, the plur. of which, רַבִּים, is found at Job xvi. 13, Jer. l. 29, but in a connection which removes all doubt from the meaning of the word. Here also רב may be more closely defined by מְחַלֵּל; but how then does the proverb stand? "an archer who wounds everything, and he who hires a fool, and hires passers-by" (Ewald: street-runners), i.e. they are alike. But if the archer piercing everything is a comic *Hercules furens*, then, in order to discover the resemblance between the three, there is need of a portion of ingenuity, such as is only particularly assigned to the favoured. But it is also

against the form and the usage of the word to interpret עֲבָרִים simply of rogues and vagabonds. Several interpreters have supposed that רַב and כָּל must stand in a certain interchangeable relation to each other. Thus, *e.g.*, Ahron b. Josef: "Much makes amazement to all, but especially one who hires a fool. . . ." But this "especially" (before all) is an expression smuggled in. Agreeing with Umbreit and Hitzig, we translate line first; but in translating line second, we follow our own method:

Much bringeth all out of it;

*i.e.*, where there is much, then one has it in his power, if he begins right, to undertake everything. רַב has by כָּל the definition of a neuter, so as to designate not only many men, Ex. xix. 21, but also much ability in a pecuniary and facultative sense (cf. the subst. רַב, Isa. lxiii. 7; Ps. cxlv. 7); and of the much which bringeth forth all out of itself, effects all by itself, חוּלָל with equal right might be used, as xxv. 23, of the north wind. The antithesis 10*b* takes this form:

But the reward (read וְשֹׁכֵר) and the master (who hires him for wages) of the fool pass away,

*i.e.* perish; עֲבָרִים, as if עֲבָר, is used of chaff, Isa. xxix. 5; of stubble, Jer. xiii. 24; of shadow, Ps. cxliv. 4. That which the fool gains passes away, for he squanders it; and he who took him into his service for wages is ruined along with him, for his work is only pernicious, not useful. Although he who possesses much, and has great ability, may be able to effect everything of himself, yet that is not the case when he makes use of the assistance therein of foolish men, who not only do not accomplish anything, but, on the contrary, destroy everything, and are only ruinous to him who, with good intention, associates them with himself in his work. That the word must be more accurately וְשֹׁכֵר, instead of וְשֹׁכֵרוֹ, one may not object, since וְשֹׁכֵר is perfectly unambiguous, and is manifestly the object.

Ver. 11. The series of proverbs regarding fools is continued:

Like a dog which returneth to his vomit,  
Is a fool who cometh again with his folly.

שָׁב is like שׁוּבָה, particip.; only if the punctuation were כְּכֶלֶב, ought "which returneth to his vomit" to be taken as a

relative clause (*vid.* under Ps. xxxviii. 14). Regarding לַי as designating the *terminus quo* with verbs of motions, *vid.* Köhler under Mal. iii. 24. On נָל = נָלָה, cf. xxiii. 8. Luther rightly: as a dog devours again his vomit. The LXX. translate: ὡσπερ κύων ὅταν ἐπέλθῃ ἐπὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἔμετον; the reference in 2 Pet. ii. 22: κύων ἐπιστρέψας ἐπὶ τὸ ἴδιον ἐξέραμα, is thus not from the LXX.; the *Venet.* is not connected with this N. T. citation, but with the LXX., if its accordance with it is not merely accidental. To devour again its vomit is common with the dog.<sup>1</sup> Even so, it is the manner of fools to return again in word and in deed to their past folly (*vid.* regarding שָׁנָה with ב of the object, xvii. 9); as an Aram. popular saying has it: the fool always falls back upon his foolish conduct.<sup>2</sup> He must needs do so, for folly has become to him a second nature; but this "must" ceases when once a divine light shines forth upon him. The LXX. has after ver. 11 a distich which is literally the same as Sir. iv. 21.

Ver. 12 Seest thou a man who is wise in his own eyes?

The fool hath more hope than he.

Regarding the *perf. hypotheticum* נָלָה, *vid.* at xxii. 29. Line second is repeated, xxix. 20, unchanged. מִמֶּנִּי, *præ eo*, is equivalent to the Mishnic יוֹתֵר מִמֶּנִּי, *plus quam ei*. As the conversion of a sinner, who does not regard himself as righteous, is more to be expected than that of a self-righteous man (Matt. ix. 12 f.), so the putting right of a fool, who is conscious that he is not wise (cf. xxiv. 7), is more likely to be effected than that of one deeming himself wise; for the greatest hindrance to any turning toward that which is better lies in the delusion that he does not need it.<sup>3</sup> Thus far the group of proverbs regarding fools.

There follows now a group of proverbs regarding the slothful:

Ver. 13 The slothful saith there is a lion without,

A lion in the midst of the streets;

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Schulze's *Die bibl. Sprichwörter der deutschen Sprache*, p. 71 f.

<sup>2</sup> *Vid.* Wahl's *Das Sprichwort der heb.-aram. Literatur*, p. 147; Duke's *Rabbin. Blumenlese*, p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> The Targum has 12b after Codd. פִּקַּח סִכְלָא טַב מִנִּיהּ (= Syr. *pekach*, *expedit, convenit, melius est*), it is far better circumstanced regarding the fool than regarding him. *Vid.* Geiger's *Zeitschr.* vi. (1868), p. 154.

cf. the original of this proverb, xxii. 13. שׁוּעַל, to say nothing of שְׁחַל, is not the jackal; שְׁחַל is the bibl. name for the lion. בֵּין is the more general expression for בִּקְרֵב, Isa. v. 25; by the streets he thinks of the rows of houses that form them.

Ver. 14 The door turneth on its hinges,  
And the sluggard on his bed.

The comparison is clear. The door turns itself on its hinges, on which it hangs, in and out, without passing beyond the narrow space of its motion; so is the fool on his bed, where he turns himself from the one side to the other. He is called עֲצִיל, because he is fast glued to the place where he is (Arab. 'azila), and cannot be free (contrast of the active, cf. Arab. hafyf, moving nimbly, agilis). But the door offers itself as a comparison, because the diligent goes out by it to begin his work without (xxiv. 27; Ps. civ. 23), while the sluggard rolls himself about on his bed. The hook, the hinge, on which the door is moved, called צִיר, from צוּר, to turn,<sup>1</sup> has thus the name of הַפּוֹב.

Ver. 15 The slothful has thrust his hand into the dish,  
It is hard for him to bring it back to his mouth again.

A variation of xix. 24; the fut. יִשְׁיבֶנָּה there, is here explained by נִלְאָה לְהַשִּׁיבָהּ.

Ver. 16 The sluggard is wise in his own eyes,  
More than seven men who give an excellent answer.

Between slothfulness and conceit there exists no inward necessary mutual relation. The proverb means that the sluggard as such regards himself as wiser than seven, who all together answer well at any examination: much labour—he thinks with himself—only injures the health, blunts men for life and its joys, leads only to over-exertion; for the most prudent is, as a general rule, crack-brained. Böttcher's "*maulfaule*" [slow to speak] belongs to the German style of thinking; עֵטל in Syr. is not he who is slow to speak, but he who has a

<sup>1</sup> The Arab. verb signifies radically: to turn, like the Persian verbs *kashatn* and *kardydān*, and like our "*werden*" [to grow, turn], accords with *vertere* (Fleischer).

faltering tongue.<sup>1</sup> Seven is the number of manifoldness in completed unfolding (ix. 1). Meîri thinks, after Ezra vii. 14, on the council of seven of the Asiatic ruler. But seven is a round number of plurality, ver. 25, xxiv. 16, vi. 31. Regarding מַעַם, *vid.* at xi. 22.

A series of proverbs which recommend the love of peace, for they present caricatures of the opposite :

Ver. 17 He seizeth by the ears a dog passing by,

Who is excited by a strife which concerns him not.

According to the accentuation in the text, the proverb is to be translated with Fleischer: *Qualis est quiprehendit aures canis, talis est qui forte transiens ira abripitur propter rixam alienam (eique temere se immiscet)*. Since he is cautioned against unwarranted interference, the expression מִתְעַבֵּר בְּרִיָּן might have been used (xiv. 10), according to which the Syr. translates; but עַל-רִיב substantiates the originality of מִתְעַבֵּר (*vid.* xiv. 16, xx. 2). On the other hand, the placing together, without any connection of the two participles, is perplexing; why not עֵבֶר וּמִתְעַבֵּר? For it is certainly not meant, that falling into a passion he passes by; but that passing by, he falls into a passion; for he stands to this object. The Targumist, feeling this also, renders עֵבֶר in the sense of being angry, but contrary to the *usus loq.* Wherefore the conjecture of Euchel and Abramsohn commends itself, that עֵבֶר belongs to כָּלֵב—the figure thereby becomes more distinct. To seize one's own dog by the ear is not dangerous, but it is not advisable to do this with a strange dog. Therefore עֵבֶר belongs as a necessary attribute to the dog. The dog accidentally passing by corresponds to the strife to which one stands in no relation (רִיב לֹא-לּוֹ, *vid.* regarding the *Makkeph*, Baer's *Genesis*, p. 85, not. 9). Whoever is excited to passion about a strife that does not belong to him, is like one who lays hold by the ears (the LXX. arbitrarily: by the tail) of a dog that is passing by—to the one or to the other it happens right when he brings evil upon himself thereby.

Vers. 18, 19. These verses form a tetrastich :

Ver. 18 As a man who casteth brands,  
And arrows, and death ;

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<sup>1</sup> The Aram. עַמַּל is the Hebr. עָעַל, as עֵצָה = עֵצָה; but in Arab. corresponds not to 'atal, but to 'azal.

19 So is the man who deceiveth his neighbour,  
And saith : I only make sport.

The old translations of מתלהל are very diverse. Aquila has rendered it by *κακοηθιζόμενος*; Symmachus: *πειρώμενοι*; the Syr.: the vainglorious; the Targ.: מתחח (from נחח), a successor (spiritually); Jerome: *noxius* (injurious; for which Luther: secret). There is thus no traditional translation. Kimchi explains the word by השתגע (*Venet.* *ἐξεστώς*); Aben Ezra by השחטה (from שטה), to behave thoughtlessly, foolishly; but both erroneously, confounding with it ותלה, Gen. xlvii. 13, which is formed from להה and not from להה, and is related to להה, according to which מתלהל would designate him who exerts himself (Rashi, המתגע), or who is worn out (Saadia: who does not know what to do, and in weariness passes his time). The root להה (לה, whence the reflex form התלהל, like התמהמה, from מהה, מה) leads to another primary idea. The root לה presents in (Arab.) *âliha* (*vid.* Fleischer in the *Comm. zur Genesis*, p. 57), *waliha*, and *taliha*, formed from the 8th form of this verb (*aittalah*), the fundamental meaning of internal and external unrest; these verbs are used of the effect of fear (shrinking back from fear), and, generally, the want of self-command; the Syr. *otlahlah*, to be terrified, *obstupescere*, confirms this primary conception, connecting itself with the R. לה. Accordingly, he who shoots every possible death-bringing arrow, is thought of as one who is beside himself, one who is of confused mind, in which sense the passive forms of (Arab.) *âlah* and *talâh* are actually used. Schultens' reference to (Arab.) *lâh micare*, according to which כמתלהל must mean *sicut ludicram micationem exercens* (Böttcher: one who exerts himself; Malbim: one who scoffs, from להל), is to be rejected, because מתלהל must be the direct opposite of מִשְׁחָק; and Ewald's comparison of (Arab.) *wâh* and *akhkh*, to be entangled, distorted, *lâh*, to be veiled, confounds together heterogeneous words. Regarding אִשִּׁים (from אִשָּׁה), burning arrows, *vid.* under Isa. l. 11. Death stands third, not as comprehensive (that which is deadly of every kind), but as a climax (yea, even death itself). The אִשָּׁה of the principal sentence, correlate to אִשָּׁה of the contiguous clause, has the *Makkeph* in our editions; but the laws of the metrical *Makkeph* require אִשָּׁה (with *Munach*), as it occurs

*e.g.* in Cod. 1294. A man who gives vent to his malice against his neighbour, and then says: seest thou not that . . . (לֵלִי, like Arab. *álá*), *i.e.* I am only jesting, I have only a joke with thee: he exhibits himself as being mad, who in blind rage scatters about him deadly arrows.

There now follow proverbs regarding the *nirgân*, the slanderer (*vid.* regarding the formation and import of this word at xvi. 28):

Ver. 20 Where the wood faileth, the fire goeth out;  
And where no tale-bearer, discord cometh to silence.

Wood, as material for building or for burning, is called, with the plur. of its product, עֵצִים. Since עֵצִים is the absolute end of a thing, and thus expresses its no longer existing, so it was more appropriate to wood (Fleischer: *consumtis lignis*) than to the tale-bearer, of whom the proverb says the same thing as xxii. 10 says of the mocker.

Ver. 21 Black coal to burning coal, and wood to fire;  
And a contentious man to stir up strife.

The *Venet.* translates פֶּחֶם by καρβών, and נִחֵלֵת by ἄνθραξ; the former (from פָּחַם, Arab. *fahuma*, to be deep black) is coal in itself; the latter (from נָחַל, *jaham*, to set on fire, and intrans. to burn), coal in a glowing state (*e.g.* xxv. 22; Ezek. i. 13). Black coal is suited to glowing coal, to nourish it; and wood to the fire, to sustain it; and a contentious man is suited for and serves this purpose, to kindle up strife. חָרָר signifies to be hot, and the *Pilpel* חָרַרְתִּי, to heat, *i.e.* to make hot or hotter. The three—coal, wood, and the contentious man—are alike, in that they are a means to an end.

Ver. 22 The words of the tale-bearer are like dainty morsels;  
And they glide down into the innermost parts.

A repetition of xviii. 8.

The proverbs next following treat of a cognate theme, hypocrisy (the art of dissembling), which, under a shining [*gleissen*] exterior,<sup>1</sup> conceals hatred and destruction:

Ver. 23 Dross of silver spread over an earthen vessel—  
Lips glowing with love and a base heart.

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* regarding *gleisen* (to give a deceitful appearance) and *gleissen* (to throw a dazzling appearance), Schmitthenner-Weigand's *Deutsches Wörterbuch*.

Dross of silver is the so-called *glätte* (French, *litharge*), a combination of lead and oxygen, which, in the old process of producing silver, was separated (Luther: *silberschaum*, i.e. the silver litharge; Lat. *spuma argenti*, having the appearance of foam). It is still used to glaze over potter's ware, which here (Greek, *κέραμος*) is briefly called *הַרֵשׁ* for *בְּלִי הַרֵשׁ*; for the vessel is better in appearance than the mere potsherd. The glossing of the earthenware is called *עֲפָה עַל-הַרֵשׁ*, which is applicable to any kind of covering (*עֲפָה*, R. *צָף*, to spread or lay out broad) of a less costly material with that which is more precious. 23a contains the figure, and 23b its subscription: *שִׁפְתֵּי דִלְקִים וְלֵב רָע*. Thus, with the taking away of the *Makkeph* after Codd., to be punctuated: burning lips, and therewith a base heart; burning, that is, with the fire of love (*Meîri*, *אֵשׁ הַחֵשֶׁק*), while yet the assurances of friendship, sealed by ardent kisses, serve only to mask a far different heart. The LXX. translate *דִלְקִים* [burning] by *λεία*, and thus have read *חֲלִקִים* [smooth], which Hitzig without reason prefers; burning lips (Jerome, incorrectly: *tumentia*; Luther, after Deut. xxxii. 33, *חמת*: *Gifftiger mund* = a poisonous mouth) are just flattering, and at the same time hypocritical<sup>1</sup> lips. Regarding *שִׁפְתֵּי* as masc., *vid.* vol. i. p. 119; *רָע לֵב* means, at xxv. 20, *animus mæstus*; here, *inimicus*. The figure is excellent: one may regard a vessel with the silver gloss as silver, and it is still earthen; and that also which gives forth the silver glance is not silver, but only the refuse of silver. Both are suitable to the comparison: the lips only glitter, the heart is false (Heidenheim).

Vers. 24 and 25 form a tetrastich.

Ver. 24 With his lips the hater dissembleth,  
And in his heart he museth deceit.

25 If he maketh his voice agreeable, believe him not,  
For seven abominations are in his heart.

<sup>1</sup> Schultens explains the *labia flagrantia* by *volubiliter prompta et diserta*. But one sees from the Arab. *dhalukā*, to be loose, lightly and easily moved (*vid.* in Fleischer's *Beiträgen zur arab. Sprachkunde* the explanation of the designation of the liquid expressed with the point of the tongue by *dhal-kiytt*, at i. 26, 27; cf. de Sacy's *Grammar*), and *dalk*, to draw out (of the sword from its scabbard), to rinse (of water), that the meaning of the Heb. *דִלַק*, to burn, from R. *דָל*, refers to the idea of the flickering, tongue-like movement of the flame.

All the old translators (also the *Venet.* and Luther) give to נָכַר the meaning, to become known; but the *Niph.* as well as the *Hithpa.* (*vid.* at xx. 11; Gen. xlvii. 7) unites with this meaning also the meaning to make oneself known: to make oneself unknown, unrecognisable = (Arab.) *tanakkr*, e.g. by means of clothing, or by a changed expression of countenance.<sup>1</sup> The contrast demands here this latter signification: *labiis suis alium se simulat osor, intus in pectore autem reconditum habet dolum* (Fleischer). This rendering of יֵשִׁית מְרָמָה is more correct than Hitzig's ("in his breast) he prepares treachery;" for יֵשִׁית מְרָמָה is to be rendered after שִׁית עֲצוֹת, Ps. xiii. 3 (*vid.* Hupfeld's and also our comm. on this passage), not after Jer. ix. 7; for one says שִׁית מִקְשִׁים, to place snares, שִׁית אָרֶב, to lay an ambush, and the like, but not to place or to lay deceit. If such a dissembler makes his voice agreeable (*Piel* of קָנַן only here, for the form Ps. ix. 14 is, as it is punctuated, *Kal*), trust not thyself to him (הֶאֱמִין, with ב: to put firm trust in anything, *vid.* Genesis, p. 312<sup>2</sup>); for seven abominations, i.e. a whole host of abominable thoughts and designs, are in his heart; he is, if one may express it, after Matt. xii. 45, possessed inwardly of seven devils. The LXX. makes a history of 24a: an enemy who, under complaints, makes all possible allowances, but in his heart τεκταίνεται δόλους. The history is only too true, but it has no place in the text.

Ver. 26 Hatred may conceal itself behind deceit:

Its wickedness shall be exposed in the assembly.

Proverbs which begin with the fut. are rarely to be found, it is

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* de Goeje's *Fragmenta Hist. Arab.* ii. (1871), p. 94. The verb נָכַר, primarily to fix one's attention, sharply to contemplate anything, whence is derived the meanings of knowing and of not knowing, disowning. The account of the origin of these contrasted meanings, in Gesenius-Dietrich's *Lexicon*, is essentially correct; but the Arab. *nakar* there referred to means, not sharpness of mind, from *nakar* = הִכְבִּיר, but from the negative signification prevailing in the Arab. alone, a property by which one makes himself worthy of being disowned: craftiness, cunning, and then also in *bonam partem*: sagacity.

<sup>2</sup> The fundamental idea of firmness in הֶאֱמִין is always in the subject, not the object. The Arabic interpreters remark that *âman* with *b* expresses recognition, and with *l* submission (*vid.* Lane's *Lexicon* under *âman*); but in Hebr. הֶאֱמִין with ב *fiducia fidei*, with ל *assensus fidei*; the relation is thus not altogether the same.

true; yet, as we have seen, xii. 26, they are sometimes to be met with in the collection. This is one of the few that are of such a character; for that the LXX. and others translate  $\acute{o}$   $\kappa\rho\acute{\upsilon}\pi\tau\omega\nu$ , which gives for רָעוּת a more appropriate reference, does not require us to agree with Hitzig in reading הַכֶּסֶה (xii. 16, 23),—the two clauses rendered fut. stand in the same syntactical relation, as *e.g.* Job xx. 24. Still less can the rendering of מִשְׁאֵן by συνίστησι δόλον, by the LXX., induce us to read with Hitzig חֲרַשׁ אֵן, especially since it is doubtful whether the Heb. words which floated before those translators (the LXX.) have been fallen upon. מִשְׁאֵן (beginning and ending with a formative syllable) is certainly a word of rare formation, to be compared only to מִסְדֵּרוֹן, Judg. iii. 23; but since the nearest-lying formation מִשָּׂא signifies usury (from נָשָׂא, to credit) (according to which Symmachus, διὰ λήμματα, to desire gain), it is obvious that the language preferred this double formation for the meaning deceiving, illusion, or, exactly: fraud. It may also be possible to refer it, like מְשׂוּאוֹת (*vid.* under Ps. xxiii. 18), to שָׂא = שָׂאָה, to be confused, waste, as this is done by Parchon, Kimchi (*Venet.* ἐν ἐρημιά), Ralbag, and others; מִשְׁאֵן, in this sense of deepest concealment, certainly says not a little as the contrast of קָהָל [an assembly], but יִשְׁמֹן [a desert] stood ready for the poet to be used in this sense; he might also have expressed himself as Job xxx. 3, xxxviii. 27. The selection of this rare word is better explained if it denotes the superlative of deceit,—a course of conduct maliciously directed toward the deception of a neighbour. That is also the impression which the word has made on Jerome (*fraudulenter*), the Targ. (בְּמִוְרָסְתָא, in grinding), Luther (to do injury), and according to which it has already been explained, *e.g.* by C. B. Michaelis and Oetinger (“with dissembled, deceitful nature”). The punctuation of תַּכְסֶּה, Codd. and editions present in three different forms. Buxtorf in his *Concordance* (also Fürst), and the Basel *Biblia Rabbinica*, have the form תַּכְסֶּה; but this is a mistake. Either תַּכְסֶּה (*Niph.*) or תַּכְסֶּה (*Hithpa.*, with the same assimilation of the preformative ת as in הַכְסֶּה, Lev. xiii. 55; נִכְפֶּר, Deut. xxi. 8) is to be read; Kimchi, in his *Wörterbuch*, gives תַּכְסֶּה, which is certainly better supported. A surer contrast of מִשְׁאֵן and בָּקָה remains in our interpretation; only we translate not

as Ewald: "hatred seeks to conceal itself by hypocrisy," but: in deceitful work. Also we refer חַרְפָּה, not to בְּמִשְׁאֵן, but to חַרְפָּה, for hatred is thought of in connection with its personal representative. We see from 26b that hatred is meant which not only broods over evil, but also carries it into execution. Such hatred may conceal itself in cunningly-contrived deception, yet the wickedness of the hater in the end comes out from behind the mask with the light of publicity.

Ver. 27 He who diggeth a pit falleth therein ;

And he that rolleth up a stone, upon himself it rolleth back.

The thought that destruction prepared for others recoils upon its contriver, has found its expression everywhere among men in divers forms of proverbial sayings; in the form which it here receives, 27a has its oldest original in Ps. vii. 16, whence it is repeated here and in Eccles. x. 8, and Sir. xxvii. 26. Regarding בִּרְהָה, *vid.* at xvi. 27. בִּרְהָה here has the sense of *in eam ipsam*; expressed in French, the proverb is: *celui qui creuse la fosse, y tombera*; in Italian: *chi cava la fossa, caderà in essa*. The second line of this proverb accords with Ps. vii. 17 (*vid.* Hupfeld and Riehm on this passage). It is natural to think of the rolling as a rolling upwards; cf. Sir. xxvii. 25, ὁ βάλλων λίθον εἰς ὕψος ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ βάλλει, *i.e.* throws it on his own head. וְנִלְלָא אִבְנִי is to be syntactically judged of like xviii. 13.

Ver. 28 The lying tongue hateth those whom it bruiseeth ;

And a flattering mouth causeth ruin.

The LXX., Jerome, the Targ., and Syr. render שֵׂנֵא רָבִי in the sense of *non amat veritatem*; they appear by רָבִי to have thought of the Aram. רָבִיָּא, that which is pure; and thus they gain nothing else but an undeniable plain thought. Many Jewish interpreters gloss: מוֹכִיחִי, also after the Aram.: רָבִי = מְרַבֵּי; but the Aram. רָבִי does not mean pure in the sense of being right, therefore Elia Wilna understands him who desires to justify himself, and this violent derivation from the Aram. thus does not lead to the end. Luther, translating: "a false tongue hates those who punish it," explains, as also Gesenius, *conterentes* = *castigantes ipsam*; but רָבִי signifies, according to the usage of the language before us, "bruised" (*vid.* Ps. ix. 10), not: bruising; and the thought that the liar hates him who listens to him, leads *ad absurdum*; but that he does not love him

who bruises (punishes) him, is self-evident. Kimchi sees in דָּבִי another form of דָּבָא; and Meîri, Jona Gerundi in his ethical work (שַׁעַר הַשׁוּבָה = The gates of Repentance), and others, accordingly render דָּבִי in the sense of עָנִי (עֲנִי): the lying tongue hates—as Löwenstein translates—the humble [pious]; also that for דָּבִי, by the omission of ו, דָּבִי = דָּבִי may be read, is supposable; but this does not harmonize with the second half of the proverb, according to which לִשׁוֹן שֶׁקֶר must be the subject, and יִשְׁנֵא דָּבִי must express some kind of evil which proceeds from such a tongue. Ewald: “the lying tongue hates its master (אֲדָרְכִי),” but that is not in accordance with the Heb. style; the word in that case should have been בָּעָלָי. Hitzig countenances this אֲדָרְכִי, with the remark that the tongue is here personified; but personified, the tongue certainly means him who has it (Ps. cxx. 3). Böttcher’s conjecture יִשְׁנֵא דָּבִי, “confounds their talk,” is certainly a curiosity. Spoken of the sea, those words would mean, “it changes its surge.” But is it then at all necessary to uncover first the meaning of 28a? Rashi, Arama, and others refer דָּבִי to דָּבִים = נִדְבָאִים (מִדְבָּרִים). Thus also perhaps the *Venet.*, which translates τοὺς ἐπιτετριμμένους (not: ἐπιτετριμμένους) αὐτῆς. C. B. Michaelis: *Lingua falsitatis odio habet contritos suos, h. e. eos quos falsitate ac mendacio lædit contritosque facit.* Hitzig objects that it is more correct to say: *conterit perosos sibi.* And certainly this lay nearer, on which account Fleischer remarks: in 28a there is to be supposed a poetic transposition of the ideas (Hypallage): *homo qui lingua ad calumnias abutitur conterit eos quos odit.* The poet makes יִשְׁנֵא the main conception, because it does not come to him so readily to say that the lying tongue bruises those against whom it is directed, as that it is hatred, which is active in this. To say this was by no means superfluous. There are men who find pleasure in repeating and magnifying scandalously that which is depreciatory and disadvantageous to their neighbour unsubstantiated, without being at all conscious of any particular ill-will or personal enmity against him; but this proverb says that such untruthful tongue-thrashing proceeds always from a transgression of the commandment, “Thou shalt not hate thy brother,” Lev. xix. 17, and not merely from the want of love, but from a state of mind which is the direct

opposite of love (*vid.* x. 18). Ewald finds it incongruous that 28a speaks of that which others have to suffer from the lying tongue, whereas the whole connection of this proverb requires that the tongue should here be regarded as bringing ruin upon its owner himself. But of the destruction which the wicked tongue prepares for others many proverbs also speak, *e.g.* xii. 13, cf. xvii. 4, לִשְׁוֹן הָהֵת; and 28b does not mention that the smooth tongue (written וּפֶה־חֶלֶק with *Makkeph*) brings injury upon itself (an idea which must be otherwise expressed; cf. xiv. 32), but that it brings injury and ruin on those who have pleasure in its flatteries (חֶלְקוֹת, Ps. xii. 3; Isa. xxx. 10), and are befooled thereby: *os blandiloquum (blanditiis dolum tegens) ad casum impellit, sc. alios* (Fleischer).

xxvii. In the group 1–6 of this chapter every two proverbs form a pair. The first pair is directed against unseemly boasting:

Ver. 1 Boast not thyself of to-morrow,  
For thou knowest not what a day bringeth forth.

The ב of בַּיּוֹם is like, *e.g.* that in xxv. 14, the ב of the ground of boasting. One boasts of to-morrow when he boasts of that which he will then do and experience. This boasting is foolish and presumptuous (Luke xii. 20), for the future is God's; not a moment of the future is in our own power, we know not what a day, this present day or to-morrow (Jas. iv. 13), will bring forth, *i.e.* (cf. Zeph. ii. 2) will disclose, and cannot therefore order anything beforehand regarding it. Instead of לֹא־תִדְעַע (with *Kametz* and *Mugrash*), לֹא־תִדְעַ (thus *e.g.* the Cod. *Jaman*) is to be written; the Masora knows nothing of that pausal form. And instead of מָה־יִּלְדָּ יוֹם, we write מָה־יִּלְדָּ יוֹם with *Zinnorith*. יִלְדָּ before יוֹם has the tone thrown back on the *penult.*, and consequently a shortened *ult.*; the Masora reckons this word among the twenty-five words with only one *Tsere*.

Ver. 2 Let another praise thee, and not thine own mouth;  
A stranger, and not thine own lips.

The negative לֹא is with פִּיךָ, as in (Arab.) *ghyra fyk*, bound into one compact idea: that which is not thine own mouth (Fleischer), "not thine own lips," on the other hand, is not to be interpreted as corresponding to it, like אֶל־מִוֶּת, xii. 28; since

after the prohibitive **אַל יְהַלְלֶךָ** [praise thee] easily supplies itself. **וְ** is properly the stranger, as having come from a distance, and **נִכְרִי** he who comes from an unknown country, and is himself unknown (*vid.* under xxvi. 24); the idea of both words, however, passes from *advena* and *alienigena* to *alius*. There is certainly in rare cases a praising of oneself, which is authorized because it is demanded (2 Cor. xi. 18), which, because it is offered strongly against one's will, will be measured by truth (x. 13); but in general it is improper to applaud oneself, because it is a vain looking at oneself in a glass; it is indecent, because it places others in the shade; imprudent, because it is of no use to us, but only injures, for *propria laus sordet*, and as Stobäus says, οὐδὲν οὕτως ἄκουσμα φορτικὸν ὥς ὁ καθ' αὐτοῦ ἔπαινος. Compare the German proverb, "*Eigenlob stinkt, Freundes Lob hinkt, fremdes Lob klingt*" [= self-praise stinks, a friend's praise is lame, a stranger's praise sounds].

The second pair of proverbs designates two kinds of violent passion as unbearable :

Ver. 3 The heaviness of a stone, the weight of sand—

A fool's wrath is heavier than both.

We do not translate : *Gravis est petra et onerosa arena*, so that the substantives stand for strengthening the idea, instead of the corresponding adjective (Fleischer, as the LXX., Jerome, Syr., Targum); the two pairs of words stand, as 4a, in genit. relation (cf. on the contrary, xxxi. 30), and it is as if the poet said : represent to thyself the heaviness of a stone and the weight of sand, and thou shalt find that the wrath of a fool compared thereto is still heavier, viz. for him who has to bear it; thus heavier, not for the fool himself (Hitzig, Zöckler, Dächsel), but for others against whom his anger goes forth. A Jewish proverb (*vid.* Tendlau, No. 901) says, that one knows a man by his wine-glass (כוס), his purse (כיס), and his anger (כעס), viz. how he deports himself in the tumult; and another says that one reads what is in a man ביום כעסו, when he is in an ill-humour. Thus also כעס is to be here understood : the fool in a state of angry, wrathful excitement is so far not master of himself that the worst is to be feared; he sulks and shows hatred, and rages without being appeased; no one can calculate

what he may attempt, his behaviour is unendurable. Sand, חול,<sup>1</sup> as it appears, as to the number of its grains innumerable, so as to its mass (in weight) immeasurable, Job vi. 3; Sir. xxii. 13. נִטְלָה the *Venet.* translates, with strict regard to the etymology, by *ἄρμα*.

Ver. 4 The madness of anger, and the overflowing of wrath—  
And before jealousy who keeps his place!

Here also the two pairs of words 4a stand in connection; אֲכַזְרִיּוֹת (for which the Cod. *Jaman* has incorrectly אֲכַזְרִיּוֹת) is the connecting form; *vid.* regarding אֲכַזְרִי, v. 9. Let one imagine the blind, relentless rage of extreme excitement and irritation, a boiling over of anger like a water-flood, which bears everything down along with it—these paroxysms of wrath do not usually continue long, and it is possible to appease them; but jealousy is a passion that not only rages, but reckons calmly; it incessantly ferments through the mind, and when it breaks forth, he perishes irretrievably who is its object. Fleischer generalizes this idea: “enmity proceeding from hatred, envy, or jealousy, it is difficult or altogether impossible to withstand, since it puts into operation all means, both secretly and openly, to injure the enemy.” But after vi. 34 f., cf. Song viii. 8, there is particularly meant the passion of scorned, mortified, deceived love, viz. in the relation of husband and wife.

The third pair of proverbs passes over from this special love between husband and wife to that subsisting between friends:

Ver. 5 Better is open accusation  
Than secret love.

An integral distich; מִאֲהָבָה has *Munach*, and instead of the second Metheg *Tarcha*, after *Thorath Emeth*, p. 11. Zöckler, with Hitzig, incorrectly: better than love which, from false indulgence, keeps concealed from his neighbour his faults, when he ought to tell him of them. That would require the phrase אֲהָבָה מְסֻתָּרָה, not מְסֻתָּרָה. Dächsel, in order to accommodate the text to this meaning, remarks: concealed censure is concealed love; but it is much rather the neglected duty of love,—love without mutual discipline is weak, faint-hearted,

<sup>1</sup> Sand is called by the name חוּל (חִיל), to change, whirl, particularly to form sand-wreaths, whence (Arab.) *al-Habil*, the region of moving sand; *vid.* Wetzstein's *Nord-arabien*, p. 56.

and, if it is not too blind to remark in a friend what is worthy of blame, is altogether too forbearing, and essentially without conscience; but it is not “hidden and concealed love.” The meaning of the proverb is different: it is better to be courageously and sternly corrected—on account of some fault committed—by any one, whether he be a foe or a friend, than to be the object of a love which may exist indeed in the heart, but which fails to make itself manifest in outward act. There are men who continually assure us of the reality and depth of their friendship; but when it is necessary for them to prove their love to be self-denying and generous, they are like a torrent which is dry when one expects to drink water from it (Job vi. 15). Such “secret” love, or, since the word is not נִסְתָּרָה, but מְסֻתָּרָה, love confined to the heart alone, is like a fire which, when it burns secretly, neither lightens nor warms; and before such a friend, any one who frankly and freely tells the truth has by far the preference, for although he may pain us, yet he does us good; while the former deceives us, for he leaves us in the lurch when it is necessary to love us, not merely in word and with the tongue, but in deed and in truth (1 John iii. 18). Rightly Fleischer: *Præstat correptio aperta amicitiae tectæ, i.e. nulla re probatæ.*

Ver. 6 Faithful are the wounds of a friend,  
And overloaded [plentiful] the kisses of an enemy.

The contrast to נֶאֱמָנִים, true, *i.e.* honourable and good (with the transference of the character of the person to his act), would be *fraudulenta* (Jerome), or נֶהֱפָכוֹת, *i.e.* false (Rabag); Ewald seeks this idea from עָתָר, to stumble, make a false step;<sup>1</sup> Hitzig, from עָתָר = (Arab.) *dadhr*, whence *dûdhir*, *perfidus*, to gain from; but (1) the comparison does not lie near, since usually the Arab. عَدُو corresponds to the Heb. שָׁנִי, and the Arab. دُو to the Heb. זָנִי; (2) the Heb. עָתָר has already three meanings, and it is not advisable to load it with yet another meaning assumed for this passage, and elsewhere not found. The three meanings are the following: (a) to smoke, Aram. עֲטָר,

<sup>1</sup> Thus also Schultens in the *Animadversiones*, which later he fancied was derived from עָתָר, *nidor*, from the meaning *nidorosa*, and thence *virulenta*.

whence עָרַן, vapour, Ezek. viii. 11, according to which the *Venet.*, with Kimchi's and Parchon's *Lex.*, translates: the kisses of an enemy *συνωμίχλονται*, i.e. are fog; (b) to sacrifice, to worship, Arab. *atar*; according to which Aquila: *ἱκετικά* (as, with Grabe, it is probably to be read for *ἐκούσια* of the LXX.); and agreeably to the *Niph.*, but too artificially, Arama: obtained by entreaties = constrained; (c) to heap up, whence *Hiph.* הֶעֱרַן, Ezek. xxxv. 13, cf. Jer. xxxiii. 6, according to which Rashi, Meïri, Gesenius, Fleischer, Bertheau, and most explain, cogn. with עָרַן, whose Aram. form is עָרַן, for עָרַן is properly a heap of goods or treasures.<sup>1</sup> This third meaning gives to the kisses of an enemy a natural adjective: they are too abundant, so much the more plentiful to veil over the hatred, like the kisses by means of which Judas betrayed his Lord, not merely denoted by *φιλεῖν*, but by *καταφιλεῖν*, Matt. xxvi. 49. This, then, is the contrast, that the strokes inflicted by one who truly loves us, although they tear into our flesh (עָרַן, from עָרַן, to split, to tear open), yet are faithful (cf. Ps. cxli. 5); on the contrary, the enemy covers over with kisses him to whom he wishes all evil. Thus also נֶעְתַּרְתָּ forms an indirect contrast to נֶאֱמַנִים.

In 7-10 there is also visible a weaving of the external with the internal. First, there are two proverbs, in each of which there is repeated a word terminating with נ.

Ver. 7 A satisfied soul treadeth honeycomb under foot;

And a hungry soul—everything bitter is (to it) sweet.

It is unnecessary to read תָּבַח (Hitzig); תָּבִים is stronger; "to tread with the feet" is the extreme degree of scornful despite. That satiety and hunger are applicable to the soul, *vid.* under x. 3. In 7b, the adverb לָהּ, relative to the *nomin. absol.*, like xxviii. 7, but not xiii. 18. "Hunger is the best cook," according to a German proverb; the Hebrew proverb is so formed that it is easily transferred to the sphere of the soul. Let the man whom God has richly satisfied with good things guard himself against ingratitude towards the Giver, and against an undervaluing of the gifts received; and if they are spiritual blessings, let him guard himself against self-satisfaction and

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* regarding this word, Schlottmann in *Deutsch.-Morgenl. Zeitschrift*, xxiv. 665, 668.

self-contentment, which is, in truth, the worst poverty, Rev. iii. 17; for life without God is a constant hunger and thirst. There is in worldly things, even the most pleasing, a dissatisfaction felt, and a dissatisfaction awakening disgust; and in spiritual life, a satiety which supposes itself to be full of life, but which is nothing else than the decay of life, than the changing of life into death.

Ver. 8 As a bird that wandereth from her nest,  
So is a man that wandereth from his home.

It is not a flying out that is meant, from which at any moment a return is possible, but an unwilling taking to flight (LXX. 8b: ὅταν ἀποξενωθῇ; Venet.: πλανούμενον . . . πλανούμενος); for עוף נודד, Isa. xvi. 2, cf. Jer. iv. 25, birds that have been frightened; and נִדָּד, xxi. 15 f., designates the fugitive; cf. נָע וָנָד, Gen. iv. 14, and above, xxvi. 2, where נָד designates aimless roving about. Otherwise Fleischer: "warning against unnecessary roaming about, in journeyings and wanderings far from home: as a bird far from its nest is easily wounded, caught, or killed, so, on such excursions, one easily comes to injury and want. One may think of a journey in the East. The Arabs say, in one of their proverbs: *âlsafar ka'tat man âlklyym* (= journeying is a part of the pains of hell)." But נִדָּד here is not to be understood in the sense of a *libere vagari*. Rightly C. B. Michaelis: *qui vagatur extorris et exul a loco suo sc. natali vel habitationis ordinariæ*. This proverb mediately recommends the love of one's fatherland, i.e. "love to the land in which our father has his home; on which our paternal mansion stands; in which we have spent the years of our childhood, so significant a part of one's whole life; from which we have derived our bodily and intellectual nourishment; and in which home we recognise bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh."<sup>1</sup> But next it says, that to be in a strange land must be an unhappiness, because a man never feels better than at home, as the bird in its nest. We say: *Heimat* [home]—this beautiful word becomes the German language, which has also coined the expressive idea of *Heimweh* [longing for home]; the

<sup>1</sup> Gustave Baur's article "Vaterlandsliebe," in Schmid's *Pädagogischer Encyklopädie*.

Heb. uses, to express the idea of home, the word *מקומי*; and of fatherland, the word *ארצי* or *אדמתי*. The Heb. *שְׁבוּת* corresponds<sup>1</sup> to the German *Elend*, but = *Ellend*, *elilenti*, of another land, strange.

The two following proverbs have in common the catchword *רַע*, and treat of the value of friendship:—

Ver. 9 Oil and frankincense rejoice the heart;

And the sweet discourse of a friend from a counselling of soul.

Regarding the perfuming with dry aromas, and sprinkling with liquid aromas, as a mark of honour towards guests, and as a

<sup>1</sup> The translators transfer to this place a note from vol. ii. p. 191 f. of the author's larger *Comm. ii. den Psalter*, to which Delitzsch refers the reader:—"The modern High German adj. *elend*, middle High German *ellende*, old High German *alilandi*, *elilendi*, or *elilenti*, is composed of *ali* and *land*. The adj. *ali* occurs only in old High German in composition. In the Gothic it is found as an independent adj., in the sense of *alius* and *ἄλλος* (*vid.* Ulphilas, Gal. v. 10). The primary meaning of *elilenti* is consequently: of another country, foreign. In glosses and translations it is rendered by the Lat. words *peregrinus*, *exul*, *advena*, also *captivus*. In these meanings it occurs very frequently. In the old High German translation of Ammonius, *Diatessaron*, *sive Harmoniæ in quatuor Evangelica*, the word proselytism, occurring in Matt. xxiii. 15, is rendered by *elilantan*. To the adj. the old High German subst. corresponds. This has the meaning *exilium*, *transmigratio*, *captivitas*. The connection in *elilenti* or *elilentes*, used adverbially, is rendered by the Lat. *peregre*. In the middle High German, however, the proper signification of both words greatly predominates. But as, in the old High German, the idea of *miser* is often at the same time comprehended in the proper signification: he who is miserable through banishment, imprisonment, or through sojourning in a strange land; thus, in several places of the middle High German, this derived idea begins to separate itself from the fundamental conception, so that *ellende* comes in general to be called *miser*. In the new High German this derived conception is almost alone maintained. Yet here also, in certain connections, there are found traces of the original idea, e.g. in's *Elend schicken*, for to banish. Very early also the word came to be used, in a spiritual sense, to denote our present abode, in contrast to paradise or the heavenly kingdom. . . . Thus, e.g. in one of Luther's hymns, when we pray to the Holy Ghost:

"Das er vns behüte, an vnserm ende,  
Wenn wir heim farn aus diesem elende."

[That He guard us to our end  
When we go home from this world.]

—RUD. VON RAUMER.

means of promoting joyful social fellowship, *vid.* at vii. 16 f., xxi. 17. The pred. יִשְׁמַח comprehends frankincense or oil as the two sides of one and the same thing; the LXX. introduces, from Ps. civ. 15, also wine. It also reads ומתק רעה as one word, ומתקרעה: καταρρήγνυται δὲ ὑπὸ συμπτωμάτων ψυχῇ, which Hitzig regards as original; for he translates, understanding מַעֲצָה after Ps. xiii. 3, "but the soul is torn by cares." But why מתקרעה, this *Hithpa.* without example, for נִקְרָעָה? and now connected with מֶן in the sense of ὑπό! And what does one gain by this Alexandrian wisdom [of the LXX.]—a contrast to 9a which is altogether incongruous? Döderlein's rendering accords far better with 9a: "but the sweetness of a friend surpasses fragrant wood." But although this rendering of the word [עֲצָה] by "fragrant wood" is found in Gesen. *Lex.*, from one edition to another, yet it must be rejected; for the word signifies wood as the contents of trees, the word for aromatic wood must be עֲצִים; and if the poet had not intentionally aimed at dubiety, he ought to have written עֲצִי בִשֶׁם, since נֶפֶשׁ, with the exception of Isa. iii. 20, where it is beyond doubt, nowhere means fragrance. If we read עֲצָה and נֶפֶשׁ together, then we may suppose that the latter designates the soul, as at Ps. xiii. 3; and the former, counsel (from the verb יַעֲזֵר). But to what does the suffix of רֵעִיו refer? One may almost conjecture that the words originally were נֶפֶשׁ מַעֲצָה רֵעִיו, and the sweetness of the soul (*i.e.* a sweet relish for it, cf. ver. 7 and xvi. 24) consists in the counsel of a friend, according to which Jerome translates: *et bonis amici consiliis anima dulcoratur*. By this transposition רֵעִיו refers back to נֶפֶשׁ; for if *nephesh* denote a person or a living being, it can be construed *ad sensum* as masc., *e.g.* Num. xxxi. 28. But the words may remain in the order in which they are transmitted to us. It is possible that רֵעִיו is (Böttcher refers to Job xii. 4) of the same meaning as הָרֵעַ (the friend of one = the friend), as כָּלִי denotes directly the whole; הַצֵּי, the half; עֵתוֹ, the right time. Recognising this, Cocceius, Umbreit, Stier, and Zöckler explain: sweetness, *i.e.* the sweet encouragement (מִתְּקָה, in the sense of "sweetness (grace) of the lips," xvi. 21) of a friend, is better than one's own counsel, than prudence seeking to help oneself, and trusting merely to one's own resources; thus also Rashi: better than

what one's own soul advises him. But (1) נפש cannot mean one's own person (oneself) in contrast to another person; and (2) this does not supply a correct antithesis to 9a. Thus מן will not express the preference, but the origin. Accordingly Ewald, *e.g.*, explains: the sweetness of a friend whom one has proceedeth from the counsel of soul, *i.e.* from such counsel as is drawn from a deep, full soul. But no proof can be brought from the usage of the language that עצה-נפש can be so meant; these words, after the analogy of רעה נפש, xix. 2, mean ability to give counsel as a quality of the soul (viii. 14; Job xii. 13), *i.e.* its ability to advise. Accordingly, with Bertheau, we explain ישמח-לב as the common predicate for 9a and 9b: ointment and perfume rejoice the heart, and (the Syr., Targ., well: even so) the sweet exhortation of a friend, from a soul capable of rendering counsel; also, this and this, more than that fragrance. This proverb is formed in the same way as xxvi. 9, 14. In this explanation רעהו is well referred back to לב: and (more than) the sweet advice of his friend. But not so that רעהו is equivalent to רע הלב, for one does not thus speak; but the construction is as when we say, in the German language: *Nichts thut einem Herzen woler als wenn sein Freund es mitfühlend tröstet* [nothing does more good to a heart than when a friend sympathizingly comforts it]; or: *Zage nicht, tief betrübtes Herz! Dein Freund lebt und wird dir bald sich zeigen* [Be not dismayed, deeply-troubled heart! thy friend lives, and will soon show himself to thee]. In such cases the word "*Herz*" [heart] does not designate a distinct part of the person, but, synecdochically, it denotes the whole person.

Ver. 10. Another proverb, consisting of three lines, in commendation of friendship:

Thine own friend and the friend of thy father forsake not,  
And into thy brother's house go not in the day of thy misfortune—  
Better is a near neighbour than a far-off brother.

In our editions רעהו is incorrectly pointed with *Pasek* after it, so that the accent is *Asla Legarmeh*; the *Pasek* is, after the example of older editions, with Norzi, to be cancelled, so that only the conjunctive *Asla* remains; "thine own and the friend of thy father" denotes the family friend, like some family

heirloom, descending from father to son. Such an old tried friend one must certainly not give up. The *Kerî* changes the second ורעה into ורע, but ורעה (which, after the Masora in *st. constr.*, retains its *segol*, Ewald, § 211e) is also admissible, for a form of comparison (Hitzig) this רעה is not, but the fuller form of the abbreviated רע, from רעה, to take care of, to tend, to pasture—an infinitive formation (= רעי) like the cogn. راع

a participial. Such a proved friend one ought certainly not to give up, and in the time of heavy trial (*vid.* regarding איך, i. 26) one should go to him and not to a brother's house—it is by this supposed that, as xviii. 24 says, there is a degree of friendship (cf. xvii. 17) which in regard to attachment stands above that of mere fraternal relationship, and it is true; blood-relationship, viewed in itself, stands as a relationship of affection on natural grounds below friendship, which is a relationship of life on moral grounds. But does blood-relationship exclude friendship of soul? cannot my brother be at the same time my heart-friend? and is not friendship all the firmer when it has at the same time its roots in the spirit and in natural grounds? The poet seems to have said this, for in 10c, probably a popular saying (cf. “*Besser Nachbar an der Wand als Bruder über Land*” [Better a neighbour by one's side than a brother abroad]), he gives to his advice a foundation, and at the same time a limitation which modifies its ruggedness. But Dächsel places (like Schultens) in קרוב and רחוק meanings which the words do not contain, for he interprets them of inward nearness and remoteness; and Zöckler reads between the lines, for he remarks, a “near neighbour” is one who is near to the oppressed to counsel and help them, and a “distant brother” is one who with an unamiable disposition remains far from the oppressed. The state of the matter is simple. If one has a tried friend in neighbourly nearness, so in the time of distress, when he needs consolation and help, he must go to this friend, and not first to the house of a brother dwelling at a distance, for the former certainly does for us what the latter probably may and probably may not do for us.

Ver. 11. This proverb has, in common with the preceding tristich, the form of an address:

Become wise, my son, and make my heart rejoice,  
That I may give an answer to my accusers.

Better than "be wise" (Luther), we translate "become wise" (LXX. σοφὸς γίνου); for he who is addressed might indeed be wise, though not at present so, so that his father is made to listen to such deeply wounding words as these, "Cursed be he who begat, and who educated this man" (Malbim). The cohortative clause 11b (cf. Ps. cxix. 42) has the force of a clause with a purpose (Gesen. § cxxviii. 1): *ut habeam quod iis qui me conviciantur regerere possim*; it does not occur anywhere in the Hezekiah collection except here.

Ver. 12. עָרוֹם appears to lean on חָכָם.

The prudent man seeth the misfortune, hideth himself;  
The simple pass on, suffer injury.

= xxii. 3, where וְנִעְנְשׁוּ for וְנִסְתָּר, וְנִסְתָּר for וְנִסְתָּר, and וְנִעְנְשׁוּ for וְנִעְנְשׁוּ; the three *asyndeta* make the proverb clumsy, as if it counted out its seven words separately to the hearer. Ewald, § 349a, calls it a "*Steinschrift*" [an inscription on a stone]. The perfects united in pairs with, and yet more without, *Vav*, express the coincidence<sup>1</sup> as to time.

Ver. 13. עָרוֹם alliterates with עָרַב.

Take from him the garment, for he hath become surety for another,  
And for the sake of a strange matter put him under bonds.

= xx. 16, *vid.* there. נִכְרִיָּה we interpret neut. (LXX. τὰ ἀλλότρια; Jerome, *pro alienis*), although certainly the case occurs that one becomes surety for a strange woman (Aquila, Theodotion, περὶ ξένης), by whose enticements and flatteries he

<sup>1</sup> The second *Munach* is at xxii. 3, as well as here, according to the rule xviii. 4 of the *Accentuationssystem*, the transformation of the *Dechi*, and preserves its value of interpunction; the *Legarmeh* of עָרוֹם is, however, a disjunctive of less force than *Dechi*, so that thus the sequence of the accents denotes that עָרוֹם רָאָה רָעָה is a clause related to וְנִסְתָּר as a hypothetical antecedent: if the prudent sees the calamity, then he hides himself from it. This syntactic relation is tenable at xxii. 3, but not here at xxvii. 12. Here, at least, עָרוֹם would be better with *Rebia*, to which the following *Dechi* would subordinate itself. The prudent seeth the evil, concealeth himself; or also, prudent is he who sees the evil, hides himself. For of two disjunctives before *Athnach*, the first, according as it is greater or less than the second, retains either *Legarmeh* (e.g. Ps. i. 5, lxxxvi. 12, lxxxviii. 14, cix. 14) or *Rebia* (xii. 2; Ps. xxv. 2, lxix. 9, cxlvi. 5).

is taken, and who afterwards leaves him in the lurch with the debts for which he had become security, to show her costly favour to another.

Ver. 14. This proverb, passing over the three immediately intervening, connects itself with vers. 9 and 10. It is directed against cringing, noisy complimenting:

He who blesseth his neighbour with a loud voice, rising early in the morning,

It is reckoned as a curse to him.

The first line is intentionally very heavy, in order to portray the *empressement* of the maker of compliments: he calls out to another his good wishes with a loud voice, so as to make the impression of deep veneration, of deeply felt thankfulness, but in reality to gain favour thereby, and to commend himself to greater acts of kindness; he sets himself to meet him, having risen up (הַשְׁבִּים, adverbial *inf. abs.*; cf. Jer. xliv. 4 with xxv. 4) early in the morning, to offer his *captatio benevolentiae* as speedily as possible; but this salutation of good wishes, the affected zeal in presenting which is a sign of a selfish, calculating, servile soul, is reckoned to him as קִלְלָה, viz. before God and every one who can judge correctly of human nature, also before him who is complimented in so ostentatious and troublesome a manner, the true design of which is thus seen. Others understand the proverb after the example of *Berachoth* 14a, that one ought to salute no one till he has said his morning's prayer, because honour is due before all to God (the Book of Wisdom, x. 28); and others after *Erachin* 16a, according to which one is meant who was invited as a guest of a generous lord, and was liberally entertained, and who now on the public streets blesses him, *i.e.* praises him for his nobility of mind—such blessing is a curse to him whom it concerns, because this trumpeting of his praise brings upon him a troublesome, importunate crowd. But plainly the particularity of בְּקוֹל וָגוֹ' lays the chief emphasis on the servility manifested; and one calls to mind the case of the clients besieging the doors of their patrons, those *clientes matutini*, each of whom sought to be the first in the *salutatio* of his distinguished wealthy patron.

Ver. 15. This proverb passes from the *complimentarius* to its opposite, a shrewish wife:

A continual dropping in a rainy day  
And a contentious woman are alike.

Thus we have already translated (vol. i. p. 9), where, when treating of the manifold forms of parabolic proverbs, we began with this least poetic, but at the same time remarked that vers. 15 and 16 are connected, forming a tetrastich, which is certainly the case according to the text here lying before us. In verse 15, xix. 13b is expanded into a distich, and made a complete verse. Regarding טוֹרֵר רֶלֶף, *vid.* the explanation there

given. The noun סַגִּיר, which the Syr. translates by ܣܓܝܪ, but the Targumist retains, because it is in common use in the post.-bibl. Heb. (*Bereschith rabba*, c. 1) and the Jewish Aramaic, signifies violent rain, after the Jewish interpreters, because then the people remain shut up in their houses; more correctly, perhaps, from the unbroken continuousness and thickness (cf. the Arab. *insajara*, to go behind each other in close column) with which the rain pours down. Regarding מְדוֹנִים, *Kerî* מְדִינִים, *vid.* vi. 14; the genit. connection of אִשָּׁת מִ we had already at xxi. 9. The form נִשְׁתָּה is doubtful. If accented, with Löwenstein and others, as *Milra*, then we would have a *Nithkatal* before us, as at Num. i. 47, or a *Hothkatal*—a passive form of the *Kal*, the existence of which, however, is not fully established. Rather this word is to be regarded as נִשְׁתָּה (Nithpa. as Deut. xxi. 8; Ezek. xxiii. 48) without the *dagesh*, and lengthened; the form of the word נִשְׁתָּה, as found in the Cod. *Jaman.*, aims at this. But the form נִשְׁתָּה is better established, e.g. by Cod. 1294, as *Milel*. Kimchi, *Michlol* 131a (cf. Ewald, § 132c), regards it as a form without the *dagesh*, made up of the *Niph.* and *Hithpa.*, leaving the *penultima* toning unexplained. Bertheau regards it as a voluntative: let us compare (as נִשְׁתָּה, Isa. xli. 23); but as he himself says, the reflexive form does not accord with this sense. Hitzig has adopted the right explanation (cf. Olshausen, § 275, and Böttcher, § 1072, who, however, registers it at random as an Ephraimitism). נִשְׁתָּה is a *Niphal*, with a transposition of consonants for נִשְׁתָּה, since נִשְׁתָּה passes over into נִשְׁתָּה. Such is now the *genus* in the arrangement; the *Milra* form would be as masc. syntactically inaccurate. “The finite following the subjects is regulated by

the gender and number of that which is next before it, as at 2 Sam. iii. 22, xx. 20; Ps. lv. 6; Job xix. 15" (Hitzig).

Ver. 16. This verse stands in close connection with the preceding, for it speaks of the contentious woman:

He that restraineth her restraineth the wind,  
And oil meeteth his right hand.

The connection of the plur. subject **צִפְנִיָּה** = *quicunque eam cohibet*, with a sing. predicate, is not to be disputed (*vid.* iii. 18 and xxviii. 16, *Chethâb*); but can **צִפְנִיָּה** gain from the meaning of preserving, laying up, also the meanings of keeping, of confining, and shutting up?—for these meanings we have **כָּלָא** and **עָצַר** (cf. **צָרַר**, xxx. 4). In 16*b* it lies nearer to see in **יְמִינוֹ** the object of the clause (oil meeteth his right hand) than the subject (his right hand meeteth oil), for the gender of **יְמִין** directs to **יָר** (*e.g.* Ezek. xv. 6*b*; cf. 6*a*, where **נֶאֱדָרִי** is as to gender indifferent): it is fem., while on the contrary **שְׁמֶן** is generally masc. (cf. Song i. 3). There is no reason for regarding **יְמִינוֹ** as an adverbial accus. (he meets oil with his right hand), or, with Hitzig, as a second subject (he meets oil, his right hand); the latter, in the order of the words lying before us, is not at all possible. We suppose that **יִקְרָא**, as at Gen. xlix. 1, is equivalent to **יִקְרֶה** (Ewald, § 116*c*), for the explanation *oleum dexteræ ejus præconem agit* (Cocceius, Schultens) does not explain, but only darkens; and *oleum dexterâ suâ legit*, i.e. *colligit* (Fleischer), is based on an untenable use of the word. As one may say of person to person, **קָרַר**, *occurrit tibi*, Num. xxv. 18, so also **יִקְרָא** (**יִקְרֶה**), of a thing that meets a man or one of his members; and if we compare **לִקְרָא** and **קָרַי**, then for 16*b* the meaning is possible: oil meets his right hand; the quarrelsome woman is like oil that cannot be held in the hand, which struggles against that which holds it, for it always glides out of the hand. Thus also Luther: "and seeks to hold oil with his hand," as if he read **יִקְמָץ**. In fact, this word was more commonly used as the expression of untenableness than the colourless and singular word **יִקְרָא**, which, besides, is so ambiguous, that none of the old translators has thought on any other **קָרָא** than that which signifies "to call," "to name." The Jewish interpreters also adhere to this nearest lying **קָרָא**, and, moreover, explain, as the Syr., Targ., Aquila, Symmachus, Jerome, and the *Venet.*, **יִשְׁכַּן יְמִינוֹ**,

according to the accentuation as genit. connected, *e.g.* Rashi : he calls for oil to his right hand, viz. as the means of purification from leprosy, Lev. viii. 14 [xiv. 16] ; and Aben Ezra : even when he calls for oil to his right hand, *i.e.* would move them to silence with the precious anointing oil. Perhaps ver. 16 was originally an independent proverb as follows :

צפני הן צפן רוח  
ושמן ימינו יקרא

He who layeth up riches in store layeth up the wind,  
And he nameth them the fat of his right hand ;

*i.e.*, he sees in them that which makes his right hand fat and strong (שמן), as at Ps. cix. 24, *opp.* Zech. xi. 17 ; cf. בְּמִשְׁמְנֵי, Isa. x. 16, and regarding 'Εσμούν, the Phœnician god of health, at Isa. lix. 10), and yet it is only the wind, *i.e.* something that is worthless and transient, which he stored up (צפן), as at xiii. 22, and in מִצְפְּנֵי, Obad. ver. 6). הן is used as it frequently occurs in the Book of Proverbs, *e.g.* xi. 4, and the whole proverb expresses by another figure the same as xviii. 11. The fact that צפן (רוח), xxv. 23, and as a contrast thereto in the compass ימין (the south), hovered before the poet, may not have been without its influence on the choice of the words and expression here.

Ver. 17. This proverb expresses the influence arising from the intercourse of man with man :

Iron is sharpened by iron,  
And a man may sharpen the appearance of another.

When the Masora reads יַחַד, Ewald remarks, it interprets the word as denoting “at the same time,” and the further meaning of the proverb must then accord therewith. Accordingly he translates : “iron together with iron ! and one together with the face of another !” But then the prep. ב or עם is wanting after the second יַחַד—for יַחַד is, in spite of Ewald, § 217*h*, never a prep.—and the “face,” 17*b*, would be a perplexing superfluity. Hitzig already replies, but without doing homage to the traditional text-punctuation, that such a violence to the use of language, and such a darkening of the thought, is not at all to be accepted. He suggests four ways of interpreting יַחַד : (1) the adverb יַחַד, united, properly (taken accusat.) union ; (2) יַחַד, Ps. lxxxvi. 11, imper. of the *Piel* יַחַד, unite ; (3) יַחַד, Job iii. 6,

jussive of the *Kal*  $\text{חָרָה}$ , *gaudeat*; and (4) as Kimchi, in *Michlol* 126a, jussive of the *Kal*  $\text{חָרָה}$  (=  $\text{חָרַר}$ ) *acuere*, after the form  $\text{חָחַו}$ , Mic. iv. 11.  $\text{וַיַּחַזֵּץ}$ , Gen. xxxii. 8, etc. *in p.*  $\text{יָחַר}$ , after the form  $\text{אָחַז}$ , Job xxiii. 9.  $\text{וַיַּחַלֵּץ}$ , 2 Kings i. 2 (=  $\text{וַיַּחַלֵּץ}$ , 2 Chron. xvi. 12). If we take  $\text{יָחַר}$  with  $\text{בְּרָזָל}$ , then it is *à priori* to be supposed that in  $\text{יָחַר}$  the idea of sharpening lies; in the Arab. iron is simply called *hadyda* =  $\text{חָדָד}$ , that which is sharpened, sharp; and a current Arab. proverb says: *alhadyd balhadyd yuflah* = *ferrum ferro diffinditur* (*vid.* Freytag under the word *falah*). But is the traditional text-punctuation thus understood to be rightly maintained? It may be easily changed in conformity with the meaning, but not so that with Böttcher we read  $\text{יָחַר}$  and  $\text{יָחַר}$ , the *fut. Kal* of  $\text{חָרַר$ : “iron sharpeneth itself on iron, and a man sharpeneth himself over against his neighbour”—for  $\text{פָּנִי}$  after a verb to be understood actively, has to be regarded as the object—but since  $\text{יָחַר}$  is changed into  $\text{יָחַר}$  (*fut. Hiph.* of  $\text{חָרַר}$ ), and  $\text{יָחַר}$  into  $\text{יָחַר}$  or  $\text{יָחַר}$  (*fut. Hiph.* of  $\text{חָרַר}$ , after the form  $\text{אָחַץ}$ , *incipiam*, Deut. ii. 25, or  $\text{אָחַל$ , *profanabo*, Ezek. xxxix. 7; Num. xxx. 3). The passive rendering of the idea 17a and the active of 17b thus more distinctly appear, and the unsuitable jussive forms are set aside: *ferrum ferro exacuitur, et homo exacuit faciem amici sui* (Jerome, Targ., the *Venet.*). But that is not necessary. As  $\text{וַיַּעַל}$  may be the *fut.* of the *Hiph.* (he brought up) as well as of the *Kal* (he went up), so  $\text{יָחַר}$  may be regarded as *fut. Kal*, and  $\text{יָחַר}$  as *fut. Hiph.* Fleischer prefers to render  $\text{יָחַר}$  also as *Hiph.*: *aciem exhibet*, like  $\text{וַיַּעֲשִׂיר}$ , *divitias acquirit*, and the like; but the jussive is not favourable to this supposition of an intransitive (inwardly transitive) *Hiph.* It may indeed be said that the two jussives appear to be used, according to poetic licence, with the force of indicatives (*cf.* under xii. 26), but the repetition opposes it. Thus we explain: iron is sharpened [*gewetzt*, Luther uses this appropriate word] by iron ( $\text{בַּיָּחַר}$  of the means, not of the object, which was rather to be expected in 17b after xx. 30), and a man whets  $\text{פָּנִי}$ , the appearance, the deportment, the nature, and manner of the conduct of his neighbour. The proverb requires that the intercourse of man with man operate in the way of sharpening the manner and forming the habits and character; that one help another to culture and polish of manner, rub off his ruggedness, round

his corners, as one has to make use of iron when he sharpens iron and seeks to make it bright. The jussive form is the oratorical form of the expression of that which is done, but also of that which is to be done.

The following three proverbs are connected with 17 in their similarity of form :—

Ver. 18 Whosoever watcheth the fig-tree will enjoy its fruit ;

And he that hath regard to his master attaineth to honour.

The first member is, as in ver. 17, only the means of contemplating the second ; as faithful care of the tree has fruit for a reward, so faithful regard for one's master, honour ; נָצַר is used as at Isa. xxvii. 3, שָׁמַר as at Hos. iv. 10, etc.—the proverb is valid in the case of any kind of master up to the Lord of lords. The fig-tree presented itself, as Heidenheim remarks, as an appropriate figure ; because in the course of several years' training it brings forth its fruit, which the language of the Mishna distinguishes as פֶּגֶן, unripe, בֹּחַל, half ripe, and צֶמֶל, fully ripe. To fruit in the first line corresponds honour in the second, which the faithful and attentive servant attains unto first on the part of his master, and then also from society in general.

Ver. 19 As it is with water, face correspondeth to face,

So also the heart of man to man.

Thus the traditional text is to be translated ; for on the supposition that כְּמַיִם must be used for כְּבָנִימִים, yet it might not be translated : as in waters face corresponds to face (Jerome : *quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus respicientium*), because כְּ (*instar*) is always only a prep. and never conj. subordinating to itself a whole sentence (*vid.* under Ps. xxxviii. 14). But whether כְּמַיִם, “like water,” may be an abridgment of a sentence: “like as it is with water,” is a question, and the translation of the LXX. (Syr., Targ., Arab.), ὥσπερ οὐχ ὁμοία πρόσωπα προσώποις, κ.τ.λ., appears, according to Böttcher's ingenious conjecture, to have supposed כְּאִשֶּׁר בָּמִים, from which the LXX. derived כְּאִין דָּמִים, *sicut non pares*. The thought is beautiful : as in the water-mirror each one beholds his own face (Luther : *der Scheme* = the shadow), so out of the heart of another each sees his own heart, *i.e.* he finds in another the dispositions and feelings of his own heart (Fleischer)—the face finds in water its

reflection, and the heart of a man finds in man its echo; men are *ὁμοιοπαθεῖς*, and it is a fortunate thing that their heart is capable of the same sympathetic feelings, so that one can pour into the heart of another that which fills and moves his own heart, and can there find agreement with it, and a re-echo. The expression with *ל* is extensive: one corresponds to another, one belongs to another, is adapted to the other, turns to the other, so that the thought may be rendered in manifold ways; the divinely-ordained mutual relationship is always the ground-thought. This is wholly obliterated by Hitzig's conjecture *כְּמוֹן*, "what a mole on the face is to the face, that is man's heart to man," i.e. the heart is the dark spot in man, his *partie honteuse*. But the Scripture nowhere speaks of the human heart after this manner, at least the Book of Proverbs, in which *ל* frequently means directly the understanding. Far more intelligible and consistent is the conjecture of Mendel Stern, to which Abrahamsohn drew my attention: *כְּמִים הַפְּנִים לַפְּנִים*, like water (viz. flowing water), which directs its course always forward, thus (is turned) the heart of man to man. This conjecture removes the syntactic harshness of the first member without changing the letters, and illustrates by a beautiful and excellent figure the natural impulse moving man to man. It appears, however, to us, in view of the LXX., more probable that *כְּמִים* is abbreviated from the original *כַּאֲשֶׁר בְּמִים* (cf. xxiv. 29).

The following proverb has, in common with the preceding, the catchword *הָאָדָם*, and the emphatic repetition of the same expression:

Ver. 20 The under-world and hell are not satisfied,  
And the eyes of man are not satisfied.

A *Kerî* *וְאִבְרֹן* is here erroneously noted by Löwenstein, Stuart, and others. The *Kerî* to *וְאִבְרֹה* is here *וְאִבְרֹו*, which secures the right utterance of the ending, and is altogether wanting<sup>1</sup> in many MSS. (e.g. Cod. *Jaman*). The stripping off of the *ו* from the ending *וְ* is common in the names of persons and places (e.g. *שְׁלֹמֹה*, LXX. *Σολομών* and *שְׁלֹה*); we write at pleasure either *ו* or *וְ* (e.g. *מְנַדְו*), Olsh. § 215*g*. *וְאִבְרֹו* (*וְאִבְרֹה*) of the

<sup>1</sup> In Gesen. *Lex.* this *וְאִבְרֹה* stands to the present day under *וְאִבְרֹה*.

nature of a proper name, is already found in its full form אֲבֵרֶן at xv. 11, along with שָׂאֹל; the two synonyms are, as was there shown, not wholly alike in the idea they present, as the underworld and realm of death, but are related to each other almost the same as Hades and Gehenna; אֲבֵרֶן is what is called<sup>1</sup> in the Jonathan-Targum בֵּית אֲבֵרֶנָּא, the place of destruction, i.e. of the second death (מִוְתָּא תַּנִּינָא). The proverb places Hades and Hell on the one side, and the eyes of man on the other, on the same line in respect of their insatiableness. To this Fleischer adds the remark: cf. the Arab. *al'ayn l'a tam'aha all'a altrab*, nothing fills the eyes of man but at last the dust of the grave—a strikingly beautiful expression! If the dust of the grave fills the open eyes, then they are full—fearful irony! The eye is the instrument of seeing, and consequently in so far as it always looks out farther and farther, it is the instrument and the representation of human covetousness. The eye is filled, is satisfied, is equivalent to: human covetousness is appeased. But first “the desire of the eye,” 1 John ii. 16, is meant in the proper sense. The eyes of men are not satisfied in looking and contemplating that which is attractive and new, and no command is more difficult to be fulfilled than that in Isa. xxxiii. 15, “. . . that shutteth his eyes from seeing evil.” There is therefore no more inexhaustible means, *impia speculationis*, than the desire of the eyes.

There follow here two proverbs which have in common with each other the figures of the crucible and the mortar:

Ver. 21 The crucible for silver and the furnace for gold,  
And a man according to the measure of his praise;

i.e., silver and gold one values according to the result of the smelting crucible and the smelting furnace; but a man, according to the measure of public opinion, which presupposes that which is said in xii. 8, “according to the measure of his wisdom is a man praised.” מְהֵלֵל is not a *ῥῆμα μέσον* like our *Leumund* [renown], but it is a graduated idea which denotes fame down to evil *Lob* [fame], which is only *Lob* [praise] *per antiphrasin*. Ewald otherwise: “according to the measure of his glorying;” or Hitzig better: “according to the measure with which he praises himself,” with the remark: “מְהֵלֵל is not the act, the

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Frankel, *Zu dem Targum der Propheten* (1872), p. 25.

glorifying of self, but the object of the glorying (cf. מִבְּטַח, מִדָּוָן), *i.e.* that in which he places his glory." Böttcher something further: "one recognises him by that which he is generally wont to praise in himself and others, persons and things." Thus the proverb is to be understood; but in connection with xii. 8 it seems to us more probable that מִהֵלֶל is thought of as going forth from others, and not as from himself. In line first, xvii. 3a is repeated; the second line there is conformable to the first, according to which it should be here said that the praise of a man is for him what the crucible and the furnace is for metal. The LXX., Syr., Targ., Jerome, and the *Venet.* read לִפִּי מִהֵלֶל, and thereby obtain more concinnity. Luther accordingly translates:

A man is tried by the mouth of his praise,  
As silver in the crucible and gold in the furnace.

Others even think to interpret man as the subject examining, and so they vocalize the words. Thus *e.g.* Fleischer: *Qualis est catinus argento et fornax auro, talis sit homo ori a quo laudatur*, so that "mouth of his praise" is equivalent to the man who praises him with his mouth. But where, as here, the language relates to relative worth, the supposition for לִפִּי, that it denotes, as at xii. 8, *pro ratione*, is tenable. And that the mouth of him who praises is a smelting crucible for him who is praised, or that the praised shall be a crucible for the mouth of him who praises, would be a wonderful comparison. The LXX. has here also an additional distich which has no place in the Heb. text.

Ver. 22 Though thou bruise a fool in a mortar among grit with a pestle,  
Yet would not his folly depart from him.

According to the best accredited accentuations, אֶם-תִּכְתֹּשׁ has *Illuj.* and בִּמְכַתֵּשׁ has *Pazer*, not *Rebia*, which would separate more than the *Dechi*, and disturb the sequence of the thoughts. The first line is long; the chief disjunctive in the sphere of the *Athnach* is *Dechi* of הוּא, this disjoins more than the *Pazer* of בִּמְ, and this again more than the *Legarmeh* of אֶת-הָאוֹיֵל. The ה of הָרָפוֹת does not belong to the stem of the word (Hitzig), but is the article; רָפוֹת (from רוּף, to shake, to break; according

to Schultens, from רָפַת, to crumble, to cut in pieces, after the form קִיטֹר, which is improbable) are bruised grains of corn (peeled grain, grit), here they receive this name in the act of being bruised; rightly Aquila and Theodotion, ἐν μέσῳ ἐμπτισσομένων (grains of corn in the act of being pounded or bruised), and the Venet. μέσον τῶν πτισανῶν.<sup>1</sup> In בְּעָלִי (thus to be written after *Michlol* 43b, not בְּעָלִי, as Heidenheim writes it without any authority) also the article is contained. מִכְתֵּשׁ is the vessel, and the ב of בעלי is *Beth instrumenti*; עָלִי (of lifting up for the purpose of bruising) is the club, pestle (Luther: *stempffel* = pounder); in the Mishna, *Beza* i. 5, this word denotes a pounder for the cutting out of flesh. The proverb interprets itself: folly has become to the fool as a second nature, and he is not to be delivered from it by the sternest discipline, the severest means that may be tried; it is not indeed his substance (Hitzig), but an inalienable accident of his substance.

Vers. 23–27. An exhortation to rural industry, and particularly to the careful tending of cattle for breeding, forms the conclusion of the foregoing series of proverbs, in which we cannot always discern an intentional grouping. It is one of the *Mashalodes* spoken of vol. i. p. 12. It consists of 11 = 4 + 7 lines.

- Ver. 23 Give heed to the look of thy small cattle,  
Be considerate about the herds.  
24 For prosperity continues not for ever;  
And does the diadem continue from generation to generation?  
25 (But) the hay is gone, and the after-growth appears,  
And the grass of the mountains is gathered:  
26 Lambs serve to clothe thee,  
And goats are the price of a field.  
27 And there is plenty of goats' milk for thy nourishment,  
And for the nourishment of thy house,  
And subsistence for thy maidens.

The beginning directs to the fut., as is not common in these proverbs, *vid.* xxvi. 26. With יָרַע, to take knowledge, which is strengthened by the *inf. intensivus*, is interchanged לָבַשׁ, which means at xxiv. 32 to consider well, but here, to be careful regarding anything. צֶאֱנָן is the small or little cattle, thus sheep and goats. Whether לְעֶרְרִים (here and at Isa. xvii. 2) contains the

<sup>1</sup> The LXX. translates ἐν μέσῳ συνεδρίου, and has thereby misled the Syr., and mediately the Targum.

article is questionable (Gesen. § 35. 2 A), and, since the herds are called **הַעֲדָרִים**, is not probable; thus: direct thy attention to the herds, that is; to this, that thou hast herds. **פָּנִי** is the external side in general; here, the appearance which the sheep present; thus their condition as seen externally. In ver. 24 I formerly regarded **גֵּזֶר** as a synonym of **גִּזְזִי**, to be understood of the produce of wool, or, with Hitzig, of the shearing of the meadow, and thus the produce of the meadow. But this interpretation of the word is untenable, and ver. 25 provides for ver. 24, thus understood, no natural continuation of thought. That **חֵסֶן** signifies a store, fulness of possessions, property, and abundance, has already been shown under xv. 6; but **גֵּזֶר** is always the mark of royal, and generally of princely dignity, and here denotes, *per meton. signi pro re signata*, that dignity itself. With the negative expression in 24a the interrogative in 24b is interchanged as at Job xl. 9, with the implied negative answer; **וְאֵם**, of an oath ("and truly not," as at Isa. lxii. 8), presents the same thought, but with a passionate colouring here unnecessary. Rightly Fleischer: "ready money, moveable property, and on the other hand the highest positions of honour, are far more easily torn away from a man, and secure to him far less of quiet prosperity, than husbandry, viewed particularly with respect to the rearing of cattle." In other words: the possession of treasures and of a lofty place of power and of honour has not in itself the security of everlasting duration; but rural economy, and particularly the rearing of cattle, gives security for food and clothing. The *Chethîb* **לָרֹד דֹּר** is found, e.g. at Ex. iii. 15; the *Kerî* **לָרֹד וְדֹר** substitutes the more usual form. If ver. 25 was an independent whole (Hitzig: grass vanishes and fresh green appears, etc.), then the meaning here and onward would be that in the sphere of husbandry it is otherwise than is said in ver. 24: there that which is consumed renews itself, and there is an enlarging circulation. But this contrast to ver. 24 must be expressed and formed unambiguously. The connection is rather this, that ver. 23 commends the rearing of cattle, ver. 24 confirms it, and 25 ff. discuss what real advantages, not dependent on the accidents of public and social life, it brings.

I rejoice to agree with Fleischer in the opinion that the perfects of ver. 25 form a complex hypothetical antecedent to ver.

26: *Quum evanuerit gramen (sc. vetus) et apparuerint herbæ recentes et collecta fuerint pabula montium, agni vestitui tuo (inservient) et pretium agri (sc. a te emendi) erunt hirci, i.e. then wilt thou nourish thy herds of sheep and goats with the grass on thy fields, and with the dried gathered hay; and these will yield for thee, partly immediately and partly by the money derived therefrom (viz. from the valuable goats not needed for the flocks), all that is needful for thy life. He also remarks, under נָלָה, that it means to make a place void, empty (viz. to quit the place, évacuer la forteresse); hence to leave one's fatherland or home, to wander abroad; thus, rhetorically and poetically of things and possessions: to disappear. הָצִיר (from הָצַר, to be green) is hay, and רִשְׁא the after-growing second crop (after-grass); thus a meadow capable of being mowed a second time is thought of. עֲשֻׁבוֹת הָרִים (with *Dag. dirimens*, as e.g. עֲנָבִי, Deut. xxxii. 32) are the herbage of the mountains. The time when one proceeds to sheep-shearing, ver. 25 cannot intend to designate; it sets before us an interesting rural harvest scene, where, after a plentiful ingathering of hay, one sees the meadows again overspread with new grass (Ewald); but with us the shearing of sheep takes place in the month of May, when the warm season of the year is just at hand. The poet means in general to say, that when the hay is mown and now the herbage is grown up, and also the fodder from the mountains (Ps. cvi. 20) has been gathered home, when thus the barns are filled with plenty, the husbandman is guaranteed against the future on all sides by his stock of cattle. הָלַב (from הָלַב, Arab. *halyb*, with *halab*) is the usual metaplastic connecting form of הָלַב, milk. הִי (from הִי, like הִי from הִי), generally connected with the genitive of the person or thing, for which anything is sufficient (e.g. xxv. 16, הִי, to which *Fleischer* compares Arab. *hasbuha, tassuha kifayuha*), has here the genitive of the thing of which, or in which, one has enough. The complex subject-conception is limited by *Rebia*, and the governing הִי has the subordinated disjunctive *Legarmeh*. עֲנִים is a word of two genders (*epicoenum*), Gesen. § 107, 1d. In וְהִים the influence of the ל still continues; one does not need to supply it meanwhile, since all that maintains and nourishes life can be called חיים (*vita = victus*), e.g. iii. 22. The LXX. translates בִּיתָךְ by*

σὼν θεραπεύοντων, and omits (as also the Syr., but not the Syro-Hexap.) the last line as now superfluous; but that the maids attending to the cattle—by whom we particularly think of milkers—are especially mentioned, intentionally presents the figure of a well-ordered household, full of varied life and activity (Job xl. 29).

This Mashal-ode, commending the rearing of cattle, is a boundary. The series of proverbs beginning with the next chapter is not, however, a commencement, like that at xxii. 17; and Hitzig's supposition, that xxviii. 1–16 and xxii. 17 ff. have one and the same author, stands on a false foundation. The second proverb of the twenty-eighth chapter shows directly that this new series of proverbs is subordinated to the aim of the Hezekiah-collection beginning with xxv., and thus has to be regarded as an original component part of it. The traces of the post-exilian period which Hitzig discovers in xxviii. 1–16 are not sufficient to remove the origin of the proverbs so far down from the times of Hezekiah. We take the first group, xxviii. 1–11, together; for *יָבִינוּ* and *מִבֵּין*, pervading these eleven proverbs, gives to them, as a whole, a peculiar colouring; and xxviii. 12 presents itself as a new beginning, going back to ver. 2, which ver. 1 precedes as a prelude.

xxviii. 1 The godless flee without any one pursuing them;

But the righteous are bold like a lion.

We would misinterpret the sequence of the accents if we supposed that it denoted *רָשָׁע* as obj.; it by no means takes *וַאֲזַרְדָּה* as a parenthesis. *רָשָׁע* belongs thus to *נָסוּ* as collective sing. (cf. e.g. Isa. xvi. 4b);<sup>1</sup> in 1b, *יִבְטַח*, as comprehensive or distributive (individualizing) singular, follows the plur. subject. One cannot, because the word is vocalized *בְּכַפִּיר* and not *בְּכַפִּיר*, regard *יִבְטַח* as an attributive clause thereto (Ewald, like Jerome, *quasi leo confidens*); but the article, denoting the idea of kind, does not certainly always follow *ב*. We say, indifferently, *בְּאֵרִי* or *בְּאֵרִי*, *בְּלֵבִיא* or *בְּלֵבִיא*, and always *בְּאֵרִי*, not *בְּאֵרִי*. In itself, indeed, *יִבְטַח* may be used absolutely: he is confident, undismayed, of the lion as well as of the leviathan, Job xl. 23. But

<sup>1</sup> The Targum of xxviii. 1a is, in *Bereschith rabba*, c. 84, *עֵרָק רָשָׁעָא*, *וְלֹא רָדִיפִין לֵהּ*; that lying before us is formed after the Peshito.

it is suitable thus without any addition for the righteous, and נסו and יבטה correspond to each other as predicates, in accordance with the parallelism; the accentuation is also here correct. The perf. נסו denotes that which is uncaused, and yet follows: the godless flee, pursued by the terrible images that arise in their own wicked consciences, even when no external danger threatens. The fut. יבטה denotes that which continually happens: the righteous remains, even where external danger really threatens, bold and courageous, after the manner of a young, vigorous lion, because feeling himself strong in God, and assured of his safety through Him.

Ver. 2. There now follows a royal proverb, whose key-note is the same as that struck at xxv. 2, which states how a country falls into the οὐκ ἀγαθόν of the rule of the many:

Through the wickedness of a land the rulers become many;

And through a man of wisdom, of knowledge, authority continues.

If the text presented בַּפְּשָׁע as Hitzig corrects, then one might think of a political revolt, according to the usage of the word, 1 Kings xii. 19, etc.; but the word is בַּפְּשָׁע,<sup>1</sup> and פֶּשַׁע (from פָּשַׁע, *dirumpere*) is the breaking through of limits fixed by God, apostasy, irreligion, *e.g.* Mic. i. 5. But that many rulers for a land arise from such a cause, shows a glance into the Book of Hosea, *e.g.* vii. 16: "They return, but not to the Most High (*sursum*); they are become like a deceitful bow; their princes shall then fall by the sword;" and viii. 4: "They set up kings, but not by me; they have made princes, and I knew it not." The history of the kingdom of Israel shows that a land which apostatizes from revealed religion becomes at once the victim of party spirit, and a subject of contention to many would-be rulers, whether the fate of the king whom it has rejected be merited or not. But what is now the contrast which 2b brings forward? The translation by Bertheau and also by Zöckler is impossible: "but through intelligent, prudent men, he (the prince) continueth long." For 2a does not mean a frequent changing of the throne, which in itself may not be a punishment for the sins of the people, but the appearance at the same time of many pretenders to the throne, as was the

<sup>1</sup> Thus to be written with *Gaja* here and at xxix. 6, after the rule of *Metheg-Setzung*, § 42.

case in the kingdom of Israel during the interregnum after the death of Jeroboam II., or in Rome at the time of the thirty tyrants; יִאֲרִי must thus refer to one of these “many” who usurp for a time the throne. בְּאֶרֶם may also mean, xxiii. 28, *inter homines*; but אֶרֶם, with adjective following, e.g. xi. 7, xii. 23, xvii. 18, xxi. 16, always denotes one; and that translation also changes the בֵּן into a “so,” “then” introducing the concluding clause, which it altogether disregards as untranslatable. But equally impossible is Böttcher’s: “among intelligent, prudent people, one continues (in the government),” for then the subject-conception on which it depends would be slurred over. Without doubt בֵּן is here a substantive, and just this subject-conception. That it may be a substantive has been already shown at xi. 19. There it denoted integrity (properly that which is right or genuine); and accordingly it means here, not the *status quo* (Fleischer: *idem rerum status*), but continuance, and that in a full sense: the jurisdiction (properly that which is upright and right), i.e. this, that right continues and is carried on in the land. Similarly Heidenheim, for he glosses בֵּן by מִכֵּן הָאָרֶץ; and Umbreit, who, however, unwarned by the accent, subordinates this בֵּן [in the sense of “right”] to יָרַע as its object. Zöckler, with Bertheau, finds a difficulty in the *asyndeton* מִכֵּן יָרַע. But these words also, Neh. x. 29, stand together as a formula; and that this formula is in the spirit and style of the Book of Proverbs, passages such as xix. 25, xxix. 7<sup>1</sup> show. A practical man, and one who is at the same time furnished with thorough knowledge, is thus spoken of, and prudence and knowledge of religious moral character and worth are meant. What a single man may do under certain circumstances is shown in xxi. 22; Eccles. ix. 15. Here one has to think of a man of understanding and spirit at the helm of the State, perhaps as the nearest counsellor of the king. By means of such an one, right continues long (we do not need to supply לְהֵיוֹת after “continues long”). If, on the one side, the State falls asunder by the evil conduct of the inhabitants of the

<sup>1</sup> The three connected words מִכֵּן וּבְאֶרֶם יָרַע have, in Löwenstein, the accents *Mercha, Mercha, Muqrash*; but the Venetian, 1515, 20, Athias, v. d. Hooght, and Hahn, have rightly *Tarcha, Mercha, Muqrash*,—to place two *Merchas* is Ben-Naphtali’s manner.

land, on the other hand a single man who unites in himself sound understanding and higher knowledge, for a long time holds it together.

Ver. 3. A proverb of a tyrant here connects itself with that of usurpers:

A poor man and an oppressor of the lowly—  
A sweeping rain without bringing bread.

Thus it is to be translated according to the accents. Fleischer otherwise, but also in conformity with the accents: *Quales sunt vir pauper et oppressor miserorum, tales sunt pluvia omnia secum abripiens et qui panem non habent*, i.e. the relation between a poor man and an oppressor of the needy is the same as that between a rain carrying all away with it and a people robbed thereby of their sustenance; in other words: a prince or potentate who robs the poor of their possessions is like a pouring rain which floods the fruitful fields—the separate members of the sentence would then correspond with each other after the scheme of the chiasmus. But the comparison would be faulty, for **נָבֵר רֵשׁ** and **אֵין לָהֶם** fall together, and then the explanation would be *idem per idem*. A “sweeping rain” is one which has only that which is bad, and not that which is good in rain, for it only destroys instead of promoting the growth of the corn; and as the Arab, according to a proverb compared by Hitzig, says of an unjust sultan, that he is a stream without water, so an oppressor of the helpless is appropriately compared to a rain which floods the land and brings no bread. But then the words, “a poor man and an oppressor of the lowly,” must designate one person, and in that case the Heb. words must be accentuated, **נָבֵר רֵשׁ וְעֹשֶׂה דָלִים** (cf. xxix. 4a). For, that the oppressor of the helpless deports himself toward the poor man like a sweeping rain which brings no bread, is a saying not intended to be here used, since this is altogether too obvious, that the poor man has nothing to hope for from such an extortioner. But the comparison would be appropriate if 3a referred to an oppressive master; for one who belongs to a master, or who is in any way subordinated to him, has before all to expect from him that which is good, as a requital for his services, and as a proof of his master’s condescending sympathy.

It is thus asked whether “a poor man and an oppressor of the lowly” may be two properties united in the person of one master. This is certainly possible, for he may be primarily a poor official or an upstart (Zöckler), such as were the Roman proconsuls and procurators, who enriched themselves by impoverishing their provinces (cf. LXX. xxviii. 15); or a hereditary proprietor, who seeks to regain what he has lost by extorting it from his relatives and workmen. But רש (poor) is not sufficient to give this definite feature to the figure of the master; and what does this feature in the figure of the master at all mean? What the comparison 3b says is appropriate to any oppressive ruler, and one does not think of an oppressor of the poor as himself poor; he may find himself in the midst of shattered possessions, but he is not poor; much rather the oppressor and the poor are, as *e.g.* at xxix. 13, contrasted with each other. Therefore we hold, with Hitzig, that רש of the text is to be read *rosh*, whether we have to change it into ראש, or to suppose that the Jewish transcriber has here for once slipped into the Phœnician writing of the word;<sup>1</sup> we do not interpret, with Hitzig, גְּבֹרֵי רֹאשׁ in the sense of ἀνθρώπος δυνάστης, Sir. viii. 1, but explain: a man (or master = גְּבִיר) is the head (cf. *e.g.* Judg. xi. 8), and oppresses the helpless. This rendering is probable, because גְּבִיר־רש, a poor man, is a combination of words without a parallel; the Book of Proverbs does not once use the expression איש־רש, but always simply רש (*e.g.* xxviii. 6, xxix. 13); and גְּבִיר is compatible with חָכָם and the like, but not with רש. If we stumble at the isolated position of ראש, we should consider that it is in a certain measure covered by דלִים; for one has to think of the גְּבֹר, who is the ראש, also as the ראש of these דלִים, as one placed in a high station who numbers poor people among his subordinates. The LXX. translates ἀνδρείος ἐν ἀσεβείᾳ as if the words of the text were גְּבֹר־רשָׁע (cf. the interchange of גְּבִיר and גְּבֹר in both texts of Ps. xviii. 26), but what the LXX. read must have been גְּבֹר לְהַרְשִׁיעַ (Isa. v. 22); and what can גְּבֹר here mean? The statement here made refers to the ruinous conduct of a גְּבִיר, a man of standing, or גְּבִיר, a high lord, a “wicked ruler,” xxviii. 15. On the

<sup>1</sup> The Phœn. writes רש (*i.e.* רש, *rus*); *vid.* Schröder's *Phœnizische Gram.* p. 133; cf. Gesen. *Thes.* under ראש.

contrary, what kind of rain the rule of an ideal governor is compared to, Ps. lxxii. 1-8 tells.

Ver. 4 They who forsake the law praise the godless ;

But they who keep the law become angry with them,

viz. the godless, for רָשָׁע is to be thought of collectively, as at ver. 1. They who praise the godless turn away from the revealed word of God (Ps. lxxiii. 11-15); those, on the contrary, who are true to God's word (xxix. 18) are aroused against them (*vid.* regarding גִּירָה, xv. 18), they are deeply moved by their conduct, they cannot remain silent and let their wickedness go unpunished ; הִתְנַחֲרָה is zeal (excitement) always expressing itself, passing over into actions (syn. הִתְעוֹרֵר, Job xvii. 8).

Ver. 5. A similar antithetic distich :

Wicked men understand not what is right ;

But they who seek Jahve understand all.

Regarding the gen. expression אֲנִשִּׁירָע, *vid.* under ii. 14. He who makes wickedness his element, falls into the confusion of the moral conception ; but he whose end is the one living God, gains from that, in every situation of life, even amid the greatest difficulties, the knowledge of that which is morally right. Similarly the Apostle John (1 John ii. 20): "ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things" (οἴδατε πάντα): i.e., ye need to seek that knowledge which ye require, and which ye long after, not without yourselves, but in the new divine foundation of your personal life; from thence all that ye need for the growth of your spiritual life, and for the turning away from you of hostile influences, will come into your consciences. It is a potential knowledge, all-comprehensive in its character, and obviously a human relative knowledge, that is here meant.

Ver. 6. What is stated in this proverb is a conclusion from the preceding, with which it is also externally connected, for רָשָׁ (= ראש), רָשָׁע, רָע, and now רָשָׁ, follow each other :

Better a poor man who walketh in his innocence,

Than a double-going deceiver who is rich thereby.

A variation of xix. 1. Stainlessness, *integritas vitæ*, as a consequence of unreserved devotion to God, gives to a man with poverty a higher worth and nobility than riches connected with

falsehood which “halts between two opinions” (1 Kings xviii. 21), and appears to go one way, while in reality it goes another. The two ways דְּרָכַיִם (cf. Sir. ii. 12, *οὐαὶ ἀμαρτωλῶ . . . ἐπιβαίνοντι ἐπὶ δύο τρίβους*) are, as ver. 18, not ways going aside to the right or to the left of the right way, but the evil way which the deceiver truly walks in, and the good way which he pretends to walk in (Fleischer); the two ways of action placed over against one another, by one of which he masks the other.

Ver. 7 He who keepeth instruction is a wise son ;

But he that is a companion of profligates bringeth his father into shame.

We have translated תורה at ver. 4 by “law ;” here it includes the father’s instruction regarding the right way of life. נֹצֵר תּוֹרָה, according to the nearest lying syntax, has to be taken as pred. זִלְזָלִים are such as squander their means and destroy their health, *vid.* under xxiii. 20 f. רָעָה signifies, as frequently from the idea of (cf. xxix. 3) pasturing, or properly of tending, to take care of, and to have fellowship with. יִכְלִים [shall put to shame] denotes both that he himself does disgrace to him, and that he brings disgrace to him on the part of others.

Ver. 8. This verse continues a series of proverbs (commencing in ver. 7) beginning with a participle :

He who increaseth his wealth by interest and usury,

Gathereth it for one who is benevolent toward the lowly.

Wealth increased by covetous plundering of a neighbour does not remain with him who has scraped it together in so relentless a manner, and without considering his own advantage ; but it goes finally into the possession of one who is merciful towards the poor, and thus it is bestowed in a manner that is pleasing to God (cf. xiii. 22, Job xxii. 16 f.). The *Kerî*, which drops the second ב, appears to wish to mitigate the sharpness of the distinction of the second idea supposed in its repetition. But Lev. xxv. 35–37, where an Israelite is forbidden to take usury and interest from his brother, the two are distinguished ; and Fleischer rightly remarks that there נֶשֶׁךְ means usury or interest taken in money, and תְּרִבִּית usury or interest taken in kind ; *i.e.*, of that which one has received

in loan, such as grain, or oil, etc., he gives back more than he has received. In other words : נשך is the name of the interest for the capital that is lent, and מְרִבִּית, or, as it is here called תְּרִבִּית, the more, the addition thereto, the increase (Luther : *versatz*). This meaning of gain by means of lending on interest remains in נשך ; but תְּרִבִּית, according to the later *usus loq.*, signifies gain by means of commerce, thus business-profit, *vid. Baba Mez'ia*, v. 1. Instead of יִקְבְּצֵנִי, more recent texts have the *Kal*<sup>1</sup> יִקְבְּצֵנִי. לְחִינֹן also is, as xiv. 31, xix. 17, *part. Kal*, not *inf. Poel* : *ad largiendum pauperibus* (Merc., Ewald, Bertheau), for there the person of him who presents the gift is undefined ; but just this, that it is another and better-disposed, for whom, without having it in view, the collector gathers his stores, is the very point of the thought.

Ver. 9 He who turneth away his ear not to hear of the law,  
Even his prayer is an abomination.

Cf. xv. 8 and the argument 1 Sam. xv. 22. Not only the evil which such an one does, but also the apparent good is an abomination, an abomination to God, and *eo ipso* also in itself : morally hollow and corrupt ; for it is not truth and sincerity, for the whole soul, the whole will of the suppliant, is not present : he is not that for which he gives himself out in his prayer, and does not earnestly seek that which he presents and expresses a wish for in prayer.

Ver. 10. A tristich beginning with a participle :

He who misleads the upright into an evil way,  
He shall fall into his own pit ;  
But the innocent shall inherit that which is good.

In the first case, xxvi. 27 is fulfilled : the deceiver who leads astray falls himself into the destruction which he prepared for others, whether he misleads them into sin, and thus mediately prepares destruction for them, or that he does this immediately

<sup>1</sup> If, as Hitzig, after J. H. Michaelis, remarks, the word were Ben-Asher's יִקְבְּצֵנִי, then it would be thus rightly punctuated by Clodius and the moderns. Kimchi, in the *Wörterbuch* under קָבַץ, adduces this word as Ben-Asher's. But the Masora knows nothing of it. It marks יִקְבְּצֵנִי, Jer. xxxi. 10, with לִית as *unicum*, and thus supposes for the passage before us יִקְבְּצֵנִי, which certainly is found in mss., and is also marked on the margin with לִית as *unicum*.

by enticing them into this or that danger; for בְּדֶרֶךְ רָע may be understood of the way of wicked conduct, as well as of the experience of evil, of being betrayed, robbed, or even murdered. That those who are misled are called יִשְׁרִים, explains itself in the latter case: that they are such as he ought to show respect towards, and such as deserved better treatment, heightens the measure of his guilt. If we understand being morally led astray, yet may we not with Hitzig here find the "theory" which removes the punishment from the just and lays it on the wicked. The clause xi. 8 is not here applicable. The first pages of the Scripture teach that the deceiver does not by any means escape punishment; but certainly the deceiver of the upright does not gain his object, for his diabolical joy at the destruction of such an one is vain, because God again helps him with the right way, but casts the deceiver so much the deeper down. As the idea of דֶּרֶךְ רָע has a twofold direction, so the connections of the words may be genitival (*via mali*) as well as adjectival (*via mala*). בְּשִׁחָתוֹ is not incorrectly written for בְּשִׁחָתוֹ, for שָׁחִית occurs (only here) with שִׁחָת as its warrant both from שָׁחָה, to bend, to sink; cf. לָזֹית under iv. 24. In line third, opposite to "he who misleads," stand "the innocent" (pious), who, far from seeking to entice others into the evil way and bring them to ruin, are unreservedly and honestly devoted to God and to that which is good; these shall inherit good (cf. iii. 35); even the consciousness of having made no man unhappy makes them happy; but even in their external relations there falls to them the possession of all good, which is the divinely ordained reward of the good.

Ver. 11 A rich man deems himself wise;

But a poor man that hath understanding searcheth him out,

or, as we have translated, xviii. 17, goes to the bottom of him, whereby is probably thought of the case that he seeks to use him as a means to an ignoble end. The rich man appears in his own eyes to be a wise man, *i.e.* in his self-delusion he thinks that he is so; but if he has anything to do with a poor man who has intelligence, then he is seen through by him. Wisdom is a gift not depending on any earthly possession.

We take vers. 12-20 together. A proverb regarding riches

closes this group, as also the foregoing is closed, and its commencement is related in form and in its contents to ver. 2 :

Ver. 12 When righteous men triumph, the glory is great ;  
And when the godless rise, the people are searched for.

The first line of this distich is parallel with .xxix. 2 ; cf. xi. 10a, 11a : when the righteous rejoice, viz. as conquerors (cf. *e.g.* Ps. lx. 8), who have the upper hand, then תפארת, bright prosperity, is increased ; or as Fleischer, by comparison of the Arab. *yawm alazynt* (day of ornament = festival day), explains : so is there much festival adornment, *i.e.* one puts on festival clothes, *signum pro re signata* : thus all appears festal and joyous, for prosperity and happiness then show themselves forth. רבה is adj. and pred. of the substantival clause ; Hitzig regards it as the attribute : “then is there great glory ;” this supposition is possible (*vid.* vii. 26, and under Ps. lxxxix. 51), but here it is purely arbitrary. 28a is parallel with 12b : if the godless arise, attain to power and prominence, these men are spied out, *i.e.* as we say, after Zeph. i. 12, they are searched for as with lamps. יחפש אדם is to be understood after Obadiah, ver. 6, cf. ii. 4 : men are searched out, *i.e.* are plundered (in which sense Heidenheim regards חפש as here a transposition from חשף), or, with reference to the secret police of despotism : they are subjected to an espionage. But a better gloss is יפתר אדם. 28a : the people let themselves be sought for, they keep themselves concealed in the inside of their houses, they venture not out into the streets and public places (Fleischer), for mistrust and suspicion oppress them all ; one regards his person and property nowhere safer than within the four walls of his house ; the lively, noisy, variegated life which elsewhere rules without, is as if it were dead.

Ver. 13 He that denieth his sin shall not prosper ;  
But he that acknowledgeth and forsaketh it shall obtain mercy.

Thus is this proverb translated by Luther, and thus it lives in the mouth of the Christian people. He who falsely disowns, or with self-deception excuses, if he does not altogether justify his sins, which are discernible as פשעים, has no success ; he remains, after Ps. xxxii., in his conscience and life burdened with a secret ban ; but he who acknowledges (the LXX. has ἐξηγούμενος

instead of ἐξομολογούμενος, as it ought to be) and forsakes (for the *remissio* does not follow the *confessio*, if there is not the accompaniment of *nova obedientia*) will find mercy (יִרְחַם, as Hos. xiv. 4). In close connection therewith stands the thought that man has to work out his salvation "with fear and trembling" (Phil. ii. 12).

Ver. 14 Well is it with the man who feareth always :

But he that is stiff-necked shall fall into mischief.

The *Piel* פִּהַי occurs elsewhere only at Isa. li. 13, where it is used of the fear and dread of men ; here it denotes the anxious concern with which one has to guard against the danger of evil coming upon his soul. Aben Ezra makes God the object ; but rather we are to regard sin as the object, for while the truly pious is one that "fears God," he is at the same time one that "feareth evil." The antithesis extends beyond the nearest lying contrast of fleshly security ; this is at the same time more or less one who hardens or steels his heart (מִקְשָׁה לִבּוֹ), viz. against the word of God, against the sons of God in his heart, and against the affectionate concern of others about his soul, and as such rushes on to his own destruction (יִפּוֹל בְּרָעָה, as at xvii. 20).

This general ethical proverb is now followed by one concerning the king :

Ver. 15 A roaring lion and a ravening bear

Is a foolish ruler over a poor people,

i.e. a people without riches and possessions, without lasting sources of help,—a people brought low by the events of war and by calamities. To such a people a tyrant is a twofold terror, like a ravenous monster. The LXX. translate מוֹשֵׁל רָשָׁע by ὁ τυραννεὶ πτωχὸς ὢν, as if רָשָׁע had been transferred to this place from ver. 3. But their translation of רָשָׁע, xxix. 7, wavers between ἀσεβής and πτωχός, and of the bear they make a wolf ὕα, dialectical דִּיב. שׁוֹקֵק designates a bear as lingering about, running hither and thither, impelled by extreme hunger (Venet. ἐπιούσα), from שָׁקַק = שָׁקַח, to drive, which is said of nimble running, as well as of urging impulses (cf. under Gen. iii. 16), viz. hunger.

Ver. 16. Another proverb of the king :

O prince devoid of understanding and rich in oppression !

He that hateth unrighteous gain continueth long.

The old interpreters from the LXX. interpret **וְיָרֵב מְעַשְׂקוֹת** as pred. (as also Fleischer: *princeps qui intelligentiæ habet parum idem oppressionis exercet multum*); but why did not the author use the word **הוּא** or **יְהוּא** instead of this ambiguous inconvenient **י**? Hitzig regards the first term as a nominative absolute, which does not assume a suffix in the second line. But examples such as 27a, xxvii. 7b, are altogether of a different sort; there occurs a reference that is in reality latent, and only finds not expression; the clause following the nominative is related to it as its natural predicate, but here 15b is an independent clause standing outside of any syntactical relation to 15a. Heidenheim has acknowledged that here there lies before us a proverb not in the form of a mere declaration, but of a warning address, and thus also it is understood by Ewald, Bertheau, Elster, and Zöckler. The accentuation seems to proceed on the same supposition. It is the only passage in the Book of Proverbs where **נָגִיד**, of the supreme ruler of the people, and where the plur. **תְּבִנוֹת**, occur; it is not therefore at all strange if the proverb also has something strange in its formation. Often enough, proverbs are in the form of an address to a son, and generally to their reader; why not also one at least to the king? It is a proverb as when I say: Oh thou reckless, merry fellow! he who laughs much will sometimes weep long. Thus here the address is directed to the prince who is devoid of all wisdom and intelligence, which are necessary for a prince; but on this account the more earnest in exhortation to say to him that only one who hates defrauding the people attains an old age; thus that a prince who plunders the people wantonly shortens his life as a man, and his position as a ruler (cf. **שְׁנִיָּהֶם**, xxiv. 22). The *Kerî* **שָׁנָא** has the tone thrown back on the *penult.*, as the *Chethîb* **שָׁנָא** would also have it, cf. **לְמַצָּא**, viii. 9. The relation of a plur. subj. to a sing. pred. is as at xxvii. 16. Regarding **בָּצַע**, *vid.* under i. 19. A confirmation of this proverb directing itself to princes is found in Jer. xxii. 13–19, the woe pronounced upon Jehoiakim. And a glance at the woe pronounced in Hab. ii. 12, shows how easily ver. 17 presents itself in connection.

Ver. 17 A man burdened with the guilt of blood upon his soul  
Fleeth to the pit; let no one detain him.

Luther translates: "A man that doeth violence to the blood

of any one," as if he had read the word עָשָׂק. Löwenstein persuades himself that עָשָׂק may mean "having oppressed," and for this refers to לְבוּשׁ, having clothed, in the Mishna רָכִיב, נָשִׂי, Lat. *coenatus, juratus*; but none of all these cases are of the same nature, for always the conduct designated is interpreted as a suffering of that which is done, *e.g.* the drawing on, as a being clothed; the riding, as a being ridden, etc. Of עָשָׂק, in the sense of the oppression of another, there is no such *part. pass.* as throws the action as a condition back upon the subject. This is valid also against Aben Ezra, who supposes that עָשָׂק means oppressing after the forms אָגַר, שָׁדַד, שָׁכַן, for of שָׁכַן, settled = dwelling, that which has just been said is true; that אָגַר is equivalent to אָגַר, cf. regarding it under xxx. 1, and that שָׁדַד, Ps. cxxxvii. 8, is equivalent to שָׁדַד, is not true. Kimchi adds, under the name of his father (Joseph Kimchi), also שָׁחַט, Jer. ix. 7 = שָׁחַט; but that "slaughtered" can be equivalent to slaughtering is impossible. Some mss. have the word עָשָׂק, which is not inadmissible, but not in the sense of "accused" (Löwenstein), but: persecuted, exposed to war; for עָשָׂק signifies to treat hostilely, and post-bibl. generally to aspire after or pursue anything, *e.g.* עָשָׂק בְּרִבְי תֹרָה, R. עֵשׂ (whence *Piel contractare*, cf. Isa. xxiii. 2, according to which עָשָׂק appears to be an intensifying of this עֵשׂ). However, there is no ground for regarding עָשָׂק<sup>1</sup> as not original, nor in the sense of "hard pressed;" for it is not used of avenging persecution, but: inwardly pressed, for Isa. xxxviii. 14 עָשָׂקָה also signifies the anguish of a guilty conscience. Whoever is inwardly bowed down by the blood of a man whom he has murdered, betakes himself to a ceaseless flight to escape the avenger of blood, the punishment of his guilt, and his own inward torment; he flees and finds no rest, till at last the grave (בֹּר according to the Eastern, *i.e.* the Babylonian, mode of writing בֹּר) receives him, and death accomplishes the only possible propitiation of the murderer. The exhortation, "let no one detain him," does not mean that one should not lay hold on the fugitive; but, since בִּזְמָנוּ does not mean merely to hold fast, but to hold right, that

<sup>1</sup> Bottcher supposes much rather עָשָׂק = מַעֲשָׂק; also, xxv. 11, דָּבַר = מַדְבֵּר; but that does not follow from the *defectiva scriptio*, nor from anything else.

one should not afford him any support, any refuge, any covering or security against the vengeance which pursues him; that one should not rescue him from the arm of justice, and thereby invade and disturb the public administration of justice, which rests on moral foundations; on the other side, the Book of Proverbs, xxiv. 11 f., has uttered its exhortation to save a human life whenever it is possible to do so. The proverb lying before us cannot thus mean anything else than that no one should give to the murderer, as such, any assistance; that no one should save him clandestinely, and thereby make himself a partaker of his sin. Grace cannot come into the place of justice till justice has been fully recognised. Human sympathy, human forbearance, under the false title of grace, do not stand in contrast to this justice. We must, however, render *אֶל־יִתְמָוֵרְבוּ* not directly as an admonition against that which is immoral; it may also be a declaration of that which is impossible: only let no one support him, let no one seek to deliver him from the unrest which drives him from place to place. This is, however, in vain; he is unceasingly driven about to fulfil his lot. But the translation: *nemine eum sustinente* (Fleischer), is inadmissible; a mere declaration of a fact without any subjective colouring is never *לֹא* seq. *fut.*

Ver. 18 He who walketh blamelessly is helped,

And he who is perverse in a double way suddenly perisheth.

The LXX. translate *תָּמִים* by *δικαίως* (as the accusative of manner), Aquila and Theodotion by *τέλειος*; but it may also be translated *τέλειον* or *τελειότητα*, as the object accus. of ii. 7. Instead of *נַעֲקֹשׁ דְּרָכִים*, ver. 6, there is here *נַעֲקֹשׁ דְּרָכִים*, obliquely directed in a double way, or reflex bending himself. At ver. 6 we have interpreted the *dual* *דְּרָכִים* rightly, thus *בְּאַחַת* cannot refer back to one of these two ways; besides, *דְּרָכָה* as fem. is an anomaly, if not a solecism. *בְּאַחַת* signifies, like the Aram. *בְּחֶדֶר*, either all at once (for which the Mish. *בְּאַחַת*, Aram. *בְּחֶדֶר*), or once (= *בְּפַעַם אַחַת*), and it signifies in the passage before us, not: once, *aliquando*, as Nolde, with Flacius, explains, but: all at once, *i.e.* as Geier explains: *penitus, sic ut pluribus casibus porro non sit opus*. Schultens compares:

"*Procubuit moriens et humum semel ore momordit.*"<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Æneid*, xi. 418.

Rightly Fleischer: *repente totus concidet.*

Ver. 19 He who cultivateth his land is satisfied with bread,  
And he that graspeth after vanities is satisfied with poverty.

A variation of xii. 11. The pred. here corresponds to its contrast. On רִישׁ (here and at xxxi. 7), instead of the more frequent רֵאשׁ, cf. x. 4.

To this proverb of the cultivation of the land as the sure source of support, the next following stands related, its contents being cognate:

Ver. 20 A strong, upright man is enriched with blessings;  
But he that hastens to become rich remains not unpunished.

אִישׁ אֱמוּנִים, xx. 6, as well as אֱמוּנוֹת 'א, denotes a man *bonæ fidei*; but the former expression refers the description to a constancy and certainty in the relations of favour and of friendship, here to rectitude or integrity in walk and conduct; the plur. refers to the all-sidedness and the ceaselessness of the activity. בְּרָכוֹת is related, as at x. 6: the idea comprehends blessings on the side of God and of man, thus *benedictio rei* and *benedictio voti*. On the contrary, he who, without being careful as to the means, is in haste to become rich, remains not only unblessed, but also is not guiltless, and thus not without punishment; also this לֹא יִנָּקָה (e.g. vi. 29), frequently met in the Mishle, is, like בְּרָכוֹת, the union of two ideas, for generally the bibl. mode of conception and language comprehends in one, sin, guilt, and punishment.

With a proverb, in the first half of which is repeated the beginning of the second appendix, xxiv. 23, a new group commences:

Ver. 21 Respect of persons is not good;  
And for a morsel of bread a man may become a transgressor.

Line first refers to the administration of justice, and line second—the special generalized—to social life generally. The “morsel of bread,” as example of a bribe by means of which the favour of the judge is purchased, is too low a conception. Hitzig well: “even a trifle, a morsel of bread (1 Sam. ii. 36), may, as it awakens favour and dislike within us, thus in general call forth in the will an inclination tending to draw one aside from the line of strict rectitude.” Geier compares A. Gellius' *Noct.*

*Att. i. 15*, where Cato says of the Tribune Cœlius: *Frusto panis conduci potest vel ut taceat vel ut loquatur.*

Ver. 22 The man of an evil eye hasteneth after riches,  
And knoweth not that want shall come upon him.

Hitzig renders 'אִישׁ רָע [the man of an evil eye] as appos. of the subject; but in that case the phrase would have been אִישׁ רָע עֵין נִבְהָל לָהֶן (cf. *e.g.* xxix. 1). רָע עֵין (xxiii. 6) is the jealous, envious, grudging, and at the same time covetous man. It is certainly possible that an envious man consumes himself in ill-humour without quietness, as Hitzig objects; but as a rule there is connected with envy a passionate endeavour to raise oneself to an equal height of prosperity with the one who is the object of envy; and this zeal, proceeding from an impure motive, makes men blind to the fact that thereby they do not advance, but rather degrade themselves, for no blessing can rest on it; discontentedness loses, with that which God has assigned to us, deservedly also that which it has. The *pret.* נִבְהָל, the expression of a fact; the *part.* נִבְהָל, the expression of an habitual characteristic action; the word signifies *præceps* (*qui præceps fertur*), with the root-idea of one who is unbridled, who is not master of himself (*vid.* under Ps. ii. 5, and above at xx. 21). The phrase wavers between נִבְהָל (Kimchi, under בָּהֵל; and Norzi, after Codd. and old editions) and נִבְהָל (thus, *e.g.*, Cod. *Jaman*); only at Ps. xxx. 8 נִבְהָל stands unquestioned. חָסֵר [want] is recognised by Symmachus, Syr., and Jerome. To this, as the authentic reading, cf. its ingenious rendering in *Bereschith Rabba*, c. 58, to Gen. xxiii. 14. The LXX. reads, from 22b, that a חָסֵר, ἐλεήμων, will finally seize the same riches, according to which Hitzig reads חָסֵר, disgrace, shame (cf. xxv. 10).

Ver. 23 He that reproveth a man who is going backwards,  
Findeth more thanks than the flatterer.

It is impossible that *aj* can be the suffix of אַחֲרֵי; the Talmud, *Tamid* 28a, refers it to God; but that it signifies: after my (Solomon's) example or precedence (Aben Ezra, Ahron b. Josef, *Venet.*, J. H. Michaelis), is untenable — such a name given by the teacher here to himself is altogether aimless. Others translate, with Jerome: *Qui corripit hominem gratiam postea inveniet apud eum magis, quam ille qui per linguæ blandi-*

*menta decipit*, for they partly purpose to read אַחֲרֵי־כֵן, partly to give to אַחֲרֵי the meaning of *postea*. אַחֲרֵי, Ewald says, is a notable example of an adverb. Hitzig seeks to correct this adv. as at Neh. iii. 30 f., but where, with Keil, אַחֲרֵי is to be read; at Josh. ii. 7, where אַחֲרֵי is to be erased; and at Deut. ii. 30, where the traditional text is accountable. This אַחֲרֵי may be formed like אֲחֵי and מִתֵּי; but if it had existed, it would not be a ἀπαξ λεγ. The accentuation also, in the passage before us, does not recognise it; but it takes אַחֲרֵי and אָדָם together, and how otherwise than that it appears, as Ibn-Jachja in his *Grammar*, and Immanuel<sup>1</sup> have recognised it, to be a noun terminating in *aj*. It is a formation, like לִפְנֵי, 1 Kings vi. 10 (cf. Olshausen's *Lehrb.* p. 428 f.), of the same termination as שָׂרִי, חָנִי, and in the later Aram.-Heb. וְנִי, and the like. The variant אַחֲרֵי, noticed by Heidenheim, confirms it; and the distinction between different classes of men (*vid.* vol. i. p. 39) which prevails in the Book of Proverbs favours it. A אָדָם אַחֲרֵי is defined, after the manner of Jeremiah (vii. 24): a man who is directed backwards, and not לִפְנֵי, forwards. Not the renegade—for מוֹכִיחַ, *opp.* מחליק לשון, does not lead to so strong a conception—but the retrograder is thus called in German: *Rückläufige* [one who runs backwards] or *Rückwendige* [one who turns backwards], who turns away from the good, the right, and the true, and always departs the farther away from them (Immanuel: going backwards in his nature or his moral relations). This centrifugal direction, leading to estrangement from the fear of Jahve, or, what is the same thing, from the religion of revelation, would lead to entire ruin if unreserved and fearless denunciation did not interpose and seek to restrain it; and he who speaks<sup>2</sup> so truly, openly, and earnestly home to the conscience of one who is on the downward course, gains for himself thereby, on the part of him whom he has directed aright, and on the part of all who are well disposed, better thanks (and also, on the part of God, a better reward, James

<sup>1</sup> Abulwalid (*Rikma*, p. 69) also rightly explains אַחֲרֵי, as a characterizing epithet, by אַחֲרֵי (turned backwards).

<sup>2</sup> Löwenstein writes מוֹכִיחַ, after *Metheg-Setzung*, § 43, not incorrectly; for the following word, although toned on the first syllable, begins with guttural having the same sound.

v. 19 f.) than he who, speaking to him, smooths his tongue to say to him who is rich, or in a high position, only that which is agreeable. *Laudat adulator, sed non est verus amator.* The second half of the verse consists, as often (Ps. lxxiii. 8; Job xxxiii. 1; cf. *Thorath Emeth*, p. 51), of only two words, with *Mercha Silluk*.

Ver. 24 He who robbeth his father and mother, and saith: It is no  
wrong,

Is a companion of the destroyer.

The second line is related to xviii. 9b. Instead of *dominus perditionis* there found, there is here אִישׁ מְשֻׁחֵית, *vir perdens* (*perditor*); the word thus denotes a man who destroys, not from revenge, but from lust, and for the sake of the life of men, and that which is valuable for men; thus the spoiler, the incendiary, etc. Instead of אָח there, here we have הָבֵר in the same sense. He who robs his parents, *i.e.* takes to himself what belongs to them, and regards his doing so as no particular sin,<sup>1</sup> because he will at last come to inherit it all (cf. xx. 21 with xix. 26), is to be likened to a man who allows himself in all offences against the life and property of his neighbour; for what the deed of such a son wants in external violence, it makes up in its wickedness, because it is a rude violation of the tenderest and holiest demands of duty.

Ver. 25 The covetous stirreth up strife;

But he that trusteth in Jahve is richly comforted.

Line first is a variation of xv. 18a; רָחֵב-נֶפֶשׁ is not to be interchanged with רָחֵב-לֵב, xxi. 4. He is of a wide heart who haughtily puffs himself up, of a wide soul (cf. with Schultens הרחיב נפשו, of the opening up of the throat, or of revenge, Isa. v. 14; Hab. ii. 5) who is insatiably covetous; for לֵב is the spiritual, and נֶפֶשׁ the natural, heart of man, according to which the widening of the heart is the overstraining of self-consciousness, and the widening of the soul the overstraining of passion. Rightly the LXX., according to its original text: ἀπληστος ἀνὴρ κινεῖ (thus with Hitzig for κρινεῖ) νείκη. Line second is a variation of xvi. 20, xxix. 25. Over against the insatiable is he who trusts in God (יֵב טָהָה, with *Gaja* to the vocal, concluding

<sup>1</sup> Accentuate וְאִמֶּר אֵין פֶּשַׁע without *Makkeph*, as in Codd. 1294 and old editions.

the word, for it follows a word accented on the first syllable, and beginning with a guttural; cf. 'אָ, xxix. 2; 'יָ, xxix. 18), that He will bestow upon him what is necessary and good for him. One thus contented is easily satisfied (compare with the word xi. 25, xiii. 4, and with the matter, x. 3, xiii. 24), is externally as well as internally appeased; while that other, never contented, has no peace, and creates dispeace around him.

The following proverb assumes the בָּטִיחַ of the foregoing:<sup>1</sup>

Ver. 26 He that trusteth in his own heart is a fool;  
But he that walketh in wisdom shall escape.

From the promise in the second line, Hitzig concludes that a courageous heart is meant, but when by itself לֵב never bears this meaning. He who trusteth in his own heart is not merely one who is guided solely "by his own inconsiderate, defiant impulse to act" (Zöckler). The proverb is directed against a false subjectivity. The heart is that fabricator of thoughts, of which, as of man by nature, nothing good can be said, Gen. vi. 5, viii. 21. But wisdom is a gift from above, and consists in the knowledge of that which is objectively true, that which is normatively godlike. הֹלֵךְ בְּחָכְמָה is he who so walks that he has in wisdom a secure authority, and has not then for the first time, when he requires to walk, need to consider, to reckon, to experiment. Thus walking in the way of wisdom, he escapes dangers to which one is exposed who walks in foolish confidence in his own heart and its changeful feelings, thoughts, imaginations, delusions. One who thoughtlessly boasts, who vainly dreams of victory before the time, is such a person; but confidence in one's own heart takes also a hundred other forms. Essentially similar to this proverb are the words of Jer. ix. 22 f., for the wisdom meant in 26b is there defined at ver. 23.

Ver. 27 He that giveth to the poor suffereth no want;  
But he that covereth his eyes meeteth many curses.

In the first line the pronoun לוֹ, referring back to the subject noun, is to be supplied, as at xxvii. 7 לָהּ. He who gives to the poor has no want (מַחְסוֹר), for God's blessing reimburses

<sup>1</sup> We take the opportunity of remarking that the tendency to form together certain proverbs after one catchword is found also in German books of proverbs; *vid.* Paul, *Ueber die urspr. Anord. von Freidanks Bescheidenheit* (1870), p. 12.

him richly for what he bestows. He, on the other hand, who veils (מַעְלִים, cf. the *Hithpa.*, Isa. lviii. 7) his eyes so as not to see the misery which calls forth compassion, or as if he did not see the misery which has a claim on his compassion; he is (becomes) rich in curses, *i.e.* is laden with the curses of those whose wants he cared not for; curses which, because they are deserved, change by virtue of a divine requital (*vid.* Sir. iv. 5f.; Tob. iv. 7) into all kinds of misfortunes (*opp.* רַב־בְּרָכוֹת, 20a). מַאֲרָה is constructed after the form מַגֵּרָה, מַקֵּרָה from אָרַר.

The following proverb resembles the beginnings xxviii. 2, 12. The proverbs xxviii. 28, xxix. 1, 2, 3, form a beautiful square grasp, in which the first and third, and the second and fourth, correspond to one another.

Ver. 28 When the godless rise up, men hide themselves;  
And when they perish, the righteous increase.

Line first is a variation of 12*b*. Since they who hide themselves are merely called men, people, the meaning of יִרְבִּי is probably not this, that the righteous then from all sides come out into the foreground (Hitzig), but that they prosper, multiply, and increase as do plants, when the worms, caterpillars, and the like are destroyed (Fleischer); Löwenstein glosses יִרְבִּי by יִגְדְּלוּ, they become great = powerful, but that would be Elihu's style, Job xxxiii. 12, which is not in common use; the names of masters and of those in authority, רַב, רִבִּי, רִבּוֹן, רִבְנֹת, are all derived from רָבַב, not from רָבָה. The increase is to be understood of the prosperous growth (to become great = to increase, as perhaps also Gen. xxi. 10) of the congregation of the righteous, which gains in the overthrow of the godless an accession to its numbers; cf. xxix. 2, and especially 16.

xxix. 1. A general ethical proverb here follows:

A man often corrected who hardeneth his neck,  
Shall suddenly go to ruin without remedy.

Line second = vi. 15*b*. The connection אִישׁ תּוֹכַחֲתוֹ must make the nearest impression on a reader of the Book of Proverbs that they mean a censurer (reprehender), but which is set aside by what follows, for the genit. after אִישׁ is, xvi. 29, xxvi. 21, xxix. 10, xiii. 20, the designation of that which proceeds from the subject treated. And since תּוֹכַחֲתוֹ, Ps. xxxvii. 15, Job xxiii. 4, denotes counter evidence, and generally rejoinders, thus

in the first line a reasoner is designated who lets nothing be said to him, and nothing be shown to him, but contradicts all and every one. Thus *e.g.* Fleischer: *vir qui correptus contradicit et cervicem obdurat*. But this interpolated *correptus* gives involuntary testimony of this, that the nearest lying impression of the 'תו' suffers a change by מְקַשֶּׁה עָרַף: if we read הקֶשֶׁה (לב) עָרַף with 'תו', the latter then designates the *correptio*, over against which is placed obstinate boldness (Syr., Targ., Jerome, Luther), and 'תו' shows itself thus to be *gen. objecti*, and we have to compare the *gen.* connection of אִישׁ, as at xviii. 23, xxi. 17, or rather at 1 Kings xx. 42 and Jer. xv. 10. But it is unnecessary, with Hitzig, to limit 'תו' to divine infliction of punishment, and after Hos. v. 9, Isa. xxxvii. 3, to read תוֹכַחַת [punishment], which occurs, Ps. cxlix. 7, in the sense of punishment inflicted by man.<sup>1</sup> Besides, we must think first not of actual punishment, but of chastening, reproving words; and the man to whom are spoken the reproving words is one whose conduct merits more and more severe censure, and continually receives correction from those who are concerned for his welfare. Hitzig regards the first line as a conditional clause: "Is a man of punishment stiff-necked?" . . . This is syntactically impossible. Only מְקַשֶּׁה עָרַף could have such force: a man of punishment, if he . . . But why then did not the author rather write the words וְהוּא עָרַף מְקַשֶּׁה? Why then could not מְקַשֶּׁה עָרַף be a co-ordinated further description of the man? Cf. *e.g.* Ex. xvii. 21. The door of penitence, to which earnest, well-meant admonition calls a man, does not always remain open. He who with stiff-necked persistence in sin and in self-delusion sets himself in opposition to all endeavours to save his soul, shall one day suddenly, and without the prospect and possibility of restoration (cf. Jer. xix. 11), become a wreck. *Audi doctrinam si vis vitare ruinam*. The general ethical proverb is here followed by one that is political:

Ver. 2 When the righteous increase, the people rejoice;  
And when a godless man ruleth, the people mourn.

Regarding בְּרִבּוּת צֶדֶק (Aquila rightly, ἐν τῷ πληθύνει δικαίους), *vid.* at xxviii. 28. If the righteous form the majority, or are

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Zunz, "Regarding the Idea and the Use of *Tokhecha*," in Steinschneider's *Heb. Bibliographia*, entitled המזכיר, 1871, p. 70 f.

in such numbers that they are the party that give the tone, that form the predominant power among the people (Fleischer, *cum incrementa capiunt justī*), then the condition of the people is a happy one, and their voice joyful (xi. 10); if, on the contrary, a godless man or (after xxviii. 1) godless men rule, the people are made to sigh (עִינָה עִם, with the *Gaja*, according to rule). "There is reason," as Hitzig remarks, "why עִם should be placed first with, and then without, the article." In the first case it denotes the people as those among whom there is such an increase of the righteous; in the second case, the article is wanting, because it is not generally used in poetry; and, besides, its absence makes the second line consist of nine syllables, like the first. This political proverb is now followed by one of general ethics:

Ver. 3 A man who loveth wisdom delighteth his father;  
And he who keepeth company with harlots spendeth his  
substance.

Line first is a variation of x. 1. אִישׁ-אָהֶב has, according to rule, the *Metheg*, cf. 9a. אִישׁ is man, without distinction of age, from childhood (Gen. iv. 1) up to ripe old age (Isa. lxvi. 13); love and dutiful relation towards father and mother never cease. Line second reminds of xxviii. 7 (cf. xiii. 20).

A series of six proverbs follows, beginning with a proverb of the king:

Ver. 4 A king by righteousness bringeth the land to a good condition;  
But a man of taxes bringeth it down.

The *Hiph.* הִעֲמִיד signifies to make it so that a person or matter comes to stand erect and stand fast (*e.g.* 1 Kings xv. 4); הָרַם, to tear down, is the contrary of building up and extending (Ps. xxviii. 5), cf. נִהַרַם, *opp.* רוּם, of the state, xi. 11. By 'אִישׁ תֶּר' is meant the king, or a man of this kind; but it is questionable whether as a man of gifts, *i.e.* one who lets gifts be made to him (Grotius, Fleischer, Ewald, Bertheau, Zöckler), or as a man of taxes, *i.e.* who imposes them (Midrash, Aben Ezra, Ralbagg, Rosenmüller, Hitzig). Both interpretations are possible, for 'תֶּר means tax (lifting, raising = dedicating), free-will offerings, as well as gifts that are obligatory and required by the laws of nature. Since the word, in the only other place

where it occurs, Ezek. xlv. 13–16, is used of the relation of the people to the prince, and denotes a legally-imposed tax, so it appears also here, in passing over from the religious sphere to the secular, to be meant of taxes, and that according to its fundamental conception of gifts, *i.e.* such taxes as are given on account of anything, such as the produce of the soil, manufactures, heritages. Thus also is to be understood Aquila's and Theodotion's ἀνὴρ ἀφαιρεμάτων, and the rendering also of the Venet. ἐράνων. A man on the throne, covetous of such gifts, brings the land to ruin by exacting contributions; on the contrary, a king helps the land to a good position, and an enduring prosperity, by the exercise of right, and that in appointing a well-proportioned and fit measure of taxation.

Ver. 5 A man who flattereth his neighbour  
Spreadeth a net for his steps.

Fleischer, as Bertheau: *vir qui alterum blanditiis circumvenit*; but in the על there does not lie in itself a hostile tendency, an intention to do injury; it interchanges with אל, Ps. xxxvi. 3, and what is expressed in line second happens also, without any intention on the part of the flatterer: the web of the flatterer before the eyes of a neighbour becomes, if he is caught thereby, a net for him in which he is entangled to his own destruction (Hitzig). הַחֲלִיק signifies also, without any external object, xxviii. 23, ii. 16, as internally transitive: to utter that which is smooth, *i.e.* flattering. פִּעֲמִי is, as Ps. lvii. 7 = רִגְלִי, for which it is the usual Phœnician word.

Ver. 6 In the transgression of the wicked man lies a snare;  
But the righteous rejoiceth [*jubelt*] and is glad.

Thus the first line is to be translated according to the sequence of the accents, *Mahpach, Munach, Munach, Athnach*, for the second *Munach* is the transformation of *Dechi*; אִישׁ רָע thus, like אֲנִשֵּׁי־רָע, xxviii. 5, go together, although the connection is not, like this, genitival, but adjectival. But there is also this sequence of the accents, *Munach, Déchi, Munach, Athnach*, which separates רָע and אִישׁ. According to this, Ewald translates: "in the transgression of one lies an evil snare;" but in that case the word ought to have been מִקֶּט רָע, as at xii. 13; for although the numeral רבים sometimes precedes its substantive, yet no other adjective ever does; passages such as Isa.

xxviii. 21 and x. 30 do not show the possibility of this position of the words. In this sequence of accents the explanation must be: in the wickedness of a man is the evil of a snare, *i.e.* evil is the snare laid therein (Böttcher); but a reason why the author did not write מוקש רע would also not be seen there, and thus we must abide by the accentuation אִישׁ רֵעַ. The righteous also may fall, yet he is again raised by means of repentance and pardon; but in the wickedness of a bad man lies a snare into which having once fallen, he cannot again release himself from it, xxiv. 16. In the second line, the form יִרְוֶן, for יִרְוֶן, is defended by the same metaplastic forms as יִשְׂרָאֵל, Ps. xci. 6; יִרְוֶן, Isa. xlii. 4; and also that the order of the words is not יִשְׂמַח וְיִרְוֶן (LXX. ἐν χαρᾷ καὶ ἐν εὐφροσύνῃ; Luther: *freuet sich vnd hat wonne* [rejoices and has pleasure]), is supported by the same sequence of ideas, Zech. ii. 14, cf. Jer. xxxi. 7: the *Jubeln* is the momentary outburst of gladness; the *Freude* [gladness], however, is a continuous feeling of happiness. To the question as to what the righteous rejoiceth over [*jubelt*] and is glad [*freuet*] because of, the answer is not: because of his happy release from danger (Zöckler), but: because of the prosperity which his virtue procures for him (Fleischer). But the contrast between the first and second lines is not clear and strong. One misses the expression of the object or ground of the joy. Cocceius introduces into the second line a *si lapsus fuerit*. Schultens translates, *justus vel succumbens triumphabit*, after the Arab. *rân f. o.*, which, however, does not mean *succumbere*, but *subigere* (*vid.* under Ps. lxxviii. 65). Hitzig compares Arab. *raym f. i.*, *discedere, relinquere*, and translates: "but the righteous passeth through and rejoiceth." Böttcher is inclined to read יִרְאֶה וְיִשְׂמַח, he sees it (what?) and rejoiceth. All these devices, however, stand in the background compared with Pinsker's proposal (*Babylon.-Heb. Punctuationssystem*, p. 156):

"On the footsteps of the wicked man lie snares,  
But the righteous runneth and is glad,"

*i.e.* he runneth joyfully (like the sun, Ps. xix. 6) on the divinely-appointed way (Ps. cxix. 132), on which he knows himself threatened by no danger. The change of בִּפְשַׁע into בִּפְשָׁע has xii. 13 against it; but יִרְוֶן may be regarded, after iv. 12, cf. xviii. 10, as the original from which יִרְוֶן is corrupted.

Ver. 7 The righteous knoweth the cause of the poor,  
But the godless understandeth no knowledge.

The righteous knoweth and recogniseth the righteous claims of people of low estate, *i.e.* what is due to them as men, and in particular cases; but the godless has no knowledge from which such recognition may go forth (cf. as to the expression, xix. 25). The proverb begins like xii. 10, which commends the just man's compassion to his cattle; this commends his sympathy with those who are often treated as cattle, and worse even than cattle. The LXX. translates 7b twice: the second time reading רש instead of רשע, it makes nonsense of it.

Ver. 8 Men of derision set the city in an uproar,  
But wise men allay anger.

Isa. xxviii. shows what we are to understand by אֲנָשֵׁי לָצוֹן: men to whom nothing is holy, and who despise all authority. The *Hiphil* יִפְּחוּ does not signify *irretiunt*, from פָּחַח (*Venet.* παργιδιοῦσι, after Kimchi, Aben Ezra, and others), but *sufflant*, from פּוּחַ (Rashi: יִלְהִיבוּ): they stir up or excite the city, *i.e.* its inhabitants, so that they begin to burn as with flames, *i.e.* by the dissolution of the bonds of mutual respect and of piety, by the letting loose of passion, they disturb the peace and excite the classes of the community and individuals against each other; but the wise bring it about that the breathings of anger that has broken forth, or is in the act of breaking forth, are allayed. The anger is not that of God, as it is rendered by Jerome and Luther, and as יִפְּחוּ freely translated might mean. The Aram. err in regard to יִפְּחוּ in passages such as vi. 19.

Ver. 9 If a wise man has to contend with a fool,  
He [the fool] rageth and laugheth, and hath no rest.

Among the old translators, Jerome and Luther take the "wise man" as subject even of the second line, and that in all its three members: *vir sapiens si cum stulto contenderit, sive irascatur sive rideat, non inveniet requiem*. Thus Schultens, C. B. Michaelis, Umbreit, Ewald, Elster, and also Fleischer: "The doubled *Vav* is correlative, as at Ex. xxi. 16, Lev. v. 3, and expresses the perfect sameness in respect of the effect, here of the want of effect. If the wise man, when he disputes with a fool, becomes angry, or jests, he will have no rest, *i.e.* he will never bring it to pass that the fool shall cease to reply; he yields

the right to him, and thus makes it possible for him to end the strife." But the angry passion, and the bursts of laughter alternating therewith, are not appropriate to the wise man affirming his right; and since, after Eccles. ix. 17, the words of the wise are heard בְּנִחָה, the וְאֵין נִחָה [and there is no rest] will cause us to think of the fool as the logical subject. So far correctly, but in other respects inappropriately, the LXX. ἀνὴρ σοφὸς κρινεῖ ἔθνη (after the expression עַם, i.e. עַם, instead of תַּא), ἀνὴρ δὲ φαῦλος (which לֵאשׁוֹרִי does not mean) ὀργιζόμενος καταγελάται καὶ οὐ καταπτήσσει (as if the words were וְלֹא יִחָה).<sup>1</sup> The syntactical relation would be simpler if נִשְׁפָּט in 9a were vocalized as a hypothetical perfect. But we read for it the past נִשְׁפָּט. Ewald designates 9a as a conditional clause, and Hitzig remarks that the Lat. *viro sapiente disceptante cum stulto* corresponds therewith. It marks, like 1 Sam. ii. 13, Job i. 16, the situation from which there is a departure then with *perf. consec.*: if a wise man in the right is in contact with a fool, he starts up, and laughs, and keeps not quiet (supply לוֹ as at xxviii. 27), or (without לוֹ): there is no keeping quiet, there is no rest. The figure is in accordance with experience. If a wise man has any controversy with a fool, which is to be decided by reasonable and moral arguments, then he becomes boisterous and laughs, and shows himself incapable of quietly listening to his opponent, and of appreciating his arguments.

We now group together vers. 10–14. Of these, vers. 10 and 11 are alike in respect of the tense used; vers. 12–14 have in common the pronoun pointing back to the first member.

Ver. 10 Men of blood hate the guiltless

And the upright; they attempt the life of such

The nearest lying translation of the second line would certainly be: the upright seek his soul (that of the guiltless). In accordance with the contrasted יִשְׁנֹאוּ, the Aram. understand the seeking of earnest benevolent seeking, but disregarding the נִפְשׁ

<sup>1</sup> According to this the Targum וְלֹא מִתְהַבֵּר (he remains obstinate), according to which the וְלֹא מִתְתַּפִּיר (he does not lose his wits) of the Peshito is perhaps to be corrected. The distribution of the subjects is obscure.

in לִנְפֹשׁ;<sup>1</sup> Symmachus (ἐπιζητήσουσι), Jerome (*quærunt*), and Luther thus also understand the sentence; and Rashi remarks that the phrase is here לִשְׁנוֹן תָּבָה, for he rests; but mistrusting himself, refers to 1 Sam. xxi. 23. Ahron b. Josef glosses: to enter into friendship with him. Thus, on account of the contrast, most moderns, interpreting the phrase *sensu bono*, also Fleischer: *probi autem vitam ejus conservare student*. The thought is, as xii. 6 shows, correct; but the *usus loq.* protests against this rendering, which can rest only on Ps. cxlii. 5, where, however, the poet does not say אֵין דְּיוֹשׁ נִפְשִׁי, but, as here also the *usus loq.* requires, לִנְפֹשִׁי. There are only three possible explanations which Aben Ezra enumerates: (1) they seek his, the bloody man's, soul, *i.e.* they attempt his life, to take vengeance against him, according to the meaning of the expressions as generally elsewhere used, *e.g.* at Ps. lxiii. 10; (2) they revenge his, the guiltless man's, life (LXX. ἐκζητήσουσιν), which has fallen a victim, after the meaning in which elsewhere only בָּקֵשׁ דָּם and דָּרֵשׁ נֶפֶשׁ, Gen. ix. 5, occur. This second meaning also is thus not in accordance with the usage of the words, and against both meanings it is to be said that it is not in the spirit of the Book of Proverbs to think of the יְשָׁרִים [the upright, righteous] as executors of the sentences of the penal judicature. There thus remains<sup>2</sup> the interpretation (3): the upright—they (the bloody men) seek the soul of such an one. The transition from the plur. to the sing. is individualizing, and thus the arrangement of the words is like Gen. xlvii. 21: “And the people (as regards them), he removed them to the cities,” Gesen. § 145. 2. This last explanation recommends itself by the consideration that תָּם and יְשָׁרִים are cognate as to the ideas they represent,—let one call to mind the common expression תָּם וְיָשָׁר [perfect and upright, *e.g.* Job i. 1, 8, ii. 3],—that the same persons are meant thereby, and it is rendered necessary by this, that the thought, “bloody men hate the guiltless,” is incomplete; for the same thing may also be said of the godless in general. One expects to hear that just against the guiltless, *i.e.* men walking in their inno-

<sup>1</sup> The Targum translates תָּם, guiltlessness, and the Venet. (μισεῖν) γυναικῶν, turning to i. 22.

<sup>2</sup> For εὐθείς δὲ συνάξουσιν (will bring away?) τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῶν, understood after Jer. xlv. 5, lies linguistically yet further off.

cence, the bloody-mindedness of such men is specially directed, and 10b says the same thing; this second clause first brings the contrast to the point aimed at. Lutz is right in seeking to confute Hitzig, but he does so on striking grounds.

Ver. 11 All his wrath the fool poureth out;

But the wise man husheth it up in the background.

That רוחו is not meant here of his spirit (Luther) in the sense of *quæcunque in mente habet* (thus e.g. Fleischer) the contrast shows, for יִשְׁכַּחֲנָה does not signify *cohibet*, for which יִשְׁכַּחֲנָה (LXX. *ταμיעται*) would be the proper word: רוח thus is not here used of passionate emotion, such as at xvi. 31; Isa. xxv. 4, xxxiii. 11. שָׁכַח is not here equivalent to Arab. *sabbah*, *αἰνεῖν* (Imman., Venet., and Heidenheim), which does not supply an admissible sense, but is equivalent to Arab. *sabbakh*, to quiet (Ahron b. Josef: קטביאון = *καταπαύειν*), the former going back to the root-idea of extending (*amplificare*), the latter to that of going to a distance, putting away: *sabbakh*, *procul recessit, distitit*, hence שָׁכַח, Ps. lxxxix. 10, and here properly to drive off into the background, synon. הִשְׁכַּח (Fleischer). But בָּאָחוּר (only here with ב) is ambiguous. One might with Rashi explain: but the wise man finally, or afterwards (Symmachus, ἐπ' ἐσχάτων; Venet. *κατόπιον* = *κατόπισθε*), appeaseth the anger which the fool lets loose; i.e., if the latter gives vent to his anger, the former appeases, subdues, mitigates it (cf. בָּאָחוּר, Isa. xlii. 23). But it lies still nearer to refer the antithesis to the anger of the wise man himself; he does not give to it unbridled course, but husheth it in the background, viz. in his heart. Thus Syr. and Targ. reading בְּרֵעֵינָא, the former, besides יִשְׁכַּחֲנָה (*reputat eam*), so also Aben Ezra: in the heart as the background of the organ of speech. Others explain: in the background, afterward, *retrosum*, e.g. Nolde, but to which *compescit* would be more appropriate than *sedat*. Hitzig's objection, that in other cases the expression would be בְּקֶרְבּוֹ, is answered by this, that with בָּאָחוּר the idea of pressing back (of אָחוּר) is connected. The order of the words also is in favour of the meaning *in recessu (cordis)*. *Iræ dilatio mentis pacatio* (according to an old proverb).

Ver. 12 A ruler who listens to deceitful words,  
All his servants are godless.

They are so because they deceive him, and they become so; for instead of saying the truth which the ruler does not wish to hear, they seek to gain his favour by deceitful flatteries, misrepresentations, exaggerations, falsehoods. *Audiat rex quæ præcipit lex.* He does not do this, as the saying is, *sicut rex ita grex* (Sir. x. 2), in the sense of this proverb of Solomon.

Ver. 13 The poor man and the usurer meet together—  
Jahve lighteneth the eyes of both.

A variation of xxii. 2, according to which the proverb is to be understood in both of its parts. That *אִישׁ תַּכְכִּים* is the contrast of *שָׂרֵץ*, is rightly supposed in *Temura* 16b; but Rashi, who brings out here a man of moderate learning, and Saadia, a man of a moderate condition (thus also the Targ. *מְעַצָּא נַבְרָא*, after Buxtorf, *homo mediocris fortunæ*), err by connecting the word with *תָּהָר*. The LXX. *δανειστοῦ καὶ χρεωφειλέτου (ἀλλήλοις συνελθόντων)*, which would be more correct inverted, for *אִישׁ תַּכְכִּים* is a man who makes oppressive taxes, high previous payments of interest; the verbal stem *תַּכַּךְ*, Arab. *tak*, is a secondary to R. *wak*, which has the meanings of pressing together, and pressing firm (whence also the middle is named; cf. Arab. *samym ālaklab*, the solid = the middle point of the heart). *תָּהָר*, with the plur. *תַּכְכִּים*, scarcely in itself denotes interest, *τόκος*; the designation *אִישׁ תַּכְכִּים* includes in it a sensible reproach (Syr. *afflictor*), and a *rentier* cannot be so called (Hitzig). Luther: *Reiche* [rich men], with the marginal note: “who can practise usury as they then generally all do?” Therefore Löwenstein understands the second line after 1 Sam. ii. 7: God enlighteneth their eyes by raising the lowly and humbling the proud. But this line, after xxii. 2b, only means that the poor as well as the rich owe the light of life (Ps. xiii. 4) to God, the creator and ruler of all things,—a fact which has also its moral side: both are conditioned by Him, stand under His control, and have to give to Him an account; or otherwise rendered: God maketh His sun to rise on the low and the high, the evil and the good (cf. Matt. v. 45)—an all-embracing love full of typical moral motive.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *מֵאִיר* has, by Löwenstein, *Mehuppach Legarmeh*, but incorrectly, since after *Legarmeh* two conjunctives cannot occur. Also Norzi with *Mehuppach Mercha* is irregular, since Ben-Asher recognises only two examples of

Ver. 14 A king who judgeth the poor with truth,  
His throne shall stand for ever.

בִּאֲמַת, as at Isa. xvi. 5 (synon. בַּמִּישׁוֹר, בַּמִּישְׁרִים, בַּאֲמוֹנָה), is equivalent to fidelity to duty, or a complete, full accomplishment of his duty as a ruler with reference to the dispensing of justice; in other words: after the norm of actual fact, and of the law, and of his duty proceeding from both together. מִלֵּךְ has in Codd., e.g. *Jaman.*, and in the Venetian 1517, 21, rightly *Rebia*. In that which follows, שׁוֹפֵט בִּאֲמַת are more closely related than בִּאֲמַת דָּלִים, for of two conjunctives standing together the first always connects more than the second. מֶלֶךְ שׁוֹפֵט בִּאֲמַת דָּלִים is the truest representation of the logical grammatical relation. To 14b compare the proverb of the king, xvi. 12, xxv. 5.

A proverb with שֵׁבֶט, ver. 15, is placed next one with שׁוֹפֵט, but it begins a group of proverbs regarding discipline in the house and among the people:

Ver. 15 The rod and reproof give wisdom;  
But an undisciplined son is a shame to his mother.

With שֵׁבֶט [a rod], which xxii. 15 also commends as salutary, תּוֹכַחַת refers to discipline by means of words, which must accompany bodily discipline, and without them is also necessary; the construction of the first line follows in number and gender the scheme xxvii. 9, Zech. vii. 7; Ewald, § 339c. In the second line the mother is named, whose tender love often degenerates into a fond indulgence; such a darling, such a mother's son, becomes a disgrace to his mother. Our "*ausgelassen*," by which Hitzig translates מְשֻׁלָּח, is used of joyfulness unbridled and without self-restraint, and is in the passage before us too feeble a word; שֵׁלַח is used of animals pasturing at liberty, wandering in freedom (Job xxxix. 5; Isa. xvi. 2); נֶעֱרַ מְשֻׁלָּח is accordingly a child who is kept in by no restraint and no punishment, one left to himself, and thus undisciplined (Luther, Gesenius, Fleischer, and others).

Ver. 16 When the godless increase, wickedness increaseth;  
But the righteous shall see their fall.

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this double accentuation to which this מֵאִיר does not belong; *vid. Thorath Emeth*, p. 12. That the *penultima* toning מֵאִיר in several editions is false scarcely needs to be remarked. Jablonski rightly points with *Mehuppach* on the *ult.*, and *Zinnorith* on the preceding open syllable.

The LXX. translation is not bad: πολλῶν ὄντων ἀσεβῶν πολλαὶ γίνονται ἁμαρτίαι (*vid.* regarding רַבָּךְ, ver. 2, xxviii. 28); but in the main it is only a *Binsenwahrheit*, as they say in Swabia, *i.e.* a trivial saying. The proverb means, that if among a people the party of the godless increases in number, and at the same time in power, wickedness, *i.e.* a falling away into sins of thought and conduct, and therewith wickedness, prevails. When irreligion and the destruction of morals thus increase, the righteous are troubled; but the conduct of the godless carries the judgment in itself, and the righteous shall with joy perceive, in the righteous retribution of God, that the godless man will be cast down from his power and influence. This proverb is like a motto to Ps. xii.

Ver. 17 Correct thy son, and he will give thee delight,  
And afford pleasure to thy soul.

The LXX. well translates ויניח by καὶ ἀναπαύσει σε; <sup>1</sup> הניח denotes rest properly, a breathing again, ἀνάψυξις; and then, with an obliteration of the idea of restraint so far, generally (like the Arab. *arah*, compared by Fleischer) to afford pleasure or delight. The post.-bibl. language uses for this the words נָחַת רוח, and says of the pious that he makes נחת רוח to his Creator, *Berachoth* 17a; and of God, that He grants the same to them that fear Him, *Berach.* 29b; in the morning prayer of the heavenly spirits, that they hallow their Creator נחת רוח (with inward delight). Write with Codd. (also *Jaman.*) and older editions ויניחך, not ויניחך; for, except in verbs ל"ה, the suffix of this *Hiphil* form is not dageshed, *e.g.* אִמְיִתְךָ, 1 Kings ii. 26; cf. also 1 Kings xxii. 16 and Ps. l. 8. מְעַדְנִים the LXX. understands, after 2 Sam. i. 24 (עַם-עַדְנִים, μετὰ κόσμον), also here, of ornament; but the word signifies dainty dishes—here, high spiritual enjoyment. As in vers. 15 and 16 a transition was made from the house to the people, so there now follows the proverb of the discipline of children, a proverb of the education of the people:

Ver. 18 Without a revelation a people becomes ungovernable;  
But he that keepeth the law, happy is he.

<sup>1</sup> Their translation of vers. 17 and 18 here is found, in a marred and mutilated form, after xxviii. 17. At that place the words are καὶ ἀγαπήσει σε.

Regarding the importance of this proverb for estimating the relation of the *Chokma* to prophecy, *vid.* vol. i. p. 41. חֲזוֹן is, according to the sense, equivalent to נְבוּאָה, the prophetic revelation in itself, and as the contents of that which is proclaimed. Without spiritual preaching, proceeding from spiritual experience, a people is unrestrained (יִפְרָע, *vid.* regarding the punctuation at xxviii. 25, and regarding the fundamental meaning, at i. 25); it becomes פָּרָע, disorderly, Ex. xxxii. 25; *wild vnd wüst*, as Luther translates. But in the second line, according to the unity of the antithesis, the words are spoken of the people, not of individuals. It is therefore not to be explained, with Hitzig: but whoever, in such a time, nevertheless holds to the law, it is well with him! Without doubt this proverb was coined at a time when the preaching of the prophets was in vogue; and therefore this, "but whoever, notwithstanding," is untenable; such a thought at that time could not at all arise; and besides this, תוֹרָה is in the Book of Proverbs a moveable conception, which is covered at least by the law in contradistinction to prophecy. *Tōra* denotes divine teaching, the word of God; whether that of the Sinaitic or that of the prophetic law (2 Chron. xv. 3, cf. *e.g.* Isa. i. 10). While, on the one hand, a people is in a dissolute condition when the voice of the preacher, speaking from divine revelation, and enlightening their actions and sufferings by God's word, is silent amongst them (Ps. lxxiv. 9, cf. Amos viii. 12); on the other hand, that same people are to be praised as happy when they show due reverence and fidelity to the word of God, both as written and as preached. That the word of God is preached among a people belongs to their condition of life; and they are only truly happy when they earnestly and willingly subordinate themselves to the word of God which they possess and have the opportunity of hearing. אֲשֶׁרֶהוּ (defective for אֲשֶׁרֶהוּ) is the older, and here the poetic kindred form to אֲשֶׁרֶי, xiv. 21, xvi. 20. From the discipline of the people this series of proverbs again returns to the discipline of home:

Ver. 19 With words a servant will not let himself be bettered;

For he understandeth them, but conformeth not thereto.

The *Niph.* נוֹסֵף becomes a so-called tolerative, for it connects with the idea of happening that of reaching its object: to

become truly bettered (taught in wisdom, corrected), and thus to let himself be bettered. With mere words this is not reached; the unreasonable servant needs, in order to be set right, a more radical means of deliverance. This assertion demands confirmation; therefore is the view of von Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* ii. 2. 404) improbable, that 19b has in view a better-disposed servant: supposing that he is intelligent, in which case he is admonished without cause, then the words are also lost: he will let them pass over him in silence without any reply. This attempted explanation is occasioned by this, that מַעֲנֶה can signify nothing else than a response in words. If this were correct, then without doubt its fundamental meaning would correspond with כִּי; for one explains, with Löwenstein, “for he perceives it, and may not answer,” *i.e.* this, that a reply cut off frustrates the moral impression. Or also: for he understands it, but is silent,—*in præfractum se silentium configit* (Schultens); and thus it is with the ancients (Rashi). But why should not מַעֲנֶה itself be the expression of this want of any consequences? מַעֲנֶה cannot certainly mean humiliation<sup>1</sup> (Meîri, after Ex. x. 3, הַכְנֵעָה), but why as an answer in words and not also a response by act (Stuart: a practical answer)? Thus the LXX. ἐὰν γὰρ καὶ νοήσῃ, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὑπακούσεται, according to which Luther: for although he at once understands it, he does not yet take it to himself. That מַעֲנֶה may mean obedience, the Aram. so understood, also at xvi. 4. It denoted a reply in the most comprehensive meaning of the word, *vid.* at xvi. 1. The thought, besides, is the same as if one were to explain: for he understands it, and is silent, *i.e.* lets thee speak; or: he understands it, but that which he perceives finds no practical echo.

Ver. 20 Seest thou a man hasty in his words?

The fool hath more hope than he.

Cf. xxvi. 12. Such an one has blocked up against himself the path to wisdom, which to the fool, *i.e.* to the ingenuous, stands open; the former is perfect, of the latter something may yet be made. In this passage the contrast is yet more precise, for the fool is thought of as the dull, which is the proper meaning

<sup>1</sup> The Syr. and Targ. also think on עֲנָה, for they translate: “for he knows that he receives no strokes.”

of כָּסִיל, *vid.* under xvii. 24. There is more hope for the fool than for him, although he may be no fool in himself, who overthrows himself by his words. “The προπετής ἐν λόγῳ αὐτοῦ (Sir. ix. 18) has, in the existing case, already overleaped the thought; the כָּסִיל has it still before him, and comes at length, perhaps with his slow conception, to it” (Hitzig); for the ass, according to the fable, comes at last farther than the greyhound. Hence, in words as well as in acts, the proverb holds good, “*Eile mit Weile*” [= *festina lente*]. Every word, as well as act, can only be matured by being thought out, and thought over. From this proverb, which finds its practical application to the affairs of a house, and particularly also to the relation to domestics, the group returns to the subject of instruction, which is its ground-tone.

Ver. 21 If one pampers his servant from youth up,  
He will finally reach the place of a child.

The LXX. had no answer to the question as to the meaning of מָנֵן. On the other hand, for פָּנֵן, the meaning to fondle; *delicatus enutrire*, is perfectly warranted by the Aram. and Arab. The Talmud, *Succa* 52b, resorts to the alphabet אט"ב in order to reach a meaning for מָנֵן. How the Targ. comes to translate the word by מְנַפֵּחַ (outrooted) is not clear; the rendering of Jerome: *postea sentiet eum contumacem*, is perhaps mediated by the ἔσται γογγυσμός of Symmachus, who combines מָנֵן with לָן, *Niph.* γογγύζειν. The ὀθυνηθήσεται of the LXX., with the Syr., von Hofmann has sought to justify (*Schriftbew.* ii. 2. 404), for he derives מָנֵן = מְנַהֵן from נָהָה. We must then punctuate מָנֵן; but perhaps the LXX. derived the word from מָנֵן = מְנַהֵן, whether they pronounced it מָנֵן (cf. מְסַרֵת = מְאַסְרֵת) or מָנֵן. To follow them is not wise, for the formation of the word is precarious; one does not see what the speaker of this proverb, to whom the language presented a fulness of synonyms for the idea of complaint, meant by using this peculiar word. Linguistically these meanings are impossible: of Jerome, *dominus* = מְמַנֵּה (Ahron b. Josef, Meiri, and others); or: the oppressed = מְנַהֵה, from נָהָה (Johanson); or: one who is sick = מְנַהֵה (Euchel). And Ewald's “*undankbar*” [unthankful], derived from the Arabic, is a mere fancy, since (Arab.) *manuwan* does not mean one who is unthankful, but,

on the contrary, one who upbraids good deeds shown.<sup>1</sup> The ancients are in the right track, who explain מִנָּן after the verb נָנ, Ps. lxxii. 17 = נִן = נָן; the *Venet.*, herein following Kimchi, also adopts the nominal form, for it translates (but without perceptible meaning) γόυωσις. Luther's translation is fortunate:

“If a servant is tenderly treated from youth up,  
He will accordingly become a *Junker* [squire].”

The ideas represented in modern Jewish translations: that of a son (*e.g.* Solomon: he will at last be the son) and that of a master (Zunz), are here united. But how the idea of a son (from the verb נָנ), at the same time that of a master, may arise, is not to be perceived in the same way as with *Junker* and the Spanish *infante* and *hidalgo*; rather with מִנָּן, as the ironical naming of the son (little son), the idea of a weakling (de Wette) may be connected. The state of the matter appears as follows:—The verb נָנ has the meanings of luxuriant growth, numerous propagation; the fish has from this the Aram. name of נָנ, like the Heb. דָּג, from דָּגָה, which also means luxuriant, exuberant increase (*vid.* at Ps. lxxii. 17). From this is derived נִן, which designates the offspring as a component part of a kindred, as well as מִנָּן, which, according as the מ is interpreted infin. or local, means either this, that it sprouts up luxuriantly, the abundant growth, or also the place of luxuriant sprouting, wanton growing, abundant and quick multiplication: thus the place of hatching, spawning. The subject in יִהְיֶה might be the fondled one; but it lies nearer, however, to take him who fondles as the subject, as in 21a. אֲחֲרִיתוֹ is either adv. accus. for בְּאַחֲרִיתוֹ, or, as we preferred at xxiii. 32, it is the subj. in-

<sup>1</sup> n *Jahrb.* xi. p 10 f. Ewald compares, in an expressive way, the Ethiopic *mannána* (*Piel*) to scorn; *menân*, a reprobate; and *mannânî*, one who is despised; according to which מִנָּן could certainly designate “a man despising scornfully his own benefactors, or an unthankful man.” But this verbal stem is peculiarly Ethiop., and is certainly not once found in Arab. For *minnat* (which Ewald compares) denotes benefaction, and the duty laid on one thereby, the dependence thereby produced. The verb (Arab.) *minn* (= מִנָּן) signifies to divide; and particularly, partly to confer benefaction, partly to attribute benefaction, reckon to, enumerate, and thereby to bring out the sense of obligation. Thus nothing is to be derived from this verbal stem for מִנָּן.

roducing, after the manner of a substantival clause, the following sentence as its virtual predicate: "one has fondled his servant from his youth up, and his (that of the one who fondles) end is: he will become a place of increase." The master of the house is thought of along with his house; and the servant as one who, having become a man, presents his master with *ילדי בית*, who are spoilt scapegraces, as he himself has become by the pampering of his master. There was used in the language of the people, *נֵן* for *בֵּן*, in the sense in which we name a degenerate son a "*Schönes Früchtchen*" [pretty little fruit]; and *מִנֵּן* is a place (house) where many *נינים* are; and a man (master of a house) who has many of them is one whose family has increased over his head. One reaches the same meaning if *מִנֵּן* is rendered more immediately as the place or state of growing, increasing, luxuriating. The sense is in any case: he will not be able, in the end, any more to defend himself against the crowd which grows up to him from this his darling, but will be merely a passive part of it.

The following group begins with a proverb which rhymes by *מִדָּן*, with *מִנֵּן* of the foregoing, and extends on to the end of this Hezekiah collection:

Ver. 22 A man of anger stirreth up strife;

And a passionate man aboundeth in transgression.

Line first is a variation of xv. 18a and xxviii. 25a. *אִישׁ* and *בָּעַל* as here, but in the reverse order at xxii. 24.<sup>1</sup> *אָף* here means anger, not the nose, viz. the expanded nostrils (Schultens). In *רַב־פֶּשַׁע* the *פֶּשַׁע* is, after xiv. 29, xxviii. 16, xx. 27, the governed genitive; Hitzig construes it in the sense of *פֶּשַׁע רַב*, Ps. xix. 2, with *יָגֵרָה*, but one does not say *פֶּשַׁע יָגֵרָה*; and that which is true of *רַבִּים*, that, after the manner of a numeral, it can precede its substantive (*vid.* under Ps. vii. 26, lxxxix. 51), cannot be said of *רַב*. Much (great) in wickedness denotes one who heaps up many wicked actions, and burdens himself with greater guilt (cf. *פֶּשַׁע*, ver. 16). The wrathful man stirreth up (*vid.* under xv. 18) strife, for he breaks through the mutual relations of men, which rest on mutual esteem and

<sup>1</sup> For *אִישׁ-אָף* (Löwenstein after Norzi) is to be written, with Baer (*Thorath Emeth*, p. 19), *אִישׁ אָף*. Thus also in *Cod. Jaman*.

love, and by means of his passionate conduct he makes enemies of those against whom he thinks that he has reason for being angry; that on account of which he is angry can be settled without producing such hostility, but passion impels him on, and misrepresents the matter; it embitters hearts, and tears them asunder. The LXX. has, instead of רב, ἐξώρυξεν, of dreaming, ברה (xvi. 27).

Ver. 23 passes from anger to haughtiness:

A man's pride will bring him low;  
But the lowly attaineth to honour.

Thus we translate תְּתַכְּבֹּד (Lat. *honorem obtinet*) in accord with xi. 16, and שְׁפַל־רוּחַ with xvi. 19, where, however, שְׁפַל is not adj. as here, but inf. The haughty man obscures the honour which he has by this, that he boasts immeasurably of it, and aspires yet more after it; the lowly man, on the other hand, obtains honour without his seeking it, honour before God and before men, which would be of no worth were it not connected with the honour before God. The LXX.: τοὺς δὲ ταπεινόφρονας ἐρεῖδει δόξη κύριος. This κύριος is indeed not contrary to the sense, but it is opposed to the style. Why the 24th verse should now follow is, as regards the contents and the expression, hard to say; but one observes that vers. 22–27 follow each other, beginning with the successive letters of the alphabet א (ב), ג, ד, ה, ו, ז, ח (ט).

Ver. 24 He that taketh part with a thief hateth himself;  
He heareth the oath and confesseth not.

Hitzig renders the first member as the pred. of the second: “he who does not bring to light such sins as require an atonement (Lev. v. 1 ff.), but shares the secret of them with the sinner, is not better than one who is a partner with a thief, who hateth himself.” The construction of the verse, he remarks, is not understood by any interpreter. It is not, however, so cross,—for, understood as Hitzig thinks it ought to be, the author should have expressed the subject by שָׁמַע אֱלֹהִים יִגִּיד, —but is simple as the order of the words and the verbal form require it. The oath is, after Lev. v. 1, that of the judge who adjures the partner of the thief by God to tell the truth; but he conceals it, and burdens his soul with a crime worthy of

death, for from a concealer he becomes in addition a perjured man.

Ver. 25 Fear of man bringeth a snare with it ;  
But he that trusteth in Jahve is advanced.

It sounds strange, Hitzig remarks, that here in the Book of an Oriental author one should be warned against the fear of man. It is enough, in reply to this, to point to Isa. li. 12f. One of the two translations in the LXX. (cf. Jerome and Luther) has found this "strange" thought not so strange as not to render it, and that in the gnostic aorist: φοβηθέντες καὶ αἰσχυθέντες ἀνθρώπους ὑπεσκελίσθησαν. And why should not חֲרַדַּת אָדָם be able to mean the fear of man (cowardice)? Perhaps not so that אָדָם is the *gen. objecti*, but so that חֲרַדַּת אָדָם means to frighten men, as in 1 Sam. xiv. 15. חֲרַדַּת אֱלֹהִים, a trembling of God; cf. Ps. lxiv. 2; פֶּחַד אֵיב, the fear occasioned by the enemy, although this connection, after Deut. ii. 25, can also mean fear of the enemy (*gen. objecti*). To יָרָא, occasioned = brings as a consequence with it, cf. x. 10, xiii. 15; the *synalage generis* is as at xii. 25a: it is at least strange with fem. infinit. and infinitival nouns, xvi. 16, xxv. 14; Ps. lxxiii. 28; but חֲרַדַּה (trembling) is such a *nom. actionis*, Ewald, § 238a. Regarding יִשָּׁנָה (for which the LXX.<sup>1</sup> σωθήσεται, and LXX.<sup>2</sup> εὐφρανθήσεται = יִשְׂמַח), *vid.* at xviii. 10. He who is put into a terror by a danger with which men threaten him, so as to do from the fear of man what is wrong, and to conceal the truth, falls thereby into a snare laid by himself—it does not help him that by this means he has delivered himself from the danger, for he brands himself as a coward, and sins against God, and falls into an agony of conscience (reproach and anguish of heart) which is yet worse to bear than the evil wherewith he was threatened. It is only confidence in God that truly saves. The fear of man plunges him into yet greater suffering than that from which he would escape; confidence in God, on the other hand, lifts a man internally, and at last externally, above all his troubles.

Ver. 26. A similar *gen. connection* to that between חֲרַדַּת אָדָם exists between מִשְׁפַּט־אֵישׁ:

Many seek the countenance of the ruler ;  
Yet from Jahve cometh the judgment of men.

Line first is a variation of xix. 6a, cf. 1 Kings x. 24. It lies near to interpret אִישׁ as *gen. obj.*: the judgment regarding any one, *i.e.* the estimating of the man, the decision regarding him; and it is also possible, for מִשְׁפָּטִי, Ps. xvii. 2, may be understood of the judgment which I have, as well as of the judgment pronounced regarding me (cf. Lam. iii. 59). But the usage appears to think of the *genit.* after מִשְׁפָּט always as subjective, *e.g.* xvi. 33, of the decision which the lot brings, Job xxxvi. 6, the right to which the poor have a claim; so that thus in the passage before us מִשְׁפָּט־אִישׁ means the right of a man, as that which is proper or fitting to him, the judgment of a man, as that to which as appropriate he has a claim (LXX. τὸ δίκαιον ἀνδρὶ). Whether the *genit.* be rendered in the one way or the other, the meaning remains the same: it is not the ruler who finally decides the fate and determines the worth of a man, as they appear to think who with eye-service court his favour and fawn upon him.

Ver. 27 An abomination to a righteous man is a villanous man ;

And an abomination to the godless is he who walketh uprightly.

In all the other proverbs which begin with הוֹעֲבֵת, *e.g.* xi. 20, יהוה follows as *genit.*, here צַדִּיקִים, whose judgment is like that of God. אִישׁ עָל is an abhorrence to them, not as a man, but just as of such a character; עָל is the direct contrast to יֵשֶׁר. The righteous sees in the villanous man, who boldly does that which is opposed to morality and to honour, an adversary of his God; on the other hand, the godless sees in the man that walketh uprightly (יֵשֶׁר־דָּרָךְ, as at Ps. xxxvii. 14) his adversary, and the condemnation of himself.

With this doubled ה the Book of Proverbs, prepared by the men of Hezekiah, comes to an end. It closes, in accordance with its intention announced at the beginning, with a proverb concerning the king, and a proverb of the great moral contrasts which are found in all circles of society up to the very throne itself.

FIRST APPENDIX TO THE SECOND SOLOMONIC COLLECTION  
OF PROVERBS.—CHAP. XXX.

The title of this first appendix, according to the text lying before us, is:

“The words of Agur the son of Jakeh, the utterance.”

This title of the following collection of proverbs is limited by *Olewejored*; and אַגוּר, separated from the author's name by *Rebia*, is interpreted as a second inscription, standing on one line with אַבְנֵי, as particularizing that first. The old synagogue tradition which, on the ground of the general title i. 1, regarded the whole Book of Proverbs as the work of Solomon, interpreted the words, “Agur the son of Jakeh,” as an allegorical designation of Solomon, who appropriated the words of the *Tôra* to the king, Deut. xvii. 17, and again rejected them, for he said: God is with me, and I shall not do it (viz. take many wives, without thereby suffering injury), *Schemôth rabba*, c. 6. The translation of Jerome: *Verba congregantis filii Vomentis*, is the echo of this Jewish interpretation. One would suppose that if “Agur” were Solomon's name, “Jakeh” must be that of David; but another interpretation in *Midrash Mishle* renders בֶּן (“son”) as the designation of the bearer of a quality, and sees in “Agur” one who girded (אָגַר = חָגַר) his loins for wisdom; and in “son of Jakeh” one free from sin (נָקִי מִכָּל). In the Middle Ages this mode of interpretation, which is historically and linguistically absurd, first began to prevail; for then the view was expressed by several (Aben Ezra, and Meïri the Spaniard) that Agur ben Jakeh was a wise man of the time of Solomon. That of Solomon's time, they thence conclude (blind to xxv. 1) that Solomon collected together these proverbs of the otherwise unknown wise man. In truth, the age of the man must remain undecided; and at all events, the time of Hezekiah is the fixed period from which, where possible, it is to be sought. The name “Agur” means the gathered (vi. 8, x. 5), or, after the predominant meaning of the Arab. *âjar*, the bribed, *mercede conductum*; also the collector (cf. אֶקְרֵשׁ, fowler); or the word might mean, perhaps, industrious in collecting (cf. *alwak*, attached to, and other examples in Mühlau, p. 36).

Regarding בן = *binj* (usual in בן־נן), and its relation to the Arab. *ibn*, *vid. Genesis*, p. 555. The name *Jakeh* is more transparent. The noun יָקָה, xxx. 17, Gen. xlix. 10, means the obedient, from the verb יָקָה; but, formed from this verbal stem, the form of the word would be יָקָה (not יָקָה). The form יָקָה is the participial adj. from יָקָה, like יָפָה from יָפָה; and the Arab. *wakay*, corresponding to this יָקָה, viii. *ittakay*, to be on one's guard, particularly before God; the usual word for piety regarded as εὐλάβεια. Mühlau (p. 37) rightly sees in the proper names *Eltekeh* [Josh. xix. 44] and *Eltekon* [Josh. xv. 59] the secondary verbal stem יָקָה, which, like *e.g.* יָקָה (יָקָה), יָקָה, has originated from the reflexive, which in these proper names, supposing that ל is subj., means to take under protection; not: to give heed = *cavere*. All these meanings are closely connected. In all these three forms—יָקָה, יָקָה, יָקָה—the verb is a synonym of שָׁמַר; so that יָקָה denotes<sup>1</sup> the pious, either as taking care, εὐλαβής, or as keeping, *i.e.* observing, *viz.* that which is commanded by God.

In consequence of the accentuation, מִשְׁנָה is the second designation of this string of proverbs, and is parallel with דְּבָרִי. But that is absolutely impossible. מִשְׁנָה (from מִשְׁנָה, to raise, *viz.* the voice, to begin to express) denotes the utterance, and according to the usage of the words before us, the divine utterance, the message of God revealed to the prophet and announced by him, for the most part, if not always (*vid.* at Isa. xiii. 1), the message of God as the avenger. Accordingly Jewish interpreters (*e.g.* Meîri and Arama) remark that מִשְׁנָה designates what follows, as דְּבָרִי נְבוּאָה, *i.e.* an utterance of the prophetic spirit. But, on the other hand, what follows begins with the confession of human weakness and short-sightedness; and, moreover, we read proverbs not of a divine but altogether

<sup>1</sup> According to the *Lex. 'Gezerî* (from the Mesopotamian town of 'Geziret *ibn 'Amr*), the word *wakihon* is, in the Mesopotamian language, "the overseer of the house in which is the cross of the Christians;" and accordingly, in Muhammed's letter to the Christians of Negrin, after they became subject to him, "a monk shall not be removed from his monastery, nor a presbyter from his presbyterate, (*wakâhtah*) *wala watah wakahyttah*" (this will be the correct phrase), "nor an overseer from his office." The verbal stem *wak-ah* (יָקָה) is, as it appears, Northern Semitic; the South Arabian lexicographer Neshwan ignores it (Wetzstein in Mühlau).

of a human and even of a decaying spiritual stamp, besides distinguished from the Solomonic proverbs by this, that the *I* of the poet, which remains in the background, here comes to the front. This מִשָּׁנ of prophetic utterances does not at all harmonize with the following string of proverbs. It does not so harmonize on this account, because one theme does not run through these proverbs which the sing. מִשָּׁנ requires. It comes to this, that מִשָּׁנ never occurs by itself in the sense of a divine, a solemn utterance, without having some more clearly defining addition, though it should be only a demonstrative הִנֵּה (Isa. xiv. 28). But what author, whether poet or prophet, would give to his work the title of מִשָּׁנ, which in itself means everything, and thus nothing! And now: the utterance—what can the article at all mean here? This question has remained unanswered by every interpreter. Ewald also sees himself constrained to clothe the naked word; he does it by reading together הַמִּשָּׁנ נֵאֵם, and translating the “sublime saying which he spoke.” But apart from the consideration that Jer. xxiii. 31 proves nothing for the use of this use of נֵאֵם, the form נֵאֵם (הַנִּבֵּר) is supported by 2 Sam. xxiii. 1 (cf. ver. 5 with 2 Sam. xxii. 31); and besides, the omission of the אֲשֶׁר, and in addition of the relative pronoun (נֵאֵםוֹ), would be an inaccuracy not at all to be expected on the brow of this gnomology (*vid.* Hitzig). If we leave the altogether unsuspected נֵאֵם undisturbed, הַמִּשָּׁנ will be a nearer definition of the name of the author. The Midrash has a right suspicion, for it takes together *Hamassa* and *Agur ben Jakeh*, and explains: of Agur the son of Jakeh, who took upon himself the yoke of the most blessed. The *Græcus Venetus* comes nearer what is correct, for it translates: λόγοι Ἀγούρου υἱέως Ἰακέως τοῦ Μασάου. We connect xxxi. 1, where לְמוֹאֵל מֶלֶךְ, “Lemuel (the) king,” is a linguistic impossibility, and thus, according to the accentuation lying before us, מֶלֶךְ מִשָּׁנ also are to be connected together; thus it appears that מִשָּׁנ must be the name of a country and a people. It was Hitzig who first made this Columbus-egg to stand. But this is the case only so far as he recognised in לְמוֹאֵל מֶלֶךְ מִשָּׁנ a Lemuel, the king of Massa, and recognised this Massa also in xxx. 1 (*vid.* his dissertation: *Das Königreich Massa* [the kingdom of Massa], in Zeller’s *Theolog. Jahrb.* 1844, and his *Comm.*), viz. the Israel-

itish *Massa* named in Gen. xxv. 14 (= 1 Chron. i. 30) along with *Dumah* and *Tema*. But he proceeds in a hair-splitting way, and with ingenious hypothesis, without any valid foundation. That this *Dumah* is the *Dumat el-jendel* (cf. under Isa. xxi. 11) lying in the north of Nejed, near the southern frontiers of Syria, the name and the founding of which is referred by the Arabians to *Dûm* the son of Ishmael, must be regarded as possible, and consequently *Massa* is certainly to be sought in Northern Arabia. But if, on the ground of 1 Chron. iv. 42 f., he finds there a Simeonitic kingdom, and finds its origin in this, that the tribe of Simeon originally belonging to the ten tribes, and thus coming from the north settled in the south of Judah, and from thence in the days of Hezekiah, fleeing before the Assyrians, were driven farther and farther in a south-east direction towards Northern Arabia; on the contrary, it has been shown by Graf (*The Tribe of Simeon*, a contribution to the history of Israel, 1866) that Simeon never settled in the north of the Holy Land, and according to existing evidences extended their settlement from Negeb partly into the Idumean highlands, but not into the highlands of North Arabia. Hitzig thinks that there are found traces of the *Massa* of Agur and Lemuel in the Jewish town<sup>1</sup> of טילמאס, of Benjamin of Tudela, lying three days' journey from Chebar, and in the proper name (Arab.) *Malsā* (smooth), which is given to a rock between Tema and Wady el-Kora (*vid.* Kosegarten's *Chrestom.* p. 143); but how notched his ingenuity here is need scarcely be shown. By means of more cautious combinations Mühlau has placed the residence of Agur and Lemuel in the Hauran mountain range, near which there is a *Dumah*, likewise a *Têmâ*; and in the name of the town *Mismîje*, lying in the Lejâ, is probably found the *Mishma* which is named along with *Massa*, Gen. xxv. 14; and from this that is related in 1 Chron. v. 9 f., 18–22, of warlike expeditions on the part of the tribes lying on the east of the Jordan against the Hagarenes and their allies *Jetur*, *Nephish*, and *Nodab*,<sup>2</sup> it

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Blau's *Arab. im sechsten Jahrh.* in the *Deutsch. Morgl. Zeits.* xxxiii. 590, and also p. 573 of the same, regarding a family of proselytes among the Jews in Taima.

<sup>2</sup> Mühlau combines *Nodab* with *Nudêbe* to the south-east of Bosra; Blau (*Deut. Morg. Zeit.* xxv. 566), with the Ναβδαῖοι of Eupolemos named along with the Ναβαταῖοι. The Kamûs has Nadab as the name of a tribe.

is with certainty concluded that in the Hauran, and in the wilderness which stretches behind the Euphrates towards it, Israelitish tribes have had their abode, whose territory had been early seized by the trans-Jordanic tribes, and was held "until the captivity," 1 Chron. v. 22, *i.e.* till the Assyrian deportation. This designation of time is almost as unfavourable to Mühlau's theory of a *Massa* in the Hauran, inhabited by Israelitish tribes from the other side, as the expression "*to Mount Seir*" (1 Chron. iv. 42) is to Hitzig's North Arabian *Massa* inhabited by Simeonites. We must leave it undecided whether *Dumah* and *Têmâ*, which the Toledoth of Ismael name in the neighbourhood of *Massa*, are the east Hauran districts now existing; or as Blau (*Deut. Morgl. Zeit.* xxv. 539), with Hitzig, supposes, North Arabian districts (cf. *Genesis*, p. 377, 4th ed.).<sup>1</sup> "Be it as it may, the contents and the language of this difficult piece almost necessarily point to a region bordering on the Syro-Arabian waste. Ziegler's view (*Neue Uebers. der Denksprüche Salomo's*, 1791, p. 29), that Lemuel was probably an emir of an Arabian tribe in the east of Jordan, and that a wise Hebrew translated those proverbs of the emir into Hebrew, is certainly untenable, but does not depart so far from the end as may appear at the first glance" (Mühlau).<sup>2</sup> If the text-punctuation lying before us rests on the false supposition that *Massa*, xxx. 1, xxxi. 1, is a generic name, and not a proper name, then certainly the question arises whether מִשְׁמָה should not be used instead of מִשְׁמָה, much more מִשְׁמָה, which is suggested as possible in the article "Sprüche," in Herzog's *Encycl.* xiv. 694. Were מִשְׁמָה, Gen. x. 30, the region *Μεσσηνη*, on the northern border of the Persian Gulf, in which Apamea lay, then it might be said in favour of this, that as the histories of Muhammed and of Benjamin of Tudela prove the existence of an old Jewish occupation of North Arabia, but without anything being heard of a מִשְׁמָה, the Talmud bears testimony<sup>3</sup> to a Jewish occupation of Mesene, and particularly of Apamea; and by the mother of Lemuel, the king

<sup>1</sup> Dozy (*Israeliten in Mecca*, p. 89 f.) connects *Massa* with *Mansâh*, a pretended old name of Mecca.

<sup>2</sup> These German quotations with the name of Mühlau are taken from the additions to his book, which he placed at my disposal.

<sup>3</sup> *Vid.* Neubauer's *La Géographie du Talmud*, pp. 325, 329, 382.

of *Mesha*, one may think<sup>1</sup> of Helena, celebrated in Jewish writings, queen of Adiabene, the mother of Monabaz and Izates. But the identity of the *Mesha* of the catalogue of nations with *Μεσώνη* is uncertain, and the Jewish population of that place dates at least from the time of the Sassanides to the period of the Babylonian exile. We therefore hold by the Ishmaelite *Massa*, whether North Arabian or Hauranian; but we by no means subscribe Mührlau's *non possumus non negare, Agurum et Lemuëlem proselytos e paganis, non Israelitas fuisse*. The religion of the tribes descended from Abraham, so far as it had not degenerated, was not to be regarded as idolatrous. It was the religion which exists to the present day among the great Ishmaelite tribes of the Syrian desert as the true tradition of their fathers under the name of *Dîn Ibrâhîm* (Abraham's religion); which, as from Wetzstein, we have noted in the *Commentary on Job* (p. 387 and elsewhere), continues along with Mosaism among the nomadic tribes of the wilderness; which shortly before the appearance of Christianity in the country beyond the Jordan, produced doctrines coming into contact with the teachings of the gospel; which at that very time, according to historic evidences (*e.g.* Mêjâsinî's chronicles of the *Ka'be*), was dominant even in the towns of Higâz; and in the second century after Christ, was for the first time during the repeated migration of the South Arabians again oppressed by Greek idolatry, and was confined to the wilderness; which gave the mightiest impulse to the rise of Islam, and furnished its best component part; and which towards the end of the last century, in the country of Neged, pressed to a reform of Islam, and had as a result the Wahabite doctrine. If we except xxx. 5 f., the proverbs of Agur and Lemuel contain nothing which may not be conceived from a non-Israelitish standpoint on which the author of the Book of Job placed himself. Even xxx. 5 f. is not there (cf. Job vi. 10, xxiii. 12) without parallels. When one compares Deut. iv. 2, xiii. 1, and 2 Sam. xxii. 31 = Ps. xviii. 31 (from which ver. 5 of the proverbs of Agur is derived, with the change of יְהוָה into אֱלֹהִים), Agur certainly appears as one intimately acquainted with the revealed religion of Israel, and with their literature. But

<sup>1</sup> Derenbourg's *Essai sur l'Hist. et la Géog. de la Palestine*, i. p. 224.

must we take the two Massites therefore, with Hitzig, Mühlau, and Zöckler, as born Israelites? Since the Bible history knows no Israelitish king outside of the Holy Land, we regard it as more probable that King Lemuel and his countryman Agur were Ishmaelites who had raised themselves above the religion of Abraham, and recognised the religion of Israel as its completion.

If we now return to the words of xxx. 1a, Hitzig makes Agur Lemuel's brother, for he vocalizes אַגּוּר בֶּן־יִקְהָה מַשָּׁא, *i.e.* Agur the son of her whom Massa obeys. Ripa and Björck of Sweden, and Stuart of America, adopt this view. But supposing that יִקְהָה is connected with the accusative of him who is obeyed, בֶּן, as the representative of such an attributive clause, as of its virtual genitive, is elsewhere without example; and besides, it is unadvisable to explain away the proper name יִקְהָה, which speaks for itself. There are two other possibilities of comprehending מַשָּׁא, without the change, or with the change of a single letter. Wetzstein, on xxxi. 1, has said regarding Mühlau's translation "King of Massa:" "I would more cautiously translate, 'King of the Massans,' since this interpretation is unobjectionable; while, on the contrary, this is not *terra Massa*, nor *urbs Massa*. It is true that the inhabitants of Massa were not pure nomads, after xxx. and xxxi., but probably, like the other tribes of Israel, they were half nomads, who possessed no great land as exclusive property, and whose chief place did not perhaps bear their name. The latter may then have been as rare in ancient times as it is in the present day. Neither the *Sammar*, the *Harb*, the *Muntefkk*, nor other half nomads whom I know in the southern parts of the Syrian desert, have any place which bears their name. So also, it appears, the people of Uz (עֵז), which we were constrained to think of as a dominant, firmly-settled race, since it had so great a husbandman as Job, possessed no קְרִית עֵז. Only in certain cases, where a tribe resided for many centuries in and around a place, does the name of this tribe appear to have remained attached to it. Thus from גִּיף דּוּמָה, 'the low-country of the Dumahns,' or קְרִית דּוּמָה, 'the city of Dumahns,' as also from קְרִית תֵּימָא, 'the city of the Temans,' gradually there arose (probably not till the decline and fall of this tribe) a city of *Dumah*, a haven of *Midian*, and the like, so that the primary meaning of

the name came to be lost." It is clear that, from the existence of an Ishmaelite tribe מִשָּׁא, there does not necessarily follow a similar name given to a region. The conj. מִמִּשָּׁא, for הַמִּשָּׁא (*vid.* Herzog's *Encycl.* xiv. 702), has this against it, that although it is good Heb., it directly leads to this conclusion (*e.g.* 2 Sam. xxiii. 20, 29, cf. 1 Kings xvii. 1). Less objectionable is Bunsen's and Böttcher's הַמִּשָּׁאִי. But perhaps הַמִּשָּׁא may also have the same signification; far rather at least this than that which Malbim, after הַיִּשָּׁר הַמִּשָּׁא, 1 Chron. xv. 27, introduced with the LXX. ἀρχων τῶν ὠδῶν: "We ought then to compare 2 Sam. xxiii. 24, רִוּוּ בֵּית לָחֶם, a connection in which, after the analogy of such Arabic connections as *kaysu 'aylana*, Kais of the tribe of 'Ailân (*Ibn Coteiba*, 13 and 83), or *Ma'nu Tayyin*, Ma'n of the tribe of Tay, *i.e.* Ma'n belonging to this tribe, as distinguished from other men and families of this name (*Schol. Hamasæ* 144. 3), בֵּית לָחֶם is thought of as genit."<sup>1</sup> (Mühlau). That בֵּית לָחֶם (instead of בֵּית הַלְחָמִי) is easily changed, with Thenius and Wellhausen, after 1 Chron. xi. 26, into מִבֵּית לָחֶם, and in itself it is not altogether homogeneous, because without the article. Yet it may be supposed that instead of מִשָּׁא, on account of the appellat. of the proper name (the lifting up, *elatio*), the word הַמִּשָּׁא might be also employed. And since בִּרְיָקָה, along with אָגוּר, forms, as it were, one *compositum*, and does not at all destroy<sup>2</sup> the regulating force of אָגוּר, the expression is certainly, after the Arabic *usus log.*, to be thus explained: The words of Agur the son of Jakeh, of the tribe (the country) of Massa.

The second line of this verse, as it is punctuated, is to be rendered:

The saying of the man to Ithiél, to Ithiél and Uchal, not *Ukkal*; for, since Athias and van der Hooght, the incorrect form וֹאֲכָל has become current. J. H. Michaelis has the right form of the word וֹאֲכָל. Thus, with כ *raphatum*, it is to be read after the Masora, for it adds to this word the remark לִי

<sup>1</sup> In 'Jer. viii. 5, הָעַם וְגו' is thought of as genit., although it may be also nom., after the scheme of apposition instead of annexion. That it is genit., cf. Philippi's *St. Const.* pp. 192-195.

<sup>2</sup> We say, in Arab., without any anomaly, *e.g.* *Aliju-bnu-Muhammaddin Tajjiin*, *i.e.* the Ali son of Muhammed, of the tribe (from the tribe) of Tay; cf. Josh. iii. 11; Isa. xxviii. 1, lxiii. 11; and Deut. iii. 13.

וְחִסֵּר, and counts it among the forty-eight words sometimes written defectively without ו (vid. this list in the *Masora finalis*, 27b, Col. 4); and since it only remarks the absence of the letter lengthening the word where no *dagesh* follows the vocal, it thus supposes that the כ has no *dagesh*, as it is also found in Codd. (also *Jaman*.) written with the *Raphe*. לְאִיתִיָּאל is doubly accentuated; the *Tarcha* represents the *Metheg*, after the rule *Thorath Emeth*, p. 11. The ל after נָאִם is, in the sense of the punctuation, the same dat. as in לְאִרְנִי, Ps. cx. 1, and has an apparent right in him who asks קִי תִרְעָה in the 4th verse. Ithiel and Uchal must be, after an old opinion, sons, or disciples, or contemporaries, of Agur. Thus, e.g., Gesenius, in his *Lex.* under אִיתִיָּאל, where as yet his reference to Neh. xi. 7 is wanting. אִיתִיָּאל is rendered by Jefet and other Karaites, “there is a God” = אִיתִי אֵל; but it is perhaps equivalent to אֵתִי אֵל, “God is with me;” as for אִתִּי, the form אִיתִי is also found. אָכַל (אָכַל) nowhere occurs as a proper name; but in the region of proper names, everything, or almost everything, is possible.<sup>1</sup> Ewald sees in 1b–14 a dialogue: in vers. 2–4 the הַנֶּבֶךְ, i.e. as the word appears to him, the rich, haughty mocker, who has worn out his life, speaks; and in 5–14 the “*Mitmirgott*” [= God with me], or, more fully, “*Mitmirgott-sobinichstark*” [= God with me, so am I strong], i.e. the pious, humble man answers. “The whole,” he remarks, “is nothing but poetical; and it is poetical also that this discourse of mockery is called an elevated strain.” But (1) נֶבֶךְ is a harmless word; and in נָאִם הַנֶּבֶךְ, Num. xxiv. 3, 15, 2 Sam. xxiii. 1, it is a solemn, earnest one; (2) a proper name, consisting of two clauses connected by *Vav*, no matter whether it be an actual or a symbolical name, is not capable of being authenticated; Ewald, § 274b, recognises in נִרְלָתִי וְגו', 1 Chron. xxv. 4, the naming, not of one son of Heman, but of two; and (3) it would be a very forced, inferior poetry if the poet placed one half of the name in one line, and then, as if constrained to take a new breath, gave the other half of it in a second line. But, on the other hand, that אִיתִיָּאל and אָכַל are the names of two different persons, to whom the address of the man is directed, is attested by the, in this

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Wetzstein's *Inscriptionen aus den Trachonen und dem Haurangebirge* (1864), p. 336 f.

case aimless, *anadiplosis*, the here unpoetical parallelism with reservation. The repetition, as Fleischer remarks, of the name Ithiel, which may rank with Uchal, as the son or disciple of Agur, has probably its reason only in this, that one placed a second more extended phrase simply along with the shorter. The case is different; but Fleischer's supposition, that the poet himself cannot have thus written, is correct. We must not strike out either of the two **לְאִיתִיאל**; but the supposed proper names must be changed as to their vocalization into a declaratory clause. A principal argument lies in ver. 2, beginning with **כִּי**: this **כִּי** supposes a clause which it established; for, with right, Mühlaus maintains that **כִּי**, in the affirmative sense, which, by means of *aposiopesis*, proceeds from the confirmative, may open the conclusion and enter as confirmatory into the middle of the discourse (e.g. Isa. xxxii. 13), but cannot stand abruptly at the commencement of a discourse (cf. under Isa. xv. 1 and vii. 9). But if we now ask how it is to be vocalized, there comes at the same time into the sphere of investigation the striking phrase **נָאֻם הַגִּבֹּר**. This phrase all the Greek interpreters attest by their rendering, *τάδε λέγει ὁ ἀνὴρ* (*Venet. φησὶν ἀνὴρ*); besides, this is to be brought forward from the wilderness of the old attempts at a translation, that the feeling of the translators strives against the recognition in **וְאָבֶל** of a second personal name: the Peshito omits it; the Targ. translates it, after the Midrash, by **וְאֶבְרָהָם** (I may do it); as Theodotion, *καὶ δυνήσομαι*, which is probably also meant by the *καὶ συνήσομαι* (from *συνιέναι*, to be acquainted with) of the *Venet.*; the LXX. with *καὶ παύομαι*; and Aquila, *καὶ τέλεσον* (both from the verb **בָּלָה**). As an objection to **נָאֻם הַגִּבֹּר** is this, that it is so bald without being followed, as at Num. xxiv. 3, 15, 2 Sam. xxiii. 1, with the attributive description of the man. Luther was determined thereby to translate: discourse of the man Leithiel . . . And why could not **לְאִיתִיאל** be a proper-name connection like **יְשַׁעְיָהוּ** (**יְשַׁעְיָהוּ**)? Interpreted in the sense of "I am troubled concerning God," it might be a symbolical name of the *φιλόσοφος*, as of one who strives after the knowledge of divine things with all his strength. But (1) **לָאָה**, with the accus. obj., is not established, and one is rather inclined to think of a name such as **בְּלִיתִיאל**, after Ps. lxxxiv. 3; (2) moreover, **לְאִיתִיאל** cannot be at one

time a personal name, and at another time a declarative sentence—one must both times transform it into **לְאִתִּי אֵל**; but **אֵל** has to be taken as a vocative, not as accus., as is done by J. D. Michaelis, Hitzig, Bunsen, Zöckler, and others, thus: I have wearied myself, O God! . . . The nakedness of **הַנָּבֵר** is accordingly not covered by the first *Leithiel*. Mühlau, in his work, seeks to introduce **הַמֵּשָׁה** changed into **מִמֵּשָׁה**: “The man from Massa,” and prefers to interpret **הַנָּבֵר** generically:<sup>1</sup> “proverb (confession) of the man (*i.e.* the man must confess): I have wearied myself, O God! . . .” Nothing else in reality remains. The article may also be retrospective: the man just now named, whose “words” are announced, viz. Agur. But why was not the expression **נָאֵם אֲנִי** then used? Because it is not poetical to say: “the (previously named) man.” On the other hand, what follows applies so that one may understand, under **הַנָּבֵר**, any man you choose. There are certainly among men more than too many who inquire not after God (Ps. xiv. 2 f.). But there are also not wanting those who feel sorrowfully the distance between them and God. Agur introduces such a man as speaking, for he generalizes his own experience. Ps. xxxvi. 2 (*vid.* under this passage) shows that a proper name does not necessarily follow **נָאֵם**. With **נָאֵם הַנָּבֵר** Agur then introduces what the man has to confess—viz. a man earnestly devoted to God; for with **נָאֵם** the ideas of that which comes from the heart and the solemnly earnest are connected. If Agur so far generalizes his own experience, the passionate *anadiplosis* does not disturb this. After long contemplation of the man, he must finally confess: I have troubled myself, O God! I have troubled myself, O God! . . . That the trouble was directed toward God is perhaps denoted by the alliteration of **לְאִתִּי** with **אֵל**. But what now, further? **וְאֵבֶל** is read as **וְאֵבֶל, וְאֵבֶל, וְאֵבֶל, וְאֵבֶל**, and it has also been read as **וְאֵבֶל**. The reading **וְאֵבֶל** no one advocates; this that follows says the direct contrary, *et potui (pollui)*. Geiger (*Urschrift*, p. 61) supports the reading **וְאֵבֶל**, for he renders it interrogatively: “I wearied my-

<sup>1</sup> Thus, viz., that **הַנָּבֵר** denotes, not the man as he ought to be, but the man as he usually is (the article, as the Arabic grammarians say, “not for the exhaustion of the characteristic marks of the genus,” but for the expression of “the quality *māhīje* of the genus”).

self in vain about God, I wearied myself in vain about God; why should I be able to do it?" But since one may twist any affirmative clause in this way, and from a *yes* make a *no*, one should only, in cases of extreme necessity, consent to such a question in the absence of an interrogative word. Böttcher's לֹא־יָתִי, I have wearied myself out in vain, is not Hebrew. But at any rate the expression might be אֶל-אֶכֶל, if only the *Vav* did not stand between the words! If one might transpose the letters, then we might gain וְלֹא־אֶכֶל, according to which the LXX. translates: οὐ δύνησονται. At all events, this despairing as to the consequence of further trouble, "I shall be able to do nothing (shall bring it to nothing)," would be better than וְאֶכֶל (and I shall withdraw—become faint), for which, besides, וְאֶכְלָה should be used (cf. xxii. 8 with Job xxxiii. 21). One expects, after לֹא־יָתִי, the expression of that which is the consequence of earnest and long-continued endeavour. Accordingly Hitzig reads וְאֶכֶל, and I have become dull—suitable to the sense, but unsatisfactory on this account, because כָּלַל, in the sense of the Arab. *kall*, *hebescere*, is foreign to the Heb. *usus loq.* Thus וְאֶכֶל will be a *fut. consec.* of כָּלַל. J. D. Michaelis, and finally Böttcher, read it as *fut. consec. Piel* וְאֶכֶל or וְאֶכֶל (*vid.* regarding this form in pause under xxv. 9), "and I have made an end;" but it is not appropriate to the inquirer here complaining, when dissatisfaction with his results had determined him to abandon his research, and let himself be no more troubled. We therefore prefer to read with Dahler, and, finally, with Mühlau and Zöckler, וְאֶכֶל, and I have withdrawn. The form understood by Hitzig as a pausal form is, in the unchangeableness of its vocals, as accordant with rule as those of יָחַד, xxvii. 17, which lengthen the — of their first syllables in pause. And if Hitzig objects that too much is said, for one of such meditation does not depart, we answer, that if the inquiry of the man who speaks here has completed itself by the longing of his spirit and his soul (Ps. lxxxiv. 3, cxliii. 7), he might also say of himself, in person, כִּלְיָתִי or וְאֶכֶל. An inquiry proceeding not merely from intellectual, but, before all, from practical necessity, is meant—the doubled לֹא־יָתִי means that he applied thereto the whole strength of his inner and his outer man; and וְאֶכֶל, that he nevertheless did not reach his end, but wearied himself in

vain. By this explanation which we give to 1a, no change of its accents is required; but 1b has to be written:

נֶאֱמַר הַנֶּכֶד לְאִתִּי אֵל  
לְאִתִּי אֵל וְאֵל: <sup>1</sup>

Vers. 2, 3. The כִּי now following confirms the fruitlessness of the long zealous search:

For I am without reason for a man,  
And a man's understanding I have not.

3 And I have not learned wisdom,  
That I may possess the knowledge of the All-Holy.

He who cannot come to any fixed state of consecration, inasmuch as he is always driven more and more back from the goal he aims at, thereby brings guilt upon himself as a sinner so great, that every other man stands above him, and he is deep under them all. So here Agur finds the reason why in divine things he has failed to attain unto satisfying intelligence, not in the ignorance and inability common to all men—he appears to himself as not a man at all, but as an irrational beast, and he misses in himself the understanding which a man properly might have and ought to have. The מִן of מִאִישׁ is not the partitive, like Isa. xlv. 11, not the usual comparative: than any one (Böttcher), which ought to be expressed by מִכָּל-אִישׁ, but it is the negative, as Isa. lii. 14; Fleischer: *rudior ego sum quam ut homo appeller*, or: *brutus ego, hominis non similis*. Regarding בָּעֵר, *vid.* under xii. 1.<sup>2</sup> Ver. 3 now says that he went into no school of wisdom, and for that reason in his wrestling after knowledge could attain to nothing, because the necessary conditions to this were wanting to him. But then the question arises: Why this complaint? He must first go to school in order to obtain, according to the word “To him who hath is given,” that for which he strove. Thus לְמִדָּתִי refers to learning in the midst of wrestling; but

<sup>1</sup> The *Munach* is the transformation of *Mugrash*, and this sequence of accents—*Tarcha*, *Munach*, *Silluk*—remains the same, whether we regard אֵל as the accusative or as the vocative.

<sup>2</sup> According to the Arab. בָּעֵר is not a beast as grazing, but as dropping *stercus* (*ba'r*, camel's or sheep's droppings); to the R. בָּר, Mühlau rightly gives the meanings of separating, whence are derived the meanings of grazing as well as of removing (cleansing) (cf. Pers. *thak karadn*, to make clean = to make clean house, *tabula rasa*).

לִמְדָּה, spiritually understood, signifies the acquiring of a *kennens* [knowledge] or *könnens* [knowledge=ability]: he has not brought it out from the deep point of his condition of knowledge to make wisdom his own, so that he cannot adjudge to himself knowledge of the all-holy God (for this knowledge is the kernel and the star of true wisdom). If we read לֹא אָדַע בֶּל, this would be synchronistic, *nesciebam*, with לִמְדָּה standing on the same line. On the contrary, the positive אָדַע subordinates itself to לֹא-לִמְדָּה, as the Arab. *fāa' lama*, in the sense of (*ita*) *ut scirem scientiam Sanctissimi*, thus of a conclusion, like Lam. i. 19, a clause expressive of the intention, Ewald, § 347a. קְדוּשִׁים is, as at ix. 10, the name of God in a superlative sense, like the Arab. *el-kuddûs*.

Ver. 4 Who hath ascended to the heavens and descended ?

Who hath grasped the wind in his fists ?

Who hath bound up the waters in a garment ?

Who hath set right all the ends of the earth ?

What is his name, and what his son's name, if thou knowest ?

The first question here, מִי וְנֹו, is limited by *Pazer*; עֲלֵה-שָׁמַיִם has *Metheg* in the third syllable before the tone. The second question is at least shut off by *Pazer*, but, contrary to the rule, that *Pazer* does not repeat itself in a verse; Cod. Erfurt. 2, and several older editions, have for בְּחַפְנֵי more correctly בְּחַפְנֵי with *Rebia*. So much for the interpunction. חַפְנֵי are properly not the two fists, for the fist—that is, the hand gathered into a ball, *pugnus*—is called אֶגְרִיף; while, on the contrary, חֶפֶן (in all the three dialects) denotes the palm of the hand, *vola* (*vid.* Lev. xvi. 12); yet here the hands are represented after they have seized the thing as shut, and thus certainly as fists. The dual points to the dualism of the streams of air produced by the disturbance of the equilibrium; he who rules this movement has, as it were, the north or east wind in one fist, and the south or west wind in the other, to let it forth according to his pleasure from this prison (Isa. xxiv. 22). The third question is explained by Job xxvi. 8; the שְׁמַלָּה (from שָׂמַל, *comprehendere*) is a figure of the clouds which contain the upper waters, as Job xxxviii. 37, the bottles of heaven. “All the ends of the earth” are as at five other places, *e.g.* Ps. xxii. 28, the most distant, most remote parts of the earth; the setting up of all

these most remote boundaries (*margins*) of the earth is equivalent to the making fast and forming the limits to which the earth extends (Ps. lxxiv. 17), the determining of the compass of the earth and the form of its figures. כִּי הִרְרָע is in symphony with Job xxxviii. 5, cf. 18. The question is here formed as it is there, when Jahve brings home to the consciousness of Job human weakness and ignorance. But there are here two possible significations of the fourfold question. Either it aims at the answer: No man, but a Being highly exalted above all creatures, so that the question מִה־שֵּׁמוֹ [what his name?] refers to the name of this Being. Or the question is primarily meant of men: What man has the ability?—if there is one, then name him! In both cases מִי עָלָה is not meant, after xxiv. 28, in the modal sense, *quis ascenderit*, but as the following וַיֵּרֶד requires, in the nearest indicative sense, *quis ascendit*. But the choice between these two possible interpretations is very difficult. The first question is historical: Who has gone to heaven and (as a consequence, then) come down from it again? It lies nearest thus to interpret it according to the *consecutio temporum*. By this interpretation, and this representation of the going up before the descending again, the interrogator does not appear to think of God, but in contrast to himself, to whom the divine is transcendent, of some other man of whom the contrary is true. Is there at all, he asks, a man who can comprehend and penetrate by his power and his knowledge the heavens and the earth, the air and the water, *i.e.* the nature and the inner condition of the visible and invisible world, the quantity and extent of the elements, and the like? Name to me this man, if thou knowest one, by his name, and designate him to me exactly by his family—I would turn to him to learn from him what I have hitherto striven in vain to find. But there is no such an one. Thus: as I feel myself limited in my knowledge, so there is not at all any man who can claim limitless *können* and *kennen* [ability and knowledge]. Thus casually Aben Ezra explains, and also Rashi, Arama, and others, but without holding fast to this in its purity; for in the interpretation of the question, “Who hath ascended?” the reference to Moses is mixed up with it, after the Midrash and Sohar (Parasha, ויקהל, to Ex. xxxv. 1),

to pass by other obscurities and difficulties introduced. Among the moderns, this explanation, according to which all aims at the answer, "there is no man to whom this appertains," has no exponent worth naming. And, indeed, as favourable as is the *quis ascendit in cœlos ac rursus descendit*, so unfavourable is the *quis constituit omnes terminos terræ*, for this question appears not as implying that it asks after the man who has accomplished this; but the thought, according to all appearance, underlies it, that such an one must be a being without an equal, after whose name inquiry is made. One will then have to judge עלה and וירד after Gen. xxviii. 12; the ascending and descending are compared to our German "*auf und nieder*" [up and down], for which we do not use the phrase "*nieder und auf*," and is the expression of free, expanded, unrestrained presence in both regions; perhaps, since וירד is historical, as Ps. xviii. 10, the speaker has the traditional origin of the creation in mind, according to which the earth arose into being earlier than the starry heavens above.

Thus the four questions refer (as *e.g.* also Isa. xl. 12) to Him who has done and who does all that, to Him who is not Himself to be comprehended as His works are, and as He shows Himself in the greatness and wonderfulness of these, must be exalted above them all, and mysterious. If the inhabitant of the earth looks up to the blue heavens streaming in the golden sunlight, or sown with the stars of night; if he considers the interchange of the seasons, and feels the sudden rising of the wind; if he sees the upper waters clothed in fleecy clouds, and yet held fast within them floating over him; if he lets his eye sweep the horizon all around him to the ends of the earth, built up upon nothing in the open world-space (Job xxvi. 7): the conclusion comes to him that he has before him in the whole the work of an everywhere present Being, of an all-wise omnipotent Worker—it is the Being whom he has just named as אל, the absolute Power, and as קרשם, exalted above all created beings, with their troubles and limitations; but this knowledge gained *viâ causalitatis*, *viâ eminentiæ*, and *viâ negationis*, does not satisfy yet his spirit, and does not bring him so near to this Being as is to him a personal necessity, so that if he can in some measure answer the fourfold מי, yet there always

presses upon him the question מַה-שְּׁמוֹ, what is his name, i.e. the name which dissolves the secret of this Being above all beings, and unfolds the mystery of the wonder above all wonders. That this Being must be a person the fourfold מִי presupposes; but the question, "What is his name?" expresses the longing to know the name of this supernatural personality, not any kind of name which is given to him by men, but the name which covers him, which is the appropriate personal immediate expression of his being. The further question, "And what the name of his son?" denotes, according to Hitzig, that the inquirer strives after an adequate knowledge, such as one may have of a human being. But he would not have ventured this question if he did not suppose that God was not a *monas* [unity] who was without manifoldness in Himself. The LXX. translates: ἡ τί ὄνομα τοῖς τέκνοις αὐτοῦ (בְּנֵי), perhaps not without the influence of the old synagogue reference testified to in the Midrash and Sohar of בְּנוֹ to Israel, God's first-born; but this interpretation is opposed to the spirit of this חִידָה (intricate speech, enigma). Also in general the interrogator cannot seek to know what man stands in this relation of a son to the Creator of all things, for that would be an ethical question which does not accord with this metaphysical one. Geier has combined this וְמַה-שֵּׁם-בְּנוֹ with viii.; and that the interrogator, if he meant the חַכְמָה, ought to have used the phrase וְמַה-שֵּׁם-בְּתוֹ, says nothing against this, for also in viii. 30, whether it means foster-child or *artifex*, work-master, the feminine determination disappears. Not Ewald alone finds here the idea of the Logos, as the first-born Son of God, revealing itself, on which at a later time the Palestinian doctrine of מִימְרָא דִּיהוּהִי imprinted itself in Alexandria;<sup>1</sup> but also J. D. Michaelis felt himself constrained to recognise here the N. T. doctrine of the Son of God announcing itself from afar. And why might not this be possible? The Rig-Veda contains two similar questions, x. 81, 4: "Which was the primeval forest, or what the tree from which one framed the heavens and the earth? Surely, ye wise men, ye ought in your souls to make inquiry whereon he stood when he raised the wind!" And i. 164, 4: "Who has seen the first-born? Where was the life, the blood, the soul of the world? Who came thither to ask

<sup>1</sup> Vid. *Apologetik* (1869), p. 432 ff.

this from any one who knew it?"<sup>1</sup> Jewish interpreters also interpret בנו of the *causa media* of the creation of the world. Arama, in his work עקרת יצחק, *sect.* xvi., suggests that by בנו we are to understand the primordial element, as the Sankhya-philosophy understands by the first-born there in the Rig, the *Prakriti*, i.e. the primeval material. R. Levi b. Gerson (Ralbag) comes nearer to the truth when he explains בנו as meaning the cause caused by the supreme cause, in other words: the *principium principiatum* of the creation of the world. We say: the inquirer meant the demiurgic might which went forth from God, and which waited on the Son of God as a servant in the creation of the world; the same might which in chap. viii. is called Wisdom, and is described as God's beloved Son. But with the name after which inquiry is made, the relation is as with the "more excellent name than the angels," Heb. i. 4.<sup>2</sup> It is manifestly not the name בן, since the inquiry is made after the name of the בן; but the same is the case also with the name חכמה, or, since this does not harmonize, according to its grammatical gender, with the form of the question, the name רבר (מִימַר); but it is the name which belongs to the first and only-begotten Son of God, not merely according to creative analogies, but according to His true being. The inquirer would know God, the creator of the world, and His Son, the mediator in the creation of the world, according to their natures. If thou knowest, says he, turning himself to man, his equal, what the essential names of both are, tell them to me! But who can name them! The nature of the Godhead is hidden, as from the inquirer, so from every one else. On this side of eternity it is beyond the reach of human knowledge.

The solemn confession introduced by נאם is now closed.

<sup>1</sup> Cited by Lyra in *Beweis des Glaubens Jahrg.* 1869, p. 230. The second of these passages is thus translated by Wilson (*Rig-Veda-Sanhita*, London, 1854, vol. ii. p. 127): "Who has seen the primeval (being) at the time of his being born? What is that endowed with substance which the unsubstantial sustains? From earth are the breath and blood, but where is the soul? Who may repair to the sage to ask this?"

<sup>2</sup> The *Comm.* there remarks: It is the heavenly whole name of the highly exalted One, the שם המפורש, *nomen explicitum*, which here on this side has entered into no human heart, and can be uttered by no human tongue, the ὄνομα ὃ οὐδεὶς οἶδεν εἰ μὴ ὁ αὐτός, Rev. xix. 12.

Ewald sees herein the discourse of a sceptical mocker at religion; and Elster, the discourse of a meditating doubter; in ver. 5, and on, the answer ought then to follow, which is given to one thus speaking: his withdrawal from the standpoint of faith in the revelation of God, and the challenge to subordinate his own speculative thinking to the authority of the word of God. But this interpretation of the statement depends on the symbolical rendering of the supposed personal names אֱלֹהִים and אִשָּׁל, and, besides, the dialogue is indicated by nothing; the beginning of the answer ought to have been marked, like the beginning of that to which it is a reply. The confession, 1b-4, is not that of a man who does not find himself in the right condition, but such as one who is thirsting after God must renounce: the thought of a man does not penetrate to the essence of God (Job xi. 7-9); even the ways of God remain inscrutable to man (Sir. xviii. 3; Rom. xi. 33); the Godhead remains, for our thought, in immeasurable height and depth; and though a relative knowledge of God is possible, yet the dogmatic thesis, *Deum quidem cognoscimus, sed non comprehendimus*, i.e. *non perfecte cognoscimus quia est infinitus*,<sup>1</sup> even over against the positive revelation, remains unchanged. Thus nothing is wanting to make 1-4 a complete whole; and what follows does not belong to that section as an organic part of it.

Ver. 5 Every word of *Eloah* is pure;

A shield is He for those who hide themselves in Him.

6 Add thou not to His words,

Lest He convict thee and thou become a liar.

Although the tetrastich is an independent proverb, yet it is connected to the foregoing *N'ûm* [utterance, ver. 1]. The more limited a man is in his knowledge of God,—viz. in that which presents itself to him *lumine naturæ*,—so much the more thankful must he be that God has revealed Himself in history, and so much the more firmly has he to hold fast by the pure word of the divine revelation. In the dependent relation of ver. 5 to Ps. xviii. 31 (2 Sam. xxii. 31), and of ver. 6 to Deut. iv. 2, there is no doubt the self-testimony of God given to Israel, and recorded in the book of the Tôra, is here meant. כִּלְאֵם-אֱמֶרֶת

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Luthardt's *Kompendium der Dogmatik*, § 27.

is to be judged after *πᾶσα γραφή*, 2 Tim. iii. 16, not: every declaration of God, wherever promulgated, but: every declaration within the revelation lying before us. The primary passage [Ps. xviii. 31] has not כל here, but, instead of it, לְכָל הַחַסִּים, and instead of אָמַר אֱלֹהִים it has אֱמ' יְהוָה; his change of the name of Jahve is also not favourable to the opinion that ver. 5 f. is a part of the *Nêûm*, viz. that it is the answer thereto. The proverb in this contains traces of the Book of Job, with which in many respects that *Nêûm* harmonizes; in the Book of Job, אֱלֹהִים (with שְׂרִי) is the prevailing name of God; whereas in the Book of Proverbs it occurs only in the passage before us. Mühlau, p. 41, notes it as an Arabism. צָרַף (Arab. *ṣaraf*, to turn, to change) is the usual word for the changing process of smelting; צָרִיף signifies solid, pure, *i.e.* purified by separating: God's word is, without exception, like pure, massive gold. Regarding הָסָה, to hide oneself, *vid.* under Ps. ii. 12: God is a shield for those who make Him, as revealed in His word, their refuge. The part. הָסָה occurs, according to the Masora, three times written defectively,—xiv. 32; 2 Sam. xxii. 31; Neh. i. 7; in the passage before us it is to be written לְהוֹסִים; the proverbs of Agur and Lemuel have frequently the *plena scriptio* of the *part. act. Kal*, as well as of the *fut. Kal*, common to the Book of Job (*vid.* Mühlau, p. 65).

In 6a, after Aben Ezra's *Moznajim* 2b (11b of Heidenheim's edition), and *Zachoth* 53a (cf. Lipmann's ed.), and other witnesses (*vid.* Norzi), *t sp* (the ה with *dagesh*) is to be written,—the Cod. *Jaman.* and others *defect.* without ו, —not *tôsf*; for, since הוֹסֵף (Ex. x. 28) is yet further abbreviated in this way, it necessarily loses<sup>1</sup> the aspiration of the *tenuis*, as in יִלְרֵת (= יִלְרֵת). The words of God are the announcements of His holy will, measured by His wisdom; they are then to be accepted as they are, and to be recognised and obeyed. He who adds anything to them, either by an overstraining of them or by repressing them, will not escape the righteous judgment of God: God will convict him of falsifying His word (הוֹכִיחַ, Ps. l. 21; only

<sup>1</sup> That both *Shevas* in *tôsp* are quiesc., *vid.* Kimchi, *Michlol* 155 a b, who is finally decided as to this. That the word should be read *tôsp'al* is the opinion of Chajûg in הנוח'ס (regarding the quiesc. letters), p. 6 of the Ed. by Dukes-Ewald.

here with א of the obj.), and expose him as a liar—viz. by the dispensations which unmask the falsifier as such, and make manifest the falsehood of his doctrines as dangerous to souls and destructive to society. An example of this is found in the kingdom of Israel, in the destruction of which the curse of the human institution of its state religion, set up by Jeroboam, had no little share. Also the Jewish traditional law, although in itself necessary for the carrying over of the law into the *praxis* of private and public life, falls under the Deuteron. prohibition,—which the poet here repeats,—so far as it claimed for itself the same divine authority as that of the written law, and so far as it hindered obedience to the law—by the straining-at-a-gnat policy—and was hostile to piety. Or, to adduce an example of an addition more dogmatic than legal, what a fearful impulse was given to fleshly security by that overstraining of the promises in Gen. xvii., which were connected with circumcision by the tradition, “the circumcised come not into hell,” or by the overstraining of the prerogative attributed by Paul, Rom. ix. 4 f., to his people according to the Scriptures, in the principle, “All Israelites have a part in the future world!” Regarding the accentuation of the *perf. consec.* after אֵ, *vid.* at Ps. xxviii. 1. The penultima accent is always *in pausa* (cf. vers. 9 and 10).

In what now follows, the key-note struck in ver. 1 is continued. There follows a prayer to be kept in the truth, and to be preserved in the middle state, between poverty and riches. It is a Mashal-ode, *vid.* vol. i. p. 12. By the first prayer, “vanity and lies keep far from me,” it is connected with the warning of ver. 6.

- Ver. 7 Two things I entreat from Thee,  
 Refuse them not to me before I die.  
 8 Vanity and lies keep far away from me  
 Poverty and riches give me not :  
 Cause me to eat the bread which is allotted to me,  
 9 Lest in satiety I deny,  
 And say : Who is Jahve ?  
 And lest, in becoming poor, I steal,  
 And profane the name of my God.

We begin with the settlement and explanation of the traditional punctuation. A monosyllable like אֵשׁ receives, if *Legarmeh*,

always *Mehuppach Legarmeh*, while, on the contrary, the polysyllable אֲשַׁבֵּעַ has *Asla Legarmeh*. אֶל-תִּתֶּן-לִי, with double *Makkeph* and with *Gaja* in the third syllable before the tone (after the *Metheg-Setzung*, § 28), is Ben-Asher's; whereas Ben-Naphtali prefers the punctuation לִי אֶל-תִּתֶּן (vid. Baer's *Genesis*, p. 79, note 3). Also פֶּן-אֲשַׁבֵּעַ has (cf. פֶּן-יִשְׁתָּה, xxxi. 5) *Makkeph*, and on the antepenultima *Gaja* (vid. *Thorath Emeth*, p. 32).

The *perf. consec.* וְכַחֲשֵׁתִי has on the *ult.* the disjunctive *Zinnor* (*Sarka*), which always stands over the final letter; but that the *ult.* is also to be accented, is shown by the counter-tone *Metheg*, which is to be given to the first syllable. Also וְאֶמְרָתִי has in correct Codd., e.g. Cod. 1294, the correct ultima toning of a *perf. consec.*; Kimchi in the *Michlol* 6b, as well as Aben Ezra in both of his *Grammars*, quotes only וְנִגְבַּתִּי וְחִפְשֵׁתִי as toned on the *penult.* That וְנִגְבַּתִּי cannot be otherwise toned on account of the pausal accent, has been already remarked under 6b; the word, besides, belongs to the פֶּתִיחַ בֵּא"ס, i.e. to those which preserve their *Pathach* unlengthened by one of the greater disjunctives; the *Athnach* has certainly in the three so-called metrical books only the disjunctive form of the *Zakeph* of the prose books. So much as to the form of the text.

As to its artistic form, this prayer presents itself to us as the first of the numerical proverbs, under the "Words" of Agur, who delighted in this form of proverb. The numerical proverb is a brief discourse, having a didactic end complete in itself, which by means of numerals gives prominence to that which it seeks to bring forward. There are two kinds of these. The more simple form places in the first place only one numeral, which is the sum of that which is to be brought forth separately: the numerical proverb of one cipher; to this class belong, keeping out of view the above prayer, which if it did not commence a series of numerical proverbs does not deserve this technical name on account of the low ciphers: vers. 24-28, with the cipher 4; Sir. xxv. 1 and 2, with the cipher 3. Similar to the above prayer are Job xiii. 20 f., Isa. li. 19; but these are not numerical proverbs, for they are not proverbs. The more artistic kind of numerical proverb has two ciphers: the two-ciphered numerical proverb we call the sharpened (pointed) proverb.

Of such two-ciphered numerical proverbs the "words" of Agur contain four, and the whole Book of Proverbs, reckoning vi. 16-19, five—this ascending numerical character belongs to the popular saying, 2 Kings ix. 32, Job xxxiii. 29, Isa. xvi. 6, and is found bearing the stamp of the artistic distich outside of the Book of Proverbs, Ps. lxii. 12, Job xxxiii. 14, xl. 5; Job v. 19, and particularly Amos i. 3-ii. 6. According to this scheme, the introduction of Agur's prayer should be:

אַחַת שְׁאַלְתִּי מֵאַתָּה

וְשֵׁתִים אֶל-תָּמַנַּע מִפְּנֵי בִטְרָם אָמוֹת

and it could take this form, for the prayer expresses two requests, but dwells exclusively on the second. A twofold request he presents to God, these two things he wishes to be assured of on this side of death; for of these he stands in need, so as to be able when he dies to look back on the life he has spent, without the reproaches of an accusing conscience. The first thing he asks is that God would keep far from him vanity and lying words. שׁוֹא (= שְׂוָא, from שׂוָא = שָׂאָה, to be waste, after the form כִּמְיָת) is either that which is confused, worthless, untrue, which comes to us from without (*e.g.* Job xxxi. 5), or dissoluteness, hollowness, untruthfulness of disposition (*e.g.* Ps. xxvi. 4); it is not to be decided whether the suppliant is influenced by the conception thus from within or from without, since דְּבַר-כֶּזֶב [a word of falsehood] may be said by himself as well as to him, a falsehood can intrude itself upon him. It is almost more probable that by שׁוֹא he thought of the misleading power of God-estranged, idolatrous thought and action; and by דְּבַר-כֶּזֶב, of lying words, with which he might be brought into sympathy, and by which he might ruin himself and others. The second petition is that God would give him neither poverty (רָאשׁ, *vid.* x. 4) nor riches, but grant him for his sustenance only the bread of the portion destined for him. The *Hiph.* הִטְרִיף (from טָרַף, to grind, viz. the bread with the teeth) means to give<sup>1</sup> anything, as טָרַף, with which, xxxi. 15, נָתַן חֶק is parallel: to present a fixed piece, a definite portion of sustenance. חֶק, Gen. xlvii. 22, the portion assigned as nourishment; cf. Job

<sup>1</sup> The *Venet.* translates, according to Villoison, *θέρεψον με*; but the ms. has, according to Gebhardt, *θρέψον*.

xxiii. 14 חֲקִי, the decree determined regarding me. Accordingly, לֶחֶם חֲקִי does not mean the bread appropriately measured out for me (like ἄρτος ἐπιούσιος, that which is required for οὐσία, subsistence), but the bread appropriate for me, determined for me according to the divine plan. Fleischer compares (Arab.) *ratab* and *marsaum*, which both in a similar way designate a fixed sustentation portion. And why does he wish to be neither poor nor rich? Because in both extremes lie moral dangers: in riches, the temptation to deny God (which בְּחֵשׁ בָּה' signifies, in the later Heb. בָּפַר בְּעַקֵּר, to deny the fundamental truth; cf. (Arab.) *kafar*, unbelieving), whom one flowing in superabundance forgets, and of whom one in his self-indulgence desires to know nothing (Job xxi. 14–16, xxii. 16 f.); in poverty, the temptation is to steal and to blaspheme the name of God, viz. by murmuring and disputing, or even by words of blasphemy; for one who is in despair directs the outbreaks of his anger against God (Isa. viii. 21), and curses Him as the cause of His misfortune (Rev. xvi. 11, 21). The question of godless haughtiness, מִי יְהוָה, the LXX. improperly change into מִי יֵרֵא, τίς με ὀρᾷ. Regarding נוֹרֵשׁ, to grow poor, or rather, since only the *fut. Niph.* occurs in this sense, regarding יִרְשׁ, *vid.* at xx. 13.

That the author here, by blaspheming (grasping at) the name of God, especially thinks on that which the *Tôra* calls “cursing (קָלַל) God,” and particularly “blaspheming the name of the Lord,” Lev. xxiv. 15, 16, is to be concluded from the two following proverbs, which begin with the catchword קָלַל:

Ver. 10 Calumniate not a servant with his master,  
Lest he curse thee, and thou must atone for it.

Incorrectly Ewald: entice not a servant to slander against his master; and Hitzig: “Make not a servant tattle regarding his master.” It is true that the *Poel* לֹאֲשֵׁן (to pierce with the tongue, *linguâ petere*) occurs twice in the sense of to calumniate; but that הִלְשֵׁן means nothing else, is attested by the post.-bibl. Hebrew; the proverb regarding schismatics (בְּרִכַּת הַמֵּינִים) in the Jewish *Schemone-Esre* (prayer of the eighteen benedictions) began with וְלַמְלִשְׁנִים, “and to the calumniators” (*delatoribus*). Also in the Arab. *âlsana* signifies *pertulit verba alicujus ad alterum*, to make a babbler, *rapporteur* (Fleischer). That the word also

here is not to be otherwise interpreted, is to be concluded from לֹא with the causative rendering. Rightly Symmachus, μὴ διαβάλης; Theodotion, μὴ καταλάβῃς; and according to the sense also, Jerome, *ne accusas*; the Venet. μὴ καταμηνύσῃς (give not him); on the contrary, Luther, *verrate nicht* [betray not], renders לֹא with the LXX., Syr. in the sense of the Aram. לֹא and the Arab. *âslam* (*tradere, prodere*). One should not secretly accuse (Ps. ci. 5) a servant with his master, and in that lies the character of slander (לֹא שֹׁן הָרָע) when one puts suspicion upon him, or exaggerates the actual facts, and generally makes the person suspected—one thereby makes a man, whose lot in itself is not a happy one, at length and perhaps for ever unhappy, and thereby he brings a curse on himself. But it is no matter of indifference to be the object of the curse of a man whom one has unrighteously and unjustly overwhelmed in misery: such a curse is not without its influence, for it does not fruitlessly invoke the righteous retribution of God, and thus one has sorrowfully to atone for the wanton sins of the tongue (*ve-aschāmta*, for *ve-aschamtá* as it is would be without pause).

There now follows a *Priamel*,<sup>1</sup> the first line of which is, by יקלל, connected with the יקלל of the preceding distich:

- Ver. 11 A generation that curseth their father,  
 And doth not bless their mother;  
 12 A generation pure in their own eyes,  
 And yet not washed from their filthiness;  
 13 A generation—how haughty their eyes,  
 And their eyelids lift themselves up;  
 14 A generation whose teeth are swords and their jaw teeth  
 knives  
 To devour the poor from the earth and the needy from  
 the midst of men.

Ewald translates: O generation! but that would have required the word, 13a, הָרִדֹּר (Jer. ii. 31), and one would have expected

<sup>1</sup> [Cf. vol. i. p. 13. The name (from *præambulum*) given to a peculiar form of popular gnomic poetry which prevailed in Germany from the 12th (e.g. the Meistersinger or Minstrel Sparvogel) to the 16th century, but was especially cultivated during the 14th and 15th centuries. Its peculiarity consisted in this, that after a series of antecedents or subjects, a briefly-expressed consequent or predicate was introduced as the epigrammatic point applicable to all these antecedents together. *Vid.* Erschenburg's *Denkmälern altdeutscher Dichtkunst*, Bremen 1799.]

to have found something mentioned which the generation addressed were to take heed to; but it is not so. But if "O generation!" should be equivalent to "O regarding the generation!" then הוי ought to have introduced the sentence. And if we translate, with Luther: There is a generation, etc., then שׁ is supplied, which might drop out, but could not be omitted. The LXX. inserts after ἔκγονον the word κακόν, and then renders what follows as pred.—a simple expedient, but worthless. The Venet. does not need this expedient, for it renders γενεὰ τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ βλασφημήσει; but then the order of the words in 11a would have been דור יקלל אביו; and in 12a, after the manner of a subst. clause, דור מזהר בעיניו הוא, one sees distinctly, from 13 and 14, that what follows דור is to be understood, not as a pred., but as an attributive clause. As little can we interpret ver. 14, with Löwenstein, as pred. of the three subj., "it is a generation whose teeth are swords;" that would at least have required the words דור הוא; but ver. 14 is not at all a judgment valid for all the three subjects. The Targ. and Jerome translate correctly, as we above;<sup>1</sup> but by this rendering there are four subjects in the preamble, and the whole appears, since the common pred. is wanting, as a mutilated Priamel. Perhaps the author meant to say: it is such a generation that encompasses us; or: such is an abomination to Jahve; for דור is a *Gesamtheit* = totality, generation of men who are bound together by contemporary existence, or homogeneity, or by both, but always a totality; so that these verses, 11-14, might describe *quatuor detestabilia genera hominum* (C. B. Michaelis), and yet one *generatio*, which divide among themselves these four vices, of blackest ingratitude, loathsome self-righteousness, arrogant presumption, and unmerciful covetousness. Similar is the description given in the Mishna *Sota* ix. 14, of the character of the age in which the Messiah appeared. "The appearance of this age," thus it concludes, "is like the appearance of a dog; a son is not ashamed before his father; to whom will we then look for help? To our Father in heaven!"<sup>2</sup> The undutifulness of a child is here placed

<sup>1</sup> The Syr. begins 11a as if הוי were to be supplied.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. also Ali b. Abi Taleb's dark description, beginning with *hadha alzman* (this age), *Zur allg. Char. der arab. Poesie* (1870), p. 24 f.

first. To curse one's parents is, after Ex. xxi. 17, cf. Prov. xx. 10, a crime worthy of death; "not to bless," is here, *per litoten*, of the same force as קָלַל [to curse]. The second characteristic, ver. 12, is wicked blindness as to one's judgment of himself. The LXX. coarsely, but not bad: τὴν δ' ἔξοδον αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀπένιψεν. Of such darkness one says: *sordes suas putat olere cinnama*. רָחַץ is not the abbreviated part. (Stuart), as e.g. Ex. iii. 2, but the finite, as e.g. Hos. i. 6.

In 13a the attributive clause forms itself, so as to express the astonishing height of arrogance, into an exclamation: a generation, how lofty are their eyes (cf. e.g. vi. 17, עֵינַיִם רְמוֹת)! to which, as usual, it is simply added: and his eyelids (*palpebræ*) lift themselves up; in Lat., the lifting up of the eyebrow as an expression of haughtiness is described by *elatum* (*superbum*) *supercilium*.

The fourth characteristic is insatiable covetousness, which does not spare even the poor, and preys upon them, the helpless and the defenceless: they devour them as one eats bread, Ps. xiv. 4. The teeth, as the instruments of eating, are compared to swords and knives, as at Ps. lvii. 4 to spears and arrows. With שָׁנִי there is interchanged, as at Job xxix. 17,

Jonah i. 6, מִתְלַעֲתִי (not מִתְּ, as Norzi writes, contrary to *Metheg-*

*Setzung*, § 37, according to which *Gaja*, with the servant going before, is inadmissible), transposed from מִלְּתַעֲתִי, Ps. lviii. 7, from לָחַץ, to strike, pierce, bite. The designation of place, מֵאֲרֶץ, "from the earth" (which also, *in pausa*, is not modified into מֵאֲרָץ), and מֵאֲדָם, "from the midst of men," do not belong to the obj.: those who belong to the earth, to mankind (*vid.* Ps. x. 18), for thus interpreted they would be useless; but to the word of action: from the earth, out from the midst of men away, so that they disappear from thence (Amos viii. 4). By means of fine but cobweb combinations, Hitzig finds Amalek in this fourfold proverb. But it is a portrait of the times, like Ps. xiv., and certainly without any national stamp.

With the characteristic of insatiableness it closes, and there follows an *apophthegma de quatuor insatiabilibus quæ ideo comparantur cum sanguisuga* (C. B. Michaelis). We translate the text here as it lies before us:

Ver. 15 The 'Alûka hath two daughters : Give ! Give !

Three of these are never satisfied ;

Four say not : Enough !

16 The under-world and the closing of the womb ;

The earth is not satisfied with water ;

And the fire saith not : Enough !

We begin with Masoretic externalities. The first ב in הב is *Beth minusculum* ; probably it had accidentally this diminutive form in the original mss., to which the Midrash (cf. *Sepher Taghin ed. Bargès*, 1866, p. 47) has added absurd conceits. This first הב has *Pasek* after it, which in this case is servant to the *Olewejored* going before, according to the rule *Thorath Emeth*, p. 24, here, as at Ps. lxxxv. 9, *Mehuppach*. The second הב, which of itself alone is the representative of *Olewejored*, has in Hutter, as in the Cod. Erfurt 2, and Cod. 2 of the Leipzig Public Library, the pausal punctuation הב (cf. קח, 1 Sam. xxi. 10), but which is not sufficiently attested. Instead of לֹא-אָמְרוּ, 15b, לֹא אָמְרוּ, and instead of לֹא-אָמְרָה, 16b, לֹא אָמְרָה are to be written ; the *Zinnorith* removes the *Makkeph*, according to *Thorath Emeth*, p. 9, *Accentuationssystem*, iv. § 2. Instead of מַיִם, 16a, only Jablonski, as Mühlau remarks, has מַיִם ; but incorrectly, since *Athnach*, after *Olewejored*, has no pausal force (*vid. Thorath Emeth*, p. 37). All that is without any weight as to the import of the words. But the punctuation affords some little service for the setting aside of a view of Rabbenu Tam (*vid. Tosaphoth to Aboda zara* 17a, and *Erubin* 19a), which has been lately advocated by Löwenstein. That view is, that 'Alûka is the name of a wise man, not Solomon's, because the *Pesikta* does not reckon this among the names of Solomon, nor yet a name of hell, because it is not, in the *Gemara*, numbered among the names of Gehinnom. Thus לְעֵלְיָקָה would be a superscription, like לְרֹדֶד and לְשִׁלְמָה, Ps. xxvi. 1, lxxii. 1, provided with *Asla Legarmeh*. But this is not possible, for the *Asla Legarmeh*, at Ps. xxvi. 1 and lxxii. 1, is the transformation of *Olewejored*, inadmissible on the first word of the verse (*Accentuationssystem*, xix. § 1) ; but no *Olewejored* can follow such an *Asla Legarmeh*, which has the force of an *Olewejored*, as after this לְעֵלְיָקָה, which the accentuation then does not regard as the author's name given as a superscription.

עֲלִיקָה is not the name of a person, and generally not a proper name, but a generic name of certain traditional signification. "One must drink no water"—says the Gemara *Aboda zara* 12b—"out of a river or pond, nor (immediately) with his mouth, nor by means of his hand; he who, nevertheless, does it, his blood comes on his own head, because of the danger. What danger? סִכְּנָת עֲלִיקָה," i.e. the danger of swallowing a leech. The Aram. also designates a leech by עֲלִיקָה (cf. e.g. Targ. Ps. xii. 9: hence the godless walk about like the leech, which sucks the blood of men), and the Arab. by 'alak (n. unit. 'alakat), as the word is also rendered here by the Aram. and Arab. translators. Accordingly, all the Greeks render it by βδέλλα; Jerome, by *sanguisuga* (Rashi, *sangsue*); also Luther's *Eigel* is not the *Igel erinaceus* [hedgehog], but the *Egel*, i.e., as we now designate it, the *Blutegel* [leech], or (less correctly) *Blutigel*. עֲלִיקָה is the fem. of the adj. עָלִיק, attached to, which meaning, together with the whole verbal stem, the Arab. has preserved (*vid.* Mühlau's *Mittheilung des Art.* 'aluka aus dem *Kamus*, p. 42).<sup>1</sup> But if, now, the 'Alûka is the leech,<sup>2</sup> which are then its two daughters, to which is here given the name הַב הַב, and which at the same time have this cry of desire in their mouths? Grotius and others understand, by the two daughters of the leech, the two branches of its tongue; more correctly: the double-membered overlip of its sucker. C. B. Michaelis thinks that the greedy cry, "Give! Give!" is personified: *voces istæ concipiuntur ut hirudinis filiæ, quas ex se gignat et velut mater sobolem impense diligat*. But since this does not satisfy, symbolical interpretations of 'Aluka have been resorted to. The Talmud, *Aboda zara* 17a, regards it as a name of hell. In this sense it is used in the language of the Pijut (synagogue

<sup>1</sup> Nöldeke has remarked, with reference to Mühlau's *Monographie*, that 'aluka, in the sense of tenacious (*tenax*), is also found in Syr. (*Geopon.* xiii. 9, xli. 26), and that generally the stem קָלַע, to cleave, to adhere, is more common in Aram. than one would suppose. But this, however common in Arab., is by no means so in Syr.; and one may affirm that, among other Arabisms found in the Proverbs of Agur, the word 'Alûka has decidedly an Arab. sound.

<sup>2</sup> In Sanscrit the leech is called *galaukas* (masc.) or *galaukâ* (fem.), i.e. the inhabitant of the water (from *gala*, water, and *ôkas*, dwelling). Ewald regards this as a transformation of the Semitic name.

poetry).<sup>1</sup> If 'Alûka is hell, then fancy has the widest room for finding an answer to the question, What are the two daughters? The Talmud supposes that רשות (the worldly domination) and מינות (heresy) are meant. The Church-fathers also, understanding by 'Alûka the power of the devil, expatiated in such interpretations. Of the same character are Calmet's interpretation, that *sanguisuga* is a figure of the *mala cupiditas*, and its twin-daughters are *avaritia* and *ambitio*. The truth lying in all these is this, that here there must be some kind of symbol. But if the poet meant, by the two daughters of the 'Alûka, two beings or things which he does not name, then he kept the best of his symbol to himself. And could he use 'Alûka, this common name for the leech, without further intimation, in any kind of symbolical sense? The most of modern interpreters do nothing to promote the understanding of the word, for they suppose that 'Alûka, from its nearest signification, denotes a demoniacal spirit of the character of a vampire, like the *Dakinî* of the Indians, which nourish themselves on human flesh; the *ghouls* of the Arabs and Persians, which inhabit graveyards, and kill and eat men, particularly wanderers in the desert; in regard to which it is to be remarked, that (Arab.) 'awlak is indeed a name for a demon, and that al'aluwak, according to the Kamus, is used in the sense of *alyhwal*. Thus Dathe, Döderlein, Ziegler, Umbreit; thus also Hitzig, Ewald, and others. Mühlau, while he concurs in this understanding of the word, and now throwing open the question, Which, then, are the two daughters of the demoness 'Alûka? finds no answer to it in the proverb itself, and therefore accepts of the view of Ewald, since 15b-16, taken by themselves, form a fully completed whole, that the line לעוקה וגו' is the beginning of a numerical proverb, the end of which is wanting. We acknowledge, because of the obscurity—not possibly aimed at by the author himself—in which the two daughters remain, the fragmentary characters of the proverb of the 'Alûka; Stuart also does this, for he regards it as brought out of a connection in which it was intelligible,—but we believe that the line שלוש וגו'

<sup>1</sup> So says e.g. Salomo ha-Babli, in a *Zulath* of the first *Chanukka-Sablats* (beginning חֵלֶף צוֹר הַלֵּף : יִקְרָו בְּהִבְהָבֵי עֵלֶף, they burn like the flames of hell.

is an original formal part of this proverb. For the proverb forming, according to Mühlau's judgment, a whole rounded off:

שְׁלוֹשׁ הֵנָּה לֹא תִשְׁבַּענָה  
 אַרְבַּע לֹא אָמְרוּ הֵן:  
 שָׁאוֹל וְעֶצֶר רַחֵם  
 אֶרֶץ לֹא שִׁבְעָה מַיִם  
 וְאֵשׁ לֹא אָמְרָה הֵן:

contains a mark which makes the original combination of these five lines improbable. Always where the third is exceeded by the fourth, the step from the third to the fourth is taken by the connecting *Van*: ver. 18, וְאַרְבַּע; 21, וְיַחַת אַרְבַּע; 29, וְאַרְבַּעָה. We therefore conclude that אַרְבַּע לֹא וְ is the original commencement of independent proverb. This proverb is:

Four things say not: Enough!  
 The under-world and the closing of the womb [*i.e.* unfruitful womb]—  
 The earth is not satisfied with water,  
 And the fire says not: Enough!

a tetrastich more acceptable and appropriate than the Arab. proverb (Freytag, *Provv.* iii. p. 61, No. 347): "three things are not satisfied by three: the womb, and wood by fire, and the earth by rain;" and, on the other hand, it is remarkable to find it thus clothed in the Indian language,<sup>1</sup> as given in the *Hitopadesa* (p. 67 of Lassen's ed.), and in *Pantschatantra*, i. 153 (ed. of Kosegarten):

*nâgnis tryjati kâshṭhânân nâpagânân mahôdadhih  
 nântakah sarvabhûtânân na puṁsân vûmalocânâh.*

Fire is not sated with wood, nor the ocean with the streams,  
 Nor death with all the living, nor the beautiful-eyed with men.

As in the proverb of Agur the 4 falls into 2 + 2, so also in this Indian *sloka*. In both, fire and the realm of death (*ântaka* is death as the personified "end-maker") correspond; and as there the

<sup>1</sup> That not only natural productions, but also ideas and literary productions (words, proverbs, knowledge), were conveyed from the Indians to the Semites, and from the Semites to the Indians, on the great highways by sea and land, is a fact abundantly verified. There is not in this, however, any means of determining the situation of Massa.

womb and the earth, so here *feminarium cupiditas* and the ocean. The parallelizing of ארץ and רחם is after passages such as Ps. cxxxix. 15, Job i. 21 (cf. also Prov. v. 16; Num. xxiv. 7; Isa. xlviii. 1); that of שאל and איש is to be judged of<sup>1</sup> after passages such as Deut. xxxii. 22, Isa. lvi. 24. That לא אמרו הן repeats itself in לא אמרה הן is now, as we render the proverb independently, much more satisfactory than if it began with 'שלוש וגו': it rounds itself off, for the end returns into the beginning. Regarding הן, *vid.* i. 13. From הן, to be light, it signifies living lightly; ease, superabundance, in that which renders life light or easy. "Used accusatively, and as an exclamation, it is equivalent to plenty! enough! It is used in the same sense in the North African Arab. *brrakat* (spreading out, fulness). Wetzstein remarks that in Damascus *lahôn*, *i.e.* hitherto, is used in the sense of *hajah*, enough; and that, accordingly, we may attempt to explain הן of our [Heb.] language in the sense of (Arab.) *hawn haddah*, *i.e.* here the end of it!" (Mühlau.)

But what do we now make of the two remaining lines of the proverb of the 'Alûka? The proverb also in this division of two lines is a fragment. Ewald completes it, for to the one line, of which, according to his view, the fragment consists, he adds two:

The bloodsucker has two daughters, "Hither! hither!"

Three saying, "Hither, hither, hither the blood,

The blood of the wicked child."

A proverb of this kind may stand in the O. T. alone: it sounds as if quoted from Grimm's *Mährchen*, and is a side-piece to Zappert's *altdeutsch. Schlummerlieder*. Cannot the mutilation of the proverb be rectified in a less violent way without any self-made addition? If this is the case, that in vers. 15 and 16, which now form one proverb, there are two melted together, only the first of which lies before us in a confused form, then this phenomenon is explained by supposing that the proverb of the 'Alûka originally stood in this form:

The 'Alûka has two daughters: Give! give!—

The under-world and the closing of the womb;

There are three that are never satisfied.

Thus completed, this tristich presents itself as the original side-

<sup>1</sup> The parallelizing of רחם and שאל, *Berachoth* 15b, is not directly aimed at by the poet.

piece of the lost tetrastich, beginning with אַרְבַּע. One might suppose that if שְׂאֹל and עֵצֶר רַחֵם have to be regarded as the daughters of the 'Alûka, which Hitzig and also Zöckler have recognised, then there exists no reason for dividing the one proverb into two. Yet the taking of them as separate is necessary, for this reason, because in the fourth, into which it expands, the 'Alûka is altogether left out of account. But in the above tristich it is taken into account, as was to be expected, as the mother with her children. This, that sheol (שְׂאֹל is for the most part fem.), and the womb (רַחֵם = רָחֵם, which is fem., Jer. xx. 17) to which conception is denied, are called, on account of their greediness, the daughters of the 'Alûka, is to be understood in the same way as when a mountain height is called, Isa. v. 1, a horn of the son of oil. In the Arab., which is inexhaustibly rich in such figurative names, a man is called "a son of the clay (*limi*);" a thief, "a son of the night;" a nettle, "the daughter of fire." The under-world and a closed womb have the 'Alûka nature; they are insatiable, like the leech. It is unnecessary to interpret, as Zöckler at last does, 'Alûka as the name of a female demon, and the לִילִית, "daughters," as her companions. It may be adduced in favour of this view that לְעֹלָמָה is without the article, after the manner of a proper name. But is it really without the article? Such a doubtful case we had before us at xxvii. 23. As yet only Böttcher, § 394, has entered on this difficulty of punctuation. We compare Gen. xxix. 27, בְּעֵבֶרָה; 1 Kings xii. 32, לְעֹנָלִים; 1 Chron. xiii. 7, בְּעֹנָלָה; and consequently also Ps. cxlvi. 7, לְעֹשׂוֹקִים; thus the assimilating force of the *Chateph* appears here to have changed the syntactically required לְ and בְּ into לֵ and בִּ. But also supposing that לְעֹלָמָה in לְעֹלָמָה is treated as a proper name, this is explained from the circumstance that the leech is not meant here in the natural history sense of the word, but as embodied greediness, and is made a person, one individual being. Also the symbol of the two daughters is opposed to the mythological character of the 'Alûka. The imper. יָהּ, from יָהּ, occurs only here and at Dan. vii. 17 (= יָהּ), and in the bibl. Heb. only with the intentional יָהּ, and in inflection forms. The insatiableness of sheol (xxvii. 20a) is described by Isaiah, v. 14; and Rachel, Gen. xxx. 1, with her "Give me children,"

is an example of the greediness of the "closed-up womb" (Gen. xx. 18). The womb of a childless wife is meant, which, because she would have children, the *nuptiæ* never satisfy; or also of one who, because she does not fear to become pregnant, invites to her many men, and always burns anew with lust. "In Arab. 'aluwak means not only one fast bound to her husband, but, according to Wetzstein, in the whole of Syria and Palestine, the prostitute, as well as the κίναυδοι, are called 'ulak (plur. 'alwak), because they obtrude themselves and hold fast to their victim" (Mühlau). In the third line, the three: the leech, hell, and the shut womb, are summarized: *tria sunt quæ non satiantur*. Thus it is to be translated with Fleischer, not with Mühlau and others, *tria hæc non satiantur*. "These three" is expressed in Heb. by שְׁלֹשׁ-אֵלֶּה, Ex. xxi. 11, or שְׁלֹשֶׁת (הֵן), 2 Sam. xxi. 22; הֵנָּה (which, besides, does not signify *hæc*, but *illa*) is here, taken correctly, the pred., and represents in general the verb of being (Isa. li. 19), *vid.* at vi. 16. Zöckler finds the point of the proverb in the greediness of the unfruitful womb, and is of opinion that the poet purposely somewhat concealed this point, and gave to his proverb thereby the enhanced attraction of the ingenious. But the tetrastich וְהוֹ אֲרֻבֵּעַ shows that hell, which is compared to fire, and the unfruitful womb, to which the parched and thirsty earth is compared, were placed by the poet on one and the same line; it is otherwise with vers. 18–20, but where that point is nothing less than concealed.

The proverb of the 'Alûka is the first of the proverbs founded on the figure of an animal among the "words" of Agur. It is now followed by another of a similar character:

Ver. 17 An eye that mocketh at his father,  
And despiseth obedience to his mother:  
The ravens of the brook shall pluck it out,  
And the young eagles shall eat it.

If "an eye," and not "eyes," are spoken of here, this is accounted for by the consideration that the duality of the organ falls back against the unity of the mental activity and mental expression which it serves (cf. *Psychol.* p. 234). As haughtiness reveals itself (ver. 13) in the action of the eyes, so is the eye also the mirror of humble subordination, and also of

malicious scorn which refuses reverence and subjection to father and mother. As in German the verbs [*verspotten, spotten, höhnen, hohnsprechen*] signifying to mock at or scorn may be used with the accus., genit., or dat., so also לָעַג [to deride] and בֹּז [to despise] may be connected at pleasure with either an accusative object or a dative object. Ben-Chajim, Athias, van der Hooght, and others write תִּלְעַג; Jablonski, Michaelis, Löwenstein, תִּלְעַג; Mühlau, with Norzi, accurately, תִּלְעַג, with *Munach*, like תִּבְחַר, Ps. lxxv. 5; the writing of Ben-Asher<sup>1</sup> is תִּלְעַג, with *Gaja*, *Chateph*, and *Munach*. The punctuation of לִיקָהּ is more fluctuating. The word לִיקָהּ (*e.g.* Cod. *Jaman*.) may remain out of view, for the *Dag. dirimens* in ק stands here as firmly as at Gen. xlix. 10, cf. Ps. xlv. 10. But it is a question whether one has to write לִיקָהּ with *Yod quies*. (regarding this form of writing, preferred by Ben-Naph-tali, the *Psalmen-Comm.* under Ps. xlv. 10, in both Edd.; Luzzatto's *Gramm.* § 193; Baer's *Genesis*, p. 84, note 2; and Heidenheim's *Pentateuch*, with the text-crit. *Comm.* of Jekuthiël ha-Nakdans, under Gen. xlvii. 17, xlix. 10), as it is found in Kimchi, *Michlol* 45a, and under יָקָה, and as also Norzi requires, or לִיקָהּ (as *e.g.* Cod. Erfurt 1), which appears to be the form adopted by Ben-Asher, for it is attested<sup>2</sup> as such by Jekuthiël under Gen. xlix. 10, and also expressly as such by an old Masora-Cod. of the Erfurt Library. Löwenstein translates, "the weakness of the mother." Thus after Rashi, who refers the word to קָהָה, to draw together, and explains it, Gen. xlix. 10, "collection;" but in the passage before us, understands it of the wrinkles on the countenance of the aged mother. Nachmani (Ramban) goes still further, giving to the word, at Gen. xlix. 10, everywhere the meaning of weakness and frailty. Aben Ezra also, and Gersuni (Ralbag), do not go beyond the meaning of a drawing together; and the LXX., with the

<sup>1</sup> The *Gaja* has its reason in the *Zinnor* that follows, and the *Munach* in the syllable beginning with a moveable *Sheva*; תִּלְעַג with *Scheva quiesc.* must, according to rule, receive *Mercha*, vid. *Thorath Emeth*, p. 26.

<sup>2</sup> Kimchi is here no authority, for he contradicts himself regarding such word-forms. Thus, regarding וִילָלָה, Jer. xxv. 36, in *Michlol* 87b, and under וִלָּל. The form also wavers between בִּיתְרוֹן and בִּיתְרוֹן, Eccles. ii. 13. The Cod. *Jaman*. has here the *Jod* always *quiesc.*

Aram., who all translate the word by *senectus*, have also קָהָה in the sense of to become dull, infirm (certainly not the Æthiopic *leh'ka*, to become old, weak through old age). But Kimchi, whom the *Venet.* and Luther<sup>1</sup> follow, is informed by Abulwalid, skilled in the Arab., of a better: יִקְהָה (or יִקְהָה, cf. נִצְרָה, Ps. cxli. 3) is the Arab. *wakhat*, obedience (*vid.* above יִקְהָה, under 1a). If now it is said of such a haughty, insolent eye, that the ravens of the brook (cf. 1 Kings xvii. 4) will pluck it out, and the בְּנֵי-נֶשֶׁךְ eat it, they, the eagle's children, the unchild-like human eye: it is only the description of the fate that is before such an one, to die a violent death, and to become a prey to the fowls of heaven (cf. *e.g.* Jer. xvi. 3 f., and Passow's *Lex.* under κόραξ); and if this threatening is not always thus literally fulfilled, yet one has not on that account to render the future optatively, with Hitzig; this is a false conclusion, from a too literal interpretation, for the threatening is only to be understood after its spirit, viz. that a fearful and a dishonourable end will come to such an one. Instead of יִקְרֶה, as Mühlau reads from the Leipzig Cod., יִקְרֶה, with *Mercha* (Athias and Nissel have it with *Tarcha*), is to be read, for a word between *Olewejored* and *Athnach* must always contain a conjunctive accent (*Thorath Emeth*, p. 51; *Accentuationssystem*, xviii. § 9). עֲרִבֵי-נֶחֱלַל is also irregular, and instead of it עֲרִבֵי-נֶחֱלַל is to be written, for the reason given above under ver. 16 (פְּיִים).

The following proverb, again a numerical proverb, begins with the eagle, mentioned in the last line of the foregoing:

- Ver. 18 Three things lie beyond me,  
And four I understand not:  
19 The way of the eagle in the heavens,  
The way of a serpent over a rock,  
The way of a ship on the high sea,  
And the way of a man with a maid.  
20 Thus is the way of the adulterous woman:  
She eateth and wipeth her mouth, and saith:  
I have done no iniquity.

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<sup>1</sup> Jerome translates, *et qui despicit partum matris suæ*. To *partus* there separates itself to him here the signification *expectatio*, Gen. xlix. 10, resting on a false combination with קָוָה. To think of *pareo, parui, paritum* (Mühlau), was not yet granted to him.

נִפְלְאוֹ מִמּוֹנֵי, as relative clause, like 15*b* (where Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion rightly : *τρία δέ ἐστὶν ἃ οὐ πλησθήσεται*), is joined to שְׁלֹשָׁה הַמָּוֶה. On the other hand, אַרְבַּע (*τέσσαρα*, for which the *Kerî*, conforming to 18*a*, אַרְבַּעָה, *τέσσαρας*) has to be interpreted as object. accus. The introduction of four things that are not known is in expressions like Job xlii. 3; cf. Ps. cxxxix. 6. The turning-point lies in the fourth; to that point the other three expressions gravitate, which have not an object in themselves, but are only as *folie* to the fourth. The articles wanting after הַנִּצָּנִת: they would be only the marks of the gender, and are therefore unnecessary; cf. under xxix. 2. And while בְּשָׁמַיִם, in the heavens, and בְּלִבְיָם, in the sea, are the expressions used, עַל יֶזַע is used for on the rock, because here "on" is not at the same time "in," "within," as the eagle cleaves the air and the ship the waves. For this same reason the expression, "the way of a man בְּעֶלְמָה," is not to be understood of love unsought, suddenly taking possession of and captivating a man toward this or that maid, so that the principal thought of the proverb may be compared to the saying, "marriages are made in heaven;" but, as in *Kidduschin* 2*b*, with reference to this passage, is said *coitus via appellatur*. The כּ refers to *copula carnalis*. But in what respect did his understanding not reach to this? "Wonderful," thus Hitzig explains as the best interpreter of this opinion elsewhere (cf. *Psychol.* p. 115) propounded, "appeared to him the flying, and that how a large and thus heavy bird could raise itself so high in the air (Job xxxix. 27); then how, over the smooth rock, which offers no hold, the serpent pushes itself along; finally, how the ship on the trackless waves, which present nothing to the eye as a guide, nevertheless finds its way. These three things have at the same time this in common, that they leave no trace of their pathway behind them. But of the fourth way that cannot be said; for the trace is left on the *substrat*, which the man יִרְרָה, and it becomes manifest, possibly as pregnancy, keeping out of view that the עֶלְמָה may yet be בתולה. That which is wonderful is consequently only the coition itself, its mystical act and its incomprehensible consequences." But does not this interpretation carry in itself its own refutation? To the three wonderful ways which leave no traces behind them, there

cannot be compared a fourth, the consequences of which are not only not trackless, but, on the contrary, become manifest as proceeding from the act in an incomprehensible way. The point of comparison is either the wonderfulness of the event or the tracklessness of its consequences. But now "the way of a man בתולה" is altogether inappropriate to designate the wonderful event of the origin of a human being. How altogether differently the *Chokma* expresses itself on this matter is seen from Job x. 8-12; Eccles. xi. 5 (cf. *Psychol.* p. 210). That "way of a man with a maid" denotes only the act of coition, which physiologically differs in nothing from that of the lower animals, and which in itself, in the externality of its accomplishment, the poet cannot possibly call something transcendent. And why did he use the word בעלמה, and not rather בְּנִקְבָּה [with a female] or בְּאִשָּׁה [*id.*]? For this reason, because he meant the act of coition, not as a physiological event, but as a historical occurrence, as it takes place particularly in youth as the goal of love, not always reached in the divinely-appointed way. The point of comparison hence is not the secret of conception, but the tracelessness of the carnal intercourse. Now it is also clear why the way of the serpent עַל צִוְר was in his eye: among grass, and still more in sand, the trace of the serpent's path would perhaps be visible, but not on a hard stone, over which it has glided. And it is clear why it is said of the ship בְּלִבַּיִם [in the heart of the sea]: while the ship is still in sight from the land, one knows the track it follows; but who can in the heart of the sea, *i.e.* on the high sea, say that here or there a ship has ploughed the water, since the water-furrows have long ago disappeared? Looking to the heavens, one cannot say that an eagle has passed there; to the rock, that a serpent has wound its way over it; to the high sea, that a ship has been steered through it; to the maid, that a man has had carnal intercourse with her. That the fact might appear on nearer investigation, although this will not always guide to a certain conclusion, is not kept in view; only the outward appearance is spoken of, the intentional concealment (Rashi) being in this case added thereto. Sins against the sixth [=the seventh] commandment remain concealed from human knowledge, and are distinguished from others by this, that they shun human cognition (as the proverb

says: *אין אפֿיטרוּפּוס לעריות*, there is for sins of the flesh no *ἐπιτροπος*)—unchastity can mask itself, the marks of chastity are deceitful, here only the All-seeing Eye (*עין רֹאֶה כָּל*, *Aboth* ii. 1) perceives that which is done. Yet it is not maintained that “the way of a man with a maid” refers exclusively to external intercourse; but altogether on this side the proverb gains ethical significance. Regarding *עֲלָמָה* (from *עַלֵּם*, *pubes esse et cœundi cupidus*, not from *עַלֵּם*, to conceal, and not, as Schultens derives it, from *עַלֵּם*, *signare*, to seal) as distinguished from *בְּתוּלָה*, *vid.* under *Isa. vii. 14*. The mark of maidenhood belongs to *עֲלָמָה* not in the same way as to *בְּתוּלָה* (cf. *Gen. xxiv. 43* with 16), but only the marks of puberty and youth; the wife *אִשָּׁה* (viz. *אִשָּׁת אִישׁ*) cannot as such be called *עֲלָמָה*. Ralbag's gloss *עֲלָמָה שֶׁהִיא בְּעוֹלָה* is incorrect, and in Arama's explanation (*Akeda*, Abschn. 9): the time is not to be determined when the sexual love of the husband to his wife flames out, ought to have been *וְדָרַךְ אִישׁ בְּאִשְׁתּוֹ*. One has therefore to suppose that ver. 20 explains what is meant by “the way of a man with a maid” by a strong example (for “the adulterous woman” can mean only an old adulteress), there not inclusive, for the tracklessness of sins of the flesh in their consequences.

This 20th verse does not appear to have been an original part of the numerical proverb, but is an appendix thereto (Hitzig). If we assume that *בֵּן* points forwards: thus as follows is it with the . . . (Fleischer), then we should hold this verse as an independent cognate proverb; but where is there a proverb (except *xi. 19*) that begins with *בֵּן*? *בֵּן*, which may mean *eodem modo* (for one does not say *בֵּן נִם*) as well as *eo modo*, here points backwards in the former sense. Instead of *וּמַחֲתֶהָ* (*פִּיהָ*; not *פִּיהָ*; for the attraction of that which follows, brought about by the retrogression of the tone of the first word, requires dageshing, *Thorath Emeth*, p. 30) the LXX. has merely *ἀπονιψαμένη*, i.e. as Immanuel explains: *מְקַנְחָה עַצְמָה*, *abstergens semet ipsam*, with Grotius, who to *tergens os suum* adds the remark: *σεμνολογία* (*honesta elocutio*). But eating is just a figure, like the “secret bread,” *ix. 17*, and the wiping of the mouth belongs to this figure. This appendix, with its *בֵּן*, confirms it, that the intention of the four ways refers to the tracklessness of the consequences.

It is now not at all necessary to rack one's brains over the grounds or the reasons of the arrangement of the following proverb (*vid.* Hitzig). There are, up to this point, two numerical proverbs which begin with שְׁתֵּים, ver. 7, and שְׁתֵּי, ver. 15; after the cipher 2 there then, ver. 18, followed the cipher 3, which is now here continued:

- Ver. 21 Under three things doth the earth tremble,  
 And under four can it not stand :  
 22 Under a servant when he becomes king,  
 And a profligate when he has bread enough ;  
 23 Under an unloved woman when she is married,  
 And a maid-servant when she becomes heiress to her  
 mistress.

We cannot say here that the 4 falls into  $3 + 1$ ; but the four consists of four ones standing beside one another. אָרְץ is here without pausal change, although the *Athnach* here, as at ver. 24, where the modification of sound occurs, divides the verse into two; מְאֹרֶץ, 14*b* (cf. Ps. xxxv. 2), remains, on the other hand, correctly unchanged. The "earth" stands here, as frequently, instead of the inhabitants of the earth. It trembles when one of the four persons named above comes and gains free space for acting; it feels itself oppressed as by an insufferable burden (an expression similar to Amos vii. 10);—the arrangement of society is shattered; an oppressive closeness of the air, as it were, settles over all minds. The first case is already designated, xix. 10, as improper: under a slave, when he comes to reign (*quum rex fit*); for suppose that such an one has reached the place of government, not by the murder of the king and by the robbery of the crown, but, as is possible in an elective monarchy, by means of the dominant party of the people, he will, as a rule, seek to indemnify himself in his present highness for his former lowliness, and in the measure of his rule show himself unable to rise above his servile habits, and to pass out of the limited circle of his earlier state. The second case is this: a נָבֵל, one whose mind is perverted and whose conduct is profligate,—in short, a low man (*vid.* xvii. 17), —יִשְׂבַּע-לֶחֶם (cf. *Metheg-Setzung*, § 28), *i.e.* has enough to eat (cf. to the expression xxviii. 19, Jer. xlv. 17); for this undeserved living without care and without want makes him only so much

the more arrogant, and troublesome, and dangerous. The שְׁנוּאָה, in the second case, is not thought of as a spouse, and that, as in supposed polygamy, Gen. xxix. 31, Deut. xxi. 15–17, as fallen into disfavour, but who again comes to favour and honour (Dathe, Rosenmüller); for she can be שְׁנוּאָה without her own fault, and as such she is yet no גְּרוּשָׁה; and it is not to be perceived why the re-assumption of such an one should shatter social order. Rightly Hitzig, and, after his example, Zöckler: an unmarried lady, an old spinster, is meant, whom no one desired because she had nothing attractive, and was only repulsive (cf. Grimm, under Sir. vii. 26b). If such an one, as בִּי תִבְעַל says, at length, however, finds her husband and enters into the married relation, then she carries her head so much the higher; for she gives vent to ill-humour, strengthened by long restraint, against her subordinates; then she richly requites her earlier and happily married companions for their depreciation of her, among whom she had to suffer, as able to find no one who would love her. In the last case it is asked whether בִּי־תִירַשׁ is meant of inheriting as an heiress (Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, the Targ., Jerome, the *Venet.*, and Luther), or supplanting (Euchel, Gesenius, Hitzig), *i.e.* an entering into the inheritance of the dead, or an entering into the place of a living mistress. Since יִרַשׁ, with the accus. of the person, Gen. xv. 3, 4, signifies to be the heir of one, and only with the accus. of peoples and lands signifies, “to take into possession (to seize) by supplanting,” the former is to be preferred; the LXX. (Syr.), *ὅταν ἐκβάλῃ*, appear to have read בִּי־תִירַשׁ. This תִּירַשׁ would certainly be, after Gen. xxi. 10, a piece of the world turned upside down; but also the entering, as heiress, into the inheritance, makes the maid-servant the reverse of that which she was before, and brings with it the danger that the heiress, notwithstanding her want of culture and dignity, demean herself also as heiress of the rank. Although the old Israelitish law knew only intestate succession to an inheritance, yet there also the case might arise, that where there were no natural or legal heirs, the bequest of a wife of rank passed over to her servants and nurses.

Vers. 24–28. Another proverb with the cipher 4, its first line terminating in אַרְבָּן:

- Ver. 24 Four are the little things of the earth,  
 And yet they are quick of wit—wise :  
 25 The ants—a people not strong,  
 And yet they prepare in summer their food ;  
 26 Conies—a people not mighty,  
 And yet set their dwelling on the rocks ;  
 27 No king have the locusts,  
 And yet they go forth in rank and file, all of them together ;  
 28 The lizard thou canst catch with the hands,  
 And yet it is in the king's palaces.

By the disjunctive accent, אַרְבַּעַה, in spite of the following word toned on the beginning, retains its *ultima*-toning, 18*a*; but here, by the conjunctive accent, the tone retrogrades to the *penult.*, which does not elsewhere occur with this word. The connection קְטַנֵּי-אֶרֶץ is not superlat. (for it is impossible that the author could reckon the שְׂפָנִים, conies, among the smallest of beasts), but, as in the expression נִכְבְּדֵי-אֶרֶץ, the honoured of the earth, Isa. xxiii. 8. In 24*b*, the LXX., Syr., Jerome, and Luther see in מ the comparative: σοφώτερα τῶν σοφῶν (מַחֲכָמִים), but in this connection of words it could only be partitive (wise, reckoning among the wise); the *part. Pual* מַחֲכָמִים (Theodotion, the *Venet.* σεσοφισμένα) was in use after Ps. lviii. 6, and signified, like בִּשְׁל מִבֶּשֶׂל, Ex. xii. 9, boiled well; thus חֲכָמִים מִחֲכָמִים, taught wit, wise, cunning, prudent (cf. Ps. lxiv. 7, a planned plan = a cunningly wrought out plan; Isa. xxviii. 16, and Vitranga thereto: grounded = firm, grounding), Ewald, § 313*c*. The reckoning moves in the contrasts of littleness to power, and of greatness to prudence. The unfolding of the אַרְבַּעַה [four] begins with the הַנְּמָלִים [the ants] and שְׂפָנִים [conies], subject conceptions with apposit. joined; 26*a*, at least in the indetermina-tion of the subject, cannot be a declaration. Regarding the *fut. consec.* as the expression, not of a causal, but of a contrasted connection, *vid.* Ewald, § 342, 1*a*. The ants are called עָם, and they deserve this name, for they truly form communities with well-ordered economy; but, besides, the ancients took delight in speaking of the various classes of animals as peoples and states.<sup>1</sup> That which is said, 25*b*, as also vi. 8, is not to be understood of stores laid up for the winter. For the ants are torpid for the most part in winter; but certainly the summer is their time

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Walter von der Vogelweide, edited by Lachmann, p. 8 f.

fer labour, when the labourers gather together food, and feed in a truly motherly way the helpless.  $\text{יְעוֹשׁ}$ , translated arbitrarily in the *Venet.* by  $\epsilon\chi\hat{\iota}\nu\omicron\iota$ , in the LXX. by  $\chi\omicron\iota\rho\omicron\gamma\rho\acute{\upsilon}\lambda\lambda\iota\omicron\iota$ , by the Syr. and Targ. here and at Ps. civ. by  $\text{ܕܝܬܐ}$ , and by Jerome by *lepusculus* (cf.  $\lambda\alpha\gamma\acute{\iota}\delta\iota\omicron\nu$ ), both of which names, here to be understood after a prevailing Jewish opinion, denote the *Caninichen*<sup>1</sup> (Luther), Latin *cuniculus* ( $\kappa\acute{\omicron}\nu\iota\kappa\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ ), is not the *kaninchen* [rabbit], nor the marmot,  $\chi\omicron\iota\rho\omicron\gamma\rho\acute{\upsilon}\lambda\lambda\iota\omicron\varsigma$  (C. B. Michaelis, Ziegler, and others); this is called in Arab. *yarbuw'*; but  $\text{יְעוֹשׁ}$  is the *wabr*, which in South Arab. is called *thufun*, or rather *thafan*, viz. the *klippdachs* (*hyrax syriacus*), like the marmot, which lives in societies and dwells in the clefts of the mountains, e.g. at the Kedron, the Dead Sea, and at Sinai (vid. Knobel on Lev. xi. 5; cf. Brehm's *Thierleben*, ii. p. 721 ff., the *Illustrierte Zeitung*, 1868, Nr. 1290). The *klippdachs* are a weak little people, and yet with their weakness they unite the wisdom that they establish themselves among the rocks. The ants show their wisdom in the organization of labour, here in the arranging of inaccessible dwellings.

Ver. 27. Thirdly, the locusts belong to the class of the wise little folk: these have no king, but notwithstanding that, there is not wanting to them guidance; by the power and foresight of one sovereign will they march out as a body,  $\text{יִצְחָק}$ , dividing, viz. themselves, not the booty (Schultens); thus: dividing themselves into companies, *ordine dispositæ*, from  $\text{יָצַק}$ , to divide, to fall into two (cogn.  $\text{יָצַק}$ , e.g. Gen. xxxii. 7) or more parts; Mühlau, p. 59–64, has thoroughly investigated this whole wide range of roots. What this  $\text{יִצְחָק}$  denotes is described in Joel ii. 7: "Like mighty men they hunt; like men of war they climb the walls; they march forward every one on his appointed way, and change not their paths." Jerome narrates from his own observation: *tanto ordine ex dispositione jubentis* (LXX. at this passage before us:  $\alpha\phi' \epsilon\nu\delta\varsigma \kappa\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\nu\sigma\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma \epsilon\nu\tau\acute{\alpha}\kappa\tau\omega\varsigma$ ) *volitant, ut instar tesserularum, quæ in pavimentis artificis figuntur manu,*

<sup>1</sup> The *kaninchen* as well as the *klippdachs* [cliff-badgers] may be meant, Lev. xi. 5 (Deut. xiv. 7); neither of these belong to the *bisulca*, nor yet, it is true, to the ruminants, though to the ancients (as was the case also with hares) they seemed to do. The *klippdach* is still, in Egypt and Syria, regarded as unclean.

*suum locum teneant et ne puncto quidem et ut ita dicam ungue transverso declinent ad alterum.* Aben Ezra and others find in חֲצִץ the idea of gathering together in a body, and in troops, according to which also the Syr., Targ., Jerome, and Luther translate; Kimchi and Meîri gloss חֲצִץ by חוּתֶךָ and בּוֹרֶת, and understand it of the cutting off, *i.e.* the eating up, of plants and trees, which the *Venet.* renders by ἐκτέμνουσα.

Ver. 28. In this verse the expression wavers in a way that is with difficulty determinable between שְׂמָמִית and שְׂמָמִית. The Edd. of Opitz Jablonski and Van der Hooght have 'שִׁמ', but the most, from the Venetian 1521 to Nissel, have 'שִׁמ' (*vid* Mühlaus, p. 69). The Codd. also differ as to the reading of the word; thus the Codd. Erfurt 2 and 3 have 'שִׁמ', but Cod. 1294 has 'שִׁמ'. Isaak Tschelebi and Moses Algazi, in their writings regarding words with ש and ש (Constant. 1723 and 1799), prefer 'שִׁמ', and so also do Mordecai Nathan in his *Concordance* (1563-4), David de Pomis (1587), and Norzi. An important evidence is the writing סַמְמִית, *Schabbath* 77b, but it is as little decisive as כְּרִיּוֹן [coat of mail], used by Jeremiah [xlvi. 4], is decisive against the older expression שְׂרִיּוֹן. But what kind of a beast is meant here is a question. The swallow is at once to be set aside, as the *Venet.* translates (χελιδών) after Kimchi, who explains after Abulwalîd, but not without including himself, that the Heb. word for (Arab.) *khuttaf* (which is still the name given to the swallow from its quickness of motion), according to Haja's testimony, is much rather סַנּוּנִית, a name for the swallow; which also the Arab. (Freytag, ii. p. 368) and the modern Syriac confirm; besides, in old Heb. it has the name of סוּס or סִים (from Arab. *shash*, to fly confusedly hither and thither). In like manner the ape (Aben Ezra, Meîri, Immanuel) is to be set aside, for this is called קוּפָּה (Indian *kapi*, *kap*, *kamp*, to move inconstantly and quickly up and down),<sup>1</sup> and appears here admissible only on the ground that from בִּירִים תִּתְפֹּשׁ they read that the beast had a resemblance to man. There remains now only the lizard (LXX. Jerome) and the spider (Luther) to be considered. The Talmud, *Schabbath* 77b, reckons five instances in which fear of the weaker pursues the stronger: one of these instances is אֵימַת סַנּוּנִית עַל הַנֶּשֶׁר, another

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* A. Weber's *Indische Studien*, i. pp. 217, 343.

אֵימָת כַּמְמִית עַל הָעֶקֶר. The swallow, thus Rashi explains, creeps under the wings of the eagle and hinders it from spreading them out in its flight; and the spider (*araigne*) creeps into the ear of the scorpion; or also: a bruised spider applied heals the scorpion's sting. A second time the word occurs, *Sanhedrin* 103b, where it is said of King Amon that he burnt the Tôra, and that over the altar came a שַׁמְמִית (here with ש), which Rashi explains of the spider (a spider's web). But Aruch testifies that in these two places of the Talmud the explanation is divided between *ragnatelo* (spider) and (Ital.) *lucërta* (lizard). For the latter, he refers to Lev. xi. 30, where לְמָאָה (also explained by Rashi by *lézard*) in the Jerus. Targ. is rendered<sup>1</sup> by שַׁמְמִיתָא (the writing here also varies between ש and ש or ס). Accordingly, and after the LXX. and Jerome, it may be regarded as a confirmed tradition that שַׁמְמִית means not the spider, for which the name עֶקְבִּיִּשׁ is coined, but the lizard, and particularly the stellion (spotted lizard). Thus the later language used it as a word still living (plur. סַמְמִיּוֹת, *Sifre*, under Deut. xxxiii. 19). The Arab. also confirms this name as applicable to the lizard.<sup>2</sup> "To this day in Syria and in the Desert it is called *samawiyyat*, probably not from poison, but from *samawah* = שַׁמְמָה, the wilderness, because the beast is found only in the stony heaps of the *Kharab*" (Mühlau after Wetzstein). If this derivation is correct, then שַׁמְמִית is to be regarded as an original Heb. expression; but the lizard's name, *samm*, which, without doubt, designates the animal as poisonous (cf. סַם, *samam*, *samm*, vapour, poisonous breath, poison), favours Schultens' view: שַׁמְמִית = (Arab.) *samamyat*, *aflatu interficiens*, or generally *venenosa*. In the expression בִּידֵי־תֶהֱפֵשׁ, Schultens, Gesenius, Ewald, Hitzig, Geier, and others, understand יָדִים of the two fore-feet of the lizard: "the lizard feels (or: seizes) with its two hands;" but granting that יָדִים is used of the fifteen feet of the *stellio*, or of the climbing feet of any other animal (LXX. *καλα-*

<sup>1</sup> The Samaritan has, Lev. xi. 30, שַׁמְמִית, אֵנֶקָה, and the Syr. translates the latter word by אַמְקָתָא, which is used in the passage before us (cf. Geiger's *Urschrift*, p. 68 f.) for שַׁמְמִית; *omakto* (Targ. *akmetha*) appears there to mean, not a spider, but a lizard.

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps also the modern Greek, *σαμιάμινθος* (*σαμιάμιδος*, *σαμιαμίδιον*), which Grotius compares.

βώτης = ἀσκαλαβώτης), yet it is opposed by this explanation, that in line first of this fourth distich an expression regarding the smallness or the weakness of the beast is to be expected, as at 25*a*, 26*a*, and 27*a*. And since, besides, תפש with ביד or בכף always means “to catch” or “seize” (Ezek. xxi. 16, xxix. 7; Jer. xxxviii. 23), so the sense according to that explanation is: the lizard thou canst catch with the hand, and yet it is in kings’ palaces, *i.e.* it is a little beast, which one can grasp with his hand, and yet it knows how to gain an entrance into palaces, by which in its nimbleness and cunning this is to be thought of, that it can scale the walls even to the summit (Aristoph. *Nubes* 170). To read תפש with Mühlau, after Böttcher, recommends itself by this, that in תפש one misses the suff. pointing back (תפשנך); also why the intensive of תפש is used, is not rightly comprehended. Besides, the address makes the expression more animated; cf. Isa. vii. 25, תבוא. In the LXX. as it lies before us, the two explanations spoken of are mingled together: καὶ καλαβώτης (= ἀσκαλαβώτης) χερσὶν ἐρειδόμενος καὶ εὐάλωτος ὢν . . . This εὐάλωτος ὢν (Symmachus, χερσὶν ἐλλαμβανόμενος) hits the sense of 28*a*. In מלך, הַיְכָלִי מִלְךְ is not the genit. of possession, as at Ps. xlv. 9, but of description (Hitzig), as at Amos vii. 13.

Vers. 29-31. Another numerical proverb with the cipher  $4 = 3 + 1$ :

- Three things are of stately walk,  
And four of stately going:  
30 The lion, the hero among beasts,  
And that turneth back before nothing;  
31 The swift-loined, also the goat;  
And a king with whom is the calling out of the host.

Regarding הַיְכָלִי with inf. following (the segolated *n. actionis* יַעֲזֵב is of equal force with an inf.), *vid.* under xv. 2.<sup>1</sup> The relation of the members of the sentence in 30*a* is like that in 25*a* and 26*a*: subj. and apposit., which there, as here, is continued in a verbal clause which appears to us as relative. It deserves to be here remarked that לֵיץ, as the name for a

<sup>1</sup> In 29*a*, after Norzi, מִיְטִיבִי, and in 29*b*, מִיְטִבִי, is to be written, and this is required by the little Masora to 1 Sam. xxv. 31, the great, to Ezek. xxxiii. 33, and also the Erfurt little Masora to the passage before us.

lion, occurs only here and at Job iv. 11, and in the description of the Sinai wilderness, Isa. xxx. 6; in Arab. it is *layth*, Aram. לַיִת, and belongs to the Arameo-Arab. dialect of this language; the LXX. and Syr. translate it "the young lion;" the Venet. excellently, by the epic λῶς. בְּפֶהֱמָה has the article only to denote the genus, viz. of the beasts, and particularly the four-footed beasts. What is said in 30*b* (cf. with the expression, Job xxxix. 22) is described in Isa. xxx. 4. The two other beasts which distinguish themselves by their stately going are in 31*a* only briefly named. But we are not in the condition of the readers of this Book of Proverbs, who needed only to hear the designation זָרְזִיר מְתַנִּים at once to know what beast was meant. Certainly זָרְזִיר, as the name for a beast, is not altogether unknown in the post-bibl. Heb. "In the days of Rabbi Chija (the great teacher who came from Babylon to the Academy of Sepphoris), as is narrated in *Bereschith rabba*, sect. 65, a *zarzir* flew to the land of Israel, and it was brought to him with the question whether it were eatable. Go, said he, place it on the roof! Then came an Egyptian raven and lighted down beside it. See, said Chija, it is unclean, for it belongs to the genus of the ravens, which is unclean (Lev. xi. 15). From this circumstance there arose the proverb: The raven goes to the *zarzir* because it belongs to his own tribe."<sup>1</sup> Also the *Jer. Rosch ha-schane*, Halacha 3: "It is the manner of the world that one seeks to assist his *zarzir*, and another his *zarzir*, to obtain the victory;" and *Midrash Echa* v. 1, according to which it is the custom of the world, that one who has a large and a little *zarzir* in his house, is wont to treat the little one sparingly, so that in the case of the large one being killed, he might not need to buy another. According to this, the *zarzir* is a pugnacious animal, which also the proverb *Bereschith rabba*, c. 75, confirms: two *zarzir* do not sleep on one board; and one makes use of his for contests like cock-fights. According to this, the זָרְזִיר is a bird, and that of the species of the raven; after Rashi, the *étourneau*, the starling, which is confirmed by the Arab. *zurzur* (vulgar Arab.

<sup>1</sup> This "like draws to like" in the form: "not in vain goes the raven to the *zarzir*, it belongs just to its own tribe," came to be often employed, *Chullin* 65*a*, *Baba Kamma* 92*b*. Plantavitius has it, Tendlau more at large, *Sprichwörter*, u.s.w., Nr. 577.

*zarzur*), the common name of starlings (cf. Syr. *zarzizo*, under *zrz* of Castelli). But for the passage before us, we cannot regard this as important, for why is the starling fully named זָרִיר מִתְנִים? To this question Kimchi has already remarked that he knows no answer for it. Only, perhaps, the grave magpie (*corvus pica*), strutting with up-raised tail, might be called *succinctus lumbos*, if מִתְנִים can at all be used here of a bird. At the earliest, this might possibly be used of a cock, which the later Heb. named directly נָבֵר, because of its manly demeanour; most old translators so understand it. The LXX. translates, omitting the loins, by ἀλέκτωρ ἐμπεριπατῶν θηλείαις εὐψυχος, according to which the Syr. and Targ.: like the cock which struts about proudly among the hens;<sup>1</sup> Aquila and Theodotion: ἀλέκτωρ (ἀλεκτρῶν) νώτου; the Quinta: ἀλέκτωρ ὀσφύος; Jerome: *gallus succinctus lumbos*. *Sarsar* (not *sirsir*, as Hitzig vocalizes) is in Arab. a name for a cock, from *sarsara*, to crow, an *onomatopœia*. But the Heb. זָרִיר, as the name of a bird, signifies, as the Talmud proves on the ground of that history, not a cock, but a bird of the raven order, whether a starling, a crow, or a magpie. And if this name of a *corvinus* is formed from the *onomatopœia* זָרִיר, the weaker form of that (Arab.) *sarsar*, then מִתְנִים, which, for זָרִיר, requires the verbal root זָרַן, to girdle, is not wholly appropriate; and how strangely would the three animals be mingled together, if between לֵישׁ and תֵּישׁ, the two four-footed animals, a bird were placed! If, as is to be expected, the “*Lendenumgürtete*” [the one girded about the loins = זָרִיר מִתְנִים] be a four-footed animal, then it lies near, with C. B. Michaelis and Ziegler, after Ludolf’s<sup>2</sup> example, to

<sup>1</sup> Regarding the Targum Text, *vid.* Levy under אֶפְכָּא and זָרִיָּל. The expression דְּמִנְדָּרֵן (who is girded, and shows himself as such) is not unsuitable.

<sup>2</sup> Ludolf gave, in his *Hist. Æthiop.* i. 10, and *Commentarius*, p. 150, only a description of the *Zecora*, without combining therewith זָרִיר; but *vid.* Joh. Dietr. Winckler’s *Theol. u. Philol. Abhand.* i. (1755) p. 33 ff.: “A nearer explanation of what is to be understood by זָרִיר מִתְנִים, Prov. xxx. 31, along with a statement from a hitherto unpublished correspondence between the learned philologists Hiob Ludolf and Matthai Leydecker, a Reformed preacher in Batavia.” With Ludolf, Joh. Simonis also, in the *Arcanum Formarum* (1735), p. 687 sq., decides in favour of the zebra.

think of the zebra, the South African wild ass. But this animal lay beyond the sphere of the author's observation, and perhaps also of his knowledge, and at the same time of that of the Israelitish readers of this Book of Proverbs; and the dark-brown cross stripes on a white ground, by which the zebra is distinguished, extend not merely to its limbs, but over the whole body, and particularly over the front of the body. It would be more tenable to think of the leopard, with its black round spots, or the tiger, with dark stripes; but the name **זריר מתנים** scarcely refers to the colour of the hair, since one has to understand it after the Aram. **שָׁנִים מִתְּנִי = זָרוּ תְּרִיעָה**, 1 Kings xviii. 46, or **אָזַר הַלְּצִי**, Job xxxviii. 3, and thus of an activity, i.e. strength and swiftness, depending on the condition of the loins. Those who, with Kimchi, think that the **נִמֵּר** [leopard] is thus named, ground their view, not on this, that it has rings or stripes round its legs, but on this, that it **רק מתנים וחוק במתניו**. But this beast has certainly its definite name; but a fundamental supposition entering into every attempt at an explanation is this, that **זריר מתנים**, as well as **תיש** and **ליש**, is the proper name of a beast, not a descriptive attribute. Therefore the opinion of Rosse, which Bochart has skilfully established in the *Hierozoicon*, does not recommend itself, for he only suggests, for choice, to understand the name, "the girded about the loins," in the proper sense of straps and clasps around and on the loins (thus e.g. Gesenius, Fleischer, Hitzig), or of strength, in the sense of the Arab. *habuwk*, the firmly-bound = compact, or *samm alsfab*, the girded loin (thus e.g. Muntinghe). Schultens connects together both references: *Utrumque jungas licet*. That the by-name fits the horse, particularly the war-horse, is undeniable; one would have to refer it, with Mühlau, to the slender structure, the thin flanks, which are reckoned among the requisites of a beautiful horse.<sup>1</sup> But if *succinetus lumbos* were a by-name of a horse, why did not the author at once say **סוס זריר מתנים**? We shall give the preference to the opinion, according to which the expression, "girt about the loins" = "with strong loins," or "with slender limbs," is not the by-name, but the proper name of the animal.

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Ahlwardt, *Chalef elahmar's Qasside* (1859), and the interpretation of the description of the horse contained therein, p. 201 ff.

This may be said of the hunting-hound, *lévrier* (according to which the *Venet.*, incorrectly translating מתנים : λαγωκούων ψοιῶν),<sup>1</sup> which Kimchi ranks in the first place. Luther, by his translation, *Ein Wind = Windhund* [greyhound], of good limbs, has given the right direction to this opinion. Melancthon, Lavater, Mercier, Geier, and others, follow him; and, among the moderns, so also do Ewald and Böttcher (also Bertheau and Stuart), which latter supposes that before זריר מתנים there originally stood בלב, which afterwards disappeared. But why should the greyhound not at once be called זריר מתנים? We call the smaller variety of this dog the *Windspiel* [greyhound]; and by this name we think on a hound, without saying *Windspielhund*. The name זריר מתנים (Symmachus excellently : περιεσφιγμένος, not περιεσφραγισμένος, τὴν ὀσφύν, i.e. strongly bound in the limbs) is fitted at once to suggest to us this almost restless, slender animal, with its high, thin, nimble limbs. The verbal stem זרר, (Arab.) *zarr*, signifies to press together, to knit together; the reduplicative form זררר, to bind firmly together, whence זרירר, firmly bound together, referred to the limbs as designating a natural property (Ewald, § 158a): of straight and easily-moveable legs.<sup>2</sup> The hunting-hound (*salāki* or *salūki*, i.e. coming from Seleucia) is celebrated by the Arab. poets as much as the hunting-horse.<sup>3</sup> The name בלב, though not superfluous, the author ought certainly to have avoided, because it does not sound well in the Heb. collocation of words.

There now follows תיש, a goat, and that not the ram (Jerome, Luther), which is called איל, but the he-goat, which bears this name, as Schultens has already recognised, from its pushing, as it is also called עתור, as *paratus ad pugnam*; the two names appear to be only provincially different; שער, on the contrary, is the old he-goat, as shaggy; and צפיר also perhaps denotes it, as Schultens supposes, with twisted, i.e. curled hair (*tortipilus*).

<sup>1</sup> Thus reads Schleusner, *Opusc. Crit.* p. 318, and refers it to the horse: *nam solebant equos figuris quibusdam notare et quasi sigillare.*

<sup>2</sup> The Aram. זרן is shortened from זררר, as ברך from ברבר; the particip. adj. זרן signifies nimble, swift, eager, e.g. *Pesachim* 4a: "the zealous obey the commandment—as soon as possible hasten to fulfil it."

<sup>3</sup> *Vid.* Ahlwardt, *Chalef elahmar's Qasside*, p. 205 f.

In Arab. *tays* denotes the he-goat as well as the roebuck and the gazelle, and that at full growth. The LXX. (the Syr. and Targ., which is to be emended after the Syr.) is certainly right, for it understands the leading goat: *καὶ τράγος ἡγούμενος αἰπολίου*. The text, however, has not *וְתִישׁ*, but *וְאִישׁ*, *הַ* *טָרָגוֹס* (Aquila, Theodotion, Quinta, and the *Venet.*). Böttcher is astonished that Hitzig did not take hold of this *וְאִישׁ*, and conjectures *וְאִישׁ-תִּישׁ*, which should mean a “gazelle-goat” (Mühlau: *dorcas mas*). But it is too bold to introduce here *וְאִישׁ* (*תִּישׁ*), which is only twice named in the O. T., and *וְאִישׁ-תִּישׁ* for *וְאִישׁ* is not the Heb. style; and besides, the setting aside of *וְאִישׁ* has a harsh *asyndeton* for its consequence, which bears evidence to the appearance that *וְאִישׁ* and *תִּישׁ* are two different animals. And is the *וְאִישׁ* then so objectionable? More wonderful still must Song ii. 9 appear to us. If the author enumerated the four of stately going on his fingers, he would certainly have said *וְתִישׁ*. By *וְאִישׁ* he communicates to the hearer, setting before him another figure, how there in the Song Sulamith’s fancy passed from one object to another.

To the lion, the king of the animal world, the king *מֶלֶךְ* corresponds. This *מֶלֶךְ* Hitzig regards as mutilated from *מֶלֶךְ אֱלֹהִים* (which was both written and pronounced as *מֶלֶךְ אֱלֹהִים* by the Jews, so as to conceal the true sound of the name of God),—which is untenable, for this reason, that this religious conclusion [“A king with whom God is”] accords badly with the secular character of this proverb. Geiger (*Urschrift*, p. 62 ff.) translates: “and King Alkimos corresponding to it (the lustful and daring goat)” —he makes the harmless proverb into a *ludibrium* from the time of the Maccabeo-Syrian war. The LXX., which the Syr. and Targ. follow, translates *καὶ βασιλεὺς δημηγορῶν ἐν ἔθνει*; it appears to have changed *מֶלֶךְ אֱלֹהִים* into *מֶלֶךְ אֱלֹהִים* (standing with his people and haranguing them), like the Quinta: *καὶ βασ. ἀναστὰς (ὁς ἀνέστη) ἐν τῷ λαῷ αὐτοῦ*. Ziegler and Böttcher also, reading *מֶלֶךְ* and *אֱלֹהִים* without any transposition, get *מֶלֶךְ אֱלֹהִים*, which the former translates: “a king with the presence of his people;” the latter, “a king with the setting up of his people,”—not accordant with the thought, for the king should be brought forward as *מִיָּבִיב לְפָנַי*. For the same reason, Kimchi’s explanation is not suitable: a

king with whom is no resistance, *i.e.* against whom no one can rank himself (thus *e.g.* also Immanuel); or more specially, but not better: who has no successor of his race (according to which the *Venet.* ἀδιάδεκτος ξὺν ἑαυτῷ). Rather this explanation commends itself: a king with whom (*i.e.* in war with whom) is no resistance. Thus Jerome and Luther: against whom no one dare place himself; thus Rashi, Aben Ezra, Ralbag (שאין תקומה עמו), Ahron b. Josef (קום = ἀντίστασις), Arama, and others; \*thus also Schultens, Fleischer (*adversus quem nemo consistere audet*), Ewald, Bertheau, Elster, Stuart, and others. But this connection of אֵל with the infin. is not Heb.; and if the *Chokma*, xii. 28, has coined the expression אֵל-מָוֶת for the idea of “immortality,” then certainly it does not express the idea of resistlessness by so bold a *quasi compositum*. But this boldness is also there mitigated, for יְהִי is supplied after אֵל, which is not here practicable with קום, which is not a subst. like מָוֶת. Pocock in the *Spec. historiæ Arabum*, and Castellus in the *Lex. Heptaglotton* (not Castellio, as the word is printed by Zöckler), have recognised in אֱלָקוּם the Arab. *âlkawm*; Schultens gives the LXX. the honour of this recognition, for he regards their translation as a paraphrase of ὁ δῆμος μετ’ αὐτοῦ. Bertheau thinks that it ought to be in Arab. *kawmuhu*, but אֱלָקוּם עמו = *âlkawhu ma’ahu* is perfectly correct, *âlkawhu* is the summons or the *Heerbann* = *arriere-ban*;<sup>1</sup> in North Africa they speak in their language in the same sense of the *Gums*. This explanation of אֱלָקוּם, from the Arab. *Dachselt* (*rex cum satellitio suo*), Diedrichs in his Arab.-Syr. *Spicilegium* (1777), Umbreit, Gesenius, and Vaihinger, have recognised, and Mühlau has anew confirmed it at length. Hitzig, on the contrary, remarks that if Agur wrote on Arab. territory, we could be contented with the Arab. appellative, but not with the article, which in words like אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל and אֱלֹהֵי מִצְרָיִם is no longer of force as an art., but is an integ. component part of the word. We think that it is with אֱלָקוּם exactly as with other words descriptive of lordship, and the many similar that have passed over into the Spanish

<sup>1</sup> Wetzstein’s *Ausgewählte Inschriften*, p. 355: “The word *kawm* signifies people, not in the sense of *populus*, but in the sense of the Heb. קָיָם (Job xxiv. 17) = *mukawim abrajul*, he who breaks with or against any one.” Incorrect in Gesenius-Dietrich’s *Heb. Wörterbuch*.

language; the word is taken over along with the article, without requiring the Heb. listener to take the art. as such, although he certainly felt it better than we do, when we say "*das Alkoran*" [the Alcoran], "*das Alcohol*," and the like. Blau also, in his *Gesch. der Arab. Substantiv-Determ.*,<sup>1</sup> regards it as certain that Agur borrowed this אִלְקֹרַן from the idiom of the Arabians, among whom he lived, and heard it constantly spoken. By this explanation we first reach a correspondence between what is announced in lines first and second and line sixth. A king as such is certainly not "comely in going;" he can sit upon his throne, and especially as *δημηγορῶν* will he sit (Acts xii. 21) and not stand. But the majesty of his going shows itself when he marches at the head of those who have risen up at his summons to war. Then he is for the army what the עֵז [he-goat] is for the flock. The אֵס, preferred to א, draws close together the עֵז and the king (cf. *e.g.* Isa. xiv. 9).

Vers. 32, 33. Another proverb, the last of Agur's "Words" which exhorts to thoughtful, discreet demeanour, here follows the proverb of self-conscious, grave deportment:

If thou art foolish in that thou exaltest thyself,  
Or in devising,—put thy hand to thy mouth!  
33 For the pressure on milk bringeth forth butter,  
And pressure on the nose bringeth forth blood,  
And pressure on sensibility bringeth forth altercation.

Löwenstein translates ver. 32:

Art thou despicable, it is by boasting;  
Art thou prudent, then hold thy hand on thy mouth.

But if אָס denotes reflection and deliberation, then נָבֵל, as its opposite, denotes unreflecting, foolish conduct. Then בְּהִתְנַשֵּׂא [by boasting] is not to be regarded as a consequent (thus it happens by lifting thyself up; or: it is connected with boasting); by this construction also, אִם-נָבֵלֶּךָ must be accented with *Dechi*, not with *Tarcha*. Otherwise Eichel:

Hast thou become offensive through pride,  
Or seems it so to thee,—lay thy hand to thy mouth.

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<sup>1</sup> In the "*Alt-arab. Sprachstudien*," *Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitschr.* xxv. 539 f.

The thought is appropriate,<sup>1</sup> but נִבְלָה for נִבְלָה is more than improbable; נָבַל, thus absolutely taken in an ethical connection, is certainly related to נָבַל, as נָבַל, Jer. x. 8, to נָבַל. The prevailing mode of explanation is adopted by Fleischer: *si stulta arrogantia elatus fueris et si quid durius (in alios) mente conceperis, manum ori impone*; i.e., if thou arrogantly, and with offensive words, wilt strive with others, then keep thyself back, and say not what thou hast in thy mind. But while מְזִמָּה and מְזִמּוֹת denote intrigues, xiv. 17, as well as plans and considerations, זָמַם has never by itself alone the sense of *meditari mala*; at Ps. xxxvii. 12, also with ל of the object at which the evil devices aim. Then for זָמַם . . . זָמַם (Arab. *ân . . . wân*) there is the supposition of a correlative relation, as e.g. 1 Kings xx. 18, Eccles. xi. 3, by which at the same time זָמַם is obviously thought of as a contrast to נִבְלָה. This contrast excludes<sup>2</sup> for זָמַם not only the sense of *mala moliri* (thus e.g. also Mühlau), but also the sense of the Arab. *zamm*, *superbire* (Schultens). Hitzig has the right determination of the relation of the members of the sentence and the ideas: if thou art irrational in ebullition of temper and in thought—thy hand to thy mouth! But הִתְנַשֵּׂא has neither here nor elsewhere the meaning of הִתְעַבֵּר (to be out of oneself with anger); it signifies everywhere to elevate or exalt oneself, i.e. rightly or wrongly to make much of oneself. There are cases where a man, who raises himself above others, appears as a fool, and indeed acts foolishly; but there are also other cases, when the despised has a reason and an object for vindicating his superiority, his repute, his just claim: when, as we say, he places himself in his right position, and assumes importance; the poet here recommends, to the one as well as to the other, silence. The rule that silence is gold has its exceptions, but here also it is held valid as a rule. Luther and others interpret the *perfecta* as looking back: “hast thou be-

<sup>1</sup> Yet the Talmud, *Nidda* 27a, derives another moral rule from this proverb, for it interprets זָמַם in the sense of זָמַם = הָסַם, to tie up, to bridle, to shut up, but זָמַם in the sense of “if thou hast made thyself despicable,” as Löwenstein has done.

<sup>2</sup> The Arab. signification, to become proud, is a *nüance* of the primary signification, to hold erect—viz. the head,—as when the rider draws up the head of a camel by means of the halter (Arab. *zamam*).

come a fool and ascended too high and intended evil, then lay thy hand on thy mouth." But the reason in ver. 33 does not accord with this rendering, for when that has been done, the occasion for hatred is already given; but the proverb designs to warn against the stirring up of hatred by the reclaiming of personal pretensions. The *perfecta*, therefore, are to be interpreted as at Deut. xxxii. 29, Job ix. 15, as the expression of the abstract present; or better, as at Job ix. 16, as the expression of the fut. *exactum*: if thou wouldest have acted foolishly, since thou walkest proudly, or if thou hadst (before) thought of it (Aquila, Theodotion: καὶ ἐὰν ἐννοηθῇς)—the hand on thy mouth, *i.e.* let it alone, be silent rather (expression as xi. 24; Judg. xviii. 19; Job xl. 4). The *Venet.* best: εἴπερ ἐμάρπας ἐν τῷ ἐπαίρεσθαι καὶ εἴπερ ἐλογίσω, χεὶρ τῷ στόματι. When we have now interpreted נִשְׁנַח, not of the rising up of anger, we do not also, with Hitzig, interpret the dual of the two snorting noses—viz. of the double anger, that of him who provokes to anger, and that of him who is made angry,—but נִשְׁנַח denotes the two nostrils of one and the same person, and, figuratively, snorting or anger. Pressure against the nose is designated נִשְׁנַח, ἐκμύζησις (ἐκπλέεσις) μυκτηῖος (write נִשְׁנַח, with *Metheg*, with the long tone, after *Metheg-Setzung*, § 11, 9, 12), and נִשְׁנַח, ἐκμύζησις θυμοῦ (Theodotion), with reference to the proper meaning of נִשְׁנַח, pressure to anger, *i.e.* to the stirring up and strengthening of anger. The nose of him who raises himself up comes into view, in so far as, with such self-estimation, sneering, snuffling scorn (μυκτηριζεῖν) easily connects itself; but this view of נִשְׁנַח is not here spoken of.

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## SECOND APPENDIX TO THE SECOND SOLOMONIC COLLECTION OF PROVERBS.—XXXI. 1-9.

### Superscription :

Ver. 1 Words of Lemuel the king,

The utterance wherewith his mother warned him.

Such would be the superscription if the interpunction of the text as it lies before us were correct. But it is not possibly

right. For, notwithstanding the assurance of Ewald, § 277*b*, למואל מלך, nevertheless, as it would be here used, remains an impossibility. Certainly under circumstances an indeterminate apposition can follow a proper name. That on coins we read נרון קיסר or מתתיה כהן נרל is nothing strange; in this case we also use the words "Nero, emperor," and that we altogether omit the article shows that the case is singular: the apposition wavers between the force of a generic and of a proper name. A similar case is the naming of the proper name with the general specification of the class to which this or that one bearing the name belongs in lists of persons, as *e.g.* 1 Kings iv. 2–6, or in such expressions as, *e.g.*, "Damascus, a town," or "*Tel Hum*, a castle," and the like; here we have the indefinite article, because the apposition is a simple declaration of the class.<sup>1</sup> But would the expression, "The poem of Oscar, a king," be proper as the title of a book? Proportionally more so than "Oscar, king;" but also that form of indeterminate apposition is contrary to the *usus loq.*, especially with a king with whom the apposition is not a generic name, but a name of honour. We assume that "Lemuel" is a symbolical name, like "Jareb" in "King Jareb," Hos. v. 13, x. 6; so we would expect the phrase to be למואל מלך rather than מלך (ה) למואל. The phrase "Lemuel, king," here in the title of this section of the book, sounds like a double name, after the manner of עֶבֶר מֶלֶךְ in the book of Jeremiah. In the Greek version also the phrase Δεμουέλου βασιλέως (*Venet.*) is not used as syntactically correct without having joined to the βασιλέως a dependent genitive such as τῶν Ἀράβων, while none of the old translators, except Jerome, take the words למואל מלך together in the sense of *Lamuelis regis*. Thus מֶלֶךְ מִשָּׁא are to be taken together, with Hitzig, Bertheau, Zöckler, Mühlau, and Dächsel, against Ewald and Kamphausen; מִשָּׁא, whether it be a name of a tribe or a country, or of both

<sup>1</sup> Thus it is also with the examples of indeterminate *gentilicia*, which Riehm makes valid for למואל מלך (for he translates למואל symbolically, which, however, syntactically makes no difference): "As analogous to 'Lemuel, a king,' one may adduce 'Jeroboam, son of Nebat, an Ephrathite,' 1 Kings xi. 26, instead of the usual form 'the Ephrathite;'" and בן-ימיני, Ps. vii. 1, for בן הימיני; on the contrary, כהן, 1 Kings iv. 5, does not belong to the subject, but is the pred.

at the same time, is the region ruled over by Lemuel, and since this proper name throws back the determination which it has in itself on לִמְעֹל, the phrase is to be translated: "Words of Lemuel the king of Massa" (*vid.* under xxx. 1). If Aquila renders this proper name by Λεμμοῦν, Symmachus by Ἰαμονήλ, Theodotion by Πεβονήλ, the same arbitrariness prevails with reference to the initial and terminal sound of the word, as in the case of the words Ἀμβακούμ, Βελεξεβούλ, Βελίας. The name לִמְעֹל sounds like the name of Simeon's first-born, לִמְעֹל, Gen. xvi. 10, written in Num. xxvi. 12 and 1 Chron. iv. 24 as לִמְעֹל; לִמְעֹל also appears, 1 Chron. iv. 35, as a Simeonite name, which Hitzig adduces in favour of his view that לִמְעֹל was a North Arab. Simeonite colony. The interchange of the names לִמְעֹל and לִמְעֹל is intelligible if it is supposed that לִמְעֹל (from לִמְעֹל = לִמְעֹל) designates the sworn (sworn to) of God, and לִמְעֹל (from לִמְעֹל = לִמְעֹל) the expressed (addressed) of God; here the reference of עֹל and עֹל to verbal stems is at least possible, but a verb לִמְעֹל is found only in the Arab., and with significations *ius*. But there are two other derivations of the name: (1) The verb (Arab.) *waalla* signifies to hasten (with the infin. of the *onomatop.* verbs *waniyal*, like *rahyal*, walking, because motion, especially that which is tumultuous, proceeds with a noise), whence *mawnil*, the place to which one flees, retreat. Hence לִמְעֹל or לִמְעֹל, which is in this case to be assumed as the ground-form, might be formed from לִמְעֹל לִמְעֹל, God is a refuge, with the rejection of the ל. This is the opinion of Fleischer, which Mühlau adopts and has established, p. 38-41; for he shows that the initial ל is not only often rejected where it is without the support of a full vocal, *e.g.* לִמְעֹל = לִמְעֹל, *lalah* = *ilalah* (*Deus*), but that this aphæresis not seldom also occurs where the initial has a full vocal, *e.g.* לִמְעֹל = לִמְעֹל, *lahmaru* = *állahmaru* (*ruber*), *lahsâ* = *âl-lahsâ* (the name of a town); cf. also Blau in *Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitschr.* xxv. 580. But this view is thus acceptable and tenable; a derivation which spares us by a like certainty the supposition of such an abbreviation established only by the late Palestinianian לִמְעֹל, *Αάζαπος*, might well desire the preference. (2) Fleischer himself suggests another derivation: "The signi-

<sup>1</sup> In the *Midrash Kheleth* to i. 1, the name Lemuel (as a name of Solomon) is explained: he who has spoken to God in his heart.

fication of the name is *Deo consecratus*, לְמֹ, poetic for לָ, as also in ver. 4 it is to be vocalized לְמוֹאֵל after the Masora." The form לְמוֹאֵל is certainly not less favourable to that first derivation than to this second; the ū is in both cases an obscuration of the original . But that "Lemuel" may be explained in this second way is shown by "Lael," Num. iii. 24 (Olshausen, § 277d).<sup>1</sup> It is a beautiful sign for King Lemuel, and a verification of his name, that it is he himself by whom we receive the admonition with which his mother in her care counselled him when he attained to independent government. אֲשֶׁר connects itself with דַּבְּרִי, after we have connected מִשָּׁה with מֶלֶךְ; it is accus. of the manner to יִפְרֹתָהּ = יִפְרֹתָהּ; cf. הִטָּתוּ, vii. 21, with וּמִלֵּתָהּ, xxxi. 12: wherewith (with which words) she earnestly and impressively admonished him. The Syr. translates: words of Muel, as if ל were that of the author. "Others as inconsistently: words to Lemuel—they are words which he himself ought to carry in his mouth as received from his mother" (Fleischer).

The name "Massa," if it here means *effatum*, would be proportionally more appropriate for these "Words" of Lemuel than for the "Words" of Agur, for the maternal counsels form an inwardly connected compact whole. They begin with a question which maternal love puts to itself with regard to the beloved son whom she would advise:

Ver. 2 What, my son? and what the son of my womb?

And what, O son of my vows?!

The thrice repeated מַה is completed by תַּעֲשֶׂה (cf. Köhler under Mal. ii. 15), and that so that the question is put for the purpose of exciting attention: Consider well, my son, what thou wilt do as ruler, and listen attentively to my counsel (Fleischer). But the passionate repetition of מַה would be only affectation if thus interpreted; the underlying thought must be of a subjective nature: what shall I say, אֲדַבֵּר (*vid.* under Isa. xxxviii. 15), what advise thee to do? The question, which is at the same time a call, is like a deep sigh from the heart of the mother concerned for the welfare of her son, who would say to him what is beneficial, and say it in words which strike and remain fixed. He

<sup>1</sup> Simonis has also compared Æthiopic proper names, such as *Zakrestos*, *Zaiasus*, *Zamikaël*, *Zamariam*.

is indeed her dear son, the son whom she carries in her heart, the son for whom with vows of thanksgiving she prayed to God; and as he was given her by God, so to His care she commits him. The name "Lemuel" is, as we interpret it, like the anagram of the fulfilment of the vows of his mother. בְּרִי bears the Aramaic shade in the Arameo-Arab. colouring of these proverbs from Massa; בְּרִיָּה is common in the Aram., and particularly in the Talmudic, but it can scarcely be adduced in support of בְּרִי. וְיָמָּה belongs to the 24, יָמָּה, with ה or ע not following; *vid.* the Masora to Ex. xxxii. 1, and its correction by Norzi at Deut. xxix. 23. We do not write וְיָמָּה-בְּרִי; מָה, with *Makkeph* and with *Metheg*, exclude one another.

Ver. 3. The first admonition is a warning against effeminating sensuality:

Give not thy strength to women,  
Nor thy ways to them that destroy kings.

The punctuation לֹא-תַתֵּן sees in this form a syncopated *inf. Hiph.* = לֹא-תַתֵּן (vid. at xxiv. 17), according to which we are to translate: *viasque tuas ad perdendos reges (ne dirige)*, by which, as Fleischer formulates the twofold possibility, it may either be said: direct not thy effort to this result, to destroy neighbouring kings,—viz. by wars of invasion (properly, to wipe them away from the table of existence, as the Arabs say),—or: do not that by which kings are overthrown; *i.e.*, with special reference to Lemuel, act not so that thou thyself must thereby be brought to ruin. But the warning against vengeful, rapacious, and covetous propensity to war (thus Jerome, so the *Venet.* after Kimchi: ἀπομάττειν βασιλέας, C. B. Michaelis, and earlier, Gesenius) does not stand well as parallel with the warning against giving his bodily and mental strength to women, *i.e.* expending it on them. But another explanation: direct not thy ways to the destruction of kings, *i.e.* toward that which destroys kings (Elster); or, as Luther translates: go not in the way wherein kings destroy themselves,—puts into the words a sense which the author cannot have had in view; for the individualizing expression would then be generalized in the most ambiguous way. Thus לְמַחֲוֹת מַלְכִּין will be a name for women, parallel to לְנָשִׁים. So far the translation of the Targum: לְבָנֹת מַלְכִּין, *filiabus* (לְמַחֲוֹת?) *regum*,

lies under a right supposition. But the designation is not thus general. Schultens explains *catapultis regum* after Ezek. xxvi. 9; but, inasmuch as he takes this as a figure of those who lay siege to the hearts of men, he translates: *expugnatrixibus regum*, for he regards מַחֲה as the plur. of מַחָה, a particip. noun, which he translates by *deletor*. The connecting form of the fem. plur. of this מַחָה might certainly be מַחֲהוֹת (cf. מַוִּי, from מָוָה), but לְמַחֲהוֹת מַלְכִּין ought to be changed into לְמָ' וגו'; for one will not appeal to anomalies, such as לְמָ', xvi. 4; 'בָּנִי, Isa. xxiv. 2; לְמָ', Lam. i. 19; or 'הָתִי וגו', 1 Kings xiv. 24, to save the *Pathach* of לְמַחֲהוֹת, which, as we saw, proceeds from an altogether different understanding of the word. But if לְמָ' is to be changed into לְמָ', then one must go further, since for מַחָה not an active but a conditional meaning is to be assumed, and we must write לְמַחֲהוֹת, in favour of which Fleischer as well as Gesenius decides: *et ne committe consilia factaque tua iis quæ reges perdunt, regum pestibus*. Ewald also favours the change לְמַחֲהוֹת, for he renders מַחָה as a denom. of מָח, marrow: those who enfeeble kings, in which Kamphausen follows him. Mühlau goes further; he gives the privative signification, to enfeeble, to the *Piel* מַחָה = *makhakha* (cf. Herzog's *Real-Wörterb.* xiv. 712), which is much more probable, and proposes לְמַמַּחֲהוֹת: *iis quæ vires enervant regum*. But we can appropriately, with Nöldeke, adhere to לְמַחֲהוֹת, *deletoricibus* (*perditricibus*), for by this change the parallelism is satisfied; and that מַחָה may be used, with immediate reference to men, of entire and total destruction, is sufficiently established by such passages as Gen. vi. 7, Judg. xxi. 17, if any proof is at all needed for it. Regarding the LXX. and those misled by it, who, by מַלְכִּין and מַלְכִּים, 4a, think on the Aram. מַלְכִּין, βουλαί, vid. Mühlau, p. 53.<sup>1</sup> But the Syr. has an idea worthy of the discourse, who translates *epulis regum* without our needing, with Mühlau, to charge him with dreaming of לֶחֶם in לְמַחֲהוֹת. Perhaps that is true; but perhaps by לְמַחֲהוֹת he thought of לְמַחֲהוֹת (from מָח, the particip. adj. of מַחָה): do not direct thy ways to rich food (morsels), such as kings love and can have. By this reading,

<sup>1</sup> Also Hitzig's *Blinzlerinnen* [women who ogle or leer = seductive courtesans] and Böttcher's *Streichlerinnen* [caressers, viz. of kings] are there rejected, as they deserve to be.

3b would mediate the transition to ver. 4; and that the mother refers to the immorality, the unseemliness, and the dangers of a large harem, only in one brief word (3a), cannot seem strange, much rather it may be regarded as a sign of delicacy. But so much the more badly does לִמְחֹת accord with לִמְחֹת. Certainly one goes to a banquet, for one finds leisure for it; but of one who himself is a king, it is not said that he should not direct his ways to a king's dainties. But if לִמְחֹת refers to the whole conduct of the king, the warning is, that he should not regulate his conduct in dependence on the love and the government of women. But whoever will place himself amid the revelry of lust, is wont to intoxicate himself with ardent spirits; and he who is thus intoxicated, is in danger of giving reins to the beast within him. Hence there now follows a warning against drunkenness, not unmediated by the reading לִמְחֹת:

Ver. 4 It is not for kings, O Lemuel,  
 Not for kings to drink wine,  
 Not for rulers to ask for intoxicating drink;  
 3 Lest he drink, and forget what is prescribed,  
 And pervert the right of all the children of want.

The usual translation of 4a is: *non decet reges . . .* (as e.g. also Mühlau); but in this לֹא is not rightly rendered, which indeed is at times only an *oû*, spoken with close interest, but yet first of all, especially in such parænetic connection as here, it is a dissuasive *μὴ*. But now לֹא לְמַלְכִּים לְשָׁתוֹת or לֹא לְמַלְכִּים לְשָׁתוֹת, after 2 Chron. xxvi. 18, Mic. iii. 1, signifies: it is not the part of kings, it does not become them to drink, which may also be turned into a dissuasive form: let it not be the part of kings to drink, let them not have any business therewith, as if it belonged to their calling; according to which Fleischer renders: *Absit a regibus, Lemuel, absit a regibus potare vinum*. The clearer expression לֹא לְמַלְכִּים, instead of לֹא לְמַלְכִּים, is, after Böttcher, occasioned by this, that the name is here in the vocative; perhaps rather by this, that the meaning of the name: consecrated to God, belonging to God, must be placed in contrast to the descending to low, sensual lust. Both times we write לֹא לְמַלְכִּים with the orthophonic *Dagesh*<sup>1</sup> in the ל following ל, and with-

<sup>1</sup> Vid. *Luth. Zeitschrift*, 1863, p. 413. It is the rule, according to which, with Ben-Asher, it is to be written לֹא לְמַלְכִּים

out the recompensative *Dagesh*, the want of which is in a certain measure covered by the *Metheg* (*vid.* Norzi). Regarding the *inf. constr.* שְׁתו (cf. קָנָה, xvi. 16), *vid.* Gesen. § 75, Anm. 2; and regarding the sequence of accents here necessary, אֶל לְמַלְכִּים שְׁתוֹיִן (not *Mercha, Dechi, Athnach*, for *Dechi* would be here contrary to rule), *vid.* Thorath Emeth, p. 22 § 6, p. 43 § 7. In 4b nothing is to be gained from the *Chethîb* או. There is not a substantive או, desire, the *constr.* of which would here have to be read, not או (Umbreit, Gesenius), but או, after the form קו (Maurer); and why did the author not write תַּאֲוֹת שְׁכָר? But the particle או does not here also fall in with the connection; for if או שְׁכָר connect itself with יין (Hitzig, Ewald, and others), then it would drag disagreeably, and we would have here a spiritless classification of things inadvisable for kings. Böttcher therefore sees in this או the remains of the obliterated קבו; a corrector must then have transformed the או which remained into או. But before one ventures on such conjectures, the *Kerî* או [where?] must be tried. Is it the abbreviated או (Herzog's *Real-Wörterbuch*, xiv. 712)? Certainly not, because או שְׁכָר וְלִרְחוּמִים would mean: and the princes, or rulers (*vid.* regarding רחמים at viii. 15), have no mead, which is inconsistent. But או does not abbreviate itself into או, but into או. Not או, but או, is in Heb., as well as in Ethiop., the word with which negative adjectives such as או נָקִי, not innocent, Job xxii. 30, and in later Heb. also, negative sentences, such as או אֶפְשָׁר: it is not possible, are formed.<sup>1</sup> Therefore Mühlau vocalizes או, and thinks that the author used this word for אל, so as not to repeat this word for the third time. But how is that possible? או שְׁכָר signifies either: not mead, or: there is not mead; and both afford, for the passage before us, no meaning. Is, then, the *Kerî* או truly so unsuitable? Indeed, to explain: how came intoxicating drink to rulers! is inadmissible, since או always means only *ubi* (e.g. Gen. iv. 9); not, like the Ethiop. *aité*, also *quomodo*. But the

<sup>1</sup> The author of the Comm. עֲטַרְת זִקְנִים to the אֲרַח חַיִּים, c. 6, Geiger and others would read או, because או is abbreviated from או. But why not from או, 1 Sam. xxi. 9? The traditional expression is או; and Elias Levita in the *Tishbi*, as also Baer in the *Siddur Abodath Jisrael*, are right in defending it against that innovation.

question *ubi temetum*, as a question of desire, fits the connection, whether the sentence means: *non decet principibus dicere* (Ahron b. Josef supplies שיאמרו) *ubi temetum*, or: *absit a principibus quærere ubi temetum* (Fleischer), which, from our view of 4a, we prefer. There is in reality nothing to be supplied; but as 4a says that the drinking of wine ought not to characterize kings, so 4b, that "Where is mead?" (*i.e.* this eager inquiry after mead) ought not to characterize rulers.<sup>1</sup> Why not? ver. 5 says. That the prince, being a slave to drink, may not forget the מִחֶקֶק, *i.e.* that which has been made and has become חֶק, thus that which is lawfully right, and may not alter the righteous cause of the miserable, who cry against their oppressors, *i.e.* may not handle falsely the facts of the case, and give judgment contrary to them. שָׁנָה רֵין (Aquila, Theodotion, Quinta, ἀλλοιοῦν κρίσιν) is elsewhere equivalent to הָטָה מִשְׁפָּט (עֲוֹת). בְּנֵי-עֲנִי are those who are, as it were, born to oppression and suffering. This mode of expression is a Semitism (Fleischer), but it here heightens the impression of the Arab. colouring. In כל (Venet. ὀντινοῦν) it is indicated that, not merely with reference to individual poor men, but in general to the whole class of the poorer people, suffering humanity, sympathy and a regard for truth on the part of a prince given to sensuality are easily thrown aside. Wine is better suited for those who are in a condition to be timeously helped over which, is a refreshment to them.

- Ver. 6 Give strong drink to him that is perishing,  
 And wine to those whose soul is in bitter woe;  
 7 Let him drink and forget his poverty,  
 And let him think of his misery no more.

The preparation of a potion for malefactors who were condemned to death was, on the ground of these words of the proverb, cared for by noble women in Jerusalem (נשים יקרות), *Sanhedrin* 43a; Jesus rejected it, because He wished, without becoming insensible to His sorrow, to pass away from the earthly life freely and in full consciousness, *Mark* xv. 23.

<sup>1</sup> The translation of Jerome, *quia nullum secretum est ubi regnat ebrietas* (as if the words were לֵית רָזָא אֵי שִׁכָּר), corresponds to the proverb: נכנס יין יצא סוד, when the wine goes in the secret comes out; or, which is the same thing: if one adds יין (= 70), סוד (= 70) comes out.

The transition from the plur. to the sing. of the subject is in ver. 7 less violent than in ver. 5, since in ver. 6 singular and plur. already interchange. We write הַתְּנִיחַ with the counter-tone *Metheg* and *Mercha*. אֹהֵב designates, as at Job xxix. 13, xxxi. 19, one who goes to meet destruction: it combines the present signification *interiens*, the fut. signif. *interiturus*, and the perf. *perditus* (hopelessly lost). מִרֵּי נַפֶּשׁ (those whose minds are filled with sorrow) is also supported from the Book of Job, iii. 20, cf. xxi. 25, the language and thought and mode of writing of which notably rests on the Proverbs of Agur and Lemuel (*vid.* Mühlau, pp. 64–66). The *Venet.* τοῖς πικροῖς (not ψυχροῖς) τὴν ψυχὴν. עֲנִי (poverty) is not, however, found there, but only in the Book of Proverbs, in which this word-stem is more at home than elsewhere. Wine rejoices the heart of man, Ps. civ. 15, and at the same time raises it for the time above oppression and want, and out of anxious sorrow, wherefore it is soonest granted to them, and in sympathizing love ought to be presented to them by whom this its beneficent influence is to be wished for. The ruined man forgets his poverty, the deeply perplexed his burden of sorrow; the king, on the contrary, is in danger from this cause of forgetting what the law required at his hands, viz. in relation to those who need help, to whom especially his duty as a ruler refers.

- Ver. 8 Open thy mouth for the dumb,  
 For the right of all the children of leaving;  
 9 Open thy mouth, judge righteously,  
 And do right to the poor and needy.

He is called dumb who suffers the infirmity of dumbness, as עֵר and חֵרֵס, Job xxix. 15, is he who suffers the infirmity of blindness or lameness, not here figuratively; at the same time, he who, on account of his youth, or on account of his ignorance, or from fear, cannot speak before the tribunal for himself (Fleischer). With לְ the *dat. commodi* (LXX. after Lagarde, μογιλάλω; Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, ἀλάλω; the *Venet.* after Gebhardt, βωβῶ) לְ, of the object aimed at, interchanges, as *e.g.* 1 Kings xix. 3, 2 Kings vii. 7, לְעַלְמֵי, for the preservation of their life, or for the sake of their life, for it is seldom that it introduces the object so purely as here. And that an infin. such as הִלֵּךְ should stand as a subst. occurs proportionally

seldomer in Heb. (Isa. iv. 4; Ps. xxii. 7; cf. with ה of the artic., Num. iv. 12; Ps. lxvi. 9) than it does in Arab. בְּנֵי חֶלֶף in the same way as בְּנֵי-עֵנִי, 5b, belongs to the Arab. complexion of this proverb, but without its being necessary to refer to the Arab. in order to fix the meaning of these two words. Hitzig explains after *khalf*, to come after, which further means “to have the disadvantage,” in which Zöckler follows him; but this verb in Arab. does not mean ὑστερεῖν (ὑστερεῖσθαι), we must explain “sons of him that remains behind,” i.e. such as come not forward, but remain behind (‘an) others. Mühlau goes further, and explains, with Schultens and Vaihinger: those destitute of defence, after (Arab.) *khalfafahu* he is ranked next to him, and has become his representative—a use of the word foreign to the Heb. Still less is the rendering of Gesenius justified, “children of inheritance” = children left behind, after *khallafa*, to leave behind; and Luther, “for the cause of all who are left behind,” by the phrase (Arab.) *khallfany ‘an ‘awnih*, he has placed me behind his help, denied it to me, for the *Kal* of the verb cannot mean to abandon, to leave. And that בְּנֵי חֶלֶף means the opposers of the truth, or of the poor, or the litigious person, the quarrelsome, is perfectly inadmissible, since the *Kal* חֶלֶף cannot be equivalent to (Arab.) *khilaf*, the inf. of the 3d conj., and besides, the gen. after הֵן always denotes those in whose favour, not those against whom it is passed; the latter is also valid against Ralbag’s “sons of change,” i.e. who say things different from what they think; and Ahron b. Josef’s “sons of changing,” viz. the truth into lies. We must abide by the meaning of the Heb. חֶלֶף, “to follow after, to change places, pass away.” Accordingly, Fleischer understands by חֶלֶף, the going away, the dying, viz. of parents, and translates: *eorum qui parentibus orbatī sunt*. In another way Rashi reaches the same sense: orphans deprived of their helper. But the connection בְּנֵי חֶלֶף requires that we make those who are intended themselves the subject of חֶלֶף. Rightly Ewald, Bertheau, Kamphausen, compare Isa. ii. 18 (and Ps. xc. 5 f., this with questionable right), and understand by the sons of disappearance those whose inherited lot, whose proper fate, is to disappear, to die, to perish (Symmachus: πάντων υἱῶν ἀποικοιμένων; Jerome: *omnium filiorum qui per-*

*transeunt*). It is not men in general as children of frailty that are meant (Kimchi, Meîri, Immanuel, Euchel, and others), after which the *Venet.* τῶν νιῶν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν (*i.e.* those who must exchange this life for another), but such as are on the brink of the abyss. צָדִיק in צָדִיק-שֶׁשֶׁ is not equivalent to בְּצִדִּיק, but is the accus. of the object, as at Zech. viii. 16, decide justice, *i.e.* so that justice is the result of thy judicial act; cf. Knobel on Deut. i. 16. יָדִין is imper., do right to the miserable and the poor; cf. Ps. liv. 3 with Jer. xxii. 16, v. 28. That is a king of a right sort, who directs his high function as a judge, so as to be an advocate [*procurator*] for the helpless of his people.

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### THIRD APPENDIX TO THE SECOND COLLECTION OF SOLOMONIC PROVERBS.—XXXI. 10 ff.

The admonitions of a faithful mother are followed by words in praise of a virtuous wife; the poet praises them through all the *prædicamenta*, *i.e.* all the twenty-two letters of the Hebrew alphabet. The artificialness of the order, says Hitzig, proves that the section belongs to a proportionally late age. But if, as he himself allows, even a Davidic psalm, viz. Ps. ix.-x., is constructed acrostically, then from this, that there the acrostic design is not so purely carried out as it is here in this ode, no substantial proof can be drawn for the more recent origin of the latter. Yet we do not deny that it belongs to an earlier time than the earliest of the era of Hezekiah. If Hitzig carries it back to the times subsequent to Alexander on account of the *scriptio plena*, without distinctive accents, vers. 17, 25, it is, on the other hand, to be remarked that it has the *scriptio plena* in common with the "utterance from Massa," which he places forward in the times of Hezekiah, without being influenced to such clear vision by writings such as מִלֶּךְ, xxx. 22, אוֹבֵד, xxxi. 6, רְחוּמִים, xxxi. 4. Besides, the *plene* written עָץ, ver. 25, is incorrect, and בָּעֵץ, ver. 17, which has its parallel in עֵץ, Ps. lxxxiv. 6, is in its form altogether dependent on the *Munach*, which was added some thousand years after.

In the LXX. this section forms the concluding section of the Book of Proverbs. But it varies from the Heb. text in that the  $\delta$  ( $\sigma\acute{\tau}\omicron\mu\alpha$ ) goes before the  $\gamma$  ( $\iota\sigma\chi\acute{\upsilon}\nu$ ). The very same sequence of letters is found in the Heb. text of Ps. xxxiv. and Lam. ii. iii. and iv.

Stier has interpreted allegorically the matron here commended. He understands thereby the Holy Ghost in His regenerating and sanctifying influence, as the *Midrash* does the *Tôra*; Ambrosius, Augustine, and others, the Church; Immanuel, the soul in covenant with God, thirsting after the truth. As if it were not an invaluable part of Biblical moral instruction which is here presented to us! Such a woman's mirror is nowhere else found. The housewife is depicted here as she ought to be; the poet shows how she governs and increases the wealth of the house, and thereby also advances the position of her husband in the common estimation, and he refers all these, her virtues and her prudence, to the fear of God as their root (Von Hofmann's *Schriftbeweis*, ii. 2. 404 f.). One of the most beautiful expositions of this section is that of Luis de Leon, *La perfecta casada* (Salamanca, 1582), which has been revived in a very attractive way by Wilkens.<sup>1</sup>

A wife, such as she ought to be, is a rare treasure, a good excelling all earthly possession :

Ver. 10  $\aleph$  A virtuous woman, who findeth her!  
She stands far above pearls in worth.

In the connection  $\aleph$   $\text{אֵשֶׁת חַיִּל}$  and the like, the idea of bodily vigour is spiritualized to that of capacity, ability, and is generalized; in *virtus* the corresponding transition from manliness, and in the originally Romanic "*Bravheit*," valour to ability, is completed; we have translated as at xii. 4, but also Luther, "a virtuous woman," is suitable, since *Tugend* (virtue) has with *Tüchtigkeit* [ability] the same root-word, and according to our linguistic [German] usage designates the property of moral goodness and propriety, while for those of former times, when they spoke of the *tugend* (*tugent*) of a woman, the word combined with it the idea of fine manners (cf.  $\text{חַן}$ , xi. 16) and culture (cf.  $\text{שִׁבְלֵי טוֹב}$ , xiii. 15). The question  $\text{מַיְיָ מָה}$ , *quis inveniat*, which,

<sup>1</sup> C. A. Wilkens' *Fray Luis de Leon*. A biography from the History of the Spanish Inquisition and Church of the 16th cent. (1866), pp. 322-327.

Eccles. vii. 24, proceeds from the supposition of the impossibility of finding, conveys here only the idea of the difficulty of finding. In ancient Jerusalem, when one was married, they were wont to ask : מָצָא אוֹ מָצָא, *i.e.* has he found? thus as is said at Prov. xviii. 22, or at Eccles. vii. 26. A virtuous woman [*braves Weib*] is not found by every one, she is found by comparatively few. In 10b there is given to the thought which underlies the question a synonymous expression. Ewald, Elster, and Zöckler incorrectly render the ו by “although” or “and yet.” Fleischer rightly : the second clause, if not in form yet in sense, runs parallel to the first. מְכָר designates the price for which such a woman is sold, and thus is purchasable, not without reference to this, that in the Orient a wife is obtained by means of מְהָר, מְכָר, synon. מְהָר, for which a wife of the right kind is gained, is רָחוֹק, placed further, *i.e.* is more difficult to be obtained, than pearls (*vid.* regarding “pearls” at iii. 15), *i.e.* than the price for such precious things. The poet thereby means to say that such a wife is a more precious possession than all earthly things which are precious, and that he who finds such an one has to speak of his rare fortune. The reason for this is now given :

Ver. 11 בַּ The heart of her husband doth trust her,  
And he shall not fail of gain.

If we interpret שָׁלַל, after Eccles. ix. 8, as subject, then we miss לוֹ; it will thus be object., and the husband subj. לֹא יִחָפֵר לוֹ: *nec lucro carebit*, as *e.g.* Fleischer translates it, with the remark that שָׁלַל denotes properly the spoil which one takes from an enemy, but then also, like the Arab. *ḡanymat*, can mean profit and gain of all kinds (cf. Rödiger in Gesenius' *Thes.*). Thus also in our “*kriegen*” = to come into possession, the reference to war disappears. Hitzig understands by שָׁלַל, the continual prosperity of the man on account of his fortunate possession of such a wife; but in that case the poet should have said שְׂמֵחַת שָׁלַל; for שָׁלַל is gain, not the feeling that is therewith connected. There is here meant the gain, profit, which the housewife is the means of bringing in (cf. Ps. lxviii. 13). The heart of her husband (בְּעֵלָהּ) can be at rest, it can rest on her whom it loves—he goes after his calling, perhaps a calling which, though weighty and honourable, brings in little or nothing; but the wife keeps the family possessions scrupulously together, and

increases them by her laborious and prudent management, so that there is not wanting to him gain, which he properly did not acquire, but which the confidence he is justified in reposing in his wife alone brings to him. She is to him a perpetual spring of nothing but good.

Ver. 12 י She doeth good to him, and not evil,  
All the days of her life;

or, as Luther translates :

“*Sie thut jm liebs vnd kein leids.*”

[She does him good, and no harm.]

She is far from ever doing him evil, she does him only good all her life long; her love is not dependent on freaks, it rests on deep moral grounds, and hence derives its power and purity, which remain ever the same. נָטַל signifies to accomplish, to perform. To the not assimilated form נִיבְלָתָהּ, cf. יִכְרָתִי, 16. The poet now describes how she disposes of things :

Ver. 13 ה She careth for wool and flax,  
And worketh these with her hands' pleasure.

The verb דָּרַשׁ proceeds, as the Arab. shows,<sup>1</sup> from the primary meaning *terere*; but to translate with reference thereto: *tractat lanam et linum* (LXX., Schultens, Dathe, Rosenmüller, Fleischer), is inadmissible. The Heb. דָּרַשׁ does not mean the external working at or manufacturing of a thing; but it means, even when it refers to this, the intention of the mind purposely directed thereto. Thus wool and flax come into view as the material of work which she cares to bring in; and יָצְאָה signifies the work itself, following the creation of the need of work. Hitzig translates the second line: she works at the business of her hands. Certainly הַיָּדָיִם after עֲשֶׂה may denote the sphere of activity, Ex. xxxi. 4; 1 Kings v. 30, etc.; but if הַיָּדָיִם had here the weakened signification business, *πρᾶγμα*,—which it gains in the same way as we say business, affair, of any object of care,—the scarcely established meaning presents itself, that she shows herself active in that which she has made the business of her hands. How much more beautiful, on the contrary, is the thought: she is active with her hands' pleasure! הַיָּדָיִם is, as Schultens rightly explains, *inclinatio flexa et propensa in aliquid*, and *pulchre manibus diligentissimis attribuitur lubentia cum ob-*

<sup>1</sup> The inquirer is there called (Arab.) *daras*, as *libros terens*.

*lectatione et per oblectationem sese animans.* עֲשֵׂה, without obj. accus., signifies often: to accomplish, *e.g.* Ps. xxii. 32; here it stands, in a sense, complete in itself, and without object. accus., as when it means “*handeln*” [*agere*], xiii. 16, and particularly to act in the service of God = to offer sacrifice, Ex. x. 25; it means here, and at Ruth ii. 19, Hag. ii. 4, to be active, as at Isa. xix. 15, to be effective; וְהָעֵשׂ is equivalent to וְהָעֵשׂ וְהָאֱהָבָה or וְהָעֵשׂ מְלָאכְתָּהּ (cf. under x. 4). And pleasure and love for the work, חֶפֶץ, can be attributed to the hands with the same right as at Ps. lxxviii. 72, discretion. The disposition which animates a man, especially his inner relation to the work devolving upon him, communicates itself to his hands, which, according as he has joy or aversion in regard to his work, will be nimble or clumsy. The Syr. translates: “and her hands are active after the pleasure of her heart;” but בְּחֶפֶץ is not equivalent to בְּחֶפֶץ; also בְּחֶפֶץ, in the sense of *con amore* (Böttcher), is not used. The following proverb praises the extent of her housewifely transactions:

Ver. 14 הַ She is like the ships of the merchant—  
Bringeth her food from afar.

She is (LXX. *ἐγένετο*) like merchant ships (בְּאֵינִיֹּת, indeterminate, and thus to be read *kōṣnîjōth*), *i.e.* she has the art of such ships as sail away and bring wares from a distance, are equipped, sent out, and managed by an enterprising spirit; so the prudent, calculating look of the brave wife, directed towards the care and the advancement of her house, goes out beyond the nearest circle; she descries also distant opportunities of advantageous purchase and profitable exchange, and brings in from a distance what is necessary for the supply of her house, or, mediately, what yields this supply (מִמְרָחֵק, Cod. *Jaman*. מִמְרָחֵק, cf. under Isa. x. 6), for she finds that source of gain she has espied. With this diligence in her duties she is not a long sleeper, who is not awakened till the sun is up; but

Ver. 15 וַ She riseth up while it is yet night,  
And giveth food to her house,  
And the fixed portion to her maidens.

The *fut. consec.* express, if not a logical sequence of connection, yet a close inner binding together of the separate features of the character here described. Early, ere the morning dawns,

such a housewife rises up, because she places care for her house above her own comfort; or rather, because this care is to her a satisfaction and a joy. Since now the poet means without doubt to say that she is up before the other inmates of the house, especially before the children, though not before the maids: we have not, in וְהָיָה, to think that the inmates of the house, all in the morning night-watch, stand round about her, and that each receives from her a portion for the approaching day; but that she herself, early, whilst yet the most are asleep, gives out or prepares the necessary portions of food for the day (cf. וְהָיָה, Isa. liii. 9). Regarding פָּרֶה, food, from פָּרָה (to tear in pieces, viz. with the teeth), and regarding חֶלֶק, a portion decreed, *vid.* at xxx. 8. It is true that חֶלֶק also means the appointed labour (*pensum*), and thus the day's work (וְהָיָה יוֹם); but the parallelism brings it nearer to explain after xxx. 8, as is done by Gesenius and Hitzig after Ex. v. 14. This industry,—a pattern for the whole house,—this punctuality in the management of household matters, secures to her success in the extension of her household wealth:

Ver. 16 † She seeketh a field and getteth possession of it;

Of the fruit of her hands she planteth a vineyard.

The field which she considereth, towards which her wish and her effort are directed, is perhaps not one beyond those which she already possesses, but one which has hitherto been wanting to her family; for the poet has, after ver. 23, an inhabitant of a town in his eye,—a woman whose husband is not a landlord, but has a business in the city. The perf. וְהָיָה precedes and gives circumstantiality to the chief *factum* expressed by וְהָיָה. Regarding וְהָיָה, *vid.* xxi. 27. “וְהָיָה is the general expression for purchasing, as וְהָיָה, 24b, for selling. Thus the Aram. and Arab. وَهَدَى, while, (Arab.) *akhadh w'ta*, Turk. *alisch werisch* (from *elmek*, to take, and *wirmek*, to give—viz. *şâtün*, in the way of selling; Lat. *venum*), post.-bibl. מִשָּׂא וּמָכָר or מִכָּר וּמִשָּׂא, denotes giving and taking = business in general” (Fleischer). In 16b the *Chethîb* is, with Ewald and Bertheau, to be read נָטַע, and, with Hitzig, to be made dependent on וְהָיָה, as parallel obj.: “of her hands' fruit (she gaineth) a planting of vines.” But a planting of vines would be expressed by מִשָּׂא כֶּרֶם (Mic. i. 6); and the *Kerî* נָטַע is more acceptable. The perf., as a

fundamental verbal form, is here the expression of the abstract present: she plants a vineyard, for she purchases vines from the profit of her industry (Isa. vii. 23, cf. v. 2). The poet has this augmented household wealth in his eye, for he continues:

Ver. 17 ה She girdeth her loins with strength,  
And moveth vigorously her arms.

Strength is as the girdle which she wraps around her body (Ps. xciii. 1). We write <sup>ה</sup>גִּירָה <sup>ב</sup>עֲזָה; both words have *Munach*, and the <sup>ב</sup> of <sup>ב</sup>עֲזָה is aspirated. Thus girded with strength, out of this fulness of strength she makes firm or steels her arms (cf. Ps. lxxxix. 22). The produce of the field and vineyard extend far beyond the necessity of her house; thus a great portion is brought to sale, and the gain thence arising stimulates the industry and the diligence of the unwearied woman.

Ver. 18 ו She perceiveth that her gain is good;  
And her light goeth not out at night.

The perf. and fut. are related to each other as antecedent and consequent, so that 18a can also be rendered as an hypothetical antecedent. She comes to find (taste) how profitable her industry is by the experience resulting from the sale of its product: the corn, the grapes, and the wine are found to be good, and thus her gain (cf. iii. 14) is better, this opened new source of nourishment productive.

This spurs on her active industry to redoubled effort, and at times, when she is not fully occupied by the oversight of her fields and vineyard, she has another employment over which her light goes not out till far in the night. בִּלְיָה is, as at Lam. ii. 19, a needless *Kerî* for the poetic בִּלְיָל (Isa. xvi. 3). What other business it is to which she gives attention till in the night, is mentioned in the next verse.

Ver. 19 ו She putteth her hand to the rock [*Spinnrocken*];  
And her fingers lay hold on the spindle.

She applies herself to the work of spinning, and performs it with skill. The phrase שָׁלַח יָדָהּ (שָׁלַח, Job xxviii. 9) signifies to take up an object of work, and תָּמְקָהּ, with obj. accus. (cf. Amos i. 5), the handling of the instrument of work necessary thereto. כַּפַּיִם denotes the hands when the subject is skilful, successful work; we accordingly say יָגִיעַ כַּפַּיִם, not יָגִיעַ יָדַיִם; cf. vers. 13 and 16,

Ps. lxxviii. 72. What פֶּלֶךְ means is shown by the Arab. *falakat*, which, as distinguished from *mighzal*, i.e. *fuseau* (Lat. *fusus*), is explained by *bout arrondi et conique au bas dit fuseau*, thus: the whorl, i.e. the ring or knob fastened on the spindle below, which gives it its necessary weight and regulates its movement, Lat. *verticellus*, post-bibl. פִּיקָה (which Bartenora glosses by the Ital. *fusajuolo*) or צִנּוּרָה, e.g. *Kelim* ix. 6, כּוֹשׁ שְׂבֹלַע אֶת הַצִּנּוּרָה, a spindle which holds the whorl hidden (*vid.* Aruch under כּוֹשׁ, iii.). But the word then also signifies *per synecdochen partis pro toto*, the spindle, i.e. the cylindrical wood on which the thread winds itself when spinning (cf. 2 Sam. iii. 29, where it means the staff on which the infirm leans); Homer gives to Helen and the goddesses golden spindles (χρυσσηλάκατοι). Accordingly it is not probable that כִּישוּר also denotes the whorl, as Kimchi explains the word: “כִּישוּר is that which one calls by the name *verteil*, viz. that which one fixes on the spindle (פֶּלֶךְ) above to regulate the spinning (מַטְוֶה),” according to which the *Venet.* renders כִּישוּר by σφόνδυλος, whorl, and פֶּלֶךְ by ἄτρακτος, spindle. The old interpreters have not recognised that כִּישוּר denotes a thing belonging to the spinning apparatus; the LXX., Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, Syr., and Jerome see therein an ethical idea (from כִּישַׁר, to be capable, able); but Luther, not misled thereby, translates with unusual excellence:

She stretches her hand to the rock,  
And her fingers grasp the spindle.

He has in this no predecessors, except only the Targumists, whose כּוֹנֶשֶׁרָא (*vid.* Levy) appears also to denote the spinning-rock. The Syriac and Talmudic כּוֹשׁ, which is compared by Gesenius-Dietrich, is another word, and denotes, not the rock, but the spindle. Immanuel also, who explains פֶּלֶךְ as the מַעוֹל, i.e. the spindle, understands (as perhaps also Parchon) by כִּישוּר the rock. And why should not the rock (*wocken* = distaff), i.e. the stock to which the tuft of flax, hemp, or wool is fixed for the purpose of being spun, Lat. *colus*, not be named כִּישוּר, from כִּישַׁר, to be upright as a stick, upright in height, or perhaps more correctly as מְכַשֵּׁר, i.e. as that which prepares or makes fit the flax for spinning? Also in צִינֶק, Jer. xxix. 26, there are united the meanings of the close and the confining dungeon, and שִׁלּוֹן = שְׁלָה

signifies<sup>1</sup> the place which yields rest. The spinning-wheel is a German invention of the 16th century, but the rock standing on the ground, or held also in the hands, the spindle and the whorl, are more ancient.<sup>2</sup> With the spindle תמך stands in fit relation, for it is twirled between the fingers, as Catullus says of Fate:

*Libratum tereti versabat pollice fusum.*<sup>3</sup>

That which impels the housewife to this labour is not selfishness, not a narrow-hearted limitation of her care to the circle of what is her own, but love, which reaches out far beyond this circle:

Ver. 20 ב She holdeth out her hand to the unfortunate,  
And stretcheth forth her hands to the needy.

With בָּפִיָּה, 19b, is connected the idea of artistic skilfulness; with בָּפִיָּה, here that of offering for counsel (*vid.* at Isa. ii. 6); with sympathy and readiness to help, she presents herself to those who are oppressed by the misfortunes of life as if for an alliance, as if saying: place confidence in me, I shall do whatever I can—there thou hast my hand! Hitzig erroneously thinks of the open hand with a gift lying in it: this ought to be named, for כָּה in itself is nothing else than the half-opened

<sup>1</sup> Otherwise, but improbably, Schultens: *colus a כֶּשֶׁר = katr kathr, necti in orbem, circumnecti in globum.* In פֶּלֶף, whence פֶּלֶף, he rightly finds the primary meaning of *circumvolutio sive gyratio.*

<sup>2</sup> A view of the ancient art of spinning is afforded by the figures of the 12th Dynasty (according to Lepsius, 2380–2167 B.C.) in the burial chamber of Beni Hassan (270 kilometres above Bulak, on the right bank of the Nile). M. J. Henry, in his work *L'Egypte Pharaonique* (Paris 1846), Bd. 2, p. 431, mentions that there are figures there which represent “*toutes les opérations de la fabrication des tissus depuis le filage jusqu'au tissage.*” Then he continues: *Les fuseaux dont se servent les fileuses sont exactement semblables aux nôtres, et on voit même ces fileuses imprimer le mouvement de rotation à ces fuseaux, en en froissant le bout inférieur entre leur main et leur cuisse.*

<sup>3</sup> In the “marriage of Peleus and Thetis,” Catullus describes the work of the Fates: “Their hands are ceaselessly active at their never-ending work; while the left holds the rock, surrounded with a soft fleece, the right assiduously draws the thread and forms it with raised fingers; then it swiftly turns the spindle, with the thumb stretched down, and swings it away in whirling circles.” Then follows the refrain of the song of the Fates:

*Currite ducentes subtegmina, currite, fusi.*

(After HERTZBERG's Translation.)

hand. Also in 20b we are not to think of alms. Here Hitzig rightly: she stretches out to him both of her hands, that he might grasp them, both of them, or whichever he may. She does not throw to him merely a gift from a distance, but above all she gives to him to experience her warm sympathy (cf. Ezek. xvi. 49). Here, as at 19a, שלחה is punctuated (with *Dagesh*) as *Piel*. The punctuation supposes that the author both times not unintentionally made use of the intensive form. This one verse (20) is complete in itself as a description of character; and the author has done well in choosing such strong expressions, for, without this sympathy with misery and poverty, she, so good and trustworthy and industrious, might indeed be pleasing to her husband, but not to God. One could almost wish that greater expansion had been given to this one feature in the picture. But the poet goes on to describe her fruitful activity in the nearest sphere of her calling:

Ver. 21 ל She is not afraid of the snow for her house;  
For her whole house is clothed in scarlet.

A fall of snow in the rainy season of winter is not rare in Palestine, the Hauran, and neighbouring countries, and is sometimes accompanied with freezing cold.<sup>1</sup> She sees approaching the cold time of the year without any fear for her house, even though the season bring intense cold; for her whole house, i.e. the whole of the members of her family, are לבש שנים. The connection is accusativus (*Venet.* ἐνδεδυμένος ἐρυθρά), as at 2 Sam. xv. 32; Ezek. ix. 2, 3. שני, from שנה, to shine, glance clear, or high red, and is with or without תולעת the name of the colour of the *Kermes* worm, crimson or scarlet, perhaps to be distinguished from ארנן, the red-purple shell colour, and תכלת, the blue. שנים are clothing or material coloured with such שני (bright red) (*vid.* at Isa. i. 18). The explanation of the word by *dibapha* is inadmissible, because the doubled colouring, wherever it is mentioned, always refers to the purple, particularly that of Tyre (*dibapha Tyria*), not to the scarlet.<sup>2</sup> But why does the poet name scarlet-coloured clothing? On

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* regarding a fall of snow in Jerusalem, the journal *Saat auf Hoffnung* Jahrg. 3, Heft 3; and in the Hauran Comm. to Job xxxviii. 22.

*Vid.* Blümner's *Die gewerbliche Thätigkeit der Völker des klassischen Alterthums* (1869), p. 21 f.

account of the contrast to the white snow, says Hitzig, he clothes the family in crimson. But this contrast would be a meaningless freak. Rather it is to be supposed that there is ascribed to the red material a power of retaining the heat, as there is to the white that of keeping off the heat; but evidences for this are wanting. Therefore Rosenmüller, Vaihinger, and Böttcher approve of the translation *duplicibus* (Jerome, Luther) [= with double clothing], because they read, with the LXX., שָׁנִים.<sup>1</sup> But, with right, the Syr., Targ. abide by וְהוֹרִיטָא, scarlet. The scarlet clothing is of wool, which as such preserves warmth, and, as high-coloured, appears at the same time dignified (2 Sam. i. 24). From the protecting, and at the same time ornamental clothing of the family, the poet proceeds to speak of the bed-places, and of the attire of the housewife:

Ver. 22 מַ She prepareth for herself pillows;  
Linen and purple is her raiment.

Regarding מְרַבְּרִים (with ב *raphatum*), *vid.* at vii. 16. Thus, pillows or mattresses (Aquila, Theodotion, περιστρώματα; Jerome, *stragulatam vestem*; Luther, *Decke* = coverlets) to make the bed soft and to adorn it (Kimchi: לְיִפּוֹת עַל הַמַּטּוֹת; according to which Venet. κόσμια); Symmachus designates it as ἀμφιτάπους, i.e. τάπητες (*tapetæ*, *tapetia*, carpets), which are hairy (shaggy) on both sides.<sup>2</sup> Only the LXX. makes out of it δισσὰς χλαίνας, lined overcoats, for it brings over שָׁנִים. By עֲשֶׂתָּהָלָהּ it is not meant that she prepares such pillows for her own bed, but that she herself (i.e. for the wants of her house) prepares them. But she also clothes herself in costly attire. שֵׁשׁ (an Egyptian word, not, as Heb., derived from שָׁשׁ, cogn. יֵשֵׁשׁ, to be white) is the old name for linen, according to which the Aram. translates it by בוּץ, the Greek by βύσσος, *vid.* *Genesis*, pp. 470, 557, to which the remark is to be added, that

<sup>1</sup> The LXX. reads together שָׁנִים מְרַבְּרִים, δισσὰς χλαίνας, and brings into vers. 21 (her husband remains without care for the members of the family if it does not snow χιονίζῃ, as it is to be read for χρονίζῃ) and 22 the husband, who appears to the translator too much kept in the background.

<sup>2</sup> *Vid.* Lombroso, *Recherches sur l'Economie politique de l'Egypte sous les Lagides* (Turin, 1870), p. 111; *des tapis de laine de première qualité, pourpres, laineux des deux côtés* (ἀμφιτάποι).

the linen [Byssus], according to a prevailing probability, was not a fine cotton cloth, but linen cloth. Luther translates שֵׁשׁ, here and elsewhere, by *weisse Seide* [white silk] (σηρικόν, i.e. from the land of the Σῆρες, Rev. xviii. 12); but the silk is first mentioned by Ezekiel under the name of שֵׁשׁ; and the ancients call the country where silk-stuff (*bombycina*) was woven, uniformly Assyria. אֶרֶץ אֲרָם (Aram. אֲרָם, derived by Benfey, with great improbability, from the rare Sanscrit word *râgarant*, red-coloured; much rather from אֲרָם = אֶרֶם, as stuff of variegated colour) is red purple; the most valuable purple garments were brought from Tyre and Sidon.

Now, first, the description turns back to the husband, of the woman who is commended, mentioned in the introduction:

Ver. 23 ; Well known in the gates is her husband,  
Where he sitteth among the elders of the land.

Such a wife is, according to xii. 4, אֵלֶּיךָ בָּעָר, —she advances the estimation and the respect in which her husband is held. He has, in the gates where the affairs of the city are deliberated upon, a well-known, reputable name; for there he sits, along with the elders of the land, who are chosen into the council of the city as the chief place of the land, and has a weighty voice among them. The phrase wavers between נִדָּע (LXX. περίβλεπτος γίνεται; Venet. ἔλνωσται) and נִדָּע. The old Venetian edd. have in this place (like the Cod. Jaman.), and at Ps. ix. 17, נִדָּע; on the contrary, Ps. lxxvi. 2, Eccles. vi. 10, נִדָּע, and that is correct; for the Masora, at this place and at Ps. lxxvi. 2 (in the *Biblia rabb.*), is disfigured. The description, following the order of the letters, now directs attention to the profitable labour of the housewife:

Ver. 24 ▢ She prepareth body-linen and selleth it,  
And girdles doth she give to the Phœnicians.

It is a question whether סִדָּן signifies σινδών, cloth from *Sindhu*, the land of India (*vid.* at Isa. iii. 23); the Arab. *sadn* (*sadl*), to cause to hang down, to descend (for the purpose of covering or veiling), offers an appropriate verbal root. In the Talmud, סִדָּן is the sleeping linen, the curtain, the embroidered cloth, but particularly a light smock-frock, as summer costume, which was worn on the bare body (cf. Mark xiv. 51 f.). Kimchi explains the word by night-shirt; the *Edictum Diocle-*

*tiani*, xviii. 16, names *σινδόνες κοιταρίαι*, as the *Papyrus Louvre*, *ὀθόνια ἐγκοιμήτρια*; and the connection in the Edict shows that linen attire (*ἐκ λίνου*) is meant, although—as with *שֵׁט*, so also with *סָרִיָן*—with the ancients and the moderns, sometimes linen and sometimes cotton is spoken of without any distinction. *Æthicus* speaks of costly girdles, *Cosmogr.* 84, as fabricated at Jerusalem: *baltea regalia . . . ex Hierosolyma allata*; Jerusalem and Scythopolis were in later times the chief places in Palestine for the art of weaving. In Galilee also, where excellent flax grew, the art of weaving was carried on; and the *ὀθόνια*, which, according to *Clemens Alex. Pædag.* ii. 10, p. 239, were exported *ἐκ γῆς Ἑβραίων*, are at least in their material certainly synon. with *σινδόνες*. Regarding *נָתַן*, syn. *מָכַר*, opp. *לָקַח*, syn. *נָשָׂא* = *קָנָה*, *vid.* at 16*a*. There is no reason to interpret *פָּנַעְנִי* here, with the obliteration of the ethnographical meaning, in the general sense of *כַּתֵּר*, trader, merchant; for purple, 22*b*, is a Phœnician manufacture, and thus, as an article of exchange, can be transferred to the possession of the industrious wife. The description is now more inward:

Ver. 25 *י* Strength and honour is her clothing;  
Thus she laugheth at the future day.

She is clothed with *יָץ*, strength, *i.e.* power over the changes of temporal circumstances, which easily shatter and bring to ruin a household resting on less solid foundations; clothed with *הָדָר*, glory, *i.e.* elevation above that which is low, little, common, a state in which they remain who propose to themselves no high aim after which they strive with all their might: in other words, her raiment is just pride, true dignity, with which she looks confidently into the future, and is armed against all sorrow and care. The connection of ideas, *עַז וְהָדָר* (defectively written, on the contrary, at *Ps.* lxxxiv. 6, *Masora*, and only there written *plene*, and with *Munach*), instead of the frequent *הָדָר וְהָדָר*, occurs only here. The expression 25*b* is like *Job* xxxix. 7, wherefore *Hitzig* rightly compares *Job* xxiv. 14 to 25*a*. *יּוֹם אֲחֵרֶת*, distinguished from *אֲחֵרִית*, and incorrectly interpreted (*Rashi*) of the day of death, is, as at *Isa.* xxx. 8, the future, here that which one at a later period may enter upon.

The next verse presents one of the most beautiful features in the portrait :

Ver. 26 פ She openeth her mouth with wisdom,  
And amiable instruction is on her tongue.

The פ of פִּתְחָהּ is, as also at Ps. xlix. 5, lxxviii. 2, that of means: when she speaks, then it is wisdom pressing itself from her heart outward, by means of which she breaks the silence of her mouth. With על, in the expression 26b, elsewhere תַּחַת interchanges: under the tongue, Ps. x. 7, one has that which is ready to be spoken out, and on the tongue, Ps. xv. 3, that which is in the act of being spoken out. תּוֹרַת־חֶסֶד is a genitive connection after the manner of *tôrath* אֶמֶת, Mal. ii. 6. The gen. is not, as at Lev. vi. 2, in *tôrath* הָעֵלִיָּה, the gen. of the object (thus *e.g.* Fleischer's *institutio ad humanitatem*), but the gen. of property, but not so that חסד denotes grace (Symmachus, νόμος ἐπίχαρις; Theodotion, νόμος χάριτος), because for this meaning there is no example except Isa. xl. 6; and since חסד in the O. T. is the very same as in the N. T., love, which is the fulfilling of the law, Hos. vi. 6, cf. 1 Kings xx. 31,<sup>1</sup> it is supposed that the poet, since he writes תּוֹרַת חֶסֶד, and not תּוֹרַת חֵן, means to designate by חֶסֶד this property without which her love for her husband, her industry, her high sentiment, would be no virtues, viz. unselfish, sympathizing, gentle love. Instruction which bears on itself the stamp of such amiability, and is also gracious, *i.e.* awakening love, because going forth from love (according to which Luther, translating *holdselige Lere* = pleasing instructions, thus understands it)—such instruction she carries, as house-mother (i. 8), in her mouth. Accordingly the LXX. translate (*vid.* Lagarde regarding the mistakes of this text before us) θεσμοὶ ἐλεημοσύνης, and Jerome *lex clementiæ*. חֶסֶד is related to אֲהַבָה as grace to love; it denotes love showing itself in kindness and gracefulness, particularly condescending love, proceeding from a compassionate sympathy with the sufferings and wants of men. Such graceful instruction she communicates

<sup>1</sup> Immanuel remarks that *Tôrath* חסד probably refers to the *Tôra*, and חסד שְׂכֻלָּה, *i.e.* which is wholly love, which goes forth in love, to the *Gesetz* = statute.

now to this and now to that member of her household, for nothing that goes on in her house escapes her observation.

Ver. 27 **ו** She looketh well to the ways of her house,  
And eateth not the bread of idleness.

Although there exists an inner relation between 27a and ver. 26, yet 27a is scarcely to be thought of (Hitzig) as appos. to the suffix in **לְשׁוֹנָהּ**. Participles with or without determination occur in descriptions frequently as predicates of the subject standing in the discourse of the same force as abstr. present declarations, e.g. Isa. xl. 22 f., Ps. civ. 13 f. **צוּפִיָּה** is connected with the accus. of the object of the intended warning, like xv. 3, and is compared according to the form with **הַמָּיָה**, vii. 11. **הַלִּכָּה** signifies elsewhere things necessary for a journey, Job vi. 19, and in the plur. *magnificus* it denotes show (*pompa*), Hab. iii. 6 : but originally the walk, conduct, Nah. ii. 6 ; and here in the plur. walks = comings and goings, but not these separately, but in general, the *modi procedendi* (LXX. *διατρίβαι*). The *Chethîb* has **הִלְכֹת**, probably an error in writing, but possibly also the plur. of **הִלְכָּה**, thus found in the post.-bibl. Heb. (after the form **צִדְקוֹת**), custom, viz. appointed traditional law, but also like the Aram. **הִלְכָּא** (*emph.* **הִלְכְתָּא**), usage, manner, common practice. Hitzig estimates this *Chethîb*, understood Talmudically, as removing the section into a late period ; but this Talmudical signification is not at all appropriate (Hitzig translates, with an incorrect rendering of **צוּפִיָּה**, “for she sees after the ordering of the house”), and besides the Aram. **הִלְכָּא**, e.g. Targ. Prov. xvi. 9, in the first line, signifies only the walk or the manner and way of going, and this gives with the *Kerî* essentially the same signification. Luther well: *Sie schawet wie es in jrem Hause zugeht* [= she looks how it goes in her house]. Her eyes are turned everywhere ; she is at one time here, at another there, to look after all with her own eyes ; she does not suffer the day’s work, according to the instructions given, to be left undone, while she folds her own hands on her bosom ; but she works, keeping an oversight on all sides, and does not eat the bread of idleness (**עֲצָלָה** = **עֲצָלוּת**, xix. 15), but bread well deserved, for **εἴ τις οὐ θέλει ἐργάζεσθαι, μηδὲ ἐσθιέτω**, 2 Thess. iii. 10.

Now begins the finale of this song in praise of the virtuous woman :

Ver. 28 ק Her sons rise up and bless her,  
Her husband (riseth up) and praiseth her.

The *Piel* אָשַׁר in such a connection is denom. of אִשָּׁר (אִשְׁרָי). Her children rise up (קִים, like *e.g.* Jer. xxvi. 17, but here, perhaps, with the associated idea of reverential honour) and bless her, that she has on her part brought the house and them to such prosperity, such a position of respect, and to a state where love (חֶסֶד) reigns, and her husband rises up and sings her praise.

Ver. 29 ר “ Many are the daughters who have done bravely,  
But thou hast surpassed them all together.”

We have already often remarked, last time under xxix. 6, that רַב, not indeed in its sing., but in its plur. רַבִּים and רַבּוֹת, can precede, after the manner of a numeral, as attribute; but this syntactical licence, xxviii. 12, by no means appears, and needs to be assumed as little here as at viii. 26, although there is no reason that can be adduced against it. עָשָׂה חֵל signifies here not the gaining of riches (the LXX., Syr., Targ., Jerome, Luther, Gesenius, Böttcher, and others), which here, where the encomium comes to its height, would give to it a mercenary mammon-worship note—it indeed has this signification only when connected with ל of the person: *Sibi opes acquirere*, Deut. vi. 17; Ezek. xxviii. 4—but: bravery, energy, and, as the reference to אִשָּׁה חֵל demands, moral activity, capacity for activity, in accordance with one's calling, ποιεῖν ἀρετήν, by which the *Venet.* translates it. בָּנוֹת is, as in the primary passages, Gen. xxx. 13, Song vi. 9, a more delicate, finer name of women than נָשִׁים: many daughters there have always been who have unfolded ability, but thou my spouse hast raised thyself above them all, *i.e.* thou art excellent and incomparable. Instead of עָלִית, there is to be written, after Chajug, Aben Ezra (*Zachoth* 7a), and Jekuthiel under Gen. xvi. 11, עָלִיתָ; the Spanish *Nakdanim* thus distinguish the forms מָצָאתָ, thou hast found, and מָצְאתָ, she has found. בָּלָנָה, for בָּלָן, Gen. xlii. 36. What now follows is not a continuation of the husband's words of praise (Ewald, Elster, Löwenstein), but an *epiphonema auctoris*

(Schultens); the poet confirms the praise of the husband by referring it to the general ground of its reason:

Ver. 30 ו Grace is deceit; and beauty, vanity—

A wife that feareth Jahve, she shall be praised.

Grace is deceit, because he who estimates the works of a wife merely by the loveliness of her external appearance, is deceived by it; and beauty is vanity, *vanitas*, because it is nothing that remains, nothing that is real, but is subject to the law of all material things—transitoriness. The true value of a wife is measured only by that which is enduring, according to the moral background of its external appearance; according to the piety which makes itself manifest when the beauty of bodily form has faded away, in a beauty which is attractive.<sup>1</sup> יִרְאַת (with *Makkeph* following)<sup>2</sup> is here the connective form of יִרְאַה (fem. of יָרָא). The *Hithpa.* הִתְהַלֵּל is here manifestly (xxvii. 2) not reflexive, but representative of the passive (cf. xii. 8, and the frequently occurring מְהֻלָּל, *laudatus* = *laudandus*), nowhere occurring except in the passage before us. In itself the fut. may also mean: she will be praised = is worthy of praise, but the jussive rendering (Luther: Let her be praised) is recommended by the verse which follows:

Ver. 31 ה Give to her of the fruit of her hands;

And let her works praise her in the gates!

The fruit of her hands is the good which, by her conduct, she has brought to maturity,—the blessing which she has secured for others, but, according to the promise (Isa. iii. 10), has also secured for her own enjoyment. The first line proceeds on the idea that, on account of this blessing, she herself shall rejoice. הִנֵּנוּ-לָהּ (with *Gaja*, after *Metheg-Setzung*, § 37) is not equivalent to give to her honour because of . . .; for in that case, instead of the ambiguous מִן, another preposition—such *e.g.* as עַל—would have been used; and so הִנֵּנוּ, of itself, cannot be equi-

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* the application of ver. 30 in *Taanith* 26b: “Young man,” say the maidens, “lift up thine eyes and behold that which thou choosest for thyself! Direct thine eyes not to beauty (נוי), direct thine eyes to the family (משפחה); pleasantness is a deception, etc.”

<sup>2</sup> The writing יִרְאַת is that of Ben Asher, יִרְאַת that of Ben Naphtali; Norzi, from a misunderstanding, claims יִרְאַת (with *Gaja*) as Ben Asher's manner of writing.

valent to תָּנוּ (sing the praise of), as Ziegler would read, after Judg. xi. 40. It must stand with כבוד, or instead of מִפְּרִי an accus. obj. is to be thought of, as at Ps. lxxviii. 35, Deut. xxxii. 3, which the necessity of the case brings with it,—the giving, as a return in the echo of the song of praise. Immanuel is right in explaining תְּנוּלָה by חסד or חסד וכבוד or חסד, cf. Ps. xxviii. 4. The מִן, as is not otherwise to be expected, after תָּנוּ is partitive: give to her something of the fruit of her hands, *i.e.* recompense it to her, render it thankfully, by which not exclusively a requital in the form of honourable recognition, but yet this specially, is to be thought of. Her best praise is her works themselves. In the gates, *i.e.* in the place where the representatives of the people come together, and where the people are assembled, her works praise her; and the poet desires that this may be right worthily done, full of certainty that she merits it, and that they honour themselves who seek to praise the works of such a woman, which carry in themselves their own commendation.

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#### NOTE.

##### *The Proverbs peculiar to the Alexandrine Translation.*

In the LXX. there are not a few proverbs which are not found in the Heb. text, or, as we may express it, are peculiar to the Egyptian Text Recension, as distinguished from the Palestinean. The number is not so great as they appear to be on a superficial examination; for many of these apparently independent proverbs are duplicate translations. In many places there follows the Greek translation of the Heb. proverbs another translation, *e.g.* at i. 14, 27, ii. 2, iii. 15, iv. 10, vi. 25*b*, x. 5, xi. 16, xiv. 22, xv. 6, xvi. 26, xxiii. 31, xxix. 7*b*, 25, xxxi. 29*a*. These duplicate translations are found sometimes at different places, *e.g.* xvii. 20*b* is duplicate to xvii. 16*d*; xix. 15 is duplicate to xviii. 8; xxii. 9*cd* = xix. 6*b*, i. 19*b*; xxix. 17 is duplicate to xxviii. 17*cd*; or, according to the enumeration of the verses as it lies before us, not within the compass of one verse to which they belong: xxii. 8, 9 is a duplicate transla-

tion of ver. 8*b* and 9*a* of the Heb. text; xxiv. 23, xxx. 1, a duplicate translation of xxx. 1; and xxxi. 26, 27*b*, of xxxi. 26 of the Heb. text.<sup>1</sup> Everywhere, here, along with the translated proverb of our Heb. text, there is not an independent one. Also one has to be on his guard against seeing independent proverbs where the translator only, at his own will, modified one of the Heb. proverbs lying before us, as *e.g.* at x. 10, xiii. 23, xix. 7, as he here and there lets his Alexandrine exegesis influence him, ii. 16 *f.*, v. 5, ix. 6, and adds explanatory clauses, ii. 19, iii. 18, v. 3, ix. 12; seldom fortunate in this, oftener, as at i. 18, 22, 28, ix. 12, xxviii. 10, showing by these interpolations his want of knowledge. There are also, in the translation, here and there passages introduced from some other part of Scripture, *e.g.*: i. 7*ab* = Ps. cxi. 10, LXX.; iii. 22*cd* = iii. 8; iii. 28*c* = xxvii. 1*b*, xiii. 5*c*, from Ps. cxii. 5, cf. xxxvii. 21; xvi. 1 (ὄσφ' μέγας κ.τ.λ.) = Sir. iii. 18; xxvi. 11*cd* = Sir. iv. 21. A free reminiscence, such as xvi. 17, may speak a certain independence, but not those borrowed passages.

Keeping out of view all this only apparent independence, we place together the independent proverbs contained in the LXX., and, along with them, we present a translation of them into Heb. Such a translation has already been partly attempted by Ewald, Hitzig, and Lagarde; perhaps we have been here and there more fortunate in our rendering. It is certainly doubtful whether the translator found all these proverbs existing in Heb. Many of them appear to be originally Greek. But the rendering of them into Hebrew is by no means useless. It is of essential importance in forming a judgment regarding the original language.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> One must suppose that here translations of other Greeks, which were placed alongside of the LXX. in Origen's *Hexapla*, were taken up into the LXX. But this is not confirmed: these duplicates were component parts of the LXX., which Origen and the Syriac translators found already existing.

[<sup>2</sup> These the translator has not printed, because, however interesting it may be to the student of the Hebrew language as such, to compare Delitzsch's renderings into Hebrew with the Greek original, as placed before him, they may be here omitted, inasmuch as all that is of importance on the subject, in an exegetical point of view, has been already embodied in the Commentary.]

There are a few grains of wheat, and, on the other hand, much chaff, in these proverbs that are peculiar to the LXX. They are not, in the most remote way, fit to supply the place of the many proverbs of our Heb. text which are wanting in the LXX. One must also here be cautious in examining them. Thus, *e.g.*, xvii. 19 stands as a proverb of only one line; the second forms a part of ver. 16. As true defects, we have noticed the following proverbs and parts of proverbs: i. 16, vii. 25*b*, viii. 32*b*, 33, xi. 3*b*, 4, 10*b*, xviii. 8, 23, 24, xix. 1, 2, 15, xxi. 5, xxii. 6, xxiii. 23, xxv. 20*a*. All these proverbs and parts of proverbs of the Heb. text are wanting in the LXX.

It is difficult to solve the mystery of this Alexandrine translation, and to keep separate from each other the Text Recension which the translator had before him, the transformations and corrections which, of his own authority, he made on the corruptions which the text of the translation, as it came from the first translator and the later revisers of it, has suffered in the course of time. They appear in Egypt to have been as arbitrary as incompetent in handling the sacred Scriptures. The separating from each other of the proverbs of Agur and Lemuel, xxx.-xxxi. 9, has its side-piece in the separation of Jeremiah's proœmiums of the prophecies concerning the people, Jer. xxv.

# INDEXES

## I.—WORDS ETYMOLOGICALLY EXPLAINED.

- אָבד, x. 28, xix. 9.  
אָבוי, xxiii. 29.  
אָבוס, xiv. 4.  
אָנור, *pr. n.*, xxx. 1.  
אָהלים, vii. 17.  
אול, xiv. 24.  
אָולת, v. 23, xiv. 24.  
אָול, xx. 14.  
אָטון, vii. 16.  
אָיפה, xx. 10.  
אָישן, vii. 2.  
אָיתן, xiii. 15.  
אָכזרי, xvii. 12.  
אָכף, xvi. 26.  
אָל, xxii. 7.  
אָלוי, ii. 17.  
אָלקום, xxx. 31.  
אָלף, xxii. 24.  
אָלף, xiv. 4.  
אָמון, viii. 30.  
אָמן, *Hiphil*, xxvi. 25,  
*note*, cf. viii. 30.  
אָנה, xii. 21.  
אָסם, iii. 10.  
אָף, xi. 31, cf. xv. 11.  
אָפן, xxv. 11.  
אָצל, vii. 8.  
אָרנמן, xxxi. 22.  
אָרחה, xv. 17.  
אָרר, iii. 33.  
אָישן, xx. 20  
אָשנב, vii. 6.  
אָשֶׁר, iv. 14.  
בָּנר, ii. 19, xi. 3.  
R. בר, x. 28, xix. 9.  
בָּהל, xxviii. 22.  
בָּהמה, xii. 1.  
בּוֹשׁ, xxix. 26.  
בָּחור, xx. 30.  
בָּחן, xvii. 3.  
בָּטָה (בָּטָא), xii. 18.  
בָּטַח, iii. 5.  
בָּטן, xiii. 25, xx. 27.  
בֵּין, i. 2.  
בָּל, xxiv. 23.  
בָּלִיעַל, vi. 12.  
בָּעַד, vi. 25.  
בָּעִיר, xii. 1, xxx.  
2, *note*.  
בָּקָר, i. 28.  
בָּקֵשׁ, xi. 27.  
R. בר, xxx. 2, *note*.  
בָּר, xi. 26.  
בָּרִית, xviii. 19.  
בָּרַךְ, v. 18, xi. 23.  
בָּשָׂר, xiv. 30.  
נָאוה, xiv. 3.  
נָבֵר, vi. 34.  
נָדוּל, x. 28.  
נָהָה, נָהָה, xvii. 22.  
נָו, x. 13.  
נָוִי, xiv. 34.  
נָחֶלֶת, xxvi. 21.  
נָלַע, xvii. 14.  
נָם, xvii. 15.  
נָמוּל, xii. 14.  
נָף, ix. 3.  
נָרָה, R. נָר, xv. 18.  
נָרַל, נָרַל, xix. 19.  
נָרַר, xxi. 7.  
רָבָה, xxv. 9.  
רָד, v. 18.  
רָבָא, xxii. 22.  
R. דָּל, xxvi. 23, *note*.  
רָלַק, *id*.  
רָרוֹר, xxvi. 2.  
רָרֶשׁ, xi. 27, xxxi. 13.  
הָבֵל, xiii. 11.  
הָנָה, R. הָנָה, xxv. 4.  
הָרָף, x. 3.  
הָוָה, הָוָה, x. 3, xvii. 4.  
הָוִיחַ, xxiv. 26, *note*.  
הָוִן, i. xxx. 15.  
הָיָה, x. 3, *Niph.* xiii. 19

Wāla (Arab.), *confu-*  
*gere*, xxxi. 1.

חָרָה, xxi. 8.

R. *wk* (Arab.), xxix. 13.

Wakīha, wakay (Arab.),  
xxx. 1.

חָרָה, xi. 2.

R. זכרה, חָרָה, xviii. 11,  
xx. 9.

חָרָה, xvi. 2.

חָרָה, חָרָה, i. 4, x. 23,  
xxi. 27, xxx. 32, *note*.

חָרָה, חָרָה, xxii. 14.

חָרָה, xx. 29.

חָרָה, *canere*, xxx. 31.

חָרָה, *cingere*, xxx. 31.

חָרָה, xxi. 14.

חָרָה, xx. 30.

חָרָה, xiii. 13.

חָרָה, xxvii. 17.

חָרָה, xv. 19.

חָרָה, vii. 27, xviii. 8.

חָרָה, חָרָה, xxvi. 9.

חָרָה, xxvii. 3, *note*.

חָרָה, v. 16.

חָרָה, viii. 36.

חָרָה, vii. 16.

חָרָה, xiv. 3.

חָרָה, i. 6, xxii. 21, *note*.

חָרָה, x. 28, xiii. 22.

חָרָה, חָרָה, v. 20, xvi. 33,  
xxi. 14.

חָרָה, v. 3.

חָרָה, xxiii. 29.

חָרָה, חָרָה, i. 2, x. 1.

R. חָרָה, חָרָה, xiii. 12,  
xix. 6.

חָרָה, xxv. 12.

חָרָה, xxxi. 8.

חָרָה, xv. 1.

חָרָה, iv. 17.

חָרָה, xxii. 6.

חָרָה, xi. 9.

R. חָרָה, iii. 3, xiv. 34.

חָרָה, חָרָה, *id.*, xxv. 10.

חָרָה, חָרָה, xv. 6.

חָרָה, xxx. 4.

חָרָה, חָרָה, iii. 15, xviii.

2, xxxi. 13.

חָרָה, xix. 26.

חָרָה, ii. 4.

חָרָה, xxvii. 25.

חָרָה, xxi. 14.

R. חָרָה, חָרָה, חָרָה, xx.

17, xxx. 27.

חָרָה, *vid.* חָרָה, v. 20, xvi.

33, xxi. 14.

R. חָרָה, חָרָה, xxv. 27.

חָרָה, viii. 29.

חָרָה, חָרָה, xxiv. 31.

חָרָה, חָרָה, iii. 14, x. 4.

חָרָה, xx. 4.

חָרָה, xii. 27.

חָרָה, xx. 4.

חָרָה, *vid.* חָרָה.

חָרָה, iii. 29.

חָרָה, חָרָה, xvii. 28.

R. חָרָה, xvii. 11.

חָרָה, vi. 27.

חָרָה, חָרָה, xxiii. 28.

חָרָה, xv. 13, xxiv. 13.

חָרָה, xvi. 33.

R. חָרָה, חָרָה, ii. 1.

חָרָה, xix. 13.

חָרָה, xxiii. 4.

חָרָה, i. 2.

חָרָה, xxi. 24.

חָרָה, viii. 30.

חָרָה, iii. 19.

חָרָה, v. 19.

חָרָה, iii. 10.

חָרָה, *pr. n.*, xxx. 1.

חָרָה, xxx. 17.

חָרָה, vi. 5.

חָרָה, חָרָה, i. 13, xvii. 27.

חָרָה, ii. 7, viii. 21.

חָרָה, xi. 24.

חָרָה (?) , xii. 12, xiii. 15.

חָרָה, חָרָה, ii. 21, xiv. 13,  
xvii. 7.

חָרָה, xxv. 27.

חָרָה, iii. 19.

חָרָה, xvii. 3.

R. (Arab.) *kz*, חָרָה, xvii. 11.

R. חָרָה, xxiv. 26, *note*.

חָרָה, vi. 25.

R. חָרָה, xviii. 14.

חָרָה, חָרָה, xviii. 13,  
xxv. 8.

חָרָה, *as substantive*, xi.

19, xv. 7.

חָרָה, vii. 17.

חָרָה, i. 18, viii. 5, xvii.

21, xxiii. 9.

חָרָה, iii. 26.

חָרָה, xiv. 30.

R. חָרָה, vi. 25, xxv. 26.

חָרָה, xxxi. 19.

חָרָה (also Egypt. *ketem*),  
xxv. 12.

חָרָה, *Hiph.*, xiv. 18.

חָרָה, iv. 23, viii. 5.

R. חָרָה, חָרָה, xxv. 20.

חָרָה, x. 8.

R. חָרָה, חָרָה, xxvi. 18.

חָרָה, xviii. 8.

לֹהֶם, xxii. 7.  
 לֹחַ, ii. 15.  
 לֹחַח, iii. 3.  
 לֹוִיָּה, i. 9.  
 לָעַע, לָוַע, לָוַע, xx. 25,  
 xxiii. 2.  
 לָוִישׁ, xxx. 30.  
 R. לָךְ, iii. 26.  
 לָמוֹאֵל, xxxi. 1.  
 לָוַע, *vid.* לָוַע.  
 לָזַן, i. 6, 22, iii. 34, xxi.  
 24.  
 לָקַח, i. 5.  
 לָשֵׁן, *Hiph.*, xxx. 10.  
 לָחַע, xxx. 14.  
 מָבוֹא, viii. 3.  
 מָוֹאֵב, v. 16.  
 מָוֹדַע, vii. 5.  
 מָוֶסֶר, i. 2.  
 מָוִר, iii. 35.  
 מָוֶת, v. 5.  
 מָוֶזָּה, i. 4, v. 2.  
 R. מָלַל, vi. 13.  
 מָלֶאֶף, xiii. 17.  
 מָלַחְמָה, xv. 11, *note*.  
 מָלִיצָה, i. 6.  
 מָנֶן, xxix. 21, *note*.  
 מָנֶן, *id.*  
 מָעִז, x. 29.  
 מָעֵנָה, xvi. 4.  
 מָצָרָף, xvii. 3.  
 מָקוֹר, v. 15, xxv. 26.  
 מָר, vii. 17, *note*.  
 מָרְנָמָה, xxvi. 8.  
 מָרָר, xiv. 10.  
 מָרִי, xvii. 11.  
 מָרַק, xx. 30.

מָשָׂא, xxx. 1.  
 מָשְׁכִּית, xviii. 11, xxv.  
 11.  
 מָשְׁאוֹן, xxvi. 26.  
 מָשֶׁף, xiii. 13.  
 מָשֶׁל, i. 1.  
 מָשְׁפָּט, i. 3.  
 מָתְלַחְמִים, xviii. 8.  
 נָאוֹה, xxvi. 1.  
 נָאֵץ, v. 12.  
 נָגַד, iv. 25, viii. 6, xv.  
 11.  
 נָגִיד, viii. 6.  
 נָנָה, iv. 18, *note*.  
 נָדִיב, viii. 16, xix. 6.  
 נָהֵם, v. 11.  
 נֹב, x. 31.  
 נֹוָה, iii. 33.  
 נֹוֶחַ, xxi. 16, cf. xxix. 17.  
 נֹוֶל, v. 15.  
 נֹוֶם, xxv. 12.  
 נָחָה, vi. 22.  
 נָחַל, viii. 21, *note*.  
 נָחֵם, v. 11.  
 נִיר, xiii. 23, xxi. 4.  
 R. נָכַח, xxiv. 26,  
*note*.  
 נָכַח, iv. 25, v. 21.  
 נָכַר, xx. 11, xxiv. 23,  
 xxvi. 24.  
 נָמְלָה, vi. 6.  
 נָסֶף, viii. 23.  
 נָפֶת, v. 3, xxiv. 13.  
 נָצַח, xxi. 28.  
 נָצַל, vi. 3.  
 נָקַב, xxiv. 24.  
 נִיר, *vid.* נִיר.  
 נִרְפָּן, xvi. 28.  
 R. נֶת, iii. 17, *note*.  
 נֶתִיבָה, i. 15, iii. 17.

סָבֵא, xxiii. 21.  
 סָנְרִיר, xxvii. 15.  
 סָרִין, xxxi. 23.  
 סֹוֹד, iii. 32, xi. 13, xv.  
 22.  
 סִיס, סִיס, xxx. 24.  
 R. סָל, xv. 19.  
 סָלָף, סָלָף, xi. 3, xiii. 6,  
 xv. 4, xix. 3.  
 סָם, xxx. 28.  
 סָרַר, vii. 11.  
 עָד, viii. 26.  
 עָד, xii. 17.  
 עָזוּ, x. 29.  
 עָזוּ, viii. 28.  
 רָעַע עֵין, *vid.* עֵין.  
 עָיָף, xxv. 25.  
 עָכָם, vii. 22.  
 עָלוּקָה, xxx. 15.  
 עָל=עָלִי, viii. 2.  
 עָלָמָה, xxx. 19.  
 עָמַל, xvi. 26.  
 עָנַד, vi. 20.  
 עָנָקִים, i. 9.  
 עָצַב, v. 10, xv. 1.  
 עָצָה, xvi. 30.  
 עָצַל, vi. 9, xxvi. 14.  
 עָצַר, xxv. 28.  
 עָקַב, עָקַב, xxii. 4.  
 עָרַב, iii. 23.  
 עָרַב, R. רַב, vi. 1.  
 עָרַב, עָרַב, vii. 9.  
 עָרַמָה, i. 4.  
 עָרֶשׁ, vii. 16.  
 עָשַׁק, R. עֵשׁ, xxviii. 17.  
 עָת, xv. 23.  
 עָתַק, עָתַק, viii. 18.  
 עָתַר, xxvi. 6.

בֹּקֶה, iii. 13.  
 פֹּז, viii. 19.  
 פָּחַם, xxvi. 21.  
 פָּטַר, xvii. 14.  
 פִּיר, xix. 22.  
 פָּלַג, פָּלַג, v. 16, xxi. 1.  
 פָּלַף, xxxi. 19, *note*.  
 פָּלַם, iv. 26, v. 21.  
 R. פֶּן, xxv. 11.  
 פֶּן, v. 6, xxv. 8.  
 פְּנִינִים, iii. 15.  
 פָּסַח, xxvi. 7.  
 R. פֶּסַח, xx. 13.  
 פָּרַע, i. 25.  
 פָּרַשׁ, *Hiph.*, xxiii. 32.  
 R. פִּישׁ, xii. 13, xiii. 3.  
 פִּישָׁק, xiii. 3.  
 פִּישַׁע, פִּישַׁע, x. 19, xii. 18, xviii. 19, xxviii. 2.  
 פִּת, xxiii. 8.  
 פִּתְאֹם, vi. 15.  
 פִּתִּי, i. 4.  
 פִּתְלִי, viii. 8.  
 צֶאֱן, xxvii. 23.  
 צָבִי, vi. 5.  
 צָדֵק, xvi. 13, xxii. 21.  
 צֹדֵד, vi. 26.  
 צִיר, xiii. 17, xxvi. 14.  
 צִלְחָת, xix. 24, *note*.  
 R. צֶם, *vid.* R. טֶם.  
 צָנָה, xxv. 13.  
 צָנַע, xi. 2.  
 R. צָה, vi. 5, xxvi. 23, and *vid.* טֶם.  
 צָפָה, xv. 3.  
 צָפָה, xxvi. 23.  
 צָפוֹן, xxv. 23.  
 צָפוֹר, vi. 5, xxvi. 2.  
 צָפֹן, i. 31, x. 14.

צָפַעְנִי, xxiii. 32.  
 צָרַב, xvi. 27.  
 צָרַף, xxv. 4, xxx. 5.  
 צָרַר (to crow), xxx. 31.  
 R. קָב, xxii. 23, *note*.  
 קָבַע, xxii. 23.  
 קֹוֶף, xxx. 28.  
 קָרַן, vi. 7, xxvi. 1.  
 קָקָה, xii. 9.  
 קָפִישׁוֹנִים, xxiv. 31.  
 קָנָא, קָנָא, iii. 31.  
 קָנָה, xiv. 30.  
 קָנָה, viii. 22.  
 קָנַח, vii. 17, *note*.  
 R. קָסַם, קָסַם, xvi. 10.  
 R. קָר (to round, to dig), xxv. 26.  
 קָרַר, xvii. 27.  
 קָרַן, vi. 12.  
 R. קָשׁ, vi. 5, xvii. 4, 11.  
 קָשַׁב, i. 24, ii. 2, xvii. 4.  
 קָשַׁט, xxii. 21.  
 קָאִמֹת, xxiv. 7.  
 קָאִן, *ful. o.*, xxix. 6.  
 R. רָב, iii. 30, vi. 1, vii. 16.  
 רָבַד, vii. 16.  
 רָנַע, xii. 19.  
 רָדַם, x. 5.  
 רָדַב, vi. 3.  
 רָוֹן, xiv. 28.  
 רָוֹן, viii. 15.  
 רָחַמִּים, xii. 10.  
 רָיַב, iii. 30.  
 רָכִיל, xi. 13.  
 רָמָה, x. 4.  
 רָנַן, i. 21.  
 רָעָה, רָעָה, xxvii. 10.

רָעָה (to be considerate), xv. 14.  
 רָעָן, xxiii. 6.  
 רָעַף, iii. 20.  
 R. רָפַד, רָפַד, vii. 16.  
 רָפָא, xii. 18.  
 רָפֹחַ, xxvii. 21.  
 רָפַס, vi. 3.  
 רָצַח, xxii. 13.  
 רָקַב, x. 7.  
 R. רָשׁ, xx. 13.  
 שָׁטָה, iii. 15.  
 שָׁיְכָה, xx. 29.  
 שָׁיַח, vi. 22, *note*.  
 R. שָׁךְ (to pierce), xviii. 11, xxiii. 1.  
 שָׁכַן, xxiii. 1.  
 שָׁכַל, שָׁכַל, i. 3, iii. 4, x. 5.  
 סָנַר = שָׁכַר, xxvi. 10.  
 שָׁמַח, xiii. 9, xxi. 17.  
 שָׁמְלָה, xxx. 4.  
 שָׁמְמִית, xxx. 28.  
 שָׁפָה, v. 3.  
 שָׁאוֹל, v. 6.  
 שָׁאֵר, v. 11.  
 שָׁבַח, xxix. 11.  
 שָׁבַט, x. 13.  
 שָׁגַל, v. 16.  
 שָׁד, v. 19.  
 שָׁדַד, xix. 26.  
 שָׁוָא, xxx. 8.  
 שָׁוַק, vii. 8.  
 שָׁוַר, xiv. 4.  
 שָׁחֲקִים, iii. 20, viii. 28.  
 שָׁחַר, xiii. 24.  
 שָׁטַר, vi. 7.  
 שָׁכַר, xx. 1.

R. שָׁל, i. 13, 33, vi. 5,  
xii. 20.  
שָׁלוֹם, iii. 2, xii. 10.  
שְׁלִישׁ, xxii. 20.  
שֶׁלֶחַן, ix. 2.  
שָׁלַל, i. 13.  
שֵׁם, xxii. 1.  
שְׁמִמִּית, xxx. 28.  
שָׁנִי, xxxi. 21.  
שָׁעַר, xxiii. 7.  
שְׁעִישׁוּעִים, viii. 30.

שָׁפֵן, xxx. 26.  
שָׁקַד, viii. 34.  
שָׁקִי, iii. 8.  
שָׁקָף, *Niph.*, vii. 6.  
שָׁקַק, xxviii. 15.  
שָׁרַר, iii. 6.  
שֵׁשׁ (linen), xxxi. 22.  
  
תְּאוֹה, xviii. 1.  
תִּבֵּל, viii. 26.  
תָּד, v. 19.

תְּהַפְכוֹת, ii. 12.  
תּוֹחֶלֶת, x. 28.  
תָּוֶךְ, xxix. 13.  
תּוֹר, xii. 26.  
תּוֹשִׁיָה, ii. 7.  
תִּכְבֵּים, xxix. 13.  
תָּבֶן, xvi. 2.  
R. תַּל, i. 1.  
תִּקְוָה, x. 28.  
תָּקֶן, xvi. 2.  
תִּקַּע, vi. 1.  
תִּשְׁוָעָה, xxi. 31.

## II.—SYNONYMS EXPLAINED.

אֲבִדָּה, שָׁאוֹל, xxvii. 20.  
אֲדָמָה, תִּבֵּל, viii. 26.  
אֹוִיל, בָּסִיל, vol. i. p. 40;  
xiv. 3.  
אֹר, נֹר, vi. 23.  
אֶלֶף, שׁוֹר, xiv. 4.  
אֶשְׁנֵב, חֶלֶן, vii. 6.  
בֹּר, בֹּר, v. 15.  
בֹּשֶׁ, חָפֵר, xix. 26.  
בִּינָה, תְּבוּנָה, ii. 2.  
בִּקֵּשׁ, דָּרַשׁ, xi. 27.  
בִּשָּׂר, שָׂאֵר, v. 11.  
בֹּי, עֵם, לֹאֵם, xiv. 34.  
בֹּם, xxx. 31, *note*.  
בִּקֵּשׁ, דָּרַשׁ, *vid.*  
הִבִּין, הַשְׁבִּיל, xxi. 29.  
הִסֵּר, הוֹכִיתָ, ix. 7.  
הִעִיר, שָׁקַד, viii. 34.  
הִבִּין, *vid.*  
נֹבֵר, נֹבֵר, xxvii. 2.  
חֵיל, *virtus, ἀρετή*, xxxi.  
10.  
חֶלֶן, *vid.* אֶשְׁנֵב.

חָסַד, חֶן, xxxi. 26.  
חָפֵר, *vid.* בֹּשֶׁ.  
יִסֵּר, *vid.* הוֹכִיתָ.  
יָעַן, לִמְעַן, i. 24, cf. ii.  
20.  
יָקַשׁ, לָכַד, vi. 2.  
יָקַר, שָׁקַד, vi. 17.  
יָאִיל, בָּסִיל, *vid.*  
נָבֵל, נָבֵל, xvii. 21.  
נָסַל, תִּקְוָה, iii. 26, *note*.  
נָדִים, כָּפִים, xxxi. 19,  
20.  
נֹי, *vid.* לֹאֵם.  
יָקַשׁ, *vid.* לָכַד.  
יָעַן, *vid.*  
פָּלֵם, מֹאזְנִים, xvi. 11.  
פָּלֵם, עֵין, v. 16.  
מָקוֹר, xxv. 26.  
מִרְבִּית, *vid.* נִשְׁדָּ.  
מִשָּׁל, שָׁמַר, קָצִין, vi. 7.  
מִשְׁפָּט, מִיִּשְׂרָאֵל, i. 3.  
נָבֵל, *vid.* בָּסִיל.

נָבֵר, *vid.* נֹבֵר.  
נָפֵשׁ, רוּחַ, xviii. 14, xx.  
27.  
נֹר, *vid.* אֹר.  
נִשְׁדָּ, מִרְבִּית, or תְּרִבִּית,  
xxviii. 2.  
נָתַן, לָקַח (to give and to  
take), xxxi. 16, 24.  
נָהַל, קָהַל, v. 14.  
נָעַן, *vid.* מָעַן.  
נָעַם, *vid.* נָוִי.  
נָעַן, עָנִי, iii. 34, xiv. 21.  
נָעִים, עֲרִיפִים, iii. 26.  
נָעִישׁ, *vid.* עָתוֹד.  
נָעִים, *vid.* פָּלֵם.  
נָעִישׁ, תְּבוּנָה, x. 16.  
נָעִישׁ, צָדָקָה, i. 3, cf. vol.  
i. p. 43.  
נָעִישׁ, *vid.* צָפִיר.  
נָעִישׁ, *vid.* עָדָה.  
נָעִישׁ, קָצִיר, x. 5.  
נָעִישׁ, *vid.* מִשָּׁל.  
נָעִישׁ, *vid.* קָצִיר.

רֹאשִׁית, תְּחִלָּה, ix. 10.

נֶפֶשׁ, *vid.* רוּחַ.

תִּישׁ, *vid.* שְׁעִיר.

אֲבֹדוֹן, *vid.* שְׂאוֹל.

בָּשָׂר, *vid.* שָׂאֵר.

אֵלֶף, *vid.* שׁוֹר.

עֲרִיפִים, *vid.* שְׁחָקִים.

בִּקְשׁ, *vid.* שָׁחַר.

מִיטָל, *vid.* שֹׁטֵר.

הָעִיר, *vid.* שָׂקֵד.

בְּזָבִים, *vid.* שָׂקֵר.

פְּעֻלָּה, *vid.* תְּבוּאָה.

בִּינָה, *vid.* תְּבוּנָה.

אֲדָמָה, *vid.* תֵּבֵל.

רֹאשִׁית, *vid.* תְּחִלָּה.

שְׁעִיר, צִפִּיר, עֲתוּד, תִּישׁ,

xxx. 31.

בֶּסֶל, *vid.* תְּקוּהָה.

נִישָׁה, *vid.* תְּרִבִּית.









COMMENTARY  
ON  
THE SONG OF SONGS  
AND  
ECCLESIASTES

BY  
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*Translated from the German*

BY  
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## THE TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

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THE volume now offered to students of the Bible completes the Keil and Delitzsch series of Commentaries on the Old Testament. Like those which have preceded, it is intended exclusively for theological students and scholars, with whom it cannot but gain a welcome reception, as a most important contribution to the right interpretation of those difficult portions of the sacred canon, whether the reader may agree with the conclusions of the learned author or not.

At the end of the original volume there are added three dissertations by Wetzstein. But as the commentary is in itself complete without those, they have been omitted with Dr. Delitzsch's concurrence. I content myself by merely indicating here their import. In the first of them, Wetzstein aims at showing that the words פֶּלֶת הָרִמּוֹן, Song iv. 3, vi. 7, signify the slice (*Spalt, Ritz*) of a pomegranate = the inner surface of a sliced pomegranate. In the second, he argues that the *Dudaim* plant, Song vii. 13, is not the *mandragora vernalis* of botanists, but the *mandr. autumnalis*, which begins to bud and blossom, as is the case with most of the Palestinian flora, about the time of the first winter rains in the month of November. The passage, הָרִיחַ . . . הָרִיחַ, he accordingly translates: "Already the mandragora apples give forth their fragrance," i.e. are already ripe; because it is only the ripe apples that are fragrant. In the third dissertation, on Eccles. xii. 5, he seeks to establish the translation of וַיִּסְתַּבֵּל . . . הָחֵנֶב by "And the almond tree flourisheth, and the locusts creep forth, and the wretched life is brought to

dissolution." The first two of these clauses, he holds, denote the season of the year [the beginning of the meteorological spring. The seven days from 25th February to 3d March are called the *eijam el-'agaiz*, i.e. the (seven death-) days for old people], in which that which is said in the third (the death of the old man) takes place.

I cannot send forth this volume without expressing the deep obligation I am under to Dr. Delitzsch for his kindness in forwarding to me various important corrections and additions which I have incorporated in the translation, and for valuable suggestions with reference to it. This English edition may, from these circumstances, be almost regarded as a second edition of the original. I have done my best to verify the references, and to present a faithful rendering of the original, and in such a form as to allow the author to express himself in his own way, without violating the idiomatic structure of the language.

## ABBREVIATIONS.

THE abbreviations and technical forms common to such critical works as this have been retained. These require no explanation. The colon (:) has been used, as in the original, to introduce a translation or a quotation. In the text criticisms, the following abbreviations have been used:—

F. = *Cod. Francofurtensis* of 1294, described by Delitzsch in his Preface to Baer's edition of the *Psalter* of 1861 and 1874.

H. = *Cod. Heidenheimii*, a MS.

J. = *Cod. Jamanensis*, which was brought from South Arabia by Jacob Sappir, and passed into Baer's possession. *Vid.* Delitzsch's Preface to Baer's edition of *Isaiah*, 1872.

P. = *Cod. Petropolitanus* of the year 1010, now in St. Petersburg. *Vid.* Pinner's *Prospectus*, pp. 81–88.

D. = A parchment MS. of the Song placed at Delitzsch's disposal by Baer.

E<sup>1</sup>, E<sup>2</sup>, E<sup>3</sup>, E<sup>4</sup> = The four Erfurt Manuscripts.



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

---

## I. THE SONG OF SONGS.

	PAGE
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE SONG OF SONGS, . . . . .	1
Typical but not Allegorical, . . . . .	2
Its Ethical Character, . . . . .	5
A Dramatic Pastoral, . . . . .	8
Divisions of, . . . . .	9
The Date and Authorship of, . . . . .	11
An Antilegomenon, . . . . .	13
2. EXPOSITION OF THE SONG, . . . . .	17
Title of the Book, i. 1, . . . . .	17-161
<i>First Act—The Mutual Affection of the Lovers</i> , i. 2-ii. 7, . . . . .	19-47
(1) First Scene of the Act, i. 2-8, . . . . .	19
(2) Second Scene of the Act, i. 9-ii. 7, . . . . .	32
<i>Second Act—The Mutual Seeking and Finding of the Lovers</i> , ii. 8-iii. 5, . . . . .	47-57
(1) First Scene of the Act, ii. 8-17, . . . . .	47
(2) Second Scene of the Act, iii. 1-5, . . . . .	57
<i>Third Act—The Home-bringing of the Bride, and the Marriage</i> , iii. 6-v. 1, . . . . .	60-90
(1) First Scene of the Act, iii. 6-11, . . . . .	60
(2) Second Scene of the Act, iv. 1-v. 1, . . . . .	70
<i>Fourth Act—Love disdained, but won again</i> , v. 2-vi. 9, . . . . .	90-113
(1) First Scene of the Act, v. 2-vi. 3, . . . . .	90
(2) Second Scene of the Act, vi. 4-9, . . . . .	109
<i>Fifth Act—Shulamith the attractively fair but humble Princess</i> , vi. 10- viii. 4, . . . . .	113-140
(1) First Scene of the Act, vi. 10-vii. 6, . . . . .	113
(2) Second Scene of the Act, vii. 7-viii. 4, . . . . .	129

	PAGE
<i>Sixth Act—The Ratification of the Covenant of Love in Shulamith's Native</i>	
<i>Home, viii. 5-14,</i>	140-161
(1) First Scene of the Act, viii. 5-7,	140
(2) Second Scene of the Act, viii. 8-14,	149
3. APPENDIX.— <i>Remarks on the Song by Dr. J. G. Wetzstein,</i>	162
The Syrian Thrashing-table,	162
Notes on i. 7, i. 17,	164
Notes on ii. 11, iii. 11, iv. 14,	165-167
Notes on v. 1, vii. 1; the Dance of Mahanaim,	170
A Wedding Song ( <i>Waf</i> ) by Kāsim,	174
Note on vii. 3,	176

## II. THE BOOK OF ECCLESIASTES.

1. INTRODUCTION TO ECCLESIASTES,	179-217
A Production of the Israelitish Chokma,	180
The Standpoint and Individuality of the Author,	181
Self-Contradiction in the Book,	183
Survey of the Contents of the Book,	185
A Post-exilian Book,	189
List of Hapaxlegomena and Words and Forms belonging to the more recent Period of the Language,	190
The Style and Artistic Form of the Book,	199
The Title of the Book,	201
The Epilogue proves the late Composition of the Book,	206
The Anonymous Author speaks as if he were Solomon—represents Solomon,	207
The Date of the Book,	210
The Author a Palestinian,	216
Literature of the Book,	216
2. EXPOSITION OF THE BOOK OF ECCLESIASTES,	218-442
The Title, i. 1,	218
The Prologue: The Everlasting Sameness, i. 2-11,	218
Koheleth's Experiences and their Results, i. 12-iv. 16—	
<i>The Unsatisfactoriness of striving after Wisdom, i. 12-18,</i>	226
<i>The Unsatisfying Nature of Worldly Joy, ii. 1-11,</i>	232

	PAGE
<i>The End of the Wise Man the same as that of the Fool</i> , ii. 12-17, .	243
<i>The Vanity of Wealth gathered with Care and Privation</i> , ii. 18-23, .	248
<i>The Condition of Pure Enjoyment</i> , ii. 24-26, . . . . .	251
<i>The Short-sightedness and Impotence of Man over against God, the All-conditioning</i> , iii. 1-15, . . . . .	254
<i>The Godless Conduct of Men left to themselves, and their End like that of the Beasts</i> , iii. 16-22, . . . . .	265
<i>The Wrongs suffered by Man from Man, embittering the Life of the Observer</i> , iv. 1-3, . . . . .	273
<i>Miserable Rivalry and Restless Pursuit</i> , iv. 4-6, . . . . .	275
<i>The Aimless Labour and Penuriousness of him who stands alone</i> , iv. 7-12, . . . . .	276
<i>The People's Enthusiasm for the new King, and its Extinction</i> , iv. 13-16, . . . . .	278

FIRST CONCLUDING SECTION—

Proverbs respecting the Worship of God, iv. 17 [v. 1]-v. 6 [7], .	283
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CONTINUATION OF THE CATALOGUE OF VANITIES—

The Gradations of Oppression in Despotic States, v. 7, 8 [8, 9], .	291
The Uncertainty of Riches, and the Cheerful Enjoyment of Life, v. 9 [10]-vi. 6, . . . . .	295
Obtaining better than desiring, vi. 7-9, . . . . .	308
The Weakness and Short-sightedness of Man over against his Destiny, vi. 10-12, . . . . .	310

SECOND CONCLUDING SECTION—

Proverbs of Better Things, Things supposed to be better, Good Things, Good and Bad Days, vii. 1-14, . . . . .	313
Continuation of Experiences and their Results, vii. 15-ix. 12—	
<i>The Injuriousness of Excesses</i> , vii. 15-18, . . . . .	323
<i>What protects him who, with all his Righteousness, is not free from Sin, and what becomes him</i> , vii. 19-22, . . . . .	326
<i>Not-found and found—the Bitterest—a Woman</i> , vii. 23-29, . . . . .	329
<i>Wise Conduct toward the King and under Despotic Oppression</i> , viii. 1-9, . . . . .	336
<i>It is with the Righteous as with the Wicked—it is best to enjoy Life so long as God grants it</i> , viii. 10-15, . . . . .	345
<i>The Fruitlessness of all Philosophizing</i> , viii. 16, 17, . . . . .	352

<i>The Power of Fate, and the best possible thing for Man is his Want of Freedom, ix. 1-12, . . . . .</i>	354
<i>The Incalculableness of the Issue and of the Duration of Life, ix. 11, 12, . . . . .</i>	365
The further setting forth of Experiences, with Proverbs intermixed, ix. 13-x. 15—	
<i>Experiences and Proverbs touching Wisdom and the Contrasts to it, ix. 13-x. 3, . . . . .</i>	367
<i>The Caprice of Rulers and the Perverted World, x. 4-7, . . . . .</i>	374
<i>That which is difficult exposes to Danger; that which is improper brings Trouble; that which comes too late is of no use, x. 8-11, . . . . .</i>	377
<i>The Worthless Prating and the Aimless Labour of the Fool, x. 12-15, . . . . .</i>	382
THIRD CONCLUDING SECTION, WITH THE FINALE AND EPILOGUE—	
(A.) Warnings against Idle Revelry and Improvidence, and a Call to a Fresh Effort after a Happy Improvement of Life, x. 16-xi. 8, . . . . .	385-399
<i>The Prosperity of a Country its Misfortune, and Thoughtful Foresight, x. 16-20, . . . . .</i>	385
<i>Act cautiously, but not too cautiously—the Future is God's; enjoy life—the Future is dark, xi. 1-8, . . . . .</i>	391
(B.) Finale, with an Epiphonema, xi. 9-xii. 7, 8, . . . . .	399
(C.) The Epilogue, xii. 9-14, . . . . .	428

# THE SONG AND ECCLESIASTES.

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## INTRODUCTION TO THE SONG OF SONGS.



THE *Song* is the most obscure book of the Old Testament. Whatever principle of interpretation one may adopt, there always remains a number of inexplicable passages, and just such as, if we understood them, would help to solve the mystery. And yet the interpretation of a book presupposes from the beginning that the interpreter has mastered the idea of the whole. It has thus become an ungrateful task; for however successful the interpreter may be in the separate parts, yet he will be thanked for his work only when the conception as a whole which he has decided upon is approved of.

It is a love-poem. But why such a *minne*-song in the canon? This question gave rise in the first century, in the Jewish schools, to doubts as to the canonicity of the book. Yet they firmly maintained it; for they presupposed that it was a spiritual and not a secular love-poem. They interpreted it allegorically. The Targum paraphrases it as a picture of the history of Israel from the Exodus to the coming of the Messiah. The bride is the congregation of Israel; and her breasts, to quote one example, are interpreted of the Messiah in His lowliness and the Messiah in His glory. But "Solomon" is an anthropomorphic representation of Jahve Himself. And all the instances of the occurrence of the name, with one exception, are therefore regarded as an indirect allegorical designation of the God of peace (*vid.* Norzi under i. 1). And because of its apparently erotic, but in truth mysterious contents, it was a Jewish saying, as Origen and Jerome mention, that the Song should not be studied by any one till he was thirty years of age (*nisi quis ætatem sacerdotalis ministerii, id est, tricesimum annum impleverit*). Because, according to the traditional Targ. interpretation, it begins with the departure out of Egypt, it forms a part of the liturgy for the eighth day of

the Passover. The five Megilloths are arranged in the calendar according to their liturgical use.<sup>1</sup>

In the church this synagogal allegorizing received a new turn. They saw represented in the Song the mutual love of Christ and His church, and it thus became a mine of sacred mysticism in which men have dug to the present day. Thus Origen explains it in twelve volumes. Bernhard of Clairvaux died (1153) after he had delivered eighty-six sermons on it, and had only reached the end of the second chapter;<sup>2</sup> and his disciple Gilbert Porretanus carried forward the interpretation in forty-eight sermons only to v. 10, when he died. Perluigi de Palestrina gained by his twenty-nine motettes on the Song (1584) the honoured name of *Principe della Musica*. In modern times this allegorico-mystical interpretation is represented in the department of exegesis (Hengst.), sermon (F. W. Krummacker), and poetry (Gustav Jahn), as well as of music (Neukomm's duet: *Er und sie*), and even of painting (Ludw. von Maydell).

If the Song is to be understood allegorically, then Shulamith is the personification of the congregation of Israel, and mediately of the church. All other interpretations fall below this. Hug (1813) understands by the "beloved" the kingdom of the ten tribes longing after a reunion with the house of David; and Heinr. Aug. Hahn (1852), the Japhetic heathendom. Ludw. Noack (1869) has even changed and modified the readings of the Heb. text, that he might find therein the ballads of a Tiriâka romance, i.e. a series of pictures of the events occurring between Samaria and her Aethiopian lover Tiriâka, of the years (B.C.) 702, 691, and 690. These are the aberrations of individuals. Only one other interpretation recommends itself. Solomon's *charisma* and aim was the Chokma. The Peshito places over the Song the superscription חכמת דחכמתא. Is Shulamith, then, the personification of wisdom, like Dante's Beatrice? Rosenmüller (1830) is the most recent representative of this view; we ought then to have in Dante's *Convito* the key to the allegorical interpretation. He there sings sweet songs of love of his mistress Philosophy. But there is nothing in the description here to show that Shulamith is Wisdom. The one expression, "Thou shalt teach me" (viii. 2), warns us against attempting to put Wisdom in the place of the church, as a reversal of the facts of the case.

<sup>1</sup> The *Song* was read on the 8th day of the Passover; *Ruth*, on the second Shabuoth [Pentecost]; *Lamentations*, on the 9th Ab; *Ecclesiastes*, on the 3d Succoth [Tabernacles]; *Esther*, between the 11th and 16th Adar [feast of Purim].

<sup>2</sup> Vid. Fernbacher's *Die Reden des h. Bernhard über das Hohelied*, prefaced by Delitzsch. Leipzig 1862.

But if one understands the church to be meant, there yet remains much that is inexplicable. Who are the sixty queens and the eighty concubines (vi. 8)? And why are the heroes just sixty (iii. 7)? The synagogal and church interpretation, in spite of two thousand years' labour, has yet brought to light no sure results, but only numberless absurdities, especially where the Song describes the lovers according to their members from head to foot and from foot to head. But notwithstanding all this, it is certain that the "great mystery" (Eph. v. 32) mirrors itself in the Song. In this respect it resembles the love of Joseph and Zuleikha, often sung by the Arabian poets, which is regarded by the mystics<sup>1</sup> as a figure of the love of God toward the soul longing for union with Him. Shulamith is a historic personage; not the daughter of Pharaoh, as has been often maintained since the days of Theodore of Mopsuestia (died 429) and Abulfaraj (died 1286), but a country maiden of humble rank, who, by her beauty and by the purity of her soul, filled Solomon with a love for her which drew him away from the wantonness of polygamy, and made for him the primitive idea of marriage, as it is described in Gen. iii. 23 ff., a self-experienced reality. This experience he here sings, idealizing it after the manner of a poet; *i.e.*, removing the husk of that which is accidental, he goes back to its kernel and its essential nature. We have before us six dramatic figures, each in two divisions, which represent from within the growth of this delightful relation to its conclusion. This sunny glimpse of paradisaical love which Solomon experienced, again became darkened by the insatiableness of passion; but the Song of Songs has perpetuated it, and whilst all other songs of Solomon have disappeared, the providence of God has preserved this one, the crown of them all. It is a protest against polygamy, although only in the measure one might expect from the Mosaic standpoint. For the *Tôra* recognises, indeed, in its primitive history monogamy as the original form (Matt. xix. 4-6); but in its legislation, giving up the attempt to abolish polygamy, it is satisfied with its limitation (Deut. xvii. 17).

The Song celebrates paradisaical, but yet only natural love (*minne*). It stands, however, in the canon of the church, because Solomon is a type of Him of whom it can be said, "a greater than Solomon is here" (Matt. xii. 12). Referred to Him the antitype, the earthly contents receive a heavenly import and glorification. We see therein the mystery of the love of Christ and His church shadowed forth, not, however, allegorically, but typically. The allegory has to coincide throughout with that which is represented; but

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Hammer-Purgstall's *Das hohe Lied der Liebe der Araber*, 1854.

the type is always only a type *subtractis subtrahendis*, and is exceedingly surpassed by the antitype. In this sense Jul. Sturm (1854) has paraphrased the Song under the title of "*Zwei Rosen*" (two roses) (the typical and the antitypical). When my monograph on the Song appeared (1851), a notice of it in Colani's *Revue de Théologie* (1852) began with the frivolous remark: "*Ce n'est pas la première rêverie de ce genre sur le livre en question; plutôt à Dieu que ce fût la dernière;*" and Hitzig (1855) judged that "such a work might properly have remained unprinted; it represents nothing but a perverse inconsiderate literature which has no conception of scientific judgment and industry." But this work (long since out of print and now rare) was the fruit of many years of study. The commentary here given is based on it, but does not put it out of date. It broke with the allegorizing interpretation, the untenableness of which appears against his will in Hengstenberg's commentary (1853); it broke also with the theory which regards the poem as a history of Solomon's unsuccessful seductive efforts to gain the Shulamite's affections, a theory which Hitzig (1855) tries to exempt from the necessity of doing violence to the text by arbitrarily increasing the number of speakers and actors in the plot. I certainly succeeded in finding the right key to the interpretation of this work. Zöckler has recognised my book<sup>1</sup> as presenting "the only correct interpretation of its design and contents." Kingsbury, author of the notes on the Song in *The Speaker's Commentary*, has expressed the same judgment. Poets such as Stadelmann (*Das Hohelied, ein dramatisches Gedicht* = The Song of Songs: a dramatic poem, 1870) and J. Koch, late pastor of St. Mary's in Parchim (died 1873), have recognised in their beautiful German paraphrases my interpretation as natural and in conformity with the text; and for twenty years I have constantly more and more seen that the solution suggested by me is the right and only satisfactory one.

Shulamith is not Pharaoh's daughter. The range of her thoughts is not that of a king's daughter, but of a rustic maiden; she is a stranger among the daughters of Jerusalem, not because she comes from a foreign land, but because she is from the country; she is dark-complexioned, not from the sun of her more southern home, but from the open sunshine to which she has been exposed as the keeper of a vineyard; in body and soul she is born to be a princess, but in reality she is but the daughter of a humble family in a remote part of Galilee; hence the child-like simplicity and the rural character of her thoughts, her joy in the open fields, and her longing after the

[<sup>1</sup> *Das Hohelied untersucht u. ausg.* Leipzig 1851.]

quiet life of her village home. Solomon appears here in loving fellowship with a woman such as he had not found among a thousand (Eccles. vii. 28); and although in social rank far beneath him, he raises her to an equality with himself. That which attached her to him is not her personal beauty alone, but her beauty animated and heightened by nobility of soul. She is a pattern of simple devotedness, naive simplicity, unaffected modesty, moral purity, and frank prudence,—a lily of the field, more beautifully adorned than he could claim to be in all his glory. We cannot understand the Song of Songs unless we perceive that it presents before us not only Shulamith's external attractions, but also all the virtues which make her the ideal of all that is gentlest and noblest in woman. Her words and her silence, her doing and suffering, her enjoyment and self-denial, her conduct as betrothed, as a bride, and as a wife, her behaviour towards her mother, her younger sister, and her brothers,—all this gives the impression of a beautiful soul in a body formed as it were from the dust of flowers. Solomon raises this child to the rank of queen, and becomes beside this queen as a child. The simple one teaches the wise man simplicity; the humble draws the king down to her level; the pure accustoms the impetuous to self-restraint. Following her, he willingly exchanges the bustle and the outward splendour of court life for rural simplicity, wanders gladly over mountain and meadow if he has only her; with her he is content to live in a lowly cottage. The erotic external side of the poem has thus an ethical background. We have here no "song of loves" (Ezek. xxxiii. 32) having reference to sensual gratification. The rabbinical proverb is right when it utters its threat against him who would treat this Song, or even a single verse of it, as a piece of secular literature.<sup>1</sup> The Song transfigures natural but holy love. Whatever in the sphere of the divinely-ordered marriage relation makes love the happiest, firmest bond uniting two souls together, is presented to us here in living pictures. "The Song," says Herder, "is written as if in Paradise. Adam's song: Thou art my second self! Thou art mine own! echoes in it in speech and interchanging song from end to end." The place of the book in the canon does not need any further justification; that its reception was favoured also by the supposition that it represented the intercourse between Jahve and the congregation of Israel, may be conjectured indeed, but is not established. The supposition, however, would have been false; for the book is not an allegory, and Solomon is by no means an *Alle-*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Tosefta Sanhedrin* xii., *Sanhedrin* iii.a, and the commencement of the tract *Kalla*.

*phenomenon* of God. But the congregation is truly a bride (Jer. ii. 2; Isa. lxii. 5), and Solomon a type of the Prince of peace (Isa. ix. 5; Luke xi. 31), and marriage a mystery, viz. as a pattern of the loving relation of God and His Christ to the church (Eph. v. 32). The Song has consequently not only a historico-ethical, but also a typico-mystical meaning. But one must be on his guard against introducing again the allegorical interpretation as Soltz (1850) has done, under the misleading title of the typical interpretation. The typical interpretation proceeds on the idea that the type and the antitype do not exactly coincide; the mystical, that the heavenly stamps itself in the earthly, but is yet at the same time immeasurably different from it. Besides, the historico-ethical interpretation is to be regarded as the proper business of the interpreter. But because Solomon is a type (*typus realis*) of the spiritual David in his glory, and earthly love a shadow of the heavenly, and the Song a part of sacred history and of canonical Scripture, we will not omit here and there to indicate that the love subsisting between Christ and His church shadows itself forth in it.

But the prevailing view which Jacobi (1771) established, and which has predominated since Umbreit (1820) and Ewald (1826), is different from ours. According to them, the Song celebrates the victory of the chaste passion of conjugal love. The beloved of Shulamith is a shepherd, and Solomon acts toward her a part like that of Don Juan with Anna, or of Faust with Gretchen. Therefore, of course, his authorship is excluded, although Anton (1773), the second oldest representative of this so-called shepherd hypothesis, supposes that Solomon at a later period of his life recognised his folly, and now here magnanimously praises the fidelity of Shulamith, who had spurned his enticements away from her; and a Jewish interpreter, B. Holländer (1871), following Hezel (1780), supposes that Solomon represents himself as an enticer, only to exhibit the ideal of female virtue as triumphing over the greatest seduction. Similarly also Godet (1867),<sup>1</sup> who, resting on Ewald, sees here a very complicated mystery presented by Solomon himself, and pointing far beyond him: Solomon, the earthly Messiah; Shulamith, the true Israel; the shepherd, Jahve, and as Jahve who is about to come, the heavenly Solomon; the little sisters, heathenism—it is the old allegory, able for everything, only with changed names and a different division of the parts which here comes in again by the back-door of the seduction-history.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Jahrg. i. No. 22-24 of the *Berne Kirchenfreund*.

<sup>2</sup> And in this Godet stands not alone. The Jewish interpreter Malbim (1850) accepts also this seduction-history: Solomon = the sensual impulse; Shulamith =

Thus this seduction-history has not put an end to the over-ingenious allegorizing. In one point, however, at least, it has aided in the understanding of the Song. Herder saw in the Song a collection of Solomonian songs of love, which he translated (1778), as the oldest and the most beautiful, from the Orient. But Goethe, who in the *Westöst. Divan* (1819) praises the Song as the most divine of all love-songs, recognised, after the appearance of Umbreit's Comm., the unity also of the "inexplicably mysterious."

We are not conscious of any prejudice which makes it impossible for us to do justice to the interpretation to which Umbreit and Ewald gave currency. It abundantly accounts for the reception of the book into the canon, for so interpreted it has a moral motive and aim. And the personality of Solomon has certainly not merely a bright side, which is typical, but also a dark side, which is pregnant with dark issues for his kingdom; it may perhaps be possible that in the Song the latter, and not the former, is brought to view. Then, indeed, the inscription would rest on an error; for that in this case also the Solomonian authorship could be maintained, is an idea which, in the traditional-apologetical interest, mounts up to a faith in the impossible. But the truth goes beyond the tradition; the inscription would then indicate a traditional interpretation which, as is evident from the book itself, does not correspond with its original meaning and aim. "It is clear to every unprejudiced mind," says Gustav Baur,<sup>1</sup> "that in ii. 10-15, iv. 8-15, a different person speaks from the royal wooer; for (1) Solomon only says, 'my friend' [i. 15, etc.]; while, on the other hand, the shepherd heaps up flattering words of warmest love; (2) Solomon praises only the personal beauty of the woman; the shepherd, the sweet voice, the enchanting look, the warm love, the incorruptible chastity of his beloved;—in short, the former reveals the eye and the sensuousness of the king; the latter, the heart of a man who is animated by the divine flame of true love." We only ask, meanwhile, whether words such as iv. 13 are less sensuous than iv. 5, and whether the image of the twin gazelles is not more suitable in the mouth of the shepherd than the comparison of the attractions of Shulamith with the exotic plants of Solomon's garden? "In three passages," says Godet, "lies open the slender thread which Ewald's penetrating eye discovered under the flowers and leaves which adorn the poem: 'The king has brought me into his palace' (i. 4); 'I knew not how my heart has

the spirit-soul; the little sister = the natural soul; and Shulamith's beloved = the heavenly Friend, the Shepherd of the universe.

<sup>1</sup> *Literaturb. der Darmst. Kirchenzeitung*, 1851, pp. 114-146, and 1854, No. 11.

brought me to the chariots of a princely people' (vi. 12); 'I was a wall, and have found peace before his eyes' (viii. 10)." The same critic also finds in several passages an apparent contrariety between Solomon and the shepherd. "Observe," says he, "*e.g.* i. 12, 13, where the shepherd—whom Shulamith calls her spikenard, and compares to a bunch of flowers on her breast—is placed over against the king, who sits on his divan; or vii. 9 f., where, suddenly interrupting the king, she diverts the words which he speaks concerning herself to her beloved; or viii. 7, where, leaning on the arm of her beloved, she expresses her disregard for riches, with which Solomon had sought to purchase her love." But spikenard is not the figure of the shepherd, not at all the figure of a man; and she who is praised as a "prince's daughter" (vii. 2) cannot say (vi. 12) that, enticed by curiosity to see the royal train, she was taken prisoner, and now finds herself, against her will, among the daughters of Jerusalem; and he whom she addresses (viii. 12) can be no other than he with whom she now finds herself in her parents' home. The course of the exposition will show that the shepherd who is distinguished from Solomon is nothing else than a shadow cast by the person of Solomon.

The Song is a dramatic pastoral. The ancients saw in it a *carmen bucolicum mimicum*. Laurentius Petraus, in his Heb.-Danish Paraphrase (1640), calls it *carmen bucolicum*, ἀμυρβαίων (δραματικόν); George Wachter (1722), an "opera divided into scenic parts." It acquires the character of a pastoral poem from this, that Shulamith is a shepherdess, that she thinks of Solomon as a shepherd, and that Solomon condescends to occupy the sphere of life and of thought of the shepherdess. It is not properly an idyll, nor yet properly a drama. Not an idyll, because the life-image which such a miniature drawn from life—such, *e.g.*, as the Adon. of Theocritus presents to us—unfolds itself within a brief time without interruption; in the Song, on the other hand, not merely are the places and persons interchanged, but also the times. The whole, however, does not fall into little detached pictures; but there runs through this wreath of figures a love-relation, which embodies itself externally and internally before our eyes, and attains the end of its desire, and shows itself on the summit of this end as one that is not merely sensuous, but moral. The Song is certainly not a theatrical piece:<sup>1</sup> the separate pieces would necessarily have been longer if the

<sup>1</sup> "Shulamith," says E. F. Friedrich (1855 and 1866), "is the oldest theatrical piece in existence." Ewald and Böttcher, who find not fewer than twelve persons mentioned in it, think that it was represented on an actual stage. Then, indeed, it

poet had had in view the changes of theatrical scenery. But at all events the theatre is not a Semitic institution, but is of Indo-Persian Greek origin. Jewish poetry attempted the drama only after it began in Alexandrinism<sup>1</sup> to emulate Greece. Grätz' (1871) polemic against the dramatists is so far justified. But yet we see, as in the Book of Job, so in the Song, the drama in process of formation from the lyric and narrative form of poetry, as it has developed among the Greeks from the lyric, and among the Indians from the epic. In the Book of Job the colloquies are all narrative. In the Song this is never the case;<sup>2</sup> for the one expression, "answered my beloved, and said to me" (ii. 10), is not to be compared with, "and Job answered and said:" the former expression indicates a monologue. And in the "Daughters of Jerusalem" (i. 5, etc.) we have already something like the chorus of the Greek drama. The ancient Greek mss. bear involuntary testimony to this dramatic character of the Song. There are several of them which prefix to the separate addresses the names of the persons speaking, as ἡ νύμφη, ὁ νυμφίος.<sup>3</sup> And the Aethiopic translation makes five separate pieces, probably, as the *Cod. Sinait.* shows, after the example of the LXX., which appear as divisions into Acts.

The whole falls into the following six Acts:—

- (1.) The mutual affection of the lovers, i. 2–ii. 7, with the conclusion, "I adjure you, ye daughters of Jerusalem."
- (2.) The mutual seeking and finding of the lovers, ii. 8–iii. 5, with the conclusion, "I adjure you, ye daughters of Jerusalem."
- (3.) The fetching of the bride, and the marriage, iii. 6–v. 1, beginning with, "Who is this . . .?" and ending with, "Drink and be drunken, beloved."
- (4.) Love scorned, but won again, v. 2–vi. 9.
- (5.) Shulamith the attractively fair but humble princess, vi. 10–viii. 4, beginning with, "Who is this . . .?" and ending with, "I adjure you, ye daughters of Jerusalem."

would be the oldest drama—older than Thespis and Kalîdasa. For the *Sakuntala* and the drama *Der Kaufmann und die Bajadere* belong to the first century of our era.

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* my *Prolegomena* to Luzzatto's מנרל ען (Heb Paraphrase of the *Pastors fido* of Guarini), 1837, pp. 24–32.

<sup>2</sup> Similar is the relation between Homer, where the speakers are introduced with narrative, and our national epics, the *Nibelungen* and *Gudrun*, which become dramatic when the action and the feeling rise to a higher elevation: the words of the different persons follow each other without introduction, so that here the manner of the singer had to become dramatic.

<sup>3</sup> *Vid. Repert. für bibl. u. morgenl. Lit.* viii. (1781), p. 180. The Archimandrite Porphyrios describes such a ms. in his (Russian) *Reisewerk* (1856).

(6.) The ratification of the covenant of love in Shulamith's home, viii. 5-14, beginning with, "Who is this . . . ?"

Zöckler reckons only five acts, for he comprehends v. 2-viii. 4 in one; but he himself confesses its disproportionate length; and the reasons which determine him are invalid; for the analogy of the Book of Job, which, besides, including the prologue and the epilogue, falls into seven formal parts, can prove nothing; and the question, "Who is this?" vi. 10, which he interprets as a continuation of the encomium in vi. 9, is rather to be regarded, like iii. 8, viii. 5, as a question with reference to her who is approaching, and as introducing a new act; for the supposition that vi. 9 requires to be further explained by a statement of what was included in the "blessing" and the "praising" is unwarranted, since these are ideas requiring no supplement to explain them (Gen. xxx. 13; Ps. xli. 3, cvii. 32), and the poet, if he had wished to explain the praise as to its contents, would have done this otherwise (cf. Prov. xxxi. 28 f.) than in a way so fitted to mislead. Rightly, Thrupp (1862) regards vi. 10 as the chorus of the daughters of Jerusalem. He divides as follows: (1) the Anticipation, i. 2-ii. 7; (2) the Awaiting, ii. 8-iii. 5; (3) the Espousal and its Results, iii. 6-v. 1; (4) the Absence, v. 2-8; (5) the Presence, v. 9-viii. 4; (6) Love's Triumph, viii. 5-12, with the Conclusion, viii. 13, 14. But how can v. 9 begin a new formal part? It is certainly the reply to Shulamith's adjuration of the daughters of Jerusalem, and not at all the commencement of a new scene, much less of a new act.

In our division into six parts, the separate acts, for the most part necessarily, and in every case without any violence, divide themselves into two scenes each, thus:—

Act I. i. 2-ii. 7.	Scene 1. i. 2-8.	Scene 2. i. 9-ii. 7.
„ II. ii. 8-iii. 5.	„ ii. 8 ff.	„ iii. 1-5.
„ III. iii. 6-v. 1.	„ iii. 6 ff.	„ iv. 1-v. 1.
„ IV. v. 2-vi. 9.	„ v. 2-vi. 3.	„ vi. 4-9.
„ V. vi. 10-viii. 4.	„ vi. 10-vii. 6.	„ vii. 7-viii. 4.
„ VI. viii. 5-14.	„ viii. 5-7.	„ viii. 8-14.

The first scene of the first act I formerly (1851) extended to i. 17, but it reaches only to i. 8; for up to this point Solomon is absent, but with i. 9 he begins to converse with Shulamith, and the chorus is silent—the scene has thus changed. Kingsbury in his translation (1871) rightly places over i. 9 the superscription, "The Entrance of the King."

The change of scenery is not regulated in accordance with stage

decoration, for the Song is not a theatrical piece.<sup>1</sup> The first act is played both in the dining-room and in the wine-room appertaining to the women of the royal palace. In the second act, Shulamith is again at home. In the third act, which represents the marriage, the bride makes her entrance into Jerusalem from the wilderness, and what we further then hear occurs during the marriage festival. The locality of the fourth act is Jerusalem, without being more particularly defined. That of the fifth act is the park of Etam, and then Solomon's country house there. And in the sixth act we see the newly-married pair first in the way to Shulem, and then in Shulamith's parental home. In the first half of the dramatic pictures, Shulamith rises to an equality with Solomon; in the second half, Solomon descends to an equality with Shulamith. At the close of the first, Shulamith is at home in the king's palace; at the close of the second, Solomon is at home with her in her Galilean home.

. . . . .

In our monograph on the Song (1851), we believe we have proved that it distinctly bears evidences of its Solomonic origin. The familiarity with nature, the fulness and extent of its geographical and artistic references, the mention made of so many exotic plants and foreign things, particularly of such objects of luxury as the Egyptian horses, point to such an authorship; in common with Ps. lxxii., it has the multiplicity of images taken from plants; with the Book of Job, the dramatic form; with the Proverbs, manifold allusions to Genesis. If not the production of Solomon, it must at least have been written near his time, since the author of Prov. i.-ix., the introduction to the older Book of Proverbs, for the origin of which there is no better defined period than that of Jehoshaphat (909-883 B.C.), and the author or authors of the supplement (Prov. xxii. 17-xxiv. 22), reveal an acquaintance with the Song. Ewald also, and Hitzig, although denying that Solomon is the author because it is directed against him, yet see in it a product of the most flourishing state of the language and of the people; they ascribe it to a poet of the northern kingdom about 950 B.C. Modern Jewish criticism surpasses, however, on the field of O. T. history, the anachronisms of the Tübingen school. As Zunz has recently (*Deut. Morgenl. Zeitsch.*

<sup>1</sup> Ephr. Epstein, surgeon in Cincinnati, in a review of Von Grätz' *Comm.* in *The Israelite* (1872), calls the Song quite in our sense, "a dramatic poem, though not a complete scenic drama." But the bridal procession in the third act is not of this character—he sees in it a return from a hunting expedition.

xxvii.) sought to show that the Book of Leviticus was written about a thousand years after Moses, that there never was a prophet Ezekiel, that the dates of this book are fictitious, etc.; so Gratz attempts to prove that the Song in its Graecising language and Greek customs and symbols bears evidences of the Syro-Macedonian age;<sup>1</sup> that the poet was acquainted with the idylls of Theocritus and the Greek erotic poets, and, so far as his Israelitish standpoint admitted, imitates them; and that he placed an ideal picture of pure Jewish love over against the immorality of the Alexandrine court and its Hellenistic partisans, particularly of Joseph b. Tobia, the collector of taxes in the time of Ptolemy Euergetes (247–221 B.C.),—a picture in which “the Shepherd,”<sup>2</sup> now grown into a fixed idea, renders welcome service, in contrast to Solomon, in whom the poet glances at the court of Alexandria. One is thus reminded of Kirschbaum (1833), who hears in Ezek. xxxiii. 5 an echo of Cicero’s *dixi et salvavi animam*, and in the Song ii. 17, a reference to the Bethar of Barcochba. We do not deny the penetration which this chief of Jewish historians has expended on the establishment of his hypothesis; but the same penetration may prove that the Babylon.-Assyr. “*syllabaries*” of the time of Asurbanipal (667–626) belong to the Greek era, because there occurs therein the word *azamillav* (knife), and this is the Greek *σμίλη*; or that the author of Prov. i.–ix. alludes in vii. 23 to Eros and his quivers, and in ix. 1 betrays a knowledge of the seven *artes liberales*. Parallels to the Song are found wherever sensuous love is sung, also in the *Pastoralia* of Longus, without the least dependence of one author upon another. And if such a relation is found between Theocritus and the Song, then it might rather be concluded that he became acquainted with it in Alexandria from Jewish literates,<sup>3</sup> than that the author of the Song has imitated Greek models, as Immanuel Romi, the Arabians and Dante; besides, it is not at all the Song lying before us which Grätz expounds, but the Song modified by violent corrections of all kinds, and fitted to the supposed tendency. Thus he changes (i. 3) שֶׁמֶן הַיָּדָיִם (thine unguent) into בִּשְׁמֵי, and שֶׁן הַיָּדָיִם (ointment poured forth) into שֶׁן הַיָּדָיִם. — Shulamith says this of her beautiful shepherd, and what follows (i. 4) the damsels say to him; he changes

<sup>1</sup> So also, on linguistic grounds, Ant. Theod. Hartmann in Winer’s *Zeitschr.* 1829.

<sup>2</sup> Epstein, in true American style, calls him “the bogus shepherd.”

<sup>3</sup> Vid. my *Gesch. der jud. Poesie*, p. 205 ff. Not as Joh. Gott. Lessing (*Eclogae regis Salomonis*, 1777), the brother of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, supposes: through the LXX. translation; for the Song was among the books latest in being translated.

מִשְׁכְּנִי into מִשְׁכְּנִי, מִשְׁכְּנִי into מִשְׁכְּנִי, and then remarks: "Shulamith mentions it as to the praise of her beloved, that the damsels, attracted by his beauty, love him, and say to him, 'Draw us, we will run after thee; though the king brought us into his chambers, we would rejoice only with thee, and prefer thee to the king.'" His too confident conjectural criticism presents us with imaginary words, such as (iii. 10) אֶהְיֶה (ebony); with unfortunate specimens of style, such as (vi. 10), "Thou hast made me weak, O daughter of Aminadab;" and with unheard-of renderings, such as (viii. 5), "There where thy mother has wounded thee;" for he supposes that Shulamith is chastised by her mother because of her love. *This Song* is certainly not written by Solomon, nor yet does it date from the Syro-Macedonian time, but was invented in Breslau in the 19th century of our era!

Grätz (1871) has placed yet farther down than the Song the Book of Ecclesiastes, in which he has also found Graecisms; the tyrannical king therein censured is, as he maintains, Herod the Great, and the last three verses (xii. 12-14) are not so much the epilogue of the book as that of the Hagiographa which closes with it. Certainly, if this was first formed by the decision of the conference in Jerusalem about 65, and of the synod in Jabne about 90, and the reception of the Books of Ecclesiastes and the Song was carried not without controversy, then it lies near to regard these two books as the most recent, originating not long before. But the fact is this: We learn from *Jud-ajim* iii. 5, iv. 6, cf. *Edujoth* v. 3, that in the decade before the destruction of Jerusalem the saying was current among the disciples of Hillel and Shammai, that "all Holy Scriptures (*Kethubîm*) pollute the hands;"<sup>1</sup> but that the question whether Ecclesiastes is included was answered in the negative by the school of Shammai, and in the affirmative by the school of Hillel—of the Song nothing is here said. But we learn further, that several decades later the Song also was comprehended in this controversy along with Ecclesiastes; and in an assembly of seventy-two doctors of the law in Jabne, that decree, "all Holy Scriptures (*Kethubîm*) pollute the hands," was extended to Ecclesiastes and the Song. R. Akiba

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* for the explanation of this, my essay, "Das Hohelied verunreinigt die Hände," in the *Luth. Zeitsch.* 1854. [The *Tôra* and the *Theruma*-food, as being both reckoned holy, were usually placed together in the temple. It was discovered that the sacred books were thereby exposed to damage by mice; and hence, to prevent their being brought any longer into contact with the *Theruma*, the Rabbins decided that they were henceforth to be regarded as unclean, and they gave forth the decree, "All Holy Scriptures pollute the hand." This decree was applicable only to *holy* or *inspired* books. *Vid.* Ginsburg on the Song, p. 3, note.]

(or some one else) asserted, in opposition to those who doubted the canonicity of the Song, "No day in the whole history of the world is so much worth as that in which the Song of Songs was given; for all the *Kethubim* are holy, but the Song of Songs is most holy." From this Grätz draws the conclusion that the Hagiographa was received as canonical for the first time about 65, and that its canon was finally fixed so as to include Ecclesiastes and the Song, not till about 90; but this conclusion rests on the false supposition that "Holy Scriptures" (*Kethubim*) is to be understood exclusive of the Hagiographa, which is just as erroneous as that *Sephárim* designates the prophets, with the exclusion of the Hagiographa. Holy *Kethubim* is a general designation, without distinction, of all the canonical books, e.g. *Bathra* i. 6, and *Sephárim* in like manner, with the exception only of the *Tôra*, *Megilla* i. 8, iii. 1, *Shabbath* 115b. And it rests on a misapprehension of the question discussed: the question was not whether Ecclesiastes and the Song should be admitted, but whether they had been justly admitted, and whether the same sacred character should be ascribed to them as to the other holy writings; for in *Bathra* 14b-15a (without a parallel in the Palest. Talmud) the enriching of the canon by the addition of the Books of Isaiah, Proverbs, the Song, and Ecclesiastes, is ascribed to the Hezekiah-Collegium (Prov. xxi. 5), and thus is dated back in the period before the rise of the great synagogue. That Philo does not cite the Song proves nothing; he cites none of the five Megilloth. But Josephus (*C. Ap.* 1, § 8; cf. Euseb. *II. E.* iii. 10), since he enumerates five books of the Mosaic law, thirteen books of prophetic history and prediction, and four books of a hymno-ethical character, certainly means by these four the Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song, which in the Alexandrine canon stand thus connected. His work, *Cont. Apion*, was not indeed written till about 100 A.D.; but Josephus there speaks of a fact which had existed for centuries. The Song and Ecclesiastes formed part of the sacred books among the Hellenists as well as among the Palestinian Jews of the first Christian century; but, as those Talmud notices show, not without opposition. The Old Testament canon, as well as that of the New Testament, had then also its *Antilegomena*. These books were opposed not because of their late origin, but because their contents apparently militated against the truth of revelation and the spiritual nature of revealed religion. Similar doubts, though not so strong and lasting, were also uttered with reference to Proverbs, Esther, and Ezekiel.

The history of the exposition of this book is given in detail by

Christian D. Ginsburg in *The Song of Songs*, London 1857; and by Zöckler in "The Song," forming part of Lange's *Bibelwerk*, 1868, and supplemented by an account of the English interpretations and translations in the Anglo-American translation of this work by Green. Zunz, in the preface to Rebenstein's (Bernstein's) *Lied der Lieder*, 1834, has given an historical account of the Jewish expositors. Steinschneider's המזכיר (*Heb. Bibliograph.* 1869, p. 110 ff.) presents a yet fuller account of the Jewish commentaries. The Munich royal library contains a considerable number of these,—*e.g.* by Moses b. Tibbon, Shemariah, Immanuel Romi, Moses Calais (who embraced Christianity). Our commentary presents various new contributions to the history of the interpretation of this book. No other book of Scripture has been so much abused, by an unscientific spiritualizing, and an over-scientific unspiritual treatment, as this has. Luther says, at the close of his exposition: *Quodsi erro, veniam meretur primus labor, nam aliorum cogitationes longe plus absurditatis habent.* To inventory the *maculatur* of these absurdities is a repulsive undertaking, and, in the main, a useless labour, from which we absolve ourselves.



## EXPOSITION OF THE SONG OF SONGS

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THE title of the book at once denotes that it is a connected whole, and is the work of one author.—Ch. i. 1. *The Song of Songs, composed by Solomon.* The genitival connection, “Song of Songs,” cannot here signify the Song consisting of a number of songs, any more than calling the Bible “The Book of books” leads us to think of the 24 + 27 canonical books of which it consists. Nor can it mean “one of Solomon’s songs;” the title, as it here stands, would then be the paraphrase of שִׁיר שִׁירֵי שֶׁ, chosen for the purpose of avoiding the redoubled genitives; but “one of the songs” must rather have been expressed by שִׁיר מִשִּׁירֵי. It has already been rightly explained in the *Midrash*:<sup>1</sup> “the most praiseworthy, most excellent, most highly-treasured among the songs.” The connection is superl. according to the sense (cf. ἄρρηκτα ἀρρήδων of Sophocles), and signifies that song which, as such, surpasses the songs one and all of them; as “servant of servants,” Gen. ix. 25, denotes a servant who is such more than all servants together. The plur. of the second word is for this superl. sense indispensable (*vid.* Dietrich’s *Abhand. zur hebr. Gramm.* p. 12), but the article is not necessary: it is regularly wanting where the complex idea takes the place of the predicate, Gen. ix. 25, Ex. xxix. 37, or of the inner member of a genitival connection of words, Jer. iii. 19; but it is also wanting in other places, as Ezek. xvi. 7 and Eccles. i. 2, xii. 8, where the indeterminate plur. denotes not totality, but an unlimited number; here it was necessary, because a definite Song—that, namely, lying before us—must be designated as the paragon of songs. The relative clause, “*asher lishlōmō*,” does not refer to the single word “Songs” (Gr. Venet. τῶν τοῦ), as it would if the expression were שִׁיר מִהַשֵּׁ, but to the whole idea of “the Song of Songs.” A relative clause of similar formation and reference occurs at 1 Kings iv. 2: “These are the princes, *asher lo*, which belonged

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Fürst’s *Der Kanon des A. T.* (1868), p. 86.

to him (Solomon).” They who deny the Solomonic authorship usually explain: The Song of Songs which concerns or refers to Solomon, and point in favour of this interpretation to LXX. B.  $\delta$  ἐστι Σαλ., which, however, is only a latent genit., for which LXX. A. τῷ Σαλ. *Lamed* may indeed introduce the reference of a writing, as at Jer. xxiii. 9; but if the writing is more closely designated as a “Song,” “Psalm,” and the like, then *Lamed* with the name of a person foll. is always the *Lamed auctoris*; in this case the idea of reference to, as e.g. at Isa. i. 1, cf. 1 Kings v. 13, is unequivocally expressed by  $\text{ל}$ . We shall find that the dramatized history which we have here, or as we might also say, the fable of the melodrama and its dress, altogether correspond with the traits of character, the favourite turns, the sphere of vision, and the otherwise well-known style of authorship peculiar to Solomon. We may even suppose that the superscription was written by the author, and thus by Solomon himself. For in the superscription of the Proverbs he is surnamed “son of David, king of Israel,” and similarly in Ecclesiastes. But he who entitles him merely “Solomon” is most probably himself. On the other hand, that the title is by the author himself, is not favoured by the fact that instead of the  $\text{א}$ , everywhere else used in the book, the fuller form *asher* is employed. There is the same reason for this as for the fact that Jeremiah in his prophecies always uses *asher*, but in the Lamentations interchanges  $\text{א}$  with *asher*. This original demonstrative  $\text{א}$  is old-Canaanitish, as the Phoenician  $\text{𐤀}$ , arrested half-way toward the form *asher*, shows.<sup>1</sup> In the Book of Kings it appears as a North Palest. provincialism, to the prose of the pre-exilian literature it is otherwise foreign;<sup>2</sup> but the pre-exilian *shir* and *kinah* (cf. also Job xix. 29) make use of it as an ornament. In the post-exilian literature it occurs in poetry (Ps. cxxii. 3, etc.) and in prose (1 Chron. v. 20, xxvii. 27); in Ecclesiastes it is already a component part of the rabbinism in full growth. In a pre-exilian book-title  $\text{א}$  in place of *asher* is thus not to be expected. On the other hand, in the Song itself it is no sign of a post-exilian composition, as Grätz supposes. The history of the language and literature refutes this.

<sup>1</sup> From this it is supposed that *asher* is a pronom. root-cluster equivalent to  $\text{לְאִשְׁרָא}$ . Fleischer, on the contrary, sees in *asher* an original substantive *athar* = (Arab.) *ithr*, Assy. *asar*, track, place, as when the vulgar expression is used, “The man where (*wo* instead of *welcher*) has said.”

<sup>2</sup> We do not take into view here Gen. vi. 3. If  $\text{בְּשֵׁם}$  is then to be read, then there is in it the pronominal  $\text{ש}$ , as in the old proper name *Mishael* (who is what God is?).

## FIRST ACT.

## THE MUTUAL AFFECTION OF THE LOVERS.—CHAP. I. 2-II. 7.

## FIRST SCENE OF THE ACT, I. 2-8.

The first act of the melodrama, which presents the loving relationship in the glow of the first love, now opens. i. 5, 6, are evidently the words of Shulamith. Here one person speaks of herself throughout in the singular. But in vers. 2-4 one and several together speak. Ewald also attributes vers. 2-4 to Shulamith, as words spoken by her concerning her shepherd and to him. She says, "Draw me after thee, so will we run," for she wishes to be brought by him out of Solomon's court. But how can the praise, "an ointment poured forth is thy name,"—an expression which reminds us of what is said of Solomon, 1 Kings v. 11 [1 Kings iv. 31], "and his fame was in all nations round about,"—be applicable to the shepherd? How could Shulamith say to the shepherd, "virgins love thee," and including herself with others, say to him also, "we will exult and rejoice in thee"? on which Ewald remarks: it is as if something kept her back from speaking of herself alone. How this contradicts the psychology of love aiming at marriage! This love is jealous, and does not draw in rivals by head and ears. No; in vers. 2-4 it is the daughters of Jerusalem, whom Shulamith addresses in ver. 5, who speak. The one who is praised is Solomon. The ladies of the palace are at table (*vid.* under ver. 12), and Solomon, after whom she who is placed amid this splendour which is strange to her asks longingly (ver. 7), is not now present. The two pentastichal strophes, vers. 2-4, are a scholion, the table song of the ladies; the solo in both cases passes over into a chorus.

Ver. 2. From these words with which as a solo the first strophe begins:

Let him kiss me with kisses of his mouth,

we at once perceive that she who here speaks is only one of many among whom Solomon's kisses are distributed; for *min* is partitive, as *e.g.* Ex. xvi. 27 (cf. Jer. xlviii. 32 and Isa. xvi. 9), with the underlying phrase נִשְׁקָה נִשְׁקָה, *osculum osculari* = *figere, jungere, dare*. *Nashak* properly means to join to each other and to join together, particularly mouth to mouth. פִּיהִי is the parallel form of פִּי, and is found in prose as well as in poetry; it is here preferred for the sake of the rhythm. Böttcher prefers, with Hitzig, יִשְׁקֵנִי ("let him give me to drink"); but "to give to drink with kisses" is an expression unsupported.

In line 2 the expression changes into an address:

For better is thy love than wine.

Instead of "thy love," the LXX. render "thy breasts," for they had before them the word written defectively as in the traditional text, and read רִירִי. Even granting that the dual רִירִים or רִירִים could be used in the sense of the Greek *μαστοί* (Rev. i. 13),<sup>1</sup> of the breasts of a man (for which Isa. xxxii. 12, Targ., furnishes no sufficient authority); yet in the mouth of a woman it were unseemly, and also is itself absurd as the language of praise. But, on the other hand, that רִירִי is not the true reading ("for more lovely—thus he says to me—are," etc.), R. Ismael rightly says, in reply to R. Akiba, *Aboda zara* 29b, and refers to רִירִי following (ver. 3), which requires the mas. for רִירִי. Rightly the Gr. Venet. *οἱ σοὶ ἔρωτες*, for רִירִים is related to רִירָה, almost as *ἔρω* to ἀγάπη, *Minne* to *Liebe*. It is a plur. like רִירִים, which, although a *pluralitantum*, is yet connected with the plur. of the pred. The verbal stem רִיר is an abbreviated reduplicative stem (Ewald, § 118. 1); the root רִיר appears to signify "to move by thrusts or pushes" (*vid.* under Ps. xlii. 5); of a fluid, "to cause to boil up," to which the word רִיר, a kitchen-pot, is referred.<sup>2</sup> It is the very same verbal stem from which רִיר (David), the beloved, and the name of the foundress of Carthage, רִירָה (= רִירָה) *Minna*, is derived. The adj. *tov* appears here and at 3a twice in its nearest primary meaning, denoting that which is pleasant to the taste and (thus particularly in Arab.) to the smell.

This comparison *suares prae vino*, as well as that which in line 3 of the pentastich, ver. 3,

To the smell thy ointments are sweet,

shows that when this song is sung wine is presented and perfumes are sprinkled; but the love of the host is, for those who sing, more excellent than all. It is maintained that רִיר signifies fragrance emitted, and not smell. Hence Hengst., Hahn, Holem., and Zöck. explain: in odour thy ointments are sweet. Now the words can certainly, after Josh. xxii. 10, Job xxxii. 4, 1 Kings x. 23, mean "sweet in (of) smell;" but in such cases the word with *Lamed* of reference naturally stands after that to which it gives the nearer reference, not as here before it. Therefore Hengst.: *ad odorem unguentorem tuorum quod attinet bonus est*, but such giving prominence to the subject and

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* my *Handschr. Funde*, Heft 2 (1862).

<sup>2</sup> Yet it is a question whether רִיר, to love, and רִיר, the breast (Arab. *thady*, with a verb *thadiyi*, to be thoroughly wet), are not after their nearest origin such words of feeling, caressing, prattling, as the Arab. *dad*, sport (also *dadad*, the only Arab. word which consists of the same three letters); cf. Fr. *dada*, hobby-horse.

attraction (cf. 1 Sam. ii. 4a; Job xv. 20) exclude one another; the accentuation correctly places לְרִיחַ out of the gen. connection. Certainly this word, like the Arab. *ryḥ*, elsewhere signifies *odor*, and the *Hiph.* הִרִיחַ (*arah*) *odorari*; but why should not רִיחַ be also used in the sense of *odoratus*, since in the post-bibl. Heb. חוֹשׁ הָרִיחַ means the sense of smell, and also in Germ. “*riechen*” means to emit fragrance as well as to perceive fragrance? We explain after Gen. ii. 9, where *Lamed* introduces the sense of sight, as here the sense of smell. Zöckl. and others reply that in such a case the word would have been לְרִיחַ; but the art. is wanting also at Gen. ii. 9 (cf. iii. 6), and was not necessary, especially in poetry, which has the same relation to the art. as to *asher*, which, wherever practicable, is omitted.

Thus in line 4:

An ointment poured forth is thy name.

By “thy ointments,” line 3, spices are meant, by which the palace was perfumed; but the fragrance of which, as line 4 says, is surpassed by the fragrance of his name. שֵׁם (name) and שֶׁמֶן (fragrance) form a paranomasia by which the comparison is brought nearer Eccles. vii. 1. Both words are elsewhere mas.; but sooner than שֵׁם, so frequently and universally mas. (although its plur. is שִׁמּוֹת, but cf. אֲבוֹת), שֶׁמֶן may be used as fem., although a parallel example is wanting (cf. *d'vāsh*, *mōr*, *nōphēth*, *kēmūh*, and the like, which are constantly mas.). Ewald therefore translates שֶׁמֶן תּוֹרֵק as a proper name: “O sweet *Salbenduft*” [Fragrance of Ointment]; and Böttcher sees in *turāk* a subst. in the sense of “sprinkling” [*Spreng-Oel*]; but a name like “*Rosenoel*” [oil of roses] would be more appropriately formed, and a subst. form תּוֹרֵק is, in Heb. at least, unexampled (for neither תּוֹנֶה nor תּוֹבֵל, in the name Tubal-Cain, is parallel). Fürst imagines “a province in Palestine where excellent oil was got,” called *Turak*; “Turkish” *Rosenöl* recommends itself, on the contrary, by the fact of its actual existence. Certainly less is hazarded when we regard *shēmēn*, as here treated exceptionally, as fem.; thus, not: *ut unguentum nomen tuum effunditur*, which, besides, is unsuitable, since one does not empty out or pour out a name; but: *unguentum quod effunditur* (Hengst., Hahn, and others), an ointment which is taken out of its depository and is sprinkled far and wide, is thy name. The harsh expression שֶׁמֶן מוֹרֵק is intentionally avoided; the old Heb. language is not *φιλομέτοχος* (fond of participles); and, besides, מוֹרֵק sounds badly with מֶרֶק, to rub off, to wash away. Perhaps, also, שֶׁמֶן יוֹרֵק is intentionally avoided, because of the collision of the weak sounds *n* and *j*. The name *Shēm* is derived from the verb *shāmā*, to be high, prominent, remarkable: whence also the

name for the heavens (*vid.* under Ps. viii. 2). That attractive charm (lines 2, 3), and this glory (line 4), make him, the praised, an object of general love, line 5, ver. 3b:

Therefore virgins love thee.

This "therefore" reminds us of Ps. xlv. מִלִּצְיָ (sing. Isa. vii. 14), from לִצְיָ (Arab.), *ghalima*, *pubescere*, are maidens growing to maturity. The intrans. form מִלִּצְיָ, with transitive signification, indicates a pathos. The perf. is not to be translated *dilexerunt*, but is to be judged of according to Gesen. § 126. 3: they have acquired love to thee (= love thee), as the ἡγάπησάν σε of the Greek translators is to be understood. The singers themselves are the evidence of the existence of this love.

With these words the first pentastich of the table-song terminates. The mystical interpretation regards it as a song of praise and of loving affection which is sung to Christ the King, the fairest of the children of men, by the church which is His own. The Targum, in line first, thinks of the "mouth to mouth" [Num. xii. 8] in the intercourse of Moses with God. Evidence of divine love is also elsewhere thought of as a kiss: the post-bibl. Heb. calls the gentlest death the death בְּנִשְׁקָה, i.e. by which God takes away the soul with a kiss.

The second pentastich also begins with a solo:

Ver. 4 Draw me, so will we run after thee.

All recent interpreters (except Böttcher) translate, like Luther, "Draw me after thee, so we run." Thus also the Targ., but doubtfully: *Trahe nos post te et curremus post viam bonitatis tuae*. But the accentuation which gives *Tiphcha* to מִיָּךְ requires the punctuation to be that adopted by the Peshito and the Vulg., and according to which the passage is construed by the Greeks (except, perhaps, by the Quinta): Draw me, so will we, following thee, run (*vid.* Dachselt, *Biblia Accentuata*, p. 983 s.). In reality, this word needs no complement: of itself it already means, one drawing towards, or to himself; the corresponding (Arab.) *masak* signifies, *prehendere prehensumque tenere*; the root is מִסַּק, *palpare, contrectare*. It occurs also elsewhere, in a spiritual connection, as the expression of the gentle drawing of love towards itself (Hos. xi. 4; Jer. xxxi. 3); cf. ἐλκύειν, John vi. 44, xii. 32. If one connects "after thee" with "draw me," then the expression seems to denote that a certain violence is needed to bring the one who is drawn from her place; but if it is connected with "we will run," then it defines the desire to run expressed by the cohortative, more nearly than a willing obedience or following. The whole chorus, continuing the solo, confesses that there needs

only an indication of his wish, a direction given, to make those who here speak eager followers of him whom they celebrate.

In what follows, this interchange of the *solo* and the *unisono* is repeated :

Ver. 4b If the king has brought me into his chambers,  
 So will we exult and rejoice in thee.  
 We will praise thy love more than wine!  
 Uprightly have they loved thee.

The cohortative נִרְצֶה (we will run) was the *apodosis imperativi*; the cohortatives here are the *apodosis perfecti hypothetici*. "Suppose that this has happened," is oftener expressed by the perf. (Ps. lvii. 7; Prov. xxii. 29, xxv. 16); "suppose that this happens," by the fut. (Job xx. 24; Ewald, § 357b). הַחֲדָרִים are the *interiora domus*; the root word *hhādār*, as the Arab. *khadar* shows, signifies to draw oneself back, to hide; the *hhēdār* of the tent is the back part, shut off by a curtain from the front space. Those who are singing are not at present in this innermost chamber. But if the king brings one of them in (הֵבִיא, from בָּוֵא, *introire*, with *acc. loci*), then—they all say—we will rejoice and be glad in thee. The cohortatives are better translated by the fut. than by the conjunctive (*exultemus*); they express as frequently not what they then desire to do, but what they then are about to do, from inward impulse, with heart delight. The sequence of ideas, "exult" and "rejoice," is not a *climax descendens*, but, as Ps. cxviii. 24, etc., an advance from the external to the internal,—from jubilation which can be feigned, to joy of heart which gives it truth; for שָׂמֵחַ—according to its root signification: to be smoothed, unwrinkled, to be glad<sup>1</sup>—means to be of a joyful, bright, complaisant disposition; and נָלַךְ, cogn. הָלַךְ, to turn (wind) oneself, to revolve, means conduct betokening delight. The prep. ב in verbs of rejoicing, denotes the object on account of which, and in which, one has joy. Then, if admitted into the closest neighbourhood of the king, they will praise his love more than wine. זָכַר denotes to fix, viz. in the memory; *Hiph.*: to bring to remembrance, frequently in the way of praise, and thus directly equivalent to *celebrare*, e.g. Ps. xlv. 18. The wine represents the gifts of the king, in contradistinction to his person. That in inward love he gives himself to them, excels in their esteem all else he gives. For, as the closing line expresses, "uprightly they love thee,"—viz. they love thee, i.e. from a right heart, which seeks nothing besides, and nothing with thee; and a right mind, which is pleased with thee, and with nothing but thee. Heiligstedt, Zöckler, and others translate: with right they love thee. But the *pluralet*.

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Friedr. Delitzsch's *Indo-german.-sem. Studien* (1873), p. 99 f.

מִשְׁתָּרִים (from מִשְׁתָּר, for which the sing. מִשְׁתָּר occurs) is an ethical conception (Prov. i. 3), and signifies, not: the right of the motive, but: the rightness of the word, thought, and act (Prov. xxiii. 16; Ps. xvii. 2, lviii. 2); thus, not: *jure*; but: *recte, sincere, candidè*. Hengst., Thrupp, and others, falsely render this word like the LXX., Aquil., Symm., Theod., Targ., Jerome, Venet., and Luther, as subject: rectitudes [abstr. for concr.] = those who have rectitude, the upright. Hengstenberg's assertion, that the word never occurs as an adv., is set aside by a glance at Ps. lviii. 2, lxxv. 3; and, on the other hand, there is no passage in which it is used as *abstr. pro concr.* It is here, as elsewhere, an adv. acc. for which the word מִשְׁתָּרִים might also be used.

The second pentastich closes similarly with the first, which ended with "love thee." What is there said of this king, that the virgins love him, is here more generalized; for *diligunt te* is equivalent to *diligentis* (cf. viii. 1, 7). With these words the table-song ends. It is erotic, and yet so chaste and delicate,—it is sensuous, and yet so ethical, that here, on the threshold, we are at once surrounded as by a mystical cloudy brightness. But how is it to be explained that Solomon, who says (Prov. xxvii. 2), "Let another praise thee, and not thine own mouth," begins this his Song of Songs with a song in praise of himself? It is explained from this, that here he celebrates an incident belonging to the happy beginning of his reign; and for him so far fallen into the past, although not to be forgotten, that what he was and what he now is are almost as two separate persons.

After this choral song, Shulamith, who has listened to the singers not without being examined by their inquisitive glances as a strange guest not of equal rank with them, now speaks:

Ver. 5 Black am I, yet comely, ye daughters of Jerusalem,  
As the tents of Kedar, as the hangings of Solomon.

From this, that she addresses the ladies of the palace as "daughters of Jerusalem" (*Kert* יְרֻשָׁלַיִם, a *du. fractus*; like עֶפְרָה for עֵפְרָה, 2 Chron. xiii. 19), it is to be concluded that she, although now in Jerusalem, came from a different place. She is, as will afterwards appear, from Lower Galilee;—and it may be remarked, in the interest of the mystical interpretation, that the church, and particularly her first congregations, according to the prophecy (Isa. viii. 23), was also Galilean, for Nazareth and Capernaum are their original seats;—and if Shulamith is a poetico-mystical Mashal or emblem, then she represents the synagogue one day to enter into the fellowship of Solomon—i.e. of the son of David, and the daughters of Jerusalem, i.e. the

congregation already believing on the Messiah. Yet we confine ourselves to the nearest sense, in which Solomon relates a self-experience. Shulamith, the lightly esteemed, cannot boast that she is so ruddy and fair of countenance as they who have just sung how pleasant it is to be beloved by this king; but yet she is not so devoid of beauty as not to venture to love and hope to be loved: "Black am I, yet comely." These words express humility without abjectness. She calls herself "black," although she is not so dark and unchangeably black as an "Ethiopian" (Jer. xiii. 23). The verb שָׁחַר has the general primary idea of growing dark, and signifies not necessarily soot-blackness (modern Arab. *shuhwar*, soot), but blackness more or less deep, as שָׁחַר, the name of the morning twilight, or rather the morning grey, shows; for (Arab.) *sahar*<sup>1</sup> denotes the latter, as distinguished from (Arab.) *fajr*, the morning twilight (*vid.* under Isa. xiv. 12, xlvii. 11). She speaks of herself as a Beduin who appears to herself as (Arab.) *sawda*, black, and calls<sup>2</sup> the inhabitants of the town (Arab.) *hawaryyat* (*cute candidas*). The *Vav* we have translated "yet" ("yet comely"); it connects the opposite, which exists along with the blackness. נְאוּה is the fem. of the adj. נְאוּה = נְאוּה = נְאוּי, which is also formed by means of the doubling of the third stem-letter of נָאוּ = נָאוּ, נָאוּ (to bend forward, to aim; to be corresponding to the aim, conformable, becoming, beautiful), *e.g.* like רָעֵנָן, to be full of sap, green. Both comparisons run parallel to *nigra et bella*; she compares on the one hand the tents of Kedar, and on the other the tapestry of Solomon. אֶהָל signifies originally, in general, the dwelling-place, as בֵּית the place where one spends the night; these two words interchange: *ohel* is the house of the nomad, and *bäith* is the tent of him who is settled. קָדָר (with the *Tsere*, probably from (Arab.) *kadar*, to have ability, be powerful, thought of after the Heb. manner, as Theodoret explains and Symm. also translates: σκοτασμός, from (Heb.) *Kadar*, *atrum esse*) is the name of a tribe of North. Arab. Ishmaelites (Gen. xxv. 13) whom Pliny speaks of (*Cedraei* in his *Hist. Nat.* v. 11), but which disappeared at the era of the rise of Islam; the Karaite Jefeth uses for it the word (Arab.) *Karysh*, for he substitutes the powerful Arab tribe from which Muhammed sprung, and rightly remarks: "She compares the colour of her skin to the blackness of the hair tents of the Koreishites,"—

<sup>1</sup> After an improbable etymology of the Arab., from *sahar*, to turn, to depart, "the departure of the night" (Lane). Magic appears also to be called *sihar*, as *nigromantia* (Mediaev. from *nekromantia*), the black art.

<sup>2</sup> The *houri* (damsel of paradise) is thus called *hawaryyt*, *adj. relat.* from *hawra*, from the black pupil of the eye in the centre of the white eyeball.

even to the present day the Beduin calls his tent his "hair-house" (*bét wabar*, or, according to a more modern expression, *bét sa'r*, בֵּית שֵׁעַר); for the tents are covered with cloth made of the hair of goats, which are there mostly black-coloured or grey. On the one hand, dark-coloured as the tents of the Kedarenes, she may yet, on the other hand, compare herself to the beautiful appearance of the יָרֵעוֹת of Solomon. By this word we will have to think of a pleasure-tent or pavilion for the king; *pavillon* (softened from Lat. *papilio*) is a pleasure-tent spread out like the flying butterfly. This Heb. word could certainly also mean curtains for separating a chamber; but in the tabernacle and the temple the curtains separating the Most Holy from the Holy Place were not so designated, but are called פָּרֹכֶת and מָסָךְ; and as with the tabernacle, so always elsewhere, יָרֵעוֹת (from יָרַע, to tremble, to move hither and thither) is the name of the cloths or tapestry which formed the sides of the tent (Isa. liv. 2); of the tent coverings, which were named in parall. with the tents themselves as the clothing of their framework (Hab. iii. 7; Jer. iv. 20, x. 20, xlix. 29). Such tent hangings will thus also be here meant; precious, as those described Ex. xxvi. and xxxvi., and as those which formed the tabernacle on Zion (2 Sam. vii.; cf. 1 Chron. xvii. 1) before the erection of the temple. Those made in Egypt<sup>1</sup> were particularly prized in ancient times.

Shulamith now explains, to those who were looking upon her with inquisitive wonder, how it is that she is swarthy:

Ver. 6a Look not on me because I am black,  
Because the sun has scorched me.

If the words were בִּי אֶל-תִּרְאֶה (תִּרְאֶהָ), then the meaning would be: look not at me, stare not at me. But אֶל-תִּרְאֶנִּי, with שׁ (elsewhere פִּי) following, means: Regard me not that I am blackish (*subnigra*); the second שׁ is to be interpreted as co-ordin. with the first (that . . . that), or assigning a reason, and that objectively (for). We prefer, with Böttch., the former, because in the latter case we would have had שְׁחֲשֵׁשׁ. The *quineliterum* שְׁחֲחֲרָה signifies, in contradistinction to שְׁחֹר, that which is black here and there, and thus not altogether black. This form, as descriptive of colour, is diminutive; but since it also means *id quod passim est*, if the accent lies on *passim*, as distinguished from *raro*, it can be also taken as increasing instead of diminishing, as in יִפְּחֶהּ, הִפְּחֶהּ. The LXX. trans. παρέβλεψέ (Symm. παρανέβλεψέ) με ὁ ἥλιος: the sun has looked askance on me. But why only askance? The Venet. better: κατεῖδέ με; but that is too little. The look is thought of as scorching; wherefore

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Wetzstein's *Isaiah* (1869), p. 698.

Aquila: *συνέκαυσέ με*, it has burnt me; and Theodotion: *περιέφρυξέ με*, it has scorched me over and over. *פָּרַץ* signifies here not *adspicere* (Job iii. 9, xli. 10) so much as *adurere*. In this word itself (cogn. *פָּרַץ*; Arab. *sadaf*, whence *asdaf*, black; cf. *פָּרַץ* and *פָּרַץ*, Job xvii. 1), the looking is thought of as a scorching; for the rays of the eye, when they fix upon anything, gather themselves, as it were, into a focus. Besides, as the Scriptures ascribe twinkling to the morning dawn, so it ascribes eyes to the sun (2 Sam. xii. 11), which is itself as the eye of the heavens.<sup>1</sup> The poet delicately represents Shulamith as regarding the sun as fem. Its name in Arab. and old Germ. is fem., in Heb. and Aram. for the most part mas. My lady the sun, she, as it were, says, has produced on her this swarthiness.

She now says how it has happened that she is thus sunburnt:

6b My mother's sons were angry with me,  
Appointed me as keeper of the vineyards—  
Mine own vineyard have I not kept.

If "mother's sons" is the parallel for "brothers" (*אֶחָיו*), then the expressions are of the same import, *e.g.* Gen. xxvii. 29; but if the two expressions stand in apposition, as Deut. xiii. 7 [6], then the idea of the natural brother is sharpened; but when "mother's sons" stands thus by itself alone, then, after Lev. xviii. 9, it means the relationship by one of the parents alone, as "father's wife" in the language of the O. T. and also 1 Cor. v. 5 is the designation of a step-mother. Nowhere is mention made of Shulamith's father, but always, as here, only of her mother, iii. 4, viii. 2, vi. 9; and she is only named without being introduced as speaking. One is led to suppose that Shulamith's own father was dead, and that her mother had been married again; the sons by the second marriage were they who ruled in the house of their mother. These brothers of Shulamith appear towards the end of the melodrama as rigorous guardians of their youthful sister; one will thus have to suppose that their zeal for the spotless honour of their sister and the family proceeded from an endeavour to accustom the fickle or dreaming child to useful activity, but not without step-brotherly harshness. The form *נָחִיר*, Ewald, § 193c, and Olsh. p. 593, derive from *נָחַר*, the *Niph.* of which is either *נָחַר* or *נָחַר* (= *נָחַר*), Gesen. § 68, An. 5; but the plur. of this *נָחַר* should, according to rule, have been *נָחִיר* (cf. how-

<sup>1</sup> According to the Indian idea, it is the eye of Varuna; the eye (also after Plato: *ἡλιοειδέστατον τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὀργάνων*) is regarded as taken from the sun, and when men die returning to the sun (Muir in the *Asiatic Journal*, 1865, p. 294, S. 309).

ever, נָחַר, *profanantur*, Ezek. vii. 24); and what is more decisive, this נָחַר from נָחַר everywhere else expresses a different passion from that of anger; Böttch. § 1060 (2, 379). נָחַר is used of the burning of anger; and that נָחַר (from נָחַר = נָחַר) can be another form for נָחַר, is shown, *e.g.*, by the interchange of נָחַר and נָחַר; the form נָחַר, like נָחַר, Amos vi. 6, resisted the bringing together of the ה and the half guttural ר. *Nēhērā* (here as Isa. xli. 11, xlv. 24) means, according to the original, mid. signif. of the *Niph.*, to burn inwardly, ἀναφλέγεσθαι = ὀργίζεσθαι. Shulamith's address consists intentionally of clauses with perfects placed together: she speaks with childlike artlessness, and not "like a book;" in the language of a book, נִסְתָּר would have been used instead of נָחַר. But that she uses נָחַר (from נָחַר, R. נָחַר = τηρεῖν; cf. Targ. Gen. xxxvii. 11 with Luke ii. 51), and not נָחַר, as they were wont to say in Judea, after Prov. xxvii. 18, and after the designation of the tower for the protection of the flocks by the name of "the tower of the *nōtsrim*" [the watchmen], 2 Kings xvii. 9, shows that the maid is a Galilean, whose manner of speech is Aramaizing, and if we may so say, platt-Heb. (= Low Heb.), like the Lower Saxon *plattdeutsch*. Of the three forms of the particip. נָחַר, נָחַר, נָחַר, we here read the middle one, used subst. (Ewald, § 188b), but retaining the long *e* (ground-form, *nātir*). The plur. נָחַר does not necessarily imply that she had several vineyards to keep, it is the categ. plur. with the art. designating the genus; *custodiens vineas* is a keeper of a vineyard. But what kind of vineyard, or better, vine-garden, is that which she calls נָחַר, *i.e.* *meam ipsius vineam*? The personal possession is doubly expressed; *shellī* is related to *cārmī* as a nearer defining apposition: my vineyard, that which belongs to me (*vid.* Fr. Philippi's *Status constr.* pp. 112-116). Without doubt the figure refers to herself given in charge to be cared for by herself: vine-gardens she had kept, but her own vine-garden, *i.e.* her own person, she had not kept. Does she indicate thereby that, in connection with Solomon, she has lost herself, with all that she is and has? Thus in 1851 I thought; but she certainly seeks to explain why she is so sunburnt. She intends in this figurative way to say, that as the keeper of a vineyard she neither could keep nor sought to keep her own person. In this connection *cārmī*, which by no means = the colourless *memet ipsam*, is to be taken as the figure of the person in its external appearance, and that of its fresh-blooming attractive appearance which directly accords with נָחַר, since from the stem-word נָחַר (Arab.), *karuma*, the idea of that which is noble and distinguished is connected with this designation of the planting of vines (for נָחַר, (Arab.) *karm*, cf. *karnat*, of a single vine-

stock, denotes not so much the soil in which the vines are planted, as rather the vines themselves): her *kērēm* is her (Arab.) *karamat*, i.e. her stately attractive appearance. If we must interpret this mystically then, supposing that Shulamith is the congregation of Israel moved at some future time with love to Christ, then by the step-brothers we think of the teachers, who after the death of the fathers threw around the congregation the fetters of their human ordinances, and converted fidelity to the law into a system of hireling service, in which all its beauty disappeared. Among the allegorists, Hengstenberg here presents the extreme of an interpretation opposed to what is true and fine.

These words (vers. 5–6) are addressed to the ladies of the palace, who look upon her with wonder. That which now follows is addressed to her beloved:

Ver. 7 O tell me, thou whom my soul loveth: where feedest thou?  
Where causest thou it (thy flock) to lie down at noon?  
For why should I appear as one veiled  
Among the flocks of thy companions!

The country damsel has no idea of the occupation of a king. Her simplicity goes not beyond the calling of a shepherd as of the fairest and the highest. She thinks of the shepherd of the people as the shepherd of sheep. Moreover, Scripture also describes governing as a tending of sheep; and the Messiah, of whom Solomon is a type, is specially represented as the future Good Shepherd. If now we had to conceive of Solomon as present from the beginning of the scene, then here in ver. 7 would Shulamith say that she would gladly be alone with him, far away from so many who are looking on her with open eyes; and, indeed, in some country place where alone she feels at home. The entreaty “O tell me” appears certainly to require (cf. Gen. xxxvii. 19) the presence of one to whom she addresses herself. But, on the other hand, the entreaty only asks that he should let her know where he is; she longs to know where his occupation detains him, that she may go out and seek him. Her request is thus directed toward the absent one, as is proved by ver. 8. The vocat., “O thou whom my soul loveth,” is connected with אַתָּה, which lies hid in הַיָּדָה (“inform thou”). It is a circumlocution for “beloved” (cf. Neh. xiii. 26), or “the dearly beloved of my soul” (cf. Jer. xii. 7). The entreating request, *indica quaeso mihi ubi pascis*, reminds one of Gen. xxxvii. 16, where, however, *ubi* is expressed by אֵיפֶה, while here by אֵיכָה, which in this sense is ἀπ. λεγ. For *ubi* = אֵיפֶה, is otherwise denoted only by אֵיכָה (אֵיכָה), 2 Kings vi. 13, and usually אֵיִה, North Palest., by Hosea אֵיִה. This אֵיכָה elsewhere means *quo-*

*modo*, and is the key-word of the *Kīna*, as מַשָּׁל is of the *Mashal* (the satire); the Song uses for it, in common with the Book of Esther, אִיכָנָה. In themselves כָּה and כֹּה, which with אִי preceding, are stamped as interrog. in a sense analogous to *hic, ecce, κῆνος*, and the like; the local, temporal, polite sense rests only on a conventional *usus loq.*, Botch. § 530. She wishes to know where he feeds, viz. his flock, where he causes it (viz. his flock) to lie down at mid-day. The verb רָבַץ (R. רָב, with the root signif. of condensation) is the proper word for the lying down of a four-footed animal: *complicatis pedibus procumbere (cubare)*; *Hiph.* of the shepherd, who causes the flock to lie down; the Arab. *rad'a* is the name for the encampment of shepherds. The time for encamping is the mid-day, which as the time of the double-light, i.e. the most intense light in its ascending and descending, is called צָהָר. מִצָּהָר, occurring only here, signifies *nam cur*, but is according to the sense = *at ne*, like מִצָּהָר אִיכָנָה, Dan. i. 10 (cf. Ezra vii. 23); מִצָּהָר, without *Day forte caphon*, is, with the single exception of Job vii. 20, always *ultra*, while with the *Day* it is *ultra*, and as a rule, only when the following word begins with מִצָּהָר carries forward the tone to the *ult.* Shulamith wishes to know the place where her beloved feeds and rests his flock, that she might not wander about among the flocks of his companions seeking and asking for him. But what does מִצָּהָר mean? It is at all events the *part. act. fem.* of מִצָּהָר which is here treated after the manner of the strong verb, the kindred form to the equally possible מִצָּהָר (from 'ataja) and מִצָּהָר. As for the meaning, *inter errabundae* (Syr., Symm., Jerome, Venet., Luther) recommends itself; but מִצָּהָר must then, unless we wish directly to adopt the reading מִצָּהָר (Botch.), have been transposed from מִצָּהָר (הָרָה), which must have been assumed if מִצָּהָר, in the usual sense of *velare* (cf. מִצָּהָר), did not afford an appropriate signification. Indeed, *velans*, viz. *sex*, cannot denote one whom consciousness veils, one who is weak or fainting (Gesen. *Lex.*), for the *part. act.* expresses action, not passivity. But it can denote one who covers herself (the LXX., perhaps, in this sense ὡς περιβαλλομένη), because she mourns (Rashi); or after Gen. xxxviii. 14 (cf. Martial, ix. 32) one who muffles herself up, because by such affected apparent modesty she wishes to make herself known as a Hierodoule or harlot. The former of these significations is not appropriate; for to appear as mourning does not offend the sense of honour in a virtuous maiden, but to create the appearance of an immodest woman is to her intolerable; and if she bears in herself the image of an only beloved, she shrinks in horror from such a base appearance, not only as a debasing of herself, but also as a desecration of this sanctuary in her heart.

Shulamith calls entreatingly upon him whom her soul loveth to tell her how she might be able directly to reach him, without feeling herself wounded in the consciousness of her maidenhood and of the exclusiveness of her love. It is thereby supposed that the companions of her only beloved among the shepherds might not treat that which to her is holy with a holy reserve,—a thought to which Hattendorff has given delicate expression in his exposition of the Song, 1867. If Solomon were present, it would be difficult to understand this entreating call. But he is not present, as is manifest from this, that she is not answered by him, but by the daughters of Jerusalem.

Ver. 8 If thou knowest not, thou fairest of women,  
Go after the footprints of the flock,  
And feed thy kids beside the shepherds' tents.

הַיָּפִיָּה, standing in the address or call, is in the voc.; the art. was indispensable, because “the beautiful one among women” = the one distinguished for beauty among them, and thus is, according to the meaning, superlative; cf. Judg. vi. 15, Amos ii. 16, with Judg. v. 24; Luke i. 28; Ewald, § 313c. The verb יָפָה refers to the fundamental idea: *integrum, completum esse*, for beauty consists in well-proportioned fulness and harmony of the members. That the ladies of the court are excited to speak thus may arise from this, that one often judges altogether otherwise of a man, whom one has found not beautiful, as soon as he begins to speak, and his countenance becomes intellectually animated. And did not, in Shulamith's countenance, the strange external swarthyness borrow a brightness from the inner light which irradiated her features, as she gave so deep and pure an expression to her longing? But the instruction which her childlike, almost childish, *naïvete* deserved, the daughters of Jerusalem do not feel disposed to give her. לֹא יָדַע signifies, often without the obj. supplied, *non sapere*, e.g. Ps. lxxxii. 5; Job viii. 9. The לֹא subjoined guards against this inclusive sense, in which the phrase here would be offensive. This *dat. ethicus* (*vid.* ii. 10, 11, 13, 17, iv. 6, viii. 14), used twice here in ver. 8 and generally in the Song, reflects that which is said on the will of the subject, and thereby gives to it an agreeable cordial turn, here one bearing the colour of a gentle reproof: if thou knowest not to thee,—i.e. if thou, in thy simplicity and retirement, knowest it not, viz. that he whom thou thinkest thou must seek for at a distance is near to thee, and that Solomon has to tend not sheep but people,—now, then, so go forth, viz. from the royal city, and remain, although chosen to royal honours, as a shepherdess beside thine own sheep and kids. One misapprehends the answer if he supposes that they in reality point out the

way to Shulamith by which she might reach her object; on the contrary, they answer her ironically, and, entering into her confusion of mind, tell her that if she cannot apprehend the position of Solomon, she may just remain what she is. אָקִיב (Arab. 'akīb), from אָקִיב, to be convex, arched, is the heel; to go in the heels (the reading fluctuates between the form, with and without *Dag. dirimens* in ק) of one = to press hard after him, to follow him immediately. That they assign to her not goats or kids of goats, but kids, נָרִיחַ, is an involuntary fine delicate thought with which the appearance of the elegant, beautiful shepherdess inspires them. But that they name kids, not sheep, may arise from this, that the kid is a near-lying erotic emblem; cf. Gen. xxxviii. 17, where it has been fittingly remarked that the young he-goat was the proper courtesan-offering in the worship of Aphrodite (Movers' *Phœnicier*, I. 680). It is as if they said: If thou canst not distinguish between a king and shepherds, then indulge thy love-thoughts beside the shepherds' tents,—remain a country maiden if thou understandest not how to value the fortune which has placed thee in Jerusalem in the royal palace.

#### SECOND SCENE OF THE FIRST ACT, I. 9—II. 7.

Solomon, while he was absent during the first scene, is now present. It is generally acknowledged that the words which follow were spoken by him:

- Ver. 9 To a horse in the chariot of Pharaoh  
Do I compare thee, my love.  
10 Beautiful are thy cheeks in the chains,  
Thy neck in the necklaces.  
11 Golden chains will we make for thee,  
With points of silver.

Till now, Shulamith was alone with the ladies of the palace in the banqueting-chamber. Solomon now comes from the banquet-hall of the men (ver. 12); and to ii. 7, to which this scene extends, we have to think of the women of the palace as still present, although not hearing what Solomon says to Shulamith. He addresses her, "my love:" she is not yet his bride. רֵעָה (female friend), from רָעָה (רָעָה), to guard, care for, tend, ethically: to delight in something particularly, to take pleasure in intercourse with one, is formed in the same way as נִעְרָה; the mas. is רָעָה (= *ra'j*), abbreviated רָע, whence the fem. *ra'yāh* (Judg. xi. 37; *Chethib*), as well as *rē'āh*, also with reference to the ground-form. At once, in the first words used

by Solomon, one recognises a Philip, *i.e.* a man fond of horses,—an important feature in the character of the sage (*vid.* Sur. 38 of the Koran),—and that, one fond of Egyptian horses: Solomon carried on an extensive importation of horses from Egypt and other countries (2 Chron. ix. 28); he possessed 1400 war-chariots and 12,000 horsemen (1 Kings x. 26); the number of stalls of horses for his chariots was still greater (1 Kings v. 6) [iv. 26]. Horace (Ode iii. 11) compares a young sprightly maiden to a nimble and timid *equa trima*; Anacreon (60) addresses such an one: “thou Thracian filly;” and Theocritus says (Idyl xviii. 30, 31):

“As towers the cypress mid the garden’s bloom,  
As in the chariot proud Thessalian steed,  
Thus graceful rose-complexioned Helen moves.”

But how it could occur to the author of the Song to begin the praise of the beauty of a shepherdess by saying that she is like a horse in Pharaoh’s chariot, is explained only by the supposition that the poet is Solomon, who, as a keen hippologue, had an open eye for the beauty of the horse. Egyptian horses were then esteemed as afterwards the Arabian were. Moreover, the horse was not native to Egypt, but was probably first imported thither by the Hyksos: the Egyptian name of the horse, and particularly of the mare, *ses-t, ses-mut*, and of the chariot, *markabuta*, are Semitic.<sup>1</sup> סוּסָה is here not *equitatus* (Jerome), as Hengst. maintains: “*Susah* does not denote a horse, but is used collectively;” while he adds, “Shulamith is compared to the whole Egyptian cavalry, and is therefore an ideal person.” The former statement is untrue, and the latter is absurd. *Sūs* means *equus*, and *susā* may, indeed, collectively denote the stud (cf. Josh. xix. 5 with 1 Chron. iv. 31), but obviously it first denotes the *equa*. But is it to be rendered, with the LXX. and the Venet., “to my horse”? Certainly not; for the chariots of Pharaoh are just the chariots of Egypt, not of the king of Israel. The *Chirek* in which this word terminates is the *Ch. compag.*, which also frequently occurs where, as here and Gen. xlix. 11, the second member of the word-chain is furnished with a prep. (*vid.* under Ps. cxiii.). This *i* is an old genitival ending, which, as such, has disappeared from the language; it is almost always accented as the suff. Thus also here, where the *Metheg* shows that the accent rests on the *ult.* The plur. רִכְבֵּי, occurring only here, is the amplificative poetic, and denotes state equipage. רִכְבָּה is the trans. of רָכַב, which combines the meanings *aequum* and *aequalem esse*. Although not allegorizing, yet, that

<sup>1</sup> Eber’s *Aegypten u. die B. Mose’s*, Bd. I. pp. 221 f. 226; cf. *Aeg. Zeitschr* 1864, p. 26 f.

we may not overlook the judiciousness of the comparison, we must remark that Shulamith is certainly a "daughter of Israel;" a daughter of the people who increased in Egypt, and, set free from the bondage of Pharaoh, became the bride of Jahve, and were brought by the law as a covenant into a marriage relation to Him.

The transition to ver. 10 is mediated by the effect of the comparison; for the head-frame of the horse's bridle, and the poitral, were then certainly, just as now, adorned with silken tassels, fringes, and other ornaments of silver (*vid.* Lane's *Modern Egypt*, I. 149). Jerome, absurdly, after the LXX.: *pulchrae sunt genae tuae sicut turturis*. The name of the turtle, תר, redupl. *turtur*, is a pure onomatopoeia, which has nothing to do with תר, whence דר, to go round about, or to move in a circle; and turtle-dove's cheeks — what absurdity! Birds have no cheeks; and on the sides of its neck the turtle-dove has black and white variegated feathers, which also furnishes no comparison for the colour of the cheeks. תורים are the round ornaments which hang down in front on both sides of the head-band, or are also inwoven in the braids of hair in the forehead; תר, *circumire*, signifies also to form a circle or a row; in Aram. it thus denotes, *e.g.*, the hem of a garment and the border round the eye. In נא (vid. at 5a) the *Alph* is silent, as in לאמר, אכל, חרמים. חרמים are strings of pearls as a necklace; for the necklace (Arab. *kharaz*) consists of one or more, for the most part, of three rows of pearls. The verb חר signifies, to bore through and to string together; *e.g.* in the Talm., fish which one strings on a rod or line, in order to bring them to the market. In Heb. and Aram. the secondary sense of stringing predominates, so that to string pearls is expressed by חר, and to bore through pearls, by קרה; in Arab., the primary meaning of piercing through, *e.g.* *micraz*, a shoemaker's awl.

After ver. 11, one has to represent to himself Shulamith's adorning as very simple and modest; for Solomon seeks to make her glad with the thought of a continued residence at the royal court by the promise of costly and elegant ornaments. Gold and silver were so closely connected in ancient modes of representation, that in the old Aegypt. silver was called *nub het*, or white gold. Gold derived its name of זהב from its splendour, after the witty Arab. word *zahab*, to go away, as an unstable possession; silver is called כסף, from כסף, *scindere*, *abscindere*, a piece of metal as broken off from the mother-stone, like the Arab. *dhukrat*, as set free from the lump by means of the pickaxe (*cf.* at Ps. xix. 11, lxxxiv. 3). The name of silver has here, not without the influence of the rhythm (*cf.* viii. 9), the article designating the species; the Song frequently uses this, and

is generally in using the art. not so sparing as poetry commonly is.<sup>1</sup> עֶשֶׂה makes prominent the points of silver as something particular, but not separate. In נְעִיטָה, Solomon includes himself among the other inhabitants, especially the women of the palace; for the *plur. majest.* in the words of God of Himself (frequently in the Koran), or persons of rank of themselves (general in the vulgar Arab.), is unknown in the O. T. They would make for her golden globules or knobs with (*i.e.* provided with . . .; cf. Ps. lxxxix. 14) points of silver sprinkled over them,—which was a powerful enticement for a plain country damsel.

Now for the first time Shulamith addresses Solomon, who is before her. It might be expected that the first word will either express the joy that she now sees him face to face, or the longing which she had hitherto cherished to see him again. The verse following accords with this expectation:

Ver. 12 While the king is at his table,  
My nard has yielded its fragrance.

עַד or עַד אֵשֶׁר, with fut. foll., usually means: *usque eo*, until this and that shall happen, ii. 7, 17; with the perf. foll., until something happened, iii. 4. The idea connected with “until” may, however, be so interpreted that there comes into view not the end of the period as such, but the whole length of the period. So here in the subst. clause following, which in itself is already an expression of continuance, *donec* = *dum* (*erat*); so also עַד alone, without *asher*, with the part. foll. (Job i. 18), and the infin. (Judg. iii. 26; Ex. xxxiii. 22; Jonah iv. 2; cf. 2 Kings ix. 22); seldomer with the

<sup>1</sup> The art. denoting the idea of species in the second member of the *st. const.* standing in the sing. without a determining reference to the first, occurs in i. 13, “a bundle of (*von*) myrrh;” i. 14, “a cluster of (*von*) the cyprus-flower;” iv. 3, “a thread of (*von*) scarlet,” “a piece of pomegranate;” v. 13, “a bed of balm” (but otherwise, vi. 2); vii. 9, “clusters of the vine;” vii. 3, “a bowl of roundness” (which has this property); vii. 10, “wine (of the quality) of goodness;” cf. viii. 2, “wine the (= of the) spicing.” It also, in cases where the defined species to which the first undefined member of the *st. const.* belongs, stands in the pl.: ii. 9, 17, viii. 14, “like a young one of the hinds;” iv. 1, vi. 5, “a herd of goats;” iv. 2, “a flock of shorn sheep;” vi. 6, “a flock of lambs,” *i.e.* consisting of individuals of this kind. Also, when the second member states the place where a thing originates or is found, the first often remains indeterminate, as one of that which is there found, or a part of that which comes from thence: ii. 1, “a meadow-saffron of Sharon,” “a lily of the valleys;” iii. 9, “the wood of Lebanon.” The following are doubtful: iv. 4, “a thousand bucklers;” and vii. 5, “a tower of ivory;” less so vii. 1, “the dance of Mahanaim.” The following are examples of a different kind: Gen. xvi. 7, “a well of water;” Deut. xxii. 19, “a damsel of Israel;” Ps. cxiii. 9, “a mother of children;” cf. Gen. xxi. 28.

fin. foll., once with the perf. foll. (1 Sam. xiv. 19), once (for Job viii. 21 is easily explained otherwise) with the fut. foll. (Ps. cxli. 10, according to which Gen. xlix. 10 also is explained by Baur and others, but without כִּי עַד in this sense of limited duration: "so long as," being anywhere proved). עָבַר is the inflected עָבַר, which, like the post-bibl. עָבַר, signifies the circuit of the table; for עָבַר signifies also, after 1 Sam. xvi. 11 (the LXX. rightly, after the sense οὐ μὴ κατακλιθῶμεν), to seat themselves around the table, from which it is to be remarked that not till the Greek-Roman period was the Persian custom of reclining at table introduced, but in earlier times they sat (1 Sam. xx. 5; 1 Kings xiii. 20; cf. Ps. cxxviii. 3). Reclining and eating are to be viewed as separate from each other, Amos vi. 4; עָבַר, "three and three they recline at table," is in matter as in language *mishnaic* (*Berachoth* 42b; cf. *Sanhedrin* ii. 4, of the king: if he reclines at table, the Tōra must be opposite him). Thus: While (*usque eo*, so long as), says Shulamith, the king was at his table, my nard gave forth its fragrance.

נָדָה is an Indian word: *nalada*, i.e. yielding fragrance, Pers. *nard* (*nārd*), Old Arab. *nardīn* (*nārdīn*), is the aromatic oil of an Indian plant *valeriana*, called *Nardostachys 'Gatāmānsi* (hair-tress nard). Interpreters are wont to represent Shulamith as having a stalk of nard in her hand. Hitzig thinks of the nard with which she who is speaking has besprinkled herself, and he can do this because he regards the speaker as one of the court ladies. But that Shulamith has besprinkled herself with nard, is as little to be thought of as that she has in her hand a sprig of nard (*spica nardi*), or, as the ancients said, an ear of nard; she comes from a region where no nard grows, and nard-oil is for a country maiden unattainable.<sup>1</sup> Horace promises Virgil a *cadus* (= 9 gallons) of the best wine for a small onyx-box full of nard; and Judas estimated at 300 denarii (about £8, 10s.) the genuine nard (how frequently nard was adulterated we learn from Pliny) which Mary of Bethany poured from an alabaster box on the head of Jesus, so that the whole house was filled with the odour of the ointment (Mark xiv. 5; John xii. 2). There, in Bethany, the love which is willing to sacrifice all expressed itself in the nard; here, the nard is a figure of the happiness of love, and its fragrance a figure of the longing of love. It is only in the language of flowers that Shulamith makes precious perfume a figure of the love which she bears in the recess of her heart, and which, so

<sup>1</sup> The nard plant grows in Northern and Eastern India; the hairy part of the stem immediately above the root yields the perfume. Vid. Lassen's *Indische Alterthumskunde*, I. 338 f., III. 41 f.

long as Solomon was absent, breathed itself out and, as it were, cast forth its fragrance<sup>1</sup> (cf. ii. 13, vii. 14) in words of longing. She has longed for the king, and has sought to draw him towards her, as she gives him to understand. He is continually in her mind.

Ver. 13 A bundle of myrrh is my beloved to me,  
Which lieth between my breasts.

14 A bunch of cypress-flowers is my beloved to me,  
From the vine-gardens of Engedi.

Most interpreters, ignoring the lessons of botany, explain 13a of a little bunch of myrrh; but whence could Shulamith obtain this? Myrrh, מִרְרָה (מִרְרָה, to move oneself in a horizontal direction hither and thither, or gradually to advance; of a fluid, to flow over the plain<sup>2</sup>), belongs, like the frankincense, to the amyrids, which are also exotics<sup>3</sup> in Palestine; and that which is aromatic in the *Balsamodendron myrrha* are the leaves and flowers, but the resin (*Gummi myrrhae*, or merely *myrrha*) cannot be tied in a bunch. Thus the myrrh here can be understood in no other way than as at v. 5; in general צִרְרָה, according to Hitzig's correct remark, properly denotes not what one binds up together, but what one ties up—thus *sacculus*, a little bag. It is not supposed that she carried such a little bag with her (cf. Isa. iii. 20), or a box of frankincense (Luth. musk-apple); but she compares her beloved to a myrrh-repository, which day and night departs not from her bosom, and penetrates her inwardly with its heart-strengthening aroma. So constantly does she think of him, and so delightful is it for her to dare to think of him as her beloved.

The 14th verse presents the same thought. כִּפְרִי is the cypress-cluster or the cypress-flowers, κύπρος (according to Fürst, from כִּפְרִי = עֵפֶר, to be whitish, from the colour of the yellow-white flowers), which botanists call *Lawsonia*, and in the East *Alhennā*; its leaves yield the orange colour with which the Moslem women stain<sup>4</sup> their hands and feet. אֶשְׁכָּל (from שָׁכַל, to interweave) denotes that which is woven, tresses, or a cluster or garland of their flowers. Here also we

<sup>1</sup> In Arab. نَتْن = نَتَن, to give an odour, has the specific signification, to give an ill odour (*mintin*, *foetidus*), which led an Arab. interpreter to understand the expression, "my nard has yielded, etc.," of the stupifying savour which compels Solomon to go away (*Mittheilung*, Goldziher's)

<sup>2</sup> Vid. Schlotmann in the *Stud. u. Krit.* (1867), p. 217.

<sup>3</sup> They came from Arabia and India; the better Arabian was adulterated with Indian myrrh.

<sup>4</sup> Vid. the literature of this subject in Defrémery's notice of Dozy-Engelmann's work in the *Revue Critique*, III. 2 (1868), p. 408.

have not to suppose that Shulamith carried a bunch of flowers; in her imagination she places herself in the vine-gardens which Solomon had planted on the hill-terraces of Engedi lying on the west of the Dead Sea (Eccles. ii. 4), and chooses a cluster of flowers of the cypress growing in that tropical climate, and says that her beloved is to her internally what such a cluster of cypress-flowers would be to her externally. To be able to call him her beloved is her ornament; and to think of him refreshes her like the most fragrant flowers.

In this ardour of loving devotion, she must appear to the king so much the more beautiful.

Ver. 15 Lo, thou art fair, my love.

Lo, thou art fair; thine eyes are doves.

This is a so-called *comparatio decorata*, as we say: feet like the gazelle, i.e. to which the swiftness of the gazelle's feet belongs (Hab. iii. 19); but instead of "like doves," for the comparison mounts up to equalization, the expression is directly, "doves." If the pupil of the eye were compared with the feathers of the dove (Hitz.), or the sprightliness of the eye with the lively motion hither and thither of the dove (Heiligst.), then the eulogium would stand out of connection with what Shulamith has just said. But it stands in reference to it if her eyes are called doves; and so the likeness to doves' eyes is attributed to them, because purity and gentleness, longing and simplicity, express themselves therein. The dove is, like the myrtle, rose, and apple, an attribute of the goddess of love, and a figure of that which is truly womanly; wherefore דָּוָה (the Arab. name of a dove), *Columba*, and the like names of women, *columba* and *columbari*, are words of fondness and caressing. Shulamith gives back to Solomon his eulogium, and rejoices in the prospect of spending her life in fellowship with him.

Ver. 16 Behold, thou art comely, my beloved; yea, charming;

Yea, our couch is luxuriously green.

17 The beams of our house are cedars,

Our wainscot of cypresses.

If ver. 16 were not the echo of her heart to Solomon, but if she therein meant some other one, then the poet should at least not have used דָּוָה, but דָּוָה. Hitzig remarks, that up to "my beloved" the words appear as those of mutual politeness—that therefore חָדָה (charming) is added at once to distinguish her beloved from the king, who is to her insufferable. But if a man and a woman are together, and he says דָּוָה and she says דָּוָה, that is as certainly an interchange of address as that one and one are two and not three.

He praises her beauty; but in her eyes it is rather he who is beautiful, yea charming: she rejoices beforehand in that which is assigned to her. Where else could her conjugal happiness find its home but among her own rural scenes? The city with its noisy display does not please her; and she knows, indeed, that her beloved is a king, but she thinks of him as a shepherd. Therefore she praises the fresh green of their future homestead; cedar tops will form the roof of the house in which they dwell, and cypresses its wainscot. The bed, and particularly the bridal-bower (*D. M. Z.* xxii. 153),—but not merely the bed in which one sleeps, but also the cushion for rest, the divan (*Amos* vi. 4),—has the name עֶרֶשׂ, from עָרַשׁ, to cover over; cf. the “network of goats’ hair” (*1 Sam.* xix. 13) and the κωνωπέϊον of Holofernes (*Judith* x. 21, xiii. 9), (whence our *kanapee* = canopy), a bed covered over for protection against the κώνωπες, the gnats. רָעַן, whence here the fem. adj. accented on the *ult.*, is not a word of colour, but signifies to be extensible, and to extend far and wide, as *lentus* in *lenti salices*; we have no word such as this which combines in itself the ideas of softness and juicy freshness, of bending and elasticity, of looseness, and thus of overhanging ramification (as in the case of the weeping willow). The beams are called קִרֹת, from קָרָה, to meet, to lay crosswise, to hold together (cf. *contingere* and *contignare*). רְחִיטָנוּ (after another reading, רָה, from רָחַט, with *Kametz* immutable, or a virtual *Dag.*) is North Palest. = רֶהַ (Kerî), for in place of רְחִיטִים, troughs (*Ex.* ii. 16), the Samarit. has רַחֲטִים (cf. *sahar* and *sahhar*, *circumire*, *zahar* and *zahhar*, whence the Syr. name of scarlet); here the word, if it is not defect. plur. (Heiligst.), is used as collect. sing. of the hollows or panels of a wainscoted ceiling, like φάτναι, whence the LXX. φατνώματα (*Symm.* φατνώσεις), and like *lacunae*, whence *lacunaria*, for which Jerome has here *laquearia*, which equally denotes the wainscot ceiling Abulwalid glosses the word rightly by מְרוּבִים, gutters (from רָחַט, to run); only this and οἱ διάδρομοι of the Gr. Venet. is not an architectural expression, like רְחִיטִים, which is still found in the Talm. (*vid.* Buxtorf’s *Lex.*). To suppose a transposition from חֲרִיטָנוּ, from חָרַט, to turn, to carve (*Ew.* Heiligst. Hitz.), is accordingly not necessary. As the ה in בְּרוֹחִים belongs to the North Palest. (Galilean) form of speech,<sup>1</sup> so also ה for ה in this word: an exchange of the gutturals was characteristic of the Galilean idiom (*vid.* Talm. citations by Frankel, *Einl. in d. jerus. Talm.*

<sup>1</sup> Pliny, *H. N.* xxiv. 102, ed. Jan., notes *brathy* as the name of the savin-tree *Juniperus sabina*. Wetstein is inclined to derive the name of Beirut from בְּרוֹת, as the name of the sweet pine, the tree peculiar to the Syrian landscape, and which,

1870, 7b). Well knowing that a mere hut was not suitable for the king, Shulamith's fancy converts one of the magnificent nature-temples of the North Palest. forest-solitudes into a house where, once together, they will live each for the other. Because it is a large house, although not large by art, she styles it by the poet. plur. *battenu*. The mystical interpretation here finds in Isa. lx. 13 a favourable support.

What Shulamith now further says confirms what had just been said. City and palace with their splendour please her not; forest and field she delights in; she is a tender flower that has grown up in the quietness of rural life.

Ch. ii. 1 I am a meadow-flower of Sharon,  
A lily of the valleys.

We do not render: "the wild-flower," "the lily," . . . for she seeks to represent herself not as the one, but only as one of this class; the definiteness by means of the article sometimes belongs exclusively to the second number of the genit. word-chain. 'מִלֵּךְ may equally (*vid.* at i. 11, Hitz. on Ps. cxiii. 9, and my *Comm.* on Gen. ix. 20) mean "an angel" or "the angel of Jahve;" and 'בַּת "a virgin," or "the virgin of Israel" (the personification of the people). For *hhdvatselēth* (perhaps from *hhdtsel*, a denom. quadril. from *betsel*, to form bulbs or bulbous knolls) the Syr. Pesh. (Isa. xxxv. 1) uses *chamsaljothe*, the meadow-saffron, *colchicum autumnale*; it is the flesh-coloured flower with leafless stem, which, when the grass is mown, decks in thousands the fields of warmer regions. They call it *filius ante patrem*, because the blossoms appear before the leaves and the seed-capsules, which develop themselves at the close of winter under the ground. Shulamith compares herself to such a simple and common flower, and that to one in Sharon, i.e. in the region known by that name. *Sharon* is *per aphaer.* derived from שָׂרֹן. The most celebrated plain of this name is that situated on the Mediterranean coast between Joppa and Caesarea; but there is also a trans-Jordanic Sharon, 1 Chron. v. 16; and according to Eusebius and Jerome, there is also another district of this name between Tabor and the Lake of Tiberias,<sup>1</sup> which is the one here intended, because Shulamith is a Galilean: she calls herself a flower from the neighbourhood of Nazareth. Aquila translates: "A rosebud of Sharon;" but שָׂרֹן (designedly here the fem. form of the name, which is also

growing on the sandy hills, prevents the town from being filled with flying sand. The cypress is now called (Arab.) *sanaubar*; regarding its old names, and their signification in the figurative language of love, *vid.* under Isa. xli. 19.

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Lagarde, *Onomastica*, p. 236; cf. Neubauer, *Géographie du Talm.* p. 47.

the name of a woman) does not mean the Rose which was brought at a later period from Armenia and Persia, as it appears,<sup>1</sup> and cultivated in the East (India) and West (Palestine, Egypt, Europe). It is nowhere mentioned in the canonical Scriptures, but is first found in Sir. xxiv. 14, xxxix. 13, l. 8; Wisd. ii. 8; and Esth. i. 6, LXX. Since all the *rosaceae* are five-leaved, and all the *liliaceae* are six-leaved, one might suppose, with Aben Ezra, that the name *sosan* (*susan*) is connected with the numeral שש, and points to the number of leaves, especially since one is wont to represent to himself the Eastern lilies as red. But they are not only red, or rather violet, but also white: the Moorish-Spanish *azucena* denotes the white lily.<sup>2</sup> The root-word will thus, however, be the same as that of שש, *byssus*, and שש, white marble. The comparison reminds us of Hos. xiv. 6 [5], "I shall be as the dew unto Israel: he shall grow as the lily." הַעֲקָיִם are deep valleys lying between mountains. She thinks humbly of herself; for before the greatness of the king she appears diminutive, and before the comeliness of the king her own beauty disappears—but he takes up her comparison of herself, and gives it a notable turn.

Ver. 2 As a lily among thorns,

So is my love among the daughters.

By הַחֲוִיִּים are not meant the thorns of the plant itself, for the lily has no thorns, and the thorns of the rose are, moreover, called *kotsim*, and not *hhohhim*;<sup>3</sup> besides, *ben* (among) contradicts that idea, since the thorns are on the plant itself, and it is not among them—thus the *hhohhim* are not the thorns of the flower-stem, but the thorn-plants that are around. חֲוִי designates the thorn-bush, e.g. in the allegorical answer of King Josiah to Amaziah, 2 Kings xiv. 9. Simplicity, innocence, gentleness, are the characteristics in which Shulamith surpasses all בָּנוֹת, i.e. all women (*vid.* vi. 9), as the lily of the valley surpasses the thorn-bushes around it. "Although thorns surround her, yet can he see her; he sees her quiet life, he finds her beautiful." But continuing this reciprocal rivalry in the praise of mutual love, she says:

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Ewald, *Jahrbuch*, IV. p. 71; cf. Wüstemann, *Die Rose*, etc., 1854.

<sup>2</sup> *Vid.* Fleischer, *Sitzungs-Berichten d. Sächs. Gesell. d. Wissensch.* 1868, p. 305. Among the rich flora on the descent of the Hauran range, Wetstein saw (*Reisebericht*, p. 148) a dark-violet magnificent lily (*susan*) as large as his fist. We note here Rückert's "Bright lily! The flowers worship God in the garden: thou art the priest of the house."

<sup>3</sup> An Aramaic proverb: "from thorns sprouts the rose" (i.e. bad fathers have often pious children), in Heb. is קוֹץ מִצִּיָּא שֹׁשֶׁן; *vid.* *Talkut Samuel*, § 134.

Ver. 3c As an apple-tree among the trees of the wood,  
So is my beloved among the sons.

The apple-tree, the name of which, תפול, is formed from תפ, and denominates it from its fragrant flower and fruit, is as the king among fruit trees, in Shulamith's view. ש (from ש, to be rough, rugged, uneven) is the wilderness and the forest, where are also found trees bearing fruit, which, however, is for the most part sour and unpalatable. But the apple-tree unites delicious fruit along with a grateful shade; and just such a noble tree is the object of her love.

86 Under his shadow it delighted me to sit down;  
And his fruit is sweet to my taste.

In *concupivi et comedi* the principal verb completes itself by the co-ordinating of a verb instead of an adv. or inf. as Isa. xlii. 21; Esth. viii. 7; Ewald, § 285. However, *concupivi et comedi* is yet more than *concupivi comedere*, for thereby she not only says that she found delight in sitting down, but at the same time also in sitting down in the shadow of this tree. The *Piel* ש, occurring only here, expresses the intensity of the wish and longing. The shadow is a figure of protection afforded, and the fruit a figure of enjoyment obtained. The taste is denoted by ש = ש, from ש, to chew, or also *imbore*; and that which is sweet is called ש, from the smacking connected with an agreeable relish. The *usus loq.* has neglected this image, true to nature, of physical circumstances in words, especially where, as here, they are transferred to the experience of the soul-life. The taste becomes then a figure of the soul's power of perception (*αἰσθητικὴ*); a man's fruit are his words and works, in which his inward nature expresses itself; and this fruit is sweet to those on whom that in which the peculiar nature of the man reveals itself makes a happy, pleasing impression. But not only does the person of the king afford to Shulamith so great delight, he entertains her also with what can and must give her enjoyment.

Ver. 4 He has brought me into the wine-house,  
And his banner over me is love.

After we have seen the ladies of the palace at the feast, in which wine is presented, and after Solomon, till now absent, has entered the banqueting-chamber (Arab. *majlis*), by בית בית we are not to understand the vineyard, which would be called *beth haggaphanim* or *beth h'andanim*, as in Acts i. 12, Pesh. the Mount of Olives, *beth zaitē*.<sup>1</sup> He has introduced her to the place where he royally entertains his friends. Well knowing that she, the poor and sunburnt

<sup>1</sup> In Heb. בית does not denote the vine as a plant, as the *Aethiop. wain*, whence *asada wain*, wine-court = vineyard, which Ewald compares; Dillmann, however,

maiden, does not properly belong to such a place, and would rather escape away from it, he relieves her from her fear and bashfulness, for he covers her with his fear-inspiring, awful, and thus surely protecting, banner; and this banner, which he waves over her, and under which she is well concealed, is "love." דָּגֵל (from דָּגַל, to cover) is the name of the covering of the shaft or standard, *i.e.* *pannus*, the piece of cloth fastened to a shaft. Like a pennon, the love of the king hovers over her; and so powerful, so surpassing, is the delight of this love which pervades and transports her, that she cries out:

Ver. 5 Support me with grape-cakes,  
Refresh me with apples:  
For I am sick with love.

She makes use of the intensive form as one in a high degree in need of the reanimating of her almost sinking life: סָפַד is the intens. of סָפַד, to prop up, support, or, as here, to under-prop, uphold; and רָפַר, the intens. of רָפַר (R. רָפַר), to raise up from beneath (*vid.* at Prov. vii. 16), to furnish firm ground and support. The apple is the Greek attribute of Aphrodite, and is the symbol of love; but here it is only a means of refreshing; and if thoughts of love are connected with the apple-tree (ii. 3, viii. 5), that is explained from Shulamith's rural home. Böttcher understands quinces; Epstein, citrons; but these must needs have been more closely denoted, as at Prov. xxv. 11, by some addition to the expression. אֶשְׁשִׁישׁוּ (from אָשַׁשׁ, to establish, make firm) are (cf. Isa. xvi. 7; Hos. iii. 1) grapes pressed together like cakes; different from צִמְקִים, dried grapes (cf. דָּבֻלָּה), fig-cakes (Arab. *dabbûle*, a mass pressed together), and πλακοῦς, *placenta*, from the pressed-out form. A cake is among the gifts (2 Sam. vi. 19) which David distributed to the people on the occasion of the bringing up of the ark; date-cakes, *e.g.* at the monastery at Sinai, are to the present day gifts for the refreshment of travellers. If Shulamith's cry was to be understood literally, one might, with Noack, doubt the correctness of the text; for "love-sickness, even in the age of passion and sentimentality, was not to be cured with roses and apples." But (1) sentimentality, *i.e.* susceptibility, does not belong merely to the Romantic, but also to Antiquity, especially in the Orient, as *e.g.* is shown by the symptoms of sympathy with which the prophets were affected when uttering their threatenings of judgment; let one read such outbreaks of sorrow as Isa. xxi. 3, which, if one is disposed to scorn, may be derided as hysterical fits. Moreover, the Indian, Persian, and Arabic erotic ineptly cites "vine-arbour," and South-Germ. "*kamerte*" = *vinea camerata*; in Heb. בֵּית הַיַּיִן is the house in which wine is drunk.

(*vid. e.g.* the Romance *Sirat 'Antar*) is as sentimental as the German has at any time been. (2) The subject of the passage here is not the curing of love-sickness, but bodily refreshment: the cry of Shulamith, that she may be made capable of bearing the deep agitation of her physical life, which is the consequence, not of her love-sickness, but of her love-happiness. (3) The cry is not addressed (although this is grammatically possible, since *וְיָצִי* is, according to rule, = *וְיָצִי אֲנִי*) to the daughters of Jerusalem, who would in that case have been named, but to some other person; and this points to its being taken not in a literal sense. (4) It presupposes that one came to the help of Shulamith, sick and reduced to weakness, with grapes and apple-scent to revive her fainting spirit. The call of Shulamith thus means: hasten to me with that which will revive and refresh me, for I am sick with love. This love-sickness has also been experienced in the spiritual sphere. St. Ephrem was once so overcome by such a joy that he cried out: "Lord, withdraw Thine hand a little, for my heart is too weak to receive so great joy." And J. R. Hedinger († 1704) was on his deathbed overpowered with such a stream of heavenly delight that he cried: "Oh, how good is the Lord! Oh, how sweet is Thy love, my Jesus! Oh, what a sweetness! I am not worthy of it, my Lord! Let me alone; let me alone!" As the spiritual joy of love, so may also the spiritual longing of love consume the body (*cf.* Job xix. 27; Ps. lxxiii. 2, lxxxiv. 3); there have been men who have actually sunk under a longing desire after the Lord and eternity. It is the state of love-ecstasy in which Shulamith calls for refreshment, because she is afraid of sinking. The contrast between her, the poor and unworthy, and the king, who appears to her as an ideal of beauty and majesty, who raises her up to himself, was such as to threaten her life. Unlooked for, extraordinary fortune, has already killed many. Fear, producing lameness and even death, is a phenomenon common in the Orient.<sup>1</sup> If Pharaoh's daughter, if the Queen of Sheba, finds herself in the presence of Solomon, the feeling of social equality prevents all alarm. But Shulamith is dazzled by the splendour, and disconcerted;

<sup>1</sup> " *Ra'b* (رعب, thus in Damascus), or *ra'b* (thus in the Hauran and among the Beduins), is a state of the soul which with us is found only in a lower degree, but which among the Arabians is psychologically noteworthy. The *wahn*, i.e. the idea of the greatness and irresistibility of a danger or a misfortune, overpowers the Arabian; all power of body and of soul suddenly so departs from him, that he falls down helpless and defenceless. Thus, on the 8th July 1860, in a few hours, about 6000 Christian men were put to death in Damascus, without one lifting his hand in defence, or uttering one word of supplication. That the *ra'b*

and it happens to her in type as it happened to the seer of Patmos, who, in presence of the ascended Lord, fell at His feet as one dead, Rev. i. 17. If beauty is combined with dignity, it has always, for gentle and not perverted natures, something that awakens veneration and tremor; but if the power of love be superadded, then it has, as a consequence, that combination of awe and inward delight, the psychological appearance of which Sappho, in the four strophes which begin with "Φαίνεται μοι κῆνος ἴσος θεοῖσιν ἔμμεν ὀνύρ," has described in a manner so true to nature. We may thus, without carrying back modern sentimentality into antiquity, suppose that Shulamith sank down in a paroxysm caused by the rivalry between the words of love and of praise, and thus thanking him,—for Solomon supports and bears her up,—she exclaims:

Ver. 6 His left hand is under my head,  
And his right hand doth embrace me.

With his left hand he supports her head that had fallen backwards, and with his right he embraces her [*herzet*], as Luther rightly renders it (as he also renders the name *Habakkuk* by "*der Herzer*" = the embracer); for חָבַק signifies properly to enfold, to embrace; but then generally, to embrace lovingly, to fondle, of that gentle stroking with the hand elsewhere denoted by חָבַח, *mulcere*. The situation here is like that at Gen. xxix. 13, xlviii. 10; where, connected with the dat., it is meant of loving arms stretched out to embrace. If this sympathetic, gentle embracing exercises a soothing influence on her, overcome by the power of her emotions; so love mutually kindled now celebrates the first hour of delighted enjoyment, and the happy Shulamith calls to those who are witnesses of her joy:

Ver. 7 I adjure you, ye daughters of Jerusalem,  
By the gazelles or the hinds of the field,  
That ye arouse not and disturb not love  
Till she pleases.

It is permitted to the Israelites to swear, נִשְׁבַּע, only by God (Gen. xxi. 23); but to adjure, נִשְׁבַּח, by that which is not God, is also admissible, although this example before us is perhaps the only

kills in Arabia. European and native physicians have assured me; and I myself can confirm the fact. Since it frequently produces a stiffening of the limbs, with chronic lameness, every kind of paralysis is called *ro'b*, and every paralytic *mar'ûb*. It is treated medically by applying the 'terror-cup' (*tâset er-ro'b*), covered over with sentences engraved on it, and hung round with twenty bells; and since, among the Arabians, the influence of the psychical on the physical is stronger and more immediate than with us, the sympathetic cure may have there sometimes positive results."—*Wetstein*.

direct one in Scripture. צִי (= צִי, dialect. צִי), fem. צִיָּה (Aram. אֲרָמֵיָה, Acts ix. 36), plur. *tschaiim* or *tsabajim*, fem. *tsabajah* (according with the pl. of אֲרָמֵי, softened from *tsabajah*, is the name for the gazelle, from the elegance of its form and movements. צִיָּה is the connecting form of צִיָּה, whose consonantal *Yod* in the Assy. and Syr. is softened to the diphthong *aiar*, *aia*; the gen. "of the field," as not distinguishing but describing, belongs to both of the animals, therefore also the first is without the article. צִי (after the etymon corresponding to the Lat. *ref*) proceeds, leaving out of view the repetition of this so-called Slumber-Song (iii. 5; cf. viii. 4, as also ii. 9), from the endeavour to give to the adjuration the greatest impression; the expression is varied, for the representations flit from image to image, and the one, wherever possible, is surpassed by the other (cf. at Prov. xxx. 31). Under this verse Hengst. remarks: "The bride would not adjure by the hinds, much more would she adjure by the stags." He supposes that Solomon is here the speaker; but a more worthless proof for this could not be thought of. On the contrary, the adjuration by the gazelles, etc., shows that the speaker here is one whose home is the field and wood; thus also not the poet (Hitz.) nor the queen-mother (Böttch.), neither of whom is ever introduced as speaking. The adjuration is that love should not be disturbed, and therefore it is by the animals that are most lovely and free, which roam through the fields. Zöckler, with whom in this one point Grätz agrees, finds here, after the example of Böttch. and Hitz., the earnest warning against wantonly exciting love in themselves (cf. Lat. *irritamenta veneris*, *irritata coeptas*) till God Himself awakens it, and heart finds itself in sympathy with heart. But the circumstances in which Shulamith is placed ill accord with such a general moralizing. The adjuration is repeated, iii. 5, viii. 4, and wherever Shulamith finds herself near her beloved, as she is here in his arms. What lies nearer, then, than that she should guard against a disturbance of this love-ecstasy, which is like a slumber penetrated by delightful dreams? Instead of אֲרָמֵי, צִיָּה, and צִיָּה, should be more exactly the words אֲרָמֵי, צִיָּה, and צִיָּה; but the gram. distinction of the *genera* is in Heb. not perfectly developed. We meet also with the very same *synallage generis*, without this adjuration formula, at v. 8, vii. 1, iv. 2, vi. 8, etc.; it is also elsewhere frequent; but in the Song it perhaps belongs to the foil of the vulgar given to the highly poetic. Thus also in the vulgar Arab. the fem. forms *jaktulna*, *taktulna*, corresponding to אֲרָמֵי, are fallen out of use. With צִי, *expergescere*, there is connected the idea of an interruption of sleep; with שִׁיר,

*excitare*, the idea, which goes further, of arousing out of sleep, placing in the full activity of awakened life.<sup>1</sup> The one adjuration is, that love should not be awakened out of its sweet dream; the other, that it should not be disturbed from its being absorbed in itself. The *Pasek* between מעיר and the word following has, as at Lev. x. 6, the design of keeping the two *Vavs* distinct, that in reading they might not run together; it is the *Pasek* which, as Ben Asher says, serves "to secure to a letter its independence against the similar one standing next it." האהבה is not *abstr. pro concreto*, but love itself in its giving and receiving. Thus closes the second scene of the first act: Shulamith lies like one helpless in the arms of Solomon; but in him to expire is her life; to have lost herself in him, and in him to find herself again, is her happiness.

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## SECOND ACT.

### THE MUTUAL SEEKING AND FINDING OF THE LOVERS.—

CHAP. II. 8—III. 5.

#### FIRST SCENE OF THE SECOND ACT, II. 8—17.

With ii. 8 the second act begins. The so-called slumber-song (iii. 5) closes it, as it did the first act; and also the refrain-like summons to hasten to the mountains leaves no doubt regarding the close of the first scene. The locality is no longer the royal city. Shulamith, with her love-sickness, is once more at home in the house which she inhabits along with her own friends, of whom she has already (i. 6) named her brothers. This house stands alone among the rocks, and deep in the mountain range; around are the vineyards which the family have planted, and the hill-pastures on which they feed their flocks. She longingly looks out here for her distant lover.

Ver. 8 Hark, my beloved! lo, there he comes!  
Springs over the mountains,  
Bounds over the hills.

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<sup>1</sup> The distinction between these words is well explained by Lewisohn in his *Investigationes Linguae* (Wilna, 1840), p. 21: "The מעיר אהבה is satisfied that the sleeper wakes, and it is left to him fully to overcome the influence of sleep; the מעורר, however, arouses him at once from sleepiness, and awakes him to such a degree that he is secured against falling asleep again."

9 My beloved is like a gazelle,  
Or a young one of the harts.  
Lo, there he stands behind our wall!  
He looks through the windows,  
Glances through the lattices.

The word  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$ , in the expression  $\text{קָדָשׁ} \text{קָדָשׁ}$ , is to be understood of the call of the approaching lover (*Böttch.*), or only of the sound of his footsteps (*Hitz.*); it is an interjectional clause (sound of my beloved?), in which  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$  becomes an interjection almost the same as our "horch" ["hear!"]. *Vid.* under Gen. iv. 10.  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$  after  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$  sharpens it, as the demonstr. *ce* in *cece = en ce*.  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$  is thought of as partic., as is evident from the accenting of the fem.  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$ , *e.g.* Jer. x. 22.  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$  is the usual word for springing; the parallel  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$  ( $\text{קָדָשׁ}$ , Aram.  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$ ,  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$ , signifies properly *contractare* (cogn.  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$ , whence *Kawetz*, the drawing together of the mouth, more accurately, of the muscles of the lips), particularly to draw the body together, to prepare it for a spring. In the same manner, at the present day, both in the city and in the Beduin Arab. *kasar*, for which also *famar*, is used of the springing of a gazelle, which consists in a tossing up of the legs stretched out perpendicularly. 'Antar says similarly, as Shulamith here of the swift-footed *addab* (*D. M. Zeitung*, xli. 362): *wa-hu jafnis jamadil el-jazil*, it leaps away with the springing of a gazelle.

The figure used in ver. 8 is continued in ver. 9.  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$  is the gazelle, which is thus designated after its Arab. name *ghazil*, which has reached us probably through the Moorish-Spanish *guzla* (distinct from "ghasele," after the Pers. *ghasal*, love-poem).  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$  is the young hart, like the Arab. *ghufar* (*ghafar*), the young chamois, probably from the covering of young hair; whence also the young lion may be called  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$ . Regarding the effect of its passing from one figure to another, *vid.* under ii. 7a. The meaning would be plainer were ver. 9a joined to ver. 8, for the figures illustrate quick-footed speed (2 Sam. ii. 18; 1 Chron. xii. 8; cf. Ps. xviii. 34 with Hab. iii. 19 and Isa. xxxv. 6). In ver. 9b he comes with the speed of the gazelle, and his eyes seek for the unforgotten one.  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$  (from  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$ , *compingere*, *condensare*; whence, *e.g.*, Arab. *mukattal*, pressed together, rounded, *ramasat*; *vid.* regarding R.  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$  at Ps. lxxxvii. 6), Aram.  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$  (Josh. ii. 15; Targ. word for  $\text{קָדָשׁ}$ ), is meant of the wall of the house itself, not of the wall surrounding it. Shulamith is within, in the house: her beloved, standing behind the wall, stands without, before the house (*Tympe: ad latus aversum parietis*, viz. out from it), and looks through the windows,—at one

time through this one, at another through that one,—that he might see her and feast his eyes on her. We have here two verbs from the fulness of Heb. synon. for one idea of seeing. הִשָּׁגִיחַ, from שָׁגַח, occurring only three times in the O. T., refers, in respect of the roots שָׁנ, דָּךְ, פָּךְ, to the idea of piercing or splitting (whence also נָסַח, to be furious, properly pierced, *percitum esse*; cf. *oestrus*, sting of a gadfly = madness, Arab. transferred to hardness = madness), and means fixing by reflection and meditation; wherefore הִשָּׁגָחָהּ in post-bibl. Heb. is the name for Divine Providence. הִצִּיץ, elsewhere to twinkle and to bloom, appears only here in the sense of seeing, and that of the quick darting forward of the glance of the eye, as *blick* [glance] and *blitz* [lightning] (*blic*) are one word; “he saw,” says Goethe in *Werther*, “the glance of the powder” (Weigand).<sup>1</sup> The plur. *fenestrae* and *transennae* are to be understood also as *synecdoche totius pro parte*, which is the same as the plur. of *categ.*; but with equal correctness we conceive of him as changing his standing place. חֶלֶקֶת is the window, as an opening in the wall, from חָלַל, *perforare*. חֲרָכִים we combine most certainly (*vid.* Prov. xii. 27) with (Arab.) *khark*, *fissura*, so that the idea presents itself of the window broken through the wall, or as itself broken through; for the window in the country there consists for the most part of a pierced wooden frame of a transparent nature,—not (as one would erroneously conclude, from the most significant name of a window שֻׁבְכָה, now *schubbake*, from שָׁבַךְ, to twist, to lattice, to close after the manner of our Venetian blinds) of rods or boards laid crosswise. הִצִּיץ accords with the looking out through the pierced places of such a window, for the glances of his eye are like the penetrating rays of light.

When now Shulamith continues:

Ver. 10a My beloved answered and said to me,  
Arise, my love, my fair one, and go forth!

the words show that this first scene is not immediately dramatic, but only mediately; for Shulamith speaks in monologue, though in a dramatic manner narrating an event which occurred between the commencement of their love-relation and her home-bringing.<sup>2</sup> She does not relate it as a dream, and thus it is not one. Solomon

<sup>1</sup> In this sense: to look sharply toward, is הִצִּיץ (Talm.)—for Grätz alone a proof that the Song is of very recent date; but this word belongs, like סִמְדָר, to the old Heb. still preserved in the Talm.

<sup>2</sup> Grätz misinterprets this in order by the supplement of similar ones to make the whole poem a chain of narrative which Shulamith declaims to the daughters of Jerusalem. Thereby it certainly ceases to be dramatic, but so much more tedious does it become by these interposed expressions, “I said,” “he said,” “the sons of my mother said.”

again once more passes, perhaps on a hunting expedition into the northern mountains after the winter with its rains, which made them inaccessible, is over; and after long waiting, Shulamith at length again sees him, and he invites her to enjoy with him the spring season.  $\text{אָן}$  signifies, like  $\alpha\nu\alpha\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ , not always to answer to the words of another, but also to speak on the occasion of a person appearing before one; it is different from  $\text{זָן}$ , the same in sound, which signifies to sing, properly to sing through the nose, and has the root-meaning of replying (of the same root as  $\text{עָן}$ , clouds, as that which meets us when we look up toward the heavens); but taking speech in hand in consequence of an impression received is equivalent to an answer. With  $\text{וְעַתָּה}$  he calls upon her to raise herself from her stupor, and with  $\text{עַתָּה}$ , French *sa-t-elle*, to follow him.

Ver. 11 For, lo! the winter is past,

The rain is over, is gone.

12 The flowers appear in the land;

The time of song has come.

And the voice of the turtle makes itself heard in our land.

13 The fig-tree spices her green figs.

And the vines stand in bloom, they diffuse fragrance;—

Rise up, my love, my fair one, and go forth!

The winter is called  $\text{חֶטֶן}$ , perhaps from a verb  $\text{חָטַן}$  (of the same root as  $\text{חָסַן}$ ,  $\text{חָסַן}$ , without any example, since  $\text{חָסַן}$ , Gen. xlix. 11, is certainly not derived from a verb  $\text{חָסַן}$ , to conceal, to veil, as the time of being overcast with clouds, for in the East winter is the rainy season; (Arab.) *shataā* is also used in the sense of rain itself (*vid. D. M. Zeitsch.* xx. 618); and in the present day in Jerusalem, in the language of the people, no other name is used for rain but *shataā* (not *metar*). The word  $\text{חֶטֶן}$ , which the *Keri* substitutes, only means that one must not read  $\text{חָסַן}$ , but  $\text{חָטַן}$  with long *a*; in the same way  $\text{חָטַן}$ , humble, from  $\text{חָטַן}$ , to be bowed down, and  $\text{חָטַן}$ , a quail, from  $\text{חָטַן}$ , to be fat, are formed and written. Rain is here, however, especially mentioned: it is called *gāhām*, from  $\text{גָּהָם}$ , to be thick, massy (cf. *revivim*, of density). With  $\text{חָטַן}$ , to pass by, there is interchanged  $\text{חָלַף}$ , which, like (Arab.) *khalaḥ*, means properly to press on, and then generally to move to another place, and thus to remove from the place hitherto occupied. In  $\text{וְעַתָּה}$ , with the *dat. ethicus*, which throws back the action on the subject, the winter rain is thought of as a person who has passed by.  $\text{חָטַן}$ , with the noun-ending *ān*, is the same as  $\text{חָטַן}$ , and signifies the flower, as the latter the flower-month, *floral*; in the use of the word,  $\text{חָטַן}$  is related to  $\text{חָטַן}$  and  $\text{חָטַן}$ , probably as little flower is to flower. In *hazzamir* the idea of the song of birds (Arab. *gharad*) appears, and this is not to be given up. The

LXX., Aquila, Symm., Targ., Jerome, and the Venet. translate *tempus putationis*: the time of the pruning of vines, which indeed corresponds to the *usus loq.* (cf. זָכַר, to prune the vine, and מְזַמְרָה, a pruning-knife), and to similar names, such as אֲסִיף [ingathering of fruit], but supplies no reason for her being invited out into the open fields, and is on this account improbable, because the poet further on speaks for the first time of vines. זָכַר (זָכַר) is an onomatopoeia, which for the most part denotes song and music; why should זָכַר thus not be able to denote singing, like זָכַר, —but not, at least not in this passage, the singing of men (Hengst.), for they are not silent in winter; but the singing of birds, which is truly a sign of the spring, and as a characteristic feature, is added<sup>1</sup> to this lovely picture of spring? Thus there is also suitably added the mention of the turtle-dove, which is a bird of passage (vid. Jer. viii. 7), and therefore a messenger of spring. נִשְׁמָע is 3d pret.: it makes itself heard.

The description of spring is finished by a reference to the fig-tree and the vine, the standing attributes of a prosperous and peaceful homestead, 1 Kings v. 5; 2 Kings xviii. 31. פִּינִי (from פָּנִי, and thus named, not from their hardness, but their delicacy) are the little fruits of the fig-tree which now, when the harvest-rains are over, and the spring commences with the equinox of Nisan, already begin to assume a red colour; the verb הִנִּיחַ does not mean “to grow into a bulb,” as Böttch. imagines; it has only the two meanings, *condire* (*condiri*, post-bibl. syn. of בָּשַׁל) and *rubescere*. From its colour, wheat has the name הֶחָטָה = הִנִּיחָה; and here also the idea of colour has the preference, for becoming fragrant does not occur in spring,—in the history of the cursing of the fig-tree at the time of the Passover, Mark (xi. 13) says, “for the time of figs was not yet.” In fig-trees, by this time the green of the fruit-formation changes its colour, and the vines are כִּמְרִיר, blossom, i.e. are in a state of bloom (LXX. *κυπρίζουσαι*; cf. vii. 13, *κυπρισμός*)—it is a clause such as Ex. ix. 31, and to which “they diffuse fragrance” (ver. 13) is parallel. This word כִּמְרִיר is usually regarded as a compound word, consisting of כֶּסֶם, scent, and הִרָר, brightness = blossom (vid. Gesen. *Thes.*); it is undeniable that there are such compound formations, e.g. שְׁלֵאֲנָן, from שָׁלָה and שָׁאֵן; חֶלְמִישׁ, from (Arab.) *hams*, to be hard, and *hals*, to be dark-brown.<sup>2</sup> But the

<sup>1</sup> It is true that besides in this passage *zāmār*, of the singing of birds, is not demonstrable, the Arab. *zamar* is only used of the shrill cry of the ostrich, and particularly the female ostrich.

<sup>2</sup> In like manner as (Arab.) *karbsh*, *corrugare*, is formed of *karb*, to string, and *karsh*, to wrinkle, combined; and another extension of *karsh* is *kurnash*, wrinkles, and *mukarnash*, wrinkled. “One day,” said Wetstein to me, “I asked an

traditional reading קָקַר (not קָקַר) is unfavourable to this view; the middle *a* accordingly, as in קָקַר, presents itself as an *ante-tone* vowel (Ewald, § 154a), and the stem-word appears as a quadril. which may be the expansion of קָר, to range, put in order in the sense of placing asunder, unfolding. Symm. renders the word by *oirdiθη*, and the Talm. idiom shows that not only the green five-leaved blossoms of the vine were so named, but also the fruit-buds and the first shoots of the grapes. Here, as the words "they diffuse fragrance" (as at vii. 14 of the mandrakes) show, the vine-blossom is meant which fills the vineyard with an incomparably delicate fragrance. At the close of the invitation to enjoy the spring, the call "Rise up," etc., with which it began, is repeated. The *Chetib* כָּבִי, if not an error in writing, justly set aside by the *Kerf*, is to be read כָּבִי (cf. Syr. *berāi*, in thee, *ḥetebāi*, to thee, but with occult *i*)—a North Palestinianism for כָּבִי, like 2 Kings iv. 2, where the *Kerf* has substituted the usual form (*vid.* under Pa. ciii. introd.) for this very dialectic form, which is there undoubtedly original.

Ver. 14. Solomon further relates how he drew her to himself out of her retirement:

My dove in the clefts of the rock,  
In the hiding-place of the cliff;  
Let me see thy countenance,  
Let me hear thy voice!  
For thy voice is sweet and thy countenance comely.

"Dove" (for which Castellio, *columbula*, like *multicaudus*, *oculana*) is a name of endearment which Shulamith shares with the church of God, Ps. lxxiv. 19; cf. lvi. 1; Hos. vii. 11. The wood-pigeon builds its nest in the clefts of the rocks and other steep rocky places, Jer. xlviii. 28.<sup>1</sup> That Shulamith is thus here named, shows that, far removed from intercourse with the world, her home was among the mountains. כָּבִי, from כָּבִי, or also כָּבִי, requires a verb כָּבִי = (Arab.)

Arab the origin of the word *Jerusalem*, to wrinkle, and he replied that it was derived from a sheep's stomach that had lain over night, i.e. the stomach of a slaughtered sheep that had lain over night, by which its smooth surface shrieks together and becomes wrinkled. In fact, we say of a wrinkled countenance that it is *maḥal alfarash albayt*. With right Wetstein gathers from this curious fact how difficult it is to ascertain by purely etymological considerations the view which guided the Semites in this or that designation. *Semder* is also a strange word; on the one side it is connected with *safr*, of the veiling of the eyes, as the effect of terror; and on the other with *saḥal*, of stretching oneself straight out. E. Meier takes כָּקַר as the name of the vine-blossom, as changed from כָּקַר, bristling. Just as unlikely as that כָּקַר is cogn. to כָּקַר, *Jouran*, p. 211.

<sup>1</sup> Wetstein's *Reisbericht*, p. 182: "If the Syrian wood-pigeon does not find a

*khajja, findere*. סֵלַע, as a Himyar. lexicographer defines it, is a cleft into the mountains after the nature of a defile; with צִר, only the ideas of inaccessibility and remoteness are connected; with סֵלַע, those of a secure hiding-place, and, indeed, a convenient, pleasant residence. סִרְרָה is the stairs; here the rocky stairs, as the two chalk-cliffs on the Rugen, which sink perpendicularly to the sea, are called "*Stubben-kammer*," a corruption of the Slavonic *Stupnykamen*, i.e. the Stair-Rock. "Let me see," said he, as he called upon her with enticing words, "thy countenance;" and adds this as a reason, "for thy countenance is lovely." The word מְרֹאֵי, thus pointed, is sing.; the *Jod otians* is the third root letter of מְרֹאֵי, retained only for the sake of the eye. It is incorrect to conclude from *ashrêch*, in Eccles. x. 17, that the *esh* may be also the plur. suff., which it can as little be as *chu* in Prov. xxix. 18; in both cases the sing. *êshêr* has substituted itself for *ashrê*. But, inversely, *mārāich* cannot be sing.; for the sing. is simply *marêch*. Also *mārār*, Job xli. 1, is not sing.: the sing. is *marêhu*, Job iv. 16; Song v. 15. On the other hand, the determination of such forms as מְרֹאֵי, מְרֹאֵהָ, is difficult: these forms may be sing. as well as plur. In the passage before us, מְרֹאֵים is just such a non-numer. plur. as פְּנִים. But while *panîm* is an extensive plur., as Böttcher calls it: the countenance, in its extension and the totality of its parts,—*marîm*, like *marôth*, vision, a stately term, Ex. xl. 2 (*vid.* Dietrich's *Abhand.* p. 19), is an amplificative plur.: the countenance, on the side of its fulness of beauty and its overpowering impression.

There now follows a *cantiuncula*. Shulamith comes forward, and, singing, salutes her beloved. Their love shall celebrate a new spring. Thus she wishes everything removed, or rendered harmless, that would disturb the peace of this love:

Ver. 15 Catch us the foxes, the little foxes,

The spoilers of the vineyards;

For our vineyards are in bloom!

16 My beloved is mine, and I am his;

Who feeds [his flock] among the lilies.

If the king is now, on this visit of the beloved, engaged in hunting, the call: "Catch us," etc., if it is directed at all to any definite persons, is addressed to those who follow him. But this is a vine-dresser's ditty, in accord with Shulamith's experience as the keeper

pigeon-tower, περισστερεῶντα, it builds its nest in the hollows of rocky precipices, or in the walls of deep and wide fountains." See also his *Nord-arabien*, p. 58: "A number of scarcely accessible mountains in Arabia are called *alkunnat*, a rock-nest."

of a vineyard, which, in a figure, aims at her love-relation. The vineyards, beautiful with fragrant blossom, point to her covenant of love; and the foxes, the little foxes, which might destroy these united vineyards, point to all the great and little enemies and adverse circumstances which threaten to gnaw and destroy love in the blossom, ere it has reached the ripeness of full enjoyment. <sup>לְכָל־עֵץ</sup> comprehends both foxes and jackals, which "destroy or injure the vineyards; because, by their holes and passages which they form in the ground, loosening the soil, so that the growth and prosperity of the vine suffers injury" (Hitzig). This word is from <sup>לָכַד</sup> (R. <sup>לָכַד</sup>), to go down, or into the depth. The little foxes are perhaps the jackals, which are called <sup>לְכָל־עֵץ</sup>, from their extended form, and in height are seldom more than fifteen inches. The word "jackal" has nothing to do with <sup>לָכַד</sup>, but is the Persian-Turkish *shaghal*, which comes from the Sanscr. *sydla*, the howler (R. *krag*, like *kay-dla*, the skull; R. *kay*, to be arched). Moreover, the mention of the foxes naturally follows 14a, for they are at home among rocky ravines. Hitzig supposes Shulamith to address the foxes: hold for us = wait, ye rascals! But <sup>יָמַד</sup>, Aram. <sup>יָמַד</sup>, does not signify to wait, but to seize or lay hold of (synon. <sup>יָמַד</sup>, Judg. xv. 4), as the lion its prey, Isa. v. 29. And the plur. of address is explained from its being made to the king's retinue, or to all who could and would give help. Fox-hunting is still, and has been from old times, a sport of rich landowners; and that the smaller landowners also sought to free themselves from them by means of snares or otherwise, is a matter of course,—they are proverbially as destroyers, Neh. iii. 35 [iv. 3], and therefore a figure of the false prophets, Ezek. xiii. 4. <sup>כִּסְכֵּם כִּסְכֵּם</sup> are here instead of <sup>כִּסְכֵּם כִּסְכֵּם</sup>. The articles are generally omitted, because poetry is not fond of the article, where, as here (cf. on the other hand, i. 6), the thoughts and language permit it; and the fivefold <sup>כִּסְכֵּם</sup> is an intentional mere *verborum sonus*. The clause <sup>כִּסְכֵּם כִּסְכֵּם</sup> is an explanatory one, as appears from the *Vav* and the subj. preceding, as well as from the want of a *šālām*. <sup>כִּסְכֵּם</sup> maintains here also, in *primit*, the sharpening of the final syllable, as <sup>כִּסְכֵּם</sup>, Deut. xxviii. 42.

The 16th verse is connected with the 15th. Shulamith, in the pentast. song, celebrates her love-relation; for the praise of it extends into ver. 15, is continued in ver. 16, and not till ver. 17 does she address her beloved. Luther translates:

My beloved is mine, and I am his;  
He feeds [his flock] among the roses.

He has here also changed the "lilies" of the Vulgate into "roses;" for of the two queens among the flowers, he gave the preference to the

popular and common rose; besides, he rightly does not translate הָרָעָה, in the mid. after the *pascitur inter lilia* of the Vulgate: who feeds himself, i.e. pleases himself; for רָעָה has this meaning only when the object expressly follows, and it is evident that בָּשׂוֹ cannot possibly be this object, after Gen. xxxvii. 2,—the object is thus to be supplied. And which? Without doubt, *gregem*; and if Heiligst., with the advocates of the shepherd-hypothesis, understands this feeding (of the flock) among the lilies, of feeding on a flowery meadow, nothing can be said against it. But at vi. 2 f., where this saying of Shulamith is repeated, she says that her beloved בָּנִים feeds and gathers lilies. On this the literal interpretation of the *qui pascit (gregem) inter lilia* is wrecked; for a shepherd, such as the shepherd-hypothesis supposes, were he to feed his flock in a garden, would be nothing better than a thief; such shepherds, also, do not concern themselves with the plucking of flowers, but spend their time in knitting stockings. It is Solomon, the king, of whom Shulamith speaks. She represents him to herself as a shepherd; but in such a manner that, at the same time, she describes his actions in language which rises above ordinary shepherd-life, and, so to speak, idealizes. She, who was herself a shepherdess, knows from her own circle of thought nothing more lovely or more honourable to conceive and to say of him, than that he is a shepherd who feeds among lilies. The locality and the surroundings of his daily work correspond to his nature, which is altogether beauty and love. Lilies, the emblem of unapproachable highness, awe-inspiring purity, lofty elevation above what is common, bloom where the lily-like (king) wanders, whom the Lily names her own. The mystic interpretation and mode of speaking takes “lilies” as the figurative name of holy souls, and a lily-stalk as the symbol of the life of regeneration. Mary, who is celebrated in song as the *rosa mystica*, is rightly represented in ancient pictures with a lily in her hand on the occasion of the Annunciation; for if the people of God are called by Jewish poets “a people of lilies,” she is, within this lily-community, this *communio sanctorum*, the lily without a parallel.

Shulamith now further relates, in a dramatic, lively manner, what she said to her beloved after she had saluted him in a song:

Ver. 17 Till the day cools and the shadows flee away,  
 Turn; make haste, my beloved,  
 Like a gazelle or a young one of the hinds  
 On the craggy mountains.

With the perf., עַרְשׁ (cf. עַרְשׁ, Gen. xxiv. 33) signifies, till something is done; with the fut., till something will be done. Thus: till the

evening comes—and, therefore, before it comes—may he do what she requires of him. Most interpreters explain  $\text{כֹּךְ}$ , *verte te*, with the supplement *ad me*; according to which Jerome, Castell., and others translate by *revertere*. But Ps. lxxi. 21 does not warrant this rendering; and if Shulamith has her beloved before her, then by  $\text{כֹּךְ}$  she can only point him away from herself; the parall. viii. 14 has  $\text{פָּנֶיךָ}$  instead of  $\text{כֹּךְ}$ , which consequently means, “turn thyself from here away.” Rather we may suppose, as I explained in 1851, that she holds him in her embrace, as she says, and, inseparable from him, will wander with him upon the mountains. But neither that *ad me* nor this *meum* should have been here (cf. on the contrary viii. 14) unexpressed. We hold by what is written. Solomon surprises Shulamith, and invites her to enjoy with him the spring-time; not alone, because he is on a hunting expedition, and—as denoted by “catch us” (ver. 15)—with a retinue of followers. She knows that the king has not now time to wander at leisure with her; and therefore she asks him to set forward his work for the day, and to make haste on the mountains till “the day cools and the shadows flee.” Then she will expect him back; then in the evening she will spend the time with him as he promised her. The verb  $\text{נָשָׂא}$ , with the guttural letter *Heth* and the labial *P*, signifies *spirare*, here of being able to be breathed, i.e. cool, like the expression  $\text{נָשָׂא}$  ( $\text{נָשָׂא}$ ), Gen. iii. 8 (where the guttural *Heth* is connected with *Esau*). The shadows flee away, when they become longer and longer, as if on a flight, when they stretch out (Ps. cix. 23, cii. 12) and gradually disappear. Till that takes place—or, as we say, will be done—he shall hasten with the swiftness of a gazelle on the mountains, and that on the mountains of separation, i.e. the riven mountains, which thus present hindrances, but which he, the “swift as the gazelle” (*vid.* ii. 9), easily overcomes. Rightly, Bochart: *montes scissionis, ut dicti propter, βωχμοὶς αὶ χάσματα*. Also, Luther’s “*Scheidberge*” are “mountains with peaks, from one of which to the other one must spring.” We must not here think of *Bithron* (2 Sam. ii. 29), for that is a mountain ravine on the east of Jordan; nor of Bar-Cochba’s  $\text{בֵּיתֵר}$  (Kirschbaum, Landau), because this mountain (whether it be sought for to the south of Jerusalem or to the north of Antipatris) ought properly to be named  $\text{בֵּיתֵר}$  (*vid.* Aruch). It is worthy of observation, that in an Assyrian list of the names of animals, along with *sabi* (gazelle) and *apparu* (the young of the gazelle or of the hind), the name *bithru* occurs, perhaps the name of the *rupsicapra*. At the close of the song, the expression “mountain of spices” occurs instead of “mountain of separation,” as here. There no more hindrances to be overcome lie in view, the rock-cliffs

have become fragrant flowers. The request here made by Shulamith breathes self-denying humility, patient modesty, inward joy in the joy of her beloved. She will not claim him for herself till he has accomplished his work. But when he associates with her in the evening, as with the Emmaus disciples, she will rejoice if he becomes her guide through the new-born world of spring. The whole scene permits, yea, moves us to think of this, that the Lord already even now visits the church which loves Him, and reveals Himself to her; but that not till the evening of the world is His *marousia* to be expected.

SECOND SCENE OF THE SECOND ACT, III. 1-5.

In the first scene, Shulamith relates what externally happened to her one day when the evening approached. In this second scene, she now relates what she inwardly experienced when the night came. She does not indeed say that she dreamed it; but that it is a dream is seen from this, that that which is related cannot be represented as an external reality. But it at once appears as an occurrence that took place during sleep.

Chap. iii. 1 On my bed in the nights

I sought him whom my soul loveth:

I sought him, and found him not.

She does not mean to say that she sought him beside herself on her couch; for how could that be of the modest one, whose home-bringing is first described in the next act—she could and might miss him there neither waking nor sleeping. The commencement is like Job xxxiii. 15. She was at night on her couch, when a painful longing seized her: the beloved of her soul appeared to have forsaken her, to have withdrawn from her; she had lost the feeling of his nearness, and was not able to recover it. לילות is neither here nor at iii. 8 necessarily the categ. plur. The meaning may also be, that this pain, arising from a sense of being forgotten, always returned upon her for several nights through: she became distrustful of his fidelity; but the more she apprehended that she was no longer loved, the more ardent became her longing, and she arose to seek for him who had disappeared.

Ver. 2 So I will arise, then, and go about the city,

The markets, and the streets;

I will seek him whom my soul loveth!—

I sought him, and found him not.

How could this night-search, with all the strength of love, be consistent with the modesty of a maiden? It is thus a dream which she relates. And if the beloved of her soul were a shepherd, would she seek him in the city, and not rather without, in the field or in some village? No; the beloved of her soul is Solomon; and in the dream Jerusalem, his city, is transported close to the mountains of her native home. The resolution expressed by "I will arise, then," is not introduced by "then I said," or any similar phrase: the scene consists of a monologue which dramatically represents that which is experienced. Regarding the second *Chatf-Pathak* of שָׁרָה, *vid.* Haer's *Genesis*, p. 7. שָׁרָה is the plur. of שָׂרָה (= *sharā*), as שָׂרָה of שָׂרָה (= *sharā*); the root-word שָׂרָה (Arab. *sharaḥ*) signifies to press on, to follow after continuously; (Arab.) *sharaḥ* designates perhaps, originally, the place to which one drives cattle for sale, as in the desert; (Arab.) *sharaḥ* designates the place to which one drives cattle for drink (Wetzst.). The form שָׁרָה is without the *Daghash*, as are all the forms of this verb except the imper.; the semi-guttural nature of the *Koph* has something opposing the simple *Shewa*.

Shulamith now relates what she further experienced when, impelled by love-sorrow, she wandered through the city:

Ver. 3 The watchmen who go about in the city found me:

"Have ye seen him whom my soul loveth?"

Here also (as in ver. 2) there is wanting before the question such a phrase as, "and I asked them, saying:" the monologue relates dramatically. If she described an outward experience, then the question would be a foolish one; for how could she suppose that the watchmen, who make their rounds in the city (Epstein, against Gratz, points for the antiquity of the order to Pa cxxvii. 1; Isa. lxii. 6; cf. xxi. 11), could have any knowledge of her beloved! But if she relates a dream, it is to be remembered that feeling and imagination rise higher than reflection. It is in the very nature of a dream, also, that things thus quickly follow one another without fixed lineaments. This also, that having gone out by night, she found in the streets him whom she sought, is a happy combination of circumstances formed in the dreaming soul; an occurrence without probable external reality, although not without deep inner truth:

Ver. 4 Scarcely had I passed from them,

When I found him whom my soul loveth.

I seized him, and did not let him go

Until I brought him into the house of my mother,

And into the chamber of her that gave me birth.

כָּלֵי = *paululum*, here standing for a sentence: it was as a little that I passed, etc. Without עַל, it would be *paululum transii*; with it, *paululum fuit quod transii*, without any other distinction than that in the latter case the *paululum* is more emphatic. Since Shulamith relates something experienced earlier, אֶחָזֶקֶי is not fitly rendered by *teneo*, but by *tenui*; and לֹא אֶרְפֶּנּוּ, not by *et non dimittam eum*, but, as the neg. of אֶרְפֶּנּוּ, *et dimisi eum*,—not merely *et non dimittebam eum*, but *et non dimisi eum*. In Gen. xxxii. 27 [26], we read the cogn. לִפְנֵי, which signifies, to let go (“let me go”), as לִרְפֶּה, to let loose, to let free. It is all the same whether we translate, with the subjective colouring, *donec introduxerim*, or, with the objective, *donec introduxi*; in either case the meaning is that she held him fast till she brought him, by gentle violence, into her mother’s house. With בֵּית there is the more definite parallel חָדָר, which properly signifies (*vid.* under i. 4), *recessus, penetrale*; with אִמִּי, the seldom occurring (only, besides, at Hos. ii. 7) הוֹרָה, *part. f. Kal* of הָרָה, to conceive, be pregnant, which poetically, with the accus., may mean *parturire* or *purere*. In Jacob’s blessing, Gen. xlix. 26, as the text lies before us, his parents are called הוֹרֵי; just as in Arab. *ummāni*, properly “my two mothers,” may be used for “my parents;” in the Lat. also, *parentes* means father and mother *zeugmatically* taken together.

The closing words of the monologue are addressed to the daughters of Jerusalem.

Ver. 5 I adjure you, O ye daughters of Jerusalem,  
By the gazelles or the hinds of the field,  
That ye awake not and disturb not love  
Till she pleases.

We are thus obliged apparently to think of the daughters of Jerusalem as being present during the relation of the dream. But since Shulamith in the following Act is for the first time represented as brought from her home to Jerusalem, it is more probable that she represented her experience to herself in secret, without any auditors, and feasting on the visions of the dream, which brought her beloved so near, that she had him by herself alone and exclusively, that she fell into such a love-ecstasy as ii. 7; and pointing to the distant Jerusalem, deprecates all disturbance of this ecstasy, which in itself is like a slumber pervaded by pleasant dreams. In two monologues dramatically constructed, the poet has presented to us a view of the thoughts and feelings by which the inner life of the maiden was moved in the near prospect of becoming a bride and being married. Whoever reads the Song in the sense in which it is incor-

perated with the canon, and that, too, in the historical sense fulfilled in the N. T., will not be able to read the two scenes from Shulamith's experience without finding therein a mirror of the intercourse of the soul with God in Christ, and cherishing thoughts such, *e.g.*, as are expressed in the ancient hymn:

*Quando tandem venies, meus amor!  
Propere de Libano, dulcis amor!  
Clamat, amat sponsula: Veni, Jesu,  
Dulcis veni Jesu!*

### THIRD ACT.

#### THE BRINGING OF THE BRIDE AND THE MARRIAGE. CHAP. III. 6-V. 1.

##### FIRST SCENE OF THE THIRD ACT, III. 6-11.

In this third Act the longing of the loving one after her beloved is finally appeased. The first scene<sup>1</sup> represents her home-bringing into the royal city. A gorgeous procession which marches towards Jerusalem attracts the attention of the inhabitants of the city.

Ver. 6 Who is this coming up from the wilderness  
Like pillars of smoke,  
Perfumed with myrrh and frankincense,  
With all aromatics of the merchants?

It is possible that נָחַל and אֲנָחַל may be connected; but אֲנָחַל, Ps. xxxiv. 7 (this poor man, properly, this, a poor man), is not analogous, it ought to be אֲנָחַל נָחַל. Thus אֲנָחַל will either be closely connected with אֲנָחַל, and make the question sharper and more animated, as is that in Gen. xii. 18, or it will be the subject which then, as in Isa. lxiii. 1, Job xxxviii. 2, cf. below vii. 5b, Jonah iv. 17, Amos ix. 12, is more closely written with indeterminate participles, according to which it is rightly accented. But we do not translate with Heiligst. *quid est hoc quod adscendit*, for מִי asks after a person, מֵא after a thing, and only *per attract.* does מִי stand for מֵא in Gen. xxxiii. 8; Judg. xiii. 17; Mic. i. 5; also not *quis est hoc* (Vaih.), for אֲנָחַל after מִי has a personal sense, thus: *quis (quaenam) haec est*. That it is

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Schlottmann in the *Stud. u. Kritiken*, 1867, pp. 209-243. Rejecting the dramatic arrangement of this section, he interprets it throughout as a song of the chorus of the daughters of Jerusalem, which is already contradicted by 104.

a woman that is being brought forward those who ask know, even if she is yet too far off to be seen by them, because they recognise in the festal gorgeous procession a marriage party. That the company comes up from the wilderness, it may be through the wilderness which separates Jerusalem from Jericho, is in accordance with the fact that a maiden from Galilee is being brought up, and that the procession has taken the way through the Jordan valley (Ghôr); but the scene has also a typical colouring; for the wilderness is, since the time of the Mosiac deliverance out of Egypt, an emblem of the transition from a state of bondage to freedom, from humiliation to glory (*vid.* under Isa. xl. 3; Hos. i. 16; Ps. lxxviii. 5). The pomp is like that of a procession before which the censor of frankincense is swung. Columns of smoke from the burning incense mark the line of the procession before and after. תִּקְרָה (תִּקְרָה) here and at Job iii. (*vid.* Norzi) is formed, as it appears, from תָּקַר, to strive upwards, a kindred form to אָבַר; cf. Isa. lxi. 6 with xvii. 6, Ps. xciv. 4; the verb תָּקַר, whence the date-palm receives the name תָּקַר, is a secondary formation, like אָבַר to תָּאבַר. Certainly this form תִּקְרָה (cf. on the contrary, תוֹלָדָה) is not elsewhere to be supported; Schlottm. sees in it תִּקְרָה, from תָּקַר; but such an expansion of the word for *Dug. dirimens* is scarcely to be supposed. This naming of the pillars of smoke is poet., as Jonah iii. 3; cf. "a pillar of smoke," Judg. xx. 40. She who approaches comes from the wilderness, brought up to Jerusalem, placed on an elevation, "like pillars of smoke," i.e. not herself likened thereto, as Schlottm. supposes it must be interpreted (with the *tertium comp.* of the slender, precious, and lovely), but encompassed and perfumed by such. For her whom the procession brings this lavishing of spices is meant; it is she who is incensed or perfumed with myrrh and frankincense. Schlottm. maintains that מְקַטְרֶת cannot mean anything else than "perfumed," and therefore he reads מְקַטְרֶת (as Aq. ἀπὸ θυμιάματος, and Jerome). But the word *mekuttērēth* does not certainly stand alone, but with the genit. foll.; and thus as "rent in their clothes," 2 Sam. xiii. 31, signifies not such as are themselves rent, but those whose clothes are rent (Ewald, § 288b, compare also de Sacy, II. § 321), so מְקַטְרֶת can also mean those for whom (for whose honour) this incense is expended, and who are thus fumigated with it. מֵר, myrrh, (Arab.) *murr* (*vid.* above under i. 13), stands also in Ex. xxx. 23 and Ps. xlv. 9 at the head of the perfumes; it came from Arabia, as did also frankincense *levōnā*, Arab. *lubān* (later referred to benzoin); both of the names are Semitic, and the circumstance that the *Tōra* required myrrh as a component part of the holy oil, Ex. xxx. 23, and frank-

incense as a component part of the holy incense, Ex. xxx. 34, points to Arabia as the source whence they were obtained. To these two principal spices there is added סָלֵל (cf. Gen. vi. 20, ix. 2) as an *et cetera*. רוֹכֵל denotes the travelling spice merchants (traders in aromatics), and traders generally. סָפָא, which is related to סָפָא as powder to dust (cf. *abacus*, a reckoning-table, so named from the sand by means of which arithmetical numbers were reckoned), is the name designating single drugs (i.e. dry wares; cf. the Arab. *clitir* = ξηρόν).

The description of the palanquin now following, one easily attributes to another voice from the midst of the inhabitants of Jerusalem.

Ver. 7 Lo! Solomon's palanquin,  
Threescore heroes are around it,  
Of the heroes of Israel,  
8 All of them armed with the sword, expert in war.  
Each with his sword on his thigh,  
Against fear in the nights.

Since סָפָא, 9a, is not by itself a word clearly intelligible, so as to lead us fully to determine what is here meant by סָפָא as distinguished from it, we must let the connection determine. We have before us a figure of that which is called in the post-bibl. Heb. הַקָּבִיעַת הַכֵּלֶה (the bringing-home of the bride). The bridegroom either betook himself to her parents' house and fetched his bride thence, which appears to be the idea lying at the foundation of Ps. xlv., if, as we believe, the ivory-palaces are those of the king of Israel's house; or she was brought to him in festal procession, and he went forth to meet her, 1 Mac. ix. 39—the prevailing custom, on which the parable of the ten virgins (Matt. xxv.) is founded.<sup>1</sup> Here the bride comes from a great distance; and the difference in rank between the Galilean maid and the king brings this result, that he does not himself go and fetch her, but that she is brought to him. She comes, not as in old times Rebecca did, riding on a camel, but is carried in a *mittā*, which is surrounded by an escort for protection and as a mark of honour. Her way certainly led through the wilderness, where it was necessary, by a safe convoy, to provide against the possibility (*min* in *nippahad*, cf. Isa. iv. 6, xxv. 4) of being attacked by robbers; whereas it would be more difficult to understand why the marriage-bed in the palace of the king of peace (1 Chron. xxii. 9) should be surrounded by such

<sup>1</sup> Weigand explains the German word *Braut* (bride) after the Sanscr. *praudha*, "she who is brought in a carriage;" but this particip. signifies nothing more than (*aetate*) *profecta*.

an armed band for protection. That Solomon took care to have his chosen one brought to him with royal honours, is seen in the lavish expenditure of spices, the smoke and fragrance of which signalized from afar the approach of the procession,—the *mittā*, which is now described, can be no other than that in which, sitting or reclining, or half sitting, half reclining, she is placed, who is brought to him in such a cloud of incense. Thus *mittā* (from *nāthā*, to stretch oneself out), which elsewhere is also used of a bier, 2 Sam. iii. 21 (like the Talm. ערש = ערש), will here signify a portable bed, a sitting cushion hung round with curtains after the manner of the Indian palanquin, and such as is found on the Turkish caïques or the Venetian gondolas. The appositional nearer definition 'שליש, "which belonged to Solomon" (*vid.* under i. 6b), shows that it was a royal palanquin, not one belonging to one of the nobles of the people. The bearers are unnamed persons, regarding whom nothing is said; the sixty heroes form only the guard for safety and for honour (*sauvegarde*), or the *escorte* or *convoie*. The sixty are the tenth part (the *élite*) of the royal body-guard, 1 Sam. xxvii. 2, xxx. ', etc. (Schlottm.). If it be asked, Why just 60? we may perhaps not unsuitably reply: The number 60 is here, as at vi. 8, the number of Israel multiplied by 5, the fraction of 10; so that thus 60 distinguished warriors form the half of the escort of a king of Israel. אֶחָזִי הָרֶב properly means, held fast by the sword so that it does not let them free, which, according to the sense = holding fast [= practised in the use of the sword]; the Syr. translation of the Apoc. renders παντοκράτωρ by "he who is held by all," i.e. holding it (cf. Ewald, § 149d).<sup>1</sup>

Another voice now describes the splendour of the bed of state which Solomon prepared in honour of Shulamith:

- Ver. 9 A bed of state hath King Solomon made for himself  
Of the wood of Lebanon.  
10 Its pillars hath he made of silver,  
Its support of gold, its cushion of purple;  
Its interior is adorned from love  
By the daughters of Jerusalem.

The sound of the word, the connection and the description, led the Greek translators (the LXX., Venet., and perhaps also others) to render אֶפְרִיִן by φορῆϊον, litter, palanquin (Vulg. *ferculum*). The *appiryon* here described has a silver pedestal and a purple cushion—as we read in Athenaeus v. 13 (II. p. 317, ed. Schweigh.) that the

<sup>1</sup> This deponent use of the *part. pass.* is common in the Mishna; *vid.* Geiger's *Lehrbuch zur Sprache der Mishna*, § 16. 5.

philosopher and tyrant Athenion showed himself "on a silver-legged *φορείον*, with purple coverlet;" and the same author, v. 5 (II. p. 253), also says, that on the occasion of a festal procession by Antiochus Epiphanes, behind 200 women who sprinkled ointments from golden urns came 80 women, sitting in pomp on golden-legged, and 500 on silver-legged, *φορεῖα*—this is the proper name for the costly women's-litter (Suidas: *φορείον γυναικείον*), which, according to the number of bearers (Mart. VI. 77: six Cappadocians and, ix. 2, eight Syrians), was called *ἑξάφορον* (*hexaphorum*, Mart. II. 81) or *ὀκτώφορον* (*octophorum*, Cicero's *Verr.* v. 10). The Mishna, *Sota* ix. 14, uses *appiryon* in the sense of *phoreion*: "in the last war (that of Hadrian) it was decreed that a bride should not pass through the town in an *appiryon* [on account of the danger], but our Rabbis sanctioned it later [for modesty's sake];" as here, "to be carried in an *appiryon*," so in Greek, *πρῶναι* (*καταστείλχειν*) *ἐν φορείῳ*. In the Midrash also, *Bamidbar rabba* c. 12, and elsewhere, *appiryon* of this passage before us is taken in all sorts of allegorical significations in most of which the identity of the word with *φορείον* is suppressed, which is also there written פֶּרֶךְ (after Aruch), cf. Isa. xlix. 22, Targ., and is once interchanged with פֶּרֶץ, *parilio* (*parillon*), pleasure-tent. But a Greek word in the Song is in itself so improbable, that Ewald describes this derivation of the word as a frivolous jest; so much the more improbable, as *φορείον* as the name of a litter (*lectica*) occurs first in such authors (of the *κοινή*) as Plutarch, Polybius, Herodian, and the like, and therefore, with greater right, it may be supposed that it is originally a Semitic word, which the Greek language adopted at the time when the Oriental and Graeco-Roman customs began to be amalgamated. Hence, if *mittā*, *ṭa*, means a portable bed,—as is evident from this, that it appears as the means of transport with an escort,—then *appiryon* cannot also mean a litter; the description, moreover, does not accord with a litter. We do not read of rings and carrying-poles, but, on the contrary, of pillars (as those of a tent-bed) instead, and, as might be expected, of feet. Schlottm., however, takes *mittā* and *appiryon* as different names for a portable bed; but the words, "an *appiryon* has King Solomon made," etc., certainly indicate that he who thus speaks has not the *appiryon* before him, and also that this was something different from the *mittā*. While Schlottm. is inclined to take *appiryon*, in the sense of a litter, as a word borrowed from the Greek (but in the time of the first king?), Gesen. in his *Thes.* seeks to derive it, thus understood, from פָּרַח, *cito ferri, currere*; but this signification of the verb is imaginary. We expect here, in accord-

ance with the progress of the scene, the name of the bridal couch; and on the supposition that *appiryon*, *Sota* 12a, as in the Mishna, means the litter (Aruch) of the bride, Arab. *maziffat*, and not *torus nuptialis* (Buxt.), then there is a possibility that *appiryon* is a more dignified word for 'ערס, i. 17, yet sufficient thereby to show that פּוּרְיָא is the usual Talm. name of the marriage-bed (e.g. *Mezia* 23b, where it stands, *per meton.*, for *concubitus*), which is wittily explained by שֵׁפְרִין וּרְבִין עָלֶיהָ (*Kethuboth* 10b, and elsewhere). The Targ. has for it the form פּוּרְיָן (*vid.* Levy). It thus designates a bed with a canopy (a tent-bed), *Deut.* xxxii. 50, *Jerus*; so that the ideas of the bed of state and the palanquin (cf. כִּילָה, canopy, and כִּילַת חַתָּנִים, bridal-bed, *Succa* 11a) touch one another. In general, פּוּרְיָא (פּוּרִין), as is also the case with *appiryon*, must have been originally a common designation of certain household furniture with a common characteristic; for the Syr. *parautha*, plur. *parjevatha* (Wiseman's *Horae*, p. 255), or also *parha* (Castell.), signifies a cradle. It is then to be inquired, whether this word is referable to a root-word which gives a common characteristic with manifold applications. But the Heb. פָּרָה, from the R. פָּר, signifies to split,<sup>1</sup> to tear asunder, to break forth, to bring fruit, to be fruitful, and nothing further. *Pārā* has nowhere the signification to run, as already remarked; only in the Palest.-Aram. פָּרָא is found in this meaning (*vid.* Buxt.). The Arab. *farr* does not signify to run, but to flee; properly (like our "*ausreissen*" = to tear out, to break out), to break open by flight the rank in which one stands (as otherwise turned by horse-dealers: to open wide the horse's mouth). But, moreover, we do not thus reach the common characteristic which we are in search of; for if we may say of the litter that it runs, yet we cannot say that of a bed or a cradle, etc. The Arab. *farfār*, *species vehiculi muliebris*, also does not help us; for the verb *farfar*, to vacillate, to shake, is its appropriate root-word.<sup>2</sup> With better results shall we compare the Arab. *fary*, which, in *Kal* and *Hiph.*, signifies to break open, to cut out (*couper, tailler une étoffe*), and also, figuratively, to bring forth something strange, something not yet existing (*yafry alfaryya*, according to the Arab. *Lex.* = *yaty bal'ajab fy 'amalh*, he accomplishes something wonderful); the primary

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Friedr. Delitzsch's *Indogerman.-semit. Studien*, p. 72.

<sup>2</sup> The Turkish *Kâmûs* says of *farfâr*: "it is the name of a vehicle (*merkeb*), like the camel-litter (*haudej*), destined merely for women." This also derives its name from rocking to and fro. So *farfâr*, for *farfara* is to the present day the usual word for *agiter, sécouer les ailes*; *farfarah*, for *légereté*; *furfûr*, for butterfly (cf. Ital. *farfalla*); generally, the ideas of that which is light and of no value—e.g. a babbler—connect themselves with the root *far* in several derivatives.

meaning in Conj. viii. is evidently: *yftarra kidban*, to cut out lies, to meditate and to express that which is calumnious (a similar metaphor to *khar'a*, *findere*, viii. *findere*, to cut out something in the imagination; French, *inventer*, *imaginer*). With this *fary*, however, we do not immediately reach פָּרָא, פָּרִיץ; for *fary*, as well as *fara* (*faric*), are used only of cutting to pieces, cutting out, sewing together of leather and other materials (cf. Arab. *farwat*, fur; *farrā*, furrier), but not of cutting and preparing wood. But why should not the Semitic language have used פָּרָא, פָּרִיץ, also, in the sense of the verb כָּרַא, which signifies<sup>1</sup> to cut and hew, in the sense of forming (cf. *Pih.* כָּרַא, *sculptere*, Ezek. xxi. 24), as in the Arab. *bara* and *bary*, according to Lane, mean, "be formed or fashioned by cutting (a writing-reed, stick, bow), shaped out, or pared,"—in other words: Why should פָּרָא, used in the Arab. of the cutting of leather, not be used, in the Heb. and Aram., of the preparing of wood, and thus of the fashioning of a bed or carriage? As הַשֶּׁבֶת signifies a machine, and that the work of an engineer, so פָּרִיץ signifies timber-work, carpenter-work, and, lengthened especially by *Aleph prosth.*, a product of the carpenter's art, a bed of state. The *Aleph prosth.* would indeed favour the supposition that *appiryon* is a foreign word; for the Semitic language frequently forms words after this manner,—e.g. אֶמְשִׁיטָא, a magician; אֶסְתֵּרָא, a stater.<sup>2</sup> But apart from such words as אֶנְרֵטָל, oddly sounding in accord with *κάρταλλος* as *appiryon* with *φωπεῖον*, אֶנְבִּיטָא and אֶנְעֵבֶתָא are examples of genuine Heb. words with such a prosthesis, i.e. an *Aleph* added at the beginning of the word; not a formative *Aleph*, as in אֶנְכָּב and the like. אֶפְרָן, palace, Dan. xi. 45, is, for its closer amalgamation by means of *Dag.*, at least an analogous example; for thus it stands related to the Syr. *opadna*, as, e.g. (Syr.), *oparsons*, net, Ewald, § 163c, to the Jewish-Aram. אֶפְרִסְנָא or אֶפְרִסְנָא; cf. also אֶפְתָּח, "finally," in relation to the Pehlv. אֶפְדִּים (Spiegel's *Literatur der Parsen*, p. 356).<sup>3</sup> We think we have thus proved that אֶפְרִיץ is a Heb. word, which, coming from the verb פָּרָא, to cut right, to make, frame, signifies<sup>4</sup> a bed, and that, as Ewald also renders, a bed of state.

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Friedr. Delitzsch's *Indogerm.-sem. Stud.* p. 50. We are now taught by the Assy. that as בָּן goes back to בָּנָה, so בָּר (Assyr. *nibru*) to בָּרָא = בָּרָא, to bring forth.

<sup>2</sup> Vid. Merx's *Gramm. Syr.* p. 115.

<sup>3</sup> אֶפְרִיטָא, quoted by Gesen. in his *Thes.*, *Sanhedrin* 109b, is not applicable here; it is contracted from אֶרֶץ-פִּוּרִיָא (on the bed).

<sup>4</sup> This derivation explains how it comes that *appiryon* can mean, in the Karaite Heb., a bird-cage or aviary, vid. Gottlober's בָּקֶרֶת ס', p. 208. We have left out of view the phrase אֶפְרִיץ נִמְטִי לִיה, which, in common use, means: we present

רִפְיָה (from רָפַד, R. רָפ, to lift from beneath, *sublevare*, then *sternere*) is the head of the bed; LXX. ἀνάκλιτον; Jerome, *reclinatorium*, which, according to Isidore, is the Lat. vulgar name for the *fulchra*, the reclining (of the head and foot) of the bedstead. Schlottmann here involuntarily bears testimony that *appiryon* may at least be understood of a bed of state as well as of a litter of state; for he remarks: "The four sides of the bed were generally adorned with carved work, ivory, metal, or also, as in the case of most of the Oriental divans, with drapery." "*Nec mihi tunc*," says Propertius, ii. 10, 11, "*fulcro lectus sternatur eburno*." Here the *fulcrum* is not of ivory, but of gold.

מְרַבֵּב (from רָבַב, to lie upon anything; Arab. II. *componere*; Aethiop. *adipisci*) is that which one takes possession of, sitting or lying upon it, the cushion, *e.g.* of a saddle (Lev. xv. 9); here, the divan (*vid.* Lane, *Mod. Egypt*, I. 10) arranged on an elevated frame, serving both as a seat and as a couch. Red purple is called אֶרְבֶּמֶן, probably from רָבַם = רָקַם, as material of variegated colour. By the interior תוֹף of the bed, is probably meant a covering which lay above this cushion. רָצַף, to arrange together, to combine (whence רָצֵפָה, pavement; Arab. *rusafat*, a paved way), is here meant like *στορέννυμι, στόρνυμι, στρώννυμι*, whence *στρώμα*. And רָצוּף אֵהָ is not equivalent to רָצוּף אֵהָ (after the construction 1 Kings xxii. 10; Ezek. ix. 2), inlaid with love, but is the adv. accus. of the manner; "love" (cf. *hhesed*, Ps. cxli. 5) denotes the motive: laid out or made up as a bed from love on the part of the daughters of Jerusalem, *i.e.* the ladies of the palace—these from love to the king have procured a costly tapestry or tapestries, which they have spread over the purple cushion. Thus rightly Vaihinger in his *Comm.*, and Merx, *Archiv.* Bd. II. 111–114. Schlottmann finds this interpretation of מן "stiff and hard;" but although מן in the pass. is not used like the Greek ὑπό, yet it can be used like ἀπό (Ewald, sec. 295*b*); and if there be no actual example of this, yet we point to Ps. xlv. in illustration of the custom of presenting gifts to a newly-married pair. He himself understands אֶהְבָּה personally, as do also Ewald, Heiligst., Böttcher; "the voice of the people," says Ewald, "knows that the finest ornament with which the in-

to him homage (of approbation or thanks). It occurs first, as uttered by the Sassanidean king, Shabur I., *Mezia* 119*a*, *extr.*; and already Rapoport, in his *Erech Millin*, 1852, p. 183, has recognised this word *appiryon* as Pers. It is the Old Pers. *âfrîna* or *âfrivana* (from *frî*, to love), which signifies blessing or benediction (*vid.* Justi's *Handb. d. Zendsprache*, p. 51). Rashi is right in glossing it by חֲזַן נְשִׁלָּנוּ (the testimony of our favour).

visible interior of the couch is adorned, is a love from among the daughters of Jerusalem,—i.e. some one of the court ladies who was raised, from the king's peculiar love to her, to the rank of a queen-consort. The speaker thus ingeniously names this newest favourite 'a love,' and at the same time designates her as the only thing with which this elegant structure, all adorned on the outside is adorned within." Relatively better Böttcher: with a love (beloved one), *præ filiis Hierus*. But even though אהבה, like *amor* and *amoris*, might be used of the beloved one herself, yet רצון does not harmonize with this, seeing we cannot speak of being paved or tapestried with persons. Schlottm. in vain refers for the personal signification of אהבה to ii. 7, where it means love and nothing else, and seeks to bring it into accord with רצון; for he remarks, "as the stone in mosaic work fills the place destined for it, so the bride the interior of the litter, which is intended for just one person filling it." But is this not more comical, without intending to be so, than Juvenal's (i. 1. 32 s.):

*Causidici nova cum veniat lectica Mathonis  
Plena ipso . . . .*

But Schlottm. agrees with us in this, that the marriage which is here being prepared for was the consummation of the happiness of Solomon and Shulamith, not of another woman, and not the consummation of Solomon's assault on the fidelity of Shulamith, who hates him to whom she now must belong, loving only one, the shepherd for whom she is said to sigh (i. 4a), that he would come and take her away. "This triumphal procession," says Rocke,<sup>1</sup> "was for her a mourning procession, the royal litter a bier; her heart died within her with longing for her beloved shepherd." Touching, if it were only true! Nowhere do we see her up to this point resisting; much rather she is happy in her love. The shepherd-hypothesis cannot comprehend this marriage procession without introducing incongruous and imaginary things; it is a poem of the time of Gellert. Solomon the seducer, and Shulamith the heroine of virtue, are figures as from Gellert's Swedish Countess; they are moral commonplaces personified, but not real human beings. In the litter sits Shulamith, and the *appiryon* waits for her. Solomon rejoices that now the reciprocal love-bond is to find its conclusion; and what Shulamith, who is brought from a lowly to so lofty a station, experiences, we shall hear her describe in the sequel.

<sup>1</sup> *Das Hohelied, Erstlingslied, u.s.w.* [The Song, a Primitive Drama from the East; or, Family Sins and Love's Devotion. A Moral Mirror for the Betrothed and Married], 1851.

At the close of the scene, the call now goes forth to the daughters of Zion, *i.e.* the women of Jerusalem collectively, to behold the king, who now shows himself to the object of his love and to the jubilant crowd, as the festal procession approaches.

Ver. 11 Come out, ye daughters of Zion, and see  
King Solomon with the crown  
With which his mother crowned him  
On the day of his espousal,  
And on the day of the gladness of his heart.

The women of the court, as distinguished from the Galilean maiden, are called "daughters of Jerusalem;" here, generally, the women of Zion or Jerusalem (Lam. v. 11) are called "daughters of Zion." Instead of צִיּוֹן (since the verb *Lamed Aleph* is treated after the manner of verbs *Lamed He*, cf. Jer. l. 20; Ezek. xxiii. 49), צִיּוֹן, and that defect. צִיּוֹן,<sup>1</sup> is used for the sake of assonance with וְרִאֲיוֹן;<sup>2</sup> elsewhere also, as we have shown at Isa. xxii. 13, an unusual form is used for the sake of the sound. It is seen from the *Sota* (ix. 14) that the old custom for the bridegroom to wear a "crown" was abolished in consequence of the awful war with Vespasian. Rightly Epstein, against Grätz, shows from Job xxxi. 36, Isa. xxviii. 1, Ps. ciii. 4, that men also crowned themselves. בְּעֶטֶרָה (with the crown) is, according to the best authorities, without the art., and does not require it, since it is determined by the relat. clause following. חֲתָן is the marriage (the word also used in the post.-bibl. Heb., and interchanging with חֲפָה, properly *νυμφών*, Matt. ix. 15), from the verb חָתַן, which, proceeding from the root-idea of cutting into (Arab. *khatn*, to circumcise; R. חת, whence חֲתָן, חֲתָם, חֲתָר), denotes the pressing into, or going into, another family; חָתָן is he who enters into such a relation of affinity, and חֲתָן the father of her who is taken away, who also on his part is related to the husband.<sup>3</sup> Here also the seduction fable is shattered. The marriage with Shulamith takes place with the joyful consent of the queen-mother. In order to set aside this fatal circumstance, the "crown"

<sup>1</sup> Without the *Jod* after *Aleph* in the older ed. Thus also in J and H with the note לִית וְחָסֵר [= *nonnisi h. l. et defective*] agreeing with the ms. Masora Parna. Thus also Kimchi, *Michlol* 108b.

<sup>2</sup> The *Resh* has in H *Chatef-Pathach*, with *Metheg* preceding. This, according to Ben-Asher's rule, is correct (cf. Ps. xxviii. 9. 'נָר). In the punctuation of the *Aleph* with *Tsere* or *Segol* the Codd. vary, according to the different views of the punctuation. J has *Segol*; D H, *Tsere*, which latter also Kimchi, *Michlol* 109a.

<sup>3</sup> L. Geiger (*Ursprung der Sprache*, 1869, p. 88) erroneously finds in R. חת (חתם, etc.) the meaning of binding. The (Arab.) noun *Khatan* means first a

is referred back to the time when Solomon was married to Pharaoh's daughter. *Cogitandus est Salomo*, says Heiligst., *qui cum Sulamitha pompa sollemni Hierosolyma redit, eadem corona nuptiali ornatus, qua quum filiam regis Aegyptiorum uxorem duxeret ornatus erat.* But was he then so poor or niggardly as to require to bring forth this old crown? and so basely regardless of his legitimate wife, of equal rank with himself, as to wound her by placing this crown on his head in honour of a rival? No; at the time when this youthful love-history occurred, Pharaoh's daughter was not yet married. The mention of his mother points us to the commencement of his reign. His head is not adorned with a crown which had already been worn, but with a fresh garland which his mother wreathed around the head of her youthful son. The men have already welcomed the procession from afar; but the king in his wedding attire has special attractions for the women—they are here called upon to observe the moment when the happy pair welcome one another.

#### SECOND SCENE OF THE THIRD ACT, IV. 1-V. 1.

This scene contains a conversation between Solomon and his beloved, whom he at first calls friend, and then, drawing always nearer to her, bride. The place of the conversation is, as v. 1 shows, the marriage hall. That the guests there assembled hear what Solomon says to Shulamith, one need not suppose; but the poet has overheard it from the loving pair. Fairer than ever does Shulamith appear to the king. He praises her beauty, beginning with her eyes.

Chap. iv. 1a Lo, thou art fair, my friend! yes, thou art fair!  
Thine eyes are doves behind thy veil.

The Gr. Venet. translates, after Kimchi, "looking out from behind, thy hair flowing down from thy head like a mane." Thus also Schultens, *capillus plexus*; and Hengst., who compares *πλέγμα*, 1 Tim. ii. 9, and *ἐμπλοκή τριχῶν*, 1 Pet. iii. 3, passages which do not accord with the case of Shulamith; but neither *סֵם*, *סֵם*, nor *סֵם* signifies to plait; the latter is used of the hair when it is too abundant, and ready for the shears. To understand the hair as married man, and then any relation on the side of the wife (Lane); the fundamental idea must be the same as that of *Khatn*, *circumcidere* (cf. Ex. iv. 25), viz that of penetrating, which *תַּתַּן*, *percellere*, and *תַּתַּן*, *descendere* (cf. e.g. *ferrum descendit haud alte in corpus*, in Livy, and Prov. xvii. 1), also exhibit.

denoted here, is, moreover, inadmissible, inasmuch as מבער cannot be used of the eyes in relation to the braids of hair hanging before them. Symm. rightly translates צמה by κάλυμμα [veil] (in the Song the LXX. erroneously renders by σιωπήσεως [behind thy silence]), Isa. xlvii. 2. The verb צָמַם, (Arab.) *ṣamm*, to make firm, solid, massive, impenetrable; whence e.g. (Arab.) *ṣimam*, a stopper, and (Arab.) *alṣamma*, a plaid in which one veils himself, when he wraps it around him.<sup>1</sup> The veil is so called, as that which closely hides the face. In the Aram. צָמַם, *Palp.* צָמַמַּם, means directly to veil, as e.g. *Bereshith rabba* c. 45, *extr.*, of a matron whom the king lets pass before him it is said, צִמְצָמָה פָּנֶיהָ. Shulamith is thus veiled. As the Roman bride wore the *velum flammeum*, so also the Jewish bride was deeply veiled; cf. Gen. xxiv. 65, where Rebecca veiled herself (Lat. *nubit*) before her betrothed. בָּעַר, constr. בְּעָרָה, a segolate noun, which denotes separation, is a prep. in the sense of *pone*, as in Arab. in that of *post*. Ewald, sec. 217*m*, supposes, contrary to the Arab., the fundamental idea of covering (cogn. בָּגַר); but that which surrounds is thought of as separating, and at the same time as covering, the thing which it encompasses. From behind her veil, which covered her face (*vid.* Bachmann, under Judg. iii. 23), her eyes gleam out, which, without needing to be supplemented by עֵינֶיהָ, are compared, as to their colour, motion, and lustre, to a pair of doves.

From the eyes the praise passes to the hair.

Ver. 1*b* Thy hair is like a flock of goats

Which repose downwards on Mount Gilead.

The hair of the bride's head was uncovered. We know from later times that she wore in it a wreath of myrtles and roses, or also a 'golden city' (עִיר שֶׁל זָהָב), i.e. an ornament which emblematically represented Jerusalem. To see that this comparison is not incongruous, we must know that sheep in Syria and Palestine are for the most part white; but goats, for the most part, black, or at least dark coloured, as e.g. the brown *gedi Mamri*.<sup>2</sup> The verb נָלַשׁ is the Arab. جلس, which signifies, to rest upon; and is distinguished from

<sup>1</sup> Regarding this verbal stem and its derivatives, see Ethé's *Schlafgemach der Phantasie*, pp. 102–105.

<sup>2</sup> Burns, the Scottish poet, thinking that goats are white, transfers the comparison from the hair to the teeth:

“Her teeth are like a flock of sheep,  
With fleeces newly washen clean,  
That slowly mount the rising steep;  
And she's twa glancin', sparklin' een.”

the synon. *קַד* in this, that the former is used of him who has previously lain down; the latter, of one who first stands and then sits down.<sup>1</sup> The *ncjd* bears also the name *jals*, as the high land raising itself, and like a dome sitting above the rest of the land. One has to think of the goats as having lain down, and thus with the upper parts of their bodies as raised up. *קַד* in *קַדֶּר* is used almost as in *קַדֶּר סֶדֶל*, Isa. xl. 15. A flock of goats encamped on a mountain (rising up, to one looking from a distance, as in a steep slope, and almost perpendicularly), and as if hanging down lengthwise on its sides, presents a lovely view adorning the landscape. Solomon likens to this the appearance of the locks of his beloved, which hang down over her shoulders. She was till now a shepherdess, therefore a second rural image follows:

Ver. 2 Thy teeth are like a flock of shorn sheep  
Which come up from the washing  
All bearing twins,  
And a bereaved one is not among them.

The verb *קַדֶּר* is, as the Arab. shows, in the sense of *tondere oves*, the synon. of *קַדֶּר*. With shorn (not to be shorn) sheep, the teeth in regard to their smoothness, and with washed sheep in regard to their whiteness, are compared—as a rule the sheep of Palestine are white; in respect of their full number, in which in pairs they correspond to one another, the one above to the one below, like twin births in which there is no break. The parallel passage, vi. 6, omits the point of comparison of the smoothness. That some days after the shearing the sheep were bathed, is evident from Columella vii. 4. Regarding the incorrect exchange of mas. with fem. forms, *vid.* under ii. 7. The part. *Hiph.* *קַדֶּרֶת* (cf. *διδυματόκος*, Theocr. i. 25) refers to the mothers, none of which has lost a twin of the pair she had borne. In “which come up from the washing,” there is perhaps thought of, at the same time with the whiteness, the *saliva dentium*. The moisture of the saliva, which heightens the glance of the teeth, is frequently mentioned in the love-songs of Mutenebbi, Hariri, and Deschami. And that the saliva of a clean and sound man is not offensive, is seen from this, that the Lord healed a blind man by means of His spittle.

The mouth is next praised:

Ver. 3a Like a thread of crimson thy lips,  
And thy mouth is lovely.

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<sup>1</sup> *K'ad* cannot be used of one who sits on the bed *farash*; in *jals* lies the direction from beneath to above; in *k'ad* (properly, to heap together, to cower down), from above to beneath.

As distinguished from red-purple, אֶרְנָן, שָׁנִי (properly, shining, glistening; for this form has an active signification, like נָקִי, as well as a passive, like עָנִי)—fully, תּוֹלַעַת שָׁנִי—signifies the *kermes* or worm-colour; the *karmese*, the red juice of the cochineal. מִדְּבָרָךְ (מִדְּבָרֶיךָ) is translated by the LXX. “thy speech;” Jerome, *eloquium*; and the Venet. “thy dialogue;” but that would be expressed, though by a ἀπ. λεγ., by דְּבִירָךְ. מִדְּבָר is here the name of the mouth, the naming of which one expects; the preform. is the *mem instrumenti*: the mouth, as the instrument of speech, as the organ by which the soul expresses itself in word and in manner of speech. The poet needed for דְּבִירָךְ a fuller, more select word; just as in Syria the nose is not called *anf*, but *minchār* (from *nachara*, to blow, to breathe hard).

### Praise of her temples.

Ver. 3b Like a piece of pomegranate thy temples  
Behind thy veil.

רִקָּה is the thin piece of the skull on both sides of the eyes; Lat., mostly in the plur., *tempora*; German, *schläfe*, from *schlaff*, loose, slack, *i.e.* weak = רָק. The figure points to that soft mixing of colours which makes the colouring of the so-called carnation one of the most difficult accomplishments in the art of painting. The half of a cut pomegranate (Jer. *fragmen mali punici*) is not meant after its outer side, as Zöckler supposes, for he gives to the noun *rākkā*, contrary to Judg. iv. 21, v. 26, the meaning of cheek, a meaning which it has not, but after its inner side, which presents<sup>1</sup> a red mixed and tempered with the ruby colour,—a figure so much the more appropriate, since the ground-colour of Shulamith’s countenance is a subdued white.<sup>2</sup> Up to this point the figures are borrowed from the circle of vision of a shepherdess. Now the king derives them from the sphere of his own experience as the ruler of a kingdom. She who has eyes like doves is in form like a born queen.

Ver. 4 Like the tower of David thy neck,  
Built in terraces;  
Thereon a thousand shields hang,  
All the armour of heroes.

<sup>1</sup> The interior of a pomegranate is divided by tough, leather-like white or yellow skins, and the divisions are filled with little berries, in form and size like those of the grape, in the juicy inside of which little, properly, seed-corns, are found. The berries are dark red, or also pale red. The above comparison points to the mixing of these two colours.

<sup>2</sup> The Moslem erotic poets compare the division of the lips to the dividing cleft into a pomegranate.

The tower of David is, as it appears, "the tower of the flock," Mic. iv. 4, from which David surveyed the flock of his people. In Neh. iii. 25 f. it is called the "tower which lieth out from the king's high house," i.e. not the palace, but a government house built on Zion, which served as a court of justice. But what is the meaning of the ἀπ. λεγ. τῷ πύργῳ? Grätz translates: for a prospect; but the Greek τηλωπός, of which he regards 'תל as the Heb. abstr., is a word so rare that its introduction into the Semitic language is on that account improbable. Hengst. translates: built for hanging swords; and he sees in the word a compound of תל (from תלה, with which forms such as ת' = *jadj*, ש' = *shadj*, של, 2 Sam. vi. 7, are compared) and פיה; but this latter word signifies, not swords, but edges of the (double-edged) sword; wherefore Kimchi (interpreting תל as the constr. of תל, as תל, in תלול, is of תל) explains: an erection of sharp-cornered stones; and, moreover, the Heb. language knows no such *num. comp. appellativa*: the names of the frog, צפרצפה, and the bat, חושב (cf. the *Beth* in (Arab.) *sa'lab*, fox, with the added *Pe*), are not such; and also *tsalmāveṭh*, the shadow of death, is at a later period, for the first time, restamped<sup>1</sup> as such from the original *tsalmuth* (cf. Arab. *zalumat* = *tenebrae*). Gesen. obtains the same meanings; for he explains 'תל by *cautibus* (sc. *armis*), from an adj. תלם, from תלם = Arab. *talifa*, to perish, the inf. of which, *talaf*, is at the present day a word synon. with *halak* (to perish); (Arab.) *matlaf* (place of going down) is, like מרש, a poetic name of the wilderness. The explanation is acceptable but hazardous, since neither the Heb. nor the Aram. shows a trace of this verb; and it is thus to be given up, if 'תל can be referred to a verbal stem to be found in the Heb. and Aram. This is done in Ewald's explanation, to which also Böttcher and Rödiger give the preference: built for close (crowded) troops (so, viz., that many hundreds or thousands find room therein); the (Arab.) verb *aff*, to wrap together (opp. *nashar*, to unfold), is used of the packing together of multitudes of troops (*liff*, plur. *lufuf*), and also of warlike hand-to-hand conflicts; 'תלם would be traced to a verb תלם synon. therewith, after the form תלם. But if 'תל were meant of troops, then they would be denoted as the garrison found therein, and it would not be merely said that the tower was built for such; for the point of comparison would then be, the imposing look of the neck, overpowering by the force of the impression proceeding from within. But now, in the Aram., and relatively in the Talm. Heb., not only תלם and תל occur, but also 'תל (Af. 'תלם), and that in

<sup>1</sup> Cf. regarding such double words belonging to the more modern Semitic language, *Jesurun*, pp. 232-236.

the sense of enclosure, *i.e.* of joining together, the one working into the other,—*e.g.* in the Targ. : of the curtain of the tabernacle (בֵּית לֹפֶי, place of the joining together = חִבְרָה or מַחְבֵּרָה of the Heb. text); and in the Talm. : of the roofs of two houses (*Bathra* 6a, לֹפֶת, the joining<sup>1</sup>). Accordingly 'לחלף, if we interpret the *Lamed* not of the definition, but of the norm, may signify, "in ranks together." The *Lamed* has already been thus rendered by Döderl. : "in turns" (cf. לָפַת, to turn, to wind); and by Meier, Mr. : "in gradation;" and Aq. and Jerome also suppose that 'חלף refers to component parts of the building itself, for they understand<sup>2</sup> pinnacles or parapets (ἐπάλξεις, *propugnacula*); as also the Venet. : εἰς ἐπάλξεις χιλίας. But the name for pinnacles is פִּנָּה, and their points, שְׂמֻטָּה; while, on the contrary, 'חלף is the more appropriate name for terraces which, connected together, rise the one above the other. Thus to build towers like terraces, and to place the one, as it were, above the other, was a Babylonian custom.<sup>3</sup> The comparison lies in this, that Shulamith's neck was surrounded with ornaments so that it did not appear as a uniform whole, but as composed of terraces. That the neck is represented as hung round with ornaments, the remaining portion of the description shows.

מָגֶן signifies a shield, as that which protects, like *clupeus* (*clypeus*), perhaps connected with καλύπτειν and שָׁלַט, from שָׁלַט = (Arab.) *shalita*, as a hard impenetrable armour. The latter is here the more common word, which comprehends, with מָגֶן, the round shield; also צֶנֶה, the oval shield, which covers the whole body; and other forms of shields. אֶלֶף הַמָּגִן, "the thousand shields," has the indicative, if not (*vid.* under i. 11) the generic article. The appositional כָּל שְׁלֵטִי 'הֵן is not intended to mean: all shields of (*von*) heroes, which it would if the article were prefixed to *col* and omitted before *gibborim*, or if כָּלֵם, iii. 8, were used; but it means: all the shields of heroes, as the accentuation also indicates. The article is also here significant. Solomon made, according to 1 Kings x. 16 f., 200 golden targets and 300 golden shields, which he put in the house of the forest of Lebanon. These golden shields Pharaoh Shishak took away with him, and Rehoboam replaced them by "shields of brass," which the guards bore when they accompanied the king on his going into the temple (1 Kings xiv. 26–28; cf. 2 Chron. xii. 9–11); these

<sup>1</sup> The Arab. *lafa*, vi., proceeding from the same root-idea, signifies to bring in something again, to bring in again, to seek to make good again.

<sup>2</sup> *Vid.* also Lagarde's *Onomastica*, p. 202: Θαλασσιῶθ ἐπάλξη (read εἰς) ἡ ὑψηλά.

<sup>3</sup> *Vid.* Oppert's *Grundzüge der Assyr. Kunst* (1872), p. 11.

"shields of David," i.e. shields belonging to the king's house, were given to the captains of the guard on the occasion of the raising of Joash to the throne, 2 Kings xi. 10; cf. 2 Chron. xxiii. 9. Of these brazen shields, as well as of those of gold, it is expressly said how and where they were kept, nowhere that they were hung up outside on a tower, the tower of David. Such a display of the golden shields is also very improbable. We will perhaps have to suppose that 46 describes the tower of David, not as it actually was, but as one has to represent it to himself, that it might be a figure of Shulamith's neck. This is compared to the terraced tower of David, if one thinks of it as hung round by a thousand shields which the heroes bore, those heroes, namely, who formed the king's body-guard. Thus it is not strange that to the 200 + 300 golden shields are here added yet 500 more; the body-guard, reckoned in companies of 100 each, 2 Kings xi. 4, is estimated as consisting of 1000 men. The description, moreover, corresponds with ancient custom. The words are חָלָלִים בְּחֵלֶיךָ, not חָלָלִים בְּחֵלֶיךָ; the outer wall of the tower is thought of as decorated with shields hung upon it. That shields were thus hung round on tower-walls, Ezekiel shows in his prophecy regarding Tyre, xxvii. 11; cf. 1 Mac. iv. 57, and *supra foris Capitolinae aedis*, Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* xxxv. 3; and although we express the presumption that Solomon's imagination represented David's tower as more gorgeous than it actually was, yet we must confess that we are not sufficiently acquainted with Solomon's buildings to be able to pass judgment on this. These manifold inexplicable references of the Song to the unfolded splendour of Solomon's reign, are favourable to the Solomonic authorship of the book. This grandiose picture of the distinguished beauty of the neck, and the heightening of this beauty by the ornament of chains, is now followed by a beautiful figure, which again goes back to the use of the language of shepherds, and terminates the description:

Ver. 5 Thy two breasts are like two fawns,  
Twins of a gazelle,  
Which feed among lilies.

The dual, originating in the inner differ. of the plur., which denotes in Heb. not two things of any sort, but two paired by nature or by art, exists only in the principal form; שְׁתֵּי, as soon as inflected, is unrecognisable, therefore here, where the pair as such is praised, the word שְׁתֵּי is used. The breasts are compared to a twin pair of young gazelles in respect of their equality and youthful freshness, and the bosom on which they raise themselves is compared to a meadow covered with lilies, on which the twin-pair of young gazelles feed.

With this tender lovely image the praise of the attractions of the chosen one is interrupted. If one counts the lips and the mouth as a part of the body, which they surely are, there are seven things here praised, as Hengst. rightly counts (the eyes, the hair, teeth, mouth, temples, neck, breasts); and Hahn speaks with right of the sevenfold beauty of the bride.

Shulamith replies to these words of praise :

Ver. 6 Until the day cools and the shadows flee,  
I will go forth to the mountain of myrrh  
And to the hill of frankincense.

All those interpreters who suppose these to be a continuation of Solomon's words, lose themselves in absurdities. Most of them understand the mountain of myrrh and the hill of frankincense of Shulamith's attractions, praised in ver. 5, or of her beauty as a whole; but the figures would be grotesque (cf. on the other hand v. 13), and אֶלְלִי לִי prosaic, wherefore it comes that the idea of betaking oneself away connects itself with הָלַךְ לוֹ (Gen. xii. 1; Ex. xviii. 27), or that it yet preponderates therein (Gen. xxii. 2; Jer. v. 5), and that, for אֶלְלִי in the passage before us in reference to ii. 10, 11, the supposition holds that it will correspond with the French *j'en irai*. With right Louis de Leon sees in the mountain of myrrh and the hill of frankincense names of shady and fragrant places; but he supposes that Solomon says he wishes to go thither to enjoy a siesta, and that he invites Shulamith thither. But we read nothing of this invitation; and that a bridegroom should sleep a part of his marriage-day is yet more unnatural than that, e.g., Wilh. Budäus, the French philologist, spent a part of the same at work in his study. That not Solomon but Shulamith speaks here is manifest in the beginning, "until the day," etc., which at ii. 17 are also Shulamith's words. Anton (1773) rightly remarks, "Shulamith says this to set herself free." But why does she seek to make herself free? It is answered, that she longs to be forth from Solomon's too ardent eulogies; she says that, as soon as it is dark, she will escape to the blooming aromatic fields of her native home, where she hopes to meet with her beloved shepherd. Thus, e.g., Ginsburg (1868). But do myrrh and frankincense grow in North Palestine? Ginsburg rests on Florus' *Epitome Rerum Rom.* iii 6, where Pompey the Great is said to have passed over Lebanon and by Damascus "*per nemora illa odorata, per thuris et balsami sylvas.*" But by these *thuris et balsami sylvae* could be meant only the gardens of Damascus; for neither myrrh nor frankincense is indigenous to North Palestine, or generally to any part of Palestine.

Friedrich (1866) therefore places Shulamith's home at Engedi, and supposes that she here once more looks from the window and dotes on the mountain of myrrh and the hill of frankincense, "where, at the approach of twilight, she was wont to look out for her betrothed shepherd." But Shulamith, as her name already denotes, is not from the south, but is a Galilean, and her betrothed shepherd is from Utopia! That myrrh and frankincense were planted in the gardens of Engedi is possible, although (i. 14) mention is made only of the *Al-henna* there. But here places in the neighbourhood of the royal palace must be meant; for the myrrh tree, the gum of which, prized as an aroma, is the Arab. *Balsamodendron Myrrha*, and the frankincense tree, the resin of which is used for incense, is, like the myrrh tree, an Arab. amyrid. The *Boswellia serrata*,<sup>1</sup> indigenous to the East Indies, furnishes the best frankincense; the Israelites bought it from Sheba (Isa. lx. 6; Jer. vi. 20). The myrrh tree as well as the frankincense tree were thus exotics in Palestine, as they are in our own country; but Solomon, who had intercourse with Arabia and India by his own mercantile fleet, procured them for his own garden (Eccles. ii. 5). The modest Shulamith shuns the loving words of praise; for she requests that she may be permitted to betake herself to the lonely places planted with myrrh and frankincense near the king's palace, where she thinks to tarry in a frame of mind befitting this day till the approaching darkness calls her back to the king. It is the importance of the day which suggests to her this *אֶלֶךְ לִי*, a day in which she enters into the covenant of her God with Solomon (Prov. ii. 17). Without wishing to allegorize, we may yet not omit to observe, that the mountain of myrrh and the hill of frankincense put us in mind of the temple, where incense, composed of myrrh, frankincense, and other spices, ascended up before God every morning and evening (Ex. xxx. 34 ff.). *הַר הַמִּשְׁכָּה* is perhaps a not unintentional accord to *הַר הַמִּשְׁכָּה* (2 Chron. iii. 1), the mountain where God appeared; at all events, "mountain of myrrh" and "hill of frankincense" are appropriate names for places of devout meditation, where one holds fellowship with God.

This childlike modest disposition makes her yet more lovely in the eyes of the king. He breaks out in these words:

Ver. 7 Thou art altogether fair, my love,  
And no blemish in thee.

Certainly he means, no blemish either of soul or body. In vers. 1-5 he has praised her external beauty; but in ver. 6 her soul has disclosed itself: the fame of her spotless beauty is there extended to

<sup>1</sup> Lassen's *Ind. Alterthumskunde*, I. 334.

her soul no less than to her external appearance. And as to her longing after freedom from the tumult and bustle of court life, he thus promises to her :

Ver. 8 With me from Lebanon, my bride,  
With me from Lebanon shalt thou come ;  
Shalt look from the top of Amana,  
From the top of Shenir and Hermon,  
From dens of lions,  
From mountains of leopards.

Zöckl. interprets אֶמֶת in the sense of אֱלֹהִים, and הַשְׁנִיר in the sense of journeying to this definite place: "he announces to her in overflowing fulness of expression, that from this time forth, instead of the lonely mountainous regions, and the dangerous caves and dens, she shall inhabit with him the royal palace." Thus also Kingsbury. But the interpretation, however plausible, cannot be supported. For (1) such an idea ought to be expressed either by אֱלֹהִים תֵּב or by אֶמֶת תֵּב, instead of אֶמֶת הֵב ; (2) Shulamith is not from Lebanon, nor from the Anti-Libanus, which looks toward Damascus ; (3) this would be no answer to Shulamith's longing for lonely quietness. We therefore hold by our explanation given in 1851. He seeks her to go with him up the steep heights of Lebanon, and to descend with him from thence ; for while ascending the mountain one has no view before him, but when descending he has the whole panorama of the surrounding region lying at his feet. Thus חֵשׁ is not to be understood as at Isa. lvii. 9, where it has the meaning of *migrabas*, but, as at Num. xxiii. 9, it means *spectabis*. With מֵר the idea of prospect lies nearer than that of descending ; besides, the meaning *spectare* is secondary, for שָׁר signifies first "to go, proceed, journey," and then "going to view, to go in order to view." *Sér* in Arab. means "the scene," and *sér etmek* in Turkish, "to contemplate" (cf. Arab. *tamashy*, to walk, then, to contemplate). *Lebanon* is the name of the Alpine range which lies in the N.-W. of the Holy Land, and stretches above 20 (German) miles from the Leontes (*Nahr el-Kasmê*) northwards to the Eleutheros (*Nahr el-Kebîr*). The other three names here found refer to the Anti-Libanus separated from the Lebanon by the Coelo-Syrian valley, and stretching from the Banias northwards to the plain of Hamâth.

*Amana* denotes that range of the Anti-Libanus from which the springs of the river Amana issue, one of the two rivers which the Syrian captain (2 Kings v. 12) named as better than all the waters of Israel. These are the *Amana* and *Pharpar*, i.e. the *Baradâ* and *A'wadsh* ; to the union of the *Baradâ* (called by the Greeks *Chry-*

*sorrhoas*, i.e. "golden stream") with the *Feidshe*, the environs of Damascus owe their *ghuwdat*, their paradisaical beauty.

*Hermón* (from חָרַם, to cut off; cf. Arab. *kharom* and *makhrim*, the steep projection of a mountain) is the most southern peak of the Anti-Libanus chain, the lofty mountains (about 10,000 feet above the level of the sea) which form the north-eastern border of Palestine, and from which the springs of the Jordan take their rise.

Another section of the Anti-Libanus range is called *Senir*, not *Shenir*. The name, in all the three places where it occurs (Deut. iii. 9; 1 Chron. v. 23), is, in accordance with tradition, to be written with *Sin*. The Onkelos Targum writes סִנִּיר; the Jerusalem paraphrases, מִרְא דְּמִסְרִי פִירִי (the mountain whose fruits become putrid, viz. on account of their superabundance); the Midrash explains otherwise: שְׂרָא שֶׁנֶּא הֵרִיר (the mountain which resists being broken up by the plough).—everywhere the writing of the word with the letter *Sin* is supposed. According to Deut. iii. 9, this was the Amorite name of Hermon. The expression then denotes that the Amorites called Hermon—i.e. the Anti-Libanus range, for they gave the name of a part to the whole range—by the name *Senir*; Abulfeda uses سنير as the name of the part to the north of Damascus, with which the statement of Schwarz (*Das h. Land*, p. 33) agrees, that the Hermon (Anti-Libanus) to the north-west of Damascus is called *Senir*.

נִפְרִים, panthers, to the present day inhabit the clefts and defiles of the Lebanon, and of the Anti-Libanus running parallel to it; whereas lions have now altogether disappeared from the countries of the Mediterranean. In Solomon's time they were to be met with in the lurking-places of the Jordan valley, and yet more frequently in the remote districts of the northern Alpine chains. From the heights of these Alps Solomon says Shulamith shall alone with him look down from where the lions and panthers dwell. Near these beasts of prey, and yet inaccessible by them, shall she enjoy the prospect of the extensive pleasant land which was subject to the sceptre of him who held her safe on these cliffs, and accompanied her over these giddy heights. If "mountain of myrrh," so also "the top of Amana" is not without subordinate reference. *Amana*, proceeding from the primary idea of firmness and verification, signifies fidelity and the faithful covenant as it is established between God and the congregation, for He betrothes it to Himself בְּאֱמֻנָה ("in faithfulness"), Hos. ii. 22 [20]; the congregation of which the apostle (Eph. v. 27) says the same as is here said by

Solomon of Shulamith. Here for the first time he calls her בְּלָה, not בְּלָתִי; for that, according to the *usus loq.*, would mean “my daughter-in-law.” Accordingly, it appears that the idea of “daughter-in-law” is the primary, and that of “bride” the secondary one. בְּלָה, which is = בְּלִילָה, as חֶלֶה, a cake, is = חֲלִילָה, that which is pierced through (cf. בְּלִילוֹת, being espoused; Jer. ii. 2), appears to mean<sup>1</sup> (cf. what was said regarding חֶתֶן under iii. 11b) her who is comprehended with the family into which, leaving her parents’ house, she enters; not her who is embraced = crowned with a garland (cf. Arab. تَكَلَّل, to be garlanded; *tēklil*, garlanding; *iklil*, Syr. *k’lilo*, a wreath), or her who is brought to completion (cf. the verb, Ezek. xxvii. 4, 11), *i.e.* has reached the goal of her womanly calling. Besides, בְּלָה, like “*Braut*” in the older German (*e.g.* Gudrun), means not only her who is betrothed, but also her who has been lately married.

All that the king calls his, she now can call hers; for she has won his heart, and with his heart himself and all that is his.

Ver. 9 Thou hast taken my heart, my sister-bride;  
Thou hast taken my heart with one of thy glances,  
With a little chain of thy necklace.

The *Piel* לָבַב may mean to make courageous, and it actually has this meaning in the Aram., wherefore the Syr. retains the word; Symm. renders it by ἐθάρσυνάς με. But is it becoming in a man who is no coward, especially in a king, to say that the love he cherishes gives him heart, *i.e.* courage? It might be becoming, perhaps, in a warrior who is inspired by the thought of his beloved, whose respect and admiration he seeks to gain, to dare the uttermost. But Solomon is no Antar, no wandering knight.<sup>2</sup> Besides, the first effect of love is different: it influences those whom it governs, not as encouraging, in the first instance, but as disarming them; love responded to encourages, but love in its beginning, which is the subject here, overpowers. We would thus more naturally render: “thou hast unhearted me;” but “to unheart,” according to the Semitic and generally the ancient conception of the heart (*Psychol.* p. 254), does not so much mean to

<sup>1</sup> L. Geiger’s *Ursprung d. Sprach.* p. 227; cf. 88.

<sup>2</sup> A specimen of Böttcher’s interpretation: “What is more natural than to suppose that the keeper of a vineyard showed herself with half of her head and neck exposed at the half-opened window to her shepherd on his first attempt to set her free, when he cried, ‘my dove in the clefts of the rocks,’ etc., and animated him thereby to this present bold deliverance of her from the midst of robbers?” We pity the Shulamitess, that she put her trust in this moonshiny coward.

captivate the heart, as rather to deprive of understanding or of judgment (cf. Hos. iv. 11). Such denomin. *Pi.* of names of corporeal members signify not merely taking away, but also wounding, and generally any violent affection of it, as **נָרַם, נָנַב**, Ewald, § 120c; accordingly the LXX., Venet., and Jerome: *ἐκαρδίωσάς με, vulnerasti cor meum*. The meaning is the same for "thou hast wounded my heart" = "thou hast subdued my heart" (cf. Ps. xlv. 6b). With one of her glances, with a little chain of her necklace, she has overcome him as with a powerful charm: *veni, visa sum, vici*. The *Keri* changes **בִּאֲחֶרֶץ** into **בְּאֲחֶרֶץ**; certainly **עֵץ** is mostly fem. (e.g. Judg. xvi. 28), but not only the non-bibl. *usus loq.*, which e.g. prefers **רָעָה** or **רָעָה עֵץ**, of a malignant bewitching look, but also the bibl. (*vid.* Zech. iii. 9, iv. 10) treats the word as of double gender. **עֵץ** and **עֵצִים** are related to each other as a part is to the whole. With the subst. ending *ón*, the designation of an ornament designed for the neck is formed from **צַוֵּאר**, the neck; cf. **צִוְרֵת**, the "round tires like the moon" of the women's toilet, Isa. iii. 18 ff. **עֵנַק** (connected with **עֵנַק עֵנַק**, *cervix*) is a separate chain (Aram. **עֵנִיקְתָּא**) of this necklace. In the words **עֵנַק אֶחָד**, **אֶחָד** is used instead of **אֶחָד**, occurring also out of genit. connection (Gen. xlviii. 22; 2 Sam. xvii. 22), and the arrangement (*vid.* under Ps. lxxxix. 51) follows the analogy of the pure numerals as **שְׁלֹשׁ נָשִׁים**; it appears to be transferred from the vulgar language to that used in books, where, besides the passage before us, it occurs only in Dan. viii. 13. That a glance of the eye may pierce the heart, experience shows; but how can a little chain of a necklace do this? That also is intelligible. As beauty becomes unlike itself when the attire shows want of taste, so by means of tasteful clothing, which does not need to be splendid, but may even be of the simplest kind, it becomes mighty. Hence the charming attractive power of the impression one makes communicates itself to all that he wears, as, e.g., the woman with the issue of blood touched with joyful hope the hem of Jesus' garment; for he who loves feels the soul of that which is loved in all that stands connected therewith, all that is, as it were, consecrated and charmed by the beloved object, and operates so much the more powerfully if it adorns it, because as an ornament of that which is beautiful, it appears so much the more beautiful. In the preceding verse, Solomon has for the first time addressed Shulamith by the title "bride." Here with heightened cordiality he calls her "sister-bride." In this change in the address the progress of the story is mirrored. Why he does not say **כַּלְתִּי** (my bride), has already been explained, under 8a, from the derivation of the word. Solomon's mother might call Shulamith

*callathi*, but he gives to the relation of affinity into which Shulamith has entered a reference to himself individually, for he says *āhhothi callā* (my sister-bride): she who as *callā* of his mother is to her a kind of daughter, is as *callā* in relation to himself, as it were, his sister.

He proceeds still further to praise her attractions.

Ver. 10 How fair is thy love, my sister-bride!

How much better thy love than wine!

And the fragrance of thy unguents than all spices!

11 Thy lips drop honey, my bride;

Honey and milk are under thy tongue;

And the fragrance of thy garments is like the fragrance of Lebanon.

Regarding the connection of the *pluralet*. דוֹרִים with the plur. of the pred., *vid.* at i. 2b. The pred. יָפִי praises her love in its manifestations according to its impression on the sight; טַבּוֹ, according to its experience on nearer intercourse. As in ver. 9 the same power of impression is attributed to the eyes and to the necklace, so here is intermingled praise of the beauty of her person with praise of the fragrance, the odour of the clothing of the bride; for her soul speaks out not only by her lips, she breathes forth odours also for him in her spices, which he deems more fragrant than all other odours, because he inhales, as it were, her soul along with them. נֶפֶת, from נָפַת, *ebullire* (*vid.* under Prov. v. 3, also Schultens), is virgin honey, ἄκτουον (*acetum*, Pliny, xi. 15), *i.e.* that which of itself flows from the combs (צִיפִּים). Honey drops from the lips which he kisses; milk and honey are under the tongue which whispers to him words of pure and inward joy; cf. the contrary, Ps. cxl. 4. The last line is an echo of Gen. xxvii. 27. שְׂמֵלָה is שְׂמֵל (from שָׂמַל, *complicare, compecti*) transposed (cf. עֲלֹהָ from עוֹלָה, כִּבְשָׁה from כִּבְשָׁה). As Jacob's raiment had for his old father the fragrance of a field which God had blessed, so for Solomon the garments of the faultless and pure one, fresh from the woods and mountains of the north, gave forth a heart-strengthening savour like the fragrance of Lebanon (Hos. iv. 7), *viz.* of its fragrant herbs and trees, chiefly of the balsamic odour of the apples of the cedar.

The praise is sensuous, but it has a moral consecration.

Ver. 12 A garden locked is my sister-bride;

A spring locked, a fountain sealed.

גֶּן (according to rule masc. Böttch. § 658) denotes the garden from its enclosure; מַיִם (elsewhere מַיִם), the fountain (synon. מַבְרֵץ), the waves bubbling forth (cf. Amos v. 24); and מַעַן, the place, as it were an eye

of the earth, from which a fountain gushes forth. Luther distinguishes rightly between *gan* and *gal*; on the contrary, all the old translators (even the Venet.) render as if the word in both cases were *gan*. The *Pasek* between *gan* and *nā'ul*, and between *gal* and *nā'ul*, is designed to separate the two *Nuns*, as *e.g.* at 2 Chron. ii. 9, Neh. ii. 2, the two *Mems*; it is the orthophonic *Pasek*, already described under ii. 7, which secures the independence of two similar or organically related sounds. Whether the sealed fountain (*fons signatus*) alludes to a definite fountain which Solomon had built for the upper city and the temple place,<sup>1</sup> we do not now inquire. To a locked garden and spring no one has access but the rightful owner, and a sealed fountain is shut against all impurity. Thus she is closed against the world, and inaccessible to all that would disturb her pure heart, or desecrate her pure person.<sup>2</sup> All the more beautiful and the greater is the fulness of the flowers and fruits which bloom and ripen in the garden of this life, closed against the world and its lust.

Ver. 13 What sprouts forth for thee is a park of pomegranates,

With most excellent fruits;

Cypress flowers with nards;

14 Nard and crocus; calamus and cinnamon,

With all kinds of incense trees;

Myrrh and aloes,

With all the chief aromatics.

The common subject to all down to ver. 15 inclusive is פַּרְחֵי (‘‘ what sprouts for thee ’’ = ‘‘ thy plants ’’), as a figurative designation, borrowed from plants, of all the ‘‘ phenomena and life utterances ’’ (Böttch.) of her personality. ‘‘ If I only knew here,’’ says Locke, ‘‘ how to disclose the meaning, certainly all these flowers and fruits, in the figurative language of the Orient, in the flower-language of love, had their beautiful interpretation.’’ In the old German poetry, also, the phrase *bluomen brechen* [to break flowers] was equivalent to: to enjoy love; the flowers and fruits named are figures of all that the *amata* offers to the *amator*. Most of the plants here named are exotics; פָּרֶס (heaping around, circumvallation, enclosing) is a garden or park, especially with foreign ornamental and fragrant plants—an old Persian word, the explanation of which, after Spiegel, first given in our exposition of the Song, 1851 (from *pāri* = *περί*, and *dēz*, R. *diz*, a heap), has now become common property (Justi’s *Handb. der Zendsprache*, p. 180). פֶּרֶי כִנְדִּים (from כִּנְדָּה, which corresponds to

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Zscheoke in the *Tübinger Quartalschrift*, 1867, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Seal, סֶהַל, pers. *mahr*, is used directly in the sense of maiden-like behaviour; vid. Perles’ *etymol. Studien* (1871), p. 67.

the Arab. *majd*, praise, honour, excellence; *vid.* Volck under Deut. xxxiii. 13) are *fructus laudum*, or *lautiliarum*, excellent precious fruits, which in the more modern language are simply called מְנִי־מְנִי (Shabbath 127b, מְנִי מְנִי, all kinds of fine fruits); cf. Syr. *maydo*, dried fruit. Regarding מְנִי, *vid.* under i. 14; regarding מְנִי, under i. 13; also regarding מְנִי, under i. 12. The long vowel of מְנִי corresponds to the Pers. form *nârd*, but near to which is also *nard*, Indian *nalada* (fragrance-giving); the *ê* is thus only the long accent, and can therefore disappear in the plur. For נָרִים, Grätz reads יָרִים, roses, because the poet would not have named *nard* twice. The conjecture is beautiful, but for us, who believe the poem to be Solomonic, is inconsistent with the history of roses (*vid.* under ii. 1), and also unnecessary. The description moves forward by steps rhythmically.

כַּרְכֹּם is the *crocus sativus*, the genuine Indian *safran*, the dried flower-eyes of which yield the safran used as a colour, as an aromatic, and also as medicine; *safran* is an Arab. word, and means yellow root and yellow colouring matter. The name כַּרְכֹּם, Pers. *karkam*, Arab. *karkum*, is radically Indian, Sanscr. *kuṅkuma*. קִנְיָה, a reed (from קָנָה, R. קָנָה, to rise up, viewed intrans.),<sup>1</sup> viz. sweet reed, *acorus calamus*, which with us now grows wild in marshes, but is indigenous to the Orient.

קִנְיָה is the *laurus cinnamomum*, a tree indigenous to the east coast of Africa and Ceylon, and found later also on the Antilles. It is of the family of the *laurineae*, the inner bark of which, peeled off and rolled together, is the cinnamon-bark (*cannella*, French *cannelle*); Aram. קִנְיָה, as also the Greek *κιννάμωμον* and *κίνναμον*, Lat. (*e.g.* in the 12th book of Pliny) *cinnaomum* and *cinnaomum*, are interchanged, from קִנְיָה, probably a secondary formation from קָנָה (like בָּם, whence בָּמָה, from בָּא), to which also סִסְטָה, ὑπόστασις, and the Talm.-Targ. קִנְיָה קִנְיָה, an oath (cf. קָנָה), go back, so that thus the name which was brought to the west by the Phoenicians denoted not the tree, but the reed-like form of the rolled dried bark. As “*nards*” refer to varieties of the *nard*, perhaps to the Indian and the Jamanic spoken of by Strabo and others, so “all kinds of incense trees” refers definitely to Indo-Arab. varieties of the incense tree and its fragrant resin; it has its name from the white and transparent seeds of this its resin (cf. Arab. *lubān*, incense and benzoin, the resin of

<sup>1</sup> In this general sense of “reed” (*Syn. arundo*) the word is also found in the Gr. and Lat.: *κάνναι* (*κάνναι*), reed-mats, *κάνειον*, *κάναστρον*, a wicker basket, *canna*, *canistrum*, without any reference to an Indo-Germ. verbal stem, and without acquiring the specific signification of an aromatic plant.

the storax tree, לִבְנֶה); the Greek λίβανος, λιβανωτός (Lat. *thus*, frankincense, from θύω), is a word derived from the Phoenicians.

אֶהְלֵם or אֶהְלֵם (which already in a remarkable way was used by Balaam, Num. xxiv. 6, elsewhere only since the time of Solomon) is the Semitized old Indian name of the aloe, *agaru* or *aguru*; that which is aromatic is the wood of the aloe-tree (*aloëxylon agallochum*), particularly its dried root (*agallochum* or *lignum aloës*, ξυλαλόη, according to which the Targ. here: אֶהְלֵם אֶלֶם, after the phrase in Aruch) mouldered in the earth, which chiefly came from farther India.<sup>1</sup> עַם, as everywhere, connects things contained together or in any way united (v. 1; cf. i. 11, as Ps. lxxxvii. 4; cf. 1 Sam. xvi. 12). The concluding phrase עַם קְלִיר' וְעַם, *cum præstantissimis quibusque aromatibus*, is a poet. *et cetera*. עֲרֵא, with the gen. of the object whose value is estimated, denotes what is of *meilleure qualité*; or, as the Talm. says, what is אֶלֶם, ἄλφα, i.e. number one. Ezekiel, xxvii. 22, in a similar sense, says, "with chief (עֲרֵא) of all spices."

The panegyric returns now once more to the figure of a fountain.

Ver. 15 A garden-fountain, a well of living water,  
And torrents from Lebanon.

The *tertium compar.* in ver. 12 was the collecting and sealing up; here, it is the inner life and its outward activity. A fountain in gardens (עֵינַי, categ. pl.) is put to service for the benefit of the beds of plants round about, and it has in these gardens, as it were, its proper sphere of influence. A well of living water is one in which that which it distributes springs up from within, so that it is indeed given to it, but not without at the same time being its own true property. נָל is related, according to the Semitic *usus loq.*, to לָא, as "niedergehen" (to go down) to "weggehen" (to go away) (*vid.* Prov. v. 15); similarly related are (Arab.) *sar*, to go, and *sal* (in which

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Lassen's *Ind. Alterthumsk.* I. 334 f. Furrer, in Schenkel's *Bib. Lex.*, understands אֶהְלֵם of the *liliaceae*, indigenous to Palestine as to Arabia, which is also called *aloë*. But the drastic purgative which the succulent leaves of this plant yield is not aromatic, and the verb אֶהְלֵם "to glisten," whence he seeks to derive the name of this aloe, is not proved. Cf. besides, the Petersburg *Lex.* under *aguru* ("not difficult"), according to which is this name of the *amyrus agallocha*, and the *aquilaria agallocha*, but of no *liliaceae*. The name *Adlerholz* ("eagle-wood") rests on a misunderstanding of the name of the *Agila* tree. It is called "*Paradiesholz*," because it must have been one of the paradise trees (*vid.* *Bereshith rabba* under Gen. ii. 8). Dioskorides says of this wood: θυμιάται ἀντὶ λιβανωτοῦ; the Song therefore places it along with myrrh and frankincense. That which is common to the lily-aloe and the wood-aloe, is the bitter taste of the juice of the former and of the resinous wood of the latter. The Arab. name of the aloe, *sabir*, is also given to the lily-aloe. The proverbs: *amarru min es-sabir*, bitterer than the aloe, and *es-sabr sabir*, patience is the aloe, refer to the aloe-juice.

the letter *ra* is exchanged for *lam*, to express the softness of the liquid), to flow, whence *syl* (*sél*), impetuous stream, rushing water, kindred in meaning to נָזִילִים. Streams which come from Lebanon have a rapid descent, and (so far as they do not arise in the snow region) the water is not only fresh, but clear as crystal. All these figures understood sensuously would be insipid; but understood ethically, they are exceedingly appropriate, and are easily interpreted, so that the conjecture is natural, that on the supposition of the spiritual interpretation of the Song, Jesus has this saying in His mind when He says that streams of living water shall flow "out of the belly" of the believer, John vii. 38.

The king's praise is for Shulamith proof of his love, which seeks a response. But as she is, she thinks herself yet unworthy of him; her modesty says to her that she needs preparation for him, preparation by that blowing which is the breath of God in the natural and in the spiritual world.

Ver. 16 Awake, thou North (wind), and come, thou South!

Blow through my garden, cause its spices to flow—

Let my beloved come into his garden,

And eat the fruits which are precious to him.

The names of the north and south, denoting not only the regions of the heavens, but also the winds blowing from these regions, are of the fem. gender, Isa. xliii. 6. The east wind, קָרִים, is purposely not mentioned; the idea of that which is destructive and adverse is connected with it (*vid.* under Job xxvii. 21). The north wind brings cold till ice is formed, Sir. xliii. 20; and if the south wind blow, it is hot, Luke xii. 55. If cold and heat, coolness and sultriness, interchange at the proper time, then growth is promoted. And if the wind blow through a garden at one time from this direction and at another from that,—not so violently as when it shakes the trees of the forest, but softly and yet as powerfully as a garden can bear it,—then all the fragrance of the garden rises in waves, and it becomes like a sea of incense. The garden itself then blows, *i.e.* emits odours; for פָּחַ = the Arab. *fakh*, *fah*, cf. *fawh*, pl. *afwāh*, sweet odours, fragrant plants) as in רוּחַ הַיּוֹם, Gen. iii. 8, the idea underlies the expression, that when it is evening the day itself blows, *i.e.* becomes cool, the causative הִפְיֵחַ, connected with the object-accus. of the garden, means to make the garden breezy and fragrant. נָזִיל is here used of the odours which, set free as it were from the plants, flow out, being carried forth by the waves of air. Shulamith wishes that in her all that is worthy of love should be fully realized. What had to be done for Esther (Esth. ii. 12) before she could be

brought in to the king, Shulamith calls on the winds to accomplish for her, which are, as it were, the breath of the life of all nature, and as such, of the life-spirit, which is the sustaining background of all created things. If she is thus prepared for him who loves her, and whom she loves, he shall come into his garden and enjoy the precious fruit belonging to him. With words of such gentle tenderness, childlike purity, she gives herself to her beloved.

She gives herself to him, and he has accepted her, and now celebrates the delight of possession and enjoyment.

Chap. v. 1 I am come into my garden, my sister-bride;  
Have plucked my myrrh with my balsam;  
Have eaten my honeycomb with my honey;  
Have drunk my wine with my milk—  
Eat, drink, and be drunken, ye friends!

If the exclamation of Solomon, 1a, is immediately connected with the words of Shulamith, iv. 16, then we must suppose that, influenced by these words, in which the ardour of love and humility express themselves, he thus in triumph exclaims, after he has embraced her in his arms as his own inalienable possession. But the exclamation denotes more than this. It supposes a union of love, such as is the conclusion of marriage following the betrothal, the God-ordained aim of sexual love within the limits fixed by morality. The poetic expression *לָנִי בָאָהִי אֵלַי* points to the *בוא אל*, used of the entrance of a man into the woman's chamber, to which the expression (Arab.) *dakhal bihā* (he went in with her), used of the introduction into the bride's chamber, is compared. The road by which Solomon reached this full and entire possession was not short, and especially for his longing it was a lengthened one. He now triumphs in the final enjoyment which his ardent desire had found. A pleasant enjoyment which is reached in the way and within the limits of the divine order, and which therefore leaves no bitter fruits of self-reproach, is pleasant even in the retrospect. His words, beginning with "I am come into my garden," breathe this pleasure in the retrospect. Ginsburg and others render incorrectly, "I am coming," which would require the words to have been *הִנֵּה אֲנִי בָא*. The series of perfects beginning with *בָּאָהִי* cannot be meant otherwise than retrospectively. The "garden" is Shulamith herself, iv. 12, in the fulness of her personal and spiritual attractions, iv. 16; cf. *פְּרִי*, i. 6. He may call her "my sister-bride;" the garden is then his by virtue of divine and human right, he has obtained possession of this garden, he has broken its costly rare flowers.

*אָרֶה* (in the Mishna dialect the word used of plucking figs) signifies

to pluck; the Aethiop. trans. *ararku karbé*, I have plucked myrrh; for the Aethiop. has *arara* instead of simply ארה. בִּשְׁמִי is here בִּשְׁמִי deflected. While בִּשְׁמִי, with its plur. *b'sāmim*, denotes fragrance in general, and only balsam specially, *bāsām* = (Arab.) *bashām* is the proper name of the balsam-tree (the Mecca balsam), *amyris opobalsamum*, which, according to Forskal, is indigenous in the central mountain region of Jemen (S. Arabia); it is also called (Arab.) *balsaman*; the word found its way in this enlarged form into the West, and then returned in the forms אֶפְרוֹסוֹמָא, אֶפְרוֹסוֹמָא, בִּלְסָמֹן (Syr. *afrusomo*), into the East. Balsam and other spices were brought in abundance to King Solomon as a present by the Queen of Sheba, 1 Kings x. 10; the celebrated balsam plantations of Jericho (*vid.* Winer's *Real-W.*), which continued to be productive till the Roman period, might owe their origin to the friendly relations which Solomon sustained to the south Arab. princess. Instead of the Indian aloe, iv. 14, the Jamanic balsam is here connected with myrrh as a figure of Shulamith's excellences. The plucking, eating, and drinking are only interchangeable figurative descriptions of the enjoyment of love.

"Honey and milk," says Solomon, iv. 11, "is under thy tongue." יֵצֵר is like יֵצֵרָה, 1 Sam. xiv. 27, the comb (*favus*) or cells containing the honey,—a designation which has perhaps been borrowed from porous lava.<sup>1</sup> With honey and milk "under the tongue" wine is connected, to which, and that of the noblest kind, vii. 10, Shulamith's palate is compared. Wine and milk together are οἰνόγαλα, which Chloe presents to Daphnis (Longus, i. 23). Solomon and his Song here hover on the pinnacle of full enjoyment; but if one understands his figurative language as it interprets itself, it here also expresses that delight of satisfaction which the author of Ps. xix. 6*a* transfers to the countenance of the rising sun, in words of a chaste purity which sexual love never abandons, in so far as it is connected with esteem for a beloved wife, and with the preservation of mutual personal dignity. For this very reason the words of Solomon, 1*a*, cannot be thought of as spoken to the guests. Between iv. 16 and v. 1*a* the bridal night intervenes. The words used in 1*a* are Solomon's morning salutation to her who has now wholly become his own. The call addressed to the guests at the feast is given forth on the second day of the marriage, which, according to ancient custom, Gen. xxix. 28, Judg. xiv. 12, was wont to be celebrated for seven days, Tob. xi. 18. The dramatical character of the Song leads to this result, that the pauses are passed over, the scenes are quickly changed, and the times appear to be continuous.

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Wetstein in the *Zeitsch. für allgem. Erdkunde*, 1859, p. 123.

The plur. דָּרִים Hengst. thinks always designates "love" (*Liebe*); thus, after Prov. vii. 28, also here: Eat, friends, drink and intoxicate yourselves in love. But the summons, *inebriamini amoribus*, has a meaning if regarded as directed by the guests to the married pair, but not as directed to the guests. And while we may say רוּה דָּרִים, yet not וְשָׂכַר דָּו, for *shakar* has always only the accus. of a spirituous liquor after it. Therefore none of the old translators (except only the Venet.: μεθύσθητε ἔρωσι) understood *dodim*, notwithstanding that elsewhere in the Song it means love, in another than a personal sense; דָּרִים and דָּו are here the plur. of the elsewhere parallels דָּר and דָּו, e.g. v. 16*b*, according to which also (cf. on the contrary, iv. 16*b*) they are accentuated. Those who are assembled are, as sympathizing friends, to participate in the pleasures of the feast. The Song of Songs has here reached its climax. A Paul would not hesitate, after Eph. v. 31 f., to extend the mystical interpretation even to this. Of the antitype of the marriage pair it is said: "For the marriage of the Lamb is come, and His wife hath made herself ready" (Rev. xix. 7); and of the antitype of the marriage guests: "Blessed are they which are called unto the marriage supper of the Lamb" (Rev. xix. 9).

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## FOURTH ACT.

LOVE DISDAINED BUT WON AGAIN.—CHAP. V. 2-VI. 9.

FIRST SCENE OF THE FOURTH ACT, V. 2-VI. 3.

In this fourth Act we are not now carried back to the time when Solomon's relation to Shulamith was first being formed. We are not placed here amid the scenes of their first love, but of those of their married life, and of their original ardour of affection maintaining itself not without trial. This is evident from the circumstance that in the first two Acts the beloved is addressed by the title רַעִי (my friend, beloved), and that the third Act rises<sup>1</sup> to the title כְּלָה (bride) and אַחְתִּי כְּלָה (my sister-bride); in the fourth Act, on the other hand, along with the title *ra'yaihi*, we hear no longer *calla*, nor *ahhothi*

<sup>1</sup> Among the Slovacs a bride is called *malducha*, "virgin-bride," before she has a cap placed on her head; and after that, *nevesta*, "bride-spouse." In England, *bride* does not designate the betrothed as such, but the betrothed when near her marriage.

*calla*, but simply *ahhothi*,<sup>1</sup>—a title of address which contributes to heighten the relation, to idealize it, and give it a mystical background. We have here presented to us pictures from the life of the lovers after their marriage has been solemnized. Shulamith, having reached the goal of her longing, has a dream like that which she had (iii. 1-4) before she reached that goal. But the dreams, however they resemble each other, are yet also different, as their issues show; in the former, she seeks him, and having found him holds him fast; here, she seeks him and finds him not. That that which is related belongs to the dream-life in ch. iii., was seen from the fact that it was inconceivable as happening in real life; here that which is related is expressly declared in the introductory words as having occurred in a dream.

Ver. 2 I sleep, but my heart keeps waking—  
 Hearken! my beloved is knocking:  
 Open to me, my sister, my love,  
 My dove, my perfect one;  
 For my head is filled with dew,  
 My locks (are) full of the drops of the night.

The partic. subst. clauses, *2a*, indicate the circumstances under which that which is related in *2b* occurred. In the principal sentence in hist. prose יִרְפֹּק would be used; here, in the dramatic vivacity of the description, is found in its stead the interject. *vocem* = *ausculta* with the gen. foll., and a word designating<sup>2</sup> state or condition added, thought of as accus. according to the Semitic syntax (like Gen. iv. 10; Jer. x. 22; cf. 1 Kings xiv. 6). To sleep while the heart wakes signifies to dream, for sleep and distinct consciousness cannot be co-existent; the movements of thought either remain in obscurity or are projected as dreams. עֵר = 'awir is formed from עָרָה, to be awake

<sup>1</sup> There is scarcely any other example of the husband calling his spouse "sister" than that found in Esth. v. 9 (Apocr.), where Ahasuerus says to Esther: "What is it, Esther? I am thy brother." Still more analogous are the words of Tob. vii. 12: "From this time forth thou art her brother, and she is thy sister;" but here the relation of affinity blends itself with the marriage relationship. In Lat. *soror* frequently denotes a lover, in contrast to *uxor*. But here in the Song *ahhothi calla* comes in the place of *callathi*, which is ambiguous ("my daughter-in-law").

<sup>2</sup> דֹּפֵק [is knocking] is not an attribute to the determinate דֹּרְרִי [my beloved] which it follows, but a designation of state or condition, and thus acc., as the Beirut translation renders it: "hear my beloved in the condition of one knocking." On the other hand, דֹּרְרִי דֹּפֵק signifies "a beloved one knocking." But "hear a beloved one knocking" would also be expressed acc. In classical language, the designation of state, if the subst. to which it belongs is indeterminate, is placed before it, e.g. "at the gate stood a beloved one knocking."

(in its root cogn. to the Aryan *gar*, of like import in *γρηγορεῖν*, *ἐγείρειν*), in the same way as *מָוִי* = *mauith* from *מָוִה*. The *ו* has here the conj. sense of "*diuēil*" (because), like *asher* in Eccles. vi. 12, viii. 15. The *ו* *dag.*, which occurs several times elsewhere (*vid.* under Prov. iii. 8, xiv. 10), is one of the inconsistencies of the system of punctuation, which in other instances does not double the *ו*; perhaps a relic of the Babylonian idiom, which was herein more accordant with the lingual nature of the *ו* than the Tiberian, which treated it as a semi-guttural. *מָוִי*, a lock of hair, from *מָוִי* = *מָוִי*, *abscidit*, follows in the formation of the idea, the analogy of *מָוִי*, in the sense of branch, from *מָוִי*, *desequit*; one so names a part which is removed without injury to the whole, and which presents itself conveniently for removal; cf. the oath sworn by Egyptian women, *lahajdt mukhūsi*, "by the life of my separated," i.e. "of my locks" (Lane, *Egypt*, etc., I. 38). The word still survives in the Talmud dialect. Of a beautiful young man who proposed to become a Nazarite, *Nedarim* 9a says the same as the *Jer. Horajoth* iii. 4 of a man who was a prostitute in Rome: his locks were arranged in separate masses, like heap upon heap; in *Bereshith rabba* c. lxx., under Gen. xxvii. 11, *מָוִי*, curly-haired, is placed over against *מָוִי*, bald-headed, and the Syr. also has *kausoto* as the designation of locks of hair,—a word used by the Peshito as the rendering of the Heb. *מָוִי*, as the Syro-Hexap. Job xvi. 12, the Greek *κόμη*. *מָוִי*, from *מָוִי* (מָוִי, to moisten, viz. the ground;

to squirt, viz. blood), is in Arabic drizzling rain, in Heb. dew; the drops of the night (*מָוִי*, from *מָוִי*, to sprinkle, to drizzle)<sup>1</sup> are just drops of dew, for the precipitation of the damp air assumes this form in nights which are not so cold as to become frosty. Shulamith thus dreams that her beloved seeks admission to her. He comes a long way and at night. In the most tender words he entreats for that which he expects without delay. He addresses her, "my sister," as one of equal rank with himself, and familiar as a sister with a brother; "my love" (*מָוִי*), as one freely chosen by him to intimate fellowship; "my dove," as beloved and prized by him on account of her purity, simplicity, and loveliness. The meaning of

<sup>1</sup> According to the primary idea: to break that which is solid or fluid into little pieces, wherefore *מָוִי* means also broken pieces. To this root appertains also the Arab. *rashh*, to trickle through, to sweat through, II. to moisten (e.g. the mouth of a suckling with milk), and the Aethiop. *rasēha*, to be stained. Drops scattered with a sprinkling brush the Arabs call *rashahāt*; in the mystical writings, *rashahāt el-uns* (dew-drops of intimacy) is the designation of sporadic gracious glances of the deity.

the fourth designation used by him, תַּמְתִּי, is shown by the Arab. *tam* to be "wholly devoted," whence *teim*, "one devoted" = a servant, and *mutajjam*, desperately in love with one. In addressing her תַּמְתִּי, he thus designates this love as wholly undivided, devoting itself without evasion and without reserve. But on this occasion this love did not approve itself, at least not at once.

Ver. 3 I have put off my dress,  
How shall I put it on again?  
I have washed my feet,  
How shall I defile them again?

She now lies unclothed in bed. כְּתֹנֶת is the χιτών worn next the body, from כְּתָן, linen (diff. from the Arab. *kuṭun*, cotton, whence French *coton*, calico = cotton-stuff). She had already washed her feet, from which it is supposed that she had throughout the day walked barefooted,—how (אֵיכָכָה, how? both times with the tone on the penult.;<sup>1</sup> cf. אֵיכָה, where? i. 7) should she again put on her dress, which she had already put off and laid aside (פָּשַׁט)? why should she soil (אֶטְנַפֵּם, relating to the fem. רַגְלִי, for אֶטְנִיָּן) again her feet, that had been washed clean? Shulamith is here brought back to the customs as well as to the home of her earlier rural life; but although she should thus have been enabled to reach a deeper and more lively consciousness of the grace of the king, who stoops to an equality with her, yet she does not meet his love with an equal requital. She is unwilling for his sake to put herself to trouble, or to do that which is disagreeable to her. It cannot be thought that such an interview actually took place; and yet what she here dreamed had not only inward reality, but also full reality. For in a dream, that which is natural to us or that which belongs to our very constitution becomes manifest, and much that is kept down during our waking hours by the power of the will, by a sense of propriety, and by the activities of life, comes to light during sleep; for fancy then stirs up the ground of our nature and brings it forth in dreams, and thus exposes us to ourselves in such a way as oftentimes, when we waken, to make us ashamed and alarmed. Thus it was with Shulamith. In the dream it was inwardly manifest that she had

<sup>1</sup> That it has the tone on the penult., like כִּכָּה, e.g., v. 9, is in conformity with the paragog. nature of ה. The tone, however, when the following word in close connection begins with א, goes to the ult., Esth. vii. 6. That this does not occur in 'אֵיכָה' אל, is explained from the circumstance that the word has the disjunctive *Tifcha*. But why not in 'אֵיכָה' אַת? I think it is for the sake of the rhythm. Pinsker, *Einkl.* p. 184, seeks to change the accentuation in order that the penult. accent might be on the second אֵיכָה, but that is not necessary. Cf. Ps. cxxxvii. 7.

lost her first love. She relates it with sorrow; for scarcely had she rejected him with these unworthy deceitful pretences when she comes to herself again.

Ver. 4 My beloved stretched his hand through the opening,  
And my heart was moved for him.

הָרַחֵק<sup>1</sup>, from the verb הָרַח, in the sense of to break through (R. חָר, whence also הָרַח, i. 10, and הָרַם, Arab. *kharam*, part. broken through, e.g. of a lattice-window), signifies *foramen*, a hole, also *caverna* (whence the name of the Troglodytes, הָרִי, and the Haurân, הָרִי), here the loophole in the door above (like *khawkht*, the little door for the admission of individuals in the street or house-door). It does not properly mean a window, but a part of the door pierced through at the upper part of the lock of the door (the door-bolt). מִן-הָחֹר is understood from the standpoint of one who is within; "by the opening from without to within," thus "through the opening;" stretching his hand through the door-opening as if to open the door, if possible, by the pressing back of the lock from within, he shows how greatly he longed after Shulamith. And she was again very deeply moved when she perceived this longing, which she had so coldly responded to: the interior of her body, with the organs which, after the bibl. idea, are the seat of the tenderest emotions, or rather, in which they reflect themselves, both such as are agreeable and such as are sorrowful, groaned within her,—an expression of deep sympathy so common, that "the sounding of the bowels," Isa. lxiii. 15, an expression used, and that anthropopathically of God Himself, is a direct designation of sympathy or inner participation. The phrase here wavers between עָלָי and עָלָיו (thus, e.g. Nissel, 1662). Both forms are admissible. It is true we say elsewhere only *naphshi 'ālāi, ruhi 'ālāi, libbi 'ālāi*, for the *Ego* distinguishes itself from its substance (cf. *System d. bibl. Psychologie*, p. 151 f.); *me'āi 'alāi*, instead of *bi* (בִּי), would, however, be also explained from this, that the bowels are meant, not anatomically, but as *psychical* organs. But the old translators (LXX., Targ., Syr., Jerome, Venet.) rendered עָלָיו, which rests on later ms. authority (*vid.* Norzi and de Rossi), and is also more appropriate: her bowels are stirred, viz. over him, i.e. on account of him (Alkabez: בְּעֵבְרִי). As she will now open to him, she is inwardly more ashamed, as he has come so full of love and longing to make her glad.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the Arab. *ghawr* (*ghôr*), as a sinking of the earth, and *khawr* (*khôr*), as a breaking through, and, as it were, a piercing. The mouth of a river is also called *khôr*, because there the sea breaks into the river.

Ver. 5 I arose to open to my beloved,  
 And my hands dropped with myrrh,  
 And my fingers with liquid myrrh,  
 On the handle of the bolt.

The personal pron. **אני** stands without emphasis before the verb which already contains it; the common language of the people delights in such particularity. The Book of Hosea, the Ephraimite prophet's work, is marked by such a style. **מור עֲבַר**, with which the parallel clause goes beyond the simple *mōr*, is myrrh flowing over, dropping out of itself, *i.e.* that which breaks through the bark of the *balsamodendron myrrha*, or which flows out if an incision is made in it; *myrrha stacte*, of which Pliny (xii. 35) says: *cui nulla praeferitur*, otherwise **מֵר דָּרֹר**, from **דָּרַר**, to gush out, to pour itself forth in rich jets. He has come perfumed as if for a festival, and the costly ointment which he brought with him has dropped on the handles of the bolts (**מִנְעִיל**, keeping locked, after the form **מִלְבָּשׁ**, drawing on), *viz.* the inner bolt, which he wished to withdraw. A classical parallel is found in Lucretius, iv. 1171:

“ *At lacrimans exclusus amator limina saepe  
 Floribus et sertis operit postesque superbos  
 Unguit amaracino* ” . . .

Böttch. here puts to Hitzig the question, “Did the shepherd, the peasant of Engedi, bring with him oil of myrrh?” Rejecting this reasonable explanation, he supposes that the Shulamitess, still in Solomon's care, on rising up quickly dipped her hand in the oil of myrrh, that she might refresh her beloved. She thus had it near her before her bed, as a sick person her decoction. The right answer was, that the visitant by night is not that imaginary personage, but it is Solomon. She had dreamed that he stood before her door and knocked. But finding no response, he again in a moment withdrew, when it was proved that Shulamith did not requite his love and come forth to meet it in its fulness as she ought.

Ver. 6 I opened to my beloved;  
 And my beloved had withdrawn, was gone:  
 My soul departed when he spake—  
 I sought him, and found him not;  
 I called him, and he answered me not.

As the disciples at Emmaus, when the Lord had vanished from the midst of them, said to one another: Did not our heart burn within us when He spake with us? so Shulamith says that when he spake, *i.e.* sought admission to her, she was filled with alarm, and almost terrified to death. Love-ecstasy (*ἐκστήναι*, as contrast to *γενέσθαι*

ἐν ἑαυτῷ) is not to be here understood, for in such a state she would have flown to meet him; but a sinking of the soul, such as is described by Terence (*And. I. 5. 16*):

“*Oratio haec me miseram exanimavit metu.*”

The voice of her beloved struck her heart; but in the consciousness that she had estranged herself from him, she could not openly meet him and offer empty excuses. But now she recognises it with sorrow that she had not replied to the deep impression of his loving words; and seeing him disappear without finding him, she calls after him whom she had slighted, but he answers her not. The words: “My soul departed when he spake,” are the reason why she now sought him and called upon him, and they are not a supplementary remark (Zöckl); nor is there need for the correction of the text בְּדַבְּרוֹ, which should mean: (my soul departed) when he turned his back (Ewald), or, behind him (Hitz., Bottch.), from דָּבַר = (Arab.) *daba a, tergum vertere, praeterire*,—the Heb. has the word דָּבַר, the hinder part, and as it appears, דָּבַר, to act from behind (treacherously) and destroy, 2 Chron. xxii. 10; cf. under Gen. xxxiv. 13, but not the *Kal* דָּבַר, in that Arab. signification. The meaning of הִסָּק has been hit upon by Aquila (ἐκλινεν), Symmachus (ἀπονεύσας), and Jerome (*declinaverat*); it signifies to turn aside, to take a different direction, as the *Hithpa.* Jer. xxxi. 22: to turn oneself away; cf. הִסָּקִים, turnings, bendings, vii. 2. הִסָּק and אָסָק (cf. Gen. xxxii. 25), Aethiop. *hakafa*, Amhar. *akafa* (reminding us of חָפַץ, *Hiph.* חָפַץ), are usually compared; all of these, however, signify to “encompass;” but הִסָּק does not denote a moving in a circle after something, but a half circular motion away from something; so that in the Arab. the prevailing reference to fools, *aḥamk*, does not appear to proceed from the idea of closeness, but of the oblique direction, pushed sideways. Turning himself away, he proceeded farther. In vain she sought him; she called without receiving any answer. עָנִי is the correct pausal form of עָנִי, *vid.* under Ps. cxviii. 5. But something worse than even this seeking and calling in vain happened to her.

Ver. 7 The watchmen who go about in the city found me,  
They beat me, wounded me;  
My upper garment took away from me,  
The watchmen of the walls.

She sought her beloved, not “in the *midbar*” (open field), nor “in the *kepharim*” (villages), but בְּעִיר, “in the city,”—a circumstance which is fatal to the shepherd-hypothesis here, as in the other dream. There in the city she is found by the watchmen who patrol the city,

and have their proper posts on the walls to watch those who approach the city and depart from it (cf. Isa. lxii. 6). These rough, regardless men,—her story returns at the close like a palindrome to those previously named,—who judge only according to that which is external, and have neither an eye nor a heart for the sorrow of a loving soul, struck (נָכָה, from נָכָה, to pierce, hit, strike) and wounded (פָּצַע, R. פָּצַע, to divide, to inflict wounds in the flesh) the royal spouse as a common woman, and so treated her, that, in order to escape being made a prisoner, she was constrained to leave her upper robe in their hands (Gen. xxxix. 12). This upper robe, not the veil which at iv. 1, 3 we found was called *tsammā*, is called רִדְדִי. Aben Ezra compares with it the Arab. *ridā*, a plaid-like over-garment, which was thrown over the shoulders and veiled the upper parts of the body. But the words have not the same derivation. The *ridā* has its name from its reaching downward,—probably from the circumstance that, originally, it hung down to the feet, so that one could tread on it; but the (Heb.) *r'did* (in Syr. the *dalmatica* of the deacons), from רִדְדִי, *Hiph.*, 1 Kings vi. 32, Targ., Talm., Syr., רִדְדִי, to make broad and thin, as *expansum*, i.e. a thin and light upper robe, viz. over the *cuttonēth*, 3a. The LXX. suitably translates it here and at Gen. xxiv. 65 (*hatstsäiph*, from *tsa'aph*, to lay together, to fold, to make double or many-fold) by *θέριστρον*, a summer over-dress. A modern painter, who represents Shulamith as stripped naked by the watchmen, follows his own sensual taste, without being able to distinguish between *tunica* and *pallium*; for neither Luther, who renders by *schleier* (veil), nor Jerome, who has *pallium* (cf. the saying of Plautus: *tunica propior pallio est*), gives any countenance to such a freak of imagination. The city watchmen tore from off her the upper garment, without knowing and without caring to know what might be the motive and the aim of this her nocturnal walk.

All this Shulamith dreamed; but the painful feeling of repentance, of separation and misapprehension, which the dream left behind, entered as deeply into her soul as if it had been an actual external experience. Therefore she besought the daughters of Jerusalem:

Ver. 8 I adjure you, ye daughters of Jerusalem,  
If ye find my beloved,—  
What shall ye then say to him?  
“That I am sick of love.”

That ׀ is here not to be interpreted as the negative particle of

adjuration (Böttch.), as at ii. 7, iii. 5, at once appears from the absurdity arising from such an interpretation. The *or. directa*, following "I adjure you," can also begin (Num. v. 19 f.) with the usual  $\text{אֲשָׁר}$ , which is followed by its conclusion. Instead of "that ye say to him I am sick of love," she asks the question: What shall ye say to him? and adds the answer: *quod aegra sum amore*, or, as Jerome rightly renders, in conformity with the root-idea of  $\text{אהל}$ : *quia amore languo*; while, on the other hand, the LXX.:  $\delta\tau\iota\ \tau\epsilon\tau\rho\omega\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta$  (*saucia*)  $\alpha\gamma\acute{\alpha}\pi\eta\varsigma\ \epsilon\gamma\acute{\omega}\ \epsilon\iota\mu\iota$ , as if the word were  $\text{תללל}$ , from  $\text{ללל}$ . The question proposed, with its answer, inculcates in a naive manner that which is to be said, as one examines beforehand a child who has to order something. She turns to the daughters of Jerusalem, because she can presuppose in them, in contrast with those cruel watchmen, a sympathy with her love-sorrow, on the ground of their having had similar experiences. They were also witnesses of the origin of this covenant of love, and graced the marriage festival by their sympathetic love. When, therefore, they put to her the question:

Ver. 9 What is thy beloved before another (beloved),  
 Thou fairest of women?  
 What is thy beloved before another (beloved),  
 That thou dost adjure us thus?

the question thus asked cannot proceed from ignorance; it can only have the object of giving them the opportunity of hearing from Shulamith's own mouth and heart her laudatory description of him, whom they also loved, although they were not deemed worthy to stand so near to him as she did who was thus questioned. Böttch. and Ewald, secs. 325a, 326a, interpret the  $\text{כִּדּוּר}$  in  $\text{כִּדּוּר}$  partitively: *quid amati* (as in Cicero: *quod hominis*) *amatus tuus*; but then the words would have been  $\text{מִהַרְדוּר רֹדֵךְ}$ , if such a phrase were admissible; for  $\text{מִהַרְדוּר}$  certainly of itself alone means *quid amati*, what kind of a beloved. Thus the  $\text{כִּדּוּר}$  is the comparative (*prae amato*), and  $\text{רֹדֵךְ}$  the sing., representing the idea of species or kind;  $\text{כִּדּוּרִים}$ , here easily misunderstood, is purposely avoided. The use of the form  $\text{הַשְׁבַּעְתִּי$  for  $\text{הַשְׁבַּעְתָּ$  is one of the many instances of the disregard of the generic distinction occurring in this Song, which purposely, after the manner of the vulgar language, ignores pedantic regularity.

Hereupon Shulamith describes to them who ask what her beloved is. He is the fairest of men. Everything that is glorious in the kingdom of nature, and, so far as her look extends, everything in the sphere of art, she appropriates, so as to present a picture of his external appearance. Whatever is precious, lovely, and grand, is

all combined in the living beauty of his person.<sup>1</sup> She first praises the mingling of colours in the countenance of her beloved.

Ver. 10 My beloved is dazzlingly white and ruddy,  
Distinguished above ten thousand.

The verbal root צה has the primary idea of purity, *i.e.* freedom from disturbance and muddiness, which, in the stems springing from it, and in their manifold uses, is transferred to undisturbed health (Arab. *ṣaḥḥ*, cf. *baria*, of smoothness of the skin), a temperate stomach and clear head, but particularly to the clearness and sunny brightness of the heavens, to dazzling whiteness (חצץ, Lam. iv. 7; cf. צר), and then to parched dryness, resulting from the intense and continued rays of the sun; צה is here adj. from חצץ, Lam. iv. 7, bearing almost the same relation to לבן as λαμπρός to λευκός, cogn. with *lucere*. אדום, R. דם, to condense, is properly dark-red, called by the Turks *kuju kirmesi* (from *kuju*, thick, close, dark), by the French *rouge foncé*, of the same root as דם, the name for blood, or a thick and dark fluid. White, and indeed a dazzling white, is the colour of his flesh, and redness, deep redness, the colour of his blood tinging his flesh. Whiteness among all the race-colours is the one which best accords with the dignity of man; pure delicate whiteness is among the Caucasian races a mark of high rank, of superior training, of hereditary nobility; wherefore, Lam. iv. 7, the appearance of the nobles of Jerusalem is likened in whiteness to snow and milk, in redness to corals; and Homer, *Il.* iv. 141, says of Menelaus that he appeared stained with gore, “as when some woman tinges ivory with purple colour.” In this mingling of white and red, this fulness of life and beauty, he is דגול, distinguished above myriads. The old translators render *dagul* by “chosen” (Aquila, Symm., Syr., Jerome, Luther), the LXX. by ἐκλελογισμένος, *e cohorte selectus*; but it means “bannered” (*degel*, ii. 4), as the Venet.: σεσημαιωμένος, *i.e.* thus distinguished, as that which is furnished with a *degel*, a banner, a pennon. Grätz takes *dagul* as the Greek σημαιωτός (noted). With דגל, as a designation of an inconceivable number, Rashi rightly compares Ezek. xvi. 7. Since the “ten thousand” are here thought of, not in the same manner as דגלים, the particle *min* is not the compar. *magis quam*, but, as at Gen. iii. 14, Judg. v. 24, Isa. lii. 14, *prae*, making conspicuous (cf. Virgil, *Aen.* v. 435, *prae omnibus*

<sup>1</sup> Hengstenberg finds in this eulogium, on the supposition that Solomon is the author, and is the person who is here described, incomprehensible self-praise. But he does not certainly say all this immediately of himself, but puts it into the mouth of Shulamith, whose love he gained. But love idealizes; she sees him whom she loves, not as others see him,—she sees him in her own transforming light.

*unum*). After this praise of the bright blooming countenance, which in general distinguished the personal appearance of her beloved, so far as it was directly visible, there now follows a detailed description, beginning with his head.

Ver. 11 His head is precious fine gold,  
His locks bill upon bill,  
Black as the raven.

The word-connection **כְּתָמָא**, occurring only here, serves as a designation of the very finest pure gold; for **כְּתָמָא** (hiding, then that which is hidden), from **כָּתַם**, R. **כַּת** (*vid.* concerning the words appertaining to this root, under Ps. lxxxvii. 6), is the name of fine gold, which was guarded as a jewel (cf. Prov. xxv. 12), and **אֶזְרָא** (with long *ā*) is pure gold freed from inferior metals, from **אָזַר**, to set free, and generally violently to free (cf. *zahav muphaz*, 1 Kings x. 18, with *zahav tahor*, 2 Chron. ix. 17). The Targ. to the Hagiog. translate **אֶזְרָא** by **אֶזְרָא** (e.g. Ps. cxix. 127), or **אֶזְרָא** (e.g. Ps. xix. 11), *ᾠδρυζον*, i.e. gold which has stood the fire-proof (*obruissa*) of the cupel or the crucible. Grammatically regarded, the word-connection *kethem paz* is not genit., like *kethem ophir*, but appositional, like *naarah v'thulah*, Deut. xxii. 28, *z'vaim sh'lamim*, Ex. xxiv. 5, etc. The point of comparison is the imposing nobility of the fine form and noble carriage of his head. In the description of the locks of his hair the LXX. render **תְּלָלִים** by *ἐλάται*, Jerome by *sicut elatae palmarum*, like the young twigs, the young shoots of the palm. Ewald regards it as a harder parall. form of **תְּלָלִים**, Isa. xviii. 15, vine-branches; and Hitzig compares the *Thousand and One Nights*, iii. 180, where the loose hair of a maiden is likened to twisted clusters of grapes. The possibility of this meaning is indisputable, although (Arab.) *taltalat*, a drinking-vessel made of the inner bark of palm-branches, is named, not from *taltalah*, as the name of the palm-branch, but from *taltala*, to shake down, viz. in the throat. The palm-branch, or the vine-branch, would be named from **תְּלָלִים**, *pendulum esse*, to hang loosely and with a wavering motion, the freq. of **תָּלָה**, *pendere*. The Syr. also think on **תָּלָה**, for it translates "spread out," i.e. waving downward; and the Venet., which translates by *ἀπαιωρήματα*. The point of comparison would be the freshness and flexibility of the abundant long hair of the head, in contrast to motionless close-lying smoothness. One may think of Jupiter, who, when he shakes his head, moves heaven and earth. But, as against this, we have the fact: (1) That the language has other names for palm-branches and vine-branches; the former are called in the Song vii. 9, *sansinnim*. (2) That **תְּלָלִים**, immediately referred to the hair, but not in the sense of "hanging locks" (Böttch.),

is still in use in the post-bibl. Heb. (*vid.* under v. 2b); the Targ. also, in translating *דְּגִירִין דְּגִירִין*, *cumuli cumuli*, thinks תַּלְתִּים = תֵּלִין תֵּלִין, *Menachoth* 29b. A hill is called תֵּל, (Arab.) *tall*, from תָּלַל, *prosternere*, to throw along, as of earth thrown out, sand, or rubbish; and תֵּלְתַל, after the form נִלְנַל, in use probably only in the plur., is a hilly country which rises like steps, or presents an undulating appearance. Seen from his neck upwards, his hair forms in undulating lines, hill upon hill. In colour, these locks of hair are black as a raven, which bears the Semitic name עֹרֵב from its blackness (עָרֵב), but in India is called *kārava* from its croaking. The raven-blackness of the hair contrasts with the whiteness and redness of the countenance, which shines forth as from a dark ground, from a black border. The eyes are next described.

Ver. 12 His eyes like doves by the water-brooks,  
Bathing in milk, stones beautifully set

The eyes in their glancing moistness (cf. ὑγρότης τῶν ὀμμάτων, in Plutarch, of a languishing look), and in the movement of their pupils, are like doves which sip at the water-brooks, and move to and fro beside them. פִּיפִּי, from פָּפַץ, *continere*, is a watercourse, and then also the water itself flowing in it (*vid.* under Ps. xviii. 16), as (Arab.) *wadin*, a valley, and then the river flowing in the valley, *bahr*, the sea-basin (properly the cleft), and then also the sea itself. The pred. "bathing" refers to the eyes (cf. iv. 9), not to the doves, if this figure is continued. The pupils of the eyes, thus compared with doves, seem as if bathing in milk, in that they swim, as it were, in the white in the eye. But it is a question whether the figure of the doves is continued also in יִשְׁבוֹת עַל-מִלְּאָת. It would be the case if *milleth* meant "fulness of water," as it is understood, after the example of the LXX., also by Aquila (ἐκχύσεις), Jerome (*fluenta plenissima*), and the Arab. (*piscinas aqua refertas*); among the moderns, by Döpke, Gesen., Hengst., and others. But this pred. would then bring nothing new to 12a; and although in the Syr. derivatives from ܡܠܬܐ signify flood and high waters, yet the form *milleth* does not

seem, especially without מִים, to be capable of bearing this signification. Luther's translation also, although in substance correct: *vnd stehen in der fülle* (and stand in fulness) (*milleth*, like מִלְּמִתָּא of the Syr., πληρώσεως of the Gr. Venet., still defended by Hitz.), yet does not bring out the full force of *milleth*, which, after the analogy of כֶּפֶס, רֶצֶף, appears to have a concrete signification which is seen from a comparison of Ex. xxv. 7, xxvii. 17, 20, xxxix. 13. There מִלְּאָת and מִלְּאִים signify not the border with precious stones, but, as

rightly maintained by Keil, against Knobel, their filling in, *i.e.* their bordering, setting. Accordingly, *milleth* will be a synon. technical expression: the description, passing from the figure of the dove, says further of the eyes, that they are firm on (in) their setting; *לע* is suitable, for the precious stone is laid within the casket in which it is contained. Hitzig has, on the contrary, objected that *מלל* and *מלל* denote filling up, and thus that *milleth* cannot be a filling up, and still less the place thereof. But as in the Talm. *מלל* signifies not only fulness, but also stuffed fowls or pies, and as *πλήρωμα* in its manifold aspects is used not only of that with which anything is filled, but also of that which is filled (*e.g.* of a ship that is manned, and Eph. i. 23 of the church in which Christ, as in His body, is immanent),—thus also *milleth*, like the German "*Fassung*," may be used of a ring-casket (*funda* or *pala*) in which the precious stone is put. That the eyes are like a precious stone in its casket, does not merely signify that they fill the sockets,—for the *bulbus* of the eye in every one fills the *orbita*,—but that they are not sunk like the eyes of one who is sick, which fall back on their supporting edges in the *orbita*, and that they appear full and large as they press forward from wide and open eyelids. The cheeks are next described.

Ver. 13a His cheeks like a bed of sweet herbs,  
Towers of spicy plants.

A flower-bed is called *מגדל*, from *גדל*, to be oblique, inclined. His cheeks are like such a soft raised bed, and the impression their appearance makes is like the fragrance which flows from such a bed planted with sweet-scented flowers. *Migdaloth* are the tower-like or pyramidal mounds, and *merkahhim* are the plants used in spicery. The point of comparison here is thus the soft elevation; perhaps with reference to the mingling of colours, but the word chosen (*merkahhim*) rather refers to the lovely, attractive, heart-refreshing character of the impression. The Venet., keeping close to the existing text: *αἱ σιαγόνες αὐτοῦ ὡς πρασιὰ τοῦ ἀρώματος, πύργοι ἀρωματισμῶν* (thus (not *ἀρωματιστῶν*) according to Gebhardt's just conjecture). But is the punctuation here correct? The sing. *מגדל* is explained from this, that the bed is presented as sloping from its height downward on two parallel sides; but the height would then be the nose dividing the face, and the plur. would thus be more suitable; and the LXX., Symm., and other ancient translators have, in fact, read *מגדל*. But still less is the phrase *migd'loth merkahhim* to be comprehended; for a tower, however diminutive it may be, is not a proper figure for a soft elevation, nor even a graduated flowery walk, or a terraced flowery hill,—a tower always

presents, however round one may conceive it, too much the idea of a natural chubbiness, or of a diseased tumour. Therefore the expression used by the LXX., *φύουσαι μυρεψικά*, i.e. 'מְגִדְלוֹת מֵרֶק', commends itself. Thus also Jerome: *sicut areolae aromatum consitae a pigmentariis*, and the Targ. (which refers לְהַיִּים allegorically to the לִיָּהּ of the law, and *merkahhim* to the refinements of the Halacha): "like the rows of a garden of aromatic plants which produce (*gignentes*) deep, penetrating sciences, even as a (magnificent) garden, aromatic plants." Since we read כְּעֵרוֹת מְגִדְלוֹת, we do not refer *migadloth*, as Hitzig, who retains כְּעֵרוֹת, to the cheeks, although their name, like that of the other members (e.g. the ear, hand, foot), may be fem. (Böttch. § 649), but to the beds of spices; but in this carrying forward of the figure we find, as he does, a reference to the beard and down on the cheeks. מְגִדְלוֹת is used of suffering the hair to grow, Num. vi. 5, as well as of cultivating plants; and it is a similar figure when Pindar, *Nem.* v. 11, compares the milk-hair of a young man to the fine woolly down of the expanding vine-leaves (*vid.* Passow). In *merkahhim* there scarcely lies anything further than that this *flos juventae* on the blooming cheeks gives the impression of the young shoots of aromatic plants; at all events, the *merkahhim*, even although we refer this feature in the figure to the fragrance of the unguents on the beard, are not the perfumes themselves, to which *m'gadloth* is not appropriate, but fragrant plants, so that in the first instance the growth of the beard is in view with the impression of its natural beauty.

Ver. 13b His lips lilies,  
Dropping with liquid myrrh.

Lilies, viz. red lilies (*vid.* under ii. 1), unless the point of comparison is merely loveliness associated with dignity. She thinks of the lips as speaking. All that comes forth from them, the breath in itself, and the breath formed into words, is מוֹר עֵינַר, most precious myrrh, viz. such as of itself wells forth from the bark of the *balsamodendron*. עֵינַר, the running over of the eyes (cf. *myrrha in lacrimis*, the most highly esteemed sort, as distinguished from *myrrha in granis*), with which Dillmann combines the Aethiop. name for myrrh, *karbé* (*vid.* under v. 5).

Ver. 14a His hands golden cylinders,  
Filled in with stones of Tarshish.

The figure, according to Gesen., *Heb. Wörterbuch*, and literally also Heilgst., is derived from the closed hand, and the stained nails are compared to precious stones. Both statements are incorrect; for (1) although it is true that then Israelitish women, as at the present day Egyptian and Arabian women, stained their eyes with *stibium* (*vid.*

under Isa. liv. 11), yet it is nowhere shown that they, and particularly men, stained the nails of their feet and their toes with the orange-yellow of the Alhenna (Lane's *Egypt*, I. 33-35); and (2) the word used is not יָפֵפִי, but יָדָי; it is thus the outstretched hands that are meant; and only these, not the closed fist, could be compared to "lilies," for לֵלִי signifies not a ring (Cocc., Döpke, Böttch., etc.), but that which is rolled up, a roller, cylinder (Esth. i. 6), from לָלַי, which properly means not κυκλοῦν (Venet., after Gebhardt: *κεκυλωμένοι*), but κυλίνδειν. The hands thus are meant in respect of the fingers, which on account of their noble and fine form, their full, round, fleshy mould, are compared to bars of gold formed like rollers, garnished (יָפֵפִי, like יָדָי, Ex. xxviii. 17) with stones of Tarshish, to which the nails are likened. The transparent horn-plates of the nails, with the *lunula*, the white segment of a circle at their roots, are certainly, when they are beautiful, an ornament to the hand, and, without our needing to think of their being stained, are worthily compared to the gold-yellow topaz. *Tarshish* is not the onyx, which derives its Heb. name טָרְשִׁישׁ from its likeness to the finger-nail, but the χρυσόλιθος, by which the word in this passage before us is translated by the Quinta and the Sexta, and elsewhere also by the LXX. and Aquila. But the chrysolite is the precious stone which is now called the topaz. It receives the name *Tarshish* from Spain, the place where it was found. Pliny, xxxviii. 42, describes it as *aureo fulgore translucens*. Bredow erroneously interprets *Tarshish* of amber. There is a kind of chrysolite, indeed, which is called *chryselectron*, because *in colorem electri declinans*. The comparison of the nails to such a precious stone (Luther, influenced by the consonance, and apparently warranted by the *plena hyacinthis* of the Vulg., has substituted golden rings, *vol Türkissen*, whose blue-green colour is not suitable here), in spite of Hengst., who finds it insipid, is as true to nature as it is tender and pleasing. The description now proceeds from the uncovered to the covered parts of his body, the whiteness of which is compared to ivory and marble.

Ver. 14b His body an ivory work of art,  
Covered with sapphires.

The plur. כַּיָּמִים or כַּיָּמִים, from כַּמֶּה or כַּמֶּה (*vid.* under Ps. xl. 9), signifies properly the tender parts, and that the inward parts of the body, but is here, like the Chald. כַּיָּמִים, Dan. ii. 32, and the כַּיָּמִים, vii. 3, which also properly signifies the inner part of the body, κοιλία, transferred to the body in its outward appearance. To the question how Shulamith should in such a manner praise that which is for the most part covered with clothing, it is not only to be answered

that it is the poet who speaks by her mouth, but also that it is not the bride or the beloved, but the wife, whom he represents as thus speaking. עֲשֵׂה (from the peculiar Hebraeo-Chald. and Targ. עֲשֵׂה, which, after Jer. v. 28, like *khalak*, *create*, appears to proceed from the fundamental idea of smoothing) designates an artistic figure. Such a figure was Solomon's throne, made of שֵׁן, the teeth of elephants, ivory,<sup>1</sup> 1 Kings x. 18. Here Solomon's own person, without reference to a definite admired work of art, is praised as being like an artistic figure made of ivory, — like it in regard to its glancing smoothness and its fine symmetrical form. When, now, this work of art is described as covered with sapphires (סַפִּירִים, referred to עֲשֵׂה, as apparently gramm., or as ideal, fem.), a sapphire-coloured robe is not meant (Hitzig, Ginsburg); for עֲלָה, which only means to disguise, would not at all be used of such a robe (Gen. xxxviii. 14; cf. xxiv. 65), nor would the one uniform colour of the robe be designated by sapphires in the plur. The choice of the verb עֲלָה (elsewhere used of veiling) indicates a covering shading the pure white, and in connection with סַפִּירִים, thought of as accus., a moderating of the bright glance by a soft blue. For סַפִּיר (a genuine Semit. word, like the Chald. שִׁפִּיר; cf. regarding סַפִּיר = שִׁפִּיר, under Ps. xvi. 6) is the sky-blue sapphire (Ex. xxiv. 10), including the *Lasurstein* (*lapis lazuli*), sprinkled with golden, or rather with gold-like glistening points of pyrites, from which, with the *l* omitted, sky-blue is called *azur* (azure) (*vid.* under Job xxviii. 6). The work of art formed of ivory is quite covered over with sapphires fixed in it. That which is here compared is nothing else than the branching blue veins under the white skin.

Ver. 15a His legs white marble columns,  
Set on bases of fine gold.

If the beauty of the living must be represented, not by colours, but in figurative language, this cannot otherwise be done than by the selection of minerals, plants, and things in general for the comparison, and the comparison must more or less come short, because dead soulless matter does not reach to a just and full representation of the living. Thus here, also, the description of the lower extremity, which reaches from the thighs and the legs down to the feet, of which last, in the words of an anatomist,<sup>2</sup> it may be said that "they form the pedestal for the bony pillars of the legs." The comparison is thus in accordance with fact; the שִׁקִּים (from שִׁק = (Arab.) *sak*, to

<sup>1</sup> Ivory is fully designated by the name שִׁנֵּי־בַּיִם, Lat. *ebur*, from the Aegypt. *ebu*, the Aegyptio-Indian *ibha*, elephant.

<sup>2</sup> Hyrtl's *Lehrbuch der Anat. des Menschen*, sec. 155.

drive: the movers forward), in the structure of the human frame, take in reality the place of "pillars," and the feet the place of "pedestals," as in the tabernacle the wooden pillars rested on small supports in which they were fastened, Ex. xxvi. 18 f. But in point of fidelity to nature, the symbol is inferior to a rigid Egyptian figure. Not only is it without life; it is not even capable of expressing the curvilinear shape which belongs to the living. On the other hand, it loses itself in symbol; for although it is in conformity with nature that the legs are compared to pillars of white (according to Aquila and Theod., Parian) marble,—עָשׂוֹ = עֲשֻׁוֹ, 1 Chron. xxix. 2 (material for the building of the temple), Talm. אֶרֶבָּרָא, of the same verbal root as עֲשֻׁוֹ, the name of the white lily,—the comparison of the feet to bases of fine gold is yet purely symbolical. Gold is a figure of that which is sublime and noble, and with white marble represents greatness combined with purity. He who is here praised is not a shepherd, but a king. The comparisons are thus so grand because the beauty of the beloved is in itself heightened by his kingly dignity.<sup>1</sup>

Ver. 15. His aspect like Lebanon,  
Distinguished as the cedars.

By צִיּוֹן the Chald. thinks of "a young man" (from צָוָה = בָּנָה, to be matured, as at Ps. lxxxix. 20); but in that case we should have expected the word צִיּוֹן instead of צִיּוֹן. Luther, with all other translators, rightly renders "chosen as the cedars." His look, *i.e.* his appearance as a whole, is awe-inspiring, majestic, like Lebanon, the king of mountains; he (the praised one) is chosen, *i.e.* presents a rare aspect, rising high above the common man, like the cedars, those kings among trees, which as special witnesses of creative omnipotence are called "cedars of God," Ps. lxxx. 11 [10]. צִיּוֹן, *electus*, everywhere else an attribute of persons, does not here refer to the look, but to him whose the look is; and what it means in union with the cedars is seen from Jer. xxii. 7; cf. Isa. xxxvii. 24. Here also it is seen (what besides is manifest), that the fairest of the children of men is a king. In conclusion, the description returns from elevation of rank to loveliness.

<sup>1</sup> Dillmann proposes the question, the answer to which he desiderates in Ewald, how the maiden could be so fluent in speaking of the new glories of the Solomonic era (plants and productions of art). Böttcher answers, that she had learned to know these whilst detained at court, and that the whole description has this ground-thought, that she possessed in her beloved all the splendour which the women of the harem value and enjoy. But already the first words of the description, "white and ruddy," exclude the sunburnt shepherd. To refer the gold, in the figurative description of the uncovered parts of the body, to this bronze colour is insipid.

Ver. 16a His palate is sweets [sweetnesses],  
And he is altogether precious [lovelinesses].

The palate, פֶּה, is frequently named as the organ of speech, Job vi. 30, xxxi. 30, Prov. v. 3, viii. 7; and it is also here used in this sense. The meaning, "the mouth for kissing," which Böttch. gives to the word, is fanciful; פֶּה (= *hink*, Arab. *hanak*) is the inner palate and the region of the throat, with the *uvula* underneath the chin. Partly with reference to his words, his lips have been already praised, 13b; but there the fragrance of his breath came into consideration, his breath both in itself and as serving for the formation of articulate words. But the naming of the palate can point to nothing else than his words. With this the description comes to a conclusion; for, from the speech, the most distinct and immediate expression of the personality, advance is made finally to the praise of the person. The *pluraliatant*. מִמְתָּקִים and מִמְּדִבִּים designate what they mention in richest fulness. His palate, i.e. that which he speaks and the manner in which he speaks it, is true sweetness (cf. Prov. xvi. 21; Ps. lv. 15), and his whole being true loveliness. With justifiable pride Shulamith next says:

Ver. 16b This is my beloved and this my friend,  
Ye daughters of Jerusalem!

The emphatically repeated "this" is here pred. (Luth.: "such an one is" . . .); on the other hand, it is subj. at Ex. iii. 15 (Luth.: "that is" . . .).

The daughters of Jerusalem now offer to seek along with Shulamith for her beloved, who had turned away and was gone.

Chap. vi. 1. Whither has thy beloved gone,  
Thou fairest of women?  
Whither has thy beloved turned,  
That we may seek him with thee?

The longing remains with her even after she has wakened, as the after effect of her dream. In the morning she goes forth and meets with the daughters of Jerusalem. They cause Shulamith to describe her friend, and they ask whither he has gone. They wish to know the direction in which he disappeared from her, the way which he had probably taken (פָּנָה, R. פָּן, to drive, to urge forward, to turn from one to another), that with her they might go to seek him (*Vav* of the consequence or the object, as at Ps. lxxxiii. 17). The answer she gives proceeds on a conclusion which she draws from the inclination of her beloved.

Ver. 2 My beloved has gone down into the garden,  
 To the beds of sweet herbs,  
 To feed in the gardens  
 And gather lilies.

He is certainly, she means to say, there to be found where he delights most to tarry. He will have gone down—viz. from the palace (vi. 11; cf. 1 Kings xx. 43 and Esth. vii. 7)—into his garden, to the fragrant beds, there to feed in his garden and gather lilies (cf. Old Germ. “to collect *rôsen*”); he is fond of gardens and flowers. Shulamith expresses this in her shepherd-dialect, as when Jesus says of His Father (John xv. 1), “He is the husbandman.” Flower-beds are the feeding place (*vid.* regarding לְרֵעוֹת under ii. 16) of her beloved. Solomon certainly took great delight in gardens and parks, Eccles. ii. 5. But this historical fact is here idealized; the natural flora which Solomon delighted in with intelligent interest presents itself as a figure of a higher Loveliness which was therein as it were typically manifest (cf. Rev. vii. 17, where the “Lamb,” “feeding,” and “fountains of water,” are applied as anagogics, *i.e.* heavenward-pointing types). Otherwise it is not to be comprehended why it is lilies that are named. Even if it were supposed to be implied that lilies were Solomon’s favourite flowers, we must assume that his taste was determined by something more than by form and colour. The words of Shulamith give us to understand that the inclination and the favourite resort of her friend corresponded to his nature, which is altogether thoughtfulness and depth of feeling (cf. under Ps. xcii. 5, the reference to Dante: the beautiful women who gather flowers representing the paradisaical life); lilies, the emblems of unapproachable grandeur, purity inspiring reverence, high elevation above that which is common, bloom there wherever the lily-like one wanders, whom the lily of the valley calls her own. With the words:

Ver. 3 I am my beloved’s, and my beloved is mine,  
 Who feeds among the lilies,

Shulamith farther proceeds, followed by the daughters of Jerusalem, to seek her friend lost through her own fault. She always says, not אִישִׁי, but יְדִי and יָדַי; for love, although a passion common to mind and body, is in this Song of Songs viewed as much as possible apart from its basis in the animal nature. Also, that the description hovers between that of the clothed and the unclothed, gives to it an ideality favourable to the mystical interpretation. Nakedness is עֲרוּהָ. But at the cross nakedness appears transported from the sphere of sense to that of the supersensuous.

## SECOND SCENE OF THE FOURTH ACT, VI. 4-9.

With ver. 4 Solomon's address is resumed, and a new scene opens. Shulamith had found him again, and she who is beautiful in herself appears now so much the more beautiful, when the joy of seeing him again irradiates her whole being.

Ver. 4 Beautiful art thou, my friend, as Tirzah,  
Comely as Jerusalem,  
Terrible as a battle-array.

In the praise of her beauty we hear the voice of the king. The cities which are the highest ornament of his kingdom serve him as the measure of her beauty, which is designated according to the root conceptions by *יָפָה*, after the quality of completeness; by *נְאוֹמָה*, after the quality of that which is well-becoming, pleasing. It is concluded, from the prominence given to Tirzah, that the Song was not composed till after the division of the kingdom, and that its author was an inhabitant of the northern kingdom; for Tirzah was the first royal city of this kingdom till the time of Omri, the founder of Samaria. But since, at all events, it is Solomon who here speaks, so great an historical judgment ought surely to be ascribed to a later poet who has imagined himself in the exact position of Solomon, that he would not represent the king of the undivided Israel as speaking like a king of the separate kingdom of Israel. The prominence given to Tirzah has another reason. Tirzah was discovered by Robinson on his second journey, 1852, in which Van de Velde accompanied him, on a height in the mountain range to the north of Nablûs, under the name *Tullûzah*. Brocardus and Breydenbach had already pointed out a village called *Thersa* to the east of Samaria. This form of the name corresponds to the Heb. better than that Arab. *Tullûzah*; but the place is suitable, and if Tullûzah lies high and beautiful in a region of olive trees, then it still justifies its ancient name, which means pleasantness or sweetness. But it cannot be sweetness on account of which Tirzah is named before Jerusalem, for in the eye of the Israelites Jerusalem was "the perfection of beauty" (Ps. l. 2; Lam. ii. 15). That there is gradation from Tirzah to Jerusalem (Hengst.) cannot be said; for *נְאוֹמָה* (*decora*) and *יָפָה* (*pulchra*) would be reversed if a climax were intended. The reason of it is rather this, that Shulamith is from the higher region, and is not a daughter of Jerusalem, and that therefore a beautiful city situated in the north toward Sunem must serve as a comparison of her beauty. That Shulamith is both beautiful and terrible (*יָפָה* from *יָפָה*) is no con-

tradiction: she is terrible in the irresistible power of the impression of her personality, terrible as *nidgaloth*, i.e. as troops going forth with their banners unfurled (cf. the *Kal* of this *v. denom.*, Ps. xx. 6). We do not need to supply כְּחֵנוֹת, which is sometimes fem., Ps. xxv. 3, Gen. xxxii. 9, although the attribute would here be appropriate, Num. ii. 3, cf. x. 5; still less עֲבָאוֹת, which occurs in the sense of military service, Isa. xl. 2, and a war-expedition, Dan. viii. 12, but not in the sense of war-host, as fem. Much rather *nidgaloth*, thus neut., is meant of bannered hosts, as אֲרָחוֹת (not אֲרָ), Isa. xxi. 13, of those that are marching. War-hosts with their banners, their standards, go forth confident of victory. Such is Shulamith's whole appearance, although she is unconscious of it—a *veni, vidi, vici*. Solomon is completely vanquished by her. But seeking to maintain himself in freedom over against her, he cries out to her:

Ver. 5a Turn away thine eyes from me,  
For overpoweringly they assail me.

Döpke translates, *ferocire me faciunt*; Hengst.: they make me proud; but although הִרְהִיב, after Ps. cxxxviii. 3, may be thus used, yet that would be an effect produced by the eyes, which certainly would suggest the very opposite of the request to turn them away. The verb הִרְהִיב means to be impetuous, and to press impetuously against any one; the *Hiph.* is the intens. of this trans. signification of the *Kal*: to press overpoweringly against one, to infuse terror, *terrorem inculcere*. The LXX. translates it by ἀναπτεροῦν, which is also used of the effect of terror ("to make to start up"), and the Syr. by *afred*, to put to flight, because *arhab* signifies to put in fear, as also *arhab* = *khawwaf*, *terrefacere*; but here the meaning of the verb corresponds more with the sense of رَعِبَ, to be placed in the state of *ro'b*, i.e. of paralyzing terror. If she directed her large, clear, penetrating eyes to him, he must sink his own: their glance is unbearable by him. This peculiar form the praise of her eyes here assumes; but then the description proceeds as at iv. 1b, ii. 3b. The words used there in praise of her hair, her teeth, and her cheeks, are here repeated.

Ver. 5b Thy hair is like a flock of goats  
Which repose downwards on Gilead.  
6 Thy teeth like a flock of lambs  
Which come up from the washing,  
All of them bearing twins,  
And a bereaved one is not among them.  
7 Like a piece of pomegranate thy temples  
Behind thy veil.

The repetition is literal, but yet not without change in the expression,—there, 'מִהֶרָל, here, 'מִן־הָרָל; there, 'הֶקֶץ, *tonsarum*, here, 'הֶרֶץ, *agnarum* (Symm., Venet. τῶν ἀμνάδων); for רָחֵל, in its proper signification, is like the Arab. *rachil*, *richl*, *richleh*, the female lamb, and particularly the ewe. Hitzig imagines that Solomon here repeats to Shulamith what he had said to another *donna* chosen for marriage, and that the flattery becomes insipid by repetition to Shulamith, as well as also to the reader. But the romance which he finds in the Song is not this itself, but his own palimpsest, in the style of Lucian's transformed ass. The repetition has a morally better reason, and not one so subtle. Shulamith appears to Solomon yet more beautiful than on the day when she was brought to him as his bride. His love is still the same, unchanged; and this both she and the reader or hearer must conclude from these words of praise, repeated now as they were then. There is no one among the ladies of the court whom he prefers to her,—these must themselves acknowledge her superiority.

Ver. 8 There are sixty queens,

And eighty concubines,

And virgins without number.

9 One is my dove, my perfect one,—

The only one of her mother,

The choice one of her that bare her.

The daughters saw her and called her blessed,—

Queens and concubines, and they extolled her.

Even here, where, if anywhere, notice of the difference of gender was to be expected, הֶקֶץ stands instead of the more accurate הֶרֶץ (*e.g.* Gen. vi. 2). The number of the women of Solomon's court, 1 Kings xi. 3, is far greater (700 wives and 300 concubines); and those who deny the Solomonic authorship of the Song regard the poet, in this particular, as more historical than the historian. On our part, holding as we do the Solomonic authorship of the book, we conclude from these low numbers that the Song celebrates a love-relation of Solomon's at the commencement of his reign: his luxury had not then reached the enormous height to which he, the same Solomon, looks back, and which he designates, Eccles. ii. 8, as *vanitas vanitatum*. At any rate, the number of 60 מְלָכוֹת, *i.e.* legitimate wives of equal rank with himself, is yet high enough; for, according to 2 Chron. xi. 21, Rehoboam had 18 wives and 60 concubines. The 60 occurred before, at iii. 7. If it be a round number, as sometimes, although rarely, *sexaginta* is thus used (Hitzig), it may be reduced only to 51, but not further, especially here, where 80 stands along with it. פִּי־נָשׁ (פִּלְנֶשׁ), Gr. πάλλαξ, παλλακή (Lat. *pelle*x), which in the form פִּלְקֶתָה

(פִּלְגֶּתָא) came back from the Greek to the Aramaic, is a word as yet unexplained. According to the formation, it may be compared to חֲרַם, from חָרַם, to cut off; whence also the harem bears the (Arab.) name *haram*, or the separated *gynaecoonitis*, to which access is denied. An ending in *is* (שׁ) is known to the Assyrian, but only as an adverbial ending, which, as 'istinis = לְכֵדוּ, alone, *solus*, shows is connected with the pron. *su*. These two nouns appear as thus requiring to be referred to *quadrilitera*, with the annexed שׁ; perhaps פִּלְגֵּשׁ, in the sense of to break into splinters, from פָּלַג, to divide (whence a brook, as dividing itself in its channels, has the name of פִּלְגֵּי), points to the polygamous relation as a breaking up of the marriage of one; so that a concubine has the name *pillegesh*, as a representant of polygamy in contrast to monogamy.

In the first line of ver. 9 אִמָּה is subj. (one, who is my dove, my perfect one); in the second line, on the contrary, it is pred. (one, *unica*, is she of her mother). That Shulamith was her mother's only child does not, however, follow from this; אִמָּה, *unica*, is equivalent to *unice dilecta*, as יָחִיד, Prov. iv. 3, is equivalent to *unice dilectus* (cf. Keil's *Zech.* xiv. 7). The parall. בָּרָה has its nearest signification *electa* (LXX., Syr., Jerome), not *pura* (Venet.); the fundamental idea of cutting and separating divides itself into the ideas of choosing and purifying. The Aorists, 9b, are the only ones in this book; they denote that Shulamith's look had, on the part of the women, this immediate result, that they willingly assigned to her the good fortune of being preferred to them all,—that to her the prize was due. The words, as also at Prov. xxxi. 28, are an echo of Gen. xxx. 13,—the books of the *Chokma* delight in references to Genesis, the book of pre-Israelitish origin. Here, in vers. 8, 9, the distinction between our typical and the allegorical interpretation is correctly seen. The latter is bound to explain what the 60 and the 80 mean, and how the wives, concubines, and "virgins" of the harem are to be distinguished from each other; but what till now has been attempted in this matter has, by reason of its very absurdity or folly, become an easy subject of wanton mockery. But the typical interpretation regards the 60 and the 80, and the unreckoned number, as what their names denote,—viz. favourites, concubines, and serving-maids. But to see an allegory of heavenly things in such a herd of women—a kind of thing which the Book of Genesis dates from the degradation of marriage in the line of Cain—is a profanation of that which is holy. The fact is, that by a violation of the law of God (Deut. xvii. 17), Solomon brings a cloud over the typical representation, which is not at all to be thought of in con-

nection with the Antitype. Solomon, as Jul. Sturm rightly remarks, is not to be considered by himself, but only in his relation to Shulamith. In Christ, on the contrary, is no imperfection; sin remains in the congregation. In the Song, the bride is purer than the bridegroom; but in the fulfilling of the Song this relation is reversed: the bridegroom is purer than the bride.

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## FIFTH ACT.

SHULAMITH, THE ATTRACTIVELY FAIR BUT HUMBLE PRINCESS.—  
CHAP. VI. 10—VIII. 4.

FIRST SCENE OF THE FIFTH ACT, VI. 10—VII. 6.

The fourth Act, notwithstanding little disturbances, gives a clear view of the unchanging love of the newly-married pair. This fifth shows how Shulamith, although raised to a royal throne, yet remains, in her childlike disposition and fondness for nature, a lily of the valley. The first scene places us in the midst of the royal gardens. Shulamith comes to view from its recesses, and goes to the daughters of Jerusalem, who, overpowered by the beauty of her heavenly appearance, cry out:

Ver. 10 Who is this that looketh forth like the morning-red,  
Beautiful as the moon, pure as the sun,  
Terrible as a battle-host?

The question, "Who is this?" is the same as at iii. 6. There, it refers to her who was brought to the king; here, it refers to her who moves in that which is his as her own. There, the "this" is followed by עֲלֶיהָ appositionally; here, by הִנֵּשׂ [looking forth] determ., and thus more closely connected with it; but then indetermin., and thus apposit. predicates follow. The verb הִנֵּשׂ signifies to bend forward, to overhang; whence the *Hiph.* הִנֵּשְׂקִי and *Niph.* הִנֵּשְׂקִי, to look out, since in doing so one bends forward (*vid.* under Ps. xiv. 2). The LXX. here translates it by ἐκκύπτουσα, the Venet. by παρακύπτουσα, both of which signify to look toward something with the head inclined forward. The point of comparison is, the rising up from the background: Shulamith breaks through the shades of the garden-grove like the morning-red, the morning dawn; or, also: she comes nearer and nearer, as the morning-red rises behind the moun-

tains, and then fills always the more widely the whole horizon. The Venet. translates  $\acute{\omega}\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\omega\sigma\phi\acute{o}\rho\omicron\varsigma$ ; but the morning star is not  $\text{שֶׁהַר}$ , but  $\text{בֶּן-שֶׁהַר}$ , Isa. xiv. 12; *shahhar*, properly, the morning-dawn, means, in Heb., not only this, like the Arab. *shahar*, but rather, like the Arab. *fajr*, the morning-red,—i.e. the red tinge of the morning mist. From the morning-red the description proceeds to the moon, yet visible in the morning sky, before the sun has risen. It is usually called  $\text{יָרֵחַ}$ , as being yellow; but here it is called  $\text{לִבְנָה}$ , as being white; as also the sun, which here is spoken of as having risen (Judg. v. 31), is designated not by the word  $\text{שֶׁשֶׁט}$ , as the unwearied (Ps. xix. 6b, 6a), but, on account of the intensity of its warming light (Ps. xix. 7b), is called  $\text{חֶסֶד}$ . These, in the language of poetry, are favourite names of the moon and the sun, because already the primitive meaning of the two other names had disappeared from common use; but with these, definite attributive ideas are immediately connected. Shulamith appears like the morning-red, which breaks through the darkness; beautiful, like the silver moon, which in soft still majesty shines in the heavens (Job xxxi. 26); pure (*vid.* regarding  $\text{בֵּרַר}$ ,  $\text{בֵּרִיר}$  in this signification: smooth, bright, pure, under Isa. xlix. 2) as the sun, whose light (cf.  $\text{קְהֹר}$  with the Aram.  $\text{קְהֵרָא}$ , mid-day brightness) is the purest of the pure, imposing as war-hosts with their standards (*vid.* vi. 4b). The answer of her who was drawing near, to this exclamation, sounds homely and childlike:

Ver. 11 To the nut garden I went down  
To look at the shrubs of the valley,  
To see whether the vine sprouted,  
The pomegranates budded.

Ver. 12 I knew it not that my soul lifted me up  
To the royal chariots of my people, a noble (one).

In her loneliness she is happy; she finds her delight in quietly moving about in the vegetable world; the vine and the pomegranate, brought from her home, are her favourites. Her soul—viz. love for Solomon, which fills her soul—raised her to the royal chariots of her people, the royal chariots of a noble (one), where she sits beside the king, who drives the chariot; she knew this, but she also knew it not for what she had become without any cause of her own, that she is without self-elation and without disavowal of her origin. These are Shulamith's thoughts and feelings, which we think we derive from these two verses without reading between the lines and without refining. I went down, she says, viz. from the royal palace, cf. vi. 2. Then, further, she speaks of a valley; and the whole sounds rural, so

that we are led to think of Etam as the scene. This Etam, romantically (*vid.* Judg. xv. 8 f.) situated, was, as Josephus (*Antt.* viii. 7. 3) credibly informs us, Solomon's Belvedere. "In the royal stables," he says, "so great was the regard for beauty and swiftness, that nowhere else could horses of greater beauty or greater fleetness be found. All had to acknowledge that the appearance of the king's horses was wonderfully pleasing, and that their swiftness was incomparable. Their riders also served as an ornament to them. They were young men in the flower of their age, and were distinguished by their lofty stature and their flowing hair, and by their clothing, which was of Tyrian purple. They every day sprinkled their hair with dust of gold, so that their whole head sparkled when the sun shone upon it. In such array, armed and bearing bows, they formed a body-guard around the king, who was wont, clothed in a white garment, to go out of the city in the morning, and even to drive his chariot. These morning excursions were usually to a certain place which was about sixty stadia from Jerusalem, and which was called Etam; gardens and brooks made it as pleasant as it was fruitful." This Etam, from whence (the עֵיִן עֵיטָם<sup>1</sup>) a watercourse, the ruins of which are still visible, supplied the temple with water, has been identified by Robinson with a village called *Artas* (by Lumley called *Urtas*), about a mile and a half to the south of Bethlehem. At the upper end of the winding valley, at a considerable height above the bottom, are three old Solomonic pools,—large, oblong basins of considerable compass placed one behind the other in terraces. Almost at an equal height with the highest pool, at a distance of several hundred steps there is a strong fountain, which is carefully built over, and to which there is a descent by means of stairs inside the building. By it principally were the pools, which are just large reservoirs, fed, and the water was conducted by a subterranean conduit into the upper pool. Riding along the way close to the aqueduct, which stills exists, one sees even at the present day the valley below clothed in rich vegetation; and it is easy to understand that here there may have been rich gardens and pleasure-grounds (Moritz Lüttke's *Mittheilung*). A more suitable place for this first scene of the fifth Act cannot be thought of; and what Josephus relates serves remarkably to illustrate not only the description of ver. 11, but also that of ver. 12.

אֶנְזִי is the walnut, *i.e.* the Italian nut tree (*Juglans regia* L.), originally brought from Persia; the Persian name is *keuz*, Aethiop. *gûz*, Arab. Syr. *gauz* (*gôz*), in Heb. with א prosth., like the Armen. *engus*. אֶנְזִי גֶנֶז is a garden, the peculiar ornament of which is the

<sup>1</sup> According to *Sebachim* 54b, one of the highest points of the Holy Land.

fragrant and shady walnut tree; *נַחַל אֲנָחִים* would not be a nut garden, but a garden of nuts, for the plur. signifies, Mishn. *nuces* (viz. *juglandes* = *Jovis glandes*, Pliny, xvii. 136, ed. Jan.), as *תְּאֵנִים*, figs, in contradistinction to *תְּאֵנָה*, a fig tree, only the Midrash uses *אֲנָחָה* here, elsewhere not occurring, of a tree. The object of her going down was one, viz. to observe the state of the vegetation; but it was manifold, as expressed in the manifold statements which follow *יֵרְדֶּה*. The first object was the nut garden. Then her intention was to observe the young shoots in the valley, which one has to think of as traversed by a river or brook; for *נָחַל*, like *Wady*, signifies both a valley and a valley-brook. The nut garden might lie in the valley, for the walnut tree is fond of a moderately cool, damp soil (Joseph. *Bell.* iii. 10. 8). But the *אֲנָחִים* are the young shoots with which the banks of a brook and the damp valley are usually adorned in the spring-time. *אֲנָחִים*, shoot, in the Heb. of budding and growth, in Aram. of the fruit-formation, comes from R. *אֲנָח*, the weaker power of *נָח*, which signifies to expand and spread from within outward, and particularly to sprout up and to well forth. *נָחֵה רֵאשִׁית* signifies here, as at Gen. xxxiv. 1, attentively to observe something, looking to be fixed upon it, to sink down into it. A further object was to observe whether the vine had broken out, or had budded (this is the meaning of *פָּרַח*, breaking out, to send forth, R. *פָּר*, to break),<sup>1</sup>—whether the pomegranate trees had gained flowers or flower-buds *הַנִּיצִי*, not as Gesen. in his *Thes.* and *Heb. Lex.* states, the *Hiph.* of *נִיצַן*, which would be *הַנִּיצִי*, but from *נִיצַן* instead of *הַנִּיצִי*, with the same omission of *Dagesh*, after the forms *הַרְעִי*, *הַפְרִי*, cf. Prov. vii. 13, R. *נִין*, to glance, bloom (whence *Nisan* as the name of the flower-month, as *Ab* the name of the fruit-month).<sup>2</sup> Why the pomegranate tree (*Punica granatum* L.), which derives this its Latin name from its fruit being full of grains, bears the Semitic name of *רִמְמֹן*, (Arab.) *rummān*, is yet unexplained; the Arabians are so little acquainted with it, that they are uncertain whether *ramm* or *raman* (which, however, is not proved to exist) is to be regarded as the root-word. The question goes along with that regarding the origin and signification of *Rimmon*, the name of the Syrian god, which appears to denote<sup>3</sup> “sublimity;” and it is possible that the pomegranate tree has its name from this god as being consecrated to him.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Fried. Delitzsch, *Indo-Germ. Sem. Studien*, p. 72.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. my *Jesurun*, p. 149.

<sup>3</sup> An old Chald. king is called *Rim-Sin*; *rammu* is common in proper names, as *Ab-rammu*.

<sup>4</sup> The name scarcely harmonizes with *רִמְמֹן*, worm, although the pomegranate

In ver. 12, Shulamith adds that, amid this her quiet delight in contemplating vegetable life, she had almost forgotten the position to which she had been elevated. **לֹא יָדַעְתִּי** may, according to the connection in which it is used, mean, "I know not," Gen. iv. 9, xxi. 26, as well as "I knew not," Gen. xxviii. 16, Prov. xxiii. 35; here the latter (LXX., Aquila, Jerome, Venet., Luther), for the expression runs parallel to **יָרַדְתִּי**, and is related to it as verifying or circumstantiating it. The connection **לֹא יָדַעְתִּי נַפְשִׁי**, whether we take the word **נַפְשִׁי** as permut. of the subject (Luther: My soul knew it not) or as the accus. of the object: I knew not myself (after Job ix. 21), is objectionable, because it robs the following **שָׂמַחְתִּי** of its subject, and makes the course of thought inappropriate. The accusative, without doubt, hits on what is right, since it gives the *Rebia*, corresponding to our colon, to **יָדַעְתִּי**; for that which follows with **נַפְשִׁי שָׂמַח** is just what she acknowledges not to have known or considered. For the meaning cannot be that her soul had placed or brought her in an unconscious way, *i.e.* involuntarily or unexpectedly, etc., for "I knew not," as such a declaration never forms the principal sentence, but, according to the nature of the case, always a subordinate sentence, and that either as a conditional clause with *Vav*, Job ix. 5, or as a relative clause, Isa. xlvii. 11; cf. Ps. xlix. 21. Thus "I knew not" will be followed by what she was unconscious of; it follows in *oratio directa* instead of *obliqua*, as also elsewhere after **יָדַעְתִּי**, **כִּי**, elsewhere introducing the object of knowledge, is omitted, Ps. ix. 21; Amos v. 12. But if it remains unknown to her, if it has escaped her consciousness that her soul placed her, etc., then *naphshi* is here her own self, and that on the side of desire (Job xxiii. 13; Deut. xii. 15); thus, in contrast to external constraint, her own most inward impulse, the leading of her heart. Following this, she has been placed on the height on which she now finds herself, without being always mindful of it. It would certainly now be most natural to regard **מִרְכָּבוֹת**, after the usual constr. of the verb **שָׂמַח** with the double accus., *e.g.* Gen. xxviii. 22, Isa. l. 2, Ps. xxxix. 9, as pred. accus. (Venet. *ἔθετό με ὀχήματα*), as *e.g.* Hengst.: I knew not, thus my soul brought me (*i.e.* brought me at unawares) to the chariots of my people, who are noble. But what does this mean? He adds the remark: "Shulamith stands in the place of the war-chariots of her people as their powerful protector, or by the heroic spirit residing in her." But apart from the syntactically false rendering of **לֹא יָדַעְתִּי**, and the unwarrantable allegorizing, this interpretation suffers from worm-holes; the worm which pierces it bears the strange name (דרימוני) הה, *Shabbath* 90a.

wrecks itself on this, that "chariots" in themselves are not for protection, and thus without something further, especially in this designation by the word מרכבות, and not by רכב (2 Kings vi. 17; cf. 2 Kings ii. 12, xiii. 14), are not war-chariots. ר' will thus be the accus. of the object of motion. It is thus understood, e.g., by Ewald (sec. 281d): My soul brought me to the chariots, etc. The shepherd-hypothesis finds here the seduction of Shulamith. Holländer translates: "I perceived it not; suddenly, it can scarcely be said unconsciously, I was placed in the state-chariots of Amminadab." But the Masora expressly remarks that עמי נדיב are not to be read as if forming one, but as two words, תרין מלין.<sup>1</sup> Hitzig proportionally better, thus: without any apprehension of such a coincidence, she saw herself carried to the chariots of her noble people, i.e. as Gesen. in his *Thes.: inter currus comitatus principis*. Any other explanation, says Hitzig, is not possible, since the accus. מרכ' in itself signifies only in the direction whither, or in the neighbourhood whence. And certainly it is generally used of the aim or object toward which one directs himself or strives, e.g. Isa. xxxvii. 23. *Kodēsh*, "toward the sanctuary," Ps. cxxxiv. 2; cf. *hashshā'rā*, "toward the gate," Isa. xxii. 7. But the accus. *mārom* can also mean "on high," Isa. xxii. 16, the accus. *hashshāma'im* "in the heavens," 1 Kings viii. 32; and as *hishlic hā'ōrah* is used, Ex. i. 22, of being cast into the Nile, and *shalahh hā'ūrēts* of being sent into the land, Num. xiii. 27, thus may also *sim mērkārāh* be used for *sim b'mērkārāh*, 1 Sam. viii. 11, according to which the Syr. (*b'mercabto*) and the Quinta (*eis āppata*) translate; on the contrary, Symm. and Jerome destroy the meaning by adopting the reading שפתי (my soul placed me in confusion). The plur. *mark'roth* is thus meant amplifi., like *richvē*, i. 9, and *battēnu*, i. 17. As regards the subject, 2 Sam. xv. 1 is to be compared; it is the king's chariot that is meant, yoked, according to i. 9, with Egypt. horses. It is a question whether *nadiv* is related adject. to *ammi*: my people, a noble (people),—a connection which gives prominence to the attribute appositionally, Gen. xxxvii. 2; Ps. cxliii. 10; Ezek. xxxiv. 12,—or permutat., so that the first gen. is exchanged for one defining more closely: to the royal chariot of my people, a prince. The latter has the preference, not merely because (leaving out of view the proper name *Amminadab*) wherever עם and נדיב are used together

<sup>1</sup> עמי-נדיב, thus in D F: עמי, without the accent and connected with נדיב by Makkeph. On the contrary, P has עמי-נדיב as one word, as also the Masora *parva* has here noted חרה מלה. Our Masora, however, notes לית והרחק כתיבן, and thus Rashi and Aben Ezra testify.

they are meant of those who stand prominent above the people, Num. xxi. 18, Ps. xlvii. 10, cxiii. 8, but because this נָרִיב and בֶּת־נָרִיב evidently stand in interchangeable relation. Yet, even though we take נָרִיב and עַמִּי together, the thought remains the same. Shulamith is not one who is abducted, but, as we read at iii. 6 ff., one who is honourably brought home; and she here expressly says that no kind of external force but her own loving soul raised her to the royal chariots of her people and their king. That she gives to the fact of her elevation just this expression, arises from the circumstance that she places her joy in the loneliness of nature, in contrast to her driving along in a splendid chariot. Designating the chariot that of her noble people, or that of her people, and, indeed, of a prince, she sees in both cases in Solomon the concentration and climax of the people's glory.

Encouraged by Shulamith's unassuming answer, the daughters of Jerusalem now give utterance to an entreaty which their astonishment at her beauty suggests to them.

Chap. vii. 1 Come back, come back, O Shulamith!

Come back, come back, that we may look upon thee!

She is now (vi. 10 ff.) on the way from the garden to the palace. The fourfold "come back" entreats her earnestly, yea, with tears, to return thither with them once more, and for this purpose, that they might find delight in looking upon her; for הָזָה בֶּ signifies to sink oneself into a thing, looking at it, to delight (feast) one's eyes in looking on a thing. Here for the first time Shulamith is addressed by name. But הָשׁוּ cannot be a pure proper name, for the art. is vocat., as *e.g.* הַבַּת יְרוּ, "O daughter of Jerusalem!" Pure proper names like שְׁלֹמֶה are so determ. in themselves that they exclude the article; only such as are at the same time also nouns, like יְרֵחַ and לִבְנֵן, are susceptible of the article, particularly also of the vocat., Ps. cxiv. 5; but cf. Zech. xi. 1 with Isa. x. 34. Thus הָשׁוּ will be not so much a proper name as a name of descent, as generally nouns in *î* (with a few exceptions, viz. of ordinal number, הָרִרִי, הָמִנִּי, etc.) are all *gentilicia*. The LXX. render הָשׁוּ by ἡ Σουναμίτις, and this is indeed but another form for הַשֻּׁנִּמִּית, *i.e.* she who is from Sunem. Thus also was designated the exceedingly beautiful Abishag, 1 Kings i. 3, Elisha's excellent and pious hostess, 2 Kings iv. 8 ff. *Sunem* was in the tribe of Issachar (Josh. xix. 18), near to Little Hermon, from which it was separated by a valley, to the south-east of Carmel. This lower Galilean Sunem, which lies south from Nain, south-east from Nazareth, south-west from Tabor, is also called *Shulem*. Eusebius in his *Onomasticon* says regarding it: Σουβήμη (l. Σουλῆμη) κλήρου

Ἰσάχαρ. καὶ νῦν ἐστὶ κώμη Σουλὴμ κ.τ.λ., i.e. as Jerome translates it: *Sunem in tribu Issachar. et usque hodie vicus ostenditur nomine Sulem in quinto miliario montis Thabor contra australem plagam.* This place is found at the present day under the name of *Suwlam* (*Sólam*), at the west end of *Jebel ed-Duhi* (Little Hermon), not far from the great plain (*Jisre'el*, now *Zer'in*), which forms a convenient way of communication between Jordan and the sea-coast, but is yet so hidden in the mountain range that the Talmud is silent concerning this Sulem, as it is concerning Nazareth. Here was the home of the Shulamitess of the Song. The ancients interpret the name by εἰρηνεύουσα, or by ἐσκυλευμένη (vid. Lagarde's *Onomastica*), the former after Aquila and the Quinta, the latter after Symm. The Targum has the interpretation: הַם עַם הַנְּשִׂאִים הַזֵּה (vid. Rashi). But the form of the name (the Syr. writes *ܫܘܠܡܝܬ*) is opposed to these allegorical interpretations. Rather it is to be assumed that the poet purposely used, not *שׁוּלַם*, but *שׁוּלַמִּית*, to assimilate her name to that of Solomon; and that it has the parallel meaning of one devoted to Solomon, and thus, as it were, of a passively-applied *שׁוּלַמִּית* = *Σαλώμη*, is the more probable, as the daughters of Jerusalem would scarcely venture thus to address her who was raised to the rank of a princess unless this name accorded with that of Solomon.

Not conscious of the greatness of her beauty, Shulamith asks,—

1b α What do you see in Shulamith?

She is not aware that anything particular is to be seen in her; but the daughters of Jerusalem are of a different opinion, and answer this childlike, modest, but so much the more touching question,—

1b β As the dance of Mahanāim!

They would thus see in her something like the dance of Mahanāim. If this be here the name of the Levitical town (now *Mahneh*) in the tribe of Gad, north of Jabbok, where Ishbosheth resided for two years, and where David was hospitably entertained on his flight from Absalom (Luthr.: "the dance to Mahanāim"), then we must suppose in this trans-Jordanic town such a popular festival as was kept in Shiloh, Judg. xxi. 19, and we may compare *Abel-Meholah* [= meadow of dancing], the name of Elisha's birth-place (cf. also Herod. i. 16: "To dance the dance of the Arcadian town of Tegea"). But the Song delights in retrospective references to Genesis (cf. iv. 11b, vii. 11). At xxxii. 3, however, by *Mahanāim*<sup>1</sup> is meant the double encampment of angels who protected Jacob's two companies

<sup>1</sup> Böttcher explains *Mahanāim* as a plur.; but the plur. of מַחֲנֵה is מַחֲנֵהִים and מַחֲנֵיִם; the plur. termination *ajim* is limited to מִים and שְׂמִים.

(xxxii. 8). The town of Mahanāim derives its name from this vision of Jacob's. The word, as the name of a town, is always without the article; and here, where it has the article, it is to be understood appellatively. The old translators, in rendering by "the dances of the camps" (Syr., Jerome, *choros castrorum*, Venet. *θίασον στρατοπέδων*), by which it remains uncertain whether a war-dance or a parade is meant, overlook the dual, and by exchanging *מחנים* with *מחנות*, they obtain a figure which in this connection is incongruous and obscure. But, in truth, the figure is an angelic one. The daughters of Jerusalem wish to see Shulamith dance, and they designate that as an angelic sight. *Mahanāim* became in the post-bibl. dialect a name directly for angels. The dance of angels is only a step beyond the responsive song of the seraphim, Isa. vi. *Engelkoere* [angel-choir] and "heavenly host" are associated in the old German poetry.<sup>1</sup> The following description is undeniably that (let one only read how Hitzig in vain seeks to resist this interpretation) of one dancing. In this, according to biblical representation and ancient custom, there is nothing repulsive. The women of the ransomed people, with Miriam at their head, danced, as did also the women who celebrated David's victory over Goliath (Ex. xv. 20; 1 Sam. xviii. 66). David himself danced (2 Sam. vi.) before the ark of the covenant. Joy and dancing are, according to Old Testament conception, inseparable (Eccles. iii. 4); and joy not only as the happy feeling of youthful life, but also spiritual holy joy (Ps. lxxxvii. 7). The dance which the ladies of the court here desire to see, falls under the point of view of a play of rival individual *artistes* reciprocally acting for the sake of amusement. The play also is capable of moral nobility, if it is enacted within the limits of propriety, at the right time, in the right manner, and if the natural joyfulness, penetrated by intelligence, is consecrated by a spiritual aim. Thus Shulamith, when she dances, does not then become a Gaditanian (Martial, xiv. 203) or an *Alma* (the name given in Anterior Asia to those women who go about making it their business to dance mimic and partly lascivious dances); nor does she become a *Bajadere* (Isa. xxiii. 15 f.),<sup>2</sup> as also Miriam, Ex. xv. 20, Jephthah's daughter, Judg. xi. 34, the "daughters of Shiloh," Judg.

<sup>1</sup> *Vid. Walther von der Vogelweide*, 173. 28. The Indian mythology goes farther, and transfers not only the original of the dance, but also of the drama, to heaven; *vid. Götting. Anzeigen*, 1874, p. 106.

<sup>2</sup> *Alma* is the Arab. *'ualmah* (one skilled, viz. in dancing and *jonglerie*), and *Bajadere* is the Portug. softening of *baladera*, a dancer, from *balare* (*ballare*), *mediaev. Lat.*, and then Romanic: to move in a circle, to dance.

xxi. 21, and the women of Jerusalem, 1 Sam. xviii. 6, did not dishonour themselves by dancing; the dancing of virgins is even a feature of the times after the restoration, Jer. xxxi. 13. But that Shulamith actually danced in compliance with the earnest entreaty of the daughters of Jerusalem, is seen from the following description of her attractions, which begins with her feet and the vibration of her thighs.

After throwing aside her upper garments, so that she had only the light clothing of a shepherdess or vinedresser, Shulamith danced to and fro before the daughters of Jerusalem, and displayed all her attractions before them. Her feet, previously (v. 3) naked, or as yet only shod with sandals, she sets forth with the deportment of a prince's daughter.

Ver. 2a How beautiful are thy steps in the shoes, O prince's daughter! The noun נָדִיב, which signifies noble in disposition, and then noble by birth and rank (cf. the reverse relation of the meanings in *generosus*), is in the latter sense synon. and parallel to מְלִכָּה and שִׁרָּה; Shulamith is here called a prince's daughter because she was raised to the rank of which Hannah, 1 Sam. ii. 8, cf. Ps. cxiii. 8, speaks, and to which she herself, vi. 12, points. Her beauty, from the first associated with unaffected dignity, now appears in native princely grace and majesty. פָּעַם (from פָּעַם, *pulsare*, as in *nunc pede libero pulsanda tellus*) signifies step and foot,—in the latter sense the poet. Heb. and the vulgar P'hoen. word for רָגֵל; here the meanings *pes* and *passus* (Fr. *pus*, dance-step) flow into each other. The praise of the spectators now turns from the feet of the dancer to her thighs:

Ver. 2b The vibration of thy thighs like ornamental chains,  
The work of an artist's hands.

The double-sided thighs, viewed from the spine and the lower part of the back, are called מְתָנִים; from the upper part of the legs upwards, and the breast downwards (the lumbar region), thus seen on the front and sidewise, הֶלְצִים or יָרֵכִים. Here the manifold twistings and windings of the upper part of the body by means of the thigh-joint are meant; such movements of a circular kind are called חֲסִיקִים, from חָסַק, v. 6. הֶלְאִים is the plur. of הֶלִּי = (Arab.) *haly*, as צִבְאִים (gazelles) of צִבִּי = *zaby*. The sing. הֶלִּי (or הֶלְיָה = (Arab.) *hulyah*) signifies a female ornament, consisting of gold, silver, or precious stones, and that (according to the connection, Prov. xxv. 2; Hos. ii. 15) for the neck or the breast as a whole; the plur. 'הל, occurring only here, is therefore chosen because the bendings of the loins, full of life and beauty, are compared to the free swingings to and fro of such an ornament, and thus to a connected ornament of chains; for חֲמַ

are not the beauty-curves of the thighs at rest,—the connection here requires movement. In accordance with the united idea of 'חל, the appos. is not מַעֲשֵׂי, but (according to the Palestin.) מַעֲשֵׂה (LXX., Targ., Syr., Venet.). The artist is called אֲמָן (*ommān*) (the forms אָמָן and אֲמָן are also found), Syr. *avmon*, Jewish-Aram. אֲמָן; he has, as the master of stability, a name like יָמִין, the right hand: the hand, and especially the right hand, is the *artifex* among the members.<sup>1</sup> The eulogists pass from the loins to the middle part of the body. In dancing, especially in the Oriental style of dancing, which is the mimic representation of animated feeling, the breast and the body are raised, and the forms of the body appear through the clothing.

Ver. 3 Thy navel is a well-rounded basin—  
 Let not mixed wine be wanting to it  
 Thy body is a heap of wheat,  
 Set round with lilies.

In interpreting these words, Hitzig proceeds as if a “voluptuary” were here speaking. He therefore changes שָׁרְרָךְ into שָׁרְרָךְ, “thy *pudenda*.” But (1) it is no voluptuary who speaks here, and particularly not a man, but women who speak; certainly, above all, it is the poet, who would not, however, be so inconsiderate as to put into the mouths of women immodest words which he could use if he wished to represent the king as speaking. Moreover (2) שָׁר = (Arab.) *surr*, secret (that which is secret; in Arab. especially referred to the *pudenda*, both of man and woman), is a word that is<sup>2</sup> foreign to the Heb. language, which has for “*Geheimnis*” [secret] the corresponding word סֹר (vid. under Ps. ii. 2, xxv. 14), after the root-signification of its verbal stem (viz. to be firm, pressed together); and (3) the reference—preferred by Döpke, Magnus, Hahn, and others, also without any change of punctuation—of שָׁר to the *interfeminium mulieris*, is here excluded by the circumstance that the attractions of a woman dancing, as they unfold themselves, are here described. Like the Arab. *surr*, שָׁר (= *shurr*), from שָׁרַר, to bind fast, denotes properly the umbilical cord, Ezek. xvi. 4, and then the umbilical scar. Thus, Prov. iii. 8, where most recent critics prefer, for לֶשְׁרָךְ, to read, but without any proper reason, לֶשְׁאֲרָךְ = לֶשְׁרָךְ, “to thy flesh,” the navel comes there into view as the centre of the body,—which it always is with new-born infants, and is almost so with grown-up persons in respect of the length of the body,—and as, indeed, the centre, whence the pleasurable feeling of health diffuses its rays of heat. This middle and prominent point of the

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Ryssel's *Die Syn. d. Wahren u. Guten in d. Sem. Spr.* (1873), p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Vid. Tebrizi, in my work entitled *Jud.-Arab. Poesien*, u.s.w. (1874), p. 24.

abdomen shows itself in one lightly clad and dancing when she breathes deeply, even through the clothing; and because the navel commonly forms a little funnel-like hollow (Böttch.: in the form almost of a whirling hollow in the water, as one may see in nude antique statues), therefore the daughters of Jerusalem compare Shulamith's navel to a "basin of roundness," *i.e.* which has this general property, and thus belongs to the class of things that are round.  $\text{בֵּינָה}$  does not mean a *Becher* (a cup), but a *Becken* (basin), *pelvis*; properly a washing basin, *ijjanah* (from  $\text{בֵּינָה} = \text{ajan}$ , to full, to wash =  $\text{סָבַח}$ ); then a sprinkling basin, Ex. xxiv. 6; and generally a basin, Isa. xxii. 24; here, a mixing basin, in which wine was mingled with a proportion of water to render it palatable ( $\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\acute{\eta}\rho$ , from  $\kappa\rho\epsilon\alpha\nu\nu\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\iota$ , *temperare*),—according to the Talm. with two-thirds of water. In this sense this passage is interpreted allegorically, *Sanhedrin* 14*b*, 37*a*, and elsewhere (*vid.* Aruch under  $\text{סָבַח}$ ).  $\text{בֵּינָה}$  is not spiced wine, which is otherwise designated (viii. 2), but, as Hitzig rightly explains, mixed wine, *i.e.* mixed with water or snow (*vid.* under Isa. v. 22).  $\text{בֵּינָה}$  is not borrowed from the Greek  $\mu\acute{\iota}\sigma\gamma\epsilon\upsilon\nu$  (Gratz), but is a word native to all the three chief Semitic dialects,—the weaker form of  $\text{סָבַח}$ , which may have the meaning of "to pour in;" but not merely "to pour in," but, at the same time, "to mix" (*vid.* under Isa. v. 22; Prov. ix. 2).  $\text{סָבַח}$ , with  $\text{בֵּינָה}$ , represents the circular form (from  $\text{סָבַח} = \text{סָבַח}$ ), corresponding to the navel ring; Kimchi thinks that the moon must be understood (*cf.*  $\text{לִנְיָה}$ , *lunula*): a moon-like round basin; according to which the Venet., also in Gr., choosing an excellent name for the moon, translates:  $\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\iota\sigma\tau\rho\omicron\nu \tau\eta\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta\varsigma$ . But "moon-basin" would be an insufficient expression for it; Ewald supposes that it is the name of a flower, without, however, establishing this opinion. The "basin of roundness" is the centre of the body a little depressed; and that which the clause, "may not mixed wine be lacking," expresses, as their wish for her, is soundness of health, for which no more appropriate and delicate figure can be given than hot wine tempered with fresh water.

The comparison in 3*b* is the same as that of R. Johanan's of beauty, *Mez'ia* 84*a*: "He who would gain an idea of beauty should take a silver cup, fill it with pomegranate flowers, and encircle its rim with a garland of roses."<sup>1</sup> To the present day, winnowed and sifted corn is piled up in great heaps of symmetrical half-spherical form,

<sup>1</sup> See my *Gesch. d. Jüd. Poesie*, p. 30 f. Hoch (the German Solomon) reminds us of the Jewish marriage custom of throwing over the newly-married pair the contents of a vessel wreathed with flowers, and filled with wheat or corn (with money underneath), accompanied with the cry,  $\text{פֶּרֶוּ וְרַבּוּ}$  [be fruitful and multiply].

which are then frequently stuck over with things that move in the wind, for the purpose of protecting them against birds. "The appearance of such heaps of wheat," says Wetstein (*Isa.* p. 710), "which one may see in long parallel rows on the thrashing-floors of a village, is very pleasing to a peasant; and the comparison of the Song, vii. 3, every Arabian will regard as beautiful." Such a corn-heap is to the present day called *ṣubbah*, while *'aramah* is a heap of thrashed corn that has not yet been winnowed; here, with עֲרָמָה, is to be connected the idea of a *ṣubbah*, i.e. of a heap of wheat not only thrashed and winnowed, but also sifted (riddled). סָג, enclosed, fenced about (whence the post-bibl. סִיג, a fence), is a part. pass. such as פָּרַץ, scattered (*vid.* under Ps. xcii. 12). The comparison refers to the beautiful appearance of the roundness, but, at the same time, also to the flesh-colour shining through the dress; for fancy sees more than the eyes, and concludes regarding that which is veiled from that which is visible. A wheat-colour was, according to the Moslem Sunna, the tint of the first created man. Wheat-yellow and lily-white is a subdued white, and denotes at once purity and health; by *πυρός* [wheat] one thinks of *πῦρ*—heaped up wheat developes a remarkable heat, a fact for which Biesenthal refers to Plutarch's *Quaest.* In accordance with the progress of the description, the breasts are now spoken of:

Ver. 4 Thy two breasts are like two fawns,  
Twins of a gazelle.

iv. 5 is repeated, but with the omission of the attribute, "feeding among lilies," since lilies have already been applied to another figure. Instead of תְּאֵמִי there, we have here תְּאֵמִי (*taōme*), the former after the ground-form *tī'ām*, the latter after the ground-form *to'm* (cf. נֶאֱמַל, Neh. xiii. 29, from נֶאֱל = נֶאֱל).

Ver. 5a Thy neck like an ivory tower.

The article in תֵּשֶׁן may be that designating species (*vid.* under i. 11); but, as at vii. 5 and iv. 4, it appears to be also here a definite tower which the comparison has in view: one covered externally with ivory tablets, a tower well known to all in and around Jerusalem, and visible far and wide, especially when the sun shone on it; had it been otherwise, as in the case of the comparison following, the locality would have been more definitely mentioned. So slender, so dazzlingly white, so imposing, and so captivating to the eye did Shulamith's neck appear. These and the following figures would be open to the objection of being without any occasion, and monstrous, if they referred to an ordinary beauty; but they refer to Solomon's spouse, they apply to a queen, and therefore are derived

from that which is most splendid in the kingdom over which, along with him, she rules; and in this they have the justification of their grandeur.

Ver. 5b = Thine eyes pools in Heshbon,  
At the gate of the populous (city).

*Heshbon*, formerly belonging to the Amorites, but at this time to the kingdom of Solomon, lay about  $5\frac{1}{2}$  hours to the east of the northern point of the Dead Sea, on an extensive, undulating, fruitful, high table-land, with a far-reaching prospect. Below the town, now existing only in heaps of ruins, a brook, which here takes its rise, flows westward, and streams towards the Ghôr as the *Nahr Hesbân*. It joins the Jordan not far above its entrance into the Dead Sea. The situation of the town was richly watered. There still exists a huge reservoir of excellent masonry in the valley, about half a mile from the foot of the hill on which the town stood. The comparison here supposes two such pools, but which are not necessarily together, though both are before the gate, i.e. near by, outside the town. Since שְׁעָרֵי, except at Isa. xiv. 31, is fem., בְּתֵרֵסִים, in the sense of רִבְבוֹתַי, Lam. i. 1 (cf. for the non-determin. of the adj., Ezek. xxi. 25), is to be referred to the town, not to the gate (Hitz.); Blau's<sup>1</sup> conjectural reading, *bath-'akrabbim*, does not recommend itself, because the craggy heights of the "ascent of Akrabbim" (Num. xxxiv. 4; Josh. xv. 3), which obliquely cross<sup>2</sup> the Ghôr to the south of the Dead Sea, and from remote times formed the southern boundary of the kingdom of the Amorites (Judg. i. 36), were too far off, and too seldom visited, to give its name to a gate of Heshbon. But generally the crowds of men at the gate and the topography of the gate are here nothing to the purpose; the splendour of the town, however, is for the figure of the famed cisterns like a golden border. בִּרְכָה (from בָּרַךְ, to spread out, vid. *Genesis*, p. 98; Fleischer in *Levy*, I. 420b) denotes a skilfully built round or square pool. The comparison of the eyes to a pool means, as Weiststein<sup>3</sup> remarks, "either thus glistening like a water-mirror, or thus lovely in appearance, for the Arabian knows no greater pleasure than to look upon clear, gently rippling water." Both are perhaps to be taken together; the mirror-ing glance of the moist eyes (cf. Ovid, *De Arte Am.* ii. 722:

"*Adspicies oculos tremulo fulgore micantes,  
Ut sol a liquida saepe refulget aqua*"),

and the spell of the charm holding fast the gaze of the beholder.

<sup>1</sup> In *Merx' Archiv.* III. 355.

<sup>2</sup> Vid. Robinson's *Phys. Geogr.* p. 51.

<sup>3</sup> *Zeitschr. für allgem. Erdkunde*, 1859, p. 157 f.

Ver. 5b β Thy nose like the tower of Lebanon,  
Which looks towards Damascus.

This comparison also places us in the midst of the architectural and artistic splendours of the Solomonic reign. A definite town is here meant; the art. determines it, and the part. following appositionally without the art., with the expression "towards Damascus" defining it more nearly (*vid.* under iii. 6), describes it. הַלְבָנוֹן designates here "the whole Alpine range of mountains in the north of the land of Israel" (Furrer); for a tower which looks in the direction of Damascus (פָּנָה, accus., as אֶת־פָּנָה, 1 Sam. xxii. 4) is to be thought of as standing on one of the eastern spurs of Hermon, or on the top of Amana (iv. 8), whence the Amana (Barada) takes its rise, whether as a watch-tower (2 Sam. viii. 6), or only as a look-out from which might be enjoyed the paradisaical prospect. The nose gives to the face especially its physiognomical expression, and conditions its beauty. Its comparison to a tower on a lofty height is occasioned by the fact that Shulamith's nose, without being blunt or flat, formed a straight line from the brow downward, without bending to the right or left (Hitzig), a mark of symmetrical beauty combined with awe-inspiring dignity. After the praise of the nose it was natural to think of Carmel; Carmel is a promontory, and as such is called *anf el-jebel* ("nose of the mountain-range").

Ver. 6a α Thy head upon thee as Carmel.

We say that the head is "on the man" (2 Kings vi. 31; Judith xiv. 18), for we think of a man ideally as the central unity of the members forming the external appearance of his body. Shulamith's head ruled her form, surpassing all in beauty and majesty, as Carmel with its noble and pleasing appearance ruled the land and sea at its feet. From the summit of Carmel, clothed with trees (Amos ix. 3; 1 Kings xviii. 42), a transition is made to the hair on the head, which the Moslem poets are fond of comparing to long leaves, as vine leaves and palm branches; as, on the other hand, the thick leafy wood is called (*vid.* under Isa. vii. 20) *comata silva* (cf. Oudendorp's *Apuleii Metam.* p. 744). Grätz, proceeding on the supposition of the existence of Persian words in the Song, regards כֶּרְמֶל as the name of a colour; but (1) crimson is designated in the Heb.-Pers. not כֶּרְמֶל, but כֶּרְמִיל, instead of חֹלֶעַת שָׁנִי (*vid.* under Isa. i. 18; Prov. xxxi. 21); (2) if the hair of the head (if רֶאשֶׁךָ might be directly understood of this) may indeed be compared to the glistening of purple, not, however, to the glistening of carmese or scarlet, then red and not black hair must be meant. But it is not the locks of hair, but the hair in

locks that is meant. From this the eulogium finally passes to the hair of the head itself.

Ver. 6a 3 The flowing hair of thy head like purple—  
A king fettered by locks.

Hitzig supposes that כרמל reminded the poet of כרמל (carmese), and that thus he hit upon צרור (purple); but one would rather think that *Carmel* itself would immediately lead him to purple, for near this promontory is the principal place where purple shell-fish are found (*Seetzen's Reisen*, IV. 277 f.). חלה (from חלל, to dangle, to hang loose, Job xxviii. 4, Arab. *tadladal*) is *res pendula*, and particularly *coma pendula*. Hengst. remarks that the "purple" has caused much trouble to those who understand by חלה the hair of the head. He himself, with Gussetius, understands by it the temples, *tempus capitis*; but the word חלה is used (iv. 3) for "temples," and "purple-like" hair hanging down could occasion trouble only to those who know not how to distinguish purple from carmese. Red purple, צרור (Assyr. *argumannu*, Aram., Arab., Pers., with departure from the primary meaning of the word, צרר), which derives this name from צרר = צרר, material of variegated colour, is dark-red, and almost glistening black, as Pliny says (*Hist. Nat.* ix. 135): *Laus ei (the Tyrian purple) summa in colore sanguinis concreti, nigricans ad aspectum idemque suspecta (seen from the side) refulgens, unde et Homero purpureus dicitur sanguis*. The purple hair of Nisus does not play a part in myth alone, but beautiful shining dark black hair is elsewhere also called purple, e.g. *πυρφύρεος πλόκαμος* in Lucian, *πορφύρεαι χῆται* in Anacreon. With the words "like purple," the description closes; and to this the last characteristic distinguishing Shulamith there is added the exclamation: "A king fettered by locks!" For צרור, from צרר, to run, flow, is also a name of flowing locks, not the ear-locks (Hitz.), i.e. long ringlets flowing down in front; the same word (i. 17) signifies in its North Palest. form חלה (*Chelhal*), a water-trough, *canalis*. The locks of one beloved are frequently called in erotic poetry "the fetters" by which the lover is held fast, for "love wove her net in alluring ringlets" (Deshāmi in *Joseph and Zuleika*).<sup>1</sup> Goethe in his *Westöst. Divan* presents as a bold yet moderate example: "There are more than fifty hooks in each lock of thy hair;" and, on the other hand, one offensively extravagant, when it is said of a Sultan: "In the bonds of thy locks lies fastened the neck of the enemy." חסר signifies also in Arab. frequently one enslaved by

<sup>1</sup> Compare from the same poet: "Alas! thy braided hair, a heart is in every curl, and a dilemma in every ring" (*Deut. Morg. Zeit.* xxiv. 581).

love: *astruha* is equivalent to her lover.<sup>1</sup> The mention of the king now leads from the imagery of a dance to the scene which follows, where we again hear the king's voice. The scene and situation are now manifestly changed. We are transferred from the garden to the palace, where the two, without the presence of any spectators, carry on the following dialogue.

SECOND SCENE OF THE FIFTH ACT, VII. 7—VIII. 4.

It is the fundamental thought forming the motive and aim of the Song which now expresses itself in the words of Solomon.

Ver. 7 How beautiful art thou, and how charming,  
O love, among delights!

It is a truth of all-embracing application which is here expressed. There is nothing more admirable than love, *i.e.* the uniting or mingling together of two lives, the one of which gives itself to the other, and so finds the complement of itself; nor than this self-devotion, which is at the same time self-enrichment. All this is true of earthly love, of which Walther v. d. Vogelweide says: "*minne ist zweier herzen wünne*" [love is the joy of two hearts], and it is true also of heavenly love; the former surpasses all earthly delights (also such as are purely sensuous, Eccles. ii. 8), and the latter is, as the apostle expresses himself in his spiritual "Song of Songs," 1 Cor. xiii. 13, in relation to faith and hope, "greater than these," greater than both of them, for it is their sacred, eternal aim. In יְפִית it is indicated that the ideal, and in נַעֲמָתָהּ that the eudaemonistic feature of the human soul attains its satisfaction in love. The LXX., obliterating this so true and beautiful a promotion of love above all other joys, translate ἐν ταῖς τρυφαῖς σου (in the enjoyment which thou impartest). The Syr., Jerome, and others also rob the Song of this its point of light and of elevation, by reading אֶהְבֵּהּ (O beloved!) instead of אֶהְבֵּהּ. The words then declare (yet contrary to the spirit of the Hebrew language, which knows neither אֶהְבֵּהּ nor אֶהְבֵּתִי as vocat.) what we already read at iv. 10; while, according to the traditional form of the text, they are the prelude of the love-song, to love as such, which is continued in viii. 6 f.

When Solomon now looks on the wife of his youth, she stands before him like a palm tree with its splendid leaf-branches, which the Arabians call *ucht insân* (the sisters of men); and like a vine

<sup>1</sup> Samachshari, *Mufaṣṣal*, p. 8.

which climbs up on the wall of the house, and therefore is an emblem of the housewife, Ps. cxxviii. 3.

Ver. 8 Thy stature is like the palm tree;  
And thy breasts clusters.

9 I thought : I will climb the palm,  
Grasp its branches ;  
And thy breasts shall be to me  
As clusters of the vine,  
And the breath of thy nose like apples,

10a & And thy palate like the best wine.

Shulamith stands before him. As he surveys her from head to foot, he finds her stature like the stature of a slender, tall date-palm, and her breasts like the clusters of sweet fruit, into which, in due season, its blossoms are ripened. That שְׁטֵטָה (thy stature) is not thought of as height apart from the person, but as along with the person (cf. Ezech. xiii. 18), scarcely needs to be remarked. The palm derives its name, *šāmēr*, from its slender stem rising upwards (cf. under Isa. xvii. 9, lxi. 5). This name is specially given to the *Phoenix dactylifera*, which is indigenous from Egypt to India, and which is principally cultivated (cf. under Gen. xiv. 7), the female flowers of which, set in panicles, develop into large clusters of juicy sweet fruit. These dark-brown or golden-yellow clusters, which crown the summit of the stem and impart a wonderful beauty to the appearance of the palm, especially when seen in the evening twilight, are here called שְׂמֵרִים (connecting form at Deut. xxxii. 32), as by the Arabians *ʿāḥāl*, plur. *ʿāḥāḥ* (*botri dactylosum*). The perf. שְׁמַרְתִּי signifies *separate est se separavit*; for שָׁרַר, R. שָׁר, means, to make or to become plain, smooth, even. The perf. שְׁמַרְתָּ, on the other hand, will be meant retrospectively. As an expression of that which he just now purposed to do, it would be useless; and thus to notify with emphasis anything beforehand is unnatural and contrary to good taste and custom. But looking back, he can say that in view of this august attractive beauty the one thought filled him, to secure possession of her and of the enjoyment which she promised; as one climbs (עָלָה) with עָ, as Ps. xxiv. 3) a palm tree and seizes (חָשַׁן, fut. חָשֵׁן, and חָשֵׁן with עָ, as at Job xxiii. 11) its branches (שִׁנְיָהִים, so called, as it appears,<sup>1</sup> after the feather-like pointed leaves proceeding from the mid-rib on both sides), in order to break off the fulness of the sweet fruit under its leaves. As the cypress (*sarcocolla*), so also the palm is with the Moslem poets the figure of a loved one, and with the mystics, of God ;<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Also that שִׁנְיָהִים is perhaps equivalent to שִׁנְיָהִים (שִׁנְיָהִים, שִׁנְיָהִים), to waver hither and thither, comes here to view.

<sup>2</sup> Vid. Hāfiz, ed. Brockhaus, II. p. 46.

and accordingly the idea of possession is here particularly intended. וְהִתְקַדָּח denotes what he then thought and aimed at. Instead of בְּתִתְקַדָּח, 9a, the punctuation בְּתִתְקַדָּח is undoubtedly to be preferred. The figure of the palm tree terminates with the words, "will grasp its branches." It was adequate in relation to stature, but less so in relation to the breasts; for dates are of a long oval form, and have a stony kernel. Therefore the figure departs from the date clusters to that of grape clusters, which are more appropriate, as they swell and become round and elastic the more they ripen. The breath of the nose, which is called אֵף, from breathing hard, is that of the air breathed, going in and out through it; for, as a rule, a man breathes through his nostrils with closed mouth. Apples present themselves the more naturally for comparison, that the apple has the name תַּפְּחָה (from נָפַח, after the form תִּתְּכֹנֹף), from the fragrance which it exhales.

יַיִן הַטוֹב is wine of the good kind, i.e. the best, as אִשְׁתֵּי רָע, Prov. vi. 24, a woman of a bad kind, i.e. a bad woman; the neut. thought of as adject. is both times the gen. of the attribute, as at Prov. xxiv. 25 it is the gen. of the *substratum*. The punctuation פִּיִּי הַטוֹב (Hitz.) is also possible; it gives, however, the common instead of the delicate poetical expression. By the comparison one may think of the expressions, *jungere salivas oris* (Lucret.) and *oscula per longas jungere pressa moras* (Ovid). But if we have rightly understood iv. 11, v. 16, the palate is mentioned much rather with reference to the words of love which she whispers in his ears when embracing her. Only thus is the further continuance of the comparison to be explained, and that it is Shulamith herself who continues it.

The dramatic structure of the Song becomes here more strongly manifest than elsewhere before. Shulamith interrupts the king, and continues his words as if echoing them, but again breaks off.

Ver. 10a  $\beta$   $\delta$  Which goes down for my beloved smoothly,  
Which makes the lips of sleepers move.

The LXX. had here לְרוּרִי in the text. It might notwithstanding be a spurious reading. Hitzig suggests that it is erroneously repeated, as if from ver. 11. Ewald also (*Hohesl.* p. 137) did that before,—Heiligstedt, as usual, following him. But, as Ewald afterwards objected, the line would then be "too short, and not corresponding to that which follows." But how shall לְרוּרִי now connect itself with Solomon's words? Ginsburg explains: "Her voice is not merely compared to wine, because it is sweet to everybody, but to such wine as would be sweet to a friend, and on that account is more valuable and pleasant." But that furnishes a thought digressing  $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$

ἄλλο γένος; and besides, Ewald rightly remarks that Shulamith always uses the word דודי of her beloved, and that the king never uses it in a similar sense. He contends, however, against the idea that Shulamith here interrupts Solomon; for he replies to me (*Jahrb.* IV. 75): "Such interruptions we certainly very frequently find in our ill-formed and dislocated plays; in the Song, however, not a solitary example of this is found, and one ought to hesitate in imagining such a thing." He prefers the reading לְדוּדִים [beloved ones], although possibly דודי, with *l*, abbreviated after the popular style of speech from *im*, may be the same word. But is this *l'dodim* not a useless addition? Is excellent wine good to the taste of friends merely; and does it linger longer in the palate of those not beloved than of those loving? And is the circumstance that Shulamith interrupts the king, and carries forward his words, not that which frequently also occurs in the Greek drama, as *eg.* Eurip. *Phœnissæ*, v. 608? The text as it stands before us requires an interchange of the speakers, and nothing prevents the supposition of such an interchange. In this idea Hengstenberg for once agrees with us. The *Lamed* in *l'dodi* is meant in the same sense as when the bride drinks to the bridegroom, using the expression *l'dodi*. The *Lamed* in לְחַיִּים is that of the defining norm, as the *Beth* in בַּסֵּךְ, Prov. xxiii. 31, is that of the accompanying circumstance: that which tastes badly sticks in the palate, but that which tastes pleasantly glides down directly and smoothly. But what does the phrase רֹכֵב טַף וְנִי mean? The LXX. translate by *ικανούμενος χεῖλεσί μου καὶ ὀδοῦσιν*, "accommodating itself (Sym. προστιθέμενος) to my lips and teeth." Similarly Jerome (omitting at least the false μου), *labiisque et dentibus illius ad ruminandum*, in which רֹכֵב, *rumor*, for רֹכֵב, seems to have led him to *ruminare*. Equally contrary to the text with Luther's translation: "which to my friend goes smoothly down, and speaks of the previous year;" a rendering which supposes טַף (as also the Venet.) instead of חַיִּים (good wine which, as it were, tells of former years), and, besides, disregards נִי. The translation: "which comes at unawares upon the lips of the sleepers," accords with the language (Heiligst., Hitz.). But that gives no meaning, as if one understood by טַף, as Gesen. and Ewald do, *una in eodem toro cubantes*; but in this case the word ought to have been טַפְּכִי. Since, besides, such a thing is known as sleeping through drink or speaking in sleep, but not of drinking in sleep, our earlier translation approves itself: which causes the lips of sleepers to speak. This interpretation is also supported by a proverb in the Talm. *Jebamoth* 97a, *Jer. Mo'ed Katan*, iii. 7, etc., which, with reference to the passage under

review, says that if any one in this world adduces the saying of a righteous man in his name (שפתותיו דובבות בקבר, מרחשות or רוחשות). But it is an error inherited from Buxtorf, that דובבות means there *loquuntur*, and, accordingly, that דובב of this passage before us means *loqui faciens*. It rather means (*vid.* Aruch), *bullire, stillare, manare* (cogn. זב, טף, Syn. רחש), since, as that proverb signifies, the deceased experiences an after-taste of his saying, and this experience expresses itself in the smack of the lips; and דובב, whether it be part. *Kal* or *Po.* = מְדוּבָב, thus: brought into the condition of the overflowing, the after-experience of drink that has been partaken of, and which returns again, as it were, *ruminando*. The meaning "to speak" is, in spite of Parchon and Kimchi (whom the Venet., with its *φθεγγόμενος*, follows), foreign to the verb; for דָּבַר also means, not discourse, but sneaking, and particularly sneaking calumny, and, generally, *fama repens*. The calumniator is called in Arab. *dabûb*, as in Heb. דָּבִיל. We now leave it undecided whether in דובב, of this passage before us, that special idea connected with it in the Gemara is contained; but the roots דב and זב are certainly cogn., they have the fundamental idea of a soft, noiseless movement generally, and modify this according as they are referred to that which is solid or fluid. Consequently דָּבַב, as it means in *lente incedere* (whence the bear has the name דָּב), is also capable of being interpreted *leniter se movere*, and trans. *leniter movere*, according to which the Syr. here translates, *quod commovet labia mea et dentes meos* (this absurd bringing in of the teeth is from the LXX. and Aq.), and the Targ. allegorizes, and whatever also in general is the meaning of the Gemara as far as it exchanges דובבות for רוחשות (*vid.* Levy under רחש). Besides, the translations *qui commovet* and *qui loqui facit* fall together according to the sense. For when it is said of generous wine, that it makes the lips of sleepers move, a movement is meant expressing itself in the sleeper speaking. But generous wine is a figure of the love-responses of the beloved, sipped in, as it were, with pleasing satisfaction, which hover still around the sleepers in delightful dreams, and fill them with hallucinations.

It is impossible that לְדוּרִי in ver. 10 has any other reference than it has in ver. 11, where it is without doubt Shulamith who speaks.

Ver. 11 I am my beloved's,  
And to me goeth forth his desire.

After the words "I am my beloved's," we miss the "and my beloved is mine" of vi. 3, cf. ii. 16, which perhaps had dropped out. The second line here refers back to Gen. iii. 16, for here, as there, תְּשׁוּקָה, from שָׁק, to impel, move, is the impulse of love as a natural power.

When a wife is the object of such passion, it is possible that, on the one side, she feels herself very fortunate therein; and, on the other side, if the love, in its high commendations, becomes excessive, oppressed, and when she perceives that in her love-relation she is the observed of many eyes, troubled. It is these mingled feelings which move Shulamith when she continues the praise so richly lavished on her in words which denote what she might be to the king, but immediately breaks off in order that, as the following verse now shows, she might use this superabundance of his love for the purpose of setting forth her request, and thus of leading into another path; her simple, child-like disposition longs for the quietness and plainness of rural life, away from the bustle and display of city and court life.

Ver. 12 Up, my lover; we will go into the country,  
Lodge in the villages.

Hitzig here begins a new scene, to which he gives the superscription: "Shulamith making haste to return home with her lover." The advocate of the shepherd-hypothesis thinks that the faithful Shulamith, after hearing Solomon's panegyric, shakes her head and says: "I am my beloved's." To him she calls, "Come, my beloved;" for, as Ewald seeks to make this conceivable: the golden confidence of her near triumph lifts her in spirit forthwith above all that is present and all that is actual; only to him may she speak; and as if she were half here and half already there, in the midst of her rural home along with him, she says, "Let us go out into the fields," etc. In fact, there is nothing more incredible than this Shulamitess, whose dialogue with Solomon consists of Solomon's addresses, and of answers which are directed, not to Solomon, but in a monologue to her shepherd; and nothing more cowardly and more shadowy than this lover, who goes about in the moonlight seeking his beloved shepherdess whom he has lost, glancing here and there through the lattices of the windows and again disappearing. How much more justifiable is the drama of the Song by the French Jesuit C. F. Menestrier (born in Sion 1631, died 1705), who, in his two little works on the opera and the ballet, speaks of Solomon as the creator of the opera, and regards the Song as a shepherd-play, in which his love-relation to the daughter of the king of Egypt is set forth under the allegorical figures of the love of a shepherd and a shepherdess!<sup>1</sup> For Shulamith is thought of as a רֶעֶה [shepherdess], i. 8, and she thinks of Solomon

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Eugène Despris in the *Revue politique et littéraire* 1873. The idea was not new. This also was the sentiment of Fray Luis de Leon; *vid.* his *Biographie* by Wilkens (1866), p. 209.

as a רֹעֶה [shepherd]. She remains so in her inclination even after her elevation to the rank of a queen. The solitude and glory of external nature are dearer to her than the bustle and splendour of the city and the court. Hence her pressing out of the city to the country. הַשָּׂדֶה is local, without external designation, like *rus* (to the country). כְּפָרִים (here and at 1 Chron. xxvii. 25) is plur. of the unused form כְּפָר (const. כֶּפֶר, Josh. xviii. 24) or כֶּפֶר, Arab. *kafar* (cf. the Syr. dimin. *kafrûno*, a little town), instead of which it is once pointed כְּפָר, 1 Sam. vi. 18, of that name of a district of level country with which a multitude of later Palest. names of places, such as כְּפָר נָחוּם, are connected. Ewald, indeed, understands *k'phārim* as at iv. 13: we will lodge among the fragrant Al-henna bushes. But yet כְּפָר cannot be equivalent to תַּחַת הַכְּפָרִים; and since לֵן (probably changed from לֵיל) and הַשִּׁכִּים, 13a, stand together, we must suppose that they wished to find a bed in the henna bushes; which, if it were conceivable, would be too gipsy-like, even for a pair of lovers of the rank of shepherds (*vid.* Job xxx. 7). No. Shulamith's words express a wish for a journey into the country: they will there be in freedom, and at night find shelter (בְּכֶפֶר, as 1 Chron. xxvii. 25 and Neh. vi. 2, where also the plur. is similarly used), now in this and now in that country place. Spoken to the supposed shepherd, that would be comical, for a shepherd does not wander from village to village; and that, returning to their home, they wished to turn aside into villages and spend the night there, cannot at all be the meaning. But spoken of a shepherdess, or rather a vine-dresser, who has been raised to the rank of queen, it accords with her relation to Solomon,—they are married,—as well as with the inexpressible impulse of her heart after her earlier homely country-life. The former vine-dresser, the child of the Galilean hills, the lily of the valley, speaks in the verses following.

Ver. 13 In the morning we will start for the vineyards,  
 See whether the vine is in bloom,  
 Whether the vine-blossoms have opened,  
 The pomegranates budded—  
 There will I give thee my love.

14 The mandrakes breathe a pleasant odour,  
 And over our doors are all kinds of excellent fruits,  
 New, also old,  
 Which, my beloved, I have kept for thee.

As the rising up early follows the tarrying over night, the description of that which is longed for moves forward. As הַשִּׁכִּים is denom. of שָׁכַם, and properly signifies only to shoulder, i.e. to rise, make oneself ready, when early going forth needs to be designated it has

generally פִּנְקֵי (cf. Josh. vi. 15) along with it; yet this word may also be wanting, 1 Sam. ix. 26, xvii. 16. נִשְׁכַּ' וְנָלַף לְכוֹ' = נִשְׁכַּ' לְכוֹ', an abbreviation of the expression which is also found in hist. prose, Gen. xix. 27; cf. 2 Kings xix. 9. They wished in the morning, when the life of nature can best be observed, and its growth and progress and striving upwards best contemplated, to see whether the vine had opened, *i.e.* unfolded (thus, vi. 11), whether the vine-blossom (*vid.* at ii. 13) had expanded (LXX. ἡνθισεν ὁ κυπρισμός), whether the pomegranate had its flowers or flower-buds (הִנָּח, as at vi. 11); פָּתַח is here, as at Isa. xlviii. 8, lx. 11, used as internally transitive: to accomplish or to undergo the opening, as also (Arab.) *fattah*<sup>1</sup> is used of the blooming of flowers, for (Arab.) *tafttah* (to unfold). The vineyards, inasmuch as she does not say כְּרִמְיָי, are not alone those of her family, but generally those of her home, but of *her* home; for these are the object of her desire, which in this pleasant journey with her beloved she at once in imagination reaches, flying, as it were, over the intermediate space. There, in undisturbed quietness, and in a lovely region consecrating love, will she give herself to him in the entire fulness of her love. By יָרֵי she means the evidences of her love (*vid.* under iv. 10, i. 2), which she will there grant to him as thankful responses to his own. Thus she speaks in the spring-time, in the month Ijjar, corresponding to our *Wonnemond* (pleasure-month, May), and seeks to give emphasis to her promise by this, that she directs him to the fragrant "mandragoras," and to the precious fruits of all kinds which she has kept for him on the shelf in her native home.

יָרֵי (after the form לֵילִי), love's flower, is the *mandragora officinalis*, L., with whitish green flowers and yellow apples of the size of nutmegs, belonging to the Solanaceae; its fruits and roots are used as an aphrodisiac, therefore this plant was called by the Arabs *abd al-sal'm*, the servant of love, *postillon d'amour*; the son of Leah found such mandrakes (LXX. Gen. xxx. 14, μῆλα μανδραγορῶν) at the time of the vintage, which falls in the month of Ijjar; they have a strong but pleasant odour. In Jerusalem mandrakes are rare; but so much the more abundantly are they found growing wild in Galilee, whither Shulamith is transported in spirit. Regarding the מְנָרִים (from מָנַר, occurring in the sing. exclusively in the blessing of Moses, Deut. xxxiii.), which in the Old Testament is peculiar to the Song, *vid.* iv. 13, 16. From "over our doors," down to "I have kept for thee," is, according to the LXX., Syr., Jerome, and others, one sentence, which in itself is not inadmissible; for the object can precede

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Fleischer, *Makkari*, 1868, p. 271.

its verb, iii. 3*b*, and can stand as the subject between the place mentioned and the verb, Isa. xxxii. 13*a*, also as the object, 2 Chron. xxxi. 6, which, as in the passage before us, may be interpunctuated with *Athnach* for the sake of emphasis; in the bibl. Chald. this inverted sequence of the words is natural, *e.g.* Dan. ii. 17*b*. But such a long-winded sentence is at least not in the style of the Song, and one does not rightly see why just "over our doors" has the first place in it. I therefore formerly translated it as did Luther, dividing it into parts: "and over our doors are all kinds of precious fruits; I have," etc. But with this departure from the traditional division of the verse nothing is gained; for the "keeping" (laying up) refers naturally to the fruits of the preceding year, and in the first instance can by no means refer to fruits of this year, especially as Shulamith, according to the structure of the poem, has not visited her parental home since her home-bringing in marriage, and now for the first time, in the early summer, between the barley harvest and the wheat harvest, is carried away thither in her longing. Therefore the expression, "my beloved, I have kept for thee," is to be taken by itself, but not as an independent sentence (Böttch.), but is to be rendered, with Ewald, as a relative clause; and this, with Hitz., is to be referred to זָנִיתִי (old). *Col* refers to the many sorts of precious fruits which, after the time of their ingathering, are divided into "new and old" (Matt. xiii. 52). The plur. "our doors," which as amplif. poet. would not be appropriate here, supposes several entrances into her parents' home; and since "I have kept" refers to a particular preserving of choice fruits, *al* does not (Hitzig) refer to a floor, such as the floor above the family dwelling or above the barn, but to the shelf above the inner doors, a board placed over them, on which certain things are wont to be laid past for some particular object. She speaks to the king like a child; for although highly elevated, she yet remains, without self-elation, a child.

If Solomon now complies with her request, yields to her invitation, then she will again see her parental home, where, in the days of her first love, she laid up for him that which was most precious, that she might thereby give him joy. Since she thus places herself with her whole soul back again in her home and amid its associations, the wish expressed in these words that follow rises up within her in the childlike purity of her love:

Chap. viii. 1 O that thou wert like a brother to me,  
 Who sucked my mother's breasts!  
 If I found thee without, I would kiss thee;  
 They also could not despise me.

- 2 I would lead thee, bring thee into my mother's house;  
 Thou wouldest instruct me—  
 I would give thee to drink spiced wine,  
 The must of my pomegranates.

Solomon is not her brother, who, with her, hung upon the same mother's breast; but she wishes, carried away in her dream into the reality of that she wished for, that she had him as her brother, or rather, since she says, not  $\alpha\beta$ , but  $\alpha\beta\delta$  (with  $\delta$ , which here has not, as at 1's xxxv. 14, the meaning of *tantum*, but of *instar*, as at Job xxiv. 14), that she had in him what a brother is to a sister. In that case, if she found him without, she would kiss him (hypothesis fut. in the protasis, and fut. without *Vav* in the apodosis, as at Job xx. 24; Hos. viii. 12; Ps. cxxxix. 18)—she could do this without putting any restraint on herself for the sake of propriety (cf. the kiss of the wanton harlot, Prov. vii. 13), and also ( $\delta$ ) without needing to fear that they who saw it would treat it scornfully ( $\delta$   $\alpha\beta$ , as in the reminiscence, Prov. vi. 30). The close union which lies in the sisterly relationship thus appeared to her to be higher than the near connection established by the marriage relationship, and her childlike feeling deceived her not: the sisterly relationship is certainly purer, firmer, more enduring than that of marriage, so far as this does not deepen itself into an equality with the sisterly, and attain to friendship, yea, brotherhood (Prov. xvii. 17), within. That Shulamith thus feels herself happy in the thought that Solomon was to her as a brother, shows, in a characteristic manner, that "the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life," were foreign to her. If he were her brother, she would take him by the hand,<sup>1</sup> and bring him into her mother's house, and he would then, under the eye of their common mother, become her teacher, and she would become his scholar. The LXX. adds, after the words "into my mother's house," the phrase, *καὶ εἰς ταμίον τῆς συλλαβούσης με*, cf. iii. 4. In the same manner also the Syr., which has not read the words *διδάξεις με* following, which are found in some Codd. of the LXX. Regarding the word *clamm'dene* (thou wouldest instruct me) as incongruous, Hiizig asks: What should he then teach her? He refers it to her mother: "who would teach me," namely, from her own earlier experience, how I might do everything rightly for him. "Were the meaning," he adds, "he should do it, then also it is she who ought to be represented as led home by him

<sup>1</sup> Ben-Asher punctuates  $\alpha\beta\delta$ . Thus also P. rightly. Ben-Naphtali, on the contrary, punctuates  $\alpha\beta\alpha\beta$ . Cf. *German* (1862), p. 85, note 2.

into his house, the bride by the bridegroom." But, correctly, Jerome, the Venet., and Luther: "Thou wouldest (shouldest) instruct me;" also the Targ.: "I would conduct thee, O King Messiah, and bring Thee into the house of my sanctuary; and Thou wouldest teach me (וְתִלְמַדְנִי) to fear God and to walk in His ways." Not her mother, but Solomon, is in possession of the wisdom which she covets; and if he were her brother, as she wishes, then she would constrain him to devote himself to her as her teacher. The view, favoured by Leo Hebraeus (*Dialog. de amore*, c. III.), John Pordage (*Metaphysik*, III. 617 ff.), and Rosenmüller, and which commends itself, after the analogy of the Gītāgovinda, Boethius, and Dante, and appears also to show itself in the Syr. title of the book, "Wisdom of the Wise," that Shulamith is wisdom personified (cf. also viii. 2 with Prov. ix. 2, and viii. 3, ii. 6 with Prov. iv. 8), shatters itself against this חֶלְמִדָּנִי; the fact is rather the reverse: Solomon is wisdom in person, and Shulamith is the wisdom-loving soul,<sup>1</sup>—for Shulamith wishes to participate in Solomon's wisdom. What a deep view the "Thou wouldest teach me" affords into Shulamith's heart! She knew how much she yet came short of being to him all that a wife should be. But in Jerusalem the bustle of court life and the burden of his regal duties did not permit him to devote himself to her; but in her mother's house, if he were once there, he would instruct her, and she would requite him with her spiced wine and with the juice of the pomegranates. יַיִן הַרְקָה, *vinum conditura*, is appos. = genitiv. יַיִן הַרְקָה, *vinum conditurae* (ἀρωματῖτης in Dioscorides and Pliny), like יַיִן תֵּבֶרֶת, Ps. vi. 5, מִים לַחַץ, 1 Kings xxii. 27, etc., *vid.* Philippi's *Stat. Const.* p. 86. אֶשְׁקֶה carries forward אֶשְׁקֶה in a beautiful play upon words. עָסִים designates the juice as pressed out: the Chald. עָסִי corresponds to the Heb. רָדָה, used of treading the grapes. It is unnecessary to render רִמּוֹנֵי as apoc. plur., like מְנֵי, Ps. xlv. 9 (Ewald, § 177a); *rimmoni* is the name she gives to the pomegranate trees belonging to her,—for it is true that this word, *rimmon*, can be used in a collective sense (Deut. viii. 8); but the connection with the possessive suff. excludes this; or by 'asis *rimmoni* she means the pomegranate must (cf. ποῦνης = *vinum e punicis*, in Dioscorides and Pliny) belonging to her. Pomegranates are not to be thought of as an erotic symbol;<sup>2</sup> they are named as something beautiful and precious. "O Ali," says a proverb of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. my *Das Hohelied unter. u. ausg.* (1851), pp. 65-73.

<sup>2</sup> *Vid.* Porphyrius, *de Abstin.* iv. 16, and Inman in his smutty book, *Ancient Faiths*, vol. I. 1868, according to which the pomegranate is an emblem of "a full womb."

Sunna, "eat eagerly only pomegranates (Pers. *anâr*), for their grains are from Paradise."<sup>1</sup>

Resigning herself now dreamily to the idea that Solomon is her brother, whom she may freely and openly kiss, and her teacher besides, with whom she may sit in confidential intercourse under her mother's eye, she feels herself as if closely embraced by him, and calls from a distance to the daughters of Jerusalem not to disturb this her happy enjoyment:

Ver. 3 His left hand is under my head,  
And his right doth embrace me:  
4 I adjure you, ye daughters of Jerusalem,  
That ye awake not and disturb not love  
Till she please!

Instead of  $\text{לְתַתָּה}$ , "underneath," there is here, as usual,  $\text{תַּתָּה}$  (cf. 5b). Instead of  $\text{אִם . . . אִם}$  in the adjuration, there is here the equivalent  $\text{הֲאִם . . . וְהִם}$ ; the interrogative  $\text{הֲאִם}$ , which in the Arab. *mâ* becomes negat., appears here, as at Job xxxi. 1, on the way toward this change of meaning. The *per capreas vel per cervas agri* is wanting, perhaps because the natural side of love is here broken, and the  $\epsilon\rho\omega\varsigma$  strives up into  $\alpha\gamma\acute{\alpha}\pi\eta$ . The daughters of Jerusalem must not break in upon this holy love-festival, but leave it to its own course.

## SIXTH ACT.

### THE RATIFICATION OF THE COVENANT OF LOVE IN SHULAMITH'S NATIVE HOME.—CHAP. VIII. 5-14.

#### FIRST SCENE OF THE SIXTH ACT, VIII. 5-7.

Shulamith's longing wish attains its satisfaction. Arm in arm with Solomon, she comes forth and walks with him on her native ground. Sunem (Sulem), at the west end of Little Hermon (*Gebel ed-Duhî*), lay something more than  $1\frac{1}{2}$  hour<sup>2</sup> to the north of Jezreel (*Zera'in*), which also lay at the foot of a mountain, viz. on a N.-W. spur of Gilboa. Between the two lay the valley of Jezreel in the "great plain," which was called, 2 Chron. xxxv. 22, Zech. xii. 11, "the valley of *Megiddo*" [Esdraelon], now *Merj ibn 'Amir*—an extensive level plain, which, seen from the south Galilean hills in the spring-

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Fleischer's *Catal. Codd. Lips.* p. 428.

<sup>2</sup> Vid. "Jisreel" in Schenkel's *Bib. Lex.*

time, appears "like a green sea encompassed by gently sloping banks." From this we will have to suppose that the loving pair from the town of Jezreel, the highest point of which afforded a wide, pleasant prospect, wandered on foot through the "valley of Jezreel," a beautiful, well-watered, fruitful valley, which is here called *מדבר*, as being uncultivated pasture land. They bend their way toward the little village lying in the valley, from which the dark sloping sides of Little Hermon rise up suddenly. Here in this valley are the countrymen (*populares*) of these wanderers, as yet unrecognised from a distance, into whose mouth the poet puts these words:

Ver. 5a Who is this coming up out of the wilderness,  
Leaning on her beloved?

The third Act, iii. 6, began with a similar question to that with which the sixth here commences. The former closed the description of the growth of the love-relation, the latter closes that of the consummated love-relation. Instead of "out of the wilderness," the LXX. has "clothed in white" (*λελευκανθισμένη*); the translator has gathered *מתחננת* from the illegible consonants of his MS. before him. On the contrary, he translates *מתרפק* correctly by *ἐπιστηριζομένη* (Symm. *ἐπερειδομένη*, Venet. *κεκμηκυῖα ἐπί*, wearily supporting herself on . . .), while Jerome renders it unsuitably by *deliciis affluens*, interchanging the word with *מתפנקת*. But *התרפק*, common to the Heb. with the Arab. and Aethiop., signifies to support oneself, from *רפק*, *sublevare* (French, *soulager*), Arab. *rafaka*, *rafuka*, to be helpful, serviceable, compliant, viii. *irtafaka*, to support oneself on the elbow, or (with the elbow) on a pillow (cf. *rafik*, fellow-traveller, *rufka*, a company of fellow-travellers, from the primary idea of mutually supporting or being helpful to each other); Aethiop. *rafaka*, to encamp for the purpose of taking food, *ἀνακλίνεσθαι* (cf. John xiii. 23). That Shulamith leant on her beloved, arose not merely from her weariness, with the view of supplementing her own weakness from his fulness of strength, but also from the ardour of the love which gives to the happy and proud Solomon, raised above all fears, the feeling of his having her in absolute possession. The road brings the loving couple near to the apple tree over against Shulamith's parental home, which had been the witness of the beginning of their love.

Ver. 5b Under the apple tree I waked thy love:  
There thy mother travailed with thee;  
There travailed she that bare thee.

The words, "under the apple tree I waked thee," *עוררתיך*, might be

regarded as those of Shulamith to Solomon: here, under this apple tree, where Solomon met with her, she won his first love; for the words cannot mean that she wakened him from sleep under the apple tree, since ערר has nowhere the meaning of הקיץ and העיר here given to it by Hitzig, but only that of "to stir, to stir up, to arouse;" and only when sleep or a sleepy condition is the subject, does it mean "to shake out of sleep, to rouse up" (*vid.* under ii. 7). But it is impossible that "there" can be used by Shulamith even in the sense of the shepherd hypothesis; for the pair of lovers do not wander to the parental home of the lover, but of his beloved. We must then here altogether change the punctuation of the text, and throughout restore the fem. suffix forms as those originally used: חֲבִלְתֶּךָ אֶשֶׁר, עֲרָרְתִּי, and יִלְדְּתִי (cf. שׁ, Isa. xlvii. 10), in which we follow the example of the Syr. The allegorizing interpreters also meet only with trouble in regarding the words as those of Shulamith to Solomon. If הַתְּמוֹה were an emblem of the Mount of Olives, which, being wonderfully divided, gives back Israel's dead (Targ.), or an emblem of Sinai (Rashi), in both cases the words are more appropriately regarded as spoken to Shulamith than by her. Aben-Ezra correctly reads them as the words of Shulamith to Solomon, for he thinks on prayers, which are like golden apples in silver bowls; Hahn, for he understands by the apple tree, Canaan, where with sorrow his people brought him forth as their king; Hengstenberg, rising up to a remote-lying comparison, says, "the mother of the heavenly Solomon is at the same time the mother of Shulamith." Hoelemann thinks on Sur. xix. 32 f., according to which 'Isa, Miriam's son, was born under a palm tree; but he is not able to answer the question, What now is the meaning here of the apple tree as Solomon's birthplace? If it were indeed to be interpreted allegorically, then by the apple tree we would rather understand the "tree of knowledge" of Paradise, of which Aquila, followed by Jerome, with his ἐκεῖ διὰ φθάρη, appears to think,—a view which recently Godet approves of;<sup>2</sup> there Shulamith, i.e. poor humanity,

<sup>1</sup> חֲבִלְתֶּךָ, penult. accented, and Lamed with Pathach in P. This is certainly right. *Michlol* 33a adduces merely יִלְדְּתִי of the verse as having Kametz, on account of the pause, and had thus in view חֲבִלְתֶּךָ, with the Pathach under Lamed. But P. has also חֲבִלְתֶּךָ, with Pathach under Daleth, and so also has H, with the remark פתחין ב' (viz. here and Jer. xxii. 26). The *Biblia Rabbinica* 1526 and 1615 have also the same pointing, Pathach under Daleth. In the printed list of words having Pathach in pause, this word is certainly not found. But it is found in the ms. list of the *Ochla veochla*, at Halle.

<sup>2</sup> Others, e.g. Bruno von Asti (+ 1123) and the Waldensian Exposition, edited

awakened the compassionate love of the heavenly Solomon, who then gave her, as a pledge of this love, the *Protevangelium*, and in the neighbourhood of this apple tree, *i.e.* on the ground and soil of humanity fallen, but yet destined to be saved, Shulamith's mother, *i.e.* the pre-Christian O. T. church, brought forth the Saviour from itself, who in love raised Shulamith from the depths to regal honour. But the Song of Songs does not anywhere set before us the task of extracting from it by an allegorizing process such far-fetched thoughts. If the masc. suff. is changed into the fem., we have a conversation perfectly corresponding to the situation. Solomon reminds Shulamith by that memorable apple tree of the time when he kindled within her the fire of first love; עוֹרֵר elsewhere signifies energy (Ps. lxxx. 3), or passion (Prov. x. 12), put into a state of violent commotion; connected with the accus. of the person, it signifies, Zech. ix. 13, excited in a warlike manner; here, placed in a state of pleasant excitement of love that has not yet attained its object. Of how many references to contrasted affections the reflex. 'הָחֵר is capable, is seen from Job xvii. 8, xxxi. 29; why not thus also עוֹרֵר?

With נֶשְׂמָה Solomon's words are continued, but not in such a way as that what follows also took place under the apple tree. For Shulamith is not the child of Beduins, who in that case might even have been born under an apple tree. Among the Beduins, a maiden accidentally born at the watering-place (*menhîl*), on the way (*rahîl*), in the dew (*tall*) or snow (*thelg*), is called from that circumstance *Munéhîl*, *Ruhêla*, *Talla*, or *Thelga*.<sup>1</sup> The birthplace of her love is not also the birthplace of her life. As הַחֶפְזָה points to the apple tree to which their way led them, so נֶשְׂמָה points to the end of their way, the parental home lying near by (Hitzig). The LXX. translates well: ἐκεῖ ὠδύνησέ σε ἡ μήτηρ σου, for while the Arab. *ḥabîda* means *concupere*, and its Pi., *ḥabbada*, is the usual word for *gravidam facere*, חָבַל in the passage before us certainly appears to be<sup>2</sup> a denom.

by Herzog in the *Zeit. für hist. Theol.* 1861: *malum* = *cruz dominica*. Th. Harms (1870) quotes ii. 3, and remarks: The church brings forth her children under the apple tree, Christ. Into such absurdities, in violation of the meaning of the words, do the allegorizing interpreters wander.

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Wetstein's *Inscriptiones* (1864), p. 336.

<sup>2</sup> The Arab. *ḥabîlat*, she has conceived, and is in consequence pregnant, accords in the latter sense with *ḥamîlat*, she bears, *i.e.* is pregnant, without, however, being, as Hitzig thinks, of a cognate root with it. For *ḥamal* signifies to carry; *ḥabâl*, on the contrary, to comprehend and to receive (whence also the cord, figuratively, the tie of love, *liaison*, as enclosing, embracing, is called *ḥabl*, חֶבֶל), and like the Lat. *concupere* and *suscipere*, is used not only in a sexual, but also in an ethical sense, to

*Pi* in the sense of "to bring forth with sorrow" (חֲבָלֵי הַיָּלֶדָה). The LXX. further translates: ἐκεῖ ὠδυνήσῃ σε ἡ τεκοῦσά σε, in which the *σε* is inserted, and is thus, as also by the Syr., Jerome, and Venet., translated, with the obliteration of the finite יֵלְדָהּ, as if the reading were יֵלְדָהּ. But not merely is the name of the mother intentionally changed, it is also carried forward from the labour, *eniti*, to the completed act of birth.

After Solomon has thus called to remembrance the commencement of their love-relation, which receives again a special consecration by the reference to Shulamith's parental home, and to her mother, Shulamith answers with a request to preserve for her this love.

Ver. 6 Place me as a signet-ring on thy heart,  
As a signet-ring on thine arm!  
For strong as death is love;  
Inexorable as hell is jealousy:  
Its flames are flames of fire,  
A flame of Jah.

7 Mighty waters are unable  
To quench such love,  
And rivers cannot overflow it.  
If a man would give  
All the wealth of his house for love,—  
He would only be contemned.

The signet-ring, which is called חֶטֶם (חֶטֶם, to impress), was carried either by a string on the breast, Gen. xxxviii. 18, or also, as that which is called טַבַּעַת denotes (from טָבַעַ, to sink into), on the hand, Jer. xxii. 24, cf. Gen. xli. 42, Ezech. iii. 12, but not on the arm, like a bracelet, 2 Sam. i. 10; and since it is certainly permissible to say "hand" for "finger," but not "arm" for "hand," so we may not refer "on thine arm" to the figure of the signet-ring, as if Shulamith had said, as the poet might also introduce her as saying: Make me like a signet-ring (טַבַּעַת) on thy breast; make me like a signet-ring "on thy hand," or "on thy right hand." The words, "set me on thy heart," and "(set me) on thine arm," must thus also, without regard to "as a signet-ring," express independent thoughts, although טַבַּעַת is chosen (*vid.* Hag. ii. 23) instead of חֶטֶם, in view of the comparison.<sup>1</sup> Thus, with right, Hitzig finds the

conceive anger, to take up and cherish sorrow. The Assyr. *habal*, corresponding to the Heb. בָּן, is explained from this Arab. *habl*, *concupere*. On the supposition that the Heb. had a word, חָבַל, of the same meaning as the Arab. *habl*, then חָבַל might mean *concupiende generare*; but the Heb. sentence lying before us leads to the interpretation *eniti*.

<sup>1</sup> Of the copy of the *Tóra*, which was to be the king's *vade-mecum*, it is said,

thought therein expressed: "Press me close to thy breast, enclose me in thine arms." But it is the first request, and not the second, which is in the form על-זרועך, and not על-זרועתיך (שימני), which refers to embracing, since the subject is not the relation of person and thing, but of person and person. The signet-ring comes into view as a jewel, which one does not separate from himself; and the first request is to this effect, that he would bear her thus inalienably (the art. is that of the specific idea) on his heart (Ex. xxviii. 29); the meaning of the second, that he would take her thus inseparably as a signet-ring on his arm (cf. Hos. xi. 3: "I have taught Ephraim also to go, taking them by their arms"), so that she might lie always on his heart, and have him always at her side (cf. Ps. cx. 5): she wishes to be united and bound to him indissolubly in the affection of love and in the community of life's experience.

The reason for the double request following כִּי, abstracted from the individual case, rises to the universality of the fact realized by experience, which specializes itself herein, and celebrates the praise of love; for, assigning a reason for her "set me," she does not say, "my love," nor "thy love," but אֶהְבֶּךָ, "love" (as also in the address at vii. 7). She means love undivided, unfeigned, entire, and not transient, but enduring; thus true and genuine love, such as is real, what the word denotes, which exhausts the conception corresponding to the idea of love.

קִנְיָה, which is here parallel to "love," is the jealousy of love asserting its possession and right of property; the reaction of love against any diminution of its possession, against any reserve in its response, the "self-vindication of angry love."<sup>1</sup> Love is a passion, i.e. a human affection, powerful and lasting, as it comes to light in "jealousy." *Zelus*, as defined by Dav. Chyträus, *est affectus mixtus ex amore et ira, cum videlicet amans aliquid irascitur illi, a quo laeditur res amata*, wherefore here the adjectives עָזִיז (strong) and קָשָׁה (hard, inexorable, firm, severe) are respectively assigned to "love" and "jealousy," as at Gen. xlix. 7 to "anger" and "wrath." It is much more remarkable that the energy of love, which, so to say, is the life of life, is compared to the energy of death and Hades; with at least equal right מָוֶת and מְשֹׁאֵל might be used, for love scorns both, outlasts both, triumphs over both (Rom. viii. 38 f.; 1 Cor. xv. 54 f.). But the text does not speak of surpassing, but of equality; not of love and jealousy that they surpass death and Hades,

*Sanhedrin* 21b: עוֹשָׂה אוֹתָהּ כַּמִּין קָמִיעַ וְחוּלָה בּוֹרוּעַ, but also there the amulet is thought of not as fastened to the finger, but as wound round the arm.

<sup>1</sup> Vid. my *Prolegomena* to Weber's *Vom Zorne Gottes* (1862), p. 35 ss.

but that they are equal to it. The point of comparison in both cases is to be obtained from the predicates.  $\text{וְ}$ , powerful, designates the person who, being assailed, cannot be overcome (Num. xiii. 28), and, assailing, cannot be withstood (Judg. xiv. 18). Death is obviously thought of as the assailer (Jer. ix. 20), against which nothing can hold its ground, from which nothing can escape, to whose sceptre all must finally yield ( $\text{וְאֵל}$  Pa. xlix.). Love is like it in this, that it also seizes upon men with irresistible force (Böttcher: "He whom Death assails must die, whom Love assails must love"); and when she has once assailed him, she rests not till she has him wholly under her power; she kills him, as it were, in regard to everything else that is not the object of his love.  $\text{קָשָׁה}$ , hard (opposed to  $\text{רַחֵם}$ , 2 Sam. iii. 39),  $\text{σκληρός}$ , designates one on whom no impression is made, who will not yield (Pa. xlviii. 4, xix. 4), or one whom stern fate has made inwardly stubborn and obdurate (1 Sam. i. 15). Here the point of comparison is inflexibility; for *Sheol*, thought of with  $\text{לָמָוֶת}$ , to ask ( $\text{וְאֵל}$  under Isa. v. 14), is the God-ordained messenger of wrath, who inexorably gathers in all that are on the earth, and holds them fast when once they are swallowed up by him. So the jealousy of love wholly takes possession of the beloved object not only in arrest, but also in safe keeping; she holds her possession firmly, that it cannot be taken from her (Wied. ii. 1), and burns relentlessly and inexorably against any one who does injury to her possession (Prov. vi. 34 f.). But when Shulamith wishes, in the words, "set me," etc., to be bound to the heart and to the arm of Solomon, has she in the clause assigning a reason the love in view with which she loves, or that with which she is loved? Certainly not the one to the exclusion of the other; but as certainly, first of all, the love with which she wishes to fill, and believes that she does fill, her beloved. If this is so, then with "for strong as death is love," she gives herself up to this love on the condition that it confesses itself willing to live only for her, and to be as if dead for all others; and with "inexorable as hell is jealousy," in such a manner that she takes shelter in the jealousy of this love against the occurrence of any fit of infidelity, since she consents therein to be wholly and completely absorbed by it.

To  $\text{נֶחֱמָה}$ , which proceeds from the primary idea of a red glow, there is connected the further description of this love to the sheltering and protecting power of which she gives herself up: "its flames,  $\text{וְנֶחֱמָהּ}$ , are flames of fire;" its sparkling is the sparkling of fire. The verb  $\text{נֶחֱמָה}$  signifies, in Syr. and Arab., to creep along, to make short steps; in Heb. and Chald., to sparkle, to flame, which

in Samar. is referred to impetuosity. Symmachus translates, after the Samar. (which Hitzig approves of): αἱ ὀρμαὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρμαὶ πύρινοι; the Venet., after Kimchi, ἀνθρακες, for he exchanges רֶשֶׁף with the probably non.-cogn. רִצְפָּה; others render it all with words which denote the bright glancings of fire. רֶשֶׁף (so here, according to the Masora; on the contrary, at Ps. lxxvi. 4, רֶשֶׁפִּי) are effulgurations; the pred. says that these are not only of a bright shining, but of a fiery nature, which, as they proceed from fire, so also produce fire, for they set on fire and kindle.<sup>1</sup> Love, in its flashings up, is like fiery flashes of lightning; in short, it is שְׁלֵהֶבְתִּיהָ,<sup>2</sup> which is thus to be written as one word with ה raphatum, according to the Masora; but in this form of the word יה is also the name of God, and more than a meaningless superlative strengthening of the idea. As לֵהֶבֶת is formed from the לָהֵב, to flame (R. לָב, to lick, like לָהֵט, R. לָט, to twist), so is שְׁלֵהֶבֶת, from the שָׁלַח, to cause to flame; this active stem is frequently found, especially in the Aram., and has in the Assyri. almost wholly supplanted the Afel (vid. Schrader in Deut. Morg. Zeit. xxvi. 275). שְׁלֵהֶבֶת is thus related primarily to לָהֵב, as inflammatio to (Ger.) Flamme; יה thus presents itself the more naturally to be interpreted as gen. subjecti. Love of a right kind is a flame not kindled and inflamed by man (Job xx. 26), but by God—the divinely-influenced free inclination of two souls to each other, and at the same time, as is now further said, 7a, 7b, a situation supporting all adversities and assaults, and a pure personal relation conditioned by nothing material. It is a fire-flame which mighty waters (רַבִּים, great and many, as at Hab. iii. 15; cf. עֵזִים, wild, Isa. xliii. 16) cannot extinguish, and streams cannot overflow it (cf. Ps. lxix. 3, cxxiv. 4) or sweep it away (cf. Job xiv. 19; Isa. xxviii. 17). Hitzig adopts the latter signification, but the figure of the fire makes the former more natural; no heaping up of adverse circumstances can extinguish true love, as many waters extinguish elemental

<sup>1</sup> The Phoen. Inscriptions, Citens. xxxvii., xxxviii., show a name for God, רֶשֶׁפִּי, or merely רֶשֶׁף, which appears to correspond to Ζεὺς Κεραύνιος on the Inscriptions of Larnax (vid. Vogué's *Mélanges Archéologiques*, p. 19). רֶשֶׁפִּי are thus not the arrows themselves (Grätz), but these are, as it were, lightnings from His bow (Ps. lxxvi. 4).

<sup>2</sup> Thus in the *Biblia Rabbinica* and P. H. with the note מִלְּהֶחָדָא וְלֹא מִפִּיק. Thus by Ben-Asher, who follows the Masora. Cf. *Liber Psalmorum Hebr. atque Lat.* p. 155, under Ps. cxviii. 5; and Kimchi, *Wörterb.*, under אָפַל and שְׁלֵהֶבֶת. Ben-Naphtali, on the other hand, reads as two words, שְׁלֵהֶבֶת יְהוָה. [Except in this word, the recensions of Ben-Asher and Ben-Naphtali differ only "de punctis vocalibus et accentibus." Strack's *Prolegomena*, p. 28.]

fire; no earthly power can suppress it by the strength of its assault, as streams drench all they sweep over in their flow—the flame of Jah is inextinguishable.

Nor can this love be bought; any attempt to buy it would be scorned and counted madness. The expression is like Prov. vi. 30 f.; cf. Num. xxii. 18; 1 Cor. xiii. 3. Regarding נָח (from נָח, (Arab.) *han*, *levem esse*), convenience, and that by which life is made comfortable, *vid.* at Prov. i. 13. According to the shepherd-hypothesis, here occurs the expression of the peculiar point of the story of the intercourse between Solomon and Shulamith; she scorns the offers of Solomon; her love is not to be bought, and it already belongs to another. But of offers we read nothing beyond i. 11, where, as in the following ver. 12, it is manifest that Shulamith is in reality excited in love. Hitzig also remarks under i. 12: "When the speaker says the fragrance of her nard is connected with the presence of the king, she means that only then does she smell the fragrance of nard, *i.e.* only his presence awakens in her heart pleasant sensations or sweet feelings." Shulamith manifestly thus speaks, also emphasizing vi. 12, the spontaneousness of her relation to Solomon; but Hitzig adds: "These words, i. 12, are certainly spoken by a court lady." But the Song knows only a chorus of the "Daughters of Jerusalem"—that court lady is only a phantom, by means of which Hitzig's ingenuity seeks to prop up the shepherd-hypothesis, the weakness of which his penetration has discerned. As we understand the Song, ver. 7 refers to the love with which Shulamith loves, as decidedly as *6b* to the love with which she is loved. Nothing in all the world is able to separate her from loving the king; it is love to his person, not love called forth by a desire for riches which he disposes of, not even by the splendour of the position which awaited her, but free, responsive love with which she answered free love making its approach to her. The poet here represents Shulamith herself as expressing the idea of love embodied in her. That apple tree, where he awaked first love in her, is a witness of the renewal of their mutual covenant of love; and it is significant that only here, just directly here, where the idea of the whole is expressed more fully, and in a richer manner than at vii. 7, is God denoted by His name, and that by His name as revealed in the history of redemption. Hitzig, Ewald, Olshausen, Böttcher, expand this concluding word, for the sake of rhythmic symmetry, to שְׁלֵבֶתָּהּ שְׁלֵבֶתָּהּ [its flames are flames of Jah]; but a similar conclusion is found at Ps. xxiv. 6, xlviii. 7, and elsewhere.

"I would almost close the book," says Herder in his *Lied der*

*Lieder* (Song of Songs), 1778, "with this divine seal. It is even as good as closed, for what follows appears only as an appended echo." Daniel Sanders (1845) closes it with ver. 7, places ver. 12 after i. 6, and cuts off vers. 8-11, 13, 14 as not original. Anthologists, like Döpke and Magnus, who treat the Song as the Fragmentists do the Pentateuch, find here their confused medley sanctioned. Umbreit also, 1820, although as for the rest recognising the Song as a compact whole, explains viii. 8-12, 13, 14 as a fragment, not belonging to the work itself. Hoelemann, however, in his *Krone des Hohenliedes* [Crown of the Song], 1856 (thus he names the "concluding Act," viii. 5-14), believes that there is here represented, not only in vers. 6, 7, but further also in vers. 8-12, the essence of true love—what it is, and how it is won; and then in viii. 13 f. he hears the Song come to an end in pure idyllic tones. We see in ver. 8 ff. the continuation of the love story practically idealized and set forth in dramatic figures. There is no inner necessity for this continuance. It shapes itself after that which has happened; and although in all history divine reason and moral ideas realize themselves, yet the material by means of which this is done consists of accidental circumstances and free actions passing thereby into reciprocal action. But ver. 8 ff. is the actual continuance of the story on to the completed conclusion, not a mere appendix, which might be wanting without anything being thereby missed. For after the poet has set before us the loving pair as they wander arm in arm through the green pasture-land between Jezreel and Sunem till they reach the environs of the parental home, which reminds them of the commencement of their love relations, he cannot represent them as there turning back, but must present to us still a glimpse of what transpired on the occasion of their visit there. After that first Act of the concluding scene, there is yet wanting a second, to which the first points.

SECOND SCENE OF THE FIFTH ACT, VIII. 8-14.

The locality of this scene is Shulamith's parental home. It is she herself who speaks in these words:

Ver. 8 We have a sister, a little one,  
And she has no breasts:  
What shall we do with our sister  
In the day when she will be sued for?

Between vers. 8 and 7 is a blank. The figure of the wanderers

is followed by the figure of the visitors. But who speaks here? The interchange of the scene permits that Shulamith conclude the one scene and begin the other, as in the first Act; or also that at the same time with the change of scene there is an interchange of persons, as *e.g.* in the third Act. But if Shulamith speaks, all her words are not by any means included in what is said from ver. 8 to ver. 10. Since, without doubt, she also speaks in ver. 11 f., this whole second figure consists of Shulamith's words, as does also the second of the second Act, iii. 1-5. But there Shulamith's address presents itself as the narrative of an experience, and the narrative dramatically framed in itself is thoroughly penetrated by the *I* of the speaker; but here, as *e.g.* Ewald, Heiligst., and Böttch. explain, she would begin with a dialogue with her brothers referable to herself, one that had formerly taken place—that little sister, Ewald remarks under ver. 10, stands here now grown up; she took notice of that severe word formerly spoken by her brothers, and can now joyfully before all exclaim, taking up the same flowery language, that she is a wall, etc. But that a monologue should begin with a dialogue without any introduction, is an impossibility; in this case the poet ought not to have left the expression, "of old my mother's sons said," to be supplemented by the reader or hearer. It is true, at iii. 2, v. 3, we have a former address introduced without any formal indication of the fact; but it is the address of the narrator herself. With ver. 8 there will thus begin a colloquy arising out of present circumstances. That in this conversation ver. 8 appertains to the brothers, is evident. This harsh *entweder oder* (*aut . . . aut*) is not appropriate as coming from Shulamith's mouth; it is her brothers alone, as Hoelemann rightly remarks, who utter these words, as might have been expected from them in view of i. 6. But does ver. 8 belong also to them? There may be two of them, says Hitzig, and the one may in ver. 9 reply to the question of the other in ver. 8; Shulamith, who has heard their conversation, suddenly interposes with ver. 10. But the transition from the first to the second scene is more easily explained if Shulamith proposes the question of ver. 8 for consideration. This is not set aside by Hitzig's questions: "Has she to determine in regard to her sister? and has she now for the first time come to do nothing in haste?" For (1) the dramatic figures of the Song follow each other chronologically, but not without blanks; and the poet does not at all require us to regard ver. 8 as Shulamith's first words after her entrance into her parental home; (2) but it is altogether seeming for Shulamith, who has now become independent, and who has been raised so high, to throw

out this question of loving care for her sister. Besides, from the fact that with ver. 8 there commences the representation of a present occurrence, it is proved that the sister here spoken of is not Shulamith herself. If it were Shulamith herself, the words of vers. 8, 9 would look back to what had previously taken place, which, as we have shown, is impossible. Or does vi. 9 require that we should think of Shulamith as having no sister? Certainly not, for so understood, these words would be purposeless. The "only one," then, does not mean the only one numerically, but, as at Prov. iv. 3, it is emphatic (Hitzig); she is called by Solomon the "only one" of her mother in this sense, that she had not one her equal.

Thus it is Shulamith who here speaks, and she is not the "sister" referred to. The words, "we have a sister . . .," spoken in the family circle, whether regarded as uttered by Shulamith or not, have something strange in them, for one member of a family does not need thus to speak to another. We expect: With regard to our sister, who is as yet little and not of full age, the question arises, What will be done when she has grown to maturity to guard her innocence? Thus the expression would have stood, but the poet separates it into little symmetrical sentences; for poetry presents facts in a different style from prose. Hoelem. has on this remarked that the words are not to be translated: we have a little sister, which the order of the words אָחוּת ק' וגו' would presuppose, Gen. xl. 20; cf. 2 Sam. iv. 4, xii. 2 f.; Isa. xxvi. 1, xxxiii. 21. "Little" is not immediately connected with "sister," but follows it as an apposition; and this appositional description lays the ground for the question: We may be now without concern; but when she is grown up and will be courted, what then? "Little" refers to age, as at 2 Kings v. 2; cf. Gen. xliv. 20. The description of the child in the words, "she has no breasts," has neither in itself nor particularly for Oriental feeling anything indecent in it (cf. *mammæ sororiarunt*, Ezek. xvi. 7). The ל following מִה־נַּעֲשֶׂה is here not thus purely the *dat. commodi*, as e.g. Isa. lxiv. 3 (to act for some one), but *indiff. dat.* (what shall we do for her?); but מִה is, according to the connection, as at Gen. xxvii. 37, 1 Sam. x. 2, Isa. v. 4, equivalent to: What conducing to her advantage? Instead of בַּיּוֹם, the form בְּיוֹם lay syntactically nearer (cf. Ex. vi. 28); the art. in בְּיוֹם is, as at Eccles. xii. 3, understood *demonst.*: that day when she will be spoken for, i.e. will attract the attention of a suitor. וְאֵרָא after וְיָבִיחַ may have manifold significations (*vid.* under Ps. lxxxvii. 3); thus the general signification of "concerning," 1 Sam. xix. 3, is modified in the sense of courting a wife, 1 Sam. xxv. 39. The brothers now take speech

in hand, and answer Shulamith's question as to what will have to be done for the future safety of their little sister when the time comes that she shall be sought for:

Ver. 9 If she be a wall,  
We will build upon her a pinnacle of silver;  
And if she be a door,  
We will block her up with a board of cedar-wood.

The brothers are the nearest guardians and counsellors of the sister, and, particularly in the matter of marriage, have the precedence even of the father and mother, Gen. xxiv. 50, 55, xxxiv. 6-8. They suppose two cases which stand in contrast to each other, and announce their purpose with reference to each case. Hoëlem. here affects a synonymous instead of the antithetic parallelism; for he maintains that **וְאִם** (**וְאִם**) . . . **וְאִם** nowhere denotes a contrast, but, like *sive* . . . *sive*, essential indifference. But examples such as Deut. xviii. 3 (*sive bovem, sive ovem*) are not applicable here; for this correl. **וְאִם** . . . **וְאִם**, denoting essential equality, never begins the antecedents of two principal sentences, but always stands in the component parts of one principal sentence. Wherever **וְאִם** . . . **וְאִם** commences two parallel conditional clauses, the parallelism is always, according to the contents of these clauses, either synonymous, Gen. xxxi. 50, Amos ix. 2-4, Eccles. xi. 3 (where the first **וְאִם** signifies *ac si*, and the second *sive*), or antithetic, Num. xvi. 29 f.; Job xxxvi. 11 f.; Isa. i. 19 f. The contrast between **וְאִם** (from **וְאִם**, Arab. *haman*, Modern Syr. *chamo*, to preserve, protect) and **וְאִם** (from **וְאִם**, to hang loose, of doors, Prov. xxvi. 14, which move hither and thither on their hinges) is obvious. A wall stands firm and withstands every assault if it serves its purpose (which is here presupposed, where it is used as a figure of firmness of character). A door, on the contrary, is moveable; and though it be for the present closed (**וְאִם** is intentionally used, and not **וְאִם**, *vid.* Gen. xix. 6), yet it is so formed that it can be opened again. A maiden inaccessible to seduction is like a wall, and one accessible to it is like a door. In the apodosis, 9a, the LXX. correctly renders **וְאִם** by *ἐπάλξεις*; Jerome, by *propugnacula*. But it is not necessary to read **וְאִם**. The verb **וְאִם**, cogn. **וְאִם**, signifies to surround, whence *tirah* (= Arab. *duār*), a round encampment, Gen. xxv. 16, and, generally, a habitation, Ps. lxix. 25; and then also, to range together, whence **וְאִם**, a rank, row (cf. Arab. *thur* and *daur*, which, in the manifoldness of their meanings, are parallel with the French *tour*), or also *tirah*, which, Ezek. xlvi. 23 (*vid.* Keil), denotes the row or layer of masonry,—in the passage before us, a row of battlements (Ew.), or a crown of the wall (Hitz.), *i.e.* battle-

ments as a wreath on the summit of a wall. Is she a wall,—*i.e.* does she firmly and successfully withstand all immoral approaches?—then they will adorn this wall with silver pinnacles (cf. Isa. liv. 12), *i.e.* will bestow upon her the high honour which is due to her maidenly purity and firmness; silver is the symbol of holiness, as gold is the symbol of nobility. In the apodosis 9b, *צור על* is not otherwise meant than when used in a military sense of enclosing by means of besieging, but, like Isa. xxix. 3, with the obj.-accus., of that which is pressed against that which is to be excluded; *צור* here means, forcibly to press against, as *סגר*, Gen. ii. 21, to unite by closing up.

*לית ארז* is a board or plank (cf. Ezek. xxvii. 5, of the double planks of a ship's side) of cedar wood (cf. Zeph. ii. 14, *ארז*, cedar wainscot). Cedar wood comes here into view not on account of the beautiful polish which it takes on, but merely because of its hardness and durability. Is she a door, *i.e.* accessible to seduction? they will enclose this door around with a cedar plank, *i.e.* watch her in such a manner that no seducer or lover will be able to approach her. By this morally stern but faithful answer, Shulamith is carried back to the period of her own maidenhood, when her brothers, with good intention, dealt severely with her. Looking back to this time, she could joyfully confess:

Ver. 10 I was a wall,  
And my breasts like towers;  
Then I became in his eyes  
Like one who findeth peace.

In the language of prose, the statement would be: Your conduct is good and wise, as my own example shows; of me also ye thus faithfully took care; and that I met this your solicitude with strenuous self-preservation, has become, to my joy and yours, the happiness of my life. That in this connection not *חומה אני*, but *אני חומה* has to be used, is clear: she compares herself with her sister, and the praise she takes to herself she takes to the honour of her brothers. The comparison of her breasts to towers is suggested by the comparison of her person to a wall; Kleuker rightly remarks that here the comparison is not of thing with thing, but of relation with relation: the breasts were those of her person, as the towers were of the wall, which, by virtue of the power of defence which they conceal within themselves, never permit the enemy, whose attention they attract, to approach them. The two substantival clauses, *murus et ubera mea instar turrium*, have not naturally a retrospective signification, as they would in a historical connection (*vid.* under Gen. ii. 10); but they become retrospective by the following "then I became," like Deut. xxvi. 5, by the historical tense following, where, however, it

is to be remarked that the expression, having in itself no relation to time, which is incapable of being expressed in German, mentions the past not in a way that excludes the present, but as including it. She was a wall, and her breasts like the towers, *i.e.* all seductions rebounded from her, and ventured not near her awe-inspiring attractions; then (וְעַתָּה, temporal, but at the same time consequent; thereupon, and for this reason, as at Ps. xl. 8, Jer. xxii. 15, etc.) she became in his (Solomon's) eyes as one who findeth peace. According to the shepherd-hypothesis, she says here: he deemed it good to forbear any further attempts, and to let me remain in peace (Ewald, Hitz., and others). But how is that possible? מָצָא שְׁלוֹם בְּעֵינַי is a variation of the frequently occurring מָצָא הוּן בְּעֵינַי, which is used especially of a woman gaining the affections of a man, Esth. ii. 17, Deut. xxiv. 1, Jer. xxxi. 2 f.; and the expression here used, "thus I was in his eyes as one who findeth peace," is only the more circumstantial expression for, "then I found (אוּ מָצָאתִי) in his eyes peace," which doubtless means more than: I brought it to this, that he left me further unmolested; שְׁלוֹם in this case, as syn. of הוּן, means inward agreement, confidence, friendship, as at Ps. xli. 10; there it means, as in the salutation of peace and in a hundred other cases, a positive good. And why should she use שְׁלוֹם instead of הוּן, but that she might form a play upon the name which she immediately, 11a, thereafter utters, שְׁלָמָה, which signifies, 1 Chron. xxii. 9, "The man of peace." That *Shulamith* had found *shalom* (peace) with *Sh'lomoh* (Solomon), cannot be intended to mean that uninjured she escaped from him, but that she had entered into a relation to him which seemed to her a state of blessed peace. The delicate description, "in his eyes," is designed to indicate that she appeared to him in the time of her youthful discipline as one finding peace. The כִּי is כִּי *veritatis*, *i.e.* the comparison of the fact with its idea, Isa. xxix. 2, or of the individual with the general and common, Isa. xlii. 6; Ezek. xxvi. 10; Zech. xiv. 3. Here the meaning is, that *Shulamith* appeared to him corresponding to the idea of one finding peace, and thus as worthy to find peace with him. One "finding peace" is one who gains the heart of a man, so that he enters into a relation of esteem and affection for her. This generalization of the idea also opposes the notion of a history of seduction. מוֹצֵאת is from the ground-form *matsiat*, the parallel form to מוֹצֵאת, 2 Sam. xviii. 22. Solomon has won her, not by persuasion or violence; but because she could be no other man's, he entered with her into the marriage covenant of peace (cf. Prov. ii. 17 with Isa. liv. 10).

It now lies near, at least rather so than remote, that Shulamith, thinking of her brothers, presents her request before her royal husband :

Ver. 11 Solomon had a vineyard in Baal-hamon ;  
He committed the vineyard to the keepers,  
That each should bring for its fruit  
A thousand in silver.

12 I myself disposed of my own vineyard :  
The thousand is thine, Solomon,  
And two hundred for the keepers of its fruit !

The words 'כָּרֶם הָיָה לְשִׁי' are to be translated after 'כָּרֶם וּנְוִי' 1 Kings xxi. 1, and 'לְיָדַי' . . . , Isa. v. 1, "Solomon had a vineyard" (cf. 1 Sam. ix. 2 ; 2 Sam. vi. 23, xii. 2 ; 2 Kings i. 17 ; 1 Chron. xxiii. 17, xxvi. 10), not "Solomon has a vineyard," which would have required the words 'כָּרֶם לְשִׁי', with the omission of הָיָה. I formerly explained, as also Böttcher : a vineyard became his, thus at present is his possession ; and thus explaining, one could suppose that it fell to him, on his taking possession of his government, as a component part of his domain ; but although in itself הָיָה לוֹ can mean, "this or that has become one's own" (e.g. Lev. xxi. 3), as well as "it became his own," yet here the historical sense is necessarily connected by הָיָה with the נָתַן foll. : Solomon has had . . . , he has given ; and since Solomon, after possessing the vineyard, would probably also preserve it, Hitzig draws from this the conclusion, that the poet thereby betrays the fact that he lived after the time of Solomon. But these are certainly words which he puts into Shulamith's mouth, and he cannot at least have forgotten that the heroine of his drama is a contemporary of Solomon ; and supposing that he had forgotten this for a moment, he must have at least once read over what he had written, and could not have been so blind as to have allowed this הָיָה which had escaped him to stand. We must thus assume that he did not in reality retain the vineyard, which, as Hitzig supposes, if he possessed it, he also "probably" retained, whether he gave it away, or exchanged it, or sold it, we know not ; but the poet might suppose that Shulamith knew it, since it refers to a piece of land lying not far from her home. For בְּעֵל הָמֶן, LXX. *Βεελαμών*, is certainly the same as that mentioned in Judith viii. 3, according to which Judith's husband died from sunstroke in Bethulia, and was buried beside his fathers "between *Dothaim* and *Balamōn*"<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This is certainly not the *Baal-Meon* (now *Main*) lying half an hour to the south of Heshbon ; there is also, however, a *Meon* (now *Main*) on this [the west] side of Jordan, Nabal's Maon, near to Carmel. *Vid.* art. "Maon," by Kleuker in Schenkel's *Bibl. Lex.*

(probably, as the sound of the word denotes, *Belmen*, or, more accurately, *Belmain*, as it is also called in Judith iv. 4, with which Kleuker in Schenkel's *Bibl. Lex.*, de Bruyn in his *Karte*, and others, interchange it; and בִּמְנָן, Josh. xix. 28, lying in the tribe of Asher). This *Balamōn* lay not far from Dothan, and thus not far from *Esdraēlon*; for Dothan lay (cf. Judith iii. 10) south of the plain of Jezreel, where it has been discovered, under the name of *Tell Dotan*, in the midst of a smaller plain which lies embosomed in the hills of the south.<sup>1</sup> The ancients, since Aquila, Symm., Targ., Syr., and Jerome, make the name of the place Baal-hamon subservient to their allegorizing interpretation, but only by the aid of soap-bubble-like fancies; e.g. Hengst. makes *Baal-hamon* designate the world; *nothrim* [keepers], the nations; the 1000 pieces in silver, the duties comprehended in the ten commandments. *Hamon* is there understood of a large, noisy crowd. The place may, indeed, have its name from the multitude of its inhabitants, or from an annual market held there, or otherwise from revelry and riot; for, according to Hitzig,<sup>2</sup> there is no ground for co-ordinating it with names such as *Baal-Gad* and *Baal-Zephon*, in which *Baal* is the general, and what follows the special name of God. *Amon*, the Sun-God, specially worshipped in Egyptian Thebes, has the bibl. name אֲמֹן, with which, after the sound of the word, accords the name of a place lying, according to *Jer. Demai* ii. 1, in the region of Tyrus, but not הַמֶּן. The reference to the Egypt. *Amon Ra*, which would direct rather to Baalbec, the Coele-Syrian Heliopolis, is improbable; because the poet would certainly not have introduced into his poem the name of the place where the vineyard lay, if this name did not call forth an idea corresponding to the connection. The Shulamitess, now become Solomon's, in order to support the request she makes to the king, relates an incident of no historical value in itself of the near-lying Sunem (Sulem), situated not far from Baal-hamon to the north, on the farther side of the plain of Jezreel. She belongs to a family whose inheritance consisted in vineyards, and she herself had acted in the capacity of the keeper of a vineyard, i. 6,—so much the less therefore is it to be wondered at that she takes an interest in the vineyard of Baal-hamon, which Solomon had let out to keepers on the condition that they should pay to him for its fruit-harvest the sum of 1000 shekels of silver (*shekel* is, according to Ges. § 120. 4, Anm. 2, to be supplied). כִּנָּה, since we have interpreted הִיא retro-

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Robinson's *Physical Geogr. of the Holy Land*, p. 113; Morrison's *Recovery of Jerusalem* (1871), p. 463, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. also Schwarz' *Das heilige Land*, p. 37.

spectively, might also indeed be rendered imperfect. as equivalent to *afferebat*, or, according to Ewald, § 136c, *afferre solebat*; but since נָתַן = ἐξέδοτο, Matt. xxi. 33, denotes a gift laying the recipients under an obligation, יָבֵא is used in the sense of יָבֵא (אֲשֶׁר) לָמַעַן; however, לָמַעַן is not to be supplied (Symm. ἐνέγκαι), but יָבֵא in itself signifies *afferre debebat* (he ought to bring), like יַעַן, Dan. i. 5, they should stand (wait upon), Ewald, § 136g. Certainly נֹטְרִים does not mean tenants, but watchers,—the post-bibl. language has חָכַר, to lease, קָבַל, to take on lease, חֲכִיר, rent, e.g. *Mezla* ix. 2,—but the subject here is a *locatio conductio*; for the vine-plants of that region are entrusted to the “keepers” for a rent, which they have to pay, not in fruits but in money, as the equivalent of a share of the produce (the ב in בְּפָרִי is the ב *pretii*). Isa. vii. 23 is usually compared; but there the money value of a particularly valuable portion of a vineyard, consisting of 1000 vines, is given at “1000 silverlings” (1 shekel); while, on the other hand, the 1000 shekels here are the rent for a portion of a vineyard, the extent of which is not mentioned. But that passage in Isaiah contains something explanatory of the one before us, inasmuch as we see from it that a vineyard was divided into portions of a definite number of vines in each. Such a division into *m'komoth* is also here supposed. For if each “keeper” to whom the vineyard was entrusted had to count 1000 shekels for its produce, then the vineyard was at the same time committed to several keepers, and thus was divided into small sections (Hitzig). It is self-evident that the gain of the produce that remained over after paying the rent fell to the “keepers;” but since the produce varied, and also the price of wine, this gain was not the same every year, and only in general are we to suppose from 12b, that it yielded on an average about 20 per cent. For the vineyard which Shulamith means in 12b is altogether different from that of Baalhamon. It is of herself she says, i. 6, that as the keeper of a vineyard, exposed to the heat of the day, she was not in a position to take care of her own vineyard. This her own vineyard is not her beloved (Hoelem.), which not only does not harmonize with i. 6 (for she there looks back to the time prior to her elevation), but her own person, as comprehending everything pleasant and lovely which constitutes her personality (iv. 12—v. 1), as *kerem* is the sum-total of the vines which together form a vineyard.

Of this figurative vineyard she says: בְּרַמִּי נֶשְׁלִי לִפְנֵי. This must mean, according to Hitzig, Hoelem., and others, that it was under her protection; but although the idea of affectionate care may, in certain circumstances, be connected with לִפְנֵי, Gen. xvii. 18, Prov.

iv. 3, yet the phrase: this or that is *לְפָנַי*, wherever it has not merely a local or temporal, but an ethical signification, can mean nothing else than: it stands under my direction, Gen. xiii. 9, xx. 15, xlvii. 6; 2 Chron. xiv. 6; Gen. xxiv. 51; 1 Sam. xvi. 16. Rightly Heiligst., after Ewald: *in potestate mea est*. Shulamith also has a vineyard, which she is as free to dispose of as Solomon of his at Baal-hamon. It is the totality of her personal and mental endowments. This vineyard has been given over with free and joyful cordiality into Solomon's possession. This vineyard also has keepers (one here sees with what intention the poet has chosen in 11a just that word *נָסִים*)—to whom Shulamith herself and to whom Solomon also owes it that as a chaste and virtuous maiden she became his possession. These are her brothers, the true keepers and protectors of her innocence. Must these be unrewarded? The full thousands, she says, turning to the king, which like the annual produce of the vineyard of Baal-hamon will thus also be the fruit of my own personal worth, shall belong to none else, O Solomon, than to thee, and two hundred to the keepers of its fruit! If the keepers in Baal-hamon do not unrewarded watch the vineyard, so the king owes thanks to those who so faithfully guarded his Shulamith. The poetry would be reduced to prose if there were found in Shulamith's words a hint that the king should reward her brothers with a gratification of 200 shekels. She makes the case of the vineyard in Baal-hamon a parable of her relation to Solomon on the one hand, and of her relation to her brothers on the other. From *נָסִים*, one may conclude that there were two brothers, thus that the rendering of thanks is thought of as *מֵעֶשְׂרֵה* (a tenth part); but so that the 200 are meant not as a tax on the thousand, but as a reward for the faithful rendering up of the thousand.

The king, who seems to this point to have silently looked on in inmost sympathy, now, on being addressed by Shulamith, takes speech in hand; he does not expressly refer to her request, but one perceives from his words that he heard it with pleasure. He expresses to her the wish that she would gratify the companions of her youth who were assembled around her, as well as himself, with a song, such as in former times she was wont to sing in these mountains and valleys.

Ver. 13 O thou (who art) at home in the gardens,  
 Companions are listening for thy voice;  
 Let me hear!

We observe that in the rural paradise with which she is surrounded, she finds herself in her element. It is a primary feature of her

character which herein comes to view: her longing after quietness and peace, her love for collectedness of mind and for contemplation; her delight in thoughts of the Creator suggested by the vegetable world, and particularly by the manifold soft beauty of flowers; she is again once more in the gardens of her home, but the address, "O thou at home in the gardens!" denotes that wherever she is, these gardens are her home as a fundamental feature of her nature. The חברים are not Solomon's companions, for she has come hither with Solomon alone, leaning on his arm. Also it is indicated in the expression: "are listening for thy voice," that they are such as have not for a long time heard the dear voice which was wont to cheer their hearts. The חברים are the companions of the former shepherdess and keeper of a vineyard, i. 6 f., the playmates of her youth, the friends of her home. With a fine tact the poet does not represent Solomon as saying חברים nor חברים: the former would be contrary to the closeness of his relation to Shulamith, the latter contrary to the dignity of the king. By חברים there is neither expressed a one-sided reference, nor is a double-sided excluded. That "for thy voice" refers not to her voice as speaking, but as the old good friends wish, as singing, is evident from השמיעני in connection with ii. 14, where also קול is to be supplied, and the voice of song is meant. She complies with the request, and thus begins:

Ver. 14 Flee, my beloved,  
And be thou like a gazelle,  
Or a young one of the harts,  
Upon spicy mountains.

Hitzig supposes that with these words of refusal she bids him away from her, without, however, as "my beloved" shows, meaning them in a bad sense. They would thus, as Renan says, be bantering coquetry. If it is Solomon who makes the request, and thus also he who is addressed here, not the imaginary shepherd violently introduced into this closing scene in spite of the words "(the thousand) is thine, Solomon" (ver. 12), then Shulamith's ignoring of his request is scornful, for it would be as unseemly if she sang of her own accord to please her friends, as it would be wilful if she kept silent when requested by her royal husband. So far the Spanish author, Soto Major, is right (1599): *jussa et rogata id non debuit nec potuit recusare*. Thus with "flee" she begins a song which she sings, as at ii. 15 she commences one, in reponse to a similar request, with "catch us." Hoelem. finds in her present happiness, which fills her more than ever, the thought here expressed that her beloved, if he again went from her for a moment, would yet

very speedily return to his longing, waiting bride.<sup>1</sup> But apart from the circumstance that Shulamith is no longer a bride, but is married, and that the wedding festival is long past, there is not a syllable of that thought in the text; the words must at least have been הָסֵךְ הָרָגָה, if הָרָגָה signified generally to hasten hither, and not to hasten forth. Thus, at least as little as סוּר, ii. 17, without הָסֵךְ, signifies "turn thyself hither," can this הָרָגָה mean "hither." The words of the song thus invite Solomon to disport himself, i.e. give way to frolicsome and aimless mirth on these spicy mountains. As סוּר לְכָה is enlarged to סוּר וְלִמְעַל-לְכָה, ii. 17, for the sake of the added figures (*vid.* under ii. 9), so here וְרָגָה לְכָה (*Gen.* xxvii. 43) is enlarged to וְרָגָה וְלִמְעַל (וְלִמְעַל) לְכָה. That "mountains of spices" occurs here instead of "clift mountains," ii. 17b, has its reason, as has already been there remarked, and as Hitzig, Hoelem, and others have discovered, in the aim of the poet to conclude the pleasant song of love that has reached perfection and refinement with an absolutely pleasant word.

But with what intention does he call on Shulamith to sing to her beloved this הָרָגָה, which obviously has here not the meaning of escaping away (according to the fundamental meaning, *transversum currere*), but only, as where it is used of fleeting time, Job ix. 25, xiv. 2, the sense of hastening? One might suppose that she whom he has addressed as at home in gardens replies to his request with the invitation to hasten forth among the mountains,—an exercise which gives pleasure to a man. But (1) Solomon, according to ii. 16, vi. 2 f., is also fond of gardens and flowers; and (2) if he took pleasure in ascending mountains, it doubled his joy, according to iv. 8, to share this joy with Shulamith; and (3) we ask, would this closing scene, and along with it the entire series of dramatic pictures, find a satisfactory conclusion, if either Solomon remained and gave no response to Shulamith's call, or if he, as directed, disappeared alone, and left Shulamith by herself among the men who surrounded her? Neither of these two things can have been intended by the poet, who shows himself elsewhere a master in the art of composition. In ii. 17 the matter lies otherwise. There the love-relation is as yet in progress, and the abandonment of love to uninterrupted fellowship places a limit to itself. Now, however, Shulamith is married, and the summons is unlimited. It reconciles itself neither

<sup>1</sup> Similarly Godel: The earth during the present time belongs to the earthly power; only at the end shall the bridegroom fetch the bride, and appear as the heavenly Solomon to thrust out the false and fleshly, and to celebrate the heavenly marriage festival.

with the strength of her love nor with the tenderness of the relation, that she should with so cheerful a spirit give occasion to her husband to leave her alone for an indefinite time. We will thus have to suppose that, when Shulamith sings the song, "Flee, my beloved," she goes forth leaning on Solomon's arm out into the country, or that she presumes that he will not make this flight into the mountains of her native home without her. With this song breaking forth in the joy of love and of life, the poet represents the loving couple as disappearing over the flowery hills, and at the same time the sweet charm of the Song of Songs, leaping gazelle-like from one fragrant scene to another, vanishes away.

## APPENDIX

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### REMARKS ON THE SONG BY DR. J. G. WETZSTEIN.

**T**HE following aphoristic elucidations of the Song are partly collected from epistolary communications, but for the most part are taken from my friend's "Treatise on the Syrian thrashing-table" (in Eastian's *Zeitsch. für Ethnographie*, 1873), but not without these extracts having been submitted to him, and here and there enlarged by him.

The thrashing-table (*16<sup>re</sup> ed-dérâs*) is an agricultural implement in common use from ancient times in the countries round the Mediterranean Sea. It consists of two boards of nut-tree wood or of oak, bound together by two cross timbers. These boards are bent upwards in front, after the manner of a sledge, so as to be able to glide without interruption over the heaps of straw; underneath they are set with stones (of porous basalt) in oblique rows, thus forming a rubbing and cutting apparatus, which serves to thrash out the grain and to chop the straw; for the thrashing-table drawn by one or two animals yoked to it, and driven by their keeper, moves round on the straw-heaps spread on the barn floor. The thrashing-table may have sometimes been used in ancient times for the purpose of destroying prisoners of war by a horrible death (2 Sam. xii. 31); at the present day it serves as the seat of honour for the bride and bridegroom, and also as a bier whereon the master of the house is laid when dead. The former of these its two functions is that which has given an opportunity to Wetzstein to sketch in that Treatise, under the title of "The Table in the King's-week," a picture of the marriage festival among the Syrian peasantry. This sketch contains not a few things that serve to throw light on the Song, which we here place in order, intermixed with other remarks by Wetzstein with reference to the Song and to our commentary on it.

i. 6. In August 1861, when on a visit to the hot springs *El-hamma*, between *Domeir* and *Rohéiba* to the north of Damascus, I was the guest of the Sheikh 'Id, who was encamped with his tribe, a branch of the *Soléh*, at the sulphurous stream there (*nahar el-makabret*).

Since the language of this people (who inhabited the Syrian desert previous to the Moslem period, were longest confessors of Christianity among the nomads, and therefore kept themselves free from intermingling with the tribes that at a later period had migrated from the peninsula) possesses its own remarkable peculiarities, I embraced the opportunity of having dictated and explained to me, for three whole days, Solebian poems. The introduction to one of these is as follows: "The poet is *Ṣolēbī Tuwēs*, nephew of (the already mentioned) *Rāshid*. The latter had had a dispute with a certain *Bishr*; that *Tuwēs* came to know, and now sent the following *kasidah* (poem) to *Bishr*, which begins with praise in regard to his uncle, and finally advises *Bishr* to let that man rest, lest he (*Tuwēs*) should become his adversary and that of his party." The last verse is in these words:

"That say I to you, I shall become the adversary of the disturber of the peace,

Bend my right knee before him, and, as a second *Zir*, show myself on the field of battle (the *menāch*)."

*Zir* is a hero celebrated in the *Diwān* of *Benī Hilāl*; and to bend the right knee is to enter into a conflict for life or death: the figure is derived from the sword-dance.<sup>1</sup>

So much regarding the poem of *Ṣolēbī*. From this can nothing be gained for the explanation of נִיחָרֵרִי of the Song? This is for the most part interpreted as the *Niph.* of חָרַר or חָרַר (to be inflamed, to be angry with one); but why not as the *Pih.* of נִיחָר? It is certainly most natural to interpret this נִיחָר in the sense of *nakhar*, to breathe, snort; but the LXX., Symm., Theod., in rendering by μαχέσαστο (διεμαχέσαστο), appear to have connected with *nihharu* the meaning

<sup>1</sup> If this dance, e.g., is danced to celebrate a victory, it not seldom happens that the spectators call out to a young man particularly struck by the dancer: Kneel to her. He who is thus challenged steps into the circle, sinks down on his right knee, in which inconvenient attitude he endeavours to approach the dancer, who on her part falls down on both her knees; sliding and fencing according to the beat of the music, she retreats, and at the same time seeks with all her might to keep her assailant back with a sword. He parries the strokes with his left arm, while he attempts to gain his object, viz. with his right hand to touch the head of the dancer. If he succeeds in this, he cries out, "Dancer, I touch!" With that the play ends, and the victor leaves the arena amid the approving shouts of the throng, often bleeding from many wounds. Many a one has forfeited his life in his attempt to touch a celebrated beauty. Since such death was self-chosen, the maiden goes unpunished. If the assailant, as often happens, is the brother or father's brother's son of the dancer, in which case the venture is less perilous, he has the right to kiss the vanquished damsel, which is always for the spectator a great amusement.

of that (Arab.) *tanahar*, which comes from *tahrn*, the front of the neck. The outstretched neck of the camel, the breast, the head, the face, the brow, the nose, are, it is well known in the Arab, mere symbols for that which stands forward according to place, time, and rank. Of this *tahrn*, not only the Old Arab. (*vid. Kāmūs* under the word) but also the Modern Arab. has denom. verbal forms. In Damascus they say, *alayl nahara min alyatan*, "the torrent tore away a part of the garden opposing it;" and according to the *Deutsch. moey. Zeitschr.* xii. 142, *nahhar fana* is "to strive forward after one." Hence *tanaharna*, to step opposite to (in a hostile manner), like *takabalna*, then to contend in words, to dispute; and *nahir* is, according to a vulgar mode of expression, one who places himself *ceram* another, sits down to talk, discourses with him. These *denominativa* do not in themselves and without further addition express in the modern idioms the idea of "to take an opponent by the neck," or "to fight hand to hand with him."

i. 7. For עַדְדִּים the Arab. عَدَدِيّ presents itself for comparison; with inhabitants of the town, as well as of the desert (*Hadar* and *Bedu*), *alghadwat*, "the (maiden) languishing with love," a very favourite designation for a maiden fatally in love; the mas. *alghady* (plur. *alghadat*) is used in the same sense of a young man. According to its proper signification, it denotes a maiden with a languishing eye, the deeply sunk glimmerings of whose eyelids veil the eye. In Damascus such eyes are called 'isra *dabbal*, "pressed down eyes;" and in the Haurān, 'isra *magharribat*, "broken eyes;" and they are not often wanting in love songs there. Accordingly, she who speaks seeks to avoid the neighbourhood of the shepherd, from fear of the *hathkalitr*, i.e. for fear lest those who mocked would thus see the secret of her love, in accordance with the verse:

"By its symptoms love discovers itself to the world,  
As musk which one carries discovers itself by its aroma."

i. 17. The cypress never bears the name *gawṣar*, which always denotes only the pine, one of the pine tribe. The cypress is only called *serua*, collect. *seru*. Since it is now very probable that צרור (צרר) is the old Heb. name of the cypress, and since there can at no time have been cypresses on the downs of Beirūt, the connection of צרור with צרור is to be given up. Instead of the difficult Heb. word *salalithana*, there is perhaps to be read *ṣ'halithana* (from *halith* = *halitha*), "and our walls." The word-form حائط may have come from the idiom of the Hīglz, or from some other impure source, into the written language; the living language knows only *hayt*

(חִיט), plur. *hittin* (Syr. Egypt) and *hijāt* (Berbery). The written language itself has only the plur. *hittin*, and uses חִיט as an actual sing. For the transition of the letter *tsade* into *teth* in the Song, cf. נטר.

ii. 11. "For lo, the winter is past, the rain is over—is gone."

These are the words of the enticing love of the bridegroom to his beloved, whom he seeks to raise to the rank of queen. "The fairest period in the life of a Syrian peasant," thus Wetzstein's description begins, "are the first seven days after his marriage, in which, along with his young wife, he plays the part of king (*melik*) and she of queen (*melika*), and both are treated and served as such in their own district and by the neighbouring communities." The greater part of village weddings take place for the most part in the month of March, the most beautiful month of the Syrian year, called from its loveliness (*sahh<sup>a</sup>r*) *ādār* = "*prachtmonat*" (magnificent month), to which the proverb refers: "If any one would see Paradise in its flowery splendour (*fī azhārīhā*), let him contemplate the earth in its month of splendour (*fī ādārīhā*). Since the winter rains are past, and the sun now refreshes and revives, and does not, as in the following months, oppress by its heat, weddings are celebrated in the open air on the village thrashing-floor, which at this time, with few exceptions, is a flowery meadow. March is also suitable as the season for festivals, because at such a time there is little field labour, and, moreover, everything then abounds that is needed for a festival. During the winter the flocks have brought forth their young,—there are now lambs and kids, butter, milk, and cheese, and cattle for the slaughter, which have become fat on the spring pasture; the neighbouring desert yields for it brown, yellow, and white earth-nuts in such abundance, that a few children in one day may gather several camel-loads." The description passes over the marriage day itself, with its pomp, the sword-dance of the bride, and the great marriage feast, and begins where the newly married, on the morning after the marriage night,—which the young husband, even to this day, like the young Tobiah, spends sometimes in prayer,—appear as king and queen, and in their wedding attire receive the representative of the bride's-men, now their minister (*mezér*), who presents them with a morning meal. Then the bride's-men come, fetch the thrashing-table ("corn-drag") from the straw storehouse (*metben*), and erect a scaffolding on the thrashing-floor, with the table above it, which is spread with a variegated carpet, and with two ostrich-feather cushions studded with gold, which is the seat of honour (*merteba*) for the king and queen during the seven days. This beautiful custom

has a good reason for it, and also fulfils a noble end. For the more oppressive, troublesome, and unhappy the condition of the Syro-Palestinian peasant, so much the more reasonable does it appear that he should be honoured for a few days at least, and be celebrated and made happy. And considering the facility and wantonness of divorces in the Orient, the recollection of the marriage week, begun so joyfully, serves as a counterpoise to hinder a separation.

iii. 11. *ḥṭṭṭ*. The custom of crowning the bridegroom no longer exists in Syria. The bride's crown, called in Damascus *tdg-el-'arūs*, is called in the Haurān *'erṣa* (*ḥṭṭṭ*). This consists of a silver circlet, which is covered with a net of strings of corals of about three fingers' breadth. Gold coins are fastened in rows to this net, the largest being on the lowest row, those in the other rows upward becoming always smaller. At the wedding feast the hair of the bride is untied, and falls freely down over her neck and breast; and that it might not lose its wavy form, it is only oiled with some fragrant substances. The crowning thus begins: the headband is first bound on her head,—which on this day is not the *Šamār* (vid. *Deut. mery. Zeit.* xxii. 94), but the *Kemmāja*, a long, narrow, silken band, interwoven with dark-red and gold, and adorned at both ends with fringes, between which the *Šamāḥ*, silver, half-spherical little bells, hang down. The ends of the *Kemmāja* fall on both sides of the head, the one on the breast and the other on the back, so that the sound of the *Šamāḥ* is distinctly perceptible only during the sword-dance of the bride. Over the *Kemmāja* the crown is now placed in such a way that it rests more on the front of the head, and the front gold pieces of the under row come to lie on the naked brow. In the *Šāḥḥ*, partly referred to under vii. 2, the poet addresses the goldsmith:

"And beat (for the bride) little bells, which constantly swing and ring like the tymbals (*sakkārdt*);<sup>1</sup>

And (beat) the crown, one of four rows, and let *Gūddā*<sup>2</sup> be on the brow."

<sup>1</sup> By *sakkārdt* are meant these little tymbals (kettle-drums) which are used to keep time with the dancing-song, when that is not done by the tambourine. The ladies of Damascus take them with them to every country party, where frequently, without any singing, they are the only accompaniment of the dance. They are thus used: a damsel seats herself on the bare ground, places the two (scarcely is there ever only one) saucers—large copper hemispheres—before her breast, and beats against them with two wooden mallets. Their strings are made of the skins of goats or gazelles, while, for the tambourine, preference is given to the throat-bag of the pelican. These tymbals, like our own, have an unequal sound; when out of tune, they are rectified by being heated over a brazier.

<sup>2</sup> The *Gūddā* is a rare Turkish gold piece of money, of old and beautiful

Etymologically considered, I believe that the word *'orga* must be regarded as parallel with *'aryûn* (אֲרִיּוֹן), which in the *Haurân* is the foot-buckle; so that, from the root *'arag*, "to be bent," it is the designation of a bow or circlet, which the word *taj* also certainly means. However, on one occasion in Korêa (to the east of Bosrâ), while we were looking at a bride's crown, one said to me: "They call it *'orga*, because the coral strings do not hang directly down, but, running oblique (*mu'arawajal*), form a net of an elongated square."

iv. 14. אֶתְלֹס. Who recognises in the Moorish *nif*, "the nose," the Heb. אֶתְלֹס? And yet the two words are the same. The word אֶתְלֹס, *enf*, "the nose," is used by the wandering Arabs, who are fond of the dimin. אֶתְלֹס, "*nef*," which is changed into אֶתְלֹס; for א in the beginning of a word, particularly before a grave and accented syllable, readily falls away. From *nef* (*neif*), finally, comes *nif*, because the idiom of the Moorish Arabians rejects the diphthong *ei*.

Thus, also, it fared with the word אֶתְלֹס, "the little tent," "the little house," as the three-cornered capsules of the cardamum are called,—an aromatic plant which is to the present day so ardently loved by the Hadar and the Bedu, on account of its heat, and especially its sweet aroma, that one would have been led to wonder if it were wanting in this passage of the Song. From אֶתְלֹס there is formed the dimin. אֶתְלֹס, and this is shortened into *hel*, which is at the present day the name of the cardamum, while the unabbreviated *'hel* is retained as the caritative of the original meaning,—we say, *ja' heli*, "my dear tent- (*i.e.* tribal) companions." This linguistic process is observable in all the Semitic languages; it has given rise to a mass of new roots. That it began at an early period, is shown by the Phœnician language; for the bibl. names *Hiram* and *Huram* are abbreviated from *Ahi-ram* and *Ahu-ram*; and the Punic stones supply many analogues, *e.g.* the proper names *Himilcath* (= *Ahhi-Milcath*, *restrictus reginae coeli*) with *Hethmilcath* (= *Ahith-Milcath*) and the like. On one of the stones which I myself brought from Carthage is found the word אֶתְלֹס instead of אֶתְלֹס, "sir, master." In a similar way, the watering-place which receives so many diverse names by travellers, the *Wéba* (*Weibu*), in the Araba valley, will be an abbreviation of אֶתְלֹס, and this the dimin. of אֶתְלֹס, the name of an encampment of the Israelites in the wilderness (Num. xxi. 10). It had the name *'ên ovoth*, "the fountain of the water-bottles," perhaps coinage, thin but very large, and of the finest gold. It was carried as a charm against the evil eye. On a bride's crown it forms the lowermost row of coins.

from the multitude of water-bottles filled here by water-drawers, waiting one after another. This encampment has been sought elsewhere—certainly incorrectly. Of the harbour-town *Elatā* (on the Red Sea), it has been said, in the geography of *Ibn al-Barrā* (MSS. of the Royal Lib. in Berlin, Sect. Spr. Nr. 5), published in Jerusalem about the year 1000: "*Waila*, at the north end of the (eastern) arm of the Red Sea; prosperous and distinguished; rich in palms and fishes; the harbour of Palestine, and the granary of Higāz; is called *Aila* by the common people; but *Aila* is laid waste,—it lies quite in the neighbourhood." Thus it will be correct to say, that the name *Waila* is abbreviated from *Wailā*, "*Little-Aila*," and designated a settlement which gradually grew up in the neighbourhood of the old *Aila*, and to which, when the former was at last destroyed, the name was transferred, so that "*Little-Aila*" became *Aila*; therefore it is that the later Arab geographers know nothing of *Waila*. I have already elsewhere mentioned, that at the root of the name of the well-known Port *Sufa* lies the Arab *'ada* (= *ʿḍā*), which, among all the Syrian tribes, has lost the initial letter *ʿayf*, and takes the form of *Sufa*. Hence the name *Sufa* (*Suḍr*), the diminutive. The place has its name from this, that it was built on the foundations of an older harbour.

Silv. de Sacy already (*vid. Ossen. Tāz* p. 336) conjectured that *ḥabāḥ* means cardamums. But, as it appears, he based his proof less on the identity of the two words *ḥab* and *ḥabāḥ*, than on the circumstance that he found the word *ḥabāḥ*—the Jemanic, and perhaps originally Indian name of cardamums—in the *ḥabāḥ* of the Egyptians of the present day. But the Egyptian does not pronounce the *ḥ* like *k*; he does not utter it at all, or at most like a *Hamza*, so that *ḥabāḥ* is sounded by him not *ḥabāḥ*, but *'aḥāḥ*. And who could presuppose the antiquity of this word, or that of its present pronunciation, in a land which has so radically changed both its language and its inhabitants as Egypt? And why should the Palestinians have received their Indian spices, together with their names, from Egypt? Why not much rather from *Aila*, to which they were brought from Jemen, either by ships or by the well-organized caravans (*vid. Strabo*, xvi. 4) which traded in the maritime country *Tihāma*? Or from *Tima*, the chief place in the desert (*Job* vi. 19, *Isa.* xxi. 14), whither they were brought from *'Aḥir*, the harbour of *Gerrāa*, which, according to Strabo (as above), was the great Arab. spice market? But if Palestine obtained its spices from thence, it would also, with them, receive the foreign name for them unchanged,—*ḥabāḥ*,—since all the Arab tribes

express the *k* sound very distinctly. In short, the word אהלוֹת has nothing to do with *kakula*; it is shown to be a pure Semitic word by the plur. formations *ahaloth* and *ahalim* (Prov. vii. 17). The punctuation does not contradict this. The inhabitants of Palestine received the word, with the thing itself, through the medium of the Arabs, among whom the Heb. אהל is at the present time, as in ancient times, pronounced אהל; thus the Arab vocalization is simply retained to distinguish it from אהל in its proper signification, without the name of the spice becoming thereby a meaningless foreign word. That the living language had a sing. for "a cardamum capsule" is self-evident. Interesting is the manner and way in which the modern Arabs help themselves with reference to this sing. Since *hél* does not discover the mutilated אהל, and the Arab. أهلي besides, has modified its meaning (it signifies tent- and house-companions), the *nom. unit.* *hela*, "a cardamum capsule," is no longer formed from *hél*; the word *geras*, "the little bell," is therefore adopted, thereby forming a comparison of the firmly closed seed capsules, in which the loose seeds, on being shaken, give forth an audible rustling, with the little bells which are hung round the bell-wether and the leading camel. Thus they say: take three or four little bells (*egrás*), and not: *teldt, arba' hélát* (which at most, as a mercantile expression, would denote, "parcels or kinds" of cardamum); they speak also of *geras-el-hél* ("הל little bells") and *geras-et-tib* ("spice little bells"). This "little bell" illustrates the ancient אהל. Supposing that *kakula* might have been the true name of the cardamum, then these would have been called אהלֹת קקלה, "*kakula*-capsules," by the Heb. traders in spicery, who, as a matter of course, knew the foreign name; while, on the contrary, the people, ignoring the foreign name, would use the words אהלֹת (אהלי) בשם, "spice-capsules," or only *ahaloth*. Imported spices the people named from their appearance, without troubling themselves about their native names. An Arabian called the nutmeg *góz-et-tib*, "spice-nut," which would correspond to a Heb. אגוז בשם. So he called the clove-blossom *mismár-et-tib*, "spice-cloves," as we do, or merely *mismár*, "clove." The spice-merchant knows only the foreign word *gurumful*, "clove." It is very probable that *hél*, divested of its appellative signification by the word *geras*, in process of time disappeared from the living language.

That pounded cardamum is one of the usual ingredients in Arab. coffee, we see from a poem, only a single very defective copy of which could be obtained by Wallin (*vid. Deutsch. morg. Zeit.*

vi. 373). The verse alluded to, with a few grammatical and metrical changes which were required, is as follows :

“ With a pot (of coffee) in which must be cardamum and nutmeg,  
And twenty cloves, the right proportion for connoisseurs.”

The nut is not, as Wallin supposes, the cocoa-nut (*gôz-el-Hind*), but the nutmeg ; and ‘*ūd* = “ the small piece of wood,” is the clove, as Wallin also, rightly ; elsewhere ‘*ūd* and ‘*ūda* is the little stalk of the raisin.

v. 1. “ Eat, friends, drink and be drunken, beloved.” With יָעִים here is compared מְרַעִים, Judg. xiv. 11, where thirty companions are brought to Samson when he celebrated for seven days his marriage in Timnath, the so-called bride’s-men, who are called in post-bibl. Heb. מְרַעֲבִים, and at the present day in Syria, *shebāb el-‘arts*, i.e. the bridegroom’s young men ; their chief is called the *Shebin*. “ The designation ‘ bride’s-men ’ (Nymphagogen) is not wholly suitable. Certainly they have also to do service to the bride ; and if she is a stranger, they form the essential part of the armed escort on horseback which heads the marriage procession (*el-fārīda*), and with mock fighting, which is enacted before the bride and the bride’s-maids (*el-ferrāldāt*), leads it into the bridegroom’s village ; but the chief duties of the *shebāb* on the marriage day and during the ‘ king’s week ’ belong properly to the bridegroom. This escort must be an ancient institution of the country. Perhaps it had its origin in a time of general insecurity in the land, when the ‘ young men ’ formed a watch-guard, during the festival, against attacks.” The names רַעַ and מְרַעַ Wetzstein derives from a רַעַ, “ to be closely connected,” which is nearly related to רַעַה ; for he takes רַעַ, Job vi. 27, as the etymologically closer description of the former, and מְרַעַ (= מְרַעַ) he places parallel to the Arab. word *mirjā*, which signifies “ the inseparable companion,” and among all the Syrian nomad tribes is the designation of the bell-wether, because it follows closely the steps of the shepherd, carries his bread-pouch, and receives a portion at every meal-time.

vii. 1. What would ye see in Shulamith?—

“ As the dance of Mahanaim.”

“ The sports during the days of the marriage festival are from time to time diversified with dances. The various kinds of dances are comprehended under the general names of *sahka* and *debka*. The *sahka*, pronounced by the Beduin *sahēe* (= *sahtsche*), is a graceful solitary dance, danced by a single person, or in itself not involving several persons. The *debka*, “ hanging dance,” because the dancers

link themselves together by their little fingers ; if they were linked together by their hands, this would give the opportunity of pressing hands, which required to be avoided, because Arab ladies would not permit this from men who were strangers to them. For the most part, the *debka* appears as a circular dance. If it is danced by both sexes, it is called *debka muwadda'a* = 'the variegated *debka*.' The *sahka* must be of Beduin origin, and is accordingly always danced with a *kasidah* (poem or song) in the nomad idiom ; the *debka* is the peculiar national dance of the Syrian peasantry (*Hadari*), and the songs with which it is danced are exclusively in the language of the *Hadari*. They have the prevailing metre of the so-called Andalusian ode (— 0 — — | — 0 — — | — 0 —), and it is peculiar to the *debka*, that its strophes hang together like the links of a chain, or like the fingers of the dancers, while each following strophe begins with the words with which the preceding one closes [similar to the step-like rhythm of the psalms of degrees ; *vid. Psalmen*, ii. 257]. For the *sahka* and the *debka* they have a solo singer. Whenever he has sung a verse, the chorus of dancers and spectators takes up the *kehrvers* (*meredd*), which in the *debka* always consists of the two last lines of the first strophe of the poem. Instrumental music is not preferred in dancing ; only a little timbrel (*deff*), used by the solo singer, who is not himself (or herself) dancing, gently accompanies the song to give the proper beat" (cf. Ex. xv. 20 f., and Ps. lxviii. 26).

To the *sahka*, which is danced after a *kasidah* (for the most part with the metre — — 0 — | — — 0 — | — — 0 — | — — 0 —) without the *kehrvers* in  $\frac{2}{4}$  time, belongs the sword-dance, which the bride dances on her marriage day. Wetzstein thus describes it in *Deutsch. morg. Zeit.* xxii. 106, having twice witnessed it : "The figure of the dancer (*el-hâshî*, 'she who fills the ring,' or *abû h°wêsh*, 'she who is in the ring'), the waving dark hair of her locks cast loose, her serious noble bearing, her downcast eyes, her graceful movements, the quick and secure step of her small naked feet, the lightning-like flashing of the blade, the skilful movements of her left hand, in which the dancer holds a handkerchief, the exact keeping of time, although the song of the *munshid* (the leader) becomes gradually quicker and the dance more animated—this is a scene which has imprinted itself indelibly on my memory. It is completed by the ring (*h°wêsh*), the one half of which is composed of men and the other of women. They stand upright, gently move their shoulders, and accompany the beat of the time with a swaying to and fro of the upper part of their bodies, and a gentle beating of

their hands stretched upwards before their breasts. The whole scene is brightened by a fire that has been kindled. The constant repetition of the words *jâ ḥalālî jâ mālî*, O my own, O my possession! [*vid. Psalmen*, ii. 384, Anm.], and the sword with which the husband protects his family and his property in the hand of the maiden, give to the *sahka*, celebrated in the days of domestic happiness, the stamp of an expression of thanks and joy over the possession of that which makes life pleasant—the family and property; for with the *Ḥadart* and the *Bedawi* the word *ḥalāl* includes wife and child."

"When the *sahka* is danced by a man, it is always a sword-dance. Only the form of this dance (it is called *sahkat el-Gawāfina*), as it is performed in Gōf, is after the manner of the *contre-dance*, danced by two rows of men standing opposite each other. The dancers do not move their hands, but only their shoulders; the women form the ring, and sing the refrain of the song led by the *munshid*, who may here be also one of the dancers."

vii. 2. "How beautiful are thy steps in the shoes, O prince's daughter!"

After the maidenhood of the newly married damsel has been established (cf. Deut. xxii. 13–21) before the tribunal (*dirān*) of the wedding festival, there begins a great dance; the song sung to it refers only to the young couple, and the inevitable *wasf*, i.e. a description of the personal perfections and beauty of the two, forms its principal contents. Such a *wasf* was sung also yesterday during the sword-dance of the bride; that of to-day (the first of the seven wedding-festival days) is wholly in praise of the queen; and because she is now a wife, commends more those attractions which are visible than those which are veiled. In the Song, only vii. 2–6<sup>1</sup> is compared to this *wasf*. As for the rest, it is the lovers themselves who reciprocally sing. Yet this may also have been done under the

<sup>1</sup> According to Wetzstein's opinion, v. 2 ff. is also a *wasf*, to which the narrative, vv. 5–7, aims at giving only an agreeable commencement; the songs of the Song which he does not regard as Solomonic, nor as a dramatic united whole, particularly the *Wasf*-portions, appear to him to have been received into the Canon in order to preserve for the people some beautiful hallowed marriage songs, and to give good examples for imitation to the occasional poets whose productions may in ancient times, among the Hebrews, as in our own day among ourselves, have overstepped the limits of propriety and good taste. The allegorical or mystical interpretation appeared later, and was in this case something lying far nearer than *e.g.* with those love-songs which were sung by the singers of the mosque of the Omajads at the festival *thalilat*, at the grave of John the Baptist. "Place, time, and circumstance," says the Damascene, "give to a song its meaning."

influence of the custom of the *wasf*. The repetition, iv. 1-5 and vi. 4-7, are wholly after the manner of the *wasf*; in the Syrian wedding songs also, these encomiums are after one pattern.

We quote here by way of example such an encomium. It forms the conclusion of a *sahka*, which had its origin under the following circumstances: When, some forty years ago, the sheik of *Nawâ* gave away his daughter in marriage, she declared on her wedding day that she would dance the usual sword-dance only along with a *kasidah*, composed specially for her by a noted Hauran poet. Otherwise nothing was to be done, for the Hauranian chief admired the pride of his daughter, because it was believed it would guard her from errors, and afford security for her family honour. The most distinguished poet of the district at that time was *Kâsim el-Chinn*, who had just shortly before returned from a journey to Mesopotamia to the phylarch of the *Gerbâ* tribe, who had bestowed on him royal gifts. He lived in the district of *Gâsim*,<sup>1</sup> famed from of old for its poets, a mile (German) to the north of *Nawâ*. A messenger on horseback was sent for him. The poet had no time to lose; he stuck some writing materials and paper into his girdle, mounted his ass, and composed his poem whilst on the way, the messenger going before him to announce his arrival. When *Kâsim* came, the fire was already kindled on the ground, the wedding guests were waiting, and the dancer in bridal attire, and with the sword in her hand, stood ready. *Kâsim* kissed her hand and took the place of leader of the song, since from want of time no one could repeat the poem; moreover, *Kâsim* had a fine voice. When the dance was over, the bride took her *kesmâja* from off her head, folded twenty *Gâzi* (about thirty thalers) in it, and threw it to the poet,—a large present considering the circumstances, for the *kesmâja* of a rich bride is costly. On the other hand, she required the poem to be delivered up to her. The plan of the poem shows great skill. *Nawâ*, lying in the midst of the extremely fruitful Batanian plain, is interested in agriculture to an extent unequalled in any other part of Syria and Palestine; its sheik is proud of the fact that formerly Job's 500 yoke ploughed there, and *Nawâ* claims to be Job's town.<sup>2</sup> Since the peasant, according to the well-known proverb, *de bobus arator*, has thought and concern for nothing more than for agriculture; so the poet might

<sup>1</sup> Abû-Temmâm, the collector of the *Hamâsa*, was also a native of *Gâsim*. [Vid. Delitzsch's *Jud.-Arab. Poesien* of the pre-Muhammed period, p. 1.]

<sup>2</sup> It is not improbable that *Nawâ* is an abbreviation of נִוְהָ-אֵיב, as *Medina* is of *Medînat-en-Nebî*. Regarding the supposed grave of Job in the neighbourhood of *Nawâ*, vid. *Comment. on Job* by Fr. Delitzsch.

with certainty reckon on an understanding and an approbation of his poem if he makes it move within the sphere of country life. He does this. He begins with this, that a *shakāra*, i.e. a benefice, is sown for the dancer, which is wont to be sown only to the honour of one of great merit about the place. That the benefice might be worthy of the recipient, four *amādima* (a *amādima* consists of six yoke) are required, and the poet has opportunity to present to his audience pleasing pictures of the great *shakāra*, of harvests, thrashings, measuring, loading, selling. Of the produce of the wheat the portion of the dancer is now bought, first the clothes, then the ornaments; both are described. The *wasf* forms the conclusion, which is here given below. In the autumn of 1860, I received the poem from a young man of Nawā at the same time along with other poems of Kāsim's, all of which he knew by heart. The rest are much more artistic and complete in form than the *sakha*. Who can say how many of the (particularly metrically) weak points of the latter are to be attributed to the poet, and to the rapidity with which it was composed; and how many are to be laid to the account of those by whom it was preserved?

"Here hast thou thy ornament, O beautiful one! put it on, let nothing be forgotten!

Put it on, and live when the coward and the liar are long dead.

She said: Now shalt thou celebrate me in song, describe me in verse from head to foot!

I say. O fair one, thine attractions I am never able to relate,

And only the few will I describe which my eyes permit me to see:

Her head is like the crystal goblet, her hair like the black night,

Her black hair like the seven nights, the like are not in the whole year;<sup>1</sup>

In waves it moves hither and thither, like the rope of her who draws water,

And her side locks breathe all manner of fragrance, which kills me.

The new moon beams on her brow, and dimly illuminated are the balances,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> These seven nights are the last four of February and the first three of March (of the old calendar). They are very cloudy, rainy, and dark, and are called *el-masafiri-<sup>lat</sup>*, "the borrowing nights," either because they have a share of the clouds, rain, and darkness of all the other nights of the year, as if borrowed from them, or because the seven reciprocally dispose of their shares, so that, e.g., the darkness of each of these nights is sevenfold. The frequent hail which falls during these cold disagreeable days is called "old wives' teeth" (*asādā-el-<sup>ayāl</sup>*), because many old people die during these days.

<sup>2</sup> While sometimes the light of the new moon is weak and that of the balances is very strong; the contrary is the case here. The balances are two constellations: the one is called the right balance (*minān-el-<sup>bal</sup>*), and consists of three very bright stars; the other is called the false balance (*m. el-butl*), and consists of two bright and one dimmer star.

And her eyebrows like the arch of the *Nûn* drawn by an artist's hand.<sup>1</sup>  
The witchery of her eyes makes me groan as if they were the eyes of a  
Kufic lady;<sup>2</sup>

Her nose is like the date of Irāk,<sup>3</sup> the edge of the Indian sword;  
Her face like the full moon, and heart-breaking are her cheeks.  
Her mouth is a little crystal ring, and her teeth rows of pearls,  
And her tongue scatters pearls; and, ah me, how beautiful her lips!  
Her spittle pure virgin honey, and healing for the bite of a viper.  
Comparable to elegant writing, the *Sejāl*<sup>4</sup> waves downwards on her  
chin,

Thus black seeds of the fragrant *Kezah*<sup>5</sup> show themselves on white bread.  
The *Mānī* draws the neck down to itself with the spell written in Syrian  
letters;

Her neck is like the neck of the roe which drinks out of the fountain of  
*Kanawât*.<sup>6</sup>

Her breast like polished marble tablets, as ships bring them to *Sêlâ*  
(Sidon),

Thereon like apples of the pomegranate two glittering piles of jewels.  
Her arms are drawn swords, peeled cucumbers—oh that I had such!  
And incomparably beautiful her hands in the rose-red of the *Hinnâ*-leaf;  
Her smooth, fine fingers are like the writing reed not yet cut;  
The glance of her nails like the Dura-seeds which have lain overnight in  
milk;<sup>7</sup>

Her body is a mass of cotton wool which a master's hand has shaken  
into down,<sup>8</sup>

And her legs marble pillars in the sacred house of the Omajads.

<sup>1</sup> The eyebrows are compared to the arch of the Arab. letter *ن* inverted; this comparison, in which the rural poets imitate the insipid city poets, is only admissible when one has before him a *Nûn* written by a caligraphic hand.

<sup>2</sup> The eyes of the Kufic or Babylonian lady (*bâbilija*) are perfectly black, which for the Arabians are particularly dangerous. Also with the Babylonian sorceress *Zuhara*, who led astray the two angels *Hārūt* and *Mārūt* (vid. *Korân* ii. 26), her charms lay in her black eyes.

<sup>3</sup> The date of *Irāk* is white and small, not too long and very sweet.

<sup>4</sup> The *Sejāl* is a *dakḥḥa*, i.e. a tattooed arabesque in the form of final *Mim*'s (م) standing over one another. The *Mānī* (ver. 20), another *dakḥḥa*, is applied to the top of the windpipe. It consists for the most part of a ring, in which is engraved as a talisman a Syrian, i.e. a feigned angel's name ending in *ماني*.

<sup>5</sup> The *Kezah*, n. unitt. *Kezha*, is the *nigella sativa* with which fine pastry is sprinkled.

<sup>6</sup> Here it is not the well of the *Wādy Kanawât* on the Haurân range that is meant, but the *Kanawât* stream, an arm of the *Barādî*, which fills the tanks of the Damascus houses, so that the thought would be that the neck of the bride is white like that of a lady of the city, not brown like that of a peasant.

<sup>7</sup> The *Dura* of the Haurân is the miller, which, when laid in milk, receives a white glance, and enlarges, so that it may be compared to a finger-nail.

<sup>8</sup> The upholsterer (*neddâf*, usually called *hallâg*) has a bow above one fathom long, the string of which, consisting of a very thick gut-string, he places in contact with the wool or cotton-wool which is to be shaken loose, and then

There hast thou, fair one, thy attractions, receive this, nothing would be forgotten,

And live and flourish when the coward and the liar are long ago dead!"

vii. 3. "Thy body a heap of wheat, set round with lilies."

In the fifth Excursus regarding the winnowing shovel and the winnowing fork in my *Comment. ex Isaiaâ*, Wetstein's illustration of this figure was before me. The dissertation regarding the thrashing-table contains many instructive supplements thereto. When the grain is thrashed, from that which is thrashed (*derfs*), which consists of corn, chopped straw, and chaff, there is formed a new heap of winnowings, which is called 'arsum. According to its derivation (from 'arum, to be uncovered), 'arsum means heaps of rubbish destitute of vegetation; 'arsum, 'ersum, 'irum, are, in the Haurân and Golln, proper names of several Paps (conical hills formed by an eruption) covered with yellow or red volcanic rubbish. In the terminology of the thrashing-floor, the word always and without exception denotes the *derfs*-heaps not yet winnowed; in the Heb., on the contrary, corn-heaps already winnowed. Such a heap serves (Ruth iii. 7) Boaz as a pillow for his head when he lay down and watched his property. Lather there incorrectly renders by 'behind a *Musaid*,' i.e. a heap of (fifteen) sheaves; on the contrary, correctly at the passage before us (Song vii. 3), 'like a heap of wheat,' viz. a heap of winnowed wheat. The wheat colour (*el-lôn el-kimî*) is in Syria regarded as the most beautiful colour of the hu-ran body."

strike it with a short wooden mallet. By the violent and rapid vibration of the string, the wool, however closely it may have been pressed together and entangled, is changed with surprising quickness into the finest down.

THE BOOK OF ECCLESIASTES



# THE BOOK OF ECCLESIASTES

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## INTRODUCTION.

**I**F we look at the world without God, it appears what it is,—a magnificent, graduated combination of diverse classes of beings, connected causes and effects, well-calculated means and ends. But thus contemplated, the world as a whole remains a mystery. If, with the atheist, we lay aside the idea of God, then, notwithstanding the law of causation, which is grounded in our mental nature, we abandon the question of the origin of the world. If, with the pantheist, we transfer the idea of God to the world itself, then the effect is made to be as one with the cause,—not, however, without the conception of God, which is inalienable in man, reacting against it; for one cannot but distinguish between substance and its phenomena. The mysteries of the world which meet man as a moral being remain, under this view of the world, altogether without solution. For the moral order of the world presupposes an absolutely good Being, from whom it has proceeded, and who sustains it; it demands a Lawgiver and a Judge. Apart from the reference to this Being, the distinction between good and evil loses its depth and sharpness. Either there is no God, or all that is and happens is a moment in the being and life of God Himself, who is identical with the world: thus must the world-destructive power of sin remain unrecognised. The opinion as to the state of the world will, from a pantheistic point of view, rise to optimism; just as, on the other hand, from an atheistic point of view, it will sink to pessimism. The commanding power of goodness even the atheist may recognise by virtue of the inner law peculiar to man as a moral being, but the divine consecration is wanting to this goodness; and if human life is a journey from nothing to nothing, then this will be the best

of all goodness: that man set himself free from the evil reality, and put his confidence in nothing. "Him who views the world," says Buddhism, "as a water-bubble, a phantom, the king of death does not terrify. What pleasure, what joy is in this world? Behold the changing form—it is undone by old age; the diseased body—it dissolves and corrupts! 'I have sons and treasures; here will I dwell in the season of the cold, and there in the time of the heat:' thus thinks the fool; and cares not for, and sees not, the hindrances thereto. Him who is concerned about sons and treasures,—the man who has his heart so entangled,—death tears away, as the torrent from the forest sweeps away the slumbering village."

The view taken of the world, and the judgment formed regarding it, in the Book of Ecclesiastes, are wholly different. While in the Book of Esther faith in God remains so much in the background that there is nowhere in it express mention made of God, the name of God occurs in Ecclesiastes no fewer than thirty-seven times,<sup>1</sup> and that in such a way that the naming of Him is at the same time the confession of Him as the True God, the Exalted above the world, the Governor and the Ruler over all. And not only that: the book characterizes itself as a genuine product of the Israelitish Chokma by this, that, true to its motto, it places the command, "Fear thou God," v. 6 [7], xii. 13, in the foremost rank as a fundamental moral duty; that it makes, viii. 12, the happiness of man to be dependent thereon; that it makes, vii. 18, xi. 9, xii. 14, his final destiny to be conditioned by his fearing God; and that it contemplates the world as one that was created by God very good, iii. 11, vii. 29, and as arranged, iii. 14, and directed so that men should fear Him. These primary principles, to which the book again and again returns, are of special importance for a correct estimate of it.

Of like decisive importance for the right estimate of the theistic, and at the same time also the pessimistic, view of the world presented by Koheleth is this, that he knows of no future life compensating for the troubles of the present life, and resolving its mystery. It is true that he says, xii. 7, that the life-spirit of the man who dies returns to God who gave it, as the body returns to the dust of which it is formed; but the question asked in iii. 21 shows that this preferring of the life-spirit of man to that of a beast was not, in his regard, raised above all doubt. And what does this return to

<sup>1</sup> האֱלֹהִים, ii. 24, 26, iii. 11, 14 (twice), 15, 17, 18, iv. 17, v. 1, 5, 6, 17, 18a, 19, vi. 2 (twice), vii. 13, 14, 26, 29, viii. 15, 17, ix. 1, 7, xi. 5, 9, xii. 7, 13, 14. אֱלֹהִים, iii. 10, 13, v. 3, 18b, vii. 18, viii. 2, 13.

God mean? By no means such a return unto God as amounts to the annihilation of the separate existence of the spirit of man; for, in the first place, there is the supposition of this separate existence running through the Bible; in the second place, נחמה, xii. 7*b*, does not point to an emanation; and in the third place, the idea of Hades prevailing in the consciousness of the ages before Christ, and which is also that of *Kohleth*, proves the contrary. Man exists also beyond the grave, but without the light and the force of thought and activity characterizing his present life, ix. 5, 10. The future life is not better, but is worse than the present, a dense darkness enduring "for ever," ix. 6, xi. 8, xii. 5*b*. It is true, indeed, that from the justice of God, and the experiences of the present life as standing in contradiction thereto, viii. 14, the conclusion is drawn, xii. 14, xi. 9, that there is a last decisive judgment, bringing all to light; but this great thought, in which the interest of the book in the progress of religious knowledge comes to a climax, is as yet only an abstract postulate of faith, and not powerful enough to brighten the future; and therefore, also, not powerful enough to lift us above the miseries of the present.

That the author gives utterance to such thoughts of the future as xii. 7 and xi. 9, xii. 14,—to which *Wisd.* iii. 1 ("The souls of the righteous are in God's hand, and no trouble moves them") and *Dan.* xii. 2 ("Many that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt") are related, as being their expansion,—warrants the supposition that he disputes as little as *Job* does in chap. xiv. the reality of a better future; but only that the knowledge of such a future was not yet given to him. In general, for the first time in the N. T. era, the hope of a better future becomes a common portion of the church's creed, resting on the basis of faith in the history of redemption warranting it; and is advanced beyond the isolated prophetic gleams of light, the mere postulates of faith that were ventured upon, and the unconfirmed opinions, of the times preceding Christ. The N. T. Scripture shows how altogether different this world of sin and of change appears to be since a world of recompense and of glory has been revealed as its background; since the Lord has pronounced as blessed those who weep, and not those who laugh; and since, with the apostle (*Rom.* viii. 18), we may be convinced that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory that shall be revealed to us. The goal of human life, with its labour and its sufferings, is now carried beyond the grave. That which is done under the sun appears only

as a segment of the universal and everlasting operation, governed by the wisdom of God, the separate portions of which can only be understood in their connection with the whole. The estimate taken of this present world, apart from its connection with the future, must be one-sided. There are two worlds : the future is the solution of the mystery of the present.

A N. T. believer would not be able to write such a book as that of Job, or even as that of Ecclesiastes, without sinning against revealed truth ; without renouncing the better knowledge meanwhile made possible ; without falling back to an O. T. standpoint. The author of the Book of Ecclesiastes is related to revealed religion in its O. T. manifestation,—he is a believer before the coming of Christ ; but not such an one as all, or as most were, but of peculiar character and position. There are some natures that have a tendency to joyfulness, and others to sadness. The author of this book does not belong to the latter class ; for if he did, the call to rejoice, xi. 9, viii. 15, etc., would not as it does pervade his book, as the *χαίρετε*, though in a deeper sense, pervades the Epistle to the Philippians. Neither does he belong to those superficial natures which see almost everything in a rosy light, which quickly and easily divest themselves of their own and of others' sorrows, and on which the stern earnestness of life can make no deep and lasting impressions. Nor is he a man of feeling, whom his own weakness makes a prophet of evil ; not a predominatingly passive man, who, before he could fully know the world, withdrew from it, and now criticises it from his own retired corner in a careless, inattentive mood ; but a man of action, with a penetrating understanding and a faculty of keen observation ; a man of the world, who, from his own experience, knows the world on all its sides ; a restless spirit, who has consumed himself in striving after that which truly satisfies. That this man, who was forced to confess that all that science and art, all that table dainties, and the love of women, and riches, and honour yielded him, was at last but vanity and vexation of spirit, and who gained so deep an insight into the transitoriness and vanity of all earthly things, into the sorrows of this world of sin and death, and their perplexing mysteries, does not yet conclude by resigning himself to atheism, putting " Nothing " (*Nirvāna*), or blind Fate, in the place of God, but firmly holds that the fear of God is the highest duty and the condition of all true prosperity, as it is the highest truth and the surest knowledge—that such is the case with him may well excite our astonishment ; as well as this also, that he penetrates the known illusory character of earthly things in no over-

strained manner, despising the world in itself, and also the gifts of God in it, but that he places his ultimatum as to the pure enjoyment of life within the limits of the fear of God, and extends it as widely as God permits. One might therefore call the Book of Koheleth, "The Song of the Fear of God," rather than, as H. Heine does, "The Song of Scepticism;" for however great the sorrow of the world which is therein expressed, the religious conviction of the author remains in undiminished strength; and in the midst of all the disappointments in the present world, his faith in God, and in the rectitude of God, and in the victory of the good, stands firm as a rock, against which all the waves dash themselves into foam. "This book," says another recent author,<sup>1</sup> "which contains almost as many contradictions as verses, may be regarded as the Breviary of the most modern materialism, and of extreme licentiousness." He who can thus speak has not read the book with intelligence. The appearance of materialism arises from this, that the author sees in the death of man an end similar to that of beasts; and that is certainly so far true, but it is not the whole truth. In the knowledge of the reverse side of the matter he does not come beyond the threshold, because His hand was not yet there—viz. the hand of the Arisen One—which could help him over it. And as for the supposed licentiousness, ix. 7-9 shows, by way of example, how greatly the fear of God had guarded him from concluding his search into all earthly things with the disgust of a worn-out libertine.

But there are certainly self-contradictions in the Book of Ecclesiastes. They have a twofold ground. They are, on the one hand, the reflection of the self-contradicting facts which the author affirms. Thus, *e.g.*, iii. 11, he says that God has set eternity in the heart of man, but that man cannot find out from the beginning to the end the work which God maketh; iii. 12, 13, that the best thing in this world is for a man to enjoy life; but to be able to do this, is a gift of God; viii. 12, 14, that it goes well with them that fear God, but ill with the godless. But there is also the contrary—which is just the ground-tone of the book, that everything has its *But*; only the fear of God, after all that appertains to the world is found to be as *vanitas vanitatum*, remains as the kernel without the shell, but the commandment of the fear of God as a categorical imperative, the knowledge that the fear of God is in itself the highest happiness, and fellowship with God the highest good, remain unexpressed; the fear of God is not combined with the love of God, as *e.g.* in Ps. lxxiii. it serves only for warning and not for comfort. On the

<sup>1</sup> Hartmann's *Das Lied vom Ewigen*, St. Galle 1859, p. 12.

other hand, the book also contains contradictions, which consist in contrasts which the author is not in a condition to explain and adjust. Thus, *eg.*, the question whether the spirit of a dying man, in contrast to that of a beast, takes its way upwards, iii. 21, is proposed as one capable of a double answer; but xii. 7 answers it directly in the affirmative; the author has good grounds for the affirmative, but yet no absolute proofs. And while he denies the light of consciousness and the energy of activity to those who have gone down to Hades, ix. 10, he maintains that there is a final decisive judgment of a holy and righteous God of all human conduct, xi. 9, xii. 14, which, since there is frequently not a righteous requital given on earth, viii. 14, and since generally the issue here does not bring to light, ix. 2, the distinction between the righteous and the wicked, will take place in eternity; but it is difficult to comprehend how he has reconciled the possibility of such a final judgment with the shadowy nature of existence after death.

The Book of Koheleth is, on the one side, a proof of the power of revealed religion which has grounded faith in God, the One God, the All-wise Creator and Governor of the world, so deeply and firmly in the religious consciousness, that even the most dissonant and confused impressions of the present world are unable to shake it; and, on the other side, it is a proof of the inadequacy of revealed religion in its O. T. form, since the discontent and the grief which the monotony, the confusion, and the misery of this earth occasion, remain thus long without a counterbalance, till the facts of the history of redemption shall have disclosed and unveiled the heavens above the earth. In none of the O. T. books does the Old Covenant appear as it does in the Book of Koheleth, as "that which decayeth and waxeth old, and is ready to vanish away" (Heb. viii. 13). If the darkness of earth must be enlightened, then a New Covenant must be established; for heavenly love, which is at the same time heavenly wisdom, enters into human nature and overcomes sin, death, and Hades, and removes the turning-point of the existence of man from this to the future life. The finger of prophecy points to this new era. And Koheleth, from amid his heaps of ruins, shows how necessary it is that the heavens should now soon open above the earth.

It is a view of the world, dark, and only broken by scattered gleams of light, not disowning its sullenness even where it recommends the happy enjoyment of life, which runs through the book in a long series of dissonances, and gives to it a peculiar character. It is thus intentionally a homogeneous whole; but is it also divided into separate parts according to a plan? That we may be able to

answer this question, we subject the contents of the book to a searching analysis, step by step, yet steadily keeping the whole in view. This will at the same time also serve as a preparation for the exposition of the book.

Here below, all things under the sun are vanity. The labour of man effects nothing that is enduring, and all that is done is only a beginning and a vanishing away again, repeating itself in a never-ending circle: these are the thoughts of the book which stand as its motto, i. 2-11.

Koheleth-Solomon, who had been king, then begins to set forth the vanity of all earthly things from his own experience. The striving after secular knowledge, i. 12 ff., has proved to him unsatisfactory, as has also the striving after happiness in pleasure and in procuring the means of all imaginable gratifications, ii. 1-11; wisdom is vanity, for the wise man falls under the stroke of death as well as the fool, and is forgotten, ii. 12-17; and riches are vanity, for they become the inheritance, one knows not whether of a worthy or of an unworthy heir, ii. 18-21; and, besides, pure enjoyment, like wisdom and knowledge, depends not merely on the will of man, but both are the gift of God, ii. 22 ff. Everything has its time appointed by God, but man is unable to survey either backwards or forwards the work of God, which fills eternity, notwithstanding the impulse to search into it which is implanted within him; his dependence in all things, even in pure enjoyment, must become to him a school in which to learn the fear of God, who maintains all things unchangeably, who forms the course of that which is done, iii. 1-15. If he sees injustice prevailing in the place of justice, God's time for righteous interference has not yet come, iii. 16, 17. If God wishes to try men, they shall see that they are dependent like the beasts, and liable to death without any certain distinction from the beasts—there is nothing better than that this fleeting life should be enjoyed as well as may be, iii. 18 ff.

Koheleth now further records the evils that are under the sun: oppression, in view of which death is better than life, and not to have been at all is better than both, iv. 1-3; envy, iv. 4; the restlessness of labour, from which only the fool sets himself free, iv. 5, 6; the aimless trouble and parsimony of him who stands alone, iv. 7-12; the disappointment of the hopes placed on an upstart who has reached the throne, iv. 13-16.

Up to this point there is connection. There now follow rules, externally unconnected, for the relation of man to Him who is the Disposer of all things; regarding his frequenting the house of God, iv. 17 [v. 1]; prayer, v. 2; and praise, v. 3-6.

Then a catalogue of vanities is set forth: the insatiable covetous plundering of the lowly by those who are above them in despotic states, whereat the author praises, v. 7, 8, the patriarchal state based on agriculture; and the nothingness and uncertainty of riches, which do not make the rich happier than the labourer, v. 9-11; which sometimes are lost without any to inherit them, v. 12-14; and which their possessor, at all events, must leave behind him when he dies, v. 15, 16. Riches have only a value when by means of them a purer enjoyment is realized as the gift of God, v. 17 ff. For it happens that God gives to a man riches, but to a stranger the enjoyment thereof, vi. 1, 2. An untimely birth is better than a man who has an hundred children, a long life, and yet who has no enjoyment of life even to his death, vi. 3-6. Desire stretching on into the future is torment; only so much as a man truly enjoys has he of all his labour, vi. 7-9; what man shall be is predestinated, all contendings against it are useless: the knowledge of that which is good for him, and of the future, is in the power of no man, vi. 10 ff.

There now follow, without a premeditated plan, rules for the practical conduct of life, loosely connecting themselves with the "what is good," vi. 12, by the catchword "good:" first six (probably originally seven) proverbs of two things each, whereof the one is better than the other, vii. 1-9; then three with the same catchword, but without comparison, vii. 10, 11-12, 13-14. This series of proverbs is connected as a whole, for their ultimatum is a counsel to joy regulated by the fear of God within the narrow limits of this life, constituted by God of good and bad days, and terminating in the darkness of death. But this joy is also itself limited, for the deep seriousness of the *memento mori* is mingled with it, and sorrow is declared to be morally better than laughter.

With vii. 15, the *I*, speaking from personal experience, again comes into the foreground; but counsels and observations also here follow each other aphoristically, without any close connection with each other. Koheleth warns against an extreme tendency to the side of good as well as to that of evil: he who fears God knows how to avoid extremes, vii. 15-18. Nothing affords a stronger protection than wisdom, for (7) with all his righteousness a man makes false steps, vii. 19, 20. Thou shalt not always listen, lest thou hear something about thyself,—also thou thyself hast often spoken harshly regarding others, vii. 21, 22. He has tried everything, but in his strivings after wisdom, and in his observation of the distinction between wisdom and folly, he has found nothing more dangerous

than the snares of women; among a thousand men he found one man; but one woman such as she ought to be, he found not; he found in general that God made men upright, but that they have devised many kinds of by-ways, vii. 23 ff.

As the wise man considers women and men in general, wisdom teaches him obedience to the king to whom he has sworn fealty, and, under despotic oppression, patient waiting for the time of God's righteous interference, viii. 1-9. In the time of despotic domination, it occurs that the godless are buried with honour, while the righteous are driven away and forgotten, viii. 10. God's sentence is to be waited for, the more deliberately men give themselves to evil; God is just, but, in contradiction to His justice, it is with the righteous as with the wicked, and with the wicked as with the righteous, here on earth, viii. 11-14. In view of these vanities, then, it is the most desirable thing for a man to eat and drink, and enjoy himself, for that abides with him of his labour during the day of his life God has given him, viii. 15. Restless labour here leads to nothing; all the efforts of man to comprehend the government of God are in vain, viii. 16 ff. For on closer consideration, it appears that the righteous also, with all their actions, are ruled by God, and generally that in nothing, not even in his affections, is man his own master; and, which is the worst thing of all, because it impels men to a wicked, mad abuse of life, to the righteous and the unrighteous, death at last comes alike; it is also the will of God towards man that he should spend this transient life in cheerful enjoyment and in vigorous activity before it sinks down into the night of Hades, ix. 1-10. The fruits of one's labour are not to be gained by force, even the best ability warrants it not, an incomprehensible fate finally frustrates all, ix. 11, 12.

There now follows, but in loose connection as to thought with the preceding, a section relating to wisdom and folly, and the discordances as to the estimate of both here below, along with diverse kinds of experiences and proverbs, ix. 13-x. 15. Only one proverb is out of harmony with the general theme, viz. x. 4, which commends resignation under the ebullition of the wrath of the ruler. The following proverb, x. 5, 6, returns to the theme, but connecting itself with the preceding; the relation of rulers and the ruled to each other is kept principally in view by Koheleth.

With a proverb relating to kings and princes, good and bad, a new departure is made. Riotous living leads to slothfulness; and in contrast to this (but not without the intervention of a warning not to curse the king) follow exhortations to provident, and, at the same

time, bold and all-attempting activity; for the future is God's, and not to be reckoned on, x. 16—xi. 6. The light is sweet; and life, however long it may last, in view of the uncertain dark future, is worthy of being enjoyed, xi. 7, 8. Thus Koheleth, at the end of this last series of proverbs, has again reached his *Ceterum censeo*; he formulates it, in an exhortation to a young man to enjoy his life—but without forgetting God, to whom he owes it, and to whom he has to render an account—before grey-haired old age and death overtake him, into a full-toned *finale*, xi. 9—xii. 7. The last word of the book, xii. 8, is parallel with the first (i. 1): "O! vanity of vanities; All is vain!"

An epilogue, from the same hand as the book, seals its truth: it is written as from the very soul of Solomon; it issues from the same fountain of wisdom. The reader must not lose himself in reading many books, for the sum of all knowledge that is of value to man is comprehended in one sentence: "Fear God, for He shall bring every work into judgment," xii. 9 ff.

If we look back on this compendious reproduction of the contents and of the course of thought of the book, there appears everywhere the same view of the world, along with the same *ultimatum*; and as a pictorial *overture* opens the book, a pictorial *finale* closes it. But a gradual development, a progressive demonstration, is wanting, and so far the grouping together of the parts is not fully carried out; the connection of the thoughts is more frequently determined by that which is external and accidental, and not unfrequently an incongruous element is introduced into the connected course of kindred matters. The Solomonic stamp impressed on chap. i. and ii. begins afterwards to be effaced. The connection of the confessions that are made becomes aphoristic in chap. iii.; and the proverbs that are introduced do not appropriately fall into their place. The grounds, occasions, and views which determine the author to place confessions and moral proverbs in such an order after one another, for the most part withdraw themselves from observation. All attempts to show, in the whole, not only oneness of spirit, but also a genetic progress, an all-embracing plan, and an organic connection, have hitherto failed, and must fail.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "Ajunt Hebraei, quum inter cetera scripta Salomonis, quae antiquata sunt nec in memoria duraverunt, et hic liber obliterandus videretur, et quod vanas assereret Dei creaturas et totum putaret esse pro nihilo, et potum et cibum et delicias transeuntes praeferret omnibus, ex hoc uno capitulo (xii. 13) meruisse auctoritatem, ut in divinatorum voluminum numero poneretur."—JEROME.

In presenting this view of the spirit and plan of the Book of Koheleth, we have proceeded on the supposition that it is a post-exilian book, that it is one of the most recent of the books of the O. T. It is true, indeed, that tradition regards it as Solomonic. According to *Bathra* 15*a*, the Hezekiah-Collegium [*vid.* Del. on *Proverbs*, vol. I. p. 5] must have "written"—that is, collected into a written form—the Book of Isaiah, as also of the Proverbs, the Song, and Koheleth. The Midrash regards it as Solomon's, and as written in the evening of his days; while the Song was written in his youth, and the Proverbs when he was in middle age (*Jalkut*, under i. 1). If in *Rosch haschana* 21*b* it is said that Koheleth sought to be a second Moses, and to open the one of the fifty gates of knowledge which was unopened by Moses, but that this was denied to him, it is thereby assumed that he was the incomparable king, as Moses was the incomparable prophet. And Bloch, in his work on the origin and era of the Book of Koheleth (1872), is right in saying that all objections against the canonicity of the book leave the Solomonic authorship untouched. In the first Christian century, the Book of Koheleth was an *antilegomenon*. In the Introduction to the Song (p. 14) we have traced to their sources the two collections of legal authorities according to which the question of the canonicity of the Book of Koheleth is decided. The Synod of Jabne (Jamnia), about 90, decided the canonicity of the book against the school of Shammai. The reasons advanced by the latter against the canonicity are seen from *Shabbath* 30*b*, and *Megilla* 7*a*. From the former we learn that they regarded the words of the book, particularly ii. 2 (where they must have read מְהִלָּל, "worthy to be praised"), cf. vii. 3, and viii. 15, cf. 22, as contradictory (cf. *Proverbs*, vol. I. p. 44); and from the latter, that they hence did not recognise its inspiration. According to the *Midrash Koheleth*, under xi. 9, they were stumbled also by the call to the enjoyment of pleasure, and to walk in the way of the desire of the heart, which appeared to stand in contradiction to the *Tôra* (cf. xi. 9 with Num. xv. 39), and to savour of heresy. But belief in the Solomonic authorship remained, notwithstanding, uninjured; and the admonitions to the fear of God, with reference to the future judgment, carried them over the tendency of these observations. Already, at the time of Herod the Great (*Bathra* 4*a*), and afterwards, in the time of R. Gamaliel (*Shabbath* 30*b*), the book was cited as Holy Scripture; and when, instead of the book, the author was named, the formula of citation mentioned the name of Solomon; or the book was treated as equally Solomonic with Proverbs and the Song (*Erubin* 21*b*).

Even the doubtfulness of its contents could give rise to no manner of doubt as to the author. Down till the new era beginning with Christianity, and, in the main, even till the Reformation-century, no attention was paid to the inner and historico-literary marks which determine the time of the origin of a book. The Reformation first called into existence, along with the criticism of dogmatic traditions, at the same time also biblical criticism, which it raised to the place of an essential part of the science of Scripture. Luther, in his *Tischreden* (*Table-Talk*), is the first who explained the Preacher as one of the most recent books of the O. T.: he supposed that the book had not reached us in its completed form; that it was written by Sirach rather than by Solomon; and that it might be, "as a Talmud, collected from many books, perhaps from the library of King Ptolemy Evergetes, in Egypt."<sup>1</sup> These are only passing utterances, which have no scientific value; among his contemporaries, and till the middle of the century following, they found no acceptance. Hugo Grotius (1644) is the first who, like Luther, rejects its Solomonic authorship, erroneously supposing, with him, that it is a collection of diverse sayings of the wise, *περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας*; but on one point he excellently hits the nail on the head: *Argumentum ejus rei habeo multa vocabula, quae non alibi quam in Daniele, Esdrae, et Chaldaeis interpretibus reperias*. This observation is warranted. If the Book of Koheleth were of old Solomonic origin, then there is no history of the Hebrew language. But Bernstein (*Quaestiones nonnullae Kohelethanae*, 1854) is right in saying that the history of the Hebrew language and literature is certainly divided into two epochs by the Babylonish exile, and that the Book of Koheleth bears the stamp of the post-exilian form of the language.

*List of the Hapaxlegomena, and of the Words and Forms in the Book of Koheleth belonging to a more recent Period of the Language.*

*Ariyonah*, xii. 5; cf. *Ma'seroth* iv. 6, *Berachoth* 36a.

*Adam*, opp. *ishah*, only at vii. 28.

*Izzen*, *Pi*, only xii. 9; not Talm.

יָס, x. 16; יִסָּ, iv. 10, instead of the older יָס; cf. יָ, Ezek. ii. 10; like יִסָּ, *Shemoth rabba*, c. 46; ו' יָס, "Alas, how bad!"

<sup>1</sup> *Tischreden*, ed. Fürstmann-Bindseil, p. 400 f. The expression here almost appears as if Luther had confounded *Ecclesiastes* (Koheleth) with *Ecclesiasticus* (Sirach). At a later period he maintained that the book contained a collection of Solomonic sayings, not executed, however, by Solomon himself.

Targ. Jer. ii., Lev. xxvi. 29 ; 'ע א, "Alas for the meek!"  
*Berachoth 6b* ; cf. *Sanhedrin 11a*.

*Illu*, "if," vi. 6 ; Esth. vii. 4, of אס (אס) and א (א, read א, Ezek. iii. 6) ; Targ. Deut. xxxii. 29 = Heb. א, common in the Mishna, e.g. *Maccoth i. 10*.

*Asurim*, only vii. 26 ; cf. Judg. xv. 14 ; *Seder olam rabba*, c. 25 ; cf. at iv. 14.

*Baale asupoth*, only xii. 11 ; cf. *Sanhedrin 12a*, Jer. *Sanhedrin x. 1*.

*Bihel*, only v. 1, vii. 9 ; as *Hiph.* Esth. vi. 14 ; cf. the transitive use of the *Pih.* Esth. ii. 9, like Targ. *bahel* (= *ithb'hel*) and *b'hilu*, haste.

*Bur*, only ix. 1 ; cf. the Talm. *al buriv*, altogether free from error and sin.

*B'huroth*, only xi. 9, xii. 1 ; cf. *Mib'hurav*, Num. xi. 28.

*Butel*, xii. 3 ; elsewhere only in the Chald. of Ezra ; common in the Mishna, e.g. *Aboth i. 5*.

*Beth olam* (cf. Ezek. xxvi. 20), xii. 5 ; cf. *Tosifta Berachoth iii.*, Targ. Isa. xiv. 18, xlii. 11.

*B'chen*, viii. 10 ; Esth. iv. 16 ; elsewhere only Targ., e.g. Isa. xvi. 5.

*Baal hallashon*, x. 11 ; cf. *baal bashar*, corpulent, *Berachoth 13b* ; *baal hahhotam*, the large-nosed, carrying the nose high, *Taanith 29a*.

*Gibber*, only at x. 10, to exert oneself ; elsewhere : to prevail.

*Gummats*, only x. 8, Syr., and in the Targ. of the Hag. (cf. Targ. Ps. vii. 16).

*Divrath*, *vid.* under *v*.

*Hoveh*, ii. 22 ; cf. *Shabbath vi. 6*, *Erubin i. 10*, *Jebamoth xv. 2*.

*Holeloth*, i. 17, ii. 12, vii. 25, ix. 3 ; and *holeluth*, madness, only in the Book of Koheleth, x. 13.

*Zichron*, as primary form, i. 11, ii. 16 ; *vid.* at Lev. xxiii. 24, the connecting form.

*Z'man*, iii. 1 ; Neh. ii. 6 ; Esth. ix. 27, 31 ; elsewhere only in the bib. Chald. with אָמָר, ὥρα, the usual Mishnic word for *καίρος* and *χρόνος*.

*Holah* (*malum*), *aegrum*, v. 12, 15 ; for this *nahhlah* is used in Isa. xvii. 11 ; Nah. iii. 19 ; Jer. x. 19, xiv. 17.

*Ben-hhorim* (*liber*, in contrast to *ēvēd*, *servus*), x. 17 ; cf. חרות (freedom) on the coins of the Revolution of the Roman period ; the usual Talm. word, even of possessions, such as *praedium liberum*, *aedes liberae* of the Roman law.

*Hhuts min*, only at ii. 25 (Chald. *bar min*) ; frequent in the Mishna, e.g. *Middoth ii. 3*.

*Hhush*, ii. 25 ; in the Talm. and Syr. of sorrowful experiences ; here

(cf. Job xx. 2), of the experiences derived from the senses, and experiences in general, as in the Rabb. the five senses are called חַוְוִיָּם.

*Hhayalim*, x. 10; everywhere else, also in Aram., meaning war-hosts, except at Isa. xxx. 6, where it denotes *opes*, treasures.

*Hhezeron*, i. 15, a common word in the post-bibl. language.<sup>1</sup>

*Hephets*, iii. 1, 17, v. 7, viii. 6; cf. Isa. lviii. 3, 13. The primary unweakened meaning is found at v. 3, xii. 1, 10. The weakening of the original meaning may have already early begun; in the Book of Koheleth it has advanced as far as in the language of the Mishna, e.g. *Mezia* iv. 6.

*Hheshbon*, vii. 25, 27, ix. 10. Plur. at vii. 29, *machinationes*; only in 2 Chron. xxvi. 15 in the sense of *machinae bellicae*; but as in Koheleth, so also in *Shabbath* 150a.

*Hhathhhhatim*, only at xii. 5.

*Tahharaah*, xii. 4; cf. *Chhon*, Lam. v. 3, which is foreign to the Mishna, but is used as corresponding to the older *rehhaim*, in the same way as the vulgar Arab. *nathanat* and *fahwan*, instead of the older *raha*.<sup>2</sup>

עִסָּ, עִסָּ, only ii. 20. Talm. *Nithpa*. עִסָּ, to abandon hope, e.g. *Kelim* xxvi. 8.

*F'giyah*, only xii. 12; an abstract such as may be formed from all verbs, and particularly is more frequently formed in the more modern than in the more ancient language.

*Yether*, as a participial adj.: "that which remains" (cf. 1 Sam. xv. 15) = "gain," vi. 11, vii. 11; or "superiority," vi. 8. As an adv.: "more" (cf. Esth. vi. 6), "particularly," ii. 15, vii. 16; xii. 9, xii. 12. In the Talm. Heb., used in the sense of "remaining over" (*Kiddushin* 24b); and as an adv., in the sense of *plus* or *magis* (e.g. *Chullin* 57b).

*Yapheth*, iii. 11, v. 17, as e.g. *Jer. Pesachim* ix. 9 (b. *Pesachim* 93a): "Silence is well-becoming (נֶעֱמַל) the wise; how much more fools!"

*Yithron*, ii. 13 (twice), vii. 12 (synon. *mothar*, iii. 1); more frequently "real gain," i. 3, ii. 11, iii. 9, v. 15, x. 10; "superiority and gain," v. 8. Peculiar (= Aram. *yuthran*) to the Book of Koheleth, and in Rabb., whence it is derived.

*K'ehhad*, xi. 6, Isa. lxxv. 25, Chron., Ezra, Nehem., the Chald. *kakhuda*; Syr. *okchado*; frequent in the Mish., e.g. *Bechoroth* vii. 4; *Kilajim* i. 9.

<sup>1</sup> Vid. my *Geschichte der jud. Poesie*, p. 187 f.

<sup>2</sup> Vid. Eli Smith in my *Jud.-Arab. Poesien aus vormuh. Zeit.* (1874), p. 40.

*K'rar*, adv., i. 10, ii. 12, 16, iii. 15, iv. 2, vi. 10, ix. 6, 7; common in the Mishna, e.g. *Erubin* iv. 2, *Nedarim* v. 5; in Aram., more frequently in the sense of "perhaps" than of "formerly."

*Kasher*, xi. 6, *Esth.* viii. 5; in the Mishna, the word commonly used of that which is legally admissible; *Hiph.* verbal noun, *hachshēr*, only at x. 10; in the Mishna, of arranging according to order; in the superscription of the tract, *macshirin*, of making susceptible of uncleanness. Cf. e.g. *Menachoth* 48b. The word is generally pointed *הַכָּשֵׁר*, but more correctly *הַכְּשֵׁר*.<sup>1</sup>

*Kishron*, only at ii. 21, iv. 4, v. 10; not found in the Mishna.

*L'vad*, *tantummodo*, vii. 29; similar, but not quite the same, at *Isa.* xxvi. 13.

*Lahäg*, exclusively xii. 12; not Talm.; from the verb *lāhäg* (R. לה), to long eagerly for; Syr. *lahgoz*, vapour (of breathing, *exhalare*); cogn. *higgāyon* (*həgēh*), according to which it is explained in *Jer. Sanhedrin* x. 1 and elsewhere.

*Lavah*, viii. 15, as in the Mishna: to conduct a guest, to accompany a traveller; whence the proverb: לוֹאֵאֵי לוֹנִיָּה, he who gives a convoy to the dead, to him it will be given, *Kethuboth* 72a; cf. שֵׁם לוֹנִי, a standing surname, *Nega'im* xiv. 6.

*M'dinah*, v. 7, and in no book besides before the Exile.

*Madda'*, x. 20; elsewhere only in the Chron. and Dan.; Targ. מִדָּנָה.

*M'leah*, *gravida*, only xi. 5, as in the Mishna, e.g. *Jebamoth* xvi. 1.

*Malāk*, v. 5; cf. *Mal.* ii. 7, in the sense of the later *sh'luahh shama'im*, delegated of God.<sup>2</sup>

*Miskēn*, only iv. 13, ix. 15, 16; but cf. *miskenuth*, *Deut.* viii. 9, and *m'sukan*, *Isa.* xl. 20.

*Masm'roth*, xii. 11 = מַסֵּס, *Jer.* x. 4; cf. *Isa.* xli. 7; 1 *Chron.* xxii. 3; 2 *Chron.* iii. 9.

*M'attim*, v. 1; a plur. only at *Ps.* cix. 8.

*Mikrēh*, more frequently in the Book of Koheleth than in any other book; and at iii. 19, used as explained in the Comm.

*Mērots*, exclusively ix. 11 (elsewhere *m'rutsah*).

*Māshāk*, ii. 3; cf. *Chagiga* 14a, *Sifri* 135b, ed. Friedmann.

*Mishlahhath*, viii. 8 (cf. *Ps.* lxxviii. 49).

*Nāgā'*, *Hiph.* with *ēl*, viii. 14, as at *Esth.* ix. 26; Aram. מָטָא לְ, e.g. *Targ. Jer.* to *Ex.* xxxiii. 13.

<sup>1</sup> Vid. my *Heb. Römerbrief*, p. 79. Cf. Stein's *Talm. Termin.* (1869), under פֶּשֶׁר and הַכְּשֵׁר.

<sup>2</sup> Vid. my "Discussion der Amtsfrage in Mishna u. Gemara," *Luth. Zeitsch.* (1854), pp. 446-449.

*Nāhag*, ii. 3, as in the Mishna, *e.g.* *Aboda Zara* iii. 4, 54*b*; cf. Targ. Koh. x. 4.

*Nakhath*, vi. 5, as in the common phrase *nakhath ruakh*; cf. נח לו וְנִי, "It were better for him," etc., *Jer. Berachoth* i. 2. This נח לו, for Koheleth's נח לו, is frequent.

*Nata'*, xii. 11 (for which, Isa. xxii. 23, *taka'*; Mishna, קבע; *Jer. Sanhedrin* x. 1), as Dan. xi. 45.

סבל, *Hithpa.*, only at xii. 5.

*Sof*, iii. 11, vii. 2, xii. 13; Joel ii. 20; 2 Chron. xx. 16, the more modern word which later displaced the word *ahharith*, vii. 8, x. 13 (cf. *Jerachoth* i. 1), but which is not exactly equivalent to it; for *sof dāṣār*, xii. 13,<sup>1</sup> which has the meaning of *samma sammurum*, *ahharith dāsar*, would be inapplicable.

*Stichal*, ii. 19, vii. 17, x. 3 (twice), 14; *Jer.* iv. 22, v. 21; in the Book of Koheleth, the synonym of the yet more frequently used ססיל, the Targ. word.

*Sechēl*, exclusively x. 6.

*Sichluth*, i. 17 (here with ש), ii. 3, 12, 13, vii. 25, x. 1, 13 (synon. *k'siluth*, Prov. ix. 13).

סכס, *Niph.* x. 9; cf. *Berachoth* i. 3. The Targ.-Talm. *Itpha*, אסססס, "to be in danger," corresponds with the *Niph.*

*'Anād*, exclusively ix. 1, like the Syr. *'bad*, Jewish-Aram. עִבְדָּר.

*'Adā* (formed of אדא), *adhuc*, with אס, *nondum*, iv. 3.

*'Adenāh* (of *ad-hennāh*), *adhuc*, iv. 2; Mishmic אדא, *e.g.* *Nedarim* xi. 10.

אדא, *Hithpa.* only at xii. 3.

*'Amād*, ii. 9, viii. 3, as *Jer.* xlviii. 11; Ps. cii. 27.

*Ummāth*, *vid.* under א.

*'Anāh*, v. 19, x. 19.

*Ingān*, exclusively in the Book of Koheleth, i. 13, ii. 23, 26, iii. 10, iv. 8, v. 2, 13, viii. 16, one of the most extensive words of the post-bibl. Heb.; first, of the object of employment, *e.g.* *Kiddushin* 6*a*, "occupied with this object;" also Aram. *Bathra* 114*b*.

*'Atsāltāyim*, double impurity, *i.e.* where the one hand is as impure as the other, only at x. 18.

*'Asāh*, with *lēhhēm*, x. 19, as at Dan. v. 1: *ḁvād lēhhēm*; in the N. T. Mark vi. 21, ποιεῖν δεῖπνον. Otherwise Ezek. iv. 15, where *asah lēhhēm* is used of preparing food. With the obj. of the time of life, vi. 12; cf. Acts xv. 33. With *tor*, not

<sup>1</sup> *Vid. Heb. Römerbrief*, pp. 81, 84.

only "to do good," vii. 20, but also "to act well," "to spend a pleasant life," iii. 12.

*Pardēs* (Song iv. 13 ; Neh. ii. 8), plur. ii. 5, flower-gardens, parks, as *Mezfa* 103a, פֶּרְדִּיסי.

*Peshēr*, *explicatio*, viii. 1, elsewhere only in the Chald. parts of Dan. Aram. for the older פִּתְרוֹן and שִׁבְר, of which the Targ. word is פִּשְׁר and פִּשְׁרָן, Talm. פִּשְׁרָה, "adjustment of a controverted matter."

*Pithgam* in the Chald. parts of Ezra and Daniel, but only as a Hebraised Persian word in viii. 11, Esth. i. 20 ; common in the Targ. and in the Syr., but not in the Talm.

*Kilkāl* (*Kālāl*, Ezek. i. 7 ; Dan. x. 6), exclusively at x. 10 (on the contrary, at Ezek. xxi. 26, it means "to agitate").

*Ruth*, only v. 10 ; *Keri*, for which *Chethib* רֵאִית, which may be read רֵאִית, רֵאִית (cf. Ezek. xxviii. 17), or רֵאִית ; the latter two of these forms are common in the Mishna, and have there their special meanings proceeding from the fundamental idea of seeing.

וִרְיָ, *Niph. part.*, only iii. 15.

*Ruth*, besides the Chald. parts of Ezra, occurs only seven times in the Book of Koheleth, i. 14, ii. 11, 17, 26, iv. 4, 6, vi. 9.

*Ra'yon*, i. 17, ii. 22, iv. 16 ; elsewhere only in the Chald. parts of Daniel and in the Targ.

שְׁ, this in and of itself is in no respect modern, but, as the Babyl.-Assyr. *sa*, the Phoen. אַש, shows, is the relative (originally demonstrative) belonging to the oldest period of the language, which in the Mishna has altogether supplanted the אֲשֶׁר of the older Heb. book-language. It is used in the Book of Koheleth quite in the same way as in the Mishna, but thus, that it stands first on the same line (rank) with אֲשֶׁר, and makes it doubtful whether this or that which occurs more frequently in the book (שְׁ, according to Herzfeld, 68 times, and אֲשֶׁר 89 times) has the predominance (cf. *e.g.* i. 13 f., viii. 14, x. 14, where both are used *promiscue*). The use of *asher* as a relative pronoun and relative conjunction is not different from the use of this in the older literature: 'ad *asher lo*, in the sense of "before," xii. 1, 2, 6, Mishnic עַד שֶׁלֹא, is only a natural turn to the fundamental meaning "till that not" (2 Sam. xvii. 13 ; 1 Kings xvii. 17) ; and *mib'li asher lo* = *nisi quod non*, iii. 11 (cf. *bilti*, Dan. xi. 18), for which the Mishnic וּבְלִבְר שֶׁלֹא (*e.g.* *Erubin* i. 10),

is only accidentally not further demonstrable. But how far the use of *ש* has extended, will be seen by the following survey, from which we exclude *ש*, standing alone as a relative pronoun or relative conjunction:—

*Beshekvar*, ii. 16. *B'shel asher, eo quod*, viii. 17 (cf. Jonah i. 7, 8, 12), corresponding to the Talm. *בְּדִיל דְּ*. *Kol ש*, ii. 7, 9, and xi. 8. *Kol-ummah ש*, v. 15, corresponding to the Chald. *kol-kavel* *כַּל*, Dan. ii. 40, etc. *כַּשׁ*, v. 14, xii. 7, and in the sense of *quum*, ix. 12, x. 3. *mah-ש*, i. 9, iii. 15, vi. 10, vii. 24, viii. 7, x. 14; *meh ש*, iii. 22. *מֶשׁ*, v. 4. *'Al-divrath shello*, vii. 14 (cf. iii. 18, viii. 2). *Shëgam*, ii. 15, viii. 14.

*Shiddah* and plur. *Shiddoth*, exclusively ii. 8.

*Shaharuth*, exclusively xi. 10, to be understood after *Nedarim* iii. 8, "the black-headed," opposed to *בעלי השיבות*, "the grey-haired."

*שֶׁכַח*, *Hithpa.*, only viii. 10, the usual word in the Talm., e.g. *Sanhedrin* 13b.

*Shalat*, ii. 19, viii. 9, besides only in Nehemiah and Esther (cf. *Bechoroth*, vii. 6, etc.); *Hiph.* v. 18, vi. 2, elsewhere only Ps. cxix. 133.

*Shilton*, viii. 4, 8, nowhere else in O. T. Heb., but in the Mishna, e.g. *Kiddushin* iii. 6.

*Shallith*, with *ב*, only viii. 8 (cf. Ezek. xvi. 30); on the contrary, vii. 19, x. 5, as Gen. xlii. 6, in the political signification of a ruler.

*שָׁמַם*, *Hithpo.*, vii. 16.

*Shiphloth*, x. 18, elsewhere only Targ. Jer. xlix. 24.

*Shithi*, only x. 17.

*Tahath hashshēmēsh*, i. 3, agreeing with the Greek *ὕψ' ἡλίω*, or *ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον*.

*Takkiph*, in O. T. Heb. only vi. 10; elsewhere in the Chald., Targ., Talm.

*Takan*, i. 15; *Pih.* vii. 13, xii. 9, a Mishna-word used in the *Pih.* and *Hiph.*, whence *tikkun* ("putting right," e.g. in the text-hist. *terminus technicus*, *tikkun sopherim*, and "arrangement," e.g. *Gittin* iv. 2, "the ordering of the world") and *tikkānāh* (e.g. *Gittin* iv. 6, "welfare," frequently in the sense of "direction," "arrangement").

This survey of the forms peculiar to the Book of Koheleth, and only found in the most recent books of the O. T., partly only in

the Chaldee portions of these, and in general use in the Aramaic, places it beyond all doubt that in this book we have a product of the post-exilian period, and, at the earliest, of the time of Ezra-Nehemiah. All that Wagenmann (*Comm.* 1856), von Essen (*Der Predeger Salomo's*, 1856), Böhl (*De Aramaismis libri Coheleth*, 1860), Hahn (*Comm.* 1860), Reusch (*Tübinger Quartalschr.* 1860), Warminski (*Verfasser u. Abfassungszeit des B. Koheleth*, 1867), Prof. Taylor Lewis (in the American ed. of Lange's *Bibelwerk*, 1869), Schäfer (*Neue Untersuchungen ü d. B. Koheleth*, 1870), Vegni (*L'Ecclesiaste secondo il testo Ebraico*, Florenz 1871) have advanced to the contrary, rests on grounds that are altogether untenable. If we possessed the original work of Sirach, we should then see more distinctly than from fragments<sup>1</sup> that the form of the language found in Koheleth, although older, is yet one that does not lie much further back; it is connected, yet loosely, with the old language, but at the same time it is in full accord with that new Heb. which we meet with in the Mishna and the Barajtha-Literature, which groups itself around it. To the modern aspects of the Heb. language the following forms belong:—

1. Verbs *Lamed-Aleph*, which from the first interchange their forms with those of verbs *Lamed-He*, are regularly treated in certain forms of inflexion in the Mishna as verbs *Lamed-He*; e.g. יִצָּאֵה is not used, but יִצָּהֵה.<sup>2</sup> This interchange of forms found in the later language reveals itself here in יִצָּא, x. 5, used instead of יִצָּאֵה; and if, according to the Masora, חוּטָא (חֻטָּא) is to be always written like מוּצָא at vii. 26 (except vii. 26b), the traditional text herein discloses a full and accurate knowledge of the linguistic character of the book. The Aram. יִשְׁנָא for יִשְׁנָה, at viii. 1, is not thus to be accounted for.

2. The richness of the old language in mood-forms is here disappearing. The optative of the first person (the cohortative) is only represented by אֶחְכֶּמָה, vii. 23. The form of the subjunctive (jussive) is found in the prohibitive clauses, such as vii. 16, 17, 18, x. 4; but elsewhere the only certain examples found are שִׁלָּה, *quod auferat secum*, v. 14, and וַיִּנִּיר, x. 10. In xii. 7, וַיִּשָּׁב may also be read, although וַיִּשָּׁב, under the influence of “ere ever” (xii. 6), is also admissible. On the contrary, יִהְיֶה, xi. 3, is indic. after the Mishn. יִהְיֶה, and so also is וַיִּנָּא (derived from וַיִּנָּא, not וַיִּנָּא), xii. 5. Yet more characteristic, however, is the circumstance that the historic tense,

<sup>1</sup> Vid. the collection of the Heb. fragments of the Book of Ben-Sira in my *Gesch. der jüd. Poesie*, p. 204 f.

<sup>2</sup> Vid. Geiger's *Lehrbuch der Mishna-Sprache*, p. 46.

the so-called *ful. consecutivum*, which has wholly disappeared from the Mishna-language, also here, notwithstanding the occasions for its frequent use, occurs only three times, twice in the unabbreviated form, iv. 1, 7, and once in the form lengthened by the intentional *ah*, i. 17, which before its disappearance was in frequent use. It probably belonged more to the written than to the spoken language of the people (cf. the Song vi. 9b).

3. The complexion of the language peculiar to the Book of Koheleth is distinguished also by this, that the designation of the person already contained in the verbal form is yet particularly expressed, and without there being a contrast occasioning this emphasis, by the personal pronoun being added to and placed after it, *e.g.* i. 16, ii. 1, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 20, iii. 17, 18, iv. 1, 4, 7, v. 17, vii. 25, viii. 15, ix. 15. Among the more ancient authors, Hosea has the same peculiarity (cf. the Song v. 5); but there the personal pronoun stands always before the verb, *e.g.* viii. 13, xii. 11. The same thing is found in Ps. xxxix. 11, lxxxii. 6, etc. The inverse order of the words is found only at ii. 14, after the scheme of Job i. 15, as also ii. 15 follows the scheme of Gen. xxiv. 27. Mishna-forms of expressions such as מוֹדֵרִי, *Nedarim* i. 1, מְסַבֵּלִי, *Jebamoth* xvi. 7, are not homogeneous with that manner of subordinating the personal pronoun (cf. vii. 26, iv. 2). Thus we have here before us a separation of the subject and the predicate, instead of which, in the language of the Mishna, the form הֵיכִי אֲנִי (אֲנִי) and the like (*e.g.* *Berachoth* i. 5) is used, which found for itself a place in the language of Koheleth, in so far as this book delights in the use of the participle to an extent scarcely met with in any other book of Scripture (*vid. e.g.* i. 6, viii. 12, x. 19).

4. The use of the demonstrative pronoun הֵן bears also a Mishnic stamp. We lay no particular stress on the fact that the author uses it, as regularly as the Mishna, always without the article; but it is characteristic that he always, where he does not make use of the masculine form in a neuter sense (as vii. 10, 18, 29, viii. 9, ix. 1, xi. 6, keeping out of view cases determined by attraction), employs no other feminine form than הֵן, Mishnic הֵן, in this sense, ii. 2, v. 15, 18, vii. 23, ix. 13. In other respects also the use of the pronouns approaches the Mishna language. In the use of the pronoun also in i. 10 and v. 18 there is an approach to the Mishnic הֵן *hic est*, and הֵן *hæc est*. And the use of הֵן and הֵן for the personal verb reaches in iii. 18, ix. 4 (*vid. Comm.*), the extreme.

The enumeration of linguistic peculiarities betokening a late

origin is not yet exhausted; we shall meet with many such in the course of the Exposition. Not only the language, however, but also the style and the artistic form of the book, show that it is the most recent product of the Bibl. *Chokma* literature, and belongs to a degenerated period of art. From the fact that the so-called metrical accent system of the three books—Psalms, Job, and Proverbs—is not used in Ecclesiastes, it does not follow that it is not a poetical book in the fullest sense of the word; for the Song and Lamentations, these masterpieces of the שיר and קינה, the Minnesong and the Elegy, are also excluded from that more elevated, more richly expressive, and more melodious form of discourse, perhaps to preserve the spiritual character of the one, and not to weaken the elegiac character of the other, to which a certain melancholy monotone *andante* is suitable. So also, to apply that system of accentuation to the Book of Koheleth was not at all possible, for the symmetrical stichs to which it is appropriate is for the most part wanting in Koheleth, which is almost wholly written in eloquent prose: unfolding its instruction in the form of sentences without symmetrical stichs.—It is, so to speak, a philosophical treatise in which “I saw,” and the like, as the expression of the result of experience; “I said,” as the expression of reflection on what was observed; “I perceived,” as the expression of knowledge obtained as a conclusion from a process of reasoning; and “this also,” as the expression of the result,—repeat themselves nearly terminologically. The reasoning tone prevails, and where the writer passes into gnomic poetry he enters into it suddenly, *e.g.* v. 9*b*, or holds himself ready to leave it quickly again, *e.g.* v. 12, vii. 13 *f*. Always, indeed, where the Mashal note is struck, the discourse begins to form itself into members arranged in order; and then the author sometimes rises in language, and in the order of his words, into the true classic form of the proverb set forth in parallel members, *e.g.* vii. 7, 9, ix. 8. The symmetry of the members is faultless, v. 5, viii. 8, ix. 11; but in other places, as v. 1, vii. 26, xi. 9, it fails, and in the long run the book, altogether peculiar in its stylistic and artistic character, cannot conceal its late origin: in the elevated classical style there quickly again intermingles that which is peculiar to the author, as representing the age in which he lived, *e.g.* vii. 19, x. 2 *f*, 6, 8–10, 16 *f*, xi. 3, 6. That in the age of the Mishna they knew how to imitate classic masterpieces, is seen from the beautiful enigma, in the form of a heptastich, by Bar-Kappara, *jer. Moëd katan* iii. 1, and the elegy, in the form of a hexastich on the death of R. Abina, by Bar-Kippuk, *b. Moëd katan*

25b.<sup>1</sup> One would thus be in error if he regarded such occasional classical pieces in the Book of Koheleth as borrowed. The book, however fragmentary it may seem to be on a superficial examination, is yet the product of one author.<sup>2</sup> In its oratorical ground-form, and in the proverbs introduced into it, it is a side-piece to Prov. i.-ix. We have shown, in the introduction to the Book of Proverbs, that in these proverbial discourses which form the introduction to the older Solomonic Book of Proverbs, which was probably published in the time of Jehoshaphat, the Mashal appears already rhetorically decomposed. This decomposition is much further advanced in the Book of Ecclesiastes. To it is applicable in a higher degree what is there (*Proverbs*, vol. I. 12 f.) said of Prov. i.-ix. The distich is represented in the integral, vii. 13, synonymous, xi. 4, and synthetic, vii. 1, and also, though rarely, in the antithetic form, vii. 4; but of the emblematic form there is only one example, x. 1. The author never attempted the beautiful numerical and priamel forms; the proverbial form also, beyond the limits of the distich, loses the firmness of its outline. The tetrastich, x. 20, is, however, a beautiful exception to this. But splendour of form would not be appropriate to such a sombre work as this is. Its external form is truly in keeping with its spirit. In the checkered and yet uniform manner of the book is reflected the image of the author, who tried everything and yet was satisfied with nothing; who hastened from one thing to another because nothing was able to captivate him. His style is like the view he takes of the world, which in its course turned to him only its dark side. He holds fast to the fear of God, and hopes in a final judgment; but his sceptical world-sorrow remains unmitigated, and his forced eudaemonism remains without the right consecration: these two stars do not turn the night into day; the significance of the book, with reference to the history of redemption, consists in the actual proof that humanity, in order to its being set free from its unhappiness, needs to be illuminated by the sun of a new revelation. But although the manner of the author's representation is the reflection of his own inner relation to the things represented, yet here and there he makes his representation, not without con-

<sup>1</sup> Given and translated in *Wissenschaft, Kunst, Judenthum* (1838), p. 231 f.

<sup>2</sup> Renan, in his *Histoire des Langues Sémitiques*, supposes that a work of so bold a scepticism as Ecclesiastes could not have originated in the post-exilian period of the severely legal rabbinical Judaism; it may be an old Solomonic work, but as it now lies before us, revised by a more recent hand,—an untenable expedient for establishing an arbitrary supposition.

sciousness and art, the picture of his own manner of thought. Thus, *e.g.*, the drawling tautologies in viii. 14, ix. 9, certainly do not escape from him against his will. And as was rightly remarked under Gen. ii. 1-3, that the discourse there is extended, and forms itself into a picture of rest after the work of the creation, so Koheleth, in i. 4-11 and xii. 2-7, shows himself a master of eloquence; for in the former passage he imitates in his style the everlasting unity of the course of the world, and in the latter he paints the exhausted and finally shattered life of man.

Not only, however, by the character of its thought and language and manner of representation, but also by other characteristic features, the book openly acknowledges that it was not written by Solomon himself, but by a Jewish thinker of a much later age, who sought to conceive of himself as in Solomon's position, and clothed his own life-experiences in the confessions of Solomon. The very title of the book does not leave us in doubt as to this. It is in these words: *The words of Koheleth, the son of David, king in Jerusalem.* The apposition, "king in Jerusalem," appertains, like *e.g.* 2 Chron. xxxv. 3, to the name of the speaker who is introduced; for nothing is here said as to the place in life held by David, but to that held by him who is thus figuratively named. The indeterminate "king" of itself would be untenable, as at Prov. xxxi. 1. As there the words "king of Massa" are to be taken together, so here "king" is determined by "in Jerusalem" added to it, so far that it is said what kind of king Koheleth was. That by this name Solomon is meant, follows, apart from i. 12 ff., from this, that David had only one son who was king, viz. Solomon. The opinion of Krochmal, that a later David, perhaps a governor of Jerusalem during the Persian domination, is meant,<sup>1</sup> is one of the many superfluities of this learned author. Koheleth is Solomon, but he who calls him "king in Jerusalem" is not Solomon himself. Solomon is called "king of Israel," *e.g.* 2 Kings xxiii. 13; and as in i. 12 he names himself "king over Israel," so, Neh. xiii. 26, he is called "king of Israel," and along with this designation, "king over all Israel;" but the title, "king in Jerusalem," nowhere else occurs. We read that Solomon "reigned in Jerusalem over all Israel," 1 Kings xi. 42, cf. xiv. 21; the title, "king in Jerusalem," is quite peculiar to the title of the book before us. Eichhorn supposes that it corresponds to the time subsequent to the division of the kingdom, when there were two different royal residences;

<sup>1</sup> Vid. *Kerem chemed* v. 89, and his *More neboche ha-seman* (*Director errantium nostrae aetatis*), edited by Zunz, 1851, 4.

but against this view Bloch rightly remarks, that the contrasted "in Samaria" occurs only very rarely (as 2 Kings xiv. 23). We think that in this expression, "king in Jerusalem," there is revealed a time in which Israel had ceased to be an independent kingdom, in which Jerusalem was no more a royal city.

That the book was not composed immediately by Solomon, is indicated by the circumstance that he is not called Solomon, nor Jedidiah (2 Sam. xii. 25), but is designated by a hitherto unheard of name, which, by its form, shows that it belongs, at earliest, to the Ezra-Nehemiah age, in which it was coined. We consider the name, first, without taking into account its feminine termination. In the Arab., *kahal* (cogn. *kahal*) signifies to be dry, hard, from the dryness and leather-like toughness of the skin of an old man; and, accordingly, Dindorf (*Quomodo nomen Koheleth Salomoni tribuatur*, 1791) and others understand *Koheleth* of an old man whose life is worn out; Coccejus and Schultens, with those of their school, understand it of the penitent who is dead to the world. But both views are opposed by this, that the form  $\text{קֹהֵלֶת}$  ( $\text{קֹהֵל}$ , cf.  $\text{קָהַל}$ ) would be more appropriate; but above all by this, that  $\text{קֹהֵל}$ , in this meaning, *aridum, mareidum esse*, is a verbal stem altogether foreign to the northern Semitic. The verb  $\text{קָהַל}$  signifies, in the Heb., Aram., and Assyr., to call (cf. the Syr. *kahlonitho*, a quarrelsome woman), and particularly to call together; whence  $\text{קָהַל}$ , of the same Sanscrit-Semit. root as the words *ἐκ-κλη-σία* and *con-cil-ium*,<sup>1</sup>—an extension of the root  $\text{קָהַל}$ , which, on another side, is extended in the Arab. *kalah*, Aethiop. *kafha*, to cry. This derivation of the name *Koheleth* shows that it cannot mean *συναθροιστής* (Grotius, not Aquila), in the sense of *collector sententiarum*; the Arab. translation *alajam'at* (also van Dyk) is faultless, because *jam'* can signify, to collect men as well as things together; but  $\text{קֹהֵל}$  is not used in that sense of *in unum redigere*. In close correspondence with the Heb. word, the LXX. translates, *ὁ ἐκκλησιαστής*; and the Graec. Venet., *ἡ ἐκκλησιάστρια* (xii. 9: *ἡ ἐκκλησιάζουσα*). But in the nearest signification, "the collector," this would not be a significant name for the king represented as speaking in this book. In Solomon's reign there occurred an epoch-making assembly in Jerusalem, 1 Kings viii. 1, 2 Chron. v. 2—viz. for the purpose of consecrating the temple. The O. T. does not afford any other historical reference for the name; for although, in Prov. v. 14, xxvi. 26,  $\text{קֹהֵלֶת}$  signifies *coram populo, publice*, yet it does not occur directly of the public appearance of Wisdom; the expressions for this are different, i. 20 f.,

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Friedr. Delitzsch's *Indogermanisch-Semitische Studien*, p. 90.

viii. 1-4, ix. 3, though cognate. But on that great day of the consecration of the temple, Solomon not only called the people together, but he also preached to them,—he preached indirectly, for he consecrated the temple by prayer; and directly, for he blessed the people, and exhorted them to faithfulness, 1 Kings viii. 55-61. Thus Solomon appears not only as the assembler, but also as the preacher to those who were assembled; and in this sense of a teacher of the people (cf. xii. 9), *Koheleth* is an appropriate name of the king who was famed for his wisdom and for his cultivation of the popular *Mashal*. It is known that in proper names the *Kal* is frequently used in the sense of the *Hiph*. Thus *Koheleth* is not immediately what it may be etymologically = קָהֵל, caller, proclaimer; but is = מְקַהֵל, from קָהַל, to assemble, and to speak to the assembly, *contionari*; according to which Jerome, under i. 1, rightly explains: *ἐκκλησιαστής, Graeco sermone appellatur qui coetum, id est ecclesiam congregat, quem nos nuncupare possumus contionatorem, eo quod loquatur ad populum et ejus sermo non specialiter ad unum, sed ad universos generaliter dirigatur*. The interpretation: assembly = academy or *collectivum*, which Döderlein (*Salomon's Prediger u. Hoheslied*, 1784) and Kaiser (*Koheleth, Das Collectivum der Davidischen Könige in Jerusalem*, 1823) published, lightly disregards the form of the *n. agentis*; and Spohn's (*Der Prediger Salomo*, 1785) "O vanity of vanities, said the philosopher," itself belongs to the vanities.

Knobel in his Comm. (1836) has spoken excellently regarding the feminine form of the name; but when, at the close, he says: "Thus *Koheleth* properly signifies preaching, the office and business of the public speaker, but is then = מְקַהֵל, קָהֵל, public speaker before an assembly," he also, in an arbitrary manner, interchanges the *n. agentis* with the *n. actionis*. His remark, that "the rule that *concreta*, if they have a fem. termination, become *abstracta*, must also hold for *participia*," is a statement that cannot be confirmed. As חֲתָמָה signifies that which impresses (a seal), and כְּתָרֶת that which twines about (chapiter), so also חֲבֵרֶת, Ex. xxvi. 10, that which joins together (the coupling); one can translate such fem. particip., when used as substantives, as *abstracta*, e.g. כְּלָה (from כָּלָה), destruction, utter ruin; but they are *abstracta* in themselves as little as the *neutra* in τὸ ταυτόν, which may be translated by "identity," or in *immensum altitudinis*, by immensity (in height). Also Arab. names of men with fem. forms are *concreta*. To the participial form *Koheleth* correspond, for the most part, such names as (Arab.) *rawiyaton*, narrator of tradition (fem. of *rawyn*); but essentially cogn.

also are such words as *'allamat*, greatly learned man; also *khalyfaton*, which is by no means an inf. noun, like the Heb. קֹהֵלֶת, but is the fem. of the verbal adj. *khalyf*, successor, representative. The Arabic grammarians say that the fem. termination gives to the idea, if possible, a collective signification, *e.g.* *jarrar*, the puller, i.e. the drawer of a ship (*halcarian*), and *jarrwat*, the multitude drawing, the company (*ṭajīd*) drawing the boat up the stream; or it also serves "as an exhaustive designation of the properties of the genus," so that, *e.g.*, *'allamat* means one who unites in himself that which is peculiar to the very learned, and represents in his own person a plurality of very learned men. They also say that the fem. termination serves in such cases to strengthen the idea. But how can this strengthening result from a change in the gender? Without doubt the fem. in such cases discharges the function of a neut.; and since *doctus* is heightened to *doctissimus*, it is thereby implied that such an one is a pattern of a learned man,—the reality of the idea, or the realized ideal of such an one.

From these Arab. analogues respecting the import of the name *Kohélet*, it follows that the fem. is not to be referred to *Chokma* in such a way as that Solomon might be thereby designated as the representative, and, as it were, the incarnation of wisdom (Ewald, Hitzig, etc.).—an idea which the book by no means supports; for if the author had designed, in conformity with that signification of the name, to let Wisdom herself speak through Solomon's mouth, he would have let him speak as the author of Prov. i-ix. speaks when he addresses the reader by the title, "my son," he would not have put expressions in his mouth such as i. 16-18, vii. 23 f. One should not appeal to vii. 27; for there, where the subject is the dangers of the love of women, *Kohélet*, in the sense of Wisdom preaching, is as little appropriate as elsewhere; just here was the masculine gender of the speaker to be accented, and *Amrah Kohélet* is thus an incorrect reading for *Amar Hakkohélet* (xii. 8). The name *Kohélet*, without *Chokma* being supplied, is a man's name, of such recent formation as *Sophereth*, Neh. vii. 5, for which Ezra ii. 55, *Hassophereth*; cf. also Ezra ii. 57, שָׂרָא. The Mishna goes yet further in the coining of such names for men *generis fem.* As it generally prefers to use the *part. passivi* in an active sense, *e.g.* חֲשַׁב, thinking; רָכַב, riding; חָנַף, having drunk; so also it forms fem. plurals with a masculine signification,—as *Hadrachoth*, press-treaders, *Teramoth* iii. 4; *Hamm'sukhhoth*, surveyors, *Erubin* iv. 11; *Hall'uzoth*, speakers in a foreign tongue, *Megilla* ii. 1,—and construes these

with *mas.* predicates.<sup>1</sup> In these there can be nowhere anything said of a heightening of the idea effected by the transition to *fem.* forms. But the persons acting, although they are men, are thought of as *neut.*; and they appear, separated from the determination of their gender, as the representatives of the activity spoken of. According to this, *Kohaleth* is, without regard to the gender, a preaching person. The Book of *Kohaleth* thus bears, in its second word, as on its very forehead, the stamp of the Ezra-Nehemiah era to which it belongs.

As the woman of Endor, when she raised Samuel out of Hades at the request of Saul, sees "gods ascending out of the earth" (1 Sam. xxviii. 13), so it is not the veritable Solomon who speaks in this book, but his spirit, for which this *neut.* name *Kohaleth* is appropriate. When he says, i. 12, "I, *Kohaleth*, have been king over Israel in Jerusalem," he recognises himself not as the reigning monarch, but as having been king. The Talmudic *Agguda* has joined to this *הייתי*, the fable that Solomon was compelled to descend from the throne on account of his transgression of the law, which was then occupied by an angel in his stead, but externally bearing his likeness; and that he now went about begging, saying: "I, *Kohaleth*, have been king over Israel in Jerusalem;" but that they struck him with a stick, and set before him a plate of groats; for they said to him: "How canst thou speak thus? There the king sits in his palace on his throne."<sup>2</sup> In this fiction there is at least grammatical intelligence. For it is a vain delusion for one to persuade himself that Solomon in his advanced age could say, with reference to the period of his life as ruler, "I have been king," *fui rex*—he was certainly always so during the forty years of his reign, and on to the last moment of his life. Or can the words *הייתי מלך* mean *sum rex*? The case is as follows: *הייתי* is never the expression of the abstract present, or of existence without regard to time; "I am a king" is expressed in this sense by the substantival clause *ani mēlek*. In every case where one can translate *הייתי* by "I am," *e.g.* Ps. lxxxviii. 5, the present being is thought of as the result of an historical past (*sum = factus sum*). But at the most, *הייתי*, when it looks from the present back upon the past, out of which it arose, signifies "I have become," Gen. xxxii. 11; Ps. xxx. 8; Jer. xx. 7; or when it looks back into the past as

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Geiger, *Lehrbuch*, § xvi. 6, and cf. Weiss' *Studien*, p. 90, who arbitrarily explains away this linguistic usage. Duke, in his *Sprache der Mishna*, p. 75, avoids the difficulty by the supposition of inadmissible ellipses.

<sup>2</sup> Jer. Sanhedrin ii. 6 goes further into the story; *b. Gittin* 68b, where the angel is designated by the Persian name *Ashmodee*, cf. Jellinek's *Sammlung kleiner Midrashim* 2. xxvi.

such, "I have been," Josh. i. 5; Judg. xii. 2; Ps. xxxvii. 25. Whether this word, in the former sense, corresponds to the Greek perfect, and in the latter to the Greek aorist, is determined only by the situation and connection. Thus in Ex. ii. 22 it signifies, "I have become a stranger" (*γέγονα* = *εἰμί*); while, on the other hand, in Deut. xxiii. 8, "thou hast been a stranger" (*ἐγένου*, *fuisti*). That where the future is spoken of, *הייתי* can, by virtue of the *consecutio temporum*, also acquire the meaning of "I shall become, I shall be," *e.g.* 1 Kings i. 21, cf. 1 Chron. xix. 12, is of no importance to us here. In the more modern language the more delicate syntax, as well as that idea of "becoming," primarily inherent in the verb *היה*, is disappearing, and *הייתי* signifies either the past purely, "I have been," Neh. xiii. 6, or, though not so frequently, the past along with the present, "I was," *e.g.* Neh. i. 11. Accordingly, Solomon while still living would be able to say *הייתי מלך* only in the sense of "I have become (and still am) king;" but that does not accord with the following retrospective perfects.<sup>1</sup> This also does not harmonize with the more modern linguistic usage which is followed by *Kohelēth*, *e.g.* i. 9, *כחלש', id quod fuit*; i. 10, *כבר היה, pridem fuit*. In conformity with this, the LXX. translates *הייתי* by *ἐγενόμην*, and the Græc. Venet. by *ἐπὶ ἤρξα*. But "I have been king," Solomon, yet living, cannot say, only *Salomo redivivus* here introduced, as the preacher can use such an expression.

The epilogue, xii. 9 ff., also furnishes an argument in favour of the late composition of this book, on the supposition that it is an appendix, not by another hand, but by the author himself. But that it is from the author's own hand, and does not, as Gratz supposes, belong to the period in which the school of Hillel had established the canonicity of the book, follows from this, that it is composed in a style of Hebrew approaching that used in the Mishna, yet of an earlier date than the Mishna; for in the Talmuds it is, clause by clause, a subject of uncertain interpretation,—the language used is plainly, for the Talmudic authorities, one that is antiquated, the expressions of which, because not immediately and unambiguously clear, need, in order to their explanation, to be translated into the language then in use. The author of the book makes it thus manifest that here in the epilogue, as in the book itself, Solomon is intentionally called *Kohēlēth*; and that the manner of expression, as well as of the formation of the sentences in this

<sup>1</sup> If *וַיִּהְיֶה* followed, then *הייתי* (as Reusch and Hengstenberg interpret) might be a circumstantial perfect; *vid.* under Gen. i. 2.

epilogue, can in all particulars be supported from the book itself. In "fear God," xii. 13<sup>a</sup>, the saying in v. 6, which is similarly formed, is repeated; and "this is the whole of man," xii. 13<sup>b</sup>, a thought written as it were more in cipher than *in extenso*, is in the same style as vi. 10<sup>a</sup>. The word יִתֵּר ("moreover"), frequently used by the author, and בָּעַל, used in the formation of attributive names, x. 11, 20, v. 10, 12, viii. 8, we meet with also here. And as at xii. 9, 10, 11 a third idea connected ἀσυνδέτως follows two ideas connected by *vav*, so also at i. 7, vi. 5. But if this epilogue is the product of the author's own hand, then, in meaning and aim, it presents itself as its sequel. The author says that the *Koheleth* who appears in this book as "wise" is the same who composed the beautiful people's-book *Mishle*; that he sought out not only words of a pleasing form, but also all words of truth; that the words of the wise are like goads and nails which stand in collected rows and numbers—they are given from one Shepherd. The author of the book thereby denotes that the sentences therein collected, even though they are not wholly, as they lie before us, the words of Solomon, yet that, with the Proverbs of Solomon, and of the wise men generally, they go back to one giver and original author. The epilogue thus, by its historic reference to Solomon, recognises the fiction, and gives the reader to understand that the book loses nothing in its value from its not having been immediately composed by Solomon.

Of untruthfulness, of a so-called *pia fraus*, we cannot therefore speak. From early times, within the sphere of the most ancient Israelitish authorship, it was regarded as a justifiable undertaking for an author to reproduce in a rhetorical or poetical form the thoughts and feelings of memorable personages on special occasions. The Psalter contains not a few psalms bearing the superscription *le-David*, which were composed not by David himself, but by unknown poets, placing themselves, as it were, in David's position, and representing him, such *e.g.* as cxliv., which in the LXX. excellently bears the superscription πρὸς τὸν Δαυΐδ. The chronicler, when he seeks to give the reader an idea of the music at the festival of the consecration of the tabernacle and then of the completed temple, allows himself so great freedom, that he puts into the mouth of David the Beracha of the fourth book of the Psalms (cvi. 48), along with the preceding verse of Ps. cvi. (1 Chron. xvi. 35 f.), and into Solomon's mouth verses of Ps. cxxxii. (2 Chron. vi. 41 f.). And the prophetic discourses communicated in the O. T. historical books are certainly partly of this sort, that they either may be regarded as original, as *e.g.* 1 Sam. ii. 27 ff., or must be so regarded, as 2 Kings xviii.—xx.;

but not merely where the utterances of the prophets are in general terms reproduced, as at Judg. vi. 8-10, 2 Kings xvii. 13, xxi. 10-15, but also elsewhere in most of the prophetic discourses which we read in the Books of Kings and Chronicles, the style of the historian makes itself perceptible. Consequently (as also Caspari in his work on the Syro-Ephraimite War, 1849, finds) the discourses in the Chronicles, apart from those which are common to them, bear an altogether different homogeneous character from those of the Book of Kings. It is the same as with the speeches, for instance, which are recorded in Thucydides, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Livy, and other Greek and Roman historians. Classen may be right in the opinion, that the speeches in Thucydides are not mere inventions, but that, nevertheless, as they lie before us, they are the work of the historian; even the letters that passed between Pausanias and Xerxes bear his stamp, although he composed them on the ground of the verbal reports of the Spartans. It is thus also with the speeches found in Tacitus. They are more Ciceronian than his own style is, and the discourses of Germans have less elaborated periods than those of the Romans; but so greatly was the writing of history by the ancients influenced by this custom of free reproduction, that even a speech of the Emperor Claudius, which is found engraven on brass, is given by Tacitus not in this its original, but in another and freer form, assimilated to his own manner of representation. So also sacred history, which in this respect follows the general ancient custom, depends not on the identity of the words, but of the spirit: it does not feign what it represents the historical person as saying, it follows traditions; but yet it is the power of its own subjectivity which thus recalls the past in all that was essential to it in actual life. The aim is not artistically to represent the imitation which is made as if it were genuine. The arts by which it is sought to impart to that which is introduced into a more recent period the appearance of genuineness, were unknown to antiquity. No pseudonymous work of antiquity shows any such imitation of an ancient style as, *e.g.*, does Meinhold's *Bernsteinhexe*, or such a forgery as Wagenfeld's *Sanchuniathon*. The historians reproduce always in their own individual way, without impressing on the speeches of different persons any distinct individual character. They abstain from every art aimed at the concealment of the actual facts of the case. It is thus also with the author of the Book of Koheleth. As the author of the "*Wisdom of Solomon*" openly gives himself out to be an Alexandrian, who makes Solomon his organ, so the author of the

Book of Koheleth is so little concerned purposely to veil the fiction of the Solomon - discourse, in which he clothes his own peculiar life-experiences, that he rather in diverse ways discovers himself as one and the same person with the *Salomo redivivus* here presenting himself.

We do not reckon along with these such proverbs as have for their object the mutual relationship between the king and his subjects, viii. 3-5, x. 4, 16 f., 20, cf. v. 8; these do not betray in the speaker one who is an observer of rulers and not a ruler himself; for the two collections of "Proverbs of Solomon" in the Book of Proverbs contain a multitude of proverbs of the king, xvi. 10, 12-15, xix. 12, xx. 2, 8, 26, 28, xxv. 2, 3, 4 f., 6 f., which, although objectively speaking of the king, may quite well be looked on as old Solomonic,—for is there not a whole princely literature regarding princely government, as *e.g.* Friedrich II.'s *Anti-Machiavel*? But in the complaints against unrighteous judgment, iii. 16, iv. 1, v. 7, one is to be seen who suffers under it, or who is compelled to witness it without the power to change it; they are not appropriate in the mouth of the ruler, who should prevent injustice. It is the author himself who here puts his complaints into the mouth of Solomon; it is he who has to record life-experiences such as x. 5-7. The time in which he lived was one of public misgovernment and of dynastic oppression, in contrast with which the past shone out in a light so much the rosier, vii. 10, and it threw long dark shadows across his mind when he looked out into the world, and medially also upon the confessions of his Koheleth. This Koheleth is not the historical Solomon, but an abstraction of the historical; he is not the theocratic king, but the king among the wise men; the actual Solomon could not speak, ii. 18, of the heir to his throne as of "the man that shall be after him,"—and he who was led astray by his wives into idolatry, and thus became an apostate (1 Kings xi. 4), must have sounded an altogether different note of penitential contrition from that which we read at vii. 26-28. This Solomon who tasted all, and in the midst of his enjoyment maintained the position of a wise man (ii. 9), is described by the author of this book from history and from sayings, just as he needs him, so as to make him an organ of himself; and so little does he think of making the fiction an illusion difficult to be seen through, that he represents Koheleth, i. 16, ii. 7, 9, as speaking as if he had behind him a long line of kings over the whole of Israel and Judah, while yet not he, but the author of the book, who conceals himself behind *Salomo redivivus*, could look back on such a series of kings in Jerusalem.

When did this anonymous author, who speaks instead of his Solomon, live and write? Let us first of all see what conclusion may be gathered regarding the book from the literary references it contains. In its thoughts, and in the form of its thoughts, it is an extremely original work. It even borrows nothing from the Solomonic Book of Proverbs, which in itself contains so many repetitions; proverbs such as vii. 16-18 and Prov. iii. 7 are somewhat like, but only accidentally. On the contrary, between v. 14 and Job i. 21, as well as between vii. 14 and Job ii. 10, there undoubtedly exists some kind of connection; here there lie before us thoughts which the author of the Book of Koheleth may have read in the Book of Job, and have quoted them from thence—also the mention of an untimely birth, vi. 3, cf. Job iii. 16, and the expression “one among a thousand,” vii. 28, cf. Job ix. 3, xxxiii. 23, may perhaps be reminiscences from the Book of Job occurring unconsciously to the author. This is not of any consequence as to the determination of the time of the composition of the Book of Koheleth, for the Book of Job is in any case much older. Dependence on the Book of Jeremiah would be of greater importance, but references such as vii. 2, cf. Jer. xvi. 8, ix. 11, cf. Jer. ix. 22, are doubtful, and guide to no definite conclusion. And who might venture, with Hitzig, to derive the golden lamp, xii. 10, from the vision of Zechariah, iv. 2, especially since the figure in the one place has an altogether different signification from what it has in the other? But we gain a more certain *terminus a quo* by comparing v. 5 with Mal. ii. 7. Malachi there designates the priests as messengers (delegated) of Jahve of hosts, along with which also there is the designation of the prophets as God’s messengers, iii. 1, Hag. i. 13. With the author of the Book of Koheleth “the messenger” is already, without any name of God being added, a priestly title not to be misunderstood; מַלְאָךְ<sup>1</sup> (messenger) denotes the priest as *vicarius Dei*, the delegate of God, שְׁלֹחַ דְּרַחֲמָנָא, according to the later title (*Kiddushin* 23b). And a *terminus ad quem*, beyond which the reckoning of the time of its composition cannot extend, is furnished by the “Wisdom of Solomon,” which is not a translation, but a work written originally in Alexandrine Greek; for that this book is older than the Book of Koheleth, as Hitzig maintains, is not only in itself improbable, since the latter shows not a trace of Greek influence, but in the light of the history of doctrine is altogether impossible, since it represents, in the history of the development of the doctrine of wisdom and the

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* my dissertation: Die Discussion der Amtsfrage im Mahna u. Gemara, in the *Luth. Zeitschrift* 1854, pp. 446-449.

last things, the stage immediately preceding the last B.C., as Philo does the last; it is not earlier than the beginning of the persecution of the Jews by the Egyptians under Ptolemy VII., Physkon (Joseph. *c. Ap.* ii. 5), and at all events was written before Philo, since the combination of the *Sophia* and the *Logos* is here as yet incomplete. This Book of Wisdom must stand in some kind of historical relation to the Book of Koheleth. The fact that both authors make King Solomon the organ of their own peculiar view of the world, shows a connection that is not accidental. Accident is altogether excluded by the circumstance that the Alexandrian author stands in the same relation to the Palestinian that James stands in to the Pauline letters. As James directs himself not so much against Paul as against a Paulinism misleading to fatal consequences, so the Book of Wisdom is certainly not directly a work in opposition to the Book of Koheleth, as is assumed by J. E. Ch. Schmidt (*Salomo's Prediger*, 1794), Kelle (*Die salom. Schriften*, 1815), and others; but, as Knobel and Grimm assert, against a one-sided extreme interpretation of views and principles as set forth by Koheleth, not without an acquaintance with this book. The lovers of pleasure, who speak in Wisd. ii. 1-9, could support that saying by expressions from the Book of Koheleth, and the concluding words there sound like an appropriation of the words of Koheleth iii. 22, v. 17 (cf. LXX.); it is true they break off the point of the Book of Koheleth, for the exhortation to the fear of God, the Judge of the world, is not echoed; but to break off this point did not lie remote, since the old Chokma watchword, "fear God," hovered over the contents of the book rather than penetrated them. It is as if the author of the Book of Wisdom, i.-v., wished to show to what danger of abuse in the sense of a pure materialistic eudaemonism the wisdom presented in the Book of Koheleth is exposed. But he also opposes the pessimistic thoughts of Koheleth in the decided assertions of the contrary: (1) Koheleth says: "There is one event to the righteous and to the wicked," ix. 2; but he says: there is a difference between them wide as the heavens, Wisd. iii. 2 f., iv. 7, v. 15 f.; (2) Koheleth says: "He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow," i. 18; but he says: wisdom bringeth not sorrow, but pure joy with it, Wisd. viii. 16; (3) Koheleth says that wisdom bringeth neither respect nor favour, ix. 11; but he says: it brings fame and honour, Wisd. viii. 10; (4) Koheleth says: "There is no remembrance of the wise more than of the fool for ever," ii. 16; but he says of wisdom in contrast to folly: "I shall obtain by it a deathless name, and shall leave to my descendants an everlasting remembrance," Wisd. viii. 13.

The main distinction between the two books lies in this, that

the comfortless view of Hades running through the Book of Koheleth is thoroughly surmounted by a wonderful rising above the O. T. standpoint by the author of the Book of Wisdom, and that hence there is in it an incomparably more satisfying *Theodicee* (cf. Wisd. xii. 2-18 with Eccles. vii. 15, viii. 14), and a more spiritual relation to this present time (cf. Wisd. viii. 21, ix. 17, with Eccles. ii. 24, iii. 13, etc.). The "Wisdom of Solomon" has indeed the appearance of an anti-Ecclesiastes, a side-piece to the Book of Koheleth, which aims partly at confuting it, partly at going beyond it; for it represents, in opposition to Koheleth not rising above earthly enjoyment with the *But* of the fear of God, a more ideal, more spiritual Solomon. If Koheleth says that God "hath made everything beautiful in his time," iii. 11, and hath made man upright, vii. 29; so, on the other hand, Solomon says that He hath made all things εἰς τὸ εἶναι, Wisd. i. 14, and hath made man ἐπ' ἀφθαρσίᾳ, ii. 23. There are many such parallels, *eg.* v. 9, cf. Koh. viii. 13; viii. 5, cf. Koh. vii. 12; ix. 13-16, cf. Koh. iii. 10 f., but particularly Solomon's confession, vii. 1-21, with that of Koheleth, i. 12-18. Here, wisdom appears as a human acquisition; there (which agrees with 1 Kings iii. 11-13), as a gracious gift obtained in answer to prayer, which brings with it all that can make happy. If one keeps in his eye this mutual relation between the two books, there can be no doubt as to which is the older and which the younger. In the Book of Koheleth the Old Covenant digs for itself its own grave. It is also a "school-master to Christ," in so far as it awakens a longing after a better Covenant than the first.<sup>1</sup> But the Book of Wisdom is a precursor of this better covenant. The composition of the Book of Koheleth falls between the time of Malachi, who lived in the time of Nehemiah's second arrival at Jerusalem, probably under Darius Nothus (423-405 B.C.), and the Book of Wisdom, which at the earliest was written under Ptolemy Physkon (145-117), when the O. T. was already for the most part translated into the Greek language.<sup>2</sup>

Hitzig does not venture to place the Book of Koheleth so far back into the period of the Ptolemies; he reaches with his chain of evidence only the year 204, that in which Ptolemy Epiphanes (204-181) gained, under the guardianship of the Romans, the throne of his father,—he must be the minor whom the author has in his eye, x. 16. But the first link of his chain of proof is a *falsum*. For it is not true that Ptolemy Lagus was the first ruler who exacted from the Jews the "oath of God," viii. 2, *i.e.* the oath of fidelity; for

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Oehler's *Theol. des A. T.*, II. p. 324.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. ii. 12a with Isa. iii. 10, LXX., and xv. 10a with Isa. xlv. 20, LXX.

Josephus (*Antt.* xii. 1. 1) says directly, that Ptolemy Lagus did this with reference to the fidelity with which the Jews had kept to Alexander the Macedonian the oath of allegiance they had sworn to Darius, which he particularly describes, *Antt.* xi. 8. 3; besides, the covenant, *e.g.* 2 Sam. v. 3, concluded in the presence of Jahve with their own native kings included in it the oath of allegiance, and the oath of vassalage which, *e.g.*, Zedekiah swore to Nebuchadnezzar, 2 Chron. xxxvi. 13, *cf.* Ezek. xvii. 13-19, had at the same time binding force on the citizens of the state that was in subjection. Also that "the oath of God" must mean the oath of allegiance sworn to a foreign ruler, and not that sworn to a native ruler, which would rather be called "the oath of Jahve," does not stand the test: the author of the Book of Koheleth drives the cosmopolitism of the Chokma so far, that he does not at all make use of the national name of God connected with the history of redemption, and Nehemiah also, xiii. 25, uses an oath "of God" where one would have expected an oath "of Jahve." The first link of Hitzig's chain of proof, then, shows itself on all sides to be worthless. The author says, viii. 2, substantially the same as Paul, Rom. xiii. 5, that one ought to be subject to the king, not only from fear of punishment, but for conscience' sake.

Thus, then, viii. 10 will also stand without reference to the carrying away of the Jews captive by Ptolemy Lagus, especially since the subject there is by no means that of a mass-deportation; and, besides, those who were carried into Egypt by Lagus were partly from the regions round about Jerusalem, and partly from the holy city itself (*Joseph. Antt.* 12. 1. 1). And the old better times, vii. 10, were not those of the first three Ptolemies, especially since there are always men, and even in the best and most prosperous times, who praise the old times at the expense of the new. And also women who were a misfortune to their husbands or lovers there have always been, so that in vii. 26 one does not need to think of that Agathoclea who ruled over Ptolemy Philopator, and even had in her hands the power of life and death. Passages such as vii. 10 and vii. 26 afford no help in reference to the chronology. On the other hand, the author in ix. 13-16 relates, to all appearance, what he himself experienced. But the little city is certainly not the fortified town of Dora, on the sea-coast to the west of Carmel, which was besieged by Antiochus the Great (*Polybius*, v. 66) in the year 218, as at a later period, in the year 138, it was by Antiochus VII., Sidetes (*Joseph. Bell.* i. 2. 2); for this Dora was not then saved by a poor wise man within it,—of whom *Polybius* knows

nothing,—but “by the strength of the place, and the help of those with Nicholas.” A definite historical event is also certainly found in iv. 13–16. Hitzig sees in the old foolish king the spiritually contracted, but so much the more covetous, high priest Onias, under Ptolemy Euergetes; and in the poor but wise youth, Joseph (the son of Tobias), who robbed Onias of his place in the state, and raised himself to the office of general farmer of taxes. But here nothing agrees but that Onias was old and foolish, and that Joseph was then a young wise man (Joseph. *Antt.* xii. 4. 2); of the poverty of the latter nothing is heard—he was the nephew of Onias. And besides, he did not come out of the house “of prisoners” (סִרְסָה); this word is pointed by Hitzig so as to mean, out of the house “of fugitives” (סִרְסָה), perhaps, as he supposes, an allusion to the district Φιχόλα, which the author thus interprets as if it were derived from φεύγειν. Historical investigation has here degenerated into the boldest subjectivism. The Heb. tongue has never called “fugitives” סִרְסָה; and to whom could the Heb. word סִרְסָה (cf. *Berachoth* 28b) suggest—as Φύγελα did to Pliny and Mela—the Greek φεύγειν!

We have thus, in determining the time of the authorship of this book, to confine ourselves to the period subsequent to the Diadochs. It may be regarded as beyond a doubt that it was written under the Persian domination. Kleinert (*Der Prediger Salomo*, 1864) is in general right in saying that the political condition of the people which the book presupposes, is that in which they are placed under Satraps: the unrighteous judgment, iii. 16; and the despotic oppression, iv. 1, viii. 9, v. 7; the riotous court-life, x. 16–19; the raising of mean men to the highest places of honour, x. 5–7; the inexorable severity of the law of war-service, viii. 8;<sup>1</sup> the prudence required by the organized system of espionage<sup>2</sup> existing at such a time,—all these things were characteristic of this period. But if the Book of Koheleth is not at all older than Malachi, then it was written somewhere within the last century of the Persian kingdom, between Artaxerxes I., Longimanus (464–424), and Darius Codomannus (335–332): the better days for the Jewish people, of the Persian supremacy under the first five Achaemenides, were past (vii. 10). Indeed, in vi. 3 there appear to be reminiscences of Artaxerxes II., Mnemon (died about 360), who was 94 years old, and, according to Justin (x. 1), had 115 sons, and of Artaxerxes III., Ochus his successor, who was poisoned by the chief eunuch Bagoas, who, according to Aelian, *Var. Hist.* vi. 8, threw his (Ochus') body to the cats, and

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Herod. iv. 84, vii. 38 f.

<sup>2</sup> Vid. Duncker's *Gesch. des Alterthums*, Bd. 2 (1867), p. 894.

caused sword-handles to be made from his bones. The book altogether contains many examples to which concrete instances in the Persian history correspond, from which they might be abstracted, in which strict harmony on all sides with historical fact is not to be required, since it did not concern the author. The event recorded iv. 13-16 refers to Cyrus rising to the supremacy of world-ruler (after dispossessing the old Median King Astyages), who left<sup>1</sup> nothing but misery to posterity. Such a rich man as is described in vi. 2, who had to leave all his treasures to a stranger, was Croesus, to whom Solon, as vii. 8a (cf. Herod. i. 32. 86), said that no one ought to be praised before his end. A case analogous at least to ix. 14-16, was the deliverance of Athens by the counsel of Themistocles (Justin, ii. 12), who finally, driven from Athens, was compelled to seek the protection of the Persian king, and ended his life in despair.<sup>2</sup> If we were not confined, for the history of the Persian kingdom and its provinces, from Artaxerxes I. to the appearance of Alexander of Macedon, to only a few and scanty sources of information (we know no Jewish events of this period, except the desecration of the temple by Bagoses, described by Josephus, *Antt.* xi. 7), we might probably be better able to understand many of the historical references of the Book of Koheleth. We should then be able to say to whom the author refers by the expression, "Woe to thy land when thy king is a child," x. 16; for Artaxerxes I., who, although only as yet a boy at the time of the murder of his father Xerxes (Justin, iii. 1), soon thereafter appeared manly enough, cannot be thought of. We should then, perhaps, be also in possession of the historical key to viii. 10; for with the reference to the deportation of many thousands of Jewish prisoners (Josephus, *c. Ap.* i. 22)—which, according to Syncellus and Orosius, must have occurred under Artaxerxes III., Ochus—the interpretation of that passage does not accord.<sup>3</sup> We should then also, perhaps, know to what political arrangement the

<sup>1</sup> According to Nicolaus of Damascus (Müller's *Fragm. hist. Graec.* III. 398), Cyrus was the child of poor parents; by "prison-house" (iv. 14), reference is made to his confinement in Persia, where access to him was prevented by guards (Herod. i. 128). Justin, i. 5: "A letter could not be openly brought to him, since the guards appointed by the king kept possession of all approaches to him."

<sup>2</sup> Vid. Spiegel's *Erânische Alterthumskunde*, II. pp. 409, 413. Bernstein suggests the deliverance of Potidea (Herod. viii. 128) or Tripolis (Diodor. xvi. 41); but neither of these cities owed its deliverance to the counsel of a wise man. Burger (*Comm. in Ecclesiasten*, 1864) thinks, with greater probability, of Themistocles, who was celebrated among the Persians (Thucyd. i. 138), which Ewald also finds most suitable, provided the author had a definite fact before his eye.

<sup>3</sup> Vid. Bernstein's *Quaestiones Kohelethanae*, p. 66.

author points when he says, vii. 19, that wisdom is a stronger protection to a city than "ten mighty men;" Gratz refers this to the *decuriones* of the Roman municipal cities and colonies; but probably it refers to the dynasties<sup>1</sup> (cf. Assyr. *salat*, governor) placed by the Persian kings over the cities of conquered countries. And generally, the oppressed spirit pervading the book would be so much clearer if we knew more of the sacrifices which the Jewish people in the later time of the Persians had to make, than merely that the Phœnicians, at the same time with "the Syrians in Palestine," had to contribute (Herod. vii. 87) to Xerxes for his Grecian expedition three hundred triremes; and also that the people who "dwelt in the Solymean mountains" had to render him assistance in his expedition against Greece (Joseph. c. Ap. i. 22).

The author was without doubt a Palestinian. In iv. 17 he speaks of himself as dwelling where the temple was, and also in the holy city, viii. 10; he lived, if not actually in it, at least in its near neighbourhood, x. 15; although, as Kleinert remarks, he appears, xi. 1, to make use of a similitude taken from the corn trade of a seaport town. From iv. 8 the supposition is natural that he was alone in the land, without children or brothers or sisters; but from the contents and spirit of the whole book, it appears more certain that, like his Koheleth, he was advanced in years, and had behind him a long checkered life. The symptoms of approaching death presenting themselves in old age, which he describes to the young, xii. 2 ff., he probably borrowed from his own experience. The whole book bears the marks of age,—a production of the Old Covenant which was stricken in age, and fading away.

The literature, down to 1860, of commentaries and monographs on the Book of Koheleth is very fully set forth in the English Commentary of Ginsburg, and from that time to 1867, in Zöckler's Commentary, which forms a part of Lange's *Bibelwerk*. Keil's *Einleitung*, 3d ed. 1873, contains a supplement to these, among which, however, the *Bonner Theolog. Literaturblatt*, 1874, Nr. 7, misses Pusey's and Reusch's (cf. the *Tübingen Theol. Quartalschrift*, 1860, pp. 430-469). It is not possible for any man to compass this literature. Zedner's *Catalogue of the Hebrew books in the Library of the British Museum*, 1867, contains a number of Jewish commentaries omitted by Ginsburg and Zöckler, but far from all. For example, the Commentary of Ahron B. Josef (for the first time printed at Eupatoria, 1834) now lies before me, with those of Moses Frankel (Dessau, 1809), and of Samuel David Luz-

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Dancker's *Gesch. des Alterthums*, II. p. 910.

zatto, in the journal, *Ozar Nechmad* 1864. Regarding the literature of English interpretation, see the American translation, by Tayler Lewis (1870), of Zöckler's Commentary. The catalogue there also is incomplete, for in 1873 a Commentary by Thomas Pelham Dale appeared; and a Monograph on chap. xii., under the title of *The Dirge of Koheleth*, by the Orientalist C. Taylor, appeared in 1874. The fourth volume of the *Speaker's Commentary* contains a Commentary on the Song by Kingsbury, and on Ecclesiastes by W. T. Bullock, who strenuously maintains its Solomonic authorship. The opinion that the book represents the conflict of two voices, the voice of true wisdom and that of pretended wisdom, has lately found advocates not only in a Hebrew Commentary by Ephraim Hirsch (Warsaw, 1871), but also in the article "Koheleth" by Schenkel in his *Bibellæxikon* (vol. III., 1871). For the history and refutation of this attempt to represent the book in the form of a dialogue, we might refer to Zöckler's Introd. to his Commentary.

The old translations have been referred to at length by Ginsburg. Frederick Field, in his *Hexapla* (Poet. vol. 1867), has collected together the fragments of the Greek translations. Ge. Janichs, in his *Animadversiones criticae* (Breslau, 1871), has examined the Peshito of Koheleth and Ruth; *vid.* with reference thereto, Nöldeke's *Anzeige* in the *Liter. Centralblatt* 1871, Nr. 49, and cf. Middeldorpf's *Symbolae exegetico-criticae ad librum Ecclesiastis*, 1811. The text of the *Graecus Venetus* lies before us now in a more accurate form than that by Villoison (1784), in Gebhardt's careful edition of certain Venetian manuscripts (Leipzig, Brockhaus 1874), containing this translation of the O. T. books.

## EXPOSITION OF THE BOOK OF ECCLESIASTES

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*"Ostendit omnia esse vanitati subjecta: in his quae propter homines facta sunt vanitas est mutabilitatis; in his quae ab hominibus facta sunt vanitas est curiositatis; in his quae in hominibus facta sunt vanitas mortalitatis."*

HUGO OF ST. VICTOR († 1140).

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THE title, i. 1, *The words of Koheleth, son of David, king in Jerusalem*, has been already explained in the Introduction. The verse, which does not admit of being properly halved, is rightly divided by "son of David" by the accent *Zakef*; for the apposition, "king in Jerusalem," does not belong to "David," but to "Koheleth." In several similar cases, such as Ezek. i. 3, the accentuation leaves the designation of the oppositional genitive undefined; in Gen. x. 21*b* it proceeds on an erroneous supposition; it is rightly defined in Amos i. 1*b*, for example, as in the passage before us. That "king" is without the article, is explained from this, that it is determined by "in Jerusalem," as elsewhere by "of Israel" ("Judah"). The expression (cf. 2 Kings xiv. 23) is singular.

### PROLOGUE: THE EVERLASTING SAMENESS.—I. 2—11.

The book begins artistically with an opening section of the nature of a preamble. The ground-tone of the whole book at once sounds in ver. 2, which commences this section, "O vanity of vanities, saith Koheleth, O vanity of vanities! All is vain." As at Isa. xl. 1 (*vid. l.c.*) it is a question whether by "saith" is meant a future or a present utterance of God, so here and at xii. 8 whether "saith" designates the expression of Koheleth as belonging to history or as presently given forth. The language

admits both interpretations, as *e.g.* "saith," with God as the subject, 2 Sam. xxiii. 3, is meant historically, and in Isa. xlix. 5 of the present time. We understand "saith" here, as *e.g.* Isa. xxxvi. 4, "Thus saith . . . the king of Assyria," of something said now, not of something said previously, since it is those presently living to whom the Solomon *redivivus*, and through him the author of this book, preaches the vanity of all earthly things. The old translators take "vanity of vanities" in the nominative, as if it were the predicate; but the repetition of the expression shows that it is an exclamation = *O vanitatem vanitatum*. The abbreviated connecting form of הָבֵל is here not punctuated הֵבֵל, after the form הָרֵר (הָרֵר) and the like, but הֵבֵל, after the manner of the Aram. ground-form עֵבֵר; cf. Ewald, § 32*b*. Jerome read differently: *In Hebraeo pro vanitate vanitatum ABAL ABALIM scriptum est, quod exceptis LXX. interpretibus omnes similiter transtulerunt ἀτμός ἀτμῶν sive ἀτμῶν*. *Hēvel* primarily signifies a breath, and still bears this meaning in post-bibl. Heb., *e.g.* *Schabbath* 119*b*: "The world exists merely for the sake of the breath of school-children" (who are the hope of the future). Breath, as the contrast of that which is firm and enduring, is the figure of that which has no support, no continuance. Regarding the superlative expression, "Vanity of vanities," *vid.* the Song i. 1. "Vanity of vanities" is the *non plus ultra* of vanity,—vanity in the highest degree. The double exclamation is followed by a statement which shows it to be the result of experience. "All is vain"—the whole (of the things, namely, which present themselves to us here below for our consideration and use) is vanity.

Ver. 3. With this verse commences the proof for this exclamation and statement: "What profit hath a man of all his labour which he laboureth in under the sun?!" An interrogative exclamation, which leads to the conclusion that never anything right, *i.e.* real, enduring, satisfying, comes of it. יִתְרוֹן, profit, *synon.* with *mothar*, iii. 19, is peculiar to this book (= Aram. יִתְרוֹן). A primary form, יִתְרוֹן, is unknown. The punctator Simson (Cod. 102*a* of the Leipzig University Lib. f. 5*a*) rightly blames those who use יִתְרוֹן, in a liturgical hymn, of the Day of Atonement. The word signifies that which remains over, either, as here, clear gain, profit, or that which has the pre-eminence, *i.e.* superiority, precedence, or is the foremost. "Under the sun" is the designation of the earth peculiar to this book,—the world of men, which we are wont to call the sub-lunary world. וְ has not the force of an accusative of manner, but of the obj. The author uses the expression, "Labour wherein I

have laboured," ii. 19, 20, v. 17, as Euripides, similarly, *μοχθήν μόχθοις*. He now proceeds to justify the negative contained in the question, "What profit?"

Ver. 4. "One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh: and the earth remaineth for ever." The meaning is not that the earth remains standing, and thus (Hitz.) approaches no limit (for what limit for it could be had in view?); it is by this very immoveable condition that it fulfils, according to the ancient notion, its destiny, Ps. cxix. 20. The author rather intends to say that in this sphere nothing remains permanent as the fixed point around which all circles, generations pass away, others appear, and the earth is only the firm territory, the standing scene, of this ceaseless change. In reality, both things may be said of the earth: that it stands for ever without losing its place in the universe, and that it does not stand for ever, for it will be changed and become something else. But the latter thought, which appertains to the history of redemption, Ps. cii. 26 f., is remote from the Preacher; the stability of the earth appears to him only as the foil of the growth and decay everlastingly repeating themselves. Elster, in this fact, that the generations of men pass away, and that, on the contrary, the insensate earth under their feet remains, rightly sees something tragic, as Jerome had already done: *Quid hac tantus vanitate, quam terram manere, quae hominum caecae facta est, et hominem ipsum, terrae dominum, tam repente in pulverem dissolvi?* The sun supplies the author with another figure. This, which he thinks of in contrast with the earth, is to him a second example of ceaseless change with perpetual sameness. As the generations of men come and go, so also does the sun.

Ver. 5. "And the sun ariseth, the sun goeth down, and it hasteth (back) to its place, there to rise again." It rises and sets again, but its setting is not a coming to rest; for from its place of resting in the west it must rise again in the morning in the east, hastening to fulfil its course. Thus Hitzig rightly, for he takes "there to rise again" as a relative clause; the words may be thus translated, but strictly taken, both participles stand on the same level; *הִסָּחֵף* (hastening, hastening) is like *הִסָּחֵף* in ver. 4, the expression of the present, and *וְהָיָה* that of the *fut. instant.*; *ibi (eurus) oriturus*; the accentuation also treats the two partic. as co-ordinate, for *Tiphcha* separates more than *Tiv'it*; but it is inappropriate that it gives to *וְהָיָה* the greater disjunctive *Zakef Quaton* (with *Kadma* going before). Ewald adopts this sequence of the accents, for he explains: the sun goes down, and that to its own place, viz. hastening back to it just

by its going down, where, panting, it again ascends. But that the sun goes down to the place of its ascending, is a distorted thought. If "to its place" belongs to "goeth," then it can refer only to the place of the going down, as *e.g.* Benjamin el-Nahawendi (Neubauer, *Aus der Petersb. Bibl.* p. 108) explains: "and that to its place," viz. the place of the going down appointed for it by the Creator, with reference to Ps. civ. 19, "the sun knoweth his going down." But the שׁוּ, which refers back to "its place," opposes this interpretation; and the phrase שׁוּ cannot mean "panting, rising," since שׂאף in itself does not signify to pant, but to snatch at, to long eagerly after anything, thus to strive, panting after it (cf. Job vii. 2; Ps. cxix. 131), which accords with the words "to its place," but not with the act of rising. And how unnatural to think of the rising sun, which gives the impression of renewed youth, as panting! No, the panting is said of the sun that has set, which, during the night, and thus without rest by day and night, must turn itself back again to the east (Ps. xix. 7), there anew to commence its daily course. Thus also Rashi, the LXX., Syr., Targ., Jerome, Venet., and Luther. Instead of שׁוּ, Grätz would read שׁב אף, *redit (atque) etiam*; but שׁוּ is as characteristic of the Preacher's manner of viewing the world as סובב וְנִי, 6b, and נִי, 8a. Thus much regarding the sun. Many old interpreters, recently Grätz, and among translators certainly the LXX., refer also 6a to the sun. The Targ. paraphrases the whole verse of the state of the sun by day and night, and at the spring and autumn equinox, according to which Rashi translates הָרִיחַ, *la volonté (du soleil)*. But along with the sun, the wind is also referred to as a third example of restless motion always renewing itself. The division of the verses is correct; 6a used of the sun would overload the figure, and the whole of ver. 6 therefore refers to the wind.

Ver. 6. "It goeth to the south, and turneth to the north; the wind goeth ever circling, and the wind returneth again on its circuits." Thus designedly the verse is long-drawn and monotonous. It gives the impression of weariness. שׁב may be 3d pret. with the force of an abstract present, but the relation is here different from that in 5a, where the rising, setting, and returning stand together, and the two former lie backwards indeed against the latter; here, on the contrary, the circling motion and the return to a new beginning stand together on the same line; שׁב is thus a part., as the Syr. translates it. The participles represent continuance in motion. In ver. 4 the subjects stand foremost, because the ever anew beginning motion belongs to the subject; in vv. 5 and 6, on the contrary, the pred. stands foremost, and the subject in ver. 6 is therefore placed thus far back, because

the first two pred. were not sufficient, but required a third for their completion. That the wind goes from the south (רָרִים, R. רר, the region of the most intense light) to the north (רָפִי, R. רפ, the region of darkness), is not so exclusively true of it as it is of the sun that it goes from the east to the west; this expression requires the generalization "circling, circling goes the wind," i.e. turning in all directions here and there; for the repetition denotes that the circling movement exhausts all possibilities. The near defining part, which is subordinated to "goeth," elsewhere is annexed by "and," e.g. Jonah i. 11; cf. 2 Sam. xv. 30; here סֹבֵב סֹבֵב, in the sense of סֹבֵב סֹבֵב, Ezek. xxxvii. 2 (both times with *Pasal* between the words), precedes. סֹבֵב is here the *a. actionis* of סֹבֵב. And "on its circuits" is not to be taken adverbially: it turns back on its circuits, i.e. it turns back on the same paths (Knobel and others), but לָךְ and סֹבֵב are connected, as Prov. xvi. 11; cf. Mal. iii. 24; Ps. xix. 7: the wind returns back to its circling movements to begin them anew (Hitzig). "The wind" is repeated (cf. n. 10, iv. 1) according to the figure *Kpanaphora* or *Palindrome* (vid. the *Introd.* to Isaiah, c. xl-lxvi). To all regions of the heavens, to all directions of the compass, its movement is ceaseless, ever repeating itself anew; there is nothing permanent but the fluctuation, and nothing new but that the old always repeats itself. The examples are thoughtfully chosen and arranged. From the currents of air, the author now passes to streams of water.

VER. 7. "All rivers run into the sea, and the sea becomes not full; to the place whence the rivers came, thither they always return again." Instead of *n'khalim*, *n'khalim* was preferred, because it is the more general name for flowing waters, brooks, and rivers; נָחַל (from נָחַל, *canal*), נָחַל (from נָחַל, *canal*), and (Arab.) *wadiah* (from the root-idea of stretching, extending), all three denote the channel or bed, and then the water flowing in it. The sentence, "all rivers run into the sea," is consistent with fact. Manifestly the author does not mean that they all immediately flow thither; and by "the sea" he does not mean this or that sea; nor does he think, as the Targ. explains, of the earth as a ring (אֶרֶץ מְסֻבָּה, Pers. *angusht-dān*, properly "finger-guard") surrounding the ocean: but the sea in general is meant, perhaps including also the ocean that is hidden. If we include this internal ocean, then the rivers which lose themselves in hollows, deserts, or inland lakes, which have no visible outlet, form no exception. But the expression refers first of all to the visible sea-basins, which gain no apparent increase by these masses of water being emptied into them: "the sea, it becomes not full;" וְהַיָּם

(Mishn. וְאֵל) has the reflex. pron., as at Ex. iii. 2, Lev. xiii. 34, and elsewhere. If the sea became full, then there would be a real change; but this sea, which, as Aristophanes says (*Clouds*, 1294 f.), οὐδὲν γίγνεται ἐπιρρέοντων τῶν ποταμῶν πλείων, represents also the eternal sameness. In ver. 7b, Symm., Jer., Luther, and also Zöckler, translate עַל in the sense of "from whence;" others, as Ginsburg, venture to take עַל in the sense of עִלָּה; both interpretations are linguistically inadmissible. Generally the author does not mean to say that the rivers return to their sources, since the sea replenishes the fountains, but that where they once flow, they always for ever flow without changing their course, viz. into the all-devouring sea (Elst.); for the water rising out of the sea in vapour, and collecting itself in rain-clouds, fills the course anew, and the rivers flow on anew, for the old repeats itself in the same direction to the same end. מְקוֹם is followed by what is a virtual genitive (Ps. civ. 8); the accentuation rightly extends this only to הַלְכִים; for אֵשֶׁר, according to its relation, signifies in itself *ubi*, Gen. xxxix. 20, and *quo*, Num. xiii. 27; 1 Kings xii. 2 (never *unde*). עַל, however, has after verbs of motion, as *e.g.* Jer. xxii. 27 after שָׁב, and 1 Sam. ix. 6 after הָלַךְ, frequently the sense of שָׁמָּה. And שָׁב with ל and the infin. signifies to do something again, Hos. xi. 9, Job vii. 7, thus: to the place whither the rivers flow, thither they flow again, *eo rursus eunt*. The author here purposely uses only participles, because although there is constant change, yet that which renews itself is ever the same. He now proceeds, after this brief but comprehensive induction of particulars, to that which is general.

Ver. 8. "All things are in activity; no man can utter it; the eye is not satisfied with seeing, and the ear is not full with hearing." All translators and interpreters who understand *d'varim* here of words (LXX., Syr., and Targ.) go astray; for if the author meant to say that no words can describe this everlasting sameness with perpetual change, then he would have expressed himself otherwise than by "all words weary" (Ew., Elst., Hengst., and others); he ought at least to have said לִיָּקָה. But also "all things are wearisome" (Knob., Hitz.), or "full of labour" (Zöck.), *i.e.* it is wearisome to relate them all, cannot be the meaning of the sentence; for יָעִי does not denote that which causes weariness, but that which suffers weariness (Deut. xxv. 18; 2 Sam. vii. 2); and to refer the affection, instead of to the narrator, to that which is to be narrated, would be even for a poet too affected a *quid pro quo*. Rosenmüller essentially correctly: *omnes res fatigantur h. e. in perpetua versantur vicissitudine, qua fatigantur quasi*. But יָעִי is not appropriately rendered by

*fatigantur*; the word means, becoming wearied, or perfectly feeble, or also: wearying oneself (cf. x. 15, xii. 12), working with a strain on one's strength, fatiguing oneself (cf. פִּיִּי, that which is gained by labour, work). This is just what these four examples are meant to show, viz. that a restless activity reaching no visible conclusion and end, always beginning again anew, pervades the whole world—all things, he says, summarizing, are in labour, i.e. are restless, hastening on, giving the impression of fatigue. Thus also in strict sequence of thought that which follows: this unrest in the outer world reflects itself in man, when he contemplates that which is done around him; human language cannot exhaust this coming and going, this growth and decay in constant circle, and the *quodlibet* is so great, that the eye cannot be satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing; to the unrest of things without corresponds the unrest of the mind, which through this course, in these ever repeated variations, always bringing back the old again to view, is kept in ceaseless activity. The object to *clabber* is the totality of things. No words can comprehend this, no sensible perception exhaust it. That which is properly aimed at here is not the unsatisfiedness of the eyes (Prov. xxvii. 20), and generally of the mind, thus not the ever-new attractive power which appertains to the eye and the ear of him who observes, but the force with which the restless activity which surrounds us lays hold of and communicates itself to us, so that we also find no rest and contentment. With פִּיִּי, to be satisfied, of the eye, there is appropriately interchanged שָׂבִיב, used of the funnel-shaped ear, to be filled, i.e. to be satisfied (as at vi. 7). The *min* connected with this latter word is explained by Zock. after Hitz., "away from hearing," i.e. so that it may hear no more. This is not necessary. As *šānā'* with its *min* may signify to be satisfied with anything, e.g. vi. 3, Job xix. 22, Ps. civ. 13; so also *nimlā*, with its *min*, to be full of anything, Ezek. xxxii. 6; cf. *Kal*, Isa. ii. 6, *Pih.* Jer. li. 34, Ps. cxxvii. 5. Thus *nišāh'mōa'* is understood by all the old translators (e.g. Targ. פִּיִּי שָׂבִיב), and thus also, perhaps, the author meant it: the eye is not satisfied with seeing, and the ear is not filled (satisfied) with hearing; or yet more in accordance with the Heb. expression: there is not an eye, i.e. no eye is satisfied, etc., restlessly hastening, giving him who looks no rest, the world goes on in its circling course without revealing anything that is in reality new.

Ver. 9. "That which hath been is that which shall be, and that which is done is that which shall be done; and there is nothing new under the sun."—The older form of the language uses only נֶחָדָה instead of שֶׁנֶּחָדָה, in the sense of *id quod*, and in the sense of *quid-*

*quid*, כל אשר (vi. 10, vii. 24); but *mah* is also used by it with the extinct force of an interrogative, in the sense of *quodcunque*, Job xiii. 13, *aliquid* (*quidquam*), Gen. xxxix. 8, Prov. ix. 13; and *mi* or *mi asher*, in the sense of *quisquis*, Ex. xxiv. 14, xxxii. 33. In הוּא (cf. Gen. xlii. 14) are combined the meanings *id* (*est*) *quod* and *idem* (*est*) *quod*; *hu* is often the expression of the equality of two things, Job iii. 19, or of self-sameness, Ps. cii. 28. The double clause, *quod fuit . . . quod factum est*, comprehends that which is done in the world of nature and of men,—the natural and the historical. The bold clause, *neque est quidquam novi sub sole*, challenges contradiction; the author feels this, as the next verse shows.

Ver. 10. "Is there anything whereof it may be said: See, this is new?—it was long ago through the ages (aeons) which have been before us." The Semit. substantive verb שׁוּ (Assyr. *isu*) has here the force of a hypothetical antecedent: supposing that there is a thing of which one might say, etc. The הוּא, with *Makkeph*, belongs as subject, as at vii. 27, 29 as object, to that which follows. כְּבֶרֶךְ (*vid.* List, p. 193) properly denotes length or greatness of time (as כְּבֶרֶךְ, length of way). The ל of לֵעָלַם is that of measure: this "long ago" measured (Hitz.) after infinitely long periods of time. מִלְּפָנֵינוּ, *ante nos*, follows the usage of מִלְּפָנֵינוּ, Isa. xli. 26, and מִלְּפָנֵינוּ, Judg. i. 10, etc.; the past time is spoken of as that which was before, for it is thought of as the beginning of the succession of time (*vid.* Orelli, *Synon. der Zeit u. Ewigkeit*, p. 14 f.). The singular הוּא may also be viewed as pred. of a plur. *inhumanus* in order; but in connection, ii. 7, 9 (Gesen. § 147, An. 2), it is more probable that it is taken as a neut. verb. That which newly appears has already been, but had been forgotten; for generations come and generations go, and the one forgets the other.

Ver. 11. "There is no remembrance of ancestors; and also of the later ones who shall come into existence, there will be no remembrance for them with those who shall come into existence after them." With זְכוֹרָתָם (with *Kametz*) there is also זְכוֹרָתָם, the more common form by our author, in accordance with the usage of his age; Gesen., Elst., and others regard it here and at ii. 16 as constr., and thus לָרֵאשִׁית as virtually object-gen. (Jerome, *non est priorum memoria*); but such refinements of the old *syntaxis ornata* are not to be expected in our author: he changes (according to the traditional punctuation) here the initial sound, as at i. 17 the final sound, to *oth* and *uth*. לֵאמֹר is the contrast of הָיָה לְ: to attribute to one, to become partaker of. The use of the expression, "for them," gives emphasis to the statement. "With those who shall come after," points from the generation that is future to a remoter future, cf. Gen. xxxiii. 2. The

*Kametz* of the prep. is that of the recompens. art.; cf. Num. ii. 31, where it denotes "the last" among the four hosts; for there 'אף is meant of the last in order, as here it is meant of the remotely future time.

KOHELETH'S EXPERIENCES AND THEIR RESULTS.—I. 12-IV. 16.

*The Unsatisfactoriness of striving after Wisdom, i. 12-18.*

After this prelude regarding the everlasting sameness of all that is done under the sun, Koheleth-Solomon unfolds the treasure of his life-experience as king.

Ver. 12. "I, Koheleth, have been king over Israel in Jerusalem." That of the two possible interpretations of וָאָנֹכִי, "I have become" and "I have been," not the former (Gratz), but the latter, is to be here adopted, has been already shown (p. 295). We translate better by "I have been"—for the verb here used is a pure perfect—than by "I was" (Ew., Kist., Hengst., Zöck.), with which Bullock (*Speaker's Comm.*, vol. IV., 1875) compares the expression *Quand j'étois roi!* which was often used by Louis XIV. towards the end of his life. But here the expression is not a cry of complaint, like the "*faislas Troes*," but a simple historical statement, by which the Preacher of the vanity of all earthly things here introduces himself,—it is Solomon, resuscitated by the author of the book, who here looks back on his life as king. "Israel" is the whole of Israel, and points to a period before the division of the kingdom; a king over Judah alone would not so describe himself. Instead of "king <sup>לְ</sup> (over) Israel," the old form of the language uses frequently simply "king of Israel," although also the former expression is sometimes found; cf. 1 Sam. xv. 26; 2 Sam. xix. 23; 1 Kings xi. 37. He has been king,—king over a great, peaceful, united people; king in Jerusalem, the celebrated, populous, highly-cultivated city,—and thus placed on an elevation having the widest survey, and having at his disposal whatever can make a man happy; endowed, in particular, with all the means of gaining knowledge, which accorded with the disposition of his heart searching after wisdom (cf. 1 Kings iii. 9-11, v. 9).

But in his search after worldly knowledge he found no satisfaction.

Ver. 13. "And I gave my heart to seek and to hold survey with wisdom over all that is done under the sun: a sore trouble it is which God has given to the children of men to be exercised therewith." The synonyms דָּרַשׁ (to seek) and חָזַק (to hold survey over) do not re-

present a lower and a higher degree of search (Zöck.), but two kinds of searching: one penetrating in depth, the other going out in extent; for the former of these verbs (from the root-idea of grinding, testing) signifies to investigate an object which one already has in hand, to penetrate into it, to search into it thoroughly; and the latter verb (from the root-idea of moving round about)<sup>1</sup> signifies to hold a survey,—look round in order to bring that which is unknown, or not comprehensively known, within the sphere of knowledge, and thus has the meaning of *bakkēsh*, one going the rounds. It is the usual word for the exploring of a country, i.e. the acquiring personal knowledge of its as yet unknown condition; the passing over to an intellectual search is peculiar to the Book of Koheleth, as it has the phrase *נָתַן לִבִּי*, *animum advertere*, or *applicare ad aliquid*, in common only with Dan. x. 12. The *beth* of *bahhoch'mah* is that of the instrument; wisdom must be the means (*organon*) of knowledge in this searching and inquiry. With *עַל* is introduced the sphere into which it extends. Grotius paraphrases: *Historiam animalium et satorum diligentissime inquisiri*. But *נִסְיָא* does not refer to the world of nature, but to the world of men; only within this can anything be said of actions, only this has a proper history. But that which offers itself for research and observation there, brings neither joy nor contentment. Hitzig refers *הוּא* to human activity; but it relates to the research which has this activity as its object, and is here, on that account, called “a sore trouble,” because the attainment and result gained by the laborious effort are of so unsatisfactory a nature. Regarding *עִנָּן*, which here goes back to *עָנָה בָּ*, to fatigue oneself, to trouble oneself with anything, and then to be engaged with it, *vid.* p. 194. The words *עִנָּן רָע* would mean trouble of an evil nature (*vid.* at Ps. lxxviii. 49; Prov. vi. 24); but better attested is the reading *עִנָּן רָע*, “a sore trouble.” *הוּא* is the subj., as at ii. 1 and elsewhere; the author uses it also in expressions where it is pred. And as frequently as he uses *asher* and *שׁ*, so also, when form and matter commend it, he uses the scheme of the attributive clause (elliptical relative clause), as here (cf. iii. 16), where certainly, in conformity with the old style, *נָתַנִּי* was to be used.

Ver. 14. He adduces proof of the wearisomeness of this work of research: “I saw all the works that are done under the sun; and, behold, all is vanity and striving after the wind.” The point of the sentence lies in *וְהָיָה = וְאָרָא וְהָיָה*, so that thus *ra'ithi* is the expression of the parallel fact (circumst. perfect). The result of his seeing,

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* the investigation of these roots (Assyr. *utir*, he brought back) in Ethé's *Schlafgemach der Phantasie*, pp. 86–89.

and that, as he has said ver. 13, of a by no means superficial and limited seeing, was a discovery of the fleeting, unsubstantial, fruitless nature of all human actions and endeavours. They had, as *hevel* expresses, no reality in them; and also, as denoted by *r'uth ruakh* (the LXX. render well by *προαίρεσις πνεύματος*), they had no actual consequences, no real issue. Hos. xii. 2 [1] also says: "Ephraim feedeth on wind," i.e. follows after, as the result of effort obtains, the wind, *rokh ruakh*; but only in the Book of Kheleth is this sentence transformed into an abstract *terminus technicus* (vid. under *Ruth*, p. 195).

Ver. 15. The judgment contained in the words, "vanity and a striving after the wind," is confirmed: "That which is crooked cannot become straight; and a deficit cannot be numerable," i.e. cannot be taken into account (thus Theod., after the Syro-Hex.), as if as much were present as is actually wanting; for, according to the proverb, "Where there is nothing, nothing further is to be counted." Hitzig thinks, by that which is crooked and wanting, according to vii. 13, of the divine order of the world: that which is unjust in it, man cannot alter; its wants he cannot complete. But the preceding statement refers only to labour under the sun, and to philosophical research and observation directed thereto. This places before the eyes of the observer irregularities and wants, brings such irregularities and wants to his consciousness,—which are certainly partly brought about and destined by God, but for the most part are due to the transgressions of man himself,—and what avails the observer the discovery and investigation?—he has only lamentation over it, for with all his wisdom he can bring no help. Instead of *כִּשְׁלֵשׁ* (vid. under *כִּשׁ*, p. 196), *כִּשְׁלֵשׁ* was to be expected. However, the old language also formed intransitive infinitives with transitive modification of the final vowels, e.g. *כִּשְׁלֵשׁ*, etc. (cf. *כִּשְׁלֵשׁ*, v. 11).

Having now gained such a result in his investigation and research by means of wisdom, he reaches the conclusion that wisdom itself is nothing.

Vv. 16–18. "I have communed with mine own heart, saying: Lo, I have gained great and always greater wisdom above all who were before me over Jerusalem; and my heart hath seen wisdom and knowledge in fulness. And I gave my heart to know what was in wisdom and knowledge, madness and folly—I have perceived that this also is a grasping after the wind." The evidence in which he bears witness to himself that striving after wisdom and knowledge brings with it no true satisfaction, reaches down to the close of ver. 17; *וְכִשְׁלֵשׁ* is the conclusion which is aimed at. The manner of

expression is certainly so far involved, as he speaks of his heart to his heart what it had experienced, and to what he had purposely directed it. The **לִבִּי** leads us to think that a king speaks, for whom it is appropriate to write a capital *I*, or to multiply it into *we*; *vid.* regarding this "I," more pleonastic than emphatic, subordinated to its verb, § 3, p. 198. It is a question whether **עַם-לִבִּי**, after the phrase **דַּבֵּר עַם (אֵל)**, is meant of speaking with any one, *colloqui*, or of the place of speaking, as in "thou shalt consider in thine heart," Deut. viii. 5, it is used of the place of consciousness; cf. Job xv. 9, **עַיִן עַיִן הָיָה עִי** = *σύννοια ἐμαυτοῦ*, and what is said in my *Psychol.* p. 134, regarding *συνείδησις*, consciousness, and *συμμαρτυρεῖν*. **בְּלִבִּי**, interchanging with **עַם-לִבִּי**, ii. 1, 15, cf. xv. 1, commends the latter meaning: in my heart (LXX., Targ., Jerome, Luther); but the cogn. expressions, *m'dabbērēth al-libbah*, 1 Sam. i. 13, and *l'dabbēr el-libbi*, Gen. xxiv. 45, suggest as more natural the former rendering, viz. as of a dialogue, which is expressed by the Gr. Venet. (more distinctly than by Aquila, Symm., and Syr.): *διείλεγμαί ἐγὼ ξὺν τῇ καρδίᾳ μου*. Also **לִבִּי**, occurring only here in the Book of Koheleth, brings it near that the following *oratio directa* is directed to the heart, as it also directly assumes the form of an address, ii. 1, after **בְּלִבִּי**. The expression, **הָיָה חָכְמָה**, "to make one's wisdom great," i.e. "to gain great wisdom," is without a parallel; for the words, **הָיָה חָכְמָה**, Isa. xxviii. 29, quoted by Hitzig, signify to show and attest truly useful (beneficial) knowledge in a noble way. The annexed **וְהָיָה** refers to the continued increase made to the great treasure already possessed (cf. ii. 9 and 1 Kings x. 7). The *al* connected therewith signifies, "above" (Gen. xlix. 26) all those who were over Jerusalem before me. This is like the *sarrāni ālik mahrija*, "the kings who were my predecessors," which was frequently used by the Assyrian kings. The Targumist seeks to accommodate the words to the actual Solomon by thus distorting them: "above all the wise men who have been in Jerusalem before me," as if the word in the text were **בִּירוּשָׁלַם**,<sup>1</sup> as it is indeed found in several Codd., and according to which also the LXX., Syr., Jerome, and the Venet. translate. Rather than think of the wise (**חָכְמָה**), we are led to think of all those who from of old stood at the head of the Israelitish community. But there must have been well-known great men with whom Solomon measures

<sup>1</sup> In F the following note is added: "Several Codd. have, erroneously, *birushalam* instead of *al-yerushalam*." Kennicott counts about 60 such Codd. It stands thus also in J; and at first it thus stood in H, but was afterwards corrected to *al-yerushalam*. Cf. Elias Levita's *Masoreth hamasoreth*, II. 8, at the end.

himself, and these could not be such dissimilarly great men as the Canaanitish kings to the time of Melchizedek; and since the Jebusites, even under Saul, were in possession of Zion, and Jerusalem was for the first time completely subdued by David (2 Sam. v. 7, cf. Josh. xv. 63), it is evident that only one predecessor of Solomon in the office of ruler over Jerusalem can be spoken of, and that here an anachronism lies before us, occasioned by the circumstance that the *Salomo redivivus*, who has behind him the long list of kings whom in truth he had before him, here speaks. Regarding אִשָּׁר הָיָה, *qu'il y eut*, for אִשָּׁר הָיָה, *qui furent*, *vid.* at i. 10b. The seeing here ascribed to the heart (here = *voûs*, *Psychol.* p. 249) is meant of intellectual observation and apprehension; for "all perception, whether it be mediated by the organs of sense or not (as prophetic observing and contemplating), comprehends all, from mental discernment down to suffering, which veils itself in unconsciousness, and the Scripture designates it as a seeing" (*Psychol.* 234); the Book of Koheleth also uses the word חָכָה of every kind of human experience, bodily or mental, ii. 24, v. 17, vi. 6, ix. 9. It is commonly translated: "My heart saw much wisdom and knowledge" (thus *eg.* Ewald); but that is contrary to the gram. structure of the sentence (Ew. § 237c). The adjunct *harbêl*<sup>1</sup> is always, and by Koheleth also, ii. 7, v. 6, 16, vi. 11, ix. 18, xi. 8, xii. 9, 12, placed after its subst.; thus it is here adv., as at v. 19, vii. 16 f. Rightly the Venet.: ἡ καρδία μου τεθίσταται κατὰ πολὺ σοφίαν καὶ γνῶσιν. *Chokma* signifies, properly, solidity, compactness; and then, like *πυκρότης*, mental ability, secular wisdom; and, generally, solid knowledge of the true and the right. *Daath* is connected with *chokma* here and at Isa xxxiii. 6, as at Rom. xi. 33 γνῶσις is with σοφία. Baumgarten-Crusius there remarks that σοφία refers to the general ordering of things, γνῶσις to the determination of individual things; and Harless, that σοφία is knowledge which proposes the right aim, and γνῶσις that which finds the right means thereto. In general, we may say that *chokma* is the fact of a powerful knowledge of the true and the right, and the property which arises out of this intellectual possession; but *daath* is knowledge penetrating into the depth of the essence of things, by which wisdom is acquired and in which wisdom establishes itself.

Ver. 17. By the consecutive *modus* הִתְקַדְּשָׁה (aor. with *ah*, like Gen. xxxii. 6, xli. 11, and particularly in more modern writings; *vid.* p. 198, regarding the rare occurrence of the aorist form in the Book of Koheleth) he bears evidence to himself as to the end

<sup>1</sup> Regarding the form חָכָה, which occurs once (Jer. xli. 2), *vid.* Ew. § 240e.

which, thus equipped with wisdom and knowledge, he gave his heart to attain unto (cf. 13a), i.e. toward which he directed the concentration of his intellectual strength. He wished to be clear regarding the real worth of wisdom and knowledge in their contrasts; he wished to become conscious of this, and to have joy in knowing what he had in wisdom and knowledge as distinguished from madness and folly. After the statement of the object *lādāṣṭh*, stands *v'daath*, briefly for נִדְעָה. Ginsburg wishes to get rid of the words *holdloth v'sikluth*, or at least would read in their stead תְּבוּנִית וְשִׁכְלוֹת (rendering them "intelligence and prudence"); Grätz, after the LXX. παραβολὰς καὶ ἐπιστήμην, reads מִשְׁפָּלוֹת וְשִׁכְלוֹת. But the text can remain as it is: the object of Koheleth is, on the one hand, to become acquainted with wisdom and knowledge; and, on the other, with their contraries, and to hold these opposite to each other in their operations and consequences. The LXX., Targ., Venet., and Luther err when they render *sikluth* here by ἐπιστήμη, etc. As *sikluth*, insight, intelligence, is in the Aram. written with the letter *samek* (instead of *sin*), so here, according to the Masora סכָלוֹת, madness is for once written with ע, being everywhere else in the book written with ס; the word is an ἐναντιόφωνον,<sup>1</sup> and has, whether written in the one way or in the other, a verb, *sakal* (שָׁכַל, סָכַל), which signifies "to twist together," as its root, and is referred partly to a complication and partly to a confusion of ideas. הִקְלֹוֹת, from הִלָּל, in the sense of "to cry out," "to rage," always in this book terminates in *ōth*, and only at x. 13 in *ūth* (vid. p. 191); the termination *ūth* is that of the abstr. sing.; but *ōth*, as we think we have shown at Prov. i. 20, is that of a fem. plur., meant intensively, like *bogdoth*, Zeph. ii. 4; *binoth*, *chokmoth*, cf. *bogdim*, Prov. xxiii. 28; *hhorlim*, Zech. xi. 7, 14; *toqim*, Prov. xi. 15 (Böttch. § 700g E). Twice *v'sikluth* presents what, speaking to his own heart, he bears testimony to before himself. By *yādā'ti*, which is connected with *dibbarti* (ver. 16) in the same rank, he shows the *facit*. הִנָּהוּ refers to the striving to become conscious of the superiority of secular wisdom and science to the love of pleasure and to ignorance. He perceived that this striving also was a grasping after the wind; with רָעִית, 14b, is here interchanged רָעִיָּה (vid. p. 195). He proves to himself that nothing showed itself to be real, i.e. firm and enduring, unimpeachable and imperishable. And why not?

Ver. 18. "For in much wisdom is much grief; and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." The German proverb: "Much wisdom causeth headache," is compared, xii. 12b, but not

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Th. M. Redslob's *Die Arab. Wörter*, u.s.w. (1873).

here, where **כָּעֵס** and **כִּכְאֹב** express not merely bodily suffering, but also mental grief. Spinoza hits one side of the matter in his *Ethics*, IV. 17, where he remarks: "*Veram boni et mali cognitionem saepe non satis valere ad cupiditates coercendas, quo facto homo imbecillitatem suam animadvertens cogitur exclamare: Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.*" In every reference, not merely in that which is moral, there is connected with knowledge the shadow of a sorrowful consciousness, in spite of every effort to drive it away. The wise man gains an insight into the thousand-fold woes of the natural world, and of the world of human beings, and this reflects itself in him without his being able to change it; hence the more numerous the observed forms of evil, suffering, and discord, so much greater the sadness (**כָּעֵס**, R. כס, cogn. חס, *perstringere*) and the heart-sorrow (**כִּכְאֹב**, *crève-cœur*) which the inutility of knowledge occasions. The form of 18a is like v. 6, and that of 18b like *eg.* Prov. xviii. 22a. We change the clause *yosiph daath* into an antecedent, but in reality the two clauses stand together as the two members of a comparison: if one increaseth knowledge, he increaseth (at the same time) sorrow. "**יִסְיָ**, Isa. xxix. 14, xxxviii. 5, Eccles. ii. 18," says Ewald, § 169a, "stands alone as a *part. act.*, from the stem reverting from *Hiph.* to *Kal* with '— instead of —." But this is not unparalleled; in **יִסְיָ הַל' יִסְיָ** the verb **יִסְיָ** is fin., in the same manner as **יִסְיָ**, Isa. xxviii. 16; **יִסְיָ**, Ps. xvi. 5, is *Hiph.*, in the sense of *amplificas*, from **יִסְיָ**; **יִסְיָ**, Prov. vi. 19 (*vid. lc.*), is an attribut. clause, *qui efflet*, used as an adj.; and, at least, we need to suppose in the passage before us the confusion that the *ē* of *kātil* (from *kātil*, originally *kātal*), which is only long, has somehow passed over into *ī*. Böttcher's remark to the contrary, "An impersonal *frens* thus repeated is elsewhere altogether without a parallel," is set aside by the proverb formed exactly thus: "He that breathes the love of truth says what is right," Prov. xii. 17.

*The Unsatisfying Nature of Worldly Joy, ii. 1–11.*

After having proved that secular wisdom has no superiority to folly in bringing true happiness to man, he seeks his happiness in a different way, and gives himself up to cheerful enjoyment.

ii. 1. "I have said in mine heart: Up then, I will prove thee with mirth, and enjoy thou the good! And, lo, this also is vain." Speaking in the heart is not here merely, as at i. 16, 17a, speaking to the heart, but the words are formed into a direct address of the heart. The Targ. and Midrash obliterate this by interpreting as

if the word were אֶנְסֶנָּה, "I will try it" (vii. 23). Jerome also, in rendering by *vadam et affluam deliciis et fruar bonis*, proceeds contrary to the usual reading of אֶנְסֶנָּה (*Niph.* of נִסַּךְ, *vid.* at Ps. ii. 6), as if this could mean, "I will pour over myself." It is an address of the heart, and ב is, as at 1 Kings x. 1, that of the means: I will try thee with mirth, to see whether thy hunger after satisfaction can be appeased with mirth. אֶנְסֶנָּה also is an address; Grätz sees here, contrary to the Gramm., an infin. continuing the אֶנְסֶנָּה: *urēh*, Job x. 15, is the connect. form of the particip. adj. *rāēh*; and if *rēh* could be the inf. after the forms *naqqēh*, *hinnāqqēh*, it would be the *inf. absol.*, instead of which אֶנְסֶנָּה was to be expected. It is the imper.: See good, sinking thyself therein, *i.e.* enjoy a cheerful life. Elsewhere the author connects אֶנְסֶנָּה less significantly with the accus.-obj., v. 17, vi. 6, ii. 24.

This was his intention; but this experiment also to find out the *summum bonum* proves itself a failure: he found a life of pleasure to be a hollow life; that also, viz. devotedness to mirth, was to him manifestly vanity.

Ver. 2. "To laughter I said: It is mad; and to mirth: What doth it issue in?" Laughter and mirth are personified; *m'holāl* is thus not neut. (Hitz., a foolish matter), but mas. The judgment which is pronounced regarding both has not the form of an address; we do not need to supply אֶנְסֶנָּה and אֶנְסֶנָּה, it is objectively like an *oratio obliqua*: that it is mad; cf. Ps. xlix. 12. In the midst of the laughter and revelling in sensual delight, the feeling came over him that this was not the way to true happiness, and he was compelled to say to laughter, It has become mad (*part. Poal*, as at Ps. cii. 9), it is like one who is raving mad, who finds his pleasure in self-destruction; and to joy (mirth), which disregards the earnestness of life and all due bounds, he is constrained to say, What does it result in? = that it produces nothing, *i.e.* that it brings forth no real fruit; that it produces only the opposite of true satisfaction; that instead of filling, it only enlarges the inner void. Others, *e.g.* Luther, "What doest thou?" *i.e.* How foolish is thy undertaking! Even if we thus explain, the point in any case lies in the inability of mirth to make man truly and lastingly happy,—in the inappropriateness of the means for the end aimed at. Therefore אֶנְסֶנָּה is thus meant just as in אֶנְסֶנָּה פָּרִי (Hitz.), and מַעֲשֵׂה, effect, Isa. xxxii. 17. Thus Mendelssohn: What profit dost thou bring to me? Regarding אֶנְסֶנָּה, *vid.* p. 198; מַה-זֶּה is = *mah-zoth*, Gen. iii. 13, where it is shown that the demonstrative pronoun serves here to sharpen the interrogative: What then, what in all the world!

After this revelling in sensual enjoyment has been proved to be a fruitless experiment, he searches whether wisdom and folly cannot be bound together in a way leading to the object aimed at.

Ver. 3. "I searched in my heart, (henceforth) to nourish my body with wine, while my heart had the direction by means of wisdom; and to lay hold on folly, till I might see what it was good for the children of men that they should do, all the number of the days of their life." After he became conscious that unbridled sensual intoxication does not lead to the wished-for end, he looked around him farther, and examined into the following receipt for happiness. Inappropriately, Zöckl, with Hengst.: "I essayed in my heart to nourish . . ." חַנַּן does not mean *probare*, but *explorare*, to spy out, Num. x. 33, and frequently in the Book of Koheleth (here and at i. 13, vii. 25) of mental searching and discovery (Targ. אַלֵּל). With לְמִשְׁכָּךְ there then follows the new thing that is contrived. If we read מִשְׁכָּךְ and נָהַג in connection, then the idea of drawing a carriage, Isa. v. 18, cf. Deut. xxi. 3, and of driving a carriage, 2 Sam. vi. 3, lies near; according to which Hitzig explains: "Wine is compared to a draught beast such as a horse, and he places wisdom as the driver on the box, that his horse may not throw him into a ditch or a morass." But *moshēk* is not the wine, but the person himself who makes the trial; and *nohēg* is not the wisdom, but the heart,—the former thus only the means of guidance; no man expresses himself thus: I draw the carriage by means of a horse, and I guide it by means of a driver. Rightly the Syr.: "To delight (לְמִשְׁכָּךְ, from בָּפֶס, *oblectare*) my flesh with wine." Thus also the Targ. and the Venet., by "drawing the flesh." The metaphor does not accord with the Germ. *ziehen* = to nourish by caring for (for which רָבָה is used); it is more natural, with Gesen., to compare the passing of *trahere* into *tractare*, e.g. in the expression *se benignius tractare* (Horace, *Ep.* i. 17); but apart from the fact that *trahere* is a word of doubtful etymology,<sup>1</sup> *tractare* perhaps attains the meaning of attending to, using, managing, through the intermediate idea of moving hither and thither, which is foreign to the Heb. מִשְׁכָּךְ, which means only to draw,—to draw to oneself, and hold fast (*attractum sive prehensum tenere*). As the Talm. מִשְׁכָּךְ occurs in the sense of "to refresh," e.g. *Chagiga* 14a: "The Haggadists (in contradistinction to the Halachists) refresh the heart of a man as with water" (*vid.* p. 193); so here, "to draw the flesh" = to bring it into willing obedience by means of pleasant attractions.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Corssen's *Nachtr. zur lat. Formenlehre*, pp. 107–109.

<sup>2</sup> Gratz translates: to embrocate my body with wine, and remarks that in

The phrase which follows: *v'libbi nohēg bahhochmāh*, is conditioning: While my heart had the direction by means of wisdom; or, perhaps in accordance with the more modern *usus loq.* (*vid.* p. 194): While my heart guided, demeaned, behaved itself with wisdom. Then the inf. *limshok*, depending on *tarti* as its obj., is carried forward with *v'lēhhoz b'sichluth*. Plainly the subject treated of is an intermediate thing (Bardach: מְצִיעוּת). He wished to have enjoyment, but in measure, without losing himself in enjoyment, and thereby destroying himself. He wished to give himself over to sweet *desipere*, but yet with wise self-possession (because it is sadly true that *ubi mel ibi fel*) to lick the honey and avoid the gall. There are drinkers who know how to guide themselves so that they do not end in drunken madness; and there are habitual pleasure-seekers who yet know how so far to control themselves, that they do not at length become *roués*. Koheleth thus gave himself to a foolish life, yet tempered by wisdom, till there dawned upon him a better light upon the way to true happiness.

The expression of the *donec viderem* is old Heb. Instead of אִי-יָהּ טוֹב, *quidnam sit bonum* in indirect interrog. (as xi. 6, cf. Jer. vi. 16), the old form מֶה-טוֹב (vi. 12) would lie at least nearer. *Asher yāśu* may be rendered: *quod faciant* or *ut faciant*; after ii. 24, iii. 22, v. 4, vii. 18, the latter is to be assumed. The accus. designation of time, "through the number of the days of their life," is like v. 17, vi. 12. We have not, indeed, to translate with Knobel: "the few days of their life," but yet there certainly lies in מְסָפֵר the idea that the days of man's life are numbered, and that thus even if they are not few but many (vi. 3), they yet do not endure for ever.

The king now, in the verse following, relates his undertakings for the purpose of gaining the joys of life in fellowship with wisdom, and first, how he made architecture and gardening serviceable to this new style of life.

Vv. 4-6. "I undertook great works, built me houses, planted me vineyards. I made me gardens and parks, and planted therein all kinds of fruit-trees. I made me water-pools to water therewith a forest bringing forth trees." The expression, "I made great my works," is like i. 16; the verb contains the adj. as its obj. The love of wisdom, a sense of the beautiful in nature and art, a striving after splendour and dignity, are fundamental traits in Solomon's character.

this lies a *raffinement*. But why does he not rather say, "to bathe in wine"? If מִשְׁחָה can mean "to embrocate," it may also mean "to bathe," and for בִּיַּן may be read בִּינִי: in Grecian, i.e. Falernian, Chian, wine.

His reign was a period of undisturbed and assured peace. The nations far and near stood in manifold friendly relations with him. Solomon was "the man of rest," 1 Chron. xxii. 9; his whole appearance was as it were the embodied glory itself that had blossomed from out of the evils and wars of the reign of David. The Israelitish commonwealth hovered on a pinnacle of worldly glory till then unattained, but with the danger of falling and being lost in the world. The whole tendency of the time followed, as it were, a secular course, and it was Solomon first of all whom the danger of the love of the world, and of worldly conformity to which he was exposed, brought to ruin, and who, like so many of the O. T. worthies, began in the spirit and ended in the flesh. Regarding his buildings,—the house of the forest of Lebanon, the pillared hall (porch), the hall of judgment, the palace intended for himself and the daughter of Pharaoh,—*vid.* the description in 1 Kings vii. 1–12, gathered from the annals of the kingdom; 1 Kings ix. 15–22 = 2 Chron. viii. 3–6, gives an account of Solomon's separate buildings (to which also the city of Millo belongs), and of the cities which he built; the temple, store-cities, treasure-cities, etc., are naturally not in view in the passage before us, where it is not so much useful buildings, as rather buildings for pleasure (1 Kings ix. 19), that are referred to. Vineyards, according to 1 Chron. xxvii. 27, belonged to David's royal domain; a vineyard in Baal-hamon which Solomon possessed, but appears at a later period to have given up, is mentioned at the close of the Song. That he was fond of gardening, appears from manifold expressions in the Song; delight in the life and movements of the natural world, and particularly in plants, is a prominent feature in Solomon's character, in which he agrees with Shulamith. The Song, vi. 2, represents him in the garden at the palace. We have spoken under the Song, vi. 11 f., of the gardens and parks at Etam, on the south-west of Bethlehem. Regarding the originally Persian word *pardēs* (plur. *pardesim*, Mishnic *pardesoth*), *vid.* under Song iv. 13; regarding the primary meaning of *b'rēchah* (plur. const. *b'rēchoth*, in contradistinction to *birchoth*, blessings), the necessary information is found under Song vii. 5. These Solomonic pools are at the present day to be seen near old Etam, and the clause here denoting a purpose, "to water from them a forest which sprouted trees, *i.e.* brought forth sprouting trees," is suitable to these; for verbs of flowing and swarming, also verbs of growing, thought of transitively, may be connected with obj.-accus., Ewald, § 281*b*; cf. under Isa. v. 6. Thus, as he gave himself to the building of houses, the care of gardens,

and the erection of pools, so also to the cultivation of forests, with the raising of new trees.

Another means, wisely considered as productive of happiness, was a large household and great flocks of cattle, which he procured for himself.

Ver. 7. "I procured servants and maidens, and also I obtained servants born in the house; also the possession of flocks; I obtained many horned and small cattle before all who were in Jerusalem before me." The obtaining of these possessions is, according to Gen. xvii. 12 ff., to be understood of purchase. There is a distinction between the slaves, male and female (*mancipia*), obtained by purchase, and those who were home-born (*vernae*), the בְּנֵי יִלְדֵי (בְּנֵי יִלְדֵי), who were regarded as the chief support of the house (Gen. xiv. 14), on account of their attachment to it, and to this day are called (Arab.) *fada wayyt*, as those who offer themselves a sacrifice for it, if need be. Regarding לִי הָיָה, in the sense of increasing possession, *vid.* Song, p. 155; and regarding הָיָה לִי for לִי הָיָה, *vid.* at i. 10, 16; at all events, the sing. of the pred. may be explained from this, that the persons and things named are thought of in the mass, as at Zech. xi. 5, Joel i. 20 (although the idea there may be also individualizing); but in the use of the pass., as at Gen. xxxv. 26, Dan. ix. 24, the Semite custom is different, inasmuch as for it the passive has the force of an active without a definite subject, and thus with the most general subject; and as to the case lying before us in ver. 7, we see from Ex. xii. 49, cf. Gen. xv. 17, that הָיָה (יִהְיֶה) in such instances is thought of as neut. According to Gen. xxvi. 14 and the passage before us, מִקְנֵה lay nearer than מִקְנֵה, but the primary form instead of the connecting form is here the traditional reading; we have thus apposition (*Nebenordnung*) instead of subordination (*Annexion*), as in *z'vachim sh'lamim*, Ex. xxiv. 5, and in *habbaqar hann'hhosheth*, 2 Kings xvi. 17, although *vagar vatson* may also be interpreted as the accus. of the more accurate definition: the possession of flocks consisting in cattle and sheep. But this manner of construction is, for a book of so late an origin, too artificial. What it represents Solomon as saying is consistent with historical fact; at the consecration of the temple he sacrificed hecatombs, 1 Kings viii. 63; and the daily supply for the royal kitchen, which will at the same time serve to show the extent of the royal household, was, according to 1 Kings v. 2 f., enormous.

There now follows the enumeration of riches and jewels which were a delight to the eye; and finally, the large provision made for revelling in the pleasures of music and of sensual love.

Ver. 8. "I heaped up for myself also silver and gold, and the peculiar property of kings and of countries; I gat me men singers and women singers, and the delights of the children of men: mistress and mistresses." The verb כָּנַשׁ כֶּנֶס, συναγαγειν, is common to all Semitic dialects (also to the Assyr.), and especially peculiar to the more recent Heb., which forms from it the name of the religious community συναγωγή, כְּנֶסֶת; it is used here of that which is brought together merely for the purpose of possession. *S'gullah* (from *sagal*, Targ., to make oneself possess), properly possession, and that something which specially and peculiarly belongs to one as his property; the word is here meant collect., as at 1 Chron. xxix. 3: that which only kings and individual countries possess. The interchange of *m'lachim*, which is without the article, with the determ. *hamm'dinoth*, is arbitrary: something special, such as that which a king possesses, the specialities which countries possess,—one country this, and another that. The *hamm'dinoth* are certainly not exclusively the regions embraced within the dominion of Solomon (Zoekl.), as, according to Esth. i. 1, the Persian kingdom was divided into 127 *m'dinoth*. Solomon had a fleet which went to Ophir, was in a friendly relation with the royal house of Tyre, the metropolis of many colonies, and ruled over a widely-extended kingdom, bound by commerce with Central Asia and Africa.—His desires had thus ample opportunity to stretch beyond the limits of his own kingdom, and facilities enough for procuring the peculiar natural and artistic productions which other lands could boast of. *M'dinah* is, first of all, a country, not as a territory, but as under one government (cf. v. 7); in the later philosophical language it is the Heb. word for the Greek πολιτεία; in the passage before us, *m'dinoth* is, however, not different from מְדִינָה.

From the singing men and singing women who come into view here, not as appertaining to the temple service (*vid.* the Targ.), with which no singing women were connected, but as connected with the festivities of the court (2 Sam. xix. 36; cf. Isa. v. 12), advance is made to *shiddah v'shiddoth*; and since these are designated by the preceding מְנוּחָה (not מְנוּחָה) *b'ne hāādām*, especially as objects and means of earthly pleasure, and since, according to vii. 7, sexual love is the fairest and the most pleasant, in a word, the most attractive of all earthly delights (Solomon's *luxus*, also here contradicting the law of the king, Deut. xvii. 17, came to a height, according to 1 Kings xi. 3, after the example of Oriental rulers, in a harem of not fewer than one thousand women, princesses and concubines), of necessity, the expression *shiddah v'shiddoth* must denote a mul-

titute of women whom the king possessed for his own pleasure. Cup-bearers, male and female (Syr., LXX.), cannot at all be understood, for although it may be said that the enumeration thus connects itself with the before-named בָּיִת, yet this class of female attendants are not numbered among the highest human pleasures; besides, with such an explanation one must read שָׂרָה וְשָׂרָה, and, in addition, שָׂרָה (to throw, to pour to, or pour out), to which this Heb. שָׂרָה may correspond, is nowhere used of the pouring out of wine. Rather might שָׂרָה, like שָׂרָה, *hydria*, be the name of a vessel from which one pours out anything, according to which Aq. translates by *κυλλίκιον καὶ κυλλίκια*, Symmachus, after Jerome, by *mensurarum* (read *mensarum*<sup>1</sup>) *species et appositiones*, and Jerome, *scyphos et urceos in ministerio ad vina fundenda*; but this word for *k'lē mashkēh*, 1 Kings x. 21 (= 2 Chron. ix. 20), is not found. Also the Targ., which translates by *dimasaya unē v'navan*, public baths (*δημόσια*), and *balneae*, vindicates this translation by referring the word to the verb שָׂרָה, "with pipes which pour out (וְשָׂרָה) tepid water, and pipes which pour out hot water." But this explanation is imaginary; שָׂרָה occurs in the Mishna, *Mikwaoth* (of plunge-baths) vi. 5, but there it denotes a chest which, when it swims in the water, makes the plunge-bath unsuitable. Such an untenable conceit also is the translation suggested by Kimchi, כָּלִי זֶמֶר, according to which the Venet. *σύστημα καὶ συστήματα* (in a musical sense: *concentus*), and Luther: "all kinds of musical instruments;" the word has not this meaning; Orelli, *Sanchuniathon*, p. 33, combines therewith Σιδών, according to the Phoenician myth, the inventress of the artistic song. The explanation by Kimchi is headed, "Splendour of every kind;" Ewald, Elster, and Zöckler find therein a general expression, following *taanugoth*: great heap and heaps = in great abundance [*die Hülle und Fülle*]. But the synon. of כְּבוֹד, "splendour," is not שָׂרָה, but עָוָה; and that שָׂרָה, like עָוָה, is referred to a great number, is without proof. Thus *shiddah v'shiddoth* will denote something definite; besides, "a large number" finds its expression in the climactic union of words. In the Jerus. Talm. *Taanith* iv. 5, *shiddah* must, according to the gloss, be the name of a chariot, although the subject there is not that of motion forward, or moving quickly; it is there announced that *Sichin*, not far from Sepphoris, a place famed also for its pottery, formerly possessed 80 such *shiddoth* wholly of metal. The very same word is explained by Rashi, *Baba kamma* ix. 3, *Shabbath* 120a, *Erubin* 30b, *Gittin* 8b, 68a, *Chagiga* 25a, and elsewhere, of a carriage of wood, and especially of a chariot for

<sup>1</sup> Thus, according to Valiarsi, a *Cod. Vat.* and *Cod. Palat.* of the first hand.

women and distinguished persons. The combination of the synonyms, *shiddah uthirah umigdal*, does not in itself mean more than a chest; and Rashi himself explains, *Kethuboth* 65a, *quolphi dashidah* of the lock of a chest (*argaz*); and the author of *Aruch* knows no other meaning than that of a repository such as a chest. But in passages such as *Gittin* 8b, the *shiddah* is mentioned as a means of transport; it is to all appearance a chest going on wheels, moved forward by means of wheels, but on that very account not a state-chariot. Rashi's tradition cannot be verified. Böttcher, in the *Neue Achrenlese*, adduces for comparison the Syr. *Shydlo*, which, according to Castelli, signifies *navis magna, corbita, arca*; but from a merchant ship and a portable chest, it is a great way to a lady's palanquin. He translates: palanquin and palanquins — one consignment to the harem after another. Gesen., according to Rödigér, *Thes.* 1365b, thinks that women are to be understood; for he compares the Arab. *s'ywet*, which signifies a women's carriage, and then the woman herself (cf. our *Fräulezimmer*, women's apartment, women, like *Odolische*, from the Turk. *oda*, apartment). But this all stands or falls with that gloss of Rashi's: '*agalah l'merkavoth nashim nasrim*. Meanwhile, of all the explanations as yet advanced, this last [of splendid coaches, palanquins] is the best; for it may certainly be supposed that the words *shiddah v'shiddoth* are meant of women. Aben Ezra explains on this supposition, *shiddath* = *sh'euyoth*, females captured in war; but unwarrantably, because as yet Solomon had not been engaged in war; others (vid. Pinsker's *Zur Gesch. des Karaismus*, p. 296), recently Bullock, connect it with *shaddim*, in the sense of (Arab.) *nahidah* (a maiden with swelling breast); Knobel explains after *shadad*, to barricade, to shut up, *occlusa*, the female held in custody (cf. *ethulah*, the separated one, virgin, from *bathal*, cogn. *badal*); Hitzig, "cushions," "bolsters," from *shanad*, which, like (Arab.) *firash*, λέχος, is then transferred to the *juncta toro*. Nothing of all that is satisfactory. The Babyl. Gemara, *Gittin* 68a, glosses 'מִן הַמִּצְוֹת by "reservoirs and baths," and then further says that in the west (Palestine) they say מִן הַמִּצְוֹת, chests (according to Rashi: chariots); but that here in this country (i.e. in Babylon) they translate *shiddah v'shiddoth* by *shidah v'shidathin*, which is then explained, "demons and demonesses," which Solomon had made subservient to him.<sup>1</sup> This haggadic-mytholog. interpreta-

<sup>1</sup> A demon, and generally a superhuman being, is called, as in Heb. דִּמּוֹן, so in the Babyl.-Assyr. *sidu*, vid. Norris' *Assyrian Dictionary*, II. p. 668; cf. Schrader, in the *Jews. Lit. Zeit.* 1874, p. 218 f., according to which *sidu*, with *a'ap*, is the usual name of Adar formed like an ox.

tion is, linguistically at least, on the right track. A demon is not so named from fluttering or moving to and fro (Levy, Schönhak), for there is no evidence in the Semitic language of the existence of a verb שׂר, to flee; also not from a verb *sadad*, which must correspond to the Heb. הִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה, in the sense of to adore (Oppert's *Inscription du palais de Khorsabad*, 1863, p. 96); for this meaning is more than doubtful, and, besides, שׂר is an active, and not a passive idea,—much rather שׂר, Assy. *sīd*, Arab. *sayyid*, signifies the mighty, from שׂר, to force, Ps. xci. 6.<sup>1</sup> In the Arab. (cf. the Spanish *Cid*) it is uniformly the name of a lord, as subduing, ruling, mastering (*sabid*), and the fem. *sayyidat*, of a lady, whence the vulgar Arab. *sitti* = my lady, and *sīdi* = my lord. Since שׂר means the same as שׂר, and in Heb. is more commonly used than it, so also the fem. form שׂרה is possible, so much the more as it may have originated from שׂרה, v. שׂר = שׂר, by a sharpening contraction, like סָנִים, from סָנִים (Olsh. § 83c), perhaps intentionally to make שׂרה, a demoness, and the name of a lady (*donna* = *domina*) unlike. Accordingly we translate, with Gesen. and Meyer in their *Handwört.*: “lady and ladies;” for we take *shiddoth* as a name of the ladies of the harem, like *shēglath* (Assyr. *saklāti*) and *l’hhenath* in the book of Daniel, on which Ahron b. Joseph the Karaite remarks: *shedah hinqaroth shagal*.

The connection expressing an innumerable quantity, and at the same time the greatest diversity, is different from the genitival *dor dorim*, generation of generations, *i.e.* lasting through all generations, Ps. lxxii. 5, from the permutative heightening the idea: *rahham rahhamathaim*, one damsel, two damsels, Judg. v. 30, and from that formed by placing together the two gram. genders, comprehending every species of the generic conception: *mash’ēn umash’enah*, Isa. iii. 3 (*vid. comm. l.c.*, and Ewald, § 172b). Also the words cited by Ewald (Syr.), *rogo urōgo*, “all possible pleasures” (Cureton’s *Spicil.* p. 10), do not altogether accord with this passage, for they heighten, like *m’od m’od*, by the repetition of the same expression. But similar is the Arab. scheme, *mal wamwal*, “possession and possessions,” *i.e.* exceeding great riches, where the collective idea, in itself affording by its indetermination free scope to the imagination, is multiplied by the plur. being further added.

After Koheleth has enumerated all that he had provided for the purpose of gratifying his lusts, but without losing himself therein, he draws the conclusion, which on this occasion also shows a perceptible deficit.

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Friedrich Delitzsch’s *Assyr. Thiernamen*, p. 37.

Vv. 9-11. "And I became great, and was always greater than all that were before me in Jerusalem: also my wisdom remained with me. And all that mine eyes desired I kept not from them, I refused not any kind of joy to my heart; for my heart had joy of all my labour: and this was my portion of all my labour. And I turned myself to all the works which my hands had done, and to the labour which I had laboured to accomplish: and, behold, all was vain, and windy effort, and there was no true profit under the sun." In *v'hasaphiti* there is here no obj. as at i. 16; the obj. is the *q'dallah*, the greatness, to be concluded and thought of from *v'gadalti*, "and I became great." To the impers. עָנַף for עָנָה, 7b, cf. 7a, i. 16, 10. He became great, and always greater, viz. in the possession of all the good things, the possession of which seemed to make a man happy on this earth. And what he resolved upon, in the midst of this *dulcis insania*, viz. to deport himself as a wise man, he succeeded in doing: his wisdom forsook him not, viz. the means adapted to the end, and ruling over this colossal apparatus of sensual lust; עָנָה, as e.g. at Ps. xvi. 6, belongs to the whole clause; and עָנָה, with ל, does not mean here to stand by, sustain (Herzfeld, Ewald, Elster), which it might mean as well as לָךְ עָנָה, Dan. xii. 1, but to continue (*vid.* p. 194), as Jerome, and after him, Luther, translates: *supientia quoque perseveravit secum*; the Targ. connects the ideas of continuance (LXX, Syr., Venet.) and of help; but the idea intended is that of continuance, for עָנָה, e.g., does not refer to helping, but self-maintaining.

Ver. 10. Thus become great and also continuing wise, he was not only in a condition to procure for himself every enjoyment, but he also indulged himself in everything; all that his eyes desired, i.e. all that they saw, and after which they made him lust (Deut. xiv. 26) (cf. 1 John ii. 16), that he did not refuse to them (עָנָה, *subtrahere*), and he kept not back his heart from any kind of joy (עָנָה, with *min*, of the thing refused, as at Num. xxiv. 11, etc., oftener with *min*, of him to whom it is refused, e.g. Gen. xxx. 2), for (here, after the foregoing negations, coinciding with *immo*) his heart had joy of all his work; and this, viz. this enjoyment in full measure, was his part of all his work. The palindromic form is like i. 6, iv. 1; cf. *Isa.* p. 411. We say in Heb. as well as in German: to have joy in (*an*, ע) anything, joy over (*über*, עָלַי) anything, or joy of (*von*, מִן) anything; Koheleth here purposely uses *min*, for he wishes to express not that the work itself was to him an object and reason of joy, but that it became to him a well of joy (cf. Prov. v. 18; 2 Chron. xx. 27). Falsely, Hahn and others: after my work (*min*, as e.g.

Ps. lxxiii. 20), for thereby the causative connection is obliterated: *min* is the expression of the mediate cause, as the concluding sentence says: Joy was that which he had of all his work—this itself brought care and toil to him; joy, made possible to him thereby, was the share which came to him from it.

Ver. 11. But was this הֵלֵק a יִתְרוֹן—was this gain that fell to him a true, satisfying, pure gain? With the words *uphanithi ani* (*vid.* p. 198) he proposes this question, and answers it. פָּנָה (to turn to) is elsewhere followed by expressions of motion to an end; here, as at Job vi. 28, by פָּ, by virtue of a *constructio praeagnans*: I turned myself, fixing my attention on all my works which my hands accomplished. *La'asoth* is, as at Gen. ii. 3 (*vid. l.c.*), equivalent to *perficiendo*, carrying out, viz. such works of art and of all his labour. The exclamation "behold" introduces the *summa summarum*. Regarding יִתְרוֹן, *vid.* i. 3. Also this way of finding out that which was truly good showed itself to be false. Of all this enjoyment, there remained nothing but the feeling of emptiness. What he strove after appeared to him as the wind; the satisfaction he sought to obtain at such an expense was nothing else than a momentary delusion. And since in this search after the true happiness of life he was in a position more favourable for such a purpose than almost any other man, he is constrained to draw the conclusion that there is no יִתְרוֹן, i.e. no real enduring and true happiness, from all labour under the sun.

*The End of the Wise Man the same as that of the Fool, ii. 12-17.*

After Koheleth has shown, i. 12 ff., that the striving after wisdom does not satisfy, inasmuch as, far from making men happy, its possession only increases their inward conflicts, he proposes to himself the question, whether or not there is a difference between wisdom and folly, whether the former does not far excel the latter. He proceeds to consider this question, for it is more appropriate to him, the old much-experienced king, than to others.

Ver. 12. "And I turned myself to examine wisdom, and madness, and folly: for what is the man who could come after the king, him whom they have made so long ago!" Mendelssohn's translation, 12a: "I abandoned my design of seeking to connect wisdom with folly and madness," is impossible, because for such a rendering we should have had at least מִלְרֵאוֹת instead of לְרֵאוֹת. Hitzig, otherwise followed by Stuart: "I turned myself to examine me wisdom, and, lo, it was madness as well as folly." This rendering is impossible also, for in such a case וְהִנֵּה ought to have stood as the result, after

חכמה. The passage, Zech. xiv. 6, cited by Hitz., does not prove the possibility of such a brachyology, for there we read not *v'qaroth v'qappayon*, but *'qaroth v'qappayon* (the splendid ones, i.e. the stars, will draw themselves together, i.e. will become dark bodies). The two *vavs* are not correlative, which is without example in the usage of this book, but copulative: he wishes to contemplate (Zöckler and others) wisdom on the one side, and madness and folly on the other, in their relation to each other, viz. in their relative worth. Hitzig's ingenuity goes yet further astray in 12b: "For what will the man do who comes after the king? (He shall do) what was long ago his (own) doing, i.e. inheriting from the king the throne, he will not also inherit his wisdom." Instead of *asakā*, he reads *asakā*, after Ex. xviii. 18; but the more modern author, whose work we have here before us, would, instead of this anomalous form, use the regular form *asakā*; but, besides, the expression *ākā asher-k'var 'asakā*, " (he will do) what long ago was his doing," is not Heb.; the words ought to have been *k'asakā k'var ākēn 'asakā*, or at least *'asakā*. If we compare 12b with 18b, the man who comes after the king appears certainly to be his successor.<sup>1</sup> But by this supposition it is impossible to give just effect to the relation (assigning a reason or motive) of 12b to 12a expressed by '2. When I considered, Knobel regards Koheleth as saying, that a fool would be heir to me a wise man, it appeared strange to me, and I was led to compare wisdom and folly to see whether or not the wise man has a superiority to the fool, or whether his labour and his fate are vanity, like those of the fool. This is in point of style absurd, but it is much more absurd logically. And who then gave the interpreter the right to stamp as a fool the man who comes after the king? In the answer: "That which has long ago been done," must lie its justification; for this that was done long ago naturally consists, as Zöckler remarks, in foolish and perverse undertakings, certainly in the destruction of that which was done by the wise predecessor, in the lavish squandering of the treasures and goods collected by him. More briefly, but in the same sense, Burger: *Nihil quod a solita hominum agendi ratione recedit*. But in ver. 12, Koheleth places it as a question whether his successor will be a wise man or a fool, while here he would presuppose that "naturally," or as a matter of course, he will be a fool. In the matter of style, we have nothing to object to the translation on which Zöckler, with Ramb., Rosenm., Knobel, Hengst.,

<sup>1</sup> The LXX. and Symm. by *kammēlek* think of *melak*, counsel, *בשר*, instead of *mēlek*, king; and as Jerome, so also Bardach understands by the king the *rex factor*, i.e. God the Creator.

and others, proceeds ; the supplying of the verb **עָשָׂה** to *meh hāādām* [= what can the man do ?] is possible (cf. Mal. ii. 15), and the neut. interpret. of the suffix of **עָשָׂהוּ** is, after vii. 13, Amos i. 3, Job xxxi. 11, admissible; but the reference to a successor is not connected with the course of the thoughts, even although one attaches to the plain words a meaning which is foreign to them. The words **עָשָׂהוּ . . . אֵל** are accordingly not the answer to the question proposed, but a component part of the question itself. Thus Ewald, and with him Elster, Heiligst., construes : "How will the man be who will follow the king, compared with him whom they made (a king) long ago, *i.e.* with his predecessor?" But **אֵל**, in this pregnant sense, "compared with," is without example, at least in the Book of Koheleth, which generally does not use it as a prep.; and, besides, this rendering, by introducing the successor on the throne, offends against the logic of the relation of 12*b* to 12*a*. The motive of Koheleth's purpose, to weigh wisdom and folly against each other as to their worth, consists in this, that a king, especially such an one as Solomon was, has in the means at his disposal and in the extent of his observation so much more than every other, that no one who comes after him will reach a different experience. This motive would be satisfactorily expressed on the supposition that the answer begins with **אֵל**, if one should read **עָשָׂהוּ** for **עָשָׂהוּ**; he will be able to do (accomplish) nothing but what he (the king) has long ago done, *i.e.* he will only repeat, only be able to confirm, the king's report. But if we take the text as it here stands, the meaning is the same; and, besides, we get rid of the harsh ellipsis *meh hāādām* for *meh yāāsēh hāādām*. We translate: for what is the man who might come after the king, him whom they have made so long ago! The king whom they made so long ago is Solomon, who has a richer experience, a more comprehensive knowledge, the longer the time (*viz.* from the present time backwards) since he occupied the throne. Regarding the expression *eth asher* = *quem*, instead of the *asher* simply, *vid.* Köhler under Zech. xii. 10. **עָשָׂהוּ**, with the most general subj., is not different from **נַעֲשֶׂה**, which, particularly in the Book of Daniel (*e.g.* iv. 28 f.), has frequently an active construction, with the subject unnamed, instead of the passive (Gesen. § 137, margin). The author of the Book of Koheleth, alienated from the theocratic side of the kingdom of Israel, makes use of it perhaps not unintentionally; besides, Solomon's elevation to the throne was, according to 1 Kings i., brought about very much by human agency; and one may, if he will, think of the people in the word *'asuhu* also, according to 1 Kings i. 39, who at last decided the matter. *Meh* before the letters *hheth*

and *ayin* commonly occurs: according to the Masora, twenty-four times; before other initial letters than these, eight times, and three of these in the Book of Koheleth before the letter *he*, ii. 12, 22, vii. 10. The words are more an exclamation than a question; the exclamation means: What kind of a man is that who could come after the king! cf. "What wickedness is this!" etc., Judg. xx. 12, Josh. xxii. 16, Ex. xviii. 14, 1 Kings ix. 13, i.e. as standing behind with reference to me—the same figure of *extenuatio*, as *mah adam*, Ps. cxliv. 3; cf. viii. 5.

There now follows an account of what, on the one side, happened to him thus placed on a lofty watch-tower, such as no other occupied.

Vv. 13, 14a. "And I saw that wisdom has the advantage over folly, as light has the advantage over darkness. The wise man has eyes in his head; but the fool walketh in darkness." In the sacred Scriptures, "light" is generally the symbol of grace, Ps. xliii. 3, but also the contrast of an intellectually and morally darkened state, Isa. li. 4. To know a thing is equivalent to having light on it, and seeing it in its true light (Ps. xxxvi. 10); wisdom is thus compared to light; folly is once, Job xxxviii. 19, directly called "darkness." Thus wisdom stands so much higher than folly, as light stands above darkness. חָכְמָה, which hitherto denoted actual result, enduring gain, signifies here preference (*vid.* p. 192); along with בִּיחָיִיתָ<sup>1</sup> there is also found the form בִּיחָיִיתָ<sup>2</sup> (*vid.* Prov. xxx. 17). The fool walks in darkness: he is blind although he has eyes (Isa. xliii. 8), and thus has as good as none,—he wants the spiritual eye of understanding (x. 3); the wise man, on the other hand, his eyes are in his head, or, as we also say: he has eyes in his head,—eyes truly seeing, looking at and examining persons and things. That is the one side of the relation of wisdom to folly as put to the test.

The other side of the relation is the sameness of the result in which the elevation of wisdom above folly terminates.

Vv. 14b, 15. "And I myself perceived that one experience happeneth to them all. And I said in my heart, As it will happen to the fool, it will happen also to me; and why have I then been specially wise? Thus I spake then in my heart, that this also is vain." Zöckler gives to עַם an adversative sense; but this *gam* (= ὁμοίως, *similiter*) stands always at the beginning of the clause, Ewald, § 354a. *Gam-ani* corresponds to the Lat. *ego idem*, which gives two predicates to one subject; while *et ipse* predicates the same of the one of two subjects as it does of the other (Zumpt, § 697). The second *gam-*

<sup>1</sup> Thus written, according to J and other authorities.

<sup>2</sup> Thus Ven. 1515, 1521; *vid.* Comm. under Gen. xxvii. 28, 29; Ps. xlv. 10.

*ani* serves for the giving of prominence to the object, and here precedes, after the manner of a substantival clause (cf. Isa. xlv. 12; Ezek. xxxiii. 17; 2 Chron. xxviii. 10), as at Gen. xxiv. 27; cf. Gesen. § 121. 3. *Miqrah* (from קרה, to happen, to befall) is *quiquid alicui accidit* (in the later philosoph. terminol. *accidens*; Venet. συμβεβηκός); but here, as the connection shows, that which finally puts an end to life, the final event of death. By the word יד the author expresses what he had observed on reflection; by אָמַ' . . . בָּל, what he said inwardly to himself regarding it; and by דַּבְּ בָּל, what sentence he passed thereon with himself. *Lammah* asks for the design, as *maddu'a* for the reason. אָ is either understood temporally: then when it is finally not better with me than with the fool (Hitz. from the standpoint of the dying hour), or logically: if yet one and the same event happeneth to the wise man and to the fool (Elst.); in the consciousness of the author both are taken together. The הָ of the conclusion refers, not, as at i. 17, to the endeavouring after and the possession of wisdom, but to this final result making no difference between wise men and fools. This fate, happening to all alike, is הַבָּל, a vanity rendering all vain, a nullity levelling down all to nothing, something full of contradictions, irrational. Paul also (Rom. viii. 20) speaks of this destruction, which at last comes upon all, as a *μταϊότης*.

The author now assigns the reason for this discouraging result.

Ver. 16. "For no remembrance of the wise, as of the fool, remains for ever; since in the days that are to come they are all forgotten. And how dieth the wise man? as the fool!" As in i. 11, so here זְכָרוֹן is the principal form, not different from זִכְרוֹן. Having no remembrance for ever, is equivalent to having no eternal endurance, having simply no onward existence (ix. 6). עַם is both times the comparat. combin., as at vii. 11; Job ix. 26, xxxvii. 18; cf. יָהִר, Ps. xlix. 11. There are, indeed, individual historically great men, the memory of whom is perpetuated from generation to generation in words and in monuments; but these are exceptions, which do not always show that posterity is able to distinguish between wise men and fools. As a rule, men have a long appreciating recollection of the wise as little as they have of the fools, for long ago (*vid. b'shekvar*, p. 196) in the coming days (הַיְּ הַבֵּי, accus. of the time, like the ellipt. הַבֵּי, Isa. xxvii. 6) all are forgotten; הַבָּל is, as at Ps. xiv. 3, meant personally: the one as the other; and לִשְׁכָּחָה is rendered by the Masora, like ix. 6, כָּבַ' אָבַ', as the pausal form of the finite; but is perhaps thought of as part., denoting that which only in the coming days will become too soon a completed fact, since those who

survive go from the burial of the one, as well as from that of the other, to the ordinary duties of the day. Death thus sinks the wise man, as it does the fool, in eternal oblivion; it comes to both, and brings the same to both, which extorted from the author the cry: How dieth the wise man? as the fool! Why is the fate which awaits both thus the same! This is the pointed, sarcastic  $\text{מִן}$  (how!) of the satirical *Mashal*, *cf.* Isa. xiv. 4, Ezek. xxvi. 17; and  $\text{נִשְׁכַּח}$  is = *merendum est*, as at 2 Sam. iii. 3, *merendum erat*. Rambach well:  $\text{מִן}$  est h. l. *particula admirationis super rei indignitate*.

What happened to the author from this sorrowful discovery he now states.

Ver. 17. "Then life became hateful to me; for the work which man accomplishes under the sun was grievous to me: because all is vain and windy effort." He hated life; and the labour which is done under the sun, *i.e.* the efforts of men, including the fate that befalls men, appeared to him to be evil (repugnant). The LXX. translate:  $\pi\epsilon\sigma\eta\rho\acute{o}\nu \epsilon\pi' \epsilon\mu\acute{o}\iota$ ; the Venet.:  $\kappa\alpha\kappa\acute{o}\nu \epsilon\pi' \epsilon\mu\acute{o}\iota$ ; and thus Hitzig: as a woful burden lying on me. But  $\text{עֲבֹדָה}$  is to be understood after *tor al*, Euth. iii. 9, etc., *cf.* Ps. xvi. 6, and as synon. with  $\text{עָבַד}$  or  $\text{עָבַדְתִּי}$  (*cf.* Dan. iii. 32), according to which Symmachus:  $\kappa\alpha\kappa\acute{o}\nu \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho \mu\omicron\iota \epsilon\phi\acute{\alpha}\tau\eta$ . This *al* belongs to the more modern *usus loq.*, *cf.* Ewald, § 217i. The end of the song was also again the grievous *ceterum censeo*: Vanity, and a labour which has wind as its goal, wind as its fruit.

### *The Vanity of Wealth gathered with Care and Privation, ii. 18-23.*

In view of death, which snatches away the wise man equally with the fool, and of the night of death, which comes to the one as to the other, deep dejection came upon him from another side.

Ver. 18. "And I hated all my labour with which I laboured under the sun, that I should leave it to the man who shall be after me;" *i.e.* not: who shall come into existence after me, but: who shall occupy my place after me. The fiction discovers itself here in the expression: "The king," who would not thus express himself indefinitely and unsympathetically regarding his son and successor on the throne, is stripped of his historical individuality. The first and third  $\text{וְ}$  are relat. pron. (*quem*, after the *schema etymologicum*  $\text{לֵבָב לֵבָב}$ , ver. 11, ix. 9, and *qui*), the second is relat. conj. (*quod*). The suffix of  $\text{עֲבֹדָתִי}$  refers to the labour in the sense of that which is obtained by wearisome labour, accomplished or collected with

labour; cf. לֵב, product, fruit, Gen. iv. 12; עֲבוֹרָה, effect, Isa. xxxii. 17.

How this man will be circumstanced who will have at his disposal that for which he has not laboured, is uncertain.

Ver. 19. "And who knoweth whether he shall be wise or foolish? and he will have power over all my labour with which I had wearied myself, and had acted wisely, under the sun: this also is vain." אֵין . . . הָ, instead of אֵין . . . הָ, in the double question, as at Job xvi. 3. What kind of a man he will be no one can previously know, and yet this person will have free control (cf. שָׁלַט, p. 196) over all the labour that the testator has wisely gained by labour—a hendiadys, for הָקָם with the obj. accus. is only in such a connection possible: "my labour which I, acting wisely, gained by labour."

In view of this doubtful future of that which was with pains and wisely gained by him, his spirit sank within him.

Ver. 20. "Then I turned to give up my heart on account of [= to despair of] all the labour with which I wearied myself under the sun." As at 1 Sam. xxii. 17 f., Song ii. 17, Jer. xli. 14, סָבַב has here the intrans. meaning, to turn about (LXX. ἐπέστρεψα = ἐπεστρεψάμην). Hitzig remarks that פָּנָה and שׁוּב signify, "to turn round in order to see," and סָבַב, on the contrary, "to turn round in order to do." But פָּנָה can also mean, "to turn round in order to do," e.g. Lev. xxvi. 9; and סָבַב, "to turn in order to examine more narrowly," vii. 25. The distinction lies in this, that פָּנָה signifies a clear turning round; סָבַב, a turning away from one thing to another, a turning in the direction of something new that presents itself (iv. 1, 7, ix. 11). The phrase, יָאֵשׁ אָחֶי-לְבִי,<sup>1</sup> closely corresponds to the Lat. *despondet animum*, he gives up his spirits, lets them sink, i.e. he despairs. The old language knows only נָוָשׁ, to give oneself up, i.e. to give up hope in regard to anything; and נָוָשׁ, given up, having no prospect, in despair. The Talm., however, uses along with *nithyāēsh* (vid. p. 192) not only *noāsh*, but also יָאֵשׁ, in the sense of despair, or the giving up of all hope (subst. יָאוֹשׁ), *Mezta* 21b, from which it is at once evident that יָאֵשׁ is not to be thought of as causative (like the Arab. *ajjasa* and *aiasa*), but as simply transitive, with which, after the passage before us, לְבִי is to be thought of as connected. He turned round to give up all heart. He had no more any heart to labour.

<sup>1</sup> With *Pathach* under the *yod* in the text in *Biblia Rabb.* and the note לְ. Thus also in the *ms. Parva Masora*, and e.g. *Cod. P.*

Ver. 21. "For there is a man who labours with wisdom, and knowledge, and ability; and to a man who has not laboured for it, must he leave it as his portion: also that is vain, and a great evil." Ewald renders: whose labour aims after wisdom. But וְיָדָהּ do not denote obj. (for the obj. of לָבַד is certainly the portion which is to be inherited), but are particular designations of the way and manner of the labour. Instead of לָבַד, there is used the more emphatic form of the noun: לָבַדָּהּ, who had his labour, and performed it; 1 Sam. vii. 17, cf. Jer. ix. 5 [6], "Thine habitation is in the midst of deceit," and Hitz. under Job ix. 27. *Kisêron* is not ἀνδρεία (LXX.), manliness, moral energy (Hlster), but aptness, ability, and (as a consequence connecting itself therewith) success, good fortune, thus skilfulness conducting to the end (vid. p. 193). יָדָהּ refers to the object, and לָבַדָּהּ to the result of the work; לָבַדָּהּ is the second obj.-accus., or, as we rather say, pred.-accus.: as his portion, viz. inheritance.

That what one has gained by skill and good fortune thus falls to the lot of another who perhaps recklessly squanders it, is an evil all the greater in proportion to the labour and care bestowed on its acquisition.

Vv. 22, 23. "For what has man of all his labour, and the endeavours of his heart with which he wearies himself under the sun? All his days are certainly in sorrows, and his activity in grief; his heart resteth not even in the night: also this is vain." The question literally is: What is (comes forth, results) to a man from all his labour; for "to become, to be, to fall to, happen to," is the fundamental idea of נָפַל (whence here נָפַל, γινόμενον, as at Neh. vi. 6, γινόμενος) or נָפַל, the root signification of which is *deorsum ferri, cadere*, and then *accidere, fieri*, whence נָפַל, eagerness precipitating itself upon anything (vid. under Prov. x. 3), or object: fall, catastrophe, destruction. Instead of נָפַל, there is here to be written נָפַל,<sup>1</sup> as at iii. 18 נָפַל. The question looks forward to a negative answer. What comes out of his labour for man? Nothing comes of it, nothing but disagreeableness. This negative contained in the question is established by v. 23a. The form of the clause, "all his days are sorrows," viz. as to their condition, follows the scheme, "the porch was 20 cubits," 2 Chron. iii. 4, viz. in measurement; or, "their feast is music and wine," Isa. v. 12, viz. in its combination (vid. Philippi's *Stat. Const.* p. 30 ff.). The parallel clause is נָפַל לָבַדָּהּ, not 'לָבַד; for the final syllable, or that having the accent on the penult, immediately preceding the *Attnach*-word, takes *Kametz*, as

<sup>1</sup> Thus according to tradition, in H, J, P, vid. *Miqdat* 47b, 215b, 216a; vid. also Norzi.

e.g. Lev. xviii. 5 ; Prov. xxv. 3 ; Isa. lxxv. 17 (cf. Olsh. § 224, p. 440).<sup>1</sup> Many interpreters falsely explain: *at aegritudo est velut quotidiana occupatio ejus*. For the sake of the parallelism, עָנִינוּ (from עָנָה, to weary oneself with labour, or also to strive, aim; *vid.* *Psalmen*, ii. 390) is subj. not pred.: his endeavour is grief, i.e. brings only grief or vexation with it. Even in the night he has no rest; for even then, though he is not labouring, yet he is inwardly engaged about his labour and his plans. And this possession, acquired with such labour and restlessness, he must leave to others; for equally with the fool he falls under the stroke of death: he himself has no enjoyment, others have it; dying, he must leave all behind him,—a threefold הָבַל הַבָּלִים, vv. 17, 21, 23, and thus הָבַל הַבָּלִים.

*The Condition of Pure Enjoyment, ii. 24–26.*

Is it not then foolish thus restlessly and with so much self-torment to labour for nothing? In view of the night of darkness which awaits man, and the uncertain destiny of our possessions, it is better to make use of the present in a way as pleasant to ourselves as possible.

Ver. 24. "There is nothing better among men, than that one eat and drink, and that he should pamper his soul by his labour: this also have I seen, that it is in the hand of God." The LXX., as well as the other Greek transl., and Jerome, had before them the words בָּאֵדָם שִׂיאָכֵל. The former translates: "Man has not the good which he shall eat and drink," i.e. also this that he eats . . . is for him no true good; but the direct contrary of this is what Koheleth says. Jerome seeks to bring the thought which the text presents into the right track, by using the form of a question: *nonne melius est comedere . . .*; against this iii. 12, 22, viii. 15, are not to be cited where אֵין טִיב stands in the dependent sentence; the thought is not thus to be improved; its form is not this, for טִיב, beginning a sentence, is never interrog., but affirm.; thus אֵין טִיב is not = הֲלֹא טִיב, but is a negative statement. It is above all doubt, that instead of 'בָּאֵדָם שִׂיאָכֵל we must read 'בָּאֵדָם שִׂיאָכֵל, after iii. 12, 22, viii. 15; for, as at Job xxxiii. 17, the initial letter *mem* after the terminal *mem* has dropped out. Codd. of the LXX. have accordingly corrected δ into πλὴν δ or εἰ μὴ δ (thus the Compl. Ald.), and the Syr. and Targ. render שׁ here by אֵלֵא and אֵלֵאן [unless that he eat];

<sup>1</sup> But cf. also וְלֹא with *Zakeph Katan*, 2 Kings v. 17; 'וּגו' with *Tiphcha*, Isa. xxvi. 19; and וְיָרִיב under Ps. lv. 10.

Jerome also has *non est bonum homini nisi quod* in his *Comm.*; only the Venet. seeks to accommodate itself to the traditional text. Besides, only כ is to be inserted, not כי אע; for the phrase כי אע לאכל is used, but not כי אע לא. Instead of *bāddām*, the form *lāādām* would be more agreeable, as at vi. 12, viii. 15. Hitzig remarks, without proof, that *bāddām* is in accordance with later grammatical forms, which admit כ = "for" before the object. כ, x. 17, is neither prep. of the object, nor is ע, Sir. iii. 7, the exponent of the dative (*vid.* Grimm). *Bāddām* signifies, as at 2 Sam. xxiii. 3, and as עבד עבד, Sir. xi. 14, *inter homines*; also iii. 12 designates by כס סכ what among them (men) has to be regarded as good. It is interesting to see how here the ancient and the modern forms of the language run together, without the former wholly passing over into the latter; כע, *quam uel edat*, is followed by norm. perfects, in accordance with that comprehensive peculiarity of the old syntax which Kwald, by an excellent figure, calls the dissolution of that which is coloured into grey. כס . . . ע is equivalent to עבד עבד, Ps. xlix. 19, the causative rendering of the phrase עבד עבד, iii. 13, or עבד עבד, v. 17, vi. 6. It is well to attend to עבד [by his labour], which forms an essential component part of that which is approved of as good. Not a useless sluggard-life, but a life which connects together enjoyment and labour, is that which Koheleth thinks the best in the world. But this enjoyment, lightening, embellishing, seasoning labour, has also its *But*: *etiam hoc vidit e manu Dei esse (pendere)*. The order of the words harmonizes with this Lat.; it follows the scheme referred to at Gen. i. 4; cf. on the contrary, iii. 6. Instead of עבד, neut. by attraction, there is here the immediately neut. עבד; the book uniformly makes use of this fem. form instead of עבד (*vid.* p. 198). This or that is "in the hand of God," i.e. it is His gift, iii. 13, v. 18, and it is thus conditioned by Him, since man cannot give it to himself; cf. *minni*, Isa. xxx. 1; *mimmenni*, Hos. viii. 4; *mimmennu*, 1 Kings xx. 33.

This dependence of the enjoyment of life on God is established.

Ver. 25. "For who can eat, and who can have enjoyment, without [=except from] Him?" Also here the traditional text is untenable: we have to read עבד עבד, after the LXX. (which Jerome follows in his *Comm.*) and the Syr. If we adopt the text as it lies before us, then the meaning would be, as given by Gumpel,<sup>1</sup> and thus translated by Jerome: *Quis ita deorabit et deliciis effluet ut ego?* But (1) the question thus understood would require יותר עבד, which Gumpel and others silently substitute in place of עבד עבד;

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* regarding his noteworthy *Comm.* on Koheleth, my *Journal*, pp. 183 and 195. The author bears the name among Christians of Professor Levenson.

(2) this question, in which the king adjudicates to himself an unparalleled right to eat and to enjoy himself, would stand out of connection with that which precedes and follows. Even though with Ginsburg, after Rashi, Aben Ezra, and Rashbam, we find in ver. 25 the thought that the labourer has the first and nearest title to the enjoyment of the fruit of his labour (חַן מ' thus exemplif. as iv. 8, 'ע . . . לם), the continuation with כִּי, ver. 26, is unsuitable; for the natural sequence of the thoughts would then be this: But the enjoyment, far from being connected with the labour as its self-consequence and fruit, is a gift of God, which He gives to one and withholds from another. If we read מִמֶּנּוּ, then the sequence of the thoughts wants nothing in syllogistic exactness. חַן here has nothing in common with חַס = حاس, to proceed with a violent, impetuous motion, but, as at Job xx. 2, is = حَسَّ, *stringere* (whence *hiss*, a sensible impression); the experience (*vid.* p. 191) here meant is one mediated by means of a pleasant external enjoyment. The LXX., Theod., and Syr. translate: (and who can) drink, which Ewald approves of, for he compares (Arab.) *hasa* (inf. *hasy*), to drink, to sip. But this Arab. verb is unheard of in Heb.; with right, Heiligst. adheres to the Arab., and at the same time the modern Heb. *hass*, חַשׁ, *sentire*, according to which Schultens, *quis sensibus indulserit*. חַן מִמֶּנּוּ is not = 'ולא מ', "except from him" (Hitz., Zöckl), but חַן מ' together mean "except;" cf. *e.g.* the Mishnic 'חַן לזמנה וחַן לם', beyond the time and place suitable for the thank-offering, חַן מאַחַר מַהם, excepting one of the same, *Menachoth* vii. 3, for which the old Heb. would in the first case use בְּלֹא, and in the second זֶלַת or לְבַד מִן (= Aram. בִּר מִן) (*vid.* p. 191). Accordingly חַן מִמֶּנּוּ means *praeter eum* (*Deum*), i.e. unless he will it and make it possible, Old Heb. מִכֵּי, Gen. xli. 44.

In enjoyment man is not free, it depends not on his own will: labour and the enjoyment of it do not stand in a necessary connection; but enjoyment is a gift which God imparts, according as He regards man as good, or as a sinner.

Ver. 26. "For to a man who appears to Him as good, He gave wisdom, and knowledge, and joy; but to the sinner He gave the work of gathering and heaping up, in order to give it to him who appears to Him as good: this also is vain, and grasping after the wind;" viz. this striving after enjoyment in and of the labour—it is "vain," for the purpose and the issue lie far apart; and "striving after the wind," because that which is striven for, when one thinks that he has it, only too often cannot be grasped, but vanishes into nothing. If we refer this sentence to a collecting and heaping up

(Hengst., Grätz, and others), then the author would here come back to what has already been said, and that too in the foregoing section; the reference also to the arbitrary distribution of the good things of life on the part of God (Knobel) is inadmissible, because "this, although it might be called טוב, could not also be called רע " (Hitz.); and perfectly inadmissible the reference to the gifts of wisdom, knowledge, and joy (Hallock), for referred to these the sentence gains a meaning only by introducing all kinds of things into the text which here lie out of the connection. Besides, what is here said has indeed a deterministic character, and רע, especially if it is thought of in connection with טוב,<sup>1</sup> sounds as if to the good and the bad their objective worth and distinction should be adjudicated; but this is not the meaning of the author; the unreasonable thought that good or bad is what God's arbitrary ordinance and judgment stamp it to be, is wholly foreign to him. The "good before Him" is he who appears as good before God, and thus pleases Him, because he is truly good; and the רע, placed in contrast, as at vii. 26, is the sinner, not merely such before God, but really such; here רע has a different signification than when joined with עו: one who sins in the sight of God, i.e. without regarding Him (Luke xv. 18, *ἀνόμιον*), serves sin. Regarding עו, *vid.* under 23a: it denotes a business, *negotium*; but here such as one fatigues himself with, *quod negotium facessit*. Among the three *charismata*, joy stands last, because it is the turning-point of the series of thoughts: joy connected with wise, intelligent activity, is, like wisdom and intelligence themselves, a gift of God. The obj. of אֲשֶׁר (that He may give it) is the store gathered together by the sinner; the thought is the same as that at Prov. xiii. 22, xxviii. 8, Job xxvii. 16 f. The perfect we have so translated, for that which is constantly repeating itself is here designated by the general expression of a thing thus once for all ordained, and thus always continued.

*The Short-sightedness and Impotence of Man over against God the All-conditioning, iii. 1-15.*

As pure enjoyment stands not in the power of man, much rather is a gift of God which He bestows or denies to man according to His own will, so in general all happens when and how God wills, according to a world-plan, comprehending all things which man can

<sup>1</sup> Written with *seph* under ע in P, B38a Rabb., and elsewhere. Thus correctly after the Masora, according to which this form of the word has throughout the book *seph* under ע, with the single exception of vii. 26. Cf. *Michlol* 124b, 140b.

neither wholly understand, nor in any respect change,—feeling himself in all things dependent on God, he ought to learn to fear Him.

All that is done here below is ordered by God at a time appointed, and is done without any dependence on man's approbation, according to God's ordinance, arrangement, and providence.

iii. 1. "Everything has its time, and every purpose under the heavens its hour." The Germ. language is poor in synonyms of time. Zockler translates: Everything has its *Frist* . . ., but by *Frist* we think only of a fixed term of duration, not of a period of beginning, which, though not exclusively, is yet here primarily meant; we have therefore adopted Luther's excellent translation. Certainly זמן (from זמן, cogn. סָּמַן, *signare*), belonging to the more modern Heb. (*vid.* p. 191), means a *Frist* (*e.g.* Dan. ii. 16) as well as a *Zeitpunkt*, point of time; in the Semit. (also Assy. *simmu*, *simanu*, with ס) it is the most common designation of the idea of time. עַתָּה is abbreviated either from עֵתָּה (עֵת, to determine) or from עֵתָּה (from עָנָה, cogn. אָנָה, to go towards, to meet). In the first case it stands connected with סֹמֵךְ on the one side, and with עֵדָה (from עָדָה, to count) on the other; in the latter case, with עֵתָּה, Ex. xxi. 10 (perhaps also עַתָּה and עֵתָּה in כָּעֵת, כָּעֵתָּה). It is difficult to decide this point; proportionally more, however, can be said for the original עֵתָּה (Palest.-Aram. עֵתָּה), as also the prep. of participation אֵת is derived from אָנָה<sup>1</sup> (meeting, coming together). The author means to say, if we have regard to the root signification of the second conception of time—(1) that everything has its fore-determined time, in which there lies both a determined point of time when it happens, and a determined period of time during which it shall continue; and (2) that every matter has a time appointed for it, or one appropriate, suitable for it. The Greeks were guided by the right feeling when they rendered זמן by χρόνος, and עַתָּה by καιρός. Olympiodorus distinguishes too sharply when he understands the former of duration of time, and the latter of a point of time; while the state of the matter is this, that by χρόνος the idea comprehends the *termini a quo* and *ad quem*, while by καιρός it is limited to the *terminus a quo*. Regarding הַפֶּיֶן, which proceeds from the ground-idea of being inclined to, and intention, and thus, like πρᾶγμα and χρήμα, to the general signification of design, undertaking, *res gesta*, *res*, *vid.* p. 192.

The illustration commences with the beginning and the ending

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Orelli's work on the *Heb. Synon. der Zeit u. Ewigkeit*, 1871. He decides for the derivation from עָנָה; Fleischer (*Levy's Chald. W.B.* II. 572) for the derivation from עֵתָּה, the higher power of אָנָה, whence (Arab.) *inan*, right time. We have, under Job xxiv. 1, maintained the former derivation.

of the life of man and (in near-lying connection of thought) of plants.

Ver. 2.<sup>1</sup> "To be born has its time, and to die has its time; to plant has its time, and to root up that which is planted has its time." The inf. לָלֶדֶת signifies nothing else than to bring forth; but when that which is brought forth comes more into view than she who brings forth, it is used in the sense of being born (cf. Jer. xxv. 34, לִהְיוֹתָ - לֵבֶן); *ledah*, Hos. ix. 11, is the birth; and in the Assyr., *li-id-tu*, *li-i-tu*, *li-da-a-tu*, designates posterity, *progenies*. Since now *lalēdēth* has here *lāmuth* as contrast, and thus does not denote the birth-throes of the mother, but the child's beginning of life, the translation, "to be born has its time," is more appropriate to what is designed than "to bring forth has its time." What Zöckler, after Hitzig, objects that by *ledeth* a הַעֲשֵׂה [an undertaking], and thus a conscious, intended act must be named, is not applicable; for לָלֶדֶת standing at the beginning comprehends doing and suffering, and death also (apart from suicide) is certainly not an intended act, frequently even an unconscious suffering. Instead of מָוֶת (for which the form מָוֶת is found, cf. מָוֶת, Ps. lxi. 9), the older language uses מָוֶת, Jer. i. 10. In still more modern Heb. the expression used would be מָוֶת, i.e. מָוֶת (*Shebith* ii. 1). מָוֶת has here its nearest signification: to root up (denom. of מָוֶת, root), like מָוֶת, 2 Kings iii. 25, where it is the Targ. word for מָוֶת (to fell trees).

From out-rooting, which puts an end to the life of plants, the transition is now made to putting to death.

Ver. 3. "To put to death has its time, and to heal has its time; to pull down has its time, and to build has its time." That *harog* (to kill) is placed over against "to heal," Hitzig explains by the remark that *harog* does not here include the full consequences of the act, and is fitly rendered by "to wound." But "to put to death" is nowhere = "nearly to put to death,"—one who is *harug*

<sup>1</sup> These seven verses, 2-8, are in Codd and Edd., like Josh. xii. 9 ff., and Esth. ix. 7 ff., arranged in the form of a song, so that one מָוֶת (time) always stands under another, after the scheme described in *Meqilla* 16b, *Massecheth Soferim* xiii. 3, but without any express reference to this passage in *Kobelet*. J has a different manner of arranging the words, the first four lines of which we here adduce [read from right to left]:—

'ēth	<i>lāmōth v'eth</i>	<i>lalēdēth 'ēth</i>
'ēth	<i>nathu'ā lā'āqor v'eth</i>	<i>lathā'āth</i>
'ēth	<i>lirpō v'eth</i>	<i>lāhāroq</i>
'ēth	<i>livnoth v'eth</i>	<i>liphrots</i>

<sup>2</sup> This Abulwalid found in a correct Damascus ms., *Michlol* 81b.

is not otherwise to be healed than by resurrection from the dead, Ezek. xxxvii. 6. The contrast has no need for such ingenuity to justify it. The striking down of a sound life stands in contrast to the salvation of an endangered life by healing, and this in many situations of life, particularly in war, in the administration of justice, and in the defence of innocence against murder or injury, may be fitting. Since the author does not present these details from a moral point of view, the time here is not that which is morally right, but that which, be it morally right or not, has been determined by God, the Governor of the world and Former of history, who makes even that which is evil subservient to His plan. With the two pairs of *γένεσις καὶ φθορά* there are two others associated in ver. 3; with that, having reference, 2b, to the vegetable world, there here corresponds one referring to buildings; to פִּרְוִן (synon. הָרוֹס, Jer. i. 10) stands opposed בְּנוֹת (which is more than פְּרוֹר), as at 2 Chron. xxxii. 5.

These contrasts between existence and non-existence are followed by contrasts within the limits of existence itself:—

Ver. 4. “To weep has its time, and to laugh has its time; to mourn has its time, and to dance has its time.” It is possible that the author was led by the consonance from *livnoth* to *livkoth*, which immediately follows it; but the sequence of the thoughts is at the same time inwardly mediated, for sorrow kills and joy enlivens, Sir. xxxii. 21–24. סָפּוֹר is particularly lamentation for the dead, Zech. xii. 10; and רָקוֹד, dancing (in the more modern language the usual word for *hholēl*, *kirkēr*, *hhāgāg*) at a marriage festival and on other festal occasions.

It is more difficult to say what leads the author to the two following pairs of contrasts:—

Ver. 5. “To throw stones has its time, and to gather together stones has its time; to embrace has its time, and to refrain from embracing has its time.” Did the old Jewish custom exist at the time of the author, of throwing three shovelfuls of earth into the grave, and did this lead him to use the phrase הִשָּׁ אֶבֶן? But we do not need so incidental a connection of the thought, for the first pair accords with the specific idea of life and death; by the throwing of stones a field is destroyed, 2 Kings iii. 35, or as expressed at ver. 19, is marred; and by gathering the stones together and removing them (which is called סָקַל), it is brought under cultivation. Does אֶמְצֵא, to embrace, now follow because it is done with the arms and hands? Scarcely; but the loving action of embracing stands beside the hostile, purposely injurious throwing of stones into a

field, not exclusively (2 Kings iv. 16), but yet chiefly (as *e.g.* at Prov. v. 20) as referring to love for women; the intensive in the second member is introduced perhaps only for the purpose of avoiding the periphrasis *hirkhoy makhlayoy*.

The following pair of contrasts is connected with the avoiding or refraining from the embrace of love:—

Ver. 6. "To seek has its time, and to lose has its time; to lay up has its time, and to throw away has its time." Vaibinger and others translate *תִּשְׁכַּח*, to give up as lost, which the *PA.* signifies first as the expression of a conscious act. The older language knows it only in the stronger sense of bringing to ruin, making to perish, wasting (Prov. xix. 3). Not in the more modern language, *תִּשְׁכַּח*, like the Lat. *perdere*, in the sense of "to lose," is the trans. to the intrans. *תִּשְׁכַּח*, *e.g.* *Takrahk yoi. 3*, "if one loses (*תִּשְׁכַּח*) anything," etc.; *Syri*, at Deut. xxiv. 19, "he who has lost (*תִּשְׁכַּח*) a shekel," etc. In this sense the Palest.-Armen. uses the *Apkl* *תִּשְׁכַּח*, *e.g.* *Jer. Meas* ii. 5, "the queen had lost (*תִּשְׁכַּח*) her ornament." The intentional giving up, throwing away from oneself, finds its expression in *תִּשְׁכַּח*.

The following pair of contrasts refers the abandoning and preserving to articles of clothing:—

Ver. 7a. "To rend has its time, and to sew has its time." When evil tidings come, when the tidings of death come, then is the time for rending the garments (2 Sam. xiii. 31), whether as a spontaneous outbreak of sorrow, or merely as a traditional custom.—The tempest of the affections, however, passes by, and that which was torn is again sewed together.

Perhaps it is the recollection of great calamities which leads to the following contrasts:—

Ver. 7b. "To keep silence has its time, and to speak has its time." Severe strokes of adversity turn the mind in quietness back upon itself; and the demeanour most befitting such adversity is silent resignation (cf. 2 Kings ii. 3, 5). This mediation of the thought is so much the more probable, as in all these contrasts it is not so much the spontaneity of man that comes into view, as the pre-determination and providence of God.

The following contrasts proceed on the view that God has placed us in relations in which it is permitted to us to love, or in which our hatred is stirred up:—

Ver. 8. "To love has its time, and to hate has its time; war has its time, and peace has its time." In the two pairs of contrasts here, the contents of the first are, not exclusively indeed (Ps. cxx. 7),

but yet chiefly referred to the mutual relations of peoples. It is the result of thoughtful intention that the *quodlibet* of  $2 \times 7$  pairs terminates this *for* and *against* in "peace;" and, besides, the author has made the termination emphatic by this, that here "instead of infinitives, he introduces proper nouns" (Hitz.).

Ver. 9. Since, then, everything has its time depending not on human influence, but on the determination and providence of God, the question arises: "What gain hath he that worketh in that where-with he wearieth himself?" It is the complaint of i. 3 which is here repeated. From all the labour there comes forth nothing which carries in it the security of its continuance; but in all he does man is conditioned by the change of times and circumstances and relations over which he has no control. And the converse of this his weakness is short-sightedness.

Vers. 10, 11. "I saw the travail, which God gave to the children of men to fatigue themselves with it—: He hath well arranged everything beautiful in its appointed time; He hath also put eternity in their heart, so that man cannot indeed wholly search through from beginning to end the work which God accomplisheth." As at i. 14, רָאִיתִי is here seeing in the way of research, as elsewhere, *e.g.* at ii. 24, it is as the result of research. In ver. 10 the author says that he closely considered the labour of men, and in ver. 11 he states the result. It is impossible to render the word עֲנִין everywhere by the same German (or English) word: i. 13, wearisome trouble; ii. 26, business; here: *Geschäftigkeit*,—the idea is in all the three places the same, *viz.* an occupation which causes trouble, costs effort. What presented itself to the beholder was—(1) that He (*viz.* God, *cf.* ver. 10 and ver. 11) has made everything beautiful in its time. The author uses יָפָה as synon. of טִיב (v. 17); also in other languages the idea of the beautiful is gradually more and more generalized. The suffix in בְּעֵתוֹ does not refer to God, but to that which is in the time; this word is = *ἐν καιρῷ ἰδίῳ* (Symm.), at its proper time (*vid.* Ps. i. 3, c. 27; Jer. v. 24, etc.), since, as with יַחְדָּי (together with) and כָּלּוֹ (every one), the suffix is no longer thought of as such. Like יָפָה, בְּעֵתוֹ as pred. conception belongs to the verb: He has made everything beautiful; He has made everything (falling out) at its appointed time.—The beauty consists in this, that what is done is not done sooner or later than it ought to be, so as to connect itself as a constituent part to the whole of God's work. The pret. עָשָׂה is to be also interpreted as such: He "has made," *viz.* in His world-plan, all things beautiful, falling out at the appointed time; for that which acquires an actual form in the course of history has a previous ideal

existence in the knowledge and will of God (*vid.* under Isa. xxii. 11, xxxvii. 26).

That which presented itself to the beholder was—(2) the fact that He (God) had put  $\text{עֲלֵיהֶם}$  in their hearts (*i.e.* the hearts of men). Gaab and Spohn interpret 'alam in the sense of the Arab. 'ilam, knowledge, understanding; and Hitz, pointing the word accordingly  $\text{עֲלֵי}$ , translates: "He has also placed understanding in their heart, without which man," etc. The translation of  $\text{בְּלֹא}$  is not to be objected to; 'בְּ is, however, only seldom a conjunction, and is then to be translated by *eo quod*. Ex. xiv. 11, 2 Kings i. 3, 6, 16, which is not appropriate here; it will thus be here also a prep., and with *asher* following may mean "without which," as well as "without this, that" = "besides that" (Venet. ἀνευ τοῦ ὅτι, "except that"), as frequently 'בְּ בְלֹא, *eg.* at Amos ix. 8. But that Arab. 'ilam is quite foreign to the Heb., which has no word  $\text{עֲלֵי}$  in the sense of "to rise up, to be visible, knowable," which is now also referred <sup>1</sup> to for the Assy. as the stem-word of  $\text{עֲלֵי}$  = highland. It is true Hitzig believes that he has found the Heb.  $\text{עֲלֵי}$  = wisdom, in Sir. vi. 21, where there is a play on the word with  $\text{עֲלֵי}$ , "concealed:" σοφία γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτῆς ἐστί, καὶ οὐ πολλοῖς ἐστι φανερά. Drusus and Eichhorn have here already taken notice of the Arab. 'ilam; but Fritzsche with right asks, "Shall this word as Heb. be regarded as traceable only here and falsely pointed only at Eccles. iii. 11, and shall no trace of it whatever be found in the Chald., Syr., and Rabbin.?" We have also no need of it. That Ben-Sira has etymologically investigated the word  $\text{עֲלֵי}$  as going back to  $\text{עֲלֵי}$ , R.  $\text{עֲלֵי}$ , "to be firm, shut up, dark" (*vid.* at Ps. x. 8), is certainly very improbable, but so much the more probable (as already suggested by Drusus) that he has introduced <sup>2</sup> into  $\text{עֲלֵי}$ , after the Aram.  $\text{עֲלֵי}$ , *nigrescere*, the idea of making dark. Does *eth-ha'alam* in this passage before us then mean "the world" (Jerome, Luther, Ewald), or "desire after the knowledge of the world" (Rashi), or "worldly-mindedness" (Gesen., Knobel)? The answer to this has been already given in my *Psychol.* p. 406 (2d ed.): "In post-bibl. Heb. 'alam denotes not only 'eternity' backwards and forwards as

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Fried. Delitzsch's *Assyr. Stud.* (1874), p. 39. Otherwise Fleischer, who connects 'alima, "to know," with 'alam, "to conceal," so that to know = to be concealed, sunk deep, initiated in something (with *ba* of the obj., as *sh'ar*, whence *shā'ir*, the poet as "one who marks").

<sup>2</sup> Gratz translates *eth-ha'alam* by "ignorance" (*vid.* Orelli, p. 83). R. Achwa in the Midrash has added here the *scriptio defectiva* with the remark, 'עֲלֵי עֲלֵי, "for the mysterious name of God is concealed from them."

infinite duration, but also 'the world' as that which endures for ever (*αἰών*, *seculum*); the world in this latter sense is, however, not yet known<sup>1</sup> to the bibl. language, and we will thus not be able to interpret the words of Koheleth of the impulse of man to reflect on the whole world." In itself, the thought that God has placed the whole world in man's heart is not untrue: man is, indeed, a *microcosmos*, in which the *macrocosmos* mirrors itself (Elster), but the connection does not favour it; for the discussion does not proceed from this, that man is only a member in the great universe, and that God has given to each being its appointed place, but that in all his experience he is conditioned by time, and that in the course of history all that comes to him, according to God's world-plan, happens at its appointed time. But the idea by which that of time, *אֵת* (*et*), is surpassed is not the world, but eternity, to which time is related as part is to the whole (Cicero, *Inv.* i. 26. 39, *tempus est pars quaedam aeternitatis*). The Mishna language contains, along with the meaning of world, also this older meaning of 'olam, and has formed from it an adv. *עלמית*, *aeternae*. The author means to say that God has not only assigned to each individually his appointed place in history, thereby bringing to the consciousness of man the fact of his being conditioned, but that He has also established in man an impulse leading him beyond that which is temporal toward the eternal: it lies in his nature not to be contented with the temporal, but to break through the limits which it draws around him, to escape from the bondage and the disquietude within which he is held, and amid the ceaseless changes of time to console himself by directing his thoughts to eternity.

This saying regarding the *desiderium aeternitatis* being planted in the heart of man, is one of the profoundest utterances of Koheleth. In fact, the impulse of man shows that his innermost wants cannot be satisfied by that which is temporal. He is a being limited by time, but as to his innermost nature he is related to eternity. That which is transient yields him no support, it carries him on like a rushing stream, and constrains him to save himself by laying hold on eternity. But it is not so much the practical as the intellectual side of this endowment and this peculiar dignity of human nature which Koheleth brings here to view.

It is not enough for man to know that everything that happens has its divinely-ordained time. There is an instinct peculiar to his

<sup>1</sup> In the Phoen. also, 'olam, down to a late period, denotes not the world, but eternity: *melek 'olam*, βασιλεὺς αἰῶνος (*αἰάνιος*), *seculo frugifero* on a coin = the fruit-bringing 'olam (*Αἰών*).

nature impelling him to pass beyond this fragmentary knowledge and to comprehend eternity; but his effort is in vain, for (3) "man is unable to reach unto the work which God accomplisheth from the beginning to the end." The work of God is that which is completing itself in the history of the world, of which the life of individual men is a fragment. Of this work he says, that God has wrought it  $\text{עָשָׂה}$ ; because, before it is wrought out in its separate "time," it is already completed in God's plan. Eternity and this work are related to each other as the accomplished and the being accomplished, they are interchangeably the  $\pi\lambda\eta\rho\eta\varsigma$  to each other.  $\text{עָשָׂה}$  is potential, and the same in conception as at viii. 17, Job xi. 7, xxxvii. 23; a knowledge is meant which reaches to the object, and lays hold of it. A laying hold of this work is an impossibility, because eternity, as its name *eternitas* denotes, is the concealed, i.e. is both forwards and backwards immeasurable. The *desiderium eternitatis* inherent in man thus remains under the sun unappeased. He would raise himself above the limits within which he is confined, and instead of being under the necessity of limiting his attention to isolated matters, gain a view of the whole of God's work which becomes manifest in time; but this all-embracing view is for him unattainable.

If Koheleth had known of a future life—which proves that as no instinct in the natural world is an illusion, so also the impulse toward the eternal, which is natural to man, is no illusion—he would have reached a better *ultimatum* than the following:—

Ver. 12. "Thus I then perceived that among them (men) there is nothing better than to enjoy themselves, and indulge themselves in their life." The resignation would acquire a reality if  $\text{עָשָׂה}$  meant "to do good," i.e. right (LXX. Targ. Syr. Jer. Venet.); and this appears of necessity to be its meaning according to vii. 20. But, with right, Ginsburg remarks that nowhere else—neither at ii. 24, nor iii. 22, v. 17, viii. 15, ix. 7—is this moral rendering given to the *ultimatum*; also  $\text{עָשָׂה}$  13a, presupposes for  $\text{עָשָׂה}$  a eudemonistic sense. On the other hand, Zöckler is right in saying that for the meaning of  $\text{עָשָׂה}$  in the sense of "to be of good cheer" (Luth.), there is no example. Zirkel compares  $\epsilon\tilde{\upsilon} \pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\epsilon\alpha\iota$ , and regards it as a Grecism. But it either stands ellipt. for  $\text{עָשָׂה}$  ( $= \text{עָשָׂה}$ ), or, with Grätz, we have to read  $\text{עָשָׂה}$ ; in any case, an ethical signification is here excluded by the nearest connection, as well as by the parallels; it is not contrary to the view of Koheleth, but this is not the place to express it. *Bam* is to be understood after *hesedem*, ii. 24. The plur., comprehending men,

here, as at ver. 11, wholly passes over into the individualizing sing.

But this enjoyment of life also, Koheleth continues, this advisedly the best portion in the limited and restrained condition of man, is placed beyond his control:—

Ver. 13. "But also that he should eat and drink, and see good in all his labour, is for every man a gift of God." The inverted and yet anacoluthistic formation of the sentence is quite like that at v. 18. *כָּל־אָדָם* signifies, properly, the totality of men = all men, *eg.* Ps. cxvi. 11; but here and at v. 18, xii. 13, the author uses the two words so that the determ. second member of the *st. constr.* does not determine the first (which elsewhere sometimes occurs, as *b'thulath Israel*, a virgin of Israel, Dent. xxii. 19): every one of men (*cf.* *πᾶς τις βροτῶν*). The subst. clause *col-haadam* is subject: every one of men, in this that he eats . . . is dependent on God. Instead of *מִיָּד* the word *מִמֶּנּוּ* (abbrev. from *מִמֶּנּוּ*) is here used, as at v. 18. The connection by *e'gam* is related to the preceding adversat.: and (= but) also (= notwithstanding that), as at vi. 7, Neh. v. 8, *cf.* Jer. iii. 10, where *gam* is strengthened by *h'col-zoth*. As for the rest, it follows from ver. 13, in connection with ii. 24-26, that for Koheleth *εὐπορία* and *εὐθυμία* reciprocally condition each other, without, however, a conclusion following therefrom justifying the translation "to do good," 12b. Men's being conditioned in the enjoyment of life, and, generally, their being conditioned by God the Absolute, has certainly an ethical end in view, as is expressed in the conclusion which Koheleth now reaches:—

Ver. 14. "Thus I discerned it then, that all that God will do exists for ever; nothing is to be added to it, and nothing taken from it: God has thus directed it, that men should fear before Him." This is a conclusion derived from the facts of experience, a truth that is valid for the present and for the time to come. We may with equal correctness render by *quidquid facit* and *quidquid faciet*. But the pred. shows that the fut. expression is also thought of as fut.; for *הוּא יָהּ לְעַד* does not mean: that is for ever (Hitz.), which would be expressed by the subst. clause *הוּא לְעוֹלָם*; but: that shall be for ever (Zöck.), *i.e.* will always assert its validity. That which is affirmed here is true of God's directing and guiding events in the natural world, as well as of the announcements of His will and His controlling and directing providence in the history of human affairs. All this is removed beyond the power of the creature to alter it. The meaning is not that one ought not to add to or to take from it (Deut. xiii. 1; Prov. xxx. 6), but that such a thing cannot be done

(*vid.* Sir. xviii. 5). And this unchangeableness characterizing the arrangements of God has this as its aim, that men should fear Him who is the All-conditioning and is Himself unconditioned: He has done it that they (men) should fear before Him, *וַיַּעַשׂ כֵּן*, *fecit ut*; cf. Ezek. xxxvi. 27. *ποιεῖν ἵνα*, Rev. xiii. 15; and "fear before Him," as at viii. 12 f.; cf. 1 Chron. xvi. 30 with Ps. xvi. 9. The unchangeableness of God's action shows itself in this, that in the course of history similar phenomena repeat themselves; for the fundamental principles, the causal connections, the norms of God's government, remain always the same.

Ver. 15. "That which is now hath been long ago; and that which will be hath already been: God seeketh after that which was crowded out." The words: "hath been long ago" (*מִיָּמֵינוּ*), are used of that which the present represents as something that hath been, as the fruit of a development; the words: "hath already been" (*הָיָה מִיָּמֵינוּ*), are used of the future (*וְהָיָה מִיָּמֵינוּ*, *τὸ μέλλον*, *vid.* Gesen. § 132. 1), as denying to it the right of being regarded as something new. The government of God is not to be changed, and does not change; His creative as well as His moral ordering of the world produces with the same laws the same phenomena (the *γ* corresponds to this line of thought here, as at 14b)—God seeks *יִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה* (cf. vii. 7; Ewald, § 277*d*). Hengstenberg renders: God seeks the persecuted (LXX. Symm. Targ. Syr.), *i.e.* visits them with consolation and comfort. *Nirdaph* here denotes that which is followed, hunted, pressed, by which we may think of that which is already driven into the past; that God seeks, seeks it purposely, and brings it back again into the present; for His government remains always, and brings thus always up again that which hath been. Thus Jerome: *Deus instaurat quod abiit*; the Venet.: *ὁ θεὸς ζητήσῃ τὸ ἀπεληλαμένον*; and thus Geier, among the post-Reform. interpreters: *praestat ut quae propulsa sunt ac praeterierunt iterum innoventur ac redeant*; and this is now the prevailing exposition, after Knobel, Ewald, and Hitzig. The thought is the same as if we were to translate: God seeks after the analogue. In the Arab., one word in relation to another is called *muradif*, if it is cogn. to it; and *mutaradifat* is the technical expression for a synonym. In Heb. the expression used is *מִיָּמֵינוּ מִיָּמֵינוּ*, they who are followed the one by another,—one of which, as it were, treads on the heels of another. But this designation is mediated through the Arab. In evidence of the contrary, ancient examples are wanting.

*The godless Conduct of Men left to themselves, and their End like that of the Beasts, iii. 16-22.*

Ver. 16. "And, moreover, I saw under the sun the place of judgment, that wickedness was there; and the place of righteousness, that wickedness was there." The structure of the verse is palindromic, like i. 6, ii. 10, iv. 1. We might also render מקום as the so-called *casus absol.*, so that 'שם' . . . 'מק' is an emphatic במקום (Hitz.), and the construction like Jer. xlvi. 5; but the accentuation does not require this (cf. Gen. i. 1); and why should it not be at once the object to ראיתי, which in any case it virtually is? These two words שמה הרשע might be attribut. clauses: where wickedness (prevails), for the old scheme of the attributive clause (the *ṣifat*) is not foreign to the style of this book (*vid.* i. 13, *nathan* = *n'ethano*; and v. 12, *raithi* = *r'ithiha*); but why not rather virtual pred. accus.: *vidi locum juris (quod) ibi impietas*? Cf. Neh. xiii. 23 with Ps. xxxvii. 25. The place of "judgment" is the place where justice should be ascertained and executed; and the place of "righteousness," that where righteousness should ascertain and administer justice; for *mishpat* is the rule (of right), and the objective matter of fact; *tsedek*, a subjective property and manner of acting. רשע is in both cases the same: wickedness (see under Ps. i. 1), which bends justice, and is the contrary of *tsedek*, i.e. upright and moral sternness. רשע elsewhere, like *mēlek*, *tsedek*, preserves *in p.* its *e*, but here it takes rank along with חסד, which in like manner fluctuates (cf. Ps. cxxx. 7 with Prov. xxi. 21). שם is here = שם, as at Ps. cxxii. 5, etc.; the locative *ah* suits the question Where? as well as in the question Whither?—He now expresses how, in such a state of things, he arrived at satisfaction of mind.

Ver. 17. "I said in mine heart: God shall judge the righteous as well as the wicked: for there is there a time for every purpose and for every work." Since "the righteous" stands first, the word ישר has here the double sense of judging [*richtens* = setting upright] = acting uprightly, justly by one, as in the *shofteni* of Ps. vii. 9, xxvi. 1, etc., and of judging = inflicting punishment. To the righteous, as well as to the wicked,<sup>1</sup> God will administer that which of right belongs to them. But this does not immediately happen, and has to be waited for a long time, for there is a definite time for every undertaking

<sup>1</sup> The LXX. (in Aquila's manner): σὺν τὸν δίκαιον καὶ σὺν τὸν ἀσεβῆ—according to the Talm. hermeneut. rule, that where the obj. is designated by אֵל, with that which is expressly named, something else is associated, and is to be thought of along with it.

(iii. 1), and for עֵת, in the more modern form of the language, interchanges *promiscue* with לָמָּד and לֵךְ, *e.g.* Jer. xix. 15; Ezek. xxii. 3; Ewald, § 217c) every work there is a "time." This עֵת, defended by all the old interpreters, cannot have a temporal sense: *tunc* = *in die judicii* (Jerome, Targ.), cf. Ps. xiv. 5, xxxvi. 13, for "a time of judgment there is for all one day" is not intended, since certainly the עֵת (day of judgment) is this time itself, and not the time of this time. Ewald renders עֵת as pointing to the past, for he thus construes: the righteous and the unrighteous God will judge (for there is a time for everything), and judge (was thus explicit, "and that too," "and indeed") every act there, *i.e.* everything done before. But this עֵת is not only heavy, but also ambiguous and purposeless; and besides, by this parenthesising of the words עֵת לְכָל מְעָלָה [for there is a time for everything], the principal thought, that with God everything, even His act of judgment, has its time, is robbed of its independence and of the place in the principal clause appropriate to it. But if עֵת is understood adverbially, it certainly has a local meaning connected with it: there, *viz.* with God, *apud Deum*; true, for this use of the word Gen. xlix. 24 affords the only example, and it stands there in the midst of a very solemn and earnest address. Therefore it lies near to read, with Houbig., Döderl., Palm., and Hitz., עֵת, "a definite time . . . has He (God) ordained;" עֵת (עֵת) is the usual word for the ordinances of God in the natural world and in human history (Prov. viii. 29; Ex. xxi. 13; Num. xxiv. 23; Hab. i. 12, etc.), and, as in the Assyrian *simtu*, so the Heb. עֵת (עֵת) 2 Sam. xiii. 32, signifies lot or fate, decree.<sup>1</sup> With this reading, Elster takes exception to the position of the words; but at Judg. vi. 19 also the object goes before עֵת, and "unto every purpose and for every work" is certainly the complement of the object-conception, so that the position of the words is in reality no other than at x. 20a; Dan. ii. 17b. Quite untenable is Herzfeld's supposition (Furst, Vaih.), that עֵת has here the Talm. signification: *actus*, *factus*, for (1) this עֵת = Arab. *shams*, has not לָמָּד, but the accus. after it; (2) the thought referring to the time on which ver. 18 rests is thereby interrupted. Whether we read עֵת, or take עֵת in the sense of לָמָּד (Job xxv. 2, xxiii. 14, etc.), the thought is the same, and equally congruous: God will judge the innocent and the guilty; it shall be done some time, although not so soon as one might wish it, and think necessary, for God has for every undertaking and for every work its fixed time, also its judicial decision (*vid.* at Ps. lxxv. 3); He

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Schrader's *Keilsch. u. A. T.* p. 105, *simtu ubilzu*, *i.e.* fate snatched him away) Heb. *simah kaviathlu*), cf. Fried. Delitzsch's *Assyr. Stud.* p. 66 f.

permits wickedness, lets it develope itself, waits long before He interposes (*vid.* under Isa. xviii. 4 f.).

Reflecting on God's delay to a time hidden from men, and known only to Himself, Koheleth explains the matter to himself in the following verse:—

Ver. 18. "Thus I said then in mine heart: (it happeneth) for the sake of the children of men that God might sift them, and that they might see that they are like the cattle, they in themselves." Regarding 'על־דב' [for the sake of = on account of] as at viii. 2, *vid.* under Ps. cx. 4, where it signifies after (*κατά*) the state of the matter, and above at p. 195. The infin. 'לָבֹר is not derived from בֹּרַר. —לָבֹר, ix. 1, is only the metaplastic form of לָבַר or לָבִיר, —but only from בָּרַר, whose infin. may take the form בִּר, after the form רַר, to tread down, Isa. xlv. 1, שָׁפַךְ, to bow, Jer. v. 26; but nowhere else is this infin. form found connected with a suff.; קָהָם, Hos. xi. 3, would be in some measure to be compared, if it could be supposed that this = בְּקָהָם, *sumendo eos*. The root בר proceeds, from the primary idea of cutting, on the one side to the idea of separating, winnowing, choosing out; and, on the other, to that of smoothing, polishing, purifying (*vid.* under Isa. xlix. 2). Here, by the connection, the meaning of winnowing, *i.e.* of separating the good from the bad, is intended, with which, however, as in לָבִיר, Dan. xi. 35, the meaning of making clear, making light, bringing forward into the light, easily connects itself (*cf.* *Shabbath* 138*a*, 74*a*), of which the meaning to winnow (*cf.* לָהֵבֵר, Jer. iv. 11) is only a particular form;<sup>1</sup> *cf.* Sanhedrin 7*b*: "when a matter is clear, בָּרַר, to thee (free from ambiguity) as the morning, speak it out; and if not, do not speak it." In the expression 'לָבֹר הָאֵל, the word 'הָאֵל is, without doubt, the subject, according to Gesen. § 133. 2. 3; Hitz. regards 'הָאֵל as genit., which, judged according to the Arab., is correct; it is true that for *li-imti-hānihim allahi* (with genit. of the subj.), also *allahu* (with nominat. of the subj.) may be used; but the former expression is the more regular and more common (*vid.* Ewald's *Gramm. Arab.* § 649), but not always equally decisive with reference to the Heb. *usus loq.* That God delays His righteous interference till the time appointed beforehand, is for the sake of the children of men, with the intention, *viz.*, that God may sift them, *i.e.* that, without breaking in upon the free development of their characters before the time, He may permit the distinction between the good and the bad to become manifest. Men,

<sup>1</sup> Not "to sift," for not בָּרַר, but רָקַד, means "to sift" (properly, "to make to leap up," "to agitate"); *cf.* *Sheb'ith* v. 9.

who are the obj. to 'לָהֶם, are the subject to הָרֵאשִׁית to be supplied: *et ut videant*; it is unnecessary, with the LXX., Syr., and Jerome, to read הָרֵאשִׁית (= הָלָהֶם): *ut ostenderet*. It is a question whether הָרֵאשִׁית<sup>1</sup> is the expression of the copula: *sunt* (*sint*), or whether *hemmah lahem* is a closer definition, co-ordinate with *sh'hem b'hemah*. The remark of Hitzig, that *lahem* throws back the action on the subject, is not clear. Does he suppose that *lahem* belongs to *liroth*? That is here impossible. If we look away from *lahem*, the needlessly circumstantial expression 'הֵם . . . הֵם' can still be easily understood: *hemmah* takes up, as an echo, *b'hemah*, and completes the comparison (compare the bathology in Hos. xiii. 2). This play upon words musically accompanying the thought remains also, when, according to the accentuation הֵם ה' בְּרֵם ה' לָהֶם, we take *hemmah* along with *lahem*, and the former as well as the latter of these two words is then better understood. The ה' in לָהֶם is not that of the pure dat. (Aben Ezra: They (are like beasts) to themselves, *i.e.* in their own estimation), but that of reference, as at Gen. xvii. 20, "as for Ishmael;" cf. Ps. iii. 3; 2 Kings v. 7; cf. אֵל, 1 Sam. i. 27, etc. Men shall see that they are cattle (beasts), they in reference to themselves, *i.e.* either they in reference to themselves mutually (Luther: among themselves), or: they in reference to themselves. To interpret the reference as that of mutual relation, would, in looking back to ver. 16, commend itself, for the condemnation and oppression of the innocent under the appearance of justice is an act of human brutishness. But the reason assigned in ver. 19 does not accord with this reciprocal rendering of *lahem*. Thus *lahem* will be meant reflexively, but it is not on that account pleonastic (Knobel), nor does it ironically form a climax: *ipissimi* = *höchstes* (Ewald, § 315a); but "they in reference to themselves" is = they in and of themselves, *i.e.* viewed as men (viewed naturally). If one disregards the idea of God's interfering at a future time with the discordant human history, and, in general, if one loses sight of God, the distinction between the life of man and of beast disappears.

Ver. 19. "For the children of men are a chance, and the beast a chance, and they both have once chance: as the death of the one, so the death of the other, and they have all one breath; and there is no advantage to a man over a beast, for all is vain." If in both instances the word is pointed סָקָרָה (LXX.), the three-membered sentence would then have the form of an emblematical proverb (as

<sup>1</sup> הָרֵאשִׁית הָרֵאשִׁית הָרֵאשִׁית thus accented rightly in F. Cf. *Michal* 216a.

e.g. Prov. xxv. 25): "For as the chance of men, so (*var* of comparison) the chance of the beast; they have both one chance." מְקָרָה with *sefol* cannot possibly be the connecting form (Luzz.), for in cases such as מְקָרָה ס' כִּיעֵץ, Isa. iii. 24, the relation of the words is appositional, not genitival. This form מְקָרָה, thus found three times, is vindicated by the Targ. (also the Venet.) and by Mss.; Joseph Kimchi remarks that "all three have *sefol*, and are thus forms of the *absolutus*." The author means that men, like beasts, are in their existence and in their death influenced accidentally, *i.e.* not of necessity, and are wholly conditioned, not by their own individual energy, but by a power from without—are dependent beings, as Solon (Herod. i. 32) says to Croesus: "Man is altogether *συνμφορή*," *i.e.* the sport of accident. The first two sentences mean exclusively neither that men (apart from God) are, like beasts, the birth of a blind accident (Hitz.), nor that they are placed under the same law of transitoriness (Elst.); but of men, in the totality of their being, and doing, and suffering, it is first said that they are accidental beings; then, that which separates them from this, that they all, men like beasts, are finally exposed to one, *i.e.* to the same fate. As is the death of the one, so is the death of the other; and they all have one breath, *i.e.* men and beasts alike die, for this breath of life (רוּחַ חַיִּים), which constitutes a beast—as well as a man (נִפְשׁ חַיָּה) departs from the body (Ps. civ. 29). In יְהִי . . . יְהִי (as at vi. 5, Ex. xiv. 20, and frequently), לָהֶם (mas. as *genus potius*) is separately referred to men and beasts. With the Mishnic כָּמוֹת = bibl. כָּמוֹ (cf. *Maaser Sheni*, v. 2), the כָּמוֹת here used has manifestly nothing to do. The noun מוֹתָר, which in the Book of Proverbs (xiv. 23, xxi. 5, not elsewhere) occurs in the sense of profit, gain, is here in the Book of Koheleth found as a synon. of יִתְרוֹן, "preference," advantage which is exclusively peculiar to it. From this, that men and beasts fall under the same law of death, the author concludes that there is no preference of a man to a beast; he doubtless means that in respect of the end man has no superiority; but he expresses himself thus generally because, as the matter presented itself to him, all-absorbing death annulled every distinction. He looks only to the present time, without encumbering himself with the historical account of the matter found in the beginning of the *Tóra*; and he adheres to the external phenomenon, without thinking, with the Psalmist in Ps. xlix., that although death is common to man with the beast, yet all men do not therefore die as the beast dies. That the beast dies because it must, but that in the midst of this necessity of nature man can maintain his freedom, is for him out of view.

הכל הכל, the *παντα*, which at last falls to man as well as to the beast, throws its long dark shadows across his mind, and wholly shrouds it.

Ver. 20. "All goes hence to one place; all has sprung out of the dust, and all returns to the dust again." The "one place" is (as at vi. 6) the earth, the great graveyard which finally receives all the living when dead. The art of the first *הָאֵרֶץ* is that denoting species; the art of the second is retrospective: to the dust whence he sprang (cf. Ps. civ. 29, cxlvi. 4); otherwise, Gen. iii. 19 (cf. Job xxxiv. 15), "in dust shalt thou return," shalt become dust again. From dust to dust (Sir. xl. 11, xli. 10) is true of every living corporeal thing. It is true there exists the possibility that with the spirit of the dying man it may be different from what it is with the spirit of the dying beast, but yet that is open to question.

Ver. 21. "Who knoweth with regard to the spirit of the children of men, whether it mounteth upward; and with regard to the spirit of a beast, whether it goeth downward to the earth?" The interrogative meaning of *הֲיָדָע* and *הֲיָדָע* is recognised by all the old translators: LXX., Targ., Syr., Jerome, Venet., Luther. Among the moderns, Heyder (*vid. Psychol.* p. 410), Hengst., Halm., Dale, and Bullock take the *ה* in both cases as the article: "Who knoweth the spirit of the children of men, that which goeth upward . . . ?" But (1) thus rendered the question does not accord with the connection, which requires a sceptical question; (2) following "who knoweth," after ii. 19, vi. 12, cf. Josh. ii. 14, an interrogative continuance of the sentence was to be expected; and (3) in both cases *הֲיָדָע* stands as designation of the subject only for the purpose of marking the interrogative clause (cf. Jer. ii. 14), and of making it observable that *ha'adam* and *hayowadam* are not appos. belonging as subjects to *הֲיָדָע* and *הֲיָדָע*. It is questionable, indeed, whether the punctuation of these words, *הֲיָדָע* and *הֲיָדָע*, as they lie before us, proceeds from an interrogative rendering. Saadia in *Emunoth* c. vi, and Juda Halevi in the *Kuzari* ii. 80, deny this; and so also do Aben Ezra and Kimchi. And they may be right. For instead of *הֲיָדָע*, the pointing ought to have been *הֲיָדָע* (cf. *הֲיָדָע*, Job xlii. 25) when used as interrog. *ascendens*; even before *א* the compens. lengthening of the interrog. *he* is nowhere certainly found<sup>1</sup> instead of the virtual reduplication; and thus also the parallel *הֲיָדָע* is not to be judged after *הֲיָדָע*, Lev.

<sup>1</sup> For *ה* is to be read with a *Patach* in Judg. vi. 31, xii. 5, Neh. vi. 11; cf. under Gen. xix. 2, xxvii. 21. In Num. xvi. 22 the *ה* of *הֲיָדָע* is the art., the question is not formally designated. Cf. also *הֲיָדָע* with *ה* interrog., Jer. xii. 9; and *הֲיָדָע* with *ה* as the art., Gen. xv. 11.

x. 19, יָדָעָה, Ezek. xviii. 29,—we must allow that the punctuation seeks, by the removal of the two interrog. הָ (ה), to place that which is here said in accord with xii. 7. But there is no need for this. For יָדָעָה does not quite fall in with that which Lucretius says (*Lib. I.*):

“*Ignoratur enim quae sit natura animai,  
Nata sit an contra nascentibus insinuetur?  
An simul intereat nobiscum morte diremta?*”

It may certainly be said of *mi yod'ea*, as of *ignoratur*, that it does not exclude every kind of knowledge, but only a sure and certain knowledge resting on sufficient grounds; *interire* and יָדָעָה are also scarcely different, for neither of the two necessarily signifies annihilation, but both the discontinuance of independent individual existence. But the putting of the question by Koheleth is different, for it discloses more definitely than this by Lucretius, the possibility of a different end for the spirit of a man from that which awaits the spirit of a beast, and thus of a specific distinction between these two principles of life. In the formation even of the dilemma: Whether upwards or downwards, there lies an inquiring knowledge; and it cannot surprise us if Koheleth finally decides that the way of the spirit of a man is upwards, although it is not said that he rested this on the ground of demonstrative certainty. It is enough that, with the moral necessity of a final judgment beyond the sphere of this present life, at the same time also the continued existence of the spirit of man presented itself to him as a postulate of faith. One may conclude from the *desiderium aeternitatis* (iii. 11) implanted in man by the Creator, that, like the instincts implanted in the beasts, it will be calculated not for deception, but for satisfaction; and from the יִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה, Prov. xv. 24,—i.e. the striving of a wise man rising above earthly, temporary, common things,—that death will not put an end to this striving, but will help it to reach its goal. But this is an indirect proof, which, however, is always inferior to the direct in force of argument. He presupposes that the Omnipotence and Wisdom which formed the world is also at the same time Love. Thus, though at last, it is faith which solves the dilemma, and we see from xii. 7 that this faith held sway over Koheleth. In the Book of Sirach, also, the old conception of Hades shows itself as yet dominant; but after the οὐκ ἀθάνατος υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου, xvii. 25, we read towards the end, where he speaks of Elias: καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ζωὴν ζήσομεθα, xlviii. 11. In the passage before us, Koheleth remains in doubt, without getting over it by the hand of faith. In a certain reference the question he here proposes is to the present day unanswered; for the soul, or, more correctly, accord-

ing to the biblical mode of conception, the spirit from which the soul-life of all corporeal beings proceeds, is a monas, and as such is indestructible. Do the future of the beast's soul and of man's soul not then stand in a solidaric mutual relation to each other? In fact, the future life presents to us mysteries the solution of which is beyond the power of human thought, and we need not wonder that Koheleth, this sober-minded, intelligent man, who was inaccessible to fantastic self-deception, arrives, by the line of thought commenced at ver. 16, also again at the *ultimatum*.

Ver. 22. "Thus I then saw that there is nothing better than that a man should rejoice in his works, for that is his portion; for who can bring him to this, that he gains an insight into that which shall be after him?" Hengstenberg, who has decided against the interrog-signification of the twice-repeated  $\pi$  in ver. 21, now also explains  $\pi$  . . .  $\pi$ , not: What shall become of him after it (his death)? but: What further shall be done after the state in which he now finds himself? Zöckler, although rightly understanding both  $\pi$  as well as  $\pi$  (after him = when he will be separated, or separates from this life, vii. 14, ix. 3; cf. Gen. xxiv. 67), yet proceeds on that explanation of Hengstenberg's, and gives it the rendering: how things shall be on the earth after his departure. But (1) for this thought, as vi. 12 shows, the author had a more suitable form of expression; (2) this thought, after the author has, ver. 21, explained it as uncertain whether the spirit of a man in the act of death takes a different path from that of a beast, is altogether aside from the subject, and it is only an apologetic tendency not yet fully vanquished which here constrains him. The chain of thought is however this: How it will be with the spirit of a man when he dies, who knows? What will be after death is thus withdrawn from human knowledge. Thus it is best to enjoy the present, since we connect together (ii. 24) labour and enjoyment mediated thereby. This joy of a man in his work—*cf.* as v. 18: which flows from his work as a fountain, and accompanies him in it (viii. 15)—is his portion, *cf.* the best which he has of life in this world. Instead of  $\pi$ , the punctuation is  $\pi$ , because  $\pi$  is a kindred idea; *vid.* regarding  $\pi$  under ii. 22. And  $\pi$  is used, because it is not so much to be said of the living, that he cannot foresee how it shall be with him when he dies, as that he can gain no glimpse into that world because it is an object that has for him no fixity.

*The Wrongs suffered by Man from Man embittering the Life of the Observer, iv. 1-3.*

From unjust decisions a transition is now made to the subject of the haughty, unmerciful cruelty of the wide-extended oppressions inflicted by men.

iv. 1. "And again I saw all the oppressions that are done under the sun: and behold there the tears of the oppressed, and they have no comforter; and from the hand of their oppressors goeth forth violence; and they have no comforter." Incorrectly Hahn: And anew I saw,—the observation is different from that of iii. 16, though cognate. Thus: And again I saw,—the expression follows the syntactic scheme of Gen. xxvi. 18; regarding the *fut. consec.* brought into view here and at ver. 7, *vid.* above, p. 197, 2. The second *וַיַּעַשׂ* is *part. pass.*; the first, as at Job xxxv. 9, and also at Amos iii. 9, is abstract (*i.e.* bringing the many separate instances under one general idea) *pluralitantum* (cf. *פְּדוּתֵי*, *redempti*, Isa. xxxv. 10; and *redemptio, pretium redemptionis*, Num. iii. 46); the plur. *אֲשֶׁר נַעַ* need not appear strange, since even *הַיָּמִים* is connected with the plur. of the pred., *e.g.* Ps. xxxi. 11, lxxxviii. 4. *וַיִּמָּעַת* has, as at Isa. xxv. 8 (cf. Rev. xxiv. 4, *πάν δάκρυον*), a collective sense. The expression *כֹּחַ . . . וַיִּמָּיֵד* is singular. According to the most natural impression, it seems to signify: "and from the hand of their oppressors no power of deliverance" (carrying forward *אֵין*); but the parallelism of the palindromically constructed verse (as at i. 6, ii. 10, iii. 16) excludes this meaning. Thus *כֹּחַ* is here once—nowhere else—used, like the Greek *βία*, in the sense of violence; Luzzatto prefers the reading *וַיִּמָּיֵד*, by which the expression would be in conformity with the linguistic usage; but also *מִיד* is explained: the force which they have in their hands is, in going forth from their hands, thought of as abused, and, as taking the form of *שָׂר* or *הִזְקָה*. In view of this sorrow which men bring upon their fellow-men, life for Koheleth lost all its worth and attraction.

Vers. 2, 3. "And I praised the dead who were long ago dead, more than the living who are yet in life; and as happier than both, him who has not yet come into existence, who hath not seen the evil work which is done under the sun." *וְשֵׁבֶת* is hardly thought of as *part.*, like *יֹקֵשִׁים = מִקְשִׁים*, ix. 12; the *מ* of the *part. Pih.* is not usually thrown away, only *מִהָר*, Zeph. i. 14, is perhaps = *מִמָּהָר*, but for the same reason as *בֵּית־אֵל*, 2 Kings ii. 3, is = *בְּבֵית־אֵל*. Thus *וְשֵׁבֶת*, like *וְנָתַן*, viii. 9, is *inf. absol.*, which is used to continue, in an adverbially subord. manner, the preceding finite with the same sub-

ject,<sup>1</sup> Gen. xli 43; Lev. xxv. 14; Judg. vii. 19, etc.; cf. especially Ex. viii. 11: "Pharaoh saw . . . and hardened (קָשָׁה) his heart;" just in the same manner as קָשָׁה here connects itself with זָכַר '89. Only the annexed designation of the subject is peculiar; the syntactic possibility of this connection is established by Num. xix. 35, Ps. xv. 5, Job xl. 2, and, in the second rank, by Gen. xvii. 10, Ezek. v. 14. Yet זָכַר might well enough have been omitted had '89 זָכַר '89 not stood too remote. Regarding קָשָׁה<sup>2</sup> and קָשָׁה, *ad hoc*, *vid.* p. 194. The circumstantial form of the expression; *prox. vivis qui viv. sunt ad hoc*, is intentional: they who are as yet living must be witnesses of the manifold and comfortless human misery.

It is a question whether ver. 3 begins a new clause (LXX., Syr., and Venet.) or not. That זָכַר, like the Arab. *siqa*, sometimes serves to give prominence to the subject, cannot be denied (*vid.* Bottcher, § 516, and Muhlau's remarks thereto). The Mishnic expressions יוֹם הַזֶּה, that day, יוֹם הַהוּא, that land, and the like (Geiger, § 14. 2), presuppose a certain preparation in the older language; and we might, with Weiss (*Stud. über d. Spr. der Mishna*, p. 112), interpret זָכַר זָכַר in the sense of זָכַר זָכַר, *id est* *qui*. But the accus. rendering is more natural. Certainly the expression זָכַר קָשָׁה, "to praise," "to pronounce happy," is not used; but to זָכַר it is natural to suppose קָשָׁה added. Jerome accordingly translates: *et feliciter utroque judicari qui necesse natus est*. קָשָׁה has the double Kametz, as is generally the case, except at Ps. liv. 7 and Mic. vii. 3.<sup>3</sup> Better than he who is born is the unborn, who does not become conscious of the wicked actions that are done under the sun. A similar thought, with many variations in its expression, is found in Greek writers; see regarding these shrill discordances, which run through all the joy of the beauty and splendour of Hellenic life, my *Apologetik*, p. 116. Buddhism accordingly gives to *samsāra* the place of the highest good. That we find Koheleth on the same path (cf. vi. 3, vii. 1), has its reason in this, that so long as the central point of man's existence lies in the present life, and this is not viewed as the fore-court of eternity, there is no enduring consolation to lift us above the miseries of this present world.

<sup>1</sup> Also 1 Chron. v. 20, the subject remains virtually the same: *et ita quidem exaudirentur*.

<sup>2</sup> Thus punctuated with *Segol* under *Daleth*, and *;* *rephataw*, in F. H. J. P. Thus also Kimchi in W.B. under קָשָׁה.

<sup>3</sup> *Vel.* Hendenheim. *Meor Enayim*, under Dent. xvi. 7.

*Miserable Rivalry and Restless Pursuit, iv. 4-6.*

There follow two other observations, mutually related and issuing in "windy effort:"—

Ver. 4. "And I saw all the labour and all the skill of business, that it is an envious surpassing of the one by the other: also this is vain and windy effort." The **מִצָּד** refers to this exertion of vigorous effort and skill. The Graec. Venet., by rendering here and at ii. 24 **כִּשְׂרֹן** by *καθάρτης*, betrays himself as a Jew. With **כִּי**, *quod*, that which forms the pred. follows the object. The *min* in *mere'ehu* is as in *amatz min*, Ps. xviii. 18, and the like—the same as the compar.: *aemulatio qua unus prae altero eminere studet*. All this expenditure of strength and art has covetousness and envy, with which one seeks to surpass another, as its poisoned sting.

Ver. 5. There ought certainly to be activity according to our calling; indolence is self-destruction: "The fool foldeth his hands, and eateth his own flesh." He layeth his hands together (Prov. vi. 10 = xxiv. 33),—placeth them in his bosom, instead of using them in working,—and thereby he eateth himself up, *i.e.* bringeth ruin upon himself (Ps. xxvii. 2; Mic. iii. 3; Isa. xlix. 26); for instead of nourishing himself by the labour of his hands, he feeds on his own flesh, and thus wasteth away. The emphasis does not lie on the subject (the fool, and only the fool), but on the pred.

Ver. 6. The fifth verse stands in a relation of contrast to this which follows: "Better is one hand full of quietness, than both fists full of labour and windy effort." Mendelssohn and others interpret ver. 5 as the objection of the industrious, and ver. 6 as the reply of the slothful. Zöckler agrees with Hitz., and lapses into the hypothesis of a dialogue otherwise rejected by him (*vid.* above, p. 217). As everywhere, so also here it preserves the unity of the combination of thoughts. **נָחָה** signifies here, as little as it does anywhere else, the rest of sloth; but rest, in contrast to such activity in labour as robs a man of himself, to the hunting after gain and honour which never has enough, to the rivalry which places its goal always higher and higher, and seeks to be before others—it is rest connected with well-being (vi. 5), gentle quietness (ix. 17), resting from self-activity (Isa. xxx. 15); cf. the post-bibl. **נָחָה רַיָּה**, satisfaction, contentment, comfort. In a word, *nahath* has not here the sense of being idle or lazy. The sequence of the thoughts is this: The fool in idleness consumes his own life-strength; but, on the other hand, a little of true rest is better than the labour of windy effort, urged on by rivalry yielding no rest. **כַּף** is the open hollow hand, and **חִפְּזָה**

(Assyr. *hupunnu*) the hand closed like a ball, the fist. "Rest" and "labour and windy effort" are the accusatives of that to which the designation of measure refers (Gesen. § 118. 3); the accus. connection lay here so much the nearer, as  $\text{כֶּחָזֶק}$  is connected with the accus. of that with which anything is full. In "and windy effort" lies the reason for the judgment pronounced. The striving of a man who laboriously seeks only himself and loses himself in restlessness, is truly a striving which has wind for its object, and has the property of wind.

*The Aimless Labour and Penuriosusness of him who stands alone,*  
iv. 7-12.

Another sorrowful spectacle is the endless labour and the insatiable covetousness of the isolated man, which does good neither to himself nor to any other:

Vers. 7, 8. "There is one without a second, also son and brother he has not; and there is no end of his labour; his eyes nevertheless are not satisfied with riches: For whom do I labour, then, and deny all good to my soul? Also this is vain, and it is a sore trouble." That  $\text{לֹא־יֵשׁ־בְּיָדָיו־שֵׁנִי}$ , as in Ps. civ. 25, cv. 34, has the meaning of  $\text{לֹא־יֵשׁ־בְּיָדָיו־שֵׁנִי}$ , *abique*, Nolde has already observed in his *Partik.-Concordanz*: a *solitarius*, without one standing by his side, a second standing near him, i.e. without wife and without friend; also, as the words following show, without son and brother. Regarding  $\text{לֹא־יֵשׁ־בְּיָדָיו־שֵׁנִי}$ , for which, with the connect. accus.,  $\text{לֹא־יֵשׁ־בְּיָדָיו־שֵׁנִי}$  might be expected (cf. also ii. 7,  $\text{לֹא־יֵשׁ־בְּיָדָיו־שֵׁנִי}$  with *Mahpach*; and, on the other hand, ii. 23,  $\text{לֹא־יֵשׁ־בְּיָדָיו־שֵׁנִי}$  with *Pashta*), *vid.* under Ps. iv. 10. *Gom* may be interpreted in the sense of "also" as well as of "nevertheless" (Ewald, 354a); the latter is to be preferred, since the endless labour includes in itself a restless striving after an increase of possession. The *Keri*, in an awkward way, changes  $\text{לֹא־יֵשׁ־בְּיָדָיו־שֵׁנִי}$  into  $\text{לֹא־יֵשׁ־בְּיָדָיו־שֵׁנִי}$ ; the taking together the two eyes as one would here be unnatural, since the avaricious man devours gold, silver, and precious things really with both his eyes, and yet, however great be his wealth, still more does he wish to see in his possession; the sing. of the pred. is as at 1 Sam. iv. 15; Mic. iv. 11. With *ulmi ani*, Koheleth puts himself in the place of such a friendless, childless man; yet this change of the description into a self-confession may be occasioned by this, that the author in his old age was really thus isolated, and stood alone. Regarding  $\text{לֹא־יֵשׁ־בְּיָדָיו־שֵׁנִי}$  with the accus. of the person, to whom, and *mina* of the matter, in respect of which there is want, *vid.* under Ps. viii. 6. That the author stands in sympathy with the sorrowful condition here exposed, may also be

remarked from the fact that he now proceeds to show the value of companionship and the miseries of isolation :

Ver. 9. " Better are two together than one, seeing they have a good reward in their labour." By *hashsh'nāim*, the author refers to such a pair ; *hāchhad* is one such as is just described. The good reward consists in this, that each one of the two has the pleasant consciousness of doing good to the other by his labour, and especially of being helpful to him. In this latter general sense is grounded the idea of the reward of faithful fellowship :

Ver. 10. " For if they fall, the one can raise up his fellow : but woe to the one who falleth, and there is not a second there to lift him up." Only the Targ., which Grätz follows, confounds אִילֵּי<sup>1</sup> with אִילֵּי (vid. above, pp. 191 and 192) ; it is equivalent to אִילֵּי לוֹ, Isa. iii. 9, or לוֹ הָיָה, Ezek. xiii. 18. *Hāchhad* is appos. connecting itself to the pronominal suff., as, e.g., in a far more inappropriate manner, Ps. lxxxvi. 2 ; the prep. is not in appos. usually repeated, Gen. ii. 19, ix. 4 (exceptions : Ps. xviii. 51, lxxiv. 14). Whether we translate אִילֵּי by *qui ceciderit* (xi. 3), or by *quum ceciderit* (Jerome), is all one. אִילֵּי is potential : it is possible and probable that it will be done, provided he is a חֶבֶר טוֹב, i.e. a true friend (*Pirke aboth*, ii. 13).

Ver. 11. " Moreover, if two lie together, then there is heat to them : but how can it be warm with one who is alone?" The marriage relation is not excluded, but it remains in the background ; the author has two friends in his eye, who, lying in a cold night under one covering (Ex. xxii. 26 ; Isa. xxviii. 20), cherish one another, and impart mutual warmth. Also in *Aboth de-Rabbi Nathan*, c. 8, the sleeping of two together is spoken of as an evidence of friendship. The *var* in *v'hham* is that of the consequent ; it is wanting, 10a, according to rule, in *hāchhad*, because it commonly comes into use with the verb, seldom (e.g. Gen. xxii. 1) with the preceding subj.

Ver. 12. " And if one shall violently assail him who is alone, two shall withstand him ; and (finally) a threefold cord is not quickly broken asunder." The form *yithq'pho* for *yithq'phehu*, Job xv. 24, is like *yird'pho*, Hos. viii. 3 = *yird'phehu*, Judg. ix. 40. If we take חָקַף in the sense of to overpower, then the meaning is : If one can overpower him who is alone, then, on the contrary, two can maintain their ground against him (Herzf.) ; but the two אִם, vers. 10, 11, which are equivalent to εἰ, exclude such a pure logical εἰ. And why should חָקַף, if it can mean overpowering, not also

<sup>1</sup> With *Munach* and *Rebia* in one word, which, according to the Masora, occurs in only four other places. Vid. *Mas. magna* under this passage, and *Mishpete hateamin* 26a.

mean doing violence to by means of a sudden attack? In the Mishnic and Arab. it signifies to seize, to lay hold of; in the Aram.  $\text{קָסַם} = \text{קָסַח}$ , and also at Job xiv. 20, xv. 24 (*mid. Comm.*), it may be understood of a violent assault, as well as of a completed subjugation; as  $\text{קָסַח}$  means to lift up and carry;  $\text{קָסַח}$ , to tread and to stand. But whether it be understood inchoat. or not, in any case  $\text{קָסַח}$  is not the assailant, who is much rather the unnamed subj. in  $\text{קָסַח}$ , but the one (the *solitarius*) who, if he is alone, must succumb; the construction of  $\text{קָסַח}$  *hachlad* follows the scheme of Ex. ii. 6, "she saw it, the child." To the assault expressed by  $\text{קָסַח}$ , there stands opposed the expression  $\text{קָסַח}$   $\text{קָסַח}$ , which means to withstand any one with success; as  $\text{קָסַח}$   $\text{קָסַח}$ , 2 Kings x. 4, Ps. cxlvii. 17, Dan. viii. 7, means to maintain one's ground. Of three who hold together, 12a says nothing; the advance from two to three is thus made in the manner of a numerical proverb (*vid. Proverbs*, vol. I, p. 13). If two hold together, that is seen to be good; but if there be three, this threefold bond is likened to a cord formed of three threads, which cannot easily be broken. Instead of the definite specific art.  $\text{קָסַח}$   $\text{קָסַח}$ , we make use of the indefinite. *Pluriculus triplex difficile rumpitur* is one of the winged expressions used by Koheleth.

*The People's Enthusiasm for the new King, and its Extinction*, iv. 13-16.

A political observation follows in an aphoristic manner the observations relating to social life, viz. how popularity vanishes away and passes even into its opposite. The author, who here plainly quotes from actual events, begins with a general statement:

Ver. 13. "Better is a youth poor and wise, than a king old and foolish, who no longer understands how to be warned,"—i.e. who increases his folly by this, that he is "wise in his own eyes," Prov. xxvi. 12; earlier, as  $\text{קָסַח}$  denotes, he was, in some measure, accessible to the instruction of others in respect of what was wanting to him; but now in his advanced age he is hardened in his folly, bids defiance to all warning counsel, and undermines his throne. The connection of the verb  $\text{קָסַח}$  with  $\text{קָסַח}$  and the inf. (for which elsewhere only the inf. is used) is a favourite form with the author; it means to know anything well, v. 1, vi. 8, x. 15; here is meant an understanding resting on the knowledge of oneself and on the knowledge of men.  $\text{קָסַח}$  is here and at xii. 12, Ps. xix. 12, a *Nip̄. tolerativum*, such as the synon.  $\text{קָסַח}$ , Pa. ii. 10: to let oneself be cleared up, made wiser, enlightened, warned. After this contrast, the idea connected with  $\text{קָסַח}$  also defines itself. A young

man (לֵלִי, as at Dan i. 4, but also Gen. iv. 23) is meant who (*vid.* above, p. 123, under *maiden*) yet excels the old imbecile and childish king, in that he perceives the necessity of a fundamental change in the present state of public matters, and knows how to master the situation to such a degree that he raises himself to the place of ruler over the neglected community.

Ver. 14. "For out of the prison-house he goeth forth to reign as king, although he was born as a poor man in his kingdom." With כִּי the properties of poverty and wisdom attributed to the young man are verified,—wisdom in this, that he knew how to find the way from a prison to a throne. As *harammim*, 2 Chron. xxii. 5 = *haarammim*, 2 Kings viii. 28, so *haaurim* = *haasurim* (cf. *masoreth* = *maasoreth*, Ezek. xx. 37); *beth haasirim* (*Keri*: *haasurim*), Judg. xvi. 21, 25, and *beth haasur*, Jer. xxxvii. 15, designate the prison; cf. *Mo'ed katan*, iii. 1. The modern form of the language prefers this elision of the א, *eg.* מִסֹּרֶת = מִסֹּרֶת אֶת, אֶת־מִסֹּרֶת = אֶת־מִסֹּרֶת, *post* = בְּאַחֶר *contra*, etc. The perf. אָזַל is also thought of as such; for the comparison, ver. 13, would have no meaning if the poor and wise youth were not thought of as having reached the throne, and having pre-eminence assigned to him as such. He has come forth from the prison to become king, כִּי . . . רָשָׁ. Zöckler translates: "Whereas also he that was born in his kingdom was poor," and adds the remark: "כִּי נָם, after the כִּי of the preceding clause, does not so much introduce a verification of it, as much rather an intensification; by which is expressed, that the prisoner has not merely transitorily fallen into such misery, but that he was born in poor and lowly circumstances, and that in his own kingdom בְּמָ, *i.e.* in the same land which he should afterwards rule as king." But כִּי נָם is nowhere used by Koheleth in the sense of "*ja auch*" (= whereas also); and also where it is thus to be translated, as at Jer. xiv. 18, xxiii. 11, it is used in the sense of "*denn auch*" (= for also), assigning proof. The fact is, that this group of particles, according as כִּי is thought of as demonstr. or relat., means either "*denn auch*," iv. 16, vii. 22, viii. 16, or "*wenn auch*" = *ἐὰν καί*, as here and at viii. 12. In the latter case, it is related to כִּי נָם (sometimes also merely נָם, Ps. xcv. 9; Mal. iii. 15), as *ἐὰν (εἰ) καί*, although, notwithstanding, is to *καὶ ἐὰν (εἰ)*, even although.<sup>1</sup> Thus 14b, connecting itself with לְמֶלֶךְ, is to be translated: "although he was born (נֹלֵד, not נִלְדָּ) in his kingdom as a poor man."<sup>2</sup> We cannot also concur with Zöckler in the view

<sup>1</sup> That the accentuation separates the two words כִּי נָם is to be judged from this, that it almost everywhere prefers כִּי אִם (*vid.* under *Comm.* to Ps. i. 2).

<sup>2</sup> נֹלֵד רָשָׁ cannot mean "to become poor." Grätz appeals to the Mishnic

that the suff. of 'כב refers to the young upstart: in the kingdom which should afterwards become his; for this reason, that the suff. of 'מל, ver. 16b, refers to the old king, and thus also that this designation may be mediated, 'כב must refer to him. מלכות signifies kingdom, reign, realm; here, the realm, as at Neh. ix. 35, Dan. v. 11, vi. 29. Grätz thinks vers. 13-16 ought to drive expositors to despair. But hitherto we have found no room for despair in obtaining a meaning from them. What follows also does not perplex us. The author describes how all the world hails the entrance of the new youthful king on his government, and gathers together under his sceptre.

Vers. 15, 16a. "I saw all the living which walk under the sun on the side of the youth, the second who shall enter upon the place of the former: no end of all the people, all those at whose head he stands." The author, by the expression "I saw," places himself back in the time of the change of government. If we suppose that he represents this to himself in a lively manner, then the words are to be translated: of the second who shall be his successor; but if we suppose that he seeks to express from the standpoint of the past that which, lying farther back in the past, was now for the first time future, then the future represents the time to come in the past, as at 2 Kings iii. 27; Ps. lxxviii. 6; Job xv. 28 (Hitz.): of the second who should enter on his place (לפני, to step to, to step forth, of the new king, Dan. viii. 23, xi. 2 f.; cf. מל, 1 Kings viii. 20). The designation of the crowd which, as the pregnant מל expresses, gathered by the side of the young successor to the old king, by "all the living, those walking under the sun (לפני, perhaps intentionally the pathetic word for מלכות, Isa. xlii. 5)," would remain a hyperbole, even although the throne of the Asiatic world-ruler had been intended; still the expression, so absolute in its universality, would in that case be more natural (*vid.* the conjectural reference to Cyrus and Astyages, above, at p. 215). השני, Ewald refers to the successor to the king, the second after the king, and translates: "to the second man who should reign in his stead;" but the second man in this sense has certainly never been the child of fortune; one must then think of Joseph, who, however, remains the second man. Hitzig rightly: "The youth is the second השני, not השני, in contrast to the king, who, as his predecessor, is the first." "Yet," he continues, "השני should be the appos. and השני the principal word," i.e. instead of: with the second youth, was to be expected: with the second, the youth. It language; but no intelligent linguist will use נולד רשע of a man in any other sense than that he is originally poor.

is true, we may either translate: with the second youth, or: with the second, the youth,—the form of expression has in it something incorrect, for it has the appearance as if it treated of two youths. But similar are the expressions, Matt. viii. 21, ἕτερος κ.τ.λ., “another, and that, too, one of His disciples;” and Luke xxiii. 32, ἡγοντο κ.τ.λ. All the world ranks itself by the side (thus we may also express it) of the second youthful king, so that he comes to stand at the head of an endless multitude. The LXX., Jerome, and the Venet. render incorrectly the all (the multitude) as the subject of the relative clause, which Luther, after the Syr., corrects by reading לפני for לפניהם: of the people that went for him there was no end. Rightly the Targ.: at whose head (= כְּרִישָׁתוֹ) he had the direction, לפני, as with וְיָצָא וְכָא, 1 Sam. xviii. 16; 2 Chron. i. 10; Ps. lxxviii. 8, etc. All the world congregates about him, follows his leadership; but his history thus splendidly begun, viewed backwards, is a history of hopes falsified.

Ver. 16b. “And yet they who come after do not rejoice in him: for that also is vain, and a grasping after the wind.” For all that, and in spite of that (*gam* has here this meaning, as at vi. 7; Jer. vi. 15; Ps. cxxix. 2; Ewald, § 354a), posterity (אֲחֵרִים, as at i. 11; cf. Isa. xli. 4) has no joy in this king,—the hopes which his contemporaries placed in the young king, who had seized the throne and conquered their hearts, afterwards proved to be delusions; and also this history, at first so beautiful, and afterwards so hateful, contributed finally to the confirmation of the truth, that all under the sun is vain. As to the historical reminiscence from the time of the Ptolemies, in conformity with which Hitzig (in his *Comm.*) thinks this figure is constructed, *vid.* above, p. 213; Grätz here, as always, rocks himself in Herodian dreams. In his *Comm.*, Hitz. guesses first of Jeroboam, along with Rehoboam the יָלֵךְ שָׁנִי, who rebelled against King Solomon, who in his old age had become foolish. In an essay, “Zur Exeg. u. Kritik des B. Koheleth,” in Hilgenfeld’s *Zeitschr.* XIV. 566 ff., Saul, on the contrary, appears to him to be the old and foolish king, and David the poor wise youth who rose to the throne, and took possession of the whole kingdom, but in his latter days experienced desertion and adversities; for those who came after (the younger men) had no delight in him, but rebelled against him. But in relation to Saul, who came from the plough to be king, David, who was called from being a shepherd, is not נֹלֵךְ רֶשֶׁת; and to Jewish history this Saul, whose nobler self is darkened by melancholy, but again brightens forth, and who to his death maintained the dignity of a king of Israel, never at any time appears as מֶלֶךְ . . . וְכֹסֵל. More-

over, by both combinations of that which is related with the בית המדרש (for which בית is written) of the history of the old Israelitish kings, a meaning contrary to the usage of the language must be extracted. It is true that בית, as the so-called *particip. perfecti*, may mean "gone aside (to a distance)," Isa. xlix. 21, Jer. xvii. 13; and we may, at any rate, by בית, think on that poor rabble which at first gathered around David, 1 Sam. xxii. 2, regarded as outcasts from honourable society. But בית will not accord therewith. That David came forth from the house (home) of the estranged or separated, is and remains historically an awkward expression, linguistically obscure, and not in accordance with the style of Koheleth. In order to avoid this incongruity, Böttcher regards Antiochus the Great as the original of the בית. He was the second son of his father, who died 225. When a hopeful youth of fifteen years of age, he was recalled to the throne from a voluntary banishment into Farther Asia, very soon gained against his old cousin and rival Achæus, who was supported by Egypt, a large party, and remained for several years esteemed as a prince and captain; he disappointed, however, at a later time, the confidence which was reposed in him. But granting that the voluntary exile of Antiochus might be designated as בית בית, he was yet not a poor man, born poor, but was the son of King Seleucus Callinicus; and his older relative and rival Achæus wished indeed to become king, but never attained unto it. Hence בית is not the youth as second son of his father, but as second on the throne, in relation to the dethroned king reckoned as the first. Thus, far from making it probable that the Book of Koheleth originated in the time of the Diadochi, this combination of Böttcher's also stands on a feeble foundation, and falls in ruins when assailed.

The section i. 12-iv. 16, to which we have prefixed the superscription, "Koheleth's Experiences and their Results," has now reached its termination, and here for the first time we meet with a characteristic peculiarity in the composition of the book: the narrative sections, in which Koheleth, on the ground of his own experiences and observations, registers the vanities of earthly life, terminate in series of proverbs in which the *I* of the preacher retires behind the objectivity of the exhortations, rules, and principles obtained from experience, here recorded. The first of these series of proverbs which here follows is the briefest, but also the most complete in internal connection.

## FIRST CONCLUDING SECTION.

PROVERBS REGARDING THE WORSHIP OF GOD.—IV. 17 [v. 1]—v. 6 [7]

As an appendix and interlude, these proverbs directly follow the personal section preceding. The first rule here laid down refers to the going to the house of God.

iv. 17 [v. 1]. "Keep thy foot when thou goest to the house of God, and to go to hear is better than that fools give a sacrifice; for the want of knowledge leads them to do evil." The "house of God" is like the "house of Jahve," 2 Sam. xii. 20, Isa. xxxvii. 1, the temple;  $\text{בֵּית}$ , altogether like  $\text{בֵּית־אֱלֹהִים}$ , Ps. lxxiii. 17. The *Chetib*  $\text{רַגְלֶיךָ}$  is admissible, for elsewhere also this plur. ("thy feet") occurs in a moral connection and with a spiritual reference, *eg.* Ps. cxix. 59; but more frequently, however, the comprehensive sing. occurs, Ps. cxix. 105, Prov. i. 15, iv. 26 f., and the *Keri* thus follows the right note. The correct understanding of what follows depends on  $\text{כִּי־... רַע}$ . Interpreters have here adopted all manner of impossible views. Hitzig's translation: "for they know not how to be sorrowful," has even found in Stuart at least one imitator; but  $\text{עֲשׂוּת רַע}$  would, as the contrast of *'asoth tov*, iii. 12, mean nothing else than, "to do that which is unpleasant, disagreeable, bad," like *'asah ra'ah*, 2 Sam. xii. 18. Gesen., Ewald (§ 336b), Elster, Heiligst., Burger, Zöckl., Dale, and Bullock translate: "they know not that they do evil;" but for such a rendering the words ought to have been  $\text{עֲשׂוֹתָם רַע}$  (cf. Jer. xv. 15); the only example for the translation of  $\text{לַעֲשׂוֹת}$  after the manner of the *acc. c. inf.* = *se facere malum*—viz. at 1 Kings xix. 4—is incongruous, for  $\text{לָמוּת}$  does not here mean *se mori*, but *ut moreretur*. Yet more incorrect is the translation of Jerome, which is followed by Luther: *nesciunt quid faciant mali*. It lies near, as at ii. 24 so also here, to suppose an injury done to the text. Aben Ezra introduced  $\text{כִּי}$  before  $\text{לַעֲשׂוֹת}$ , but Koheleth never uses this limiting particle; we would have to write  $\text{כִּי אִם־לַעֲשׂוֹת}$ , after iii. 12, viii. 15. Anything thus attained, however, is not worth the violent means thus used; for the ratifying clause is not ratifying, and also in itself, affirmed of the  $\text{בְּנֵי־אֱדָמָה}$ , who, however, are not the same as the *r<sup>e</sup>sha'im* and the *hattaim*, is inappropriate. Rather it might be said: they know not to do good (thus the Syr.); or: they know not whether it be good or bad to do, *i.e.* they have no moral feeling, and act not from moral motives (so the Targ.). Not less violent than this remodelling of the text is the expedient of Herzberg, Philippon, and Ginsburg,

who from **שׁוֹמְרֵי** derive the subject-conception of the obedient (**שׁוֹמְרֵי**): "For those understand not at all to do evil;" the subj. ought to have been expressed if it must be something different from the immediately preceding **שׁוֹמְרֵי**. We may thus render *enam yefim*, after Ps. lxxxii. 5, Isa. lvi. 10, as complete in itself: they (the fools) are devoid of knowledge to do evil = so that they do evil; i.e., want of knowledge brings them to this, that they do evil. Similarly also *Knebel*: they concern themselves not,—are unconcerned (viz. about the right mode of worshipping God)—so that they do evil, with the correct remark that the consequence of their perverse conduct is here represented as their intention. But **שׁוֹמְרֵי**, *shomer*, does not mean to be unconcerned (wanting), but to be without knowledge. *Raskin*, in substance correctly: they are predisposed by their ignorance to do evil; and thus also *Hahn*; *Mendelssohn* translates directly: "they are because they are ignorant." If this interpretation is correct, then for **שׁוֹמְרֵי** it follows that it does not mean "to obey" (thus e.g. *Zöckler*), which in general it never means without some words being added to it (cf. on the contrary, 1 Sam. xv. 22), but "to hear,"—viz. the word of God, which is to be heard in the house of God,—whereby, it is true, a hearing is meant which leads to obedience. In the word **שׁוֹמְרֵי**, priests are not perhaps thought of, although the comparison of ver. 5 (**שׁוֹמְרֵי**) with Mal. ii. 7 makes it certainly natural; priestly instruction limited itself to information regarding the performance of the law already given in Scripture, Lev. x. 11, Deut. xxxiii. 9 f., and to deciding on questions arising in the region of legal praxis, Deut. xxi. 8; Hag. ii. 11. The priesthood did not belong to the teaching class in the sense of preaching. Preaching was never a part of the temple cultus, but, for the first time, after the exile became a part of the synagogue worship. The preachers under the O. T. were the prophets,—preachers by a supernatural divine call, and by the immediate impulse of the Spirit; we know from the Book of Jeremiah that they sometimes went into the temple, or there caused their books of prophecy to be read; yet the author, by the word **שׁוֹמְרֵי** of the foregoing proverb, scarcely thinks of them. But apart from the teaching of the priests, which referred to the realization of the letter of the law, and the teaching of the prophets to the realization of the spirit of the law, the word formed an essential part of the sacred worship of the temple: the *Tefilla*, the *Beracha*, the singing of psalms, and certainly, at the time of *Koheleth*, the reading of certain sections of the Bible. When thou goest to the house of God, says *Koheleth*, take heed to thy step, well reflecting whither thou goest and how thou hast there to appear;

and (with this ) he connects with this first *nota bene* a second) drawing near to hear exceeds the sacrifice-offering of fools, for they are ignorant (just because they hear not), which leads to this result, that they do evil. קָרַב, *prae*, expresses also, without an adj., precedence in number, Isa. x. 10, or activity, ix. 17, or worth, Ezek. xv. 2. קָרַב is *inf. absol.* Botcher seeks to subordinate it as such to שָׁמַר: take heed to thy foot . . . and to the coming near to hear more than to . . . But these obj. to שָׁמַר would be incongruous, and מִתְקַרְבִּים מִתַּחַת וְנֹא מִתְקַרְבִּים clumsy and even distorted in expression; it ought rather to be מִתְקַרְבִּים בְּכִסְיֵיהֶם זָכָה. As the *inf. absol.* can take the place of the obj., Isa. vii. 15, xlii. 24, Lam. iii. 45, so also the place of the subj. (Ewald, § 240a), although Prov. xxv. 27 is a doubtful example of this. That the use of the *inf. absol.* has a wide application with the author of this book, we have already seen under iv. 2. Regarding the sequence of ideas in זָכָה . . . מִתְקַרְבִּים (first the subj., then the obj.), *vid.* Gesen. § 133. 3, and cf. above at iii. 18. זָכָה (זִכְיָהוּ), along with its general signification comprehending all animal sacrifices, according to which the altar bears the name מִזְבֵּחַ, early acquired also a more special signification: it denotes, in contradistinction to עֹלָה, such sacrifices as are only partly laid on the altar, and for the most part are devoted to a sacrificial festival, Ex. xviii. 12 (cf. Ex. xii. 27), the so-called *sh'lamim*, or also *zichhe sh'lamim*, Prov. vii. 14. The expression נָתַן זָכָה makes it probable that here, particularly, is intended the festival (1 Kings i. 41) connected with this kind of sacrifice, and easily degenerating to worldly merriment (*vid.* under Prov. vii. 14); for the more common word for נָתַן would have been שָׁחַט or הִקְרִיב; in נָתַן it seems to be indicated that it means not only to present something to God, but also to give at the same time something to man. The most recent canonical Chokma-book agrees with Prov. xxi. 3 in this depreciation of sacrifice. But the Chokma does not in this stand alone. The great word of Samuel, 1 Sam. xv. 22 f., that self-denying obedience to God is better than all sacrifices, echoes through the whole of the Psalms. And the prophets go to the utmost in depreciating the sacrificial cultus.

The second rule relates to prayer.

v. 1, 2 [2, 3]. "Be not hasty with thy mouth, and let not thy heart hasten to speak a word before God: for God is in heaven, and thou art upon earth; therefore let thy words be few. For by much business cometh dreaming, and by much talk the noise of fools." As we say in German: *auf Flügeln fliegen* [to flee on wings], *auf Einem Auge nicht sehen* [not to see with one eye], *auf der Flöte blasen* [to blow on the flute], so in Heb. we say that one slandereth

with (*auf*) his tongue (Ps. xv. 3), or, as here, that he hasteth with his mouth, *i.e.* is forward with his mouth, inasmuch as the word goes before the thought. It is the same usage as when the post-bibl. Heb., in contradistinction to *הַתּוֹרָה שֶׁבְכָתוּב*, the law given in the Scripture, calls the oral law *הַתּוֹרָה שֶׁבְּעַל־פה*, *i.e.* the law mediated *על־פה*, *oraliter = oralis traditio* (*Shabbath* 31a; cf. *Gittin* 60b). The instrument and means is here regarded as the *substantiation* of the action—as that which this lays as a foundation. The phrase: “to take on the lips,” Ps. xvi. 4, which needs no explanation, is different. Regarding *לִבְרָא*, *fortimare*, which is, like *לִבְרָא*, the intens. of *Kal*, *vid.* above, p. 191; once it occurs quite like our “*sich beeilen*” [to hasten], with reflex. accus. suff., 2 Chron. xxxv. 21. Man, when he prays, should not give the reins to his tongue, and multiply words as one begins and repeats over a form which he has learnt, knowing certainly that it is God of whom and to whom he speaks, but without being conscious that God is an infinitely exalted Being, to whom one may not carelessly approach without collecting his thoughts, and irreverently, without lifting up his soul. As the heavens, God’s throne, are exalted above the earth, the dwelling-place of man, so exalted is the heavenly God above earthly man, standing far beneath him; therefore ought the words of a man before God to be few,—few, well-chosen reverential words, in which one expresses his whole soul. The older language forms no plur. from the subst. *לִבְרָא* (fewness) used as an adv.; but the more recent treats it as an adj., and forms from it the plur. *לִבְרָאִים* (here and in Ps. cix. 8, which bears the superscription *le-david*, but has the marks of Jeremiah’s style); the post-bibl. places in the room of the apparent adj. the particip. adj. *לִבְרָאֵם* with the plur. *לִבְרָאֵם* (*לִבְרָאֵם*), *e.g.* *Berachoth* 61a: “always let the words of a man before the Holy One (blessed be His name!) be few” (*לִבְרָאֵם*). Few ought the words to be; for where they are many, it is not without folly. This is what is to be understood, ver. 2, by the comparison; the two parts of the verse stand here in closer mutual relation than *via* 1,—the proverb is not merely syn-thetical, but, like Job v. 7, parabolical. The *ו* is both times that of the cause. The dream happens, or, as we say, dreams happen *בְּרַב עָמַל*; not: by much labour; for labour in itself, as the expenditure of strength making one weary, has as its consequence, v. 11, sweet sleep undisturbed by dreams; but: by much self-vexation in a man’s striving after high and remote ends beyond what is possible (Targ., in manifold project-making); the care of such a man transplants itself from the waking to the sleeping life, if it does not wholly deprive him of sleep, v. 11b, viii. 16,—all kinds of images of

the labours of the day, and fleeting phantoms and terrifying pictures hover before his mind. And as dreams of such a nature appear when a man wearies himself inwardly as well as outwardly by the labours of the day, so, with the same inward necessity, where many words are spoken folly makes its appearance. Hitzig renders כסיל, in the connection קל כ', as adj.; but, like אָיִל (which forms an adj. *aiil*), כסיל is always a subst., or, more correctly, it is a name occurring always only of a living being, never of a thing. There is sound without any solid content, mere blustering bawling without sense and intelligence. The talking of a fool is in itself of this kind (x. 14); but if one who is not just a fool falls into much talk, it is scarcely possible but that in this flow of words empty bombast should appear.

Another rule regarding the worship of God refers to vowing.

Vers. 3 [4]-6 [7]. "When thou hast made a vow to God, delay not to fulfil it; for there is no pleasure in fools: that which thou hast vowed fulfil. Better that thou vowest not, than that thou vowest and fulfillest not. Let not thy mouth bring thy body into punishment; and say not before the messenger of God that it was precipitation: why shall God be angry at thy talk, and destroy the work of thy hands? For in many dreams and words there are also many vanities: much rather fear God!" If they abstained, after *Shabbath* 30*b*, from treating the Book of Koheleth as apocryphal, because it begins with דברי תורה (cf. at i. 3) and closes in the same way, and hence warrants the conclusion that that which lies between will also be דברי תורה, this is in a special manner true of the passage before us regarding the vow which, in thought and expression, is the echo of Deut. xxiii. 22-24. Instead of *kuashēr tiddor*, we find there the words *ki tiddor*; instead of *lelohim* (= *lēlohim*, always only of the one true God), there we have *lahovah ēlohēcha*; and instead of *al-t'ahher*, there *lo t'ahher*. There the reason is: "for the Lord thy God will surely require it of thee; and it would be sin in thee;" here: for there is no pleasure in fools, *i.e.* it is not possible that any one, not to speak of God, could have a particular inclination toward fools, who speak in vain, and make promises in which their heart is not, and which they do not keep. Whatever thou vowest, continues Koheleth, fulfil it; it is better (Ewald, § 336*a*) that thou vowest not, than to vow and not to pay; for which the *Tōra* says: "If thou shalt forbear to vow, it shall be no sin in thee" (Deut. xxiii. 22). נָדָר, which, according to the stem-word, denotes first the vow of consecration or setting apart (cogn. Arab. *nadar*, to separate, נָדַר, whence נִדָּר), the so-called נָסֵךְ [*vid.* Num. xxx. 3], is here a vow in its

widest sense; the author, however, may have had, as there, the law (cf. ver. 24), especially *shalme nader*, in view, i.e. such peace-offerings as the law does not enjoin, but which the offerer promises (cogn. with the *shalme a'darah*, i.e. such as rest on free-will, but not on any obligation arising from a previous promise) from his own inclination, for the event that God may do this or that for him. The verb  $\text{עָשָׂה}$  is not, however, related to this name for sacrifices, as  $\text{קָרַב}$  is to  $\text{קָרְבָּן}$ , but denotes the fulfilling or discharge as a performance fully accordant with duty. To the expression  $\text{קָרַב} . . . \text{נָתַן}$  (twice occurring in the passage of Deut. referred to above) there is added the warning: let not thy mouth bring thy body into sin. The verb *naṭhan*, with *Leamed* and the inf. following, signifies to allow, to permit, Gen. xx. 6; Judg. i. 34; Job xxxi. 30. The inf. is with equal right translated; not to bring into punishment; for  $\text{קָרַב}$ —the syncope. *Hiph.* of which, according to an old, and, in the Pentateuch, favourite form, is  $\text{קָרַבְתָּ}$ —signifies to sin, and also (e.g. Gen. xxxix. 9; of the play on the word, Isa. viii. 11) to expose sin; sin-burdened and guilty, or liable to punishment, mean the same thing. Incorrectly, Ginsburg, Zöckl, and others: "Do not suffer thy mouth to cause thy flesh to sin;" for (1) the formula: "the flesh sins," is not in accordance with the formation of O. T. verbs; the N. T., it is true, uses the expression  $\epsilon\upsilon\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\iota\ \delta\alpha\mu\alpha\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ , Rom. viii. 3, but not  $\delta\alpha\mu\alpha\tau\acute{\iota}\sigma\sigma\alpha\iota$ , that which sins is not the flesh, but the will determined by the flesh, or by fleshly lust; (2) the mouth here is not merely that which leads to sin, but the person who sins through thoughtless haste,—who, by his haste, brings sin upon his flesh, for this suffers, for the breach of vow, by penalties inflicted by God; the mouth is, like the eye and the hand, a member of the  $\delta\omicron\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \tau\acute{o}\ \sigma\acute{o}\mu\alpha$  (Matt. v. 24 f.), which is here called  $\text{גִּבּוֹר}$ ; the whole man in its sensitive nature (app.  $\text{עַל}$ , ii. 3, xi. 10; Prov. xiv. 30) has to suffer chastisement on account of that which the mouth hath spoken. Gesen. compares this passage, correctly, with Deut. xxiv. 4, for the meaning *peccati remissio facere*; Isa. xix. 21 is also similar.

The further warning refers to the lessening of the sin of a rash vow unfulfilled as an unintentional, easily expiable offence: "and say not before the messenger of God that it was a  $\text{חַטָּאת}$ , a sin of weakness." Without doubt *hazaidāch* is an official byname of a priest (vid. above, p. 193), and that such as was in common use at the time of the author (vid. p. 210). But as for the rest, it is not easy to make the matter of the warning clear. That it is not easy, may be concluded from this, that with Jewish interpreters it lies remote to

think of a priest in the word *hammalach*. By this word the Targ. understands the angel to whom the execution of the sentence of punishment shall be committed on the day of judgment; Aben Ezra: the angel who writes down all the words of a man; similarly Jerome, after his Jewish teacher. Under this passage Ginsburg has an entire excursus regarding the angels. The LXX. and Syr. translate "before God," as if the words of the text were *נִגַּד אֵל*, Ps. cxxxviii. 1, or as if *hammalach* could of itself mean God, as presenting Himself in history. Supposing that *hammalach* is the official name of a man, and that of a priest, we appear to be under the necessity of imagining that he who is charged with the obligation of a vow turns to the priest with the desire that he would release him from it, and thus dissolve (bibl. *יָדַעַר*, Mishnic *הִסְתִּיר*) the vow. But there is no evidence that the priests had the power of releasing from vows. Individual cases in which a husband can dissolve the vow of his wife, and a father the vow of his daughter, are enumerated in Num. xxx.; besides, in the traditional law, we find the sentence: "A vow, which one who makes it repents of, can be dissolved by a learned man (*חכם*), or, where none is present, by three laymen," *Bechoroth* 36b; the matter cannot be settled by any middle person (*שליח*), but he who has taken the vow (*הטורד*) must appear personally, *Jore deah* c. 228, § 16. Of the priest as such nothing is said here. Therefore the passage cannot at all be traditionally understood of an official dissolution of an oath. Where the Talm. applies it juristically, *Shabbath* 32b, etc., Rashi explains *hammalach* by *gizbar shel-haqdesh*, i.e. treasurer of the revenues of the sanctuary; and in the *Comm.* to Koheleth he supposes that some one has publicly resolved on an act of charity (*צדקה*), i.e. has determined it with himself, and that now the representative of the congregation (*שליח*) comes to demand it. But that is altogether fanciful. If we proceed on the idea that *liphne hammalach* is of the same meaning as *liphne hakkohen*, Lev. xxvii. 8, 11, Num. ix. 6, xxvii. 2, etc., we have then to derive the figure from such passages relating to the law of sacrifice as Num. xv. 22-26, from which the words *ki sh'gagah hi* (Num. xv. 25b) originate. We have to suppose that he who has made a vow, and has not kept it, comes to terms with God with an easier and less costly offering, since in the confession (*וידוי*) which he makes before the priest he explains that the vow was a *sh'gagah*, a declaration that inconsiderately escaped him. The author, in giving it to be understood that under these circumstances the offering of the sacrifice is just the direct contrary of a good work, calls to the conscience of the inconsiderate *נודר*: why should God be angry on account of thy voice with which thou dost

excuse thy sins of omission, and destroy (vid. regarding  $\text{לִמְנוּחַ}$  under Isa. x. 27) the work of thy hands (vid. under Ps. xc. 17), for He destroys what thou hast done, and causes to fail what thou purposed? The question with  $\text{לִמְנוּחַ}$  resembles those in Ezra iv. 22, vii. 23, and is of the same kind as at vii. 16 f.; it leads us to consider what a mad self-destruction that would be (Jer. xlii. 7, cf. under Isa. i. 5).

The reason [for the foregoing admission] now following places the inconsiderate vow under the general rubric of inconsiderate words. We cannot succeed in interposing ver. 6 [7] (in so far as we do not supply, after the LXX. and Syt. with the Targ.: *et credas*; or better, with Ginsburg,  $\text{כִּי}$  = *it is*) without taking one of the *et*s in the sense of "also." That the Heb. *et*, like the Greek *καί* and the Lat. *et*, may have this comparative or intensifying sense rising above that which is purely copulative, is seen from e.g. Num. ix. 14, cf. also Josh. xiv. 11. In many cases, it is true, we are not under the necessity of translating *et* by "also;" but since the "and" here does not merely externally connect, but expresses correlation of things homogeneous, an "also" or a similar particle involuntarily substitutes itself for the "and," e.g. Gen. xvii. 20 (Jerome): *super Isaac quoque*; Ex. xxix. 8: *Aliae quoque*; Deut. i. 32: *et nec sic quidem credidistis*; ix. 8: *nam et in Horeb*; cf. Josh. xv. 19; 1 Sam. xiv. 45; 2 Sam. xix. 25; 1 Kings ii. 22, xi. 26; Isa. xlix. 6, "I have also given to thee." But there are also passages in which it cannot be otherwise translated than by "also." We do not reckon among these Ps. xxxi. 12, where we do not translate "also my neighbours," and Amos ix. 10, where the words are to be translated, "and that in your nostrils." On the contrary, Isa. xxxii. 7 is scarcely otherwise to be translated than "also when the poor maketh good his right," like 2 Sam. i. 23, "also in their death they are not divided." In 2 Chron. xxvii. 5, in like manner, the two *et*s are scarcely correlative, but we have, with Keil, to translate, "also in the second and third year." And in Hos. viii. 6,  $\text{כִּי}$ , at least according to the punctuation, signifies "also it," as Jerome translates: *ex Israele et ipse et*. According to the interpunction of the passage before us,  $\text{וְכַל מְנוּחַ}$  is the pred., and thus, with the Venet., is to be translated: "For in many dreams and vanities there are also many words." We could at all events render the *et*, as also at x. 11, Ex. xvi. 6, as *et apud*; but  $\text{וְכַל מְנוּחַ}$  has not the character of a virtual antecedent,—the meaning of the expression remains as for the rest the same; but Hitzig's objection is of force against it (as also against Ewald's disposition of the words, like that of Symmachus, Jerome,

and Luther: "for where there are many dreams, there are also vanities, and many words"), that it does not accord with the connection, which certainly in the first place requires a reason referable to inconsiderate talk, and that the second half is, in fact, erroneous, for between dreams and many words there exists no necessary inward mutual relation. Hitzig, as Knobel before him, seeks to help this, for he explains: "for in many dreams are also vanities, *i.e.* things from which nothing comes, and (the like) in many words." But not only is this assumed carrying forward of the ב doubtful, but the principal thing would be made a secondary matter, and would drag heavily. The relation in ver. 2 is different where *vav* is that of comparison, and that which is compared follows the comparison. Apparently the text (although the LXX. had it before them, as it is before us) has undergone dislocation, and is thus to be arranged: **והבלים ודברים הרבה** : כי ברב הלמנא ודברים הרבה והבלים : for in many dreams and many words there are also vanities, *i.e.* illusions by which one deceives himself and others. Thus also Bullock renders, but without assigning a reason for it. That dreams are named first, arises from a reference back to ver. 2, according to which they are the images of what a man is externally and mentally busied and engaged with. But the principal stress lies on **ודברים הרבה**, to which also the too rash, inconsiderate vows belong. The pred. **והבלים**, however, connects itself with "vanity of vanities," which is Koheleth's final judgment regarding all that is earthly. The **כי** following connects itself with the thought lying in 6a, that much talk, like being much given to dreams, ought to be avoided: it ought not to be; much rather (*imo*, Symm. ἀλλά) fear God, Him before whom one should say nothing, but that which contains in it the whole heart.

### CONTINUATION OF THE CATALOGUE OF VANITIES.

THE GRADATIONS OF OPPRESSION IN DESPOTIC STATES.—V. 7, 8 [8, 9].

"Fear God," says the proverb (Prov. xxiv. 21), "and the king." The whole Book of Koheleth shows how full its author is of this fundamental thought. Thus the transition to the theme now following was at least inwardly mediated. The state-government, however, although one should be subject to it for conscience' sake, corresponds very little to his idea: the ascending scale of the powers is an ascending scale of violence and oppression.

Ver. 7 [8]. "If thou seest the oppression of the poor and the

robbery of right and of justice in the state, marvel not at the matter: for one higher watches over him who is high; and others are high above both." Like *rash*, *mispat mispāḏy* are also the gen. of the obj.; "robbery of the right and of justice" is an expression not found elsewhere, but not on that account, as Grätz supposes, impossible: *mispat* is right, rectitude, and conformity to law; and *ḥesdy*, judicial administration, or also social deportment according to these norms; *ḥy*, a wicked, shameless depriving of a just claim, and withholding of the shewing of right which is due. If one gets a sight of such things as these in a *ṣ'firah*, i.e. in a territorial district under a common government, he ought not to wonder at the matter. *ḥy* means to be startled, astonished, and, in the sense of "to wonder," is the word commonly used in modern Heb. But *ḥy* has here the reckless general signification of *ra*, according to which the Syr. translates it (*ra* under iii. 1); every attempt in passages such as this to retain the unweakened primary meaning of the word runs out into groundless and fruitless subtlety. Cf. *Jerusalem* 5a, *ḥy ḥy* . . . *ḥy*. "a man who buys a thing from another." On the other hand, there is doubt about the meaning of the clause assigning the reason. It seems to be intended, that over him who is high, who oppresses those under him, there stands one who is higher, who in turn oppresses him, and thereby becomes the executor of punishment upon him; and that these, the high and the higher, have over them a Most High, viz. God, who will bring them to an account (Knobel, Ew., Elst., Vaih., Hengst., Zöckl.). None of the old translators and expositors rises, it is true, to the knowledge that *ḥy* may be *pl. majestic*,<sup>1</sup> but the first *ḥy* the Targ. renders by *ḥy ḥy*. This was natural to the Jewish *sensu loq.*, for *ḥy* in the post-bibl. Heb. is a favourite name for God, e.g. *Bea* 20b, *Shemath* 37a, *Kessus* 13a: "from the table of God" (*ḥy ḥy*), i.e. the altar (cf. Heb. xiii. 10; 1 Cor. x. 21).<sup>2</sup> The interpretation of *ḥy*, however, as the *pl. majest.*, has in the Book of Koheleth itself a support in *ḥy ḥy*, xii. 1; and the thought in which *ḥy* climactically terminates accords essentially with iii. 17. This explanation, however, of *ḥy* does not stand the test. For if an unrighteous

<sup>1</sup> That is surprising, since the Talm. interpretation, *Mesochah* 110a, even brings it about that *ḥy*, v. 10, is to be understood of God.

<sup>2</sup> *ḥy ḥy* is also a common Rabbin. name for the gifts and offerings (cf. e.g. *Nishumal* under *Gen.*, sup. 30). Along with *ḥy ḥy*, the sacrifices are also called (in Hurewic's work on the Heb. rites, known by the abbreviated title *ḥy ḥy*) *ḥy ḥy*, ed. 854 of the ed. 1764, and 333 of the Amsterdam ed. 1767 of the abridgment.

administration of justice, if violence is in vogue instead of right, that is an actual proof that over him who is high no human higher one watches who may put a check upon him, and to whom he feels that he is responsible. And that above them both one who is Most High stands, who will punish injustice and avenge it, is a consolatory argument against vexation, but is no explanatory reason of the phenomenon, such as we expect after the *noli mirari*; for *לֹא-תִתְחַמֵּם* does not signify "be not offended" (John xvi. 1), or, "think it not strange" (1 Pet. iv. 12), which would be otherwise expressed (cf. under Ps. xxxvii. 1), but *μὴ θαυμάσῃς* (LXX.). Also the contrast, ver. 8, warrants the conclusion that in ver. 7 the author seeks to explain the want of legal order from the constitution of a despotic state as distinguished from patriarchal government. For this reason *רָאָה* will not be meant of over-watching, which has its aim in the execution of legal justice and official duty, but of egoistic watching,—not, however, as Hitzig understands it: "they mutually protect each other's advantage; one crow does not peck out the eyes of another,"—but, on the contrary, in the sense of hostile watching, as at 1 Sam. xix. 11, 2 Sam. xi. 16, as B. Bardach understands it: "he watches for the time when he may gain the advantage over him who is high, who is yet lower than himself, and may strengthen and enrich himself with his flesh or his goods." Over the one who is high, who oppresses the poor and is a robber in respect of right and justice, there stands a higher, who on his part watches how he can plunder him to his own aggrandisement; and over both there are again other high ones, who in their own interest oppress these, as these do such as are under them. This was the state of matters in the Persian Empire in the time of the author. The satrap stood at the head of state officers. In many cases he fleeced the province to fatten himself. But over the satrap stood inspectors, who often enough built up their own fortunes by fatal denunciations; and over all stood the king, or rather the court, with its rivalry of intrigues among courtiers and royal women. The cruel death-punishments to which disagreeable officials were subjected were fearful. There was a gradation of bad government and arbitrary domination from high to low and from low to high, and no word is more fitting for this state of things in Persia than *רָאָה*; for watching, artfully lurking as spies for an opportunity to accomplish the downfall of each other, was prevalent in the Persian Empire, especially when falling into decay.

Ver. 8 [9]. The author, on the other hand, now praises the patriarchal form of government based on agriculture, whose king takes

pride, not in bloody conquests and tyrannical caprice, but in the peaceful promotion of the welfare of his people: "But the advantage of a country consists always in a king given to the arable land." What impossibilities have been found here, even by the most recent expositors! Ewald, Heiligst., Elster, Zöckl. translate: *rex agro factus = terras præfectus*; but, in the language of this book, not עֶבֶר but נָתַח מֶלֶךְ is the expression used for "to make a king." Gesen., Win., de Wette, Knobel, Vaih. translate: *rex qui colitur a terra (civibus)*. But could a country, in the sense of its population in subjection to the king, be more inappropriately designated than by שָׂרָה? Besides, עֶבֶר certainly gains the meaning of *colere* where God is the object; but with a human ruler as the object it means *servire* and nothing more, and נִעְבֵּד<sup>1</sup> can mean nothing else than "*dienstbar gemacht*" [made subject to], not "honoured." Along with this signification, related denom. to עֶבֶר, נִעְבֵּד, referred from its primary signification to שָׂרָה, the open fields (from שָׂרָה, to go out in length and breadth), may also, after the phrase עֶבֶר הָאֲדָמָה, signify cultivated, wrought, tilled; and while the phrase "made subject to" must be certainly held as possible (Rashi, Aben Ezra, and others assume it without hesitation), but is without example, the *Niph.* occurs, e.g. at Ezek. xxxvi. 9, in the latter signification, of the mountains of Israel: "ye shall be tilled." Under 8a, Hitzig, and with him Stuart and Zöckler, makes the misleading remark that the *Chethib* is כְּכֹל־הָיָא, and that it is = כְּכֹל־זֶה, according to which the explanation is then given: the protection and security which an earthly ruler secures is, notwithstanding this, not to be disparaged. But הָיָא is *Chethib*, for which the *Keri* substitutes כְּכֹל; is *Chethib* without *Keri*; and that כְּכֹל is thus a modification of the text, and that, too, an objectionable one, since כְּכֹל־הָיָא, in the sense of "in all this," is unheard of. The *Keri* seeks, without any necessity, to make the pred. and subj. like one another in gender; without necessity, for הָיָא may also be neut.: the advantage of a land is this, viz. what follows. And how כְּכֹל is to be understood is seen from Ezra x. 17, where it is to be explained: And they prepared<sup>2</sup> the sum of the men, i.e. the list of the men, of such as had married strange wives; cf. 1 Chron. vii. 5. Accordingly כְּכֹל here means, as the author generally uses כְּכֹל mostly in the impersonal sense of *omnia: in omnibus*, in all things – by all means; or: *in universum*,

<sup>1</sup> Thus pointed rightly in J., with *Shava* quiesc. and *Dagesh* in *Beth*; vid. Kimchi in *Michlol* 63a, and under עֶבֶר.

<sup>2</sup> That כָּלָה ב may mean "to be ready with anything," Keil erroneously points to Gen. xlv. 12; and Philippi, *St. Const.* p. 49, thinks that *rakel avashim* can be taken together in the sense of *rakel haavashim*.

in general. Were the words accentuated מֶלֶךְ לְשָׂדֶה נֶעֱבֵר, the adjct. connection of 'נֶעֱבֵר לְשָׂדֶה' would thereby be shown; according to which the LXX. and Theod. translate τοῦ ἀγροῦ εἰργασμένου; Symm., with the Syr., *ἡ χώρα εἰργασμένη*: "a king for the cultivated land," i.e. one who regards this as a chief object. Luzz. thus indeed accentuates; but the best established accentuation is מֶלֶךְ לְשָׂדֶה נֶעֱבֵר. This separation of נֶעֱבֵר from לְשָׂדֶה can only be intended to denote that נֶעֱבֵר is to be referred not to it, but to מֶלֶךְ, according to which the Targ. paraphrases. The meaning remains the same: a king subject (who has become a *seruus*) to the cultivated land, *rex agro addictus*, as Dathe, Rosenm., and others translate, is a still more distinct expression of that which "a king for the well-cultivated field" would denote: an agriculture-king.—one who is addicted, not to wars, law-suits, and sovereign stubbornness in his opinions, but who delights in the peaceful advancement of the prosperity of his country, and especially takes a lively interest in husbandry and the cultivation of the land. The order of the words in 8b is like that at ix. 2; cf. Isa. viii. 22, xxii. 2. The author thus praises, in contrast to a despotic state, a patriarchal kingdom based on agriculture.

THE UNCERTAINTY OF RICHES, AND THE CHEERFUL ENJOYMENT OF LIFE  
WHICH ALONE IS PRAISEWORTHY.—V. 9 [10]—VI. 6.

If we fix our attention on the word תְּבוּאָה, 9a, which properly denotes that which comes into the barn from without (e.g. Prov. xiv. 4), ver. 9 seems to continue the praise of husbandry, as Rashi, Aben Ezra, Luzzatto, Bardach, and others have already concluded. But the thought that one cannot eat money is certainly not that which is intended in 9a; and in 9b the thought would be awkwardly and insufficiently expressed, that it is vain to love riches, and not, on the contrary, the fruit of agriculture. Therefore we are decidedly of opinion that here (cf. above, p. 182), with ver. 9, the foregoing series of proverbs does not come to a close, but makes a new departure.

Ver. 9 [10]. "He who loveth silver is not satisfied with silver; and he whose love cleaveth to abundance, hath nothing of it: also this is vain." The transition in this series of proverbs is not unmediated; for the injustice which, according to ver. 7, prevails in the state as it now is becomes subservient to covetousness, in the very nature of which there lies insatiableness: *semper avarus eget, hunc nulla pecunia replet*. That the author speaks of the "*sacra fames argenti*" (not *auri*) arises from this, that not זָהָב, but כֶּסֶף, is

the specific word for coin.<sup>1</sup> Mendelssohn-Friedländer also explains: "He who loveth silver is not satisfied with silver," i.e. it does not make him full; that might perhaps be linguistically possible (cf. e.g. Prov. xii. 11), although the author would in that case probably have written the words כסף־הכסף, after vi. 3; but "to be not full of money" is, after i. 8, and especially iv. 8, Hab. ii. 5, cf. Prov. xxvii. 20 = never to have enough of money, but always to desire more.

That which follows, 9aβ, is, according to Hitz., a question: And who hath joy in abundance, which bringeth nothing in? But such questions, with the answer to be supplied, are not in Koheleth's style; and what would then be understood by capital without interest? Others, as Zöckler, supply עֲצָרָה: and he that loveth abundance of possessions (is) not (full) of income; but that which is gained by these hard ellipses is only a tautology. With right, the Targ., Syr., Jerome, the Venet., and Luther take לוֹ לְעוֹשָׁהּ as the answer or conclusion: and who clings to abundance of possessions with his love (= he has no fruit thereof; or, with a weakening of the interrog. pronoun into the relative (as at i. 9; cf. under Ps. xxxiv. 13): he who . . . clings has nothing of it. *Hamon* signifies a tumult, a noisy multitude, particularly of earthly goods, as at Ps. xxxvii. 16; 1 Chron. xxix. 16; Isa. lx. 5. The connection of אֶהָב with ב, occurring only here, follows the analogy of ב עֲצָרָה and the like. The conclusion is synon. with לְעִלְתִּי הוֹלִי; e.g. Isa. xlv. 10; Jer. vii. 8. All the Codd. read לֹא; לוֹ in this sense would be meaningless.<sup>2</sup> The designation of advantage by לְעוֹשָׁהּ may be occasioned by the foregoing agricultural proverb. In the לְעוֹשָׁהּ, the farmer enjoys the fruit of his labour; but he who hangs his heart on the continual tumult, noise, pomp of more numerous and greater possessions if possible, to him all real profit — i.e. all pleasant, peaceful enjoyment — is lost. With the increase of the possessions there is an increase also of unrest, and the possessor has in reality nothing but the sight of them.

Ver. 10 [11]. "When property and goods increase, they become many who consume them; and what advantage hath the owner thereof but the sight of [them with] his eyes?" The verb רָבָה signifies to increase, and רַבִּיב, to be many; but also (which Böttch. denies) inchoatively: to become many, Gen. vi. 1; rightly, the LXX., ἐπληθύν-

<sup>1</sup> A Jewish fancy supposes that כסף is chosen because it consists of letters rising in value (20, 60, 80); while, on the contrary, נהב consists of letters decreasing in value (7, 5, 2).

<sup>2</sup> In *Maccoth* 10a, לוֹ is read three times in succession; the Midrash *Wajikra*, c. 22, reads לוֹ, and thus it is always found without *Keri* and without variation.

*θησαν*. The author has not a miser in view, who shuts up his money in chests, and only feeds himself in looking at it with closed doors; but a covetous man, of the sort spoken of in Ps. xlix. 12, Isa. v. 8. If the *hattovah*, the possession of such an one, increases, in like manner the number of people whom he must maintain increases also, and thus the number of those who eat of it along with him, and at the same time also his disquiet and care, increase; and what advantage, what useful result (*vid.* regarding *Kishron*, above, p. 193, and under ii. 21) has the owner of these good things from them but the beholding of them (*r'ith*; *Kerî*, *r'uth*; cf. the reverse case, Ps. cxxvi. 4)?—the possession does not in itself bring happiness, for it is never great enough to satisfy him, but is yet great enough to fill him with great care as to whether he may be able to support the demands of so great a household: the fortune which it brings to him consists finally only in this, that he can look on all he has accumulated with proud self-complacency.

Ver. 11 [12]. He can also eat that which is good, and can eat much; but he does not on that account sleep more quietly than the labourer who lives from hand to mouth: "Sweet is the sleep of the labourer, whether he eats little or much; but, on the contrary, the abundance of the rich does not permit him to sleep." The LXX., instead of "labourer," uses the word "slave" (*δούλου*), as if the original were *הַעֲבָד*. But, as a rule, sound sleep is the reward of earnest labour; and since there are idle servants as well as active masters, there is no privilege to servants. The Venet. renders rightly by "of the husbandman" (*ἐργάτου*), the *עֲבֵד הָאֲדָמָה*; the "labourer" in general is called *עָמֵל*, iv. 8 and Judg. v. 26, post-bibl. *פֶּעַל*. The labourer enjoys sweet, *i.e.* refreshing, sound sleep, whether his fare be abundant or scanty—the labour rewards him by sweet sleep, notwithstanding his poverty; while, on the contrary, the sleep of the rich is hindered and disturbed by his abundance, not: by his satiety, viz. repletion, as Jerome remarks: *incocto cibo in stomachi angustiiis aestuante*; for the labourer also, if he eats much, eats his fill; and why should sufficiency have a different result in the one from what it has in the other? As *שָׂבַע* means satiety, not over-satiety; so, on the other hand, it means, objectively, sufficient and plentifully existing fulness to meet the wants of man, Prov. iii. 10, and the word is meant thus objectively here: the fulness of possession which the rich has at his disposal does not permit him to sleep, for all kinds of projects, cares, anxieties regarding it rise within him, which follow him into the night, and do not suffer his mind to be at rest, which is a condition of sleep. The expression *לֹא יָשָׁן* is the *circum-*

*locutio* of the genit. relation, like 'לֹב . . . חֵל, Ruth ii. 3; 'נַע . . . אִם (LXX. Ἀμύων τῆς Ἀχινοάμ), 2 Sam. iii. 2. Heiligstedt remarks that it stands for שָׁבַע העשיר; but the nouns צָמָא, רָעַב, שָׁבַע form no *const.*, for which reason the *circumloc.* was necessary; שָׁבַע is the *constr.* of שָׁבַע. Falsely, Ginsburg: "*aber der Ueberfluss den Reichen —er lässt ihn nicht schlafen*" [but superabundance the rich—it doth not suffer him to sleep]; but this construction is neither in accordance with the genius of the German nor of the Heb. language. Only the subject is resumed in אִינֵנּוּ (as in i. 7); the construction of הִנֵּי is as at 1 Chron. xvi. 21; cf. Ps. cv. 14. Of the two *Hiphil* forms, the properly Heb. הִנֵּי and the Aramaizing הִנִּי, the latter is used in the weakened meaning of *ēān*, *sinere*.

After showing that riches bring to their possessor no real gain, but, instead of that, dispeace, care, and unrest, the author records as a great evil the loss, sometimes suddenly, of wealth carefully amassed.

Vers. 12, 13 [13, 14]. "There is a sore evil which I have seen under the sun, riches kept by their possessor to his hurt: the same riches perish by an evil event; and he hath begotten a son, thus this one hath nothing in his hand." There is a gradation of evils. רָעָה (cf. הִלֵּי רָע, vi. 2) is not an ordinary, but a morbid evil, *i.e.* a deep hurtful evil; as a wound, not a common one, but one particularly severe and scarcely curable, is called נִחָה, *e.g.* Nah. iii. 19. 'רָא . . . הִנֵּי is, as at x. 5, an ellipt. relat. clause; cf. on the other hand, vi. 1; the author elsewhere uses the scheme of the relat. clause without relat. pron. (*vid.* under i. 13, iii. 16); the old language would use רָאִיתִי, instead of רָאִיתִי, with the reflex. pron. The great evil consists in this, that riches are not seldom kept by their owner to his own hurt. Certainly לְאִשְׁתּוֹ can also mean that which is kept for another, 1 Sam. ix. 24; but how involved and constrained is Ginsburg's explanation: "hoarded up (by the rich man) for their (future) owner," viz. the heir to whom he intends to leave them! That לְ can be used with the passive as a designation of the subj., *vid.* Ewald, § 295c; certainly it corresponds as little as ᾤ with the Greek ὑπό, but in Greek we say also πλοῦτος φυλαχθεὶς τῷ κερτημένῳ, *vid.* Rost's *Syntax*, § 112. 4. The suff. of *l'ra'atho* refers to *b'alar*, the plur. form of which can so far remain out of view, that we even say *adonim qosheh*, Isa. xix. 4, etc. "To his hurt," *i.e.* at the last suddenly to lose that which has been carefully guarded. The narrative explanation of this, "to his hurt," begins with *rav explic.* Regarding 'inyan ra', *vid.* above, p. 194. It is a *casus adversus* that is meant, such a stroke upon stroke as destroyed Job's possessions. The perf. 'הוּ is supposed the case that the man thus suddenly made

poor is the father of a son ; the clause is logically related to that which follows as hypothet. antecedent, after the scheme, Gen. xxxiii. 13*b*. The loss of riches would of itself make one who is alone unhappy, for the misfortune to be poor is less than the misfortunes to be rich and then to become poor ; but still more unfortunate is the father who thought that by well-guarded wealth he had secured the future of his son, and who now leaves him with an empty hand.

What now follows is true of this rich man, but is generalized into a reference to every rich man, and then is recorded as a second great evil. As a man comes naked into the world, so also he departs from it again without being able to take with him any of the earthly wealth he has acquired.

Ver. 14 [15]. "As he came forth from his mother's womb, naked shall he again depart as he came, and not the least will he carry away for his labour, which he could take with him in his hand." In 13*a* the author has the case of Job in his mind ; this verse before us is a reminiscence from Job i. 21, with the setting aside of the difficult word שָׁמָּה found there, which Sirach xl. 1 exhibits. With "naked" begins emphatically the main subject ; כָּאֲשֶׁר בָּא = כְּשֶׁבָּא is the intensifying resumption of the comparison ; the contrast of לָכֶּת, going away, *excedere vitam*, is בִּיא of the entrance on life, coming into the world. מְאוֹמָה (according to the root meaning and use, corresponding to the French *point*, Olsh. § 205*a*) emphatically precedes the negation, as at Judg. xiv. 6 (cf. the emphasis reached in a different way, Ps. xlix. 18). נִשָּׂא signifies here, as at ver. 18, Ps. xxiv. 5, to take hence, to take forth, to carry away. The ב of בֶּעַל is not partitive (Aben Ezra compares Lev. viii. 32), according to which Jerome and Luther translate *de labore suo*, but is the *Beth pretii*, as e.g. at 1 Kings xvi. 34, as the Chald. understands it ; Nolde cites for this *Beth pretii* passages such as ii. 24, but incorrectly. Regarding the subjunctive שִׁילֵךְ, *quod auferat*, vid. above, No. 2, p. 197. We might also with the LXX. and Symm. punctuate שִׁילֵךְ : which might accompany him in his hand, but which could by no means denote, as Hitzig thinks : (for his trouble), which goes through his hand. Such an expression is not used ; and Hitzig's supposition, that here the rich man who has lost his wealth is the subject, does not approve itself.

Ver. 15 [16]. A transition is now made to rich men as such, and the registering formula which should go before ver. 14 here follows : "And this also is a sore evil : altogether exactly as he came, thus shall he depart : and what gain hath he that laboureth in the wind ?"

Regarding **ח**, *vid.* above, No. 4, p. 198; and regarding **ש' בלע'**,<sup>1</sup> *vid.* p. 196. The writing of these first two as one word [*vid.* note below] accords with Ibn-Giat's view, accidentally quoted by Kimchi, that the word is compounded of **ב** of comparison, and the frequently occurring **לע** always retaining its **ל**, and ought properly to be pointed **בלע'** (cf. **לע**, 1 Kings vii. 20). **לע** signifies combination, society, one thing along with or parallel to another; and thus **לעכת** bears no **ב**, since it is itself a word of comparison, **כל-לעכת** "altogether parallel," "altogether the same." The question: what kind of advantage (*vid.* i. 3) is to him (has he) of this that . . . carries its answer in itself. Labouring for the wind or in the wind, his labour is **רעה** (רעיון) **רעה**, and thus fruitless. And, moreover, how miserable an existence is this life of labour leading to nothing!

Ver. 16 [17]. "Also all his life long he eateth in darkness and grieveth himself much, and oh for his sorrow and hatred!" We might place ver. 16 under the regimen of the **ש'** of **שע'** of ver. 15b; but the Heb. style prefers the self-dependent form of sentences to that which is governed. The expression 16a has something strange. This strangeness disappears if, with Ewald and Heiligst., after the LXX. and Jerome, for **ואכל** we read **ואכל**; *καὶ ἐν πένθει*; Bottch. prefers **ואכל**, "and in darkness." Or also, if we read **לע** for **ואכל**; thus the Midrash here, and several codd. by Kennicott; but the Targ, Syr., and Masora read **ואכל**. Hitzig gets rid of that which is strange in this passage by taking **כל-ימי** as accus. of the obj., not of the time: all his days, his whole life he consumes in darkness; but in Heb. as in Lat. we say: *consumere dies vitae*, Job xxi. 13, xxxvi. 11, but not *comedere*; and why should the expression, "to eat in darkness," not be a figurative expression for a faithless, gloomy life, as elsewhere "to sit in darkness" (Mic. vii. 8), and "to walk in darkness"? It is meant that all his life long he ate **לחם אננים**, the bread of sorrow, or **לחם לחי**, prison fare; he did not allow himself pleasant table comforts in a room comfortably or splendidly lighted, for it is unnecessary to understand **חשך** subjectively and figuratively (Hitz., Zöck.).

In 16b the traditional punctuation is **וְכָעֵם**.<sup>2</sup> The *perf.* ruled by the preceding *fut.* is syntactically correct, and the verb **כָּעֵם** is common with

<sup>1</sup> In H. written as one word: **בלעכת**. Parchon (*Lex.* under **לעכת**) had this form before him. In his *Lex.* Kimchi bears evidence in favour of the correct writing as two words.

<sup>2</sup> Thus in correct texts, in H. with the note: **כל-ימי** **ב'**, viz. here and at Ps. cxii. 10, only there **y** has, according to tradition, the *Kametz*. Cf. *Mas. fin.* 52b, and Baer's Ed. of Psalter, under Ps. cxii. 10.

the author, vii. 9. Hitzig regards the text as corrupt, and reads **בְּחָלִי** and **בְּעַם**, and explains: and (he consumes or swallows) much grief in his, etc.; the phrase, “to eat sorrow,” may be allowed (cf. Prov. xxvi. 6, cf. Job xv. 16); but **יֹאכֵל**, as the representative of two so bold and essentially different metaphors, would be in point of style in bad taste. If the text is corrupt, it may be more easily rectified by reading **וְכַעַם הַרְבֵּה וְחָלִי לוֹ וְקִ**: and grief in abundance, and sorrow has he, and wrath. We merely suggest this. Ewald, Burger, and Botteh. read only **וְכַעַם הַרְבֵּה וְחָלִי**; but **לוֹ** is not to be dispensed with, and can easily be reduced to a mere *var.* Elster retains **וְכַעַם**, and reads, like Hitzig, **בְּחָלִי**: he grieves himself much in his sorrow and wrath; but in that case the word **וְקִצְפוֹ** was to be expected; also in this way the ideas do not psychologically accord with each other. However the text is taken, we must interpret **וְחָלִי וְקִצְפוֹ** as an exclamation, like **הֶפֶז**, Isa. xxix. 16; **הֶפֶז**, Jer. xlix. 16; Ewald, § 328a, as we have done above. That **וְחָלִי** of itself is a subst. clause = **וְחָלִי לוֹ** is untenable; the rendering of the noun as forming a clause, spoken of under ii. 21, is of a different character.<sup>1</sup> He who by his labour and care aims at becoming rich, will not only lay upon himself unnecessary privations, but also have many sorrows; for many of his plans fail, and the greater success of others awakens his envy, and neither he himself nor others satisfy him; he is morbidly disposed, and as he is diseased in mind, so also in body, and his constantly increasing dissatisfaction becomes at last **קִצְפוֹ**, he grumbles at himself, at God, and all the world. From observing such persons, Paul says of them (1 Tim. vi. 6 f.): “They have pierced themselves through (*transfoderunt*) with many sorrows.”

In view of these great evils, with which the possession of riches also is connected: of their deceitful instability, and their merely belonging to this present life, Koheleth returns to his *ceterum censeo*.

Ver. 17 [18]. “Behold then what I have seen as good, what as beautiful (is this): that one eat and drink and see good in all his labour with which he wearieth himself, under the sun, throughout the number of the days of his life which God hath given him; for that is his portion.” Toward this seeing, *i.e.* knowing from his own experience, his effort went forth, according to ii. 3; and what he here, vers. 17, 18, expresses as his *resultat*, he has already acknowledged at ii. 24 and iii. 12 f. With “behold” he here returns to it; for he says, that from the observations just spoken of, as from others, no

<sup>1</sup> Rashi regards **וְחָלִי** as a form like **חִיתָו**. This *o* everywhere appears only in a gen. connection.

other *resultat* befell him. Instead of ר' טִיבָה (here and at vi. 6), he as often uses the words רָאָה טִיב, iii. 13, ii. 24, or בָּטִיב, ii. 1. In 'רָא', the seeing is meant of that of mental apperception; in 'לָרָא', of immediate perception, experience. Our translation above does not correspond with the accentuation of the verse, which belongs to the class of disproportionably long verses without *Athnach*; cf. Gen. xxi. 9; Num. ix. 1; Isa. xxxvi. 1; Jer. xiii. 13, li. 37; Ezek. xlii. 10; Amos v. 1; 1 Chron. xxvi. 26, xxviii. 1; 2 Chron. xxiii. 1. The sentence וְכֵן . . . הִנֵּה (with pausal *and* with *Rebia*) constitutes the beginning of the verse, in the form, as it were, of a superscription; and then its second part, the main proposition, is divided by the disjunctives following each other: *Telisha Gedhola*, *Gerash*, *Legarmeh*, *Rebia*, *Tebir*, *Tifcha*, *Silluk* (cf. Jer. viii. 1, where *Pazer* instead of *Telisha Gedhola*; but as for the rest, the sequence of the accents is the same). Among the moderns, Hengst. holds to the accents, for he translates in strict accordance therewith, as Tremellius does: "Behold what I have seen: that it is fine and good (*Trem. bonum pulchrum*) to eat . . ." The *asher* in the phrase, *tov asher-yapheh*, then connects it together: good which is at the same time beautiful; Gratz sees here the Greek *καλὸν καγαθόν*. But the only passage to which, since Kimchi, reference is made for this use of *asher*, viz. Hos. xii. 8, does not prove it; for we are not, with Drusius, to translate there by: *iniquitas quae sit peccatum*, but by *quae poenam mereat*. The accentuation here is not correct. The second *asher* is without doubt the resumption of the first; and the translation—as already Dachselt in his *Biblia Accentuata* indicated: *ecce itaque quod vidi bonum, quod pulchrum (hoc est ut quis edat)*—presents the true relation of the component parts of the sentence. The suffix of וְכֵן refers to the general subj. contained in the inf.; cf. viii. 15. The period of time denoted by מִכְּשָׁר is as at ii. 3, vi. 12. Also we read וְכֵן . . . בָּ, iii. 22, in the same connection.

Ver. 18 [19]. This verse, expressing the same, is constructed anakolouthistically, altogether like iii. 13: "Also for every man to whom God hath given riches and treasures, and hath given him power to eat thereof, and to take his portion, and to rejoice in his labour; just this is a gift of God." The anakolouthon can be rendered [into English] here as little as it can at iii. 13; for if we allow the phrase, "also every man," the "also" remains fixed to the nearest conception, while in the Heb. it governs the whole long sentence, and, at the nearest, belongs to הִנֵּה. Cheerful enjoyment is in this life that which is most advisable; but also it is not made possible in itself by the possession of earthly treasures,—it is yet a special

gift of God added thereto. *N<sup>e</sup>chasim*, besides here, occurs also in Josh. xxii. 8 ; 2 Chron. i. 11 f. ; and in the Chald. of the Book of Ezra, vi. 8, vii. 26. Also *hishlit*, to empower, to make possible, is Aram., Dan. ii. 38, 48, as well as Heb., Ps. cxix. 133 ; the prevalence of the verbal stem שלט is characteristic of the Book of Koheleth. *Helqo*, "his portion," is just the cheerful enjoyment as that which man has here below of life, if he has any of it at all.

Ver. 19 [20]. Over this enjoyment he forgets the frailty and the darkened side of this life. It proves itself to be a gift of God, a gift from above : "For he doth not (then) think much of the days of his life ; because God answereth the joy of his heart." Such an one, permitted by God to enjoy this happiness of life, is thereby prevented from tormenting himself by reflections regarding its transitoriness. Incorrectly, Hengst. : Remembrance and enjoyment of this life do not indeed last long, according to Ewald, who now, however, rightly explains : He will not, by constant reflection on the brevity of his life, too much embitter this enjoyment ; because God, indeed, grants to him true heart-joy as the fairest gift. The meaning of 19b is also, in general, hit upon. The LXX. translates : "because God occupies him with the joy of his heart ;" but for that we ought to have had the word מְעַנֶּה ; Jerome helps it, for he reads בשמחה instead of בשמחה : *co quod Deus occupet deliciis cor ejus*. But also, in this form, this explanation of מְעַנֶּה is untenable ; for עָנָה, the causat. of which would be מְעַנֶּה, signifies, in the style of Koheleth, not in general to busy oneself with something, but to weary oneself with something ; hence 'עָנָה בִּשְׂ cannot mean : to be occupied with joy, and thereby to be drawn away from some other thing. And since the explanation : "he makes him sing," needs no argument to dispose of it, מְעַנֶּה thus remains only as the *Hiph.* of עָנָה, to meet, to respond to, grant a request. Accordingly, Hitz., like Aben Ezra and Kimchi, comparing Hos. ii. 23 f. : God makes to answer, *i.e.* so works that all things which have in or of themselves that which can make him glad, must respond to his wish. But the omission of the obj.—of which Hitz. remarks, that because indefinite it is left indefinite—is insufferably hard, and the explanation thus ambiguous. Most interpreters translate : for God answers (Gesen. *Heb. Wört. B.*, incorrectly : answered) him with joy of his heart, *i.e.* grants this to him in the way of answer. Ewald compares Ps. lxxv. 6 ; but that affords no voucher for the expression : to answer one with something = to grant it to him ; for עָנָה is there connected with a double accus., and בְּצֶדֶק is the adv. statement of the way and manner. But above all, against this interpretation is the fact of the want of the personal obj.

The author behoved to have written **אָנענטוּרענדיג** or **אָנענטוּרענדיג**. We take the *Hiph.* as in the sense of the *Kal*, but give it its nearest signification: to answer, and explain, as in a similar manner Seb. Schmid, Rambam, and others have already done: God answers to the joy of his heart, *i.e.* He assents to it, or (using an expression which is an exact equivalent), He corresponds to it. This makes the joy a heart-joy, *i.e.* a joy which a man feels not merely externally, but in the deepest recess of his heart, for the joy penetrates his heart and satisfies it (Song iii. 11; Isa. xxx. 29; Jer. xv. 16). A similar expression, elsewhere not found, we had at ver. 9 in **אָנענטוּרענדיג**. Why should not **אָנענטוּרענדיג** (אָנענטוּרענדיג) be possible with **אָנענטוּרענדיג**, just as *ἀμείβεσθαι πρὸς τι* is with *ἀμείβεσθαι τινα*? For the rest, **אָנענטוּרענדיג** is not needed as obj.; we can take it also as an expression of the state or condition: God gives answer in the heart-joy of such an one. In **אָנענטוּרענדיג**, to answer, to hear the answer, is thought of as granting a request; here, as giving assent to. Job xxxv. 9 affords a twofold suitable example, that the *Hiph.* can have an enlarged *Kal* signification.

After the author has taken the opportunity of once more expressing his *ultimatum*, he continues to register the sad evils that cling to wealth.

vi. 1, 2. "There is an evil which I have seen under the sun, and in great weight it lies upon man: a man to whom God giveth riches, and treasures, and honour, and he wanteth nothing for his soul of all that he may wish, but God giveth him not power to have enjoyment of it, for a strange man hath the enjoyment: that is vanity and an evil disease." The author presents the result of personal observation; but inasmuch as he relates it in the second tense, he generalizes the matter, and places it scenically before the eyes of the reader. A similar introduction with **אָנענטוּרענדיג**, but without the unnecessary *asher*, is found at v. 12, x. 5. Regarding **אָנענטוּרענדיג**, *vid.* under viii. 6; **אָנענטוּרענדיג** does not denote the subj., as at ii. 17: it appears great to a man, but it has its nearest lying local meaning; it is a great (ii. 21) evil, pressing in its greatness heavily upon man. The evil is not the man himself, but the condition in which he is placed, as when, *e.g.*, the kingdom of heaven is compared to a merchant (Matt. xiii. 45 f.),—not the merchant in himself, but his conduct and life is a figure of the kingdom of heaven.

Ver. 2. To **אָנענטוּרענדיג**, as at 2 Chron i. 11, **אָנענטוּרענדיג** [and honour] is added as a third thing. What follows we do not translate: "and there is nothing wanting . . .;" for that **אָנענטוּרענדיג** with the pleonastic suff. may mean: "there is not," is not to be proved from Gen. xxxix. 9, thus: and he spares not for his soul (LXX. *καὶ οὐκ κ.τ.λ.*) what he

always desires. **הָסֵר** is adj. in the sense of wanting, lacking, as at 1 Sam. xxi. 16; 1 Kings xi. 22; Prov. xii. 9. **לְנַפְשׁוֹ**, "for his soul," i.e. his person, is — the synonym **לְעַצְמוֹ** found in the later usage of the language; **כִּי** (different from the *min*, iv. 8) is, as at Gen. vi. 2, partitive. The **נָכְרִי**, to whom this considerable estate, satisfying every wish, finally comes, is certainly not the legal heir (for that he enters into possession, in spite of the uncertainty of his moral character, ii. 19, would be in itself nothing less than a misfortune, yet perfectly in order, v. 13 [14]), but some stranger without any just claim, not directly a foreigner (Heiligst.), but, as Burger explains: *talis qui proprie nullum habet jus in bona ejus cui נכרי dicitur* (cf. **נְכִרְיָהּ** of the unmarried wife in the Book of Proverbs).

That wealth without enjoyment is nothing but vanity and an evil disease, the author now shows by introducing another historical figure, and thereby showing that life without enjoyment is worse than never to have come into existence at all:

Ver. 3. "If a man begat an hundred, and lived many years, and the amount of the days of his years was great, and his soul satisfied not itself in good, and also he had no grave, then I say: Better than he is the untimely birth." The accentuation of 3*a* is like that of 2*a*. The disjunctives follow the *Athnach*, as at 2 Kings xxiii. 13, only that there *Telisha Gedhola* stands for *Pazer*. Hitzig finds difficulty with the clause **וְגַם . . . לוֹ**, and regards it as a marginal gloss to 5*a*, taken up into the text at a wrong place. But just the unexpected form and the accidental nature, more than the inward necessity of this feature in the figure, leads us to conclude that the author here connects together historical facts, as conjecturally noted above at pp. 214, 215, into one fanciful picture. **מָצָה** is obviously to be supplemented by **בָּנִים (ובנות)**; the Targ. and Midrash make this man to be Cain, Ahab, Haman, and show at least in this that they extend down into the time of the Persian kingdom a spark of historical intelligence. **שָׁנָה הֵרָב** interchanges with **שָׁנָה הֵרָב**, xi. 8, as at Neh. xi. 30. In order to designate the long life emphatically, the author expresses the years particularly in days: "and if it is much which (Heiligst.: *multum est quod*) the days of his years amount to;" cf. **וַיְהִי יָמָיו** in Gen. v. With *v'naphsho* there follows the reverse side of this long life with many children: (1) his soul satisfies not itself, i.e. has no self-satisfying enjoyment of the good (*min*, as at Ps. civ. 13, etc.), i.e. of all the good things which he possesses,—in a word, he is not happy in his life; and (2) an honourable burial is not granted to him, but **קֵב' הֵמ'**, Jer. xxii. 19, which is the contrary of a burial such as becomes a man (the body of Artaxerxes Ochus

was thrown to the cats); whereupon Elster rightly remarks that in an honourable burial and an honourable remembrance, good fortune, albeit shaded with sadness, might be seen. But when now, to one so rich in children and so long-lived, neither enjoyment of his good fortune nor even this shaded glory of an honourable burial is allowed, the author cannot otherwise judge than that the untimely birth is better than he. In this section regarding the uncertainty of riches, we have already, v. 14, fallen on a reminiscence from the Book of Job; it is so much the more probable that here also Job iii. 16 has an influence on the formation of the thought.  $\text{לֵבָרֶךְ}$  is the foetus which comes lifeless from the mother's womb.

Vers. 4, 5. The comparison of an untimely birth with such a man is in favour of the former: "For it cometh in nothingness and departeth in darkness; and with darkness its name is covered. Moreover, it hath not seen the sun, and hath not known: it is better with it than with that other." It has entered into existence,  $\text{לֵבָרֶךְ}$ , because it was a lifeless existence into which it entered when its independent life should have begun; and  $\text{לֵבָרֶךְ}$ , it departeth, for it is carried away in all quietness, without noise or ceremony, and "with darkness" its name is covered, for it receives no name and remains a nameless existence, and is forgotten as if it had never been. Not having entered into a living existence, it is also (*yaam*) thus happy to have neither seen the sun nor known and named it, and thus it is spared the sight and the knowledge of all the vanities and evils, the deceptions and sorrows, that are under the sun. When we compare its fate with the long joyless life of that man, the conclusion is apparent:  $\text{שָׁלוֹם . . . טוֹב}$ , *plus quietis et huius yaam illi*, which, with the generalization of the idea of rest (Job iii. 13) in a wider sense (*vid.* above, p. 194), is = *quietis et huius yaam illi* ( $\text{שָׁלוֹם . . . טוֹב}$ , as at iii. 19). The generalization of the idea proceeds yet further in the Mishn.  $\text{טוֹב טוֹב}$ , *e.g.*: "It is better ( $\text{טוֹב וְטוֹב}$ ) for a man that he throw himself into a lime-kiln than that ( $\text{טוֹב}$ ), etc." From this usage Symm. renders  $\text{שָׁלוֹם . . . טוֹב}$  as obj. to  $\text{לֹא יָרַע}$ , and translates: *οὐδὲ ἐπαπαθῆ διαφθορᾶς ἑτέρου πράγματος πρὸς ἕτερον*; and Jerome: *neque cognovi disidentiam boni et malæ*,—a rendering which is to be rejected, because thus the point of the comparison in which it terminates is broken, for *5b* draws the *facti*. It is true that this contains a thought to which it is not easy to reconcile oneself. For supposing that life were not in itself, as over against non-existence, a good, there is yet scarcely any life that is absolutely joyless; and a man who has become the father of an hundred children, has, as it appears, sought the enjoyment of life principally in sexual love, and then

also has found it richly. But also, if we consider his life less as relating to sense: his children, though not all, yet partly, will have been a joy to him; and has a family life, so lengthened and rich in blessings, only thorns, and no roses at all? And, moreover, how can anything be said of the rest of an untimely birth, which has been without motion and without life, as of a rest excelling the termination of the life of him who has lived long, since rest without a subjective reflection, a rest not felt, certainly does not fall under the point of view of more or less, good or evil? The saying of the author on no side bears the probe of exact thinking. In the main he designs to say: Better, certainly, is no life than a joyless life, and, moreover, one ending dishonourably. And this is only a speciality of the general clause, iv. 2 f., that death is better than life, and not being born is better than both. The author misunderstands the fact that the earthly life has its chief end beyond itself; and his false eudaemonism, failing to penetrate to the inward fountain of true happiness, which is independent of the outward lot, makes exaggerated and ungrateful demands on the earthly life.

Ver. 6. A life extending to more than even a thousand years without enjoyment appears to him worthless: "And if he has lived twice a thousand years long, and not seen good—Do not all go hence to one place?" This long period of life, as well as the shortest, sinks into the night of Sheol, and has advantage over the shortest if it wants the *רצונו*, i.e. the enjoyment of that which can make man happy. That would be correct if "good" were understood inwardly, ethically, spiritually; but although, according to Koheleth's view, the fear of God presides over the enjoyment of life, regulating and hallowing it, yet it remains unknown to him that life deepened into fellowship with God is in itself a most real and blessed, and thus the highest good. Regarding *אלף* (here, as at Esth. vii. 4, with perf. foll.: *etsi vixisset, tamen interrogarem: nonne*, etc.), *vid.* above, p. 191; it occurs also in the oldest liturgical *Tefilla*, as well as in the prayer *Nishmath* (*vid.* Baer's *Siddur, Abodath Jisrael*, p. 207). *אלף . . . פ' . . . אלף*, a thousand years twice, and thus an Adam's life once and yet again. Otherwise Aben Ezra: 1000 years multiplied by itself, thus a million, like *עשרים פעמים*,  $20 \times 20 = 400$ ; cf. Targ. Isa. xxx. 26, which translates *שבעות* by  $343 = 7 \times 7 \times 7$ . Perhaps that is right; for why was not the expression *אלפים שנה* directly used? The "one place" is, as at iii. 20, the grave and Hades, into which all the living fall. A life extending even to a million of years is worthless, for it terminates at last in nothing. Life has only as much value as it yields of enjoyment.



*ἀνδρῶν ἀντιπαρὸς τῆς ζωῆς*, is not clear; scarcely as Gratz, with Mendelssohn: who, to go against (נגד, as at iv. 12) life, to fight against it, has to exercise himself in self-denial and patience; for “to fight with life” is an expression of modern coinage. ‘חַיָּה signifies here, without doubt, not life, but the living. But we explain now, not as Ewald, who separates נגד from the foll. inf. לִלְךָ: What profit has then the wise man, the intelligent, patient man, above the fool, that he walks before the living?—by which is meant (but how does this interrog. form agree thereto חַיָּה, that the wise, patient man has thereby an advantage which makes life endurable by him, in this, that he does not suffer destroying eagerness of desire so to rule over him, but is satisfied to live in quietness. Also this meaning of a quiet life does not lie in the words ‘חַיָּה . . . לִלְךָ. “To know to walk before the living” is, as is now generally acknowledged—to understand the right rule of life (Eilat.), to possess the *savoir vivre* (Heiligst.), to be experienced in the right art of living. The question accordingly is: What advantage has the wise above the fool; and what the poor, who, although poor, yet knows how to maintain his social position? The matter treated of is the insatiable nature of sensual desire. The wise seeks to control his desire; and he who is more closely designated poor, knows how to conceal it; for he lays upon himself restraints, that he may be able to appear and make something of himself. But desire is present in both; and they have in this nothing above the fool, who follows the bent of his desire and lives for the day. He is a fool because he acts as one not free, and without consideration; but, in itself, it is and remains true, that enjoyment and satisfaction stand higher than striving and longing for a thing.

Ver. 9. “Better is the sight of the eyes than the wandering of the soul: also this is vain and windy effort.” We see from the inf. הִלֵּךְ interchanging with הִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה that the latter is not meant of the object (xi. 9), but of the action, viz. the “rejoicing in that which one has” (Targ.); but this does not signify *grassatio*,—i.e. *impetus animae appetentis*, ὁρμηὶ τῆς ψυχῆς (cf. *Marcus Aurelius*, iii. 16), which Knobel, Heiligst., and Ginsburg compare (for הִלֵּךְ means *grassari* only with certain subjects, as fire, contagion, and the like; and in certain forms, as הִלֵּךְ for הִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה, to which הִלֵּךְ = הִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה does not belong),—but *erratio*, a going out in extent, roving to a distance (cf. הִלֵּךְ, wanderer), περιπατῶν ἐπιθυμίας, Wied. iv. 12.—Going is the contrast of rest; the soul which does not become full or satisfied goes out, and seeks and reaches not its aim. This insatiableness, characteristic of the soul, this endless unrest, belongs also to the miseries of this present life; for to have and to enjoy is better than this constant

*Hungern and Längern* [hungering and longing]. More must not be put into 9a than already lies in it, as Elster does: "the only enduring enjoyment of life consists in the quiet contemplation of that which, as pleasant and beautiful, it affords, without this mental joy mingling with the desire for the possession of sensual enjoyment." The conception of "the sight of the eyes" is certainly very beautifully idealized, but in opposition to the text. If 9a must be a moral proverb, then Luther's rendering is the best: "It is better to enjoy the present good, than to think about other good."

THE WEAKNESS AND SHORT-SIGHTEDNESS OF MAN OVER AGAINST  
HIS DESTINY.—VI. 10-12.

The future, toward which the soul stretches itself out to find what may satisfy it, is not man's: a power against which man is helpless fashions it.

Ver. 10. "That which hath been, its name hath long ago been named; and it is determined what a man shall be; and he cannot dispute with Him who is stronger than he." According to the usage of the tense, it would be more correct to translate: That which (at any time) has made its appearance, the name of which was long ago named, *i.e.* of which the *What?* and the *How?* were long ago determined, and, so to speak, formulated. This 'ע' . . . נֶכְדָּר does not stand parallel to כָּבֹד קֵץ, i. 10; for the expression here does not refer to the sphere of that which is done, but of the predetermination. Accordingly, אֵין . . . יֵשׁ is also to be understood. Against the accents, inconsistently periodizing and losing sight of the comprehensiveness of אֵין . . . אִשֶּׁר, Hitzig renders: "and it is known that, if one is a man, he cannot contend," etc., which is impossible for this reason, that אֵין אִשֶּׁר cannot be a conditional clause enclosed within the sentence אֵין . . . אִשֶּׁר. Obviously אֵין, which in the sense of *constat* would be a useless waste of words, stands parallel to נֶכְדָּר יָדוּעַ, and signifies known, *viz.* previously known, as passive of יָדָע, in the sense of Zech. xiv. 7; cf. Ps. cxxxix. 1 f. Bullock rightly compares Acts xv. 18. After אִשֶּׁר, *asher*, like *ei*, which is more common, may signify "that," viii. 12, Ezek. xx. 26; but neither "that he is a man" (Knobel, Valh., Luzz., Hengst., Ginsb.), nor "that he is the man" (Ewald, Elst., Zöckler), affords a consistent meaning. As *mah* after *yela'* means *quid*, so *asher* after it may mean *quod* = that which (cf. Dan. viii. 19, although it does not at all stand in need of proof); and *id quod homo est* (we cannot render אִשֶּׁר without the expression of a definite conception of time) is intended to mean that

the whole being of a man, whether of this one or that one, at all times and on all sides, is previously known; cf. to this pregnant substantival sentence, xii. 13. Against this formation of his nature and of his fate by a higher hand, man cannot utter a word.

The thought in 10b is the same as that at Isa. xlv. 9; Rom. ix. 20 f. The *Chetib* <sup>1</sup>יִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה is not inadmissible, for the stronger than man is <sup>2</sup>יִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה . . . יִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה. Also יִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה might in any case be read: with one who overcomes him, has and manifests the ascendancy over him. There is indeed no *Hiph.* 'הָ found in the language of the Bible (Herzl. and Fürst compare 'הָ, Ps. xii. 5); but in the Targ., יִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה is common; and in the school-language of the Talm., 'הָ is used of the raising of weighty objections, e.g. *Kamma* 71a. The verb, however, especially in the perf., is in the passage before us less appropriate. In לֹא יִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה lie together the ideas of physical (cf. Gen. xliii. 32; Deut. xii. 17, xvi. 5, etc.) and moral inability.

Ver. 11. "For there are many words which increase vanity: What cometh forth therefrom for man?" The dispute (objection), דִּין, takes place in words; דְּבָרִים here will thus not mean "things" (Hengst., Ginsb., Zoekl., Bullock, etc.), but "words." As that wrestling or contending against God's decision and providence is vain and worthless, nothing else remains for man but to be submissive, and to acknowledge his limitation by the fear of God; thus there are also many words which only increase yet more the multitude of vanities already existing in this world, for, because they are resultless, they bring no advantage for man. Rightly, Elster finds herein a hint pointing to the influence of the learning of the Jewish schools already existing in Koheleth's time. We know from Josephus that the problem of human freedom and of God's absolute-ness was a point of controversy between opposing parties: the Sadducees so emphasized human freedom, that they not only excluded (*Antt.* xiii. 5. 9; *Bell.* ii. 8. 14) all divine predetermination, but also co-operation; the Pharisees, on the contrary, supposed an interconnection between divine predetermination (εἰμαρμένη) and human freedom (*Antt.* xiii. 5. 9, xviii. 1. 3; *Bell.* ii. 8. 14). The Talm. affords us a glance at this controversy; but the statement in the Talm. (in *Berachoth* 33a, and elsewhere), which conditions all by the power of God manifesting itself in history, but defends the freedom of the religious-moral self-determination of man, may be regarded as a Pharisaic maxim. In Rom. ix., Paul places himself on

<sup>1</sup> With *He* unpointed, because it is omitted in the *Keri*, as in like manner in 'קִשָּׁה, x. 3, 'שָׁה, Lam. v. 18. In the bibl. Rabb., the ה is noted as superfluous.

this side; and the author of the Book of Koheleth would subscribe this passage as his testimony, for the "fear God" is the "*kern und stern*" [kernel and star] of his pessimistic book.

Ver. 12. Man ought to fear God, and also, without dispute and mourning, submit to His way: "For who knoweth what is good for man in life during the number of the days of his vain life, and which he spendeth like a shadow? No one can certainly show a man what shall be after him under the sun." We translate *וְיָדָע* only by "*ja*" ("certainly"), because in Germ. no interrogative can follow "*darum*" ("because"). The clause with *uaber* (as at iv. 9, vii. 11, x. 15; cf. Song. under v. 2), according to its meaning not different from *hi* is retained in the way of proof to that beginning with *hi*. Man is placed in our presence. To be able to say to him what is good for him,—i.e. what position he must take in life, what direction he must give to his activity, what decision he must adopt in difficult and important cases,—we ought not only to be able to penetrate his future, but, generally, the future; but, as *Tropfen* [drops] in the stream of history, we are poor *Tropfe* [simpletons], who are hedged up within the present. Regarding the *secus* of duration, *וְיָדָע* pointing to the brevity of human life, *עַל* at ii. 3. With *וְיָדָע* the attribute of breath-like transiency is assigned to life (as at vii. 15, ix. 9) (as already in the name given to Abel, the second son of Adam), which is continued by *וְיָדָע* with the force of a relative clause, which is frequently the case after preceding part. attrib., e.g. Isa. v. 25. We translate: which he spendeth like the (a) shadow [in the nom.] (after vii. 13; Job xiv. 2); not: like a shadow [in the accus.]; for although the days of life are also likened to a shadow, Ps. cxliv. 4, etc., yet this use of *וְיָדָע* does not accord therewith, which, without being a Græcism (Zirkel, Grata), harmonises with the Greek phrase, *τοὐτοῦ χρόνου*, Acts xv. 33; cf. Prov. xiii. 23, LXX. (also with the Lat. *facere dies* of Cicero, etc.). Thus also in the Syr. and Palest.-Aram. *decid* is used of time, in the sense of *transigere*. *Adarum* does not mean: after his present condition (Zöckl); but, as at iii. 22, vii. 14: after he has passed away from this scene. Luzz. explains it correctly: Whether his children will remain in life? Whether the wealth he has wearied himself in acquiring will remain and be useful to them? But these are only illustrations. The author means to say, that a man can say, neither to himself nor to another, what in definite cases is the real advantage; because, in order to say this, he must be able to look far into the future beyond the limits of the individual life of man, which is only a small member of a great whole.

## SECOND CONCLUDING SECTION.

PROVERBS OF BETTER THINGS, THINGS SUPPOSED TO BE BETTER, GOOD THINGS, GOOD AND BAD DAYS.—VII. 1-14.

We find ourselves here in the middle of the book. Of its 220 verses, vi. 10 is that which stands in the middle, and with vii. 1 begins the third of the four *Sedarim*<sup>1</sup> into which the Masora divides the book. The series of proverbs here first following, vii. 1-10, has, as we remarked above, p. 189, the word *tov* as their common catch-word, and *mah-tov*, vi. 12, as the hook on which they hang. But at least the first three proverbs do not stand merely in this external connection with the preceding; they continue the lowly and dark estimate of the earthly life contained in vi. 3 ff.

The first proverb is a synthetic distich. The thought aimed at is that of the second half of the distich.

vii. 1. "Better is a name than precious ointment; and better is the day of death than the day when one is born." Like נֶחֱם and יָרָא, so שֵׁם and יוֹם stand to each other in the relation of a paronomasia (*vid.* Song under i. 3). Luther translates: "*Ein gut Gerücht ist besser denn gute Salbe*" ["a good odour (= reputation) is better than good ointment]. If we substitute the expression *denn Wolgeruch* [than sweet scent], that would be the best possible rendering of the paronomasia. In the arrangement שֵׁם טוֹב . . . טוֹב, *tov* would be adj. to *shem* (a good reputation goes beyond sweet scent); but *tov* standing first in the sentence is pred., and *shem* thus in itself alone, as in the cogn. prov., Prov. xxii. 1, signifies a good, well-sounding, honourable, if not venerable name; cf. *anshe hashshem*, Gen. vi. 4; *v'li-shem*, nameless, Job xxx. 8. The author gives the dark reverse to this bright side of the distich: the day of death better than the day in which one (a man), or he (the man), is born; cf. for this reference of the pronoun, iv. 12, v. 17. It is the same lamentation as at iv. 2 f., which sounds less strange from the mouth of a Greek than from that of an Israelite; a Thracian tribe, the Trausi, actually celebrated their birthdays as days of sadness, and the day of death as a day of rejoicing (*vid.* Bähr's Germ. transl. of *Herodotus*, v. 4).—Among the people of the Old Covenant this was not possible; also a saying such as 1b is not in the spirit of the O. T. revelation of religion;

<sup>1</sup> Of three books the Masora gives only the number of verses: Ruth, 85 verses; Shir (the Song), 117 verses; and Kinoh (Lamentations), 154; but no sections (*Sedarim*).

yet it is significant that it was possible<sup>1</sup> within it, without apostasy from it; within the N. T. revelation of religion, except in such references as Matt. xxvi. 24, it is absolutely impossible without apostasy from it, or without rejection of its fundamental meaning.

Ver. 2. Still more in the spirit of the N. T. (cf. *e.g.* Luke vi. 25) are these words of this singular book which stands on the border of both Testaments: "It is better to go into a house of mourning than to go into a house of carousal (drinking); for that is the end of every man; and the living layeth it to heart." A house is meant in which there is sorrow on account of a death; the lamentation continued for seven days (Sirach xxii. 10), and extended sometimes, as in the case of the death of Aaron and Moses, to thirty days; the later practice distinguished the lamentations (אֲנָחָה) for the dead till the time of burial, and the mournings for the dead (אֲבָלָה), which were divided into seven and twenty-three days of greater and lesser mourning; on the return from carrying away the corpse, there was a *Trostmahl* (a comforting repast), to which, according as it appears to an ancient custom, those who were to be partakers of it contributed (Jer. xvi. 7; Hos. ix. 4; Job iv. 17, *funde vinum tuum et panem tuum super sepulchra iustorum*).<sup>2</sup> This feast of sorrow the above proverb leaves out of view, although also in reference to it the contrast between the "house of carousal" and "house of mourning" remains, that in the latter the drinking must be in moderation, and not to drunkenness.<sup>3</sup> The going into the house of mourning is certainly thought of as a visit for the purpose of showing sympathy and of imparting consolation during the first seven days of mourning (John xi. 31).<sup>4</sup> Thus to go into the house of sorrow, and to show one's sympathy with the mourners there, is better than to go into a house of drinking, where all is festivity and merriment; viz. because the former (that he is mourned over as dead) is the end of every man, and the survivor takes it to heart, viz. this, that he too must die. מָוֶה follows attractionally the gender of סָרָה (cf. Job xxxi. 11, *Kere*). What is said at iii. 13 regarding מָוֶה is appropriate to the passage before us. מָוֶה is rightly vocalised; regarding the

<sup>1</sup> "The reflections of the Preacher," says Hitzig (*Saal. deut. ex. protest. Woch. Blatt*, 1864, No. 2), "present the picture of a time in which men, participating in the recollection of a mighty religious past, and become sceptical by reason of the sadness of the present time, grasping here and there in uncertainty, were in danger of abandoning that steadfastness of faith which was the first mark of the religion of the prophets."

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Hamb. *Real Encyc. für Bibel u. Talmud* (1870), article "Trauer."

<sup>3</sup> Maimuni's *Hilchoth Ebel*, iv. 7, xiii. 8.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* xiii. 2.

form *נָתַן*, *vid.* Baer in the critical remarks of our ed. of *Isaiah* under iii. 22. The phrase *נָתַן אֱלֹהִים* here and at ix. 1 is synon. with *שִׂים עַל־לֵב* (*e.g.* Isa. lvii. 1) and *שִׂים בְּלֵב*. How this saying agrees with Koheleth's *ultimatum*: There is nothing better than to eat and drink, etc. (ii. 24, etc.), the Talmudists have been utterly perplexed to discover; Manasse ben-Israel in his *Conciliador* (1632) loses himself in much useless discussion.<sup>1</sup> The solution of the difficulty is easy. The *ultimatum* does not relate to an unconditional enjoyment of life, but to an enjoyment conditioned by the fear of God. When man looks death in the face, the two things occur to him, that he should make use of his brief life, but make use of it in view of the end, thus in a manner for which he is responsible before God.

Vers. 3, 4. The joy of life must thus be not riot and tumult, but a joy tempered with seriousness: "Better is sorrow than laughter: for with a sad countenance it is well with the heart. The heart of the wise is in the house of mourning, and the heart of fools in the house of mirth." Grief and sorrow, *בָּעֵם*, whether for ourselves or occasioned by others, is better, *viz.* morally better, than extravagant merriment; the heart is with *רַע פֶּה* (*inf.* as *רַע*, Jer. vii. 6; *cf.* *פֶּה רַע*, Gen. xl. 7; Neh. ii. 2), a sorrowful countenance, better than with laughter, which only masks the feeling of disquiet peculiar to man, Prov. xiv. 13. Elsewhere *לֵב טוֹב* = "the heart is (may be) of good cheer," *e.g.* Ruth iii. 7, Judg. xix. 6; here also joyful experience is meant, but well becoming man as a religious moral being. With a sad countenance it may be far better as regards the heart than with a merry countenance in boisterous company. Luther, in the main correct, after Jerome, who on his part follows Symmachus: "The heart is made better by sorrow." The well-being is here meant as the reflex of a moral: *bene se habere*.

Sorrow penetrates the heart, draws the thought upwards, purifies, transforms. Therefore is the heart of the wise in the house of sorrow; and, on the other hand, the heart of fools is in the house of joy, *i.e.* the impulse of their heart goes thither, there they feel themselves at home; a house of joy is one where there are continual feasts, or where there is at the time a revelling in joy. That ver. 4 is divided not by *Athnach*, but by *Zakef*, has its reason in this, that of the words following *אֲבָל*, none consists of three syllables; *cf.* on the contrary, vii. 7, *הִכָּהֵם*. From this point forward the internal relation of the contents is broken up, according to which this series of

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* the English translation by Lindo (London 1842), vol. ii. pp. 306-309.

sayings as a concluding section hangs together with that containing the observations going before in ch. vi.

Vers. 5, 6. A fourth proverb of that which is better (טוב כן) presents, like the third, the fools and the wise over against each other: "Better to hear the reproof of a wise man, than that one should hear the song of fools. For like the crackling of *Nessel* (nettles) under the *Kessel* (kettle), so the laughter of the fool: also this is vain." As at Prov. xiii. 1, xvii. 10, נקרא is the earnest and severe words of the wise, which impressively reprove, emphatically warn, and salutarily alarm. שיר in itself means only song, to the exclusion, however, of the plaintive song; the song of fools is, if not immoral, yet morally and spiritually hollow, senseless, and unbridled madness. Instead of נקרא, the words שיר וסוד are used, for the twofold act of hearing is divided between different subjects. A fire of thorn-twigs flickers up quickly and crackles merrily, but also exhausts itself quickly (Ps. cxviii. 12), without sufficiently boiling the flesh in the pot; whilst a log of wood, without making any noise, accomplishes this quietly and surely. We agree with Knobel and Vaihinger in copying the paronomasia [*Nessel*—*Kessel*]. When, on the other hand, Zöckler remarks that a fire of nettles could scarcely crackle, we advise our friend to try it for once in the end of summer with a bundle of stalks of tall dry nettles. They yield a clear blaze, a quickly expiring fire, to which here, as he well remarks, the empty laughter of foolish men is compared, who are devoid of all earnestness, and of all deep moral principles of life. This laughter is vain, like that crackling. There is a hiatus between vers. 6 and 7. For how ver. 7 can be related to ver. 6 as furnishing evidence, no interpreter has as yet been able to say. Hitzig regards 6a as assigning a reason for ver. 5, but 6b as a reply (as ver. 7 containing its motive shows) to the assertion of ver. 5,—a piece of ingenious thinking which no one imitates. Elster translates: "Yet injustice befools a wise man," being prudently silent about this "yet." Zöckler finds, as Knobel and Ewald do, the mediating thought in this, that the vanity of fools infects and also easily befools the wise. But the subject spoken of is not the folly of fools in general, but of their singing and laughter, to which ver. 7 has not the most remote reference. Otherwise Hengst.: "In ver. 7, the reason is given why the happiness of fools is so brief; first, the *mens sana* is lost, and then destruction follows." But in that case the words ought to have been ואלו כסיל; the remark, that חכם here denotes one who ought to be and might be such, is a pure *colte*. Ginsburg thinks that the two verses are co-ordinated by כי; that ver. 6 gives the reason for

5*b*, and ver. 7 that for 5*a*, since here, by way of example, one accessible to bribery is introduced, who would act prudently in letting himself therefore be directed by a wise man. But if he had wished to be thus understood, the author would have used another word instead of חכם, 7*a*, and not designated both him who reproves and him who merits reproof by the one word—the former directly, the latter at least indirectly. We do not further continue the account of the many vain attempts that have been made to bring ver. 7 into connection with vers. 6 and 5. Our opinion is, that ver. 7 is the second half of a tetrastich, the first half of which is lost, which began, as is to be supposed, with *tor*. The first half was almost the same as Ps. xxxvii. 16, or better still, as Prov. xvi. 8, and the whole proverb stood thus:

טוב מעט בעדקה  
 מרב תבואות בלא משפט:

[and then follows ver. 7 as it lies before us in the text, formed into a distich, the first line of which terminates with החכם]. We go still further, and suppose that after the first half of the tetrastich was lost, that expression, “also this is vain,” added to ver. 6 by the punctuation, was inserted for the purpose of forming a connection for כי עשק: Also this is vain, that, etc. (כי, like *asher*, viii. 14).

Ver. 7. Without further trying to explain the mystery of the כי, we translate this verse: “. . . For oppression maketh wise men mad, and corruption destroyeth the understanding.” From the lost first half of the verse, it appears that the subject here treated of is the duties of a judge, including those of a ruler into whose hands his subjects, with their property and life, are given. The second half is like an echo of Ex. xxiii. 8, Deut. xvi. 19. That which שחר there means is here, as at Prov. xv. 27, denoted by מתנה; and עשק is accordingly oppression as it is exercised by one who constrains others who need legal aid and help generally to purchase it by means of presents. Such oppression for the sake of gain, even if it does not proceed to the perversion of justice, but only aims at courting and paying for favour, makes a wise man mad (הויל, as at Job xii. 17; Isa. xliv. 25), *i.e.* it hurries him forth, since the greed of gold increases more and more, to the most blinding immorality and regardlessness; and such presents for the purpose of swaying the judgment, and of bribery, destroys the heart, *i.e.* the understanding (cf. Hos. iv. 11, *Bereschith rabba*, ch. lvi.), for they obscure the judgment, blunt the conscience, and make a man the slave of his passion. The conjecture העשר (riches) instead of the word

הַעֲלֵךְ (Burger, as earlier Ewald) is accordingly unnecessary; it has the parallelism against it, and thus generally used gives an untrue thought. The word הֵאֲרִי does not mean "gives lustre" (Desvieux), or "makes shine forth = makes manifest" (Tyler); thus also nothing is gained for a better connection of ver. 7 with ver. 6. The Venet. excellently: *ἐαστήσεται*. Aben Ezra supposes that מַתְנֵה is here = מֵהָרָג; Mendelssohn repeats it, although otherwise the consciousness of the syntactical rule, Gesen. § 147a, does not fail him.

Vers. 8, 9. There now follows a fourth, or, taking into account the mutilated one, a fifth proverb of that which is better: "Better the end of a thing than its beginning; better one who forbears than one who is haughty. Hasten thyself not in thy spirit to become angry: for anger lieth down in the bosom of fools." The clause 8a is first thus to be objectively understood as it stands. It is not without limitation true; for of a matter in itself evil, the very contrary is true, Prov. v. 4, xliii. 32. But if a thing is not in itself evil, the end of its progress, the reaching to its goal, the completion of its destination, is always better than its beginning, which leaves it uncertain whether it will lead to a prosperous issue. An example of this is Solon's saying to Croesus, that only he is to be pronounced happy whose good fortune it is to end his life well in the possession of his wealth (*Herod. i. 32*).

The proverb 8b will stand in some kind of connection with 8a, since what it says is further continued in ver. 9. In itself, the frequently long and tedious development between the beginning and the end of a thing requires expectant patience. But if it is in the interest of a man to see the matter brought to an issue, an *'עַל אֵל* will, notwithstanding, wait with self-control in all quietness for the end; while it lies in the nature of the *עַל אֵל*, the haughty, to fret at the delay, and to seek to reach the end by violent means; for the haughty man thinks that everything must at once be subservient to his wish, and he measures what others should do by his own measureless self-complacency. We may with Hitzig translate: "Better is patience (*אֵל = אֵל*) than haughtiness" (*עַל אֵל*, inf., as *עַל*, xii. 4; Prov. xvi. 19). But there exists no reason for this; *עַל אֵל* is not to be held, as at Prov. xvi. 5, and elsewhere generally, as the connecting form of *עַל אֵל*, and so *אֵל* for that of *אֵל*; it amounts to the same thing whether the two properties (characters) or the persons possessing them are compared.

Ver. 9. In this verse the author warns against this pride which, when everything does not go according to its mind, falls into passionate excitement, and thoughtlessly judges, or with a violent rude

hand anticipates the end. 'אל-תרב' : do not overturn, hasten not, rush not, as at v. 1. Why the word ברִיחַךְ, and not בנפִשְׁךְ or בלִבְךְ, is used, *vid. Psychol.* pp. 197-199 : passionate excitements overcome a man according to the biblical representation of his spirit, Prov. xxv. 28, and in the proving of the spirit that which is in the heart comes forth in the mood and disposition, Prov. xv. 13. כַּעַס is an infin., like יִשָּׁן, v. 11. The warning has its reason in this, that anger or (כַּעַס, taken more potentially than actually) fretfulness rests in the bosom of fools, i.e. is cherished and nourished, and thus is at home, and, as it were (thought of personally, as if it were a wicked demon), feels itself at home (יָנִיחַ, as at Prov. xiv. 33). The haughty impetuous person, and one speaking out rashly, thus acts like a fool. In fact, it is folly to let oneself be impelled by contradictions to anger, which disturbs the brightness of the soul, takes away the considerateness of judgment, and undermines the health, instead of maintaining oneself with equanimity, i.e. without stormy excitement, and losing the equilibrium of the soul under every opposition to our wish.

From this point the proverb loses the form "better than," but *toṽ* still remains the catchword of the following proverbs. The proverb here first following is so far cogn., as it is directed against a particular kind of *ka'as* (anger), viz. discontentment with the present.

Ver. 10. "Say not : How comes it that the former times were better than these now ? for thou dost not, from wisdom, ask after this." Cf. these lines from Horace (*Poet.* 173, 4) :

*"Difficilis, querulus, laudator temporis acti  
Se puero, censor castigatore minorum."*

Such an one finds the earlier days—not only the old days described in history (Deut. iv. 32), but also those he lived in before the present time (cf. *e.g.* 2 Chron. ix. 29)—thus by contrast so much better than the present ones, that in astonishment he asks : "What is it = how comes it that?" etc. The author designates this question as one not proceeding from wisdom : מִחָךְ, like the Mishnic מִחוּךְ הַכֶּמֶה, and שְׂאֵל עַל, as at Neh. i. 2 ; 'al-zeh refers to that question, after the ground of the contrast, which is at the same time an exclamation of wonder. The כִּי, assigning a reason for the dissuasion, does not mean that the cause of the difference between the present and the good old times is easily seen ; but it denotes that the supposition of this difference is foolish, because in truth every age has its bright and its dark sides ; and this division of light and shadow between the past and the present betrays a want of understanding

of the signs of the times and of the ways of God. This proverb does not furnish any point of support for the determination of the date of the authorship of the Book of Koheleth (*vid.* above, p. 213). But if it was composed in the last century of the Persian domination, this dissatisfaction with the present times is explained, over against which Koheleth leads us to consider that it is self-deception and one-sidedness to regard the present as all dark and the past as all bright and rosy.

Vers. 11, 12. Extensively connecting itself with "from wisdom," there now follows another proverb, which declares that wisdom along with an inheritance is good, but that wisdom is nevertheless of itself better than money and possessions: "Wisdom is good with family possessions, and an advantage for those who see the sun. For wisdom affordeth a shadow, money affordeth a shadow; yet the advantage of knowledge is this, that wisdom preserveth life to its possessor." Most of the English interpreters, from Deauxeux to Tyle, translate: "Wisdom is as good as an inheritance;" and Bullenk, who translates: "with an inheritance," says of this and the other translations: "The difference is not material." But the thought is different, and thus the distinction is not merely a formal one. Zöckl explains it as undoubted that עַד here, as at ii. 16 (*vid.* *loc.*), means *acque ac*; but (1) that *acque ac* has occurred to no ancient translator, till the Venet. and Luther, nor to the Syr., which translates: "better is wisdom than weapons (סִימָה סִימָה)," in a singular way making 11a a *replète* of ix. 13a; (2) instead of "wisdom is as good as wealth," would much rather be said: "wisdom is better than wealth," as e.g. Prov. viii. 11; (3) the proverb is formed like *Athek* E. 2, "good is simply connected with a citizen-like occupation," and similar proverbs; (4) one may indeed say: "the wise man dieth with (together with) the fool" = just as well as the fool; but "good is wisdom with wealth" can neither be equivalent to "as well as wealth," nor: "in comparison with wealth" (Ewald, Elster), but only: "in connection with wealth (possessions);" *acque ac* may be translated for *san* cases where the subject is common action and suffering, but not in a substantival clause consisting of a subst. as subject and an adj. as pred., having the form of a categorical judgment. עֲרִשָּׁה denotes a possession inherited and hereditary (*cf.* Prov. xx. 21); and this is evidence in favour of the view that עַד is meant not of comparison, but of connection; the expression would otherwise be עַד עַד. עַד is now also explained. It is not to be rendered: "and better still" (than wealth), as Herzf., Hitz., and Hengst. render it; but in spite of Hengst., who decides in his own way, "עַד never means

advantage, gain," it denotes a prevailing good, *avantage* (*vid.* above, p. 192); and it is explained also why men are here named "those who see the sun"—certainly not merely thus describing them poetically, as in Homer ζῶειν is described and coloured by ὁρᾶν φάος ἡελίοιο. To see the sun, is = to have entered upon this earthly life, in which, along with wisdom, also no inheritance is to be despised. For wisdom affords protection as well as money, but the former still more than the latter. So far, the general meaning of ver. 12 is undisputed. But how is 12a to be construed? Knobel, Hitz., and others regard 2 as the so-called *both essential*: a shadow (protection) is wisdom, a shadow is money,—very expressive, yet out of harmony, if not with the language of that period, yet with the style of Koheleth; and how useless and misleading would this doubled 2 be here! Hengstenberg translates: in the shadow of wisdom, in the shadow of silver; and Zöckler introduces between the two clauses "it is as." But (1) here the shadow of wisdom, at least according to our understanding of ver. 11, is not likened to the shadow of silver; but in conformity with that 2, it must be said that wisdom, and also that money, affords a shadow; (2) but that interpretation goes quite beyond the limits of gnomic brachyology. We explain: for in the shadow (צֶלַה, like בְּצֶלַח, Jonah iv. 5) is wisdom, in the shadow, money; by which, without any particularly bold poetic licence, is meant that he who possesses wisdom, he who possesses money, finds himself in a shadow, *i.e.* of pleasant security; to be in the shadow, spoken of wisdom and money, is = to sit in the shadow of the persons who possess both.

Ver. 12b. The exposition of this clause is agreed upon. It is to be construed according to the accentuation: and the advantage of knowledge is this, that "wisdom preserveth life to its possessors." The Targ. regards רַעַת הַחֲכָמָה as connected genit.; that might be possible (cf. i. 17, viii. 16), but yet is improbable. Wherever the author uses רַעַת as subst., it is an independent conception placed beside 'חָכְ, i. 16, ii. 26, etc. We now translate, not: wisdom gives life (LXX., Jerome, Venet., Luther) to its possessors; for חַיָּה always means only either to revive (thus Hengst., after Ps. cxix. 25; cf. lxxi. 20) or to keep in life; and this latter meaning is more appropriate to this book than the former,—thus (cf. Prov. iii. 18): wisdom preserves in life,—since, after Hitzig, it accomplishes this, not by rash utterances of denunciation,—a thought lying far behind ver. 10, and altogether too mean,—but since it secures it against self-destruction by vice and passions and emotions, *e.g.* anger (ver. 9), which consume life. The shadow in which wisdom (the wise man) sits keeps it fresh and sound,—a result which the shadow in which money (the

capitalist) sits does not afford: it has frequently the directly contrary effect.

Vers. 13, 14. There now follows a proverb of devout submission to the providence of God, connecting itself with the contents of ver. 10: "Consider the work of God: for who can make that straight which He hath made crooked! In the good day be of good cheer, and in the day of misfortune observe: God hath also made this equal to that, to the end that man need not experience anything (further) after his death." While חֲסֵךְ i. 10, vii. 27, 29, is not different from נִצֵּךְ, and in ix. 2 has the meaning of "enjoy," here the meaning of contemplative observation, mental seeing, connects itself both times with it. חֵץ before חֲסֵךְ can as little mean *quod*, as אשר, vi. 12, before וְאִי can mean *quoniam*. "Consider God's work" means: recognise in all that is done the government of God, which has its motive in this, that, as the question leads us to suppose, no creature is able (cf. vi. 10 and i. 15) to put right God's work in cases where it seems to contradict that which is right (Job vii. 3, xxiv. 12) or to make straight that which He has made crooked (Ps. cxlvi. 5).

Ver. 14a α. The call here expressed is parallel to Sir. xiv. 14 (Fritz.): "Withdraw not thyself from a good day, and let not thyself lose participation in a right enjoyment." The כ of נִצֵּךְ is, as little as that of נִצֵּךְ, the *both* *casualize*—it is not a designation of quality, but of condition: in good, i.e. cheerful mood. He who is, Jer. xlv. 17, personally *for*, cheerful (= *for her*), is בְּחֵךְ (cf. Ps. xxv. 13, also Job xxi. 13). The reverse side of the call, 14αβ, is of course not to be translated: and suffer or bear the bad day (Ewald, *Helltag*), for in this sense we use the expression חֲסֵךְ נִצֵּךְ, Jer. xlv. 17, but not נִצֵּךְ חֲסֵךְ, which much rather, Obad. 13, means a malicious contemplation of the misfortune of a stranger, although once, Gen. xxi. 16, כ חֲסֵךְ also occurs in the sense of a compassionate, sympathizing look, and, moreover, the parall. shows that נִצֵּךְ is not the obj., but the adv. designation of time. Also not: look to = be attentive to (Salomon), or bear it patiently (Burger), for חֲסֵךְ cannot of itself have that meaning.<sup>1</sup> But: in the day of misfortune observe, i.e. perceive and reflect: God has also made (cf. Job ii. 10) the latter נִצֵּךְ corresponding parallel, like to (cf. under v. 15) the former.

So much the more difficult is the statement of the object of this mingling by God of good and evil in the life of man. It is translated: that man may find nothing behind him; this is literal, but it is meaningless. The meaning, according to most interpreters, is

<sup>1</sup> Similarly also Sobar (Par. מִצְרָם): 'עַל מִצְרָם, i.e. *cave at circumspecte*, viz. that thou mayest not incur the judgment which is pronounced.

this : that man may investigate nothing that lies behind his present time,—thus, that belongs to the future ; in other words : that man may never know what is before him. But *aharav* is never (not at vi. 12) = in the future, lying out from the present of a man ; but always = after his present life. Accordingly, Ewald explains, and Heiligst. with him : that he may find nothing which, dying, he could take with him. But this rendering (cf. v. 14) is here unsuitable. Better, Hitzig : because God wills it that man shall be rid of all things after his death, He puts evil into the period of his life, and lets it alternate with good, instead of visiting him therewith after his death. This explanation proceeds from a right interpretation of the words : *idcirco ut* (cf. iii. 18) *non inveniat homo post se quidquam, scil. quod non expertus sit*, but gives a meaning to the expression which the author would reject as unworthy of his conception of God. What is meant is much more this, that God causes man to experience good and evil that he may pass through the whole school of life, and when he departs hence that nothing may be outstanding (in arrears) which he has not experienced.

CONTINUATION OF EXPERIENCES AND THEIR RESULTS.—VII. 15-IX. 12.

*The Injuriousness of Excesses, vii. 15-18.*

The concluding section, vii. 1-14, is now followed by *I*-sections, i.e. advices in the form of actually experienced facts, in which again the *I* of the author comes into the foreground.

Vers. 15-18. The first of these counsels warns against extremes, on the side of good as well as on that of evil : "All have I seen in the days of my vanity : there are righteous men who perish by their righteousness, and there are wicked men who continue long by their wickedness. Be not righteous over-much, and show not thyself wise beyond measure : why wilt thou ruin thyself ? Be not wicked over-much, and be no fool : why wilt thou die before thy time is ? It is good that thou holdest thyself to the one, and also from the other withdrawest not thine hand : for he that feareth God accomplisheth it all." One of the most original English interpreters of the Book of Koheleth, T. Tyler (1874), finds in the thoughts of the book—composed, according to his view, about 200 B.C.—and in their expression, references to the post-Aristotelian philosophy, particularly to the Stoic, variously interwoven with orientalism. But here, in vers. 15-18, we perceive, not so much the principle of the Stoical ethics—*τῇ φύσει ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν*—as that of the Aristotelian,

according to which virtue consists in the art *μῆτις* *ἐχέειν*, the art of holding the middle between extremes.<sup>1</sup> Also, we do not find here a reference to the contrasts between Pharisaism and Sadduceism (Zöckl), viz. those already in growth in the time of the author; for if it should be also true, as Tyley conjectures, that the Sadducees had such a predilection for Epicurism,—as, according to Josephus (*Var. t. 2*), “the doctrine of the Pharisees is of kin to that of the Stoics,”—yet *חכמה* and *מדות* are not appertained between these two parties, especially since the overstraining of conformity to the law by the Pharisees related not to the moral, but to the ceremonial law. We derive nothing for the right understanding of the passage from referring the wisdom of life here recommended to the tendencies of the time. The author proceeds from observation, over against which the O. T. saints knew not how to place any satisfying theodicy. *כֹּל הַיּוֹם* (*vid.* *et.* 12) he so designates the long, but for the most part uselessly spent life lying behind him. *כֹּל הַיּוֹם* is not “everything possible” (Zöckl), but “all, of all kinds” (Luth.), which is defined by 15b as of two kinds; for 15a is the introduction of the following experience relative to the righteous and the unrighteous, and thus to the two classes into which all men are divided. We do not translate: there are the righteous, who by their righteousness, etc. (*Uoibr. Hitzig*, and others); for if the author should thus commence, it would appear as if he wished to give unrighteousness the preference to righteousness, which, however, was far from him. To perish in or by his righteousness, to live long in or by his wickedness (*וְיָחַי, וְיָמֵי רַבִּים*, *vid.* 13, as at Prov. xxviii. 2), is = to die in spite of righteousness, to live in spite of wickedness, as e.g. Deut. i. 32: “in this thing” = in spite of, etc. Righteousness has the promise of long life as its reward; but if this is the rule, it has yet its exceptions, and the author thence deduces the doctrine that one should not exaggerate righteousness; for if it occurs that a righteous man, in spite of his righteousness, perishes, this happens, at earliest, in the case in which, in the practice of righteousness, he goes beyond the right measure and limit. The relative conceptions *מִדָּת* and *מִשְׁכָּל* have here, since they are referred to the idea of the right measure, the meaning of *modus*. *מִדָּת* could mean, “to play the wise man;” but that, whether more or less done, is objectionable. It means, as at Ex. i. 10, to act wisely (cf. Ps. cv. 25, *חָכָם*, to act cunningly). And *מִשְׁכָּל*, which is elsewhere used of being inwardly torpid, i.e. being astonished, *ἀσάπνοον*, has here the meaning of placing oneself in a

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Luther's *Lectures on the Moral Teachings of Christianity*, 2d ed. Edin., T. and T. Clark.

benumbed, disordered state, or also, passively, of becoming disconcerted; not of becoming desolate or being deserted (Hitz., Ginsburg, and others), which it could only mean in highly poetic discourse (Isa. liv. 1). The form <sup>הַיָּסֵד</sup> is syncope, like <sup>הַבֵּ</sup>, Num. xxi. 27; and the question, with <sup>לֹא</sup>, here and at 17b, is of the same kind as v. 5; Luther, weakening it: "that thou mayest not destroy thyself."

Ver. 17. Up to this point all is clear: righteousness and wisdom are good and wholesome, and worth striving for; but even in these a transgressing of the right measure is possible (Luther remembers the *summa juxta summa infamia*), which has as a consequence, that they become destructive to man, because he thereby becomes a caricature, and either perishes rushing from one extreme into another, or is removed out of the way by others whose hatred he provokes. But it is strange that the author now warns against an excess in wickedness, so that he seems to find wickedness, up to a certain degree, praiseworthy and advisable. So much the stranger, since "be no fool" stands as contrast to "show not thyself wise," etc.; so that "but also be no wicked person" was much rather to be expected as contrast to "be not righteous over-much." Zöckler seeks to get over this difficulty with the remark: "Kohleth does not recommend a certain moderation in wickedness as if he considered it allowable, but only because he recognises the fact as established, that every man is by nature somewhat wicked." The meaning would then be: man's life is not free from wickedness, but be only not too wicked! The offensiveness of the advice is not thus removed; and besides, 18a demands, in a certain sense, an intentional wickedness,—indeed, as 18b shows, a wickedness in union with the fear of God. The correct meaning of "be not wicked over-much" may be found if for <sup>תִּרְשַׁע</sup> we substitute <sup>הִתְרַשַּׁע</sup>; in this form the good counsel at once appears as impossible, for it would be immoral, since "sinning," in all circumstances, is an act which carries in itself its own sentence of condemnation. Thus <sup>רָשַׁע</sup> must here be a setting oneself free from the severity of the law, which, although sin in the eyes of the over-righteous, is yet no sin in itself; and the author here thinks, in accordance with the spirit of his book, principally of that fresh, free, joyous life to which he called the young, that joy of life in its fulness which appeared to him as the best and fairest reality in this present time; but along with that, perhaps also of transgressions of the letter of the law, of shaking off the scruples of conscience which conformity to God-ordained circumstances brings along with it. He means to say: be not a narrow rigorist,—enjoy life, accommodate thyself to life; but let not the reins be too loose; and be no fool who wantonly places

himself above law and discipline: Why wilt thou destroy thy life before the time by suffering vice to kill thee (Ps. xxxiv. 22), and by want of understanding ruin thyself (Prov. x. 21) ?<sup>1</sup>

Ver. 18. "It is good that thou holdest fast to the one,"—viz. righteousness and wisdom,—and withdrawest not thy hand from the other,—viz. a wickedness which renounces over-righteousness and over-wisdom, or an unrestrained life;—for he who fears God accomplishes all, *i.e.* both, the one as well as the other. Luther, against the Vulg.: "for he who fears God escapes all." But what "all"? Tyler, Bullock, and others reply: "All the perplexities of life;" but no such thing is found in the text here, however many perplexities may be in the book. Better, Zöckler: the evil results of the extreme of false righteousness as of bold wickedness. But that he does not destroy himself and does not die before his time, is yet only essentially one thing which he escapes; also, from ver. 15, only one thing, **וְנָשָׂא**, is taken. Thus either: the extremes (Umbr.), or: the extremes together with their consequences. The thought presents a connected, worthy conclusion. But if *et-kullam*, with its retrospective suffix, can be referred to that which immediately precedes, this ought to have the preference. Ginsburg, with Hitzig: "Whoso feareth God will make his way with both;" but what an improbable phrase! Jerome, with his vague *nil negligit*, is right as to the meaning. In the Bible, the phrase **וְ... כִּי**, *opimus est verbum*, Gen. xlv. 4, cf. Jer. x. 20, is used; and in the Mishna, **וְכִי כִּי**, *i.e.* he has discharged his duty, he is quit of it by fulfilling it. For the most part, **כִּי** merely is used: he has satisfied his duty; and **כִּי כִּי**, he has not satisfied it, *e.g.* *Berachoth* ii. 1. Accordingly **כִּי**—since *et-kullam* relates to, "these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone," Matt. xxiii. 23—here means: he who fears God will set himself free from all, will acquit himself of the one as well as of the other, will perform both, and thus preserve the golden *via media*.

*What protects him who with all his Righteousness is not free from Sin,  
and what becomes him, vii. 19-22.*

The thought with which the following sentence is introduced is not incongruous to that going before. But each one of these moral proverbs and aphorisms is in itself a little whole, and the deeper connections, in the discovery of which interpreters vie with each other,

<sup>1</sup> An old proverb, *Sota* 3a, says: "A man commits no transgression unless there rules in him previously the spirit of folly."

are destitute of exegetical value. One must not seek to be over-wise; but the possession of wisdom deserves to be highly valued.

Ver. 19. "Wisdom affords strong protection to the wise man more than ten mighty men who are in the city." We have to distinguish, as is shown under Ps. xxxi. 3, the verbs  $\text{עָזַר}$ , to be strong, and  $\text{נָצַח}$ , to flee for refuge;  $\text{מָצוֹן}$  is the fut. of the former, whence  $\text{מָצוֹן}$ , stronghold, safe retreat, protection, and with  $\text{ל}$ , since  $\text{עָזַר}$  means not only to be strong, but also to show oneself strong, as at ix. 20, to feel and act as one strong; it has also the trans. meaning, to strengthen, as shown in Ps. lxxviii. 29, but here the intrans. suffices: wisdom proves itself strong for the wise man. The ten *shallithim* are not, with Ginsburg, to be multiplied indefinitely into "many mighty men." And it is not necessary, with Desvieux, Hitz, Zöckl, and others, to think of ten chiefs (commanders of forces), including the portions of the city garrison which they commanded. The author probably in this refers to some definite political arrangement (*vid.* above, p. 216), perhaps to the ten archons, like those Assyrian *salat*, vice-regents after whom as eponyms the year was named by the Greeks.  $\text{שָׂרֵיט}$ , in the Asiatic kingdom, was not properly a military title. And did a town then need protection only in the time of war, and not also at other times, against injury threatening its trade, against encroachments on its order, against the spread of infectious diseases, against the force of the elements? As the Deutero-Isaiah (lx. 17) says of Jerusalem: "I will make thy officers peace, and thine exactors righteousness," so Koheleth says here that wisdom affords a wise man as strong a protection as a powerful decemvirate a city; cf. Prov. xxiv. 5a: "A wise man is *ba'oz*," i.e. mighty.

Ver. 20. "For among men there is not a righteous man on the earth, who doeth good, and sinneth not." The original passage, found in Solomon's prayer at the consecration of the temple, is briefer, 1 Kings viii. 46: "There is no man who sinneth not." Here the words might be  $\text{אֵין אָדָם צַדִּיק וְנֹי}$ , there is no righteous man . . . *Adam* stands here as representing the species, as when we say in Germ.: *Menschen gibt es keine gerechten auf Erden* [men, there are none righteous on earth]; cf. Ex. v. 16: "Straw, none was given." The verification of ver. 19 by reference to the fact of the common sinfulness from which even the most righteous cannot free himself, does not contradict all expectation to the same degree as the *lei* in vii. 7; but yet it surprises us, so that Mercer and Grätz, with Aben Ezra, take ver. 20 as the verification of ver. 16, here first adduced, and Knobel and Heiligst. and others connect it with vers. 21, 22, translating: "Because there is not a just man . . ., therefore it is also the part

of wisdom to take no heed unto all words," etc. But these are all forced interpretations; instead of the latter, we would rather suppose that ver. 20 originally stood after ver. 22, and is separated from its correct place. But yet the sequence of thought lying before us may be conceived, and that not merely as of necessity, but as that which was intended by the author. On the whole, Hitzig is correct: "For every one, even the wise man, sins; in which case virtue, which has forsaken him, does not protect him, but wisdom proves itself as his means of defence." Zöckler adds: "against the judicial justice of God;" but one escapes from this by a penitent appeal to grace, for which there is no need for the personal property of wisdom; there is thus reason rather for thinking on the dangerous consequences which often a single false step has for a man in other respects moral; in the threatening complications in which he is thereby involved, it is wisdom which then protects him and delivers him. Otherwise Tyler, who by the  $\text{לֵךְ}$ , which the wise has in wisdom, understands power over evil, which is always moving itself even in the righteous. But the sinning spoken of in ver. 20 is that which is unavoidable, which even wisdom cannot prevent or make efficacious. On the contrary, it knows how to prevent the destruction which threatens man from his transgressions, and to remove the difficulties and derangements which thence arise. The good counsel following is connected by *gese* with the foregoing. The exhortation to strive after wisdom, contained in ver. 19, which affords protection against the evil effects of the failures which run through the life of the righteous, is followed by the exhortation, that one conscious that he himself is not free from transgression, should take heed to avoid that tale-bearing which finds pleasure in exposing to view the shortcomings of others.

Vers. 21, 22. "Also give not thy heart to all the words which one speaketh, lest thou shouldest hear thy servant curse thee. For thy heart knoweth in many cases that thou also hast cursed others." The talk of the people, who are the indef. subj. of  $\text{וְכָל הָעָם}$  (LXX., Targ., Syr. supply  $\text{אֲנִי, שֶׁנֶּאֱמָר}$ ), is not about "those who give heed to the counsels just given" (Hitz., Zöckl.), for the restrictive  $\text{וְכָל הָעָם}$  is wanting; and why should a servant be zealous to utter imprecations on the conduct of his master, which rests on the best maxims? It is the babbling of the people in general that is meant. To this one ought not to turn his heart ( $\text{לֵב}$  . . .  $\text{וְכָל הָעָם}$ , as at i. 13, 17, viii. 9, 16), i.e. give wilful attention, *ne* ( $\text{אֲלֵךְ וְשָׁמַעְתִּי} = \text{נֶאֱמָר}$ , which does not occur in the Book of Koheleth) *audias servum tuum tibi malulicere*; the particip. expression of the pred. obj. follows the analogy of Gen. xxi. 9, Ewald, § 284b, and is not a Græcism; for since in this

place hearing is meant, not immediately, but mediated through others, the expression would not in good Greek be with the LXX. . . . τοῦ δούλου σου καταρωμένου σε, but τὸν δούλόν σου καταρᾶσθαι σε. The warning has its motive in this, that by such round-about hearing one generally hears most unpleasant things; and on hearsay no reliance can be placed. Such gossiping one should ignore, should not listen to it at all; and if, nevertheless, something so bad is reported as that our own servant has spoken words of imprecation against us, yet we ought to pass that by unheeded, well knowing that we ourselves have often spoken harsh words against others. The expression 'נָּ עָרַךְ, "thou art conscious to thyself that," is like 'נָּ עָרַךְ, 1 Kings ii. 44, not the obj. accus. dependent on עָרַךְ (Hitz), "many cases where also thou . . .," but the adv. accus. of time to עָרַךְ; the words are inverted (Ewald, § 336b), the style of Koheleth being fond of thus giving prominence to the chief conception (ver. 20, v. 18, iii. 13). The first *gam*, although it belongs to "thine, thy," as at 22b it is also connected with "thou,"<sup>1</sup> stands at the beginning of the sentence, after such syntactical examples as Hos. vi. 11; Zech. ix. 11; and even with a two-membered sentence, Job ii. 10.

*The not-found, and the found the bitterest—a Woman*, vii. 23-29.

The author makes here a pause, looks back at the teaching regarding prudence, already given particularly from ver. 15, and acknowledges wisdom as the goal of his effort, especially, however, that for him this goal does not lie behind him, but before him in the remote distance.

Ver. 23. "All this have I proved by wisdom: I thought, Wise I will become; but it remained far from me." The ב in בְּחִכְמָה is, as at i. 13, that designating the *organon*, the means of knowledge. Thus he possessed wisdom up to a certain degree, and in part; but his purpose, comprehended in the one word אֲחִכְמָה (*vid.* above, p. 197, § 2), was to possess it fully and completely; *i.e.* not merely to be able to record observations and communicate advices, but to adjust the contradictions of life, to expound the mysteries of time and eternity, and generally to solve the most weighty and important questions which perplex men. But this wisdom was for him still in the remote distance. It is the wisdom after which Job, chap. xxviii., made

אֲחִכְמָה, on account of the half pause, accented on the penult. according to the Masora.

inquiry in all regions of the world and at all creatures, at last to discover that God has appointed to man only a limited share of wisdom. Koheleth briefly condenses Job xxviii. 12-22 in the words following:

Ver. 24. "For that which is, is far off, and deep,—yes, deep; who can reach it?" Knobel, Hitz., Vaih., and Bullock translate: for what is remote and deep, deep, who can find it? *i.e.* investigate it; but *mah-ahelupah* is everywhere an idea by itself, and means either *id quod fuit*, or *id quod existit*, i. 9, iii. 15, vi. 10; in the former sense it is the contrast of *mah-ahelupah*, viii. 7, x. 14, cf. iii. 22; in the latter, it is the contrast of that which does not exist, because it has not come into existence. In this way it is also not to be translated: For it is far off what it (wisdom) is (Zöckl) [= what wisdom is lies far off from human knowledge], or: what it is (the essence of wisdom), is far off (Flat.)—which would be expressed by the words *קשה*. And if *קשה* is an idea complete in itself, it is evidently not that which is past that is meant (thus *e.g.* Rosenm., *quod ante aeternum*), for that is a limitation of the obj. of knowledge, which is unsuitable here, but that which has come into existence. Rightly, Hengst.: that which has being, for wisdom is *רוח דבר* *ישרה* *אפשרה*, Wied. vii. 17. He compares Judg. iii. 11, "the work which God does," and viii. 17, "the work which is done under the sun." What Koheleth there says of the totality of the historical, he here says of the world of things: this (in its essence and its grounds) remains far off from man; it is for him, and also in itself and for all creatures, far too deep (*קשה קשה*, the ancient expression for the superlative): Who can intelligibly reach (*יפ*, from *קפ*, *אפשרה*, in an intellectual sense, as at iii. 11, viii. 17; cf. Job xi. 7) it (this all of being)? The author appears in the book as a teacher of wisdom, and emphatically here makes confession of the limitation of his wisdom; for the consciousness of this limitation comes over him in the midst of his teaching.

Ver. 25. But, on the other side, he can bear testimony to himself that he has honestly exercised himself in seeking to go to the foundation of things: "I turned myself, and my heart was there to discern, and to explore, and to seek wisdom, and the account, and to perceive wickedness as folly, and folly as madness." Regarding *aschothi*, *vid.* under ii. 20: a turning is meant to the theme as given in what follows, which, as we have to suppose, was connected with a turning away from superficiality and frivolity. Almost all interpreters—as also the accentuation does—connect the two words '27 '28, but "I and my heart" is so unpsychological an expression,

without example, that many Codd. (28 of Kennicott, 44 of de Rossi) read בְּלִבִּי [with my heart]. The erasure of the *vav* (as e.g. Luther: "I applied my heart") would at the same time require the change of כִּסְוִי into חִסְוִי. The Targ., Jerome, and the Venet. render the word בְּלִבִּי; the LXX. and Syr., on the contrary, וּלְבִי; and this also is allowable, if we place the disjunctive on אֲנִי and take וּלְבִי as consequent: my heart, i.e. my striving and effort, was to discern (Aben Ezra, Herzf., Stuart),—a substantival clause instead of the verbal אֶחְסֶה אֶת־הַיֵּשֶׁבֶת, i. 13, i. 17. Regarding *tur* in an intellectual sense, *vid.* i. 13. *Hhakkhon* (*vid.* above, p. 192), with *hhochmah*, we have translated by "*Rechenenschaft*" [account, *ratio*]; for we understand by it a knowledge well grounded and exact, and able to be established,—the *facit* of a calculation of all the facts and circumstances relating thereto; נֶט וְחֶשֶׁב is Mishnic, and = the N. T. λόγον ἀποδιδοῦναι. Of the two accus. 25b following נַעֲרָה, the first, as may be supposed, and as the determination in the second member shows, is that of the obj., the second that of the pred. (Ewald, § 284b): that נַעֲרָה, i.e. conduct separating from God and from the law of that which is good, is *khal*, *Thorheit*, folly (since, as Socrates also taught, all sinning rests on a false calculation, to the sinner's own injury); and that *hazzichluth*, *Narrheit*, foolishness, *stultitia* (*vid. sichal*, p. 194, and i. 17), is to be thus translated (in contradistinction to כִּסְוִי), i.e. an intellectual and moral obtuseness, living for the day, rising up into foolery, not different from *holcluth*, fury, madness, and thus like a physical malady, under which men are out of themselves, rage, and are mad. Koheleth's striving after wisdom thus, at least in the second instance (וְלִדְרָה), with a renunciation of the transcendental, went towards a practical end. And now he expresses by וּמוֹצָא one of the experiences he had reached in this way of research. How much value he attaches to this experience is evident from the long preface, by means of which it is as it were distilled. We see him there on the way to wisdom, to metaphysical wisdom, if we may so speak—it remains as far off from him as he seeks to come near to it. We then see him, yet not renouncing the effort after wisdom, on the way toward practical wisdom, which exercises itself in searching into the good and the bad; and that which has presented itself to him as the bitterest of the bitter is—a woman.

Ver. 26. "And I found woman more bitter than death; she is like hunting-nets, and like snares is her heart, her hands are bands: he who pleaseth God will escape from her; but the sinner is caught by them." As אֶת־הַיֵּשֶׁבֶת, iv. 2, so here אֶת־הָאִשָּׁה (*vid.* above, p. 197, 1, and

198, 3) gains by the preceding **וְכִי** a past sense;<sup>1</sup> the particip. clause stands frequently thus, not only as a circumstantial clause, Gen. xiv. 12 f., but also as principal clause, Gen. ii. 10, in an historical connection. The preceding pred. **וְהָיָה**, in the max. ground-form, follows the rule, Gesen. § 147. Regarding the construction of the relative clause, Hitzig judges quite correctly: "**וְ** is copula between subj. and pred., and precedes for the sake of the contrast, giving emphasis to the pred. It cannot be a nomin., which would be taken up by the suff. in **וְהָיָה**, since if this latter were subject also to **וְהָיָה**, **וְהָיָה** would not certainly be found. Also *asher* here is not a conj.," This **וְ** (**וְ**), which in relative substantival clauses represents the copula, for the most part stands separated from *asher*, e.g. Gen. vii. 2, xvii. 12, Num. xvii. 5, Deut. xvii. 15; less frequently immediately with it, Num. xxxv. 31, 1 Sam. x. 19; 2 Kings xiv. 19; Lev. xi. 26; Deut. xx. 20. But this *asher* **אֲשֶׁר** (**אֲשֶׁר**) never represents the subj., placed foremost and again resumed by the reflex. pronoun, so as to be construed as the accentuation requires: *quasi quidem retia et loqui cor ejus* = *quasi quidem cor eant retia et loqui* (Heiligst.). **וְהָיָה** is the means of searching, i.e. either of hunting: hunting-net (*mitsodah*, ix. 12), or of blockading: siege-work, bulwarks, ix. 14; here it is the plur. of the word in the former meaning. **וְהָיָה**, Hab. i. 14, plur. Ezek. xxvi. 5, etc. (perhaps from **וְהָיָה**, to pierce, bore through), is one of the many synon. for fishing-net. **וְהָיָה**, fetters, the hands (arms) of voluptuous embrace (cf. above, p. 191). The primary form, after Jer. xxxvii. 15, is **וְהָיָה**, **וְהָיָה**; cf. **וְהָיָה**, **וְהָיָה**, Job xxxix. 9. Of the three clauses following *asher*, *see* is found in the second and is wanting to the third, as at Deut. xxix. 22, Job xlii. 9, Ps. xlv. 9, Isa. i. 13; cf. on the other hand, Isa. xxxiii. 6. Similar in their import are these Leonine verses:

*"Femina praeclara facie quasi pestis amara,  
Et quasi fermentum corrumpit cor sapientum."*

That the author is in full earnest in this harsh judgment regarding woman, is shown by 26b: he who appears to God as good (cf. ii. 26) escapes from her (the fut. of the consequence of this his relation to God); but the sinner (**וְהָיָה**, cf. above, p. 254, note) is caught by her, or, properly, in her, viz. the net-like woman, or the net to which she is compared (Ps. ix. 16; Isa. xxiv. 18). The harsh judgment is, however, not applicable to woman as such, but

<sup>1</sup> With reference to this passage and Prov. xviii. 22, it was common in Palestine when one was married to ask **וְהָיָה** **וְהָיָה** = happy or unhappy? *Jebamoth* 63b.

to woman as she is, with only rare exceptions; among a thousand women he has not found one corresponding to the idea of a woman.

Vers. 27, 28. "Behold what I have found, saith Koheleth, adding one thing to another, to find out the account: What my soul hath still sought, and I have not found, (is this): one man among a thousand have I found; and a woman among all these have I not found." It is the ascertained result, "one man, etc.," which is solemnly introduced by the words preceding. Instead of אִם קֵה, the words אִם קֵה are to be read, after xii. 8, as is now generally acknowledged; errors of transcription of a similar kind are found as 2 Sam. v. 2; Job xxxviii. 12. Ginsburg in vain disputes this, maintaining that the name *Koheleth*, as denoting wisdom personified, may be regarded as fem. as well as mas.; here, where the female sex is so much depreciated, was the fem. self-designation of the stern judge specially unsuitable (cf. above, p. 204). Hengst. supposes that *Koheleth* is purposely fem. in this one passage, since true wisdom, represented by Solomon, stands opposite to false philosophy. But this reason for the fem. rests on the false opinion that woman here is heresy personified; he further remarks that it is significant for this fem. personification, that there is "no writing of female authorship in the whole canon of the O. and N. T." But what of Deborah's triumphal song, the song of Hannah, the *magnificat* of Mary? We hand this absurdity over to the Clementines! The woman here was flesh and blood, but *pulchra quamvis pellis est mens tamen plena procellis*; and *Koheleth* is not incarnate wisdom, but the official name of a preacher, as in Assy., for חֲנִיָּים, curators, overseers, *hazanāti*<sup>1</sup> is used. וְהָ, 27a, points, as at i. 10, to what follows. אֶחָד לְאֶחָד, one thing to another (cf. Isa. xxvii. 12), must have been, like *summa summarum* and the like, a common arithmetical and dialectical formula, which is here subordinate to מִצֵּה, since an adv. inf. such as לְקִיָּה is to be supplemented: taking one thing to another to find out the חֲשִׁבֹנָה, i.e. the balance of the account, and thus to reach a *facit*, a *resultat*.<sup>2</sup>

That which presented itself to him in this way now follows. It was, in relation to woman, a negative experience: "What my soul sought on and on, and I found not, (is this)." The words are like the superscription of the following result, in which finally the וְהָ of 27a terminates. Ginsburg, incorrectly: "what my soul is still seeking," which would have required מִבְקֶשֶׁת. The pret. בִּקְשָׁה (with

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Fried. Delitzsch's *Assyr. Stud.* (1874), p. 132.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Aboth* iv. 29, לִיתֵּן וְנָתַן, "to give account;" הַכֹּל וְנָתַן, "all according to the result."

ר without *Dagesh*,<sup>1</sup> as at ver. 29] is retrospective; and רַו, from רַו, means *redire*, again and again, continually, as at Gen. xli. 29. He always anew sought, and that, as *bigdsh naphshi* for רַוִּידִּשׁ denotes, with urgent striving, violent longing, and never found, viz. a woman such as she ought to be: a man, one of a thousand, I have found, etc. With right, the accentuation gives *Garahayim* to *adam*: it stands forth, as at ver. 20, as a general denominator—the sequence of accents, *Gereš, Pashē, Zakef*, is as at Gen. i. 9. “One among a thousand” reminds us of Job xxxiii. 23, cf. ix. 3; the old interpreters (vid. Duchesne’s *Bibl. Accentuata*), with reference to these parallels, connect with the one man among a thousand all kinds of incongruous christological thoughts. Only, here *adam*, like the Romance *l’homme* and the like, means man in sexual contrast to woman. It is thus ideally meant, like אִם, 1 Sam. iv. 9, xvi. 15, and accordingly also the parall. רַוִּידִּשׁ. For it is not to be supposed that the author denies thereby perfect human nature to woman. But also Berger’s explanation: “a human being, whether man or woman,” is a useless evasion. Man has the name *adam* *κατ’ ἐξ* by primitive hist. right: “for the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man,” 1 Cor. xi. 8. The meaning, besides, is not that among a thousand human beings he found one upright man, but not a good woman (Hitz.),—for then the thousand ought to have had its proper denominator, אִם רַוִּידִּשׁ,—but that among a thousand persons of the male sex he found only one man such as he ought to be, and among a thousand of the female sex not one woman such as she ought to be: “among all these” is thus = among an equal number. Since he thus actually found the ideal of man only seldom, and that of woman still seldomer (for more than this is not denoted by the round numbers), the more surely does he resign himself to the following *resultat*, which he introduces by the word רַוִּידִּשׁ (only, alone), as the clear gain of his searching:

Ver. 29. “Lo, this only have I found, that God created man upright; but they seek many *ata*.” Also here the order of the words is inverted, since רַו, belonging as obj. to רַוִּידִּשׁ (have I found), which is restricted by רַוִּידִּשׁ (vid. above, p. 123), is amalgamated with אִם (Lo! see 7). The author means to say: Only this (*solummodo haec*) have I found, that . . .; the אִם is an interjected *nota bene*. The expression: God has made man רַוִּידִּשׁ, is dogmatically significant. Man, as he came from the Creator’s hand, was not placed in the state of moral decision,

<sup>1</sup> As generally the *Piel* forms of the root רַוִּידִּשׁ, Masor. all have *Kaph* on the פ, except the imper. רַוִּידִּשׁ; vid. Luzzatto’s *Gramm.* § 417.

nor yet in the state of absolute indifference between good and evil; he was not neither good nor bad, but he was טוב, or, which is the same thing, ישר; i.e. in every respect normal, so that he could normally develop himself from this positively good foundation. But by the expression עשה ישר, Koheleth has certainly not exclusively his origin in view, but at the same time his relative continuation in the propagation of himself, not without the concurrence of the Creator; also of man after the fall the words are true, עשה ישר, in so far as man still possesses the moral ability not to indulge sinful affections within him, nor suffer them to become sinful actions. But the sinful affections in the inborn nature of weak sinful man have derived so strong a support from his freedom, that the power of the will over against this power of nature is for the most part as weakness; the dominance of sin, where it is not counteracted by the grace of God, has always shown itself so powerful, that Koheleth has to complain of men of all times and in all circles of life: they seek many arts (as Luther well renders it), or properly, calculations, inventions, devices (*hhishsh'conoth*,<sup>1</sup> as at 2 Chron. xxvi. 15, from *hhishsh'von*, which is as little distinguished from the formation *hhēshbon*, as *hhizzayon* from *hhēzyon*), viz. of means and ways, by which they go astray from the normal natural development into abnormities. In other words: inventive refined degeneracy has come into the place of moral simplicity, ἀπλότης (2 Chron. xi. 3). As to the opinion that caricatures of true human nature, contrasts between the actual and that which ought to be (the ideal), are common, particularly among the female sex, the author has testimonies in support of it from all nations. It is confirmed by the primitive history itself, in which the woman appears as the first that was led astray, and as the seducer (cf. *Psychol.* pp. 103-106). With reference to this an old proverb says: "Women carry in themselves a frivolous mind," *Kiddushin* 80b.<sup>2</sup> And because a woman, when she has fallen into evil, surpasses a man in fiendish superiority therein, the Midrash reckons under this passage before us fifteen things of which the one is worse than the other; the thirteenth is death, and the fourteenth a bad woman.<sup>3</sup> Hitzig supposes that the author has before him as his model Agathoclea, the mistress of the fourth Ptolemy Philopator. But also the history of the Persian Court affords dreadful examples of the truth of the proverb: "Woe to the age whose leader is a woman;"<sup>4</sup> and generally the harem is a den of female wickedness.

<sup>1</sup> If we derive this word from *hhēshbon*, the *Dagesh* in the *ש* is the so-called *Dag. dirimens*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Tendlau's *Sprichw.* (1860), No. 733.

<sup>3</sup> Duke's *Rabb. Blumenl.* (1844), No. 32.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* No. 118.

*Wise Conduct towards the King and under Despotic Oppression,*  
viii. 1-9.

If now the sentence first following sings the praise of wisdom, it does not stand out of connection with the striving after wisdom, which the author, vii. 23 f., has confessed, and with the experiences announced in vii. 25 ff., which have presented themselves to him in the way of the search after wisdom, so far as wisdom was attainable. It is the incomparable superiority of the wise man which the first verse here announces and verifies.

viii. 1. "Who is like the wise? and who understandeth the interpretation of things? The wisdom of a man maketh his face bright, and the redness of his face is changed." Unlike this saying: "Who is like the wise?" are the formulas מִי כִּדְמוּתוֹ, Hos. xiv. 10, Jer. xi. 11, Ps. cvii. 43, which are compared by Hitzig and others. "Who is like the wise?" means: Who is equal to him? and this question, after the scheme מִי כִּדְמוּתוֹ, Ex. xv. 11, presents him as one who has not his like among men. Instead of כִּדְמוּתוֹ the word מִדְמוּתוֹ might be used, after מִדְמוּתוֹ, ii. 16, etc. The syncope is, as at Ezek. xl. 25, omitted, which frequently occurs, particularly in the more modern books, Ezek. xlvii. 22; 2 Chron. x. 7, xxv. 10, xxix. 27; Neh. ix. 19, xii. 38. The regular giving of *Dagah* to וְ after וְ, with *Jahab*, not *Maḥpach*, is as at ver. 7 after וְ; *Jahab* is a disjunctive. The second question is not מִי כִּדְמוּתוֹ, but מִי יִדְמוּתוֹ, and thus does not mean: who is like the man of understanding, but: who understands, viz. as the wise man does; thus it characterizes the incomparably excellent as such. Many interpreters (Oettinger, Ewald, Hitz., Helligst., Burg., Elst., Zöck.) persuade themselves that מִי יִדְמוּתוֹ is meant of the understanding of the proverb, 8b. The absence of the art., says Hitzig, does not mislead us: of a proverb, viz. the following; but in this manner determinate ideas may be made from all indeterminate ones. Rightly, Gesenius: *explicationem ullius rei*; better, as at vii. 8: *cujus rei*. Ginsburg compares מִי יִדְמוּתוֹ, 1 Sam. xvi. 18, which, however, does not mean him who has the knowledge of things, but who is well acquainted with words. It is true that here also the chief idea יִדְמוּתוֹ first leads to the meaning *verbum* (according to which the LXX., Jer., the Targ., and Syr. translate; the Venet.: *ἐρμηνείαν λόγου*); but since the unfolding or explaining (*pāshar*) refers to the actual contents of the thing spoken, *verbi* and *rei* coincide. The wise man knows how to explain difficult things, to unfold mysterious things; in short, he understands how to go to the foundation of things.

What now follows, 1b, might be introduced by the confirming

כי, but after the manner of synonymous parallelism it places itself in the same rank with *1a*, since, that the wise man stands so high, and no one like him looks through the centre of things, is repeated in another form: "Wisdom maketh his face bright" is thus to be understood after Ps. cxix. 130 and xix. 9, wisdom draws the veil from his countenance, and makes it clear; for wisdom is related to folly as light is to darkness, ii. 13. The contrast, וְעוֹ . . . שֵׁשׁ ("and the rudeness of his face is changed"), shows, however, that not merely the brightening of the countenance, but in general that intellectual and ethical transfiguration of the countenance is meant, in which at once, even though it should not in itself be beautiful, we discover the educated man rising above the common rank. To translate, with Ewald: and the brightness of his countenance is doubled, is untenable; even supposing that שֵׁשׁ can mean, like the Arab. *yuthattay*, *duplicatur*, still עוֹ, in the meaning of brightness, is in itself, and especially with פָּנִי, impossible, along with which it is, without doubt, to be understood after *az panim*, Dent. xxviii. 50, Dan. viii. 23, and *h'e'az panim*, Prov. vii. 13, or *U'phanim*, Prov. xxi. 29, so that thus עוֹ פָּנִים has the same meaning as the post-bibl. עוֹת פָּנִים, stiffness, hardness, rudeness of countenance = boldness, want of bashfulness, regardlessness, *e.g.* *Shabbath* 30*b*, where we find a prayer in these words: O keep me this day from עוֹ פָּנִים and from עוֹת פָּ (that I may not incur the former or the latter). The Talm. *Taanith* 7*b*, thus explaining, says: "Every man to whom עוֹת פָּ belongs, him one may hate, as the scripture says, וְעוֹ . . . שֵׁשׁ (do not read שֵׁשׁא)." The LXX. translates *μισηθήσεται* [will be hated], and thus also the Syr.; both have thus read as the Talm. has done, which, however, bears witness in favour of שֵׁשׁא as the traditional reading. It is not at all necessary, with Hitzig, after Zirkel, to read שֵׁשׁא: but boldness disfigureth his countenance; עוֹ in itself alone, in the meaning of boldness, would, it is true, along with פָּנִי as the obj. of the verb, be tenable; but the change is unnecessary, the passive affords a perfectly intelligible meaning: the boldness, or rudeness, of his visage is changed, viz. by wisdom (Böttch., Ginsb., Zöckl.). The verb שִׁנָּה (שָׁנָה, Lam. iv. 1) means, Mal. iii. 6, merely "to change, to become different;" the *Pih.* שִׁנָּה, Jer. lii. 33, שִׁנָּה, 2 Kings xxv. 29, denotes in these two passages a change *in melius*, and the proverb of the Greek, Sir. xiii. 24,—

Καρδία ἀνθρώπου ἀλλοιοῖ τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ,  
ἐάν τε εἰς ἀγαθὰ ἐάν τε εἰς κακά,

is preserved to us in its original form thus :

לֵב אָדָם יִשְׁנָא פָּנָיו

בֶּן לְטוֹב וּבֶן לְרָע:

so that thus שֵׁנִי, in the sense of being changed as to the sternness of the expression of the countenance, is as good as established. What Ovid says of science: *emollit mores nec sinit esse feros*, thus tolerably falls in with what is here said of wisdom: Wisdom gives bright eyes to a man, a gentle countenance, a noble expression; it refines and dignifies his external appearance and his demeanour; the hitherto rude external, and the regardless, selfish, and bold deportment, are changed into their contraries. If, now, ver. 1 is not to be regarded as an independent proverb, it will bear somewhat the relation of a prologue to what follows. Luther and others regard 1a as of the nature of an epilogue to what goes before; parallels, such as Hos. xiv. 10, make that appear probable; but it cannot be yielded, because the words are not כִּי חָסֵם, but כִּי נִחַם. But that which follows easily subordinates itself to ver. 1, in as far as fidelity to duty and thoughtfulness amid critical social relations are proofs of that wisdom which sets a man free from impetuous rudeness, and fits him intelligently and with a clear mind to accommodate himself to the time.

Ver. 2. The faithfulness of subjects, Koheleth says, is a religious duty: "I say: Observe well the king's command, and that because of the oath of God." The author cannot have written 2a as it here stands; '28 hovers in the air. Hitzig reads, with Jerome, נִשְׁבַּע, and hears in vers. 2-4 a servile person speaking who veils himself in the cloak of religion; in vers. 5-8 follows the exposure of this corrupt theory. But we have already (*vid.* above, p. 213) remarked that ver. 2 accords with Rom. xvi. 5, and is thus not a corrupt theory; besides, this distribution of the expressions of the Book of Koheleth between different speakers is throughout an expedient resting on a delusion. Luther translates: I keep the word of the king, and thus reads נִשְׁבַּע; as also does the *Jer. Seraphim* 21b, and *Koheleth rabba*, under this passage: I observe the command of the king, of the queen. In any case, it is not God who is meant here by "the king;" the words: "and that because of the oath of God," render this impossible, although Hengst. regards it as possible; for (1) "the oath of God" he understands, against all usage, of the oath which is taken to God; and (2) he maintains that in the O. T. scarcely any passage is to be found where obedience to a heathen master is set forth as a religious duty. But the prophets show themselves as morally great men, without a stain, just in this, that they decidedly condemn and

unhesitatingly chastise any breach of faith committed against the Assyrian or Chaldean oppressor, *e.g.* Isa. xxviii. 15, xxx. 1; Ezek. xvii. 15; *cf.* Jer. xxvii. 12. However, although we understand *melek* not of the heavenly, but of an earthly king, yet אֲשֶׁמֶר does not recommend itself, for Koheleth records his experience, and derives therefrom warnings and admonitions; but he never in this manner presents himself as an example of virtue. The paraenetic imper. שִׁמְרָה is thus not to be touched. Can we then use *ani* elliptically, as equivalent to "I say as follows"? Passages such as Jer. xx. 10 (Elst.), where לֹאֲמֹר is omitted, are not at all the same. Also Ezek. xxxiv. 11, where הִנְנִי is strengthened by *ani*, and the expression is not elliptical, is not in point here. And Isa. v. 9 also does not apply to the case of the supposed ellipsis here. In an ingenious bold manner the Midrash helps itself in Lev. xviii. and Num. xiv., for with reference to the self-introduction of royal words like אֲנִי פִרְעָה it explains: "Observe the *I* from the mouth of the king." This explanation is worthy of mention, but it has little need of refutation; it is also contrary to the accentuation, which gives *Pashta* to *ani*, as to רִאִיָּה, vii. 27, and לִבִּי, vii. 29, and thus places it by itself. Now, since this elliptical *I*, after which we would place a colon, is insufferably harsh, and since also it does not recommend itself to omit it, as is done by the LXX., the Targ., and Syr.,—for the words must then have a different order, שִׁמְרָה פִּי הַמֶּלֶךְ,—it is most advisable to supply אֲמַרְתִּי, and to write אָמַר אֲנִי or אָמַר אֲנִי, after ii. 1, iii. 17, 18. We find ourselves here, besides, within an *I* section, consisting of sentences interwoven in a *Mashal* form. The admonition is solemnly introduced, since Koheleth, himself a king, and a wise man in addition, gives it the support of the authority of his person, in which it is to be observed that the religious motive introduced by ו *explic.* (*vid.* Ewald, § 340*b*) is not merely an appendix, but the very point of the admonition. Kleinert, incorrectly: "Direct thyself according to the mouth of the king, and that, too, as according to an oath of God." Were this the meaning, then we might certainly wish that it were a servile Alexandrian court-Jew who said it. But why should that be the meaning? The meaning "*wegen*" [because of], which is usually attributed to the word-connection עַל-דְּבָרָה here and at iii. 18, vii. 14, Kleinert maintains to be an arbitrary invention. But it alone fits these three passages, and why an arbitrary invention? If עַל-דְּבָרָה, Ps. xlv. 5, lxxix. 9, etc., means "*von wegen*" [on account of], then also עַל-דְּבָרָה will signify "*propter rationem, naturam*," as well as (Ps. cx. 4) *ad rationem*. שֶׁב־אֵל is, as elsewhere שֶׁב־יְהוָה, *e.g.* Ex. xxii. 10, a pro-

mise given under an appeal to God, a declaration or promise strengthened by an oath. Here it is the oath of obedience which is meant, which the covenant between a king and his people includes, though it is not expressly entered into by individuals. The king is designated neither as belonging to the nation, nor as a foreigner; that which is said is valid also in the case of the latter. Daniel, Nehemiah, Mordecai, etc., acted in conformity with the words of Koheleth, and the oath of vassalage which the kings of Israel and Judah swore to the kings of Assyria and of Babylon is regarded by the prophets of both kingdoms as binding on king and people (*vid.* above, p. 213).

Ver. 3. The warning, corresponding to the exhortation, now follows: One must not thoughtlessly avoid the duty of service and homage due to the king: "Hasten not to go away from him: join not in an evil matter; for he executeth all that he desireth." Regarding the connection, of two verbs with one idea, lying before us in  $\text{לֹא תִסָּחֵק} \dots \text{לֹא תִסָּחֵק}$ , as *e.g.* at Zech. viii. 15, Hos. i. 6, *vid.* Gesen. §. 142. 3k. Instead of this sentence, we might use  $\text{לֹא תִסָּחֵק לְלִבְּךָ מִלְּפָנָיו}$ , as *e.g.* *Abeth* v. 8: "The wise man does not interrupt another, and hastens not to answer," i.e. is not too hasty in answering. As with  $\text{לֹא תִסָּחֵק}$ , to be with the king, iv. 15 = to hold with him, so here  $\text{לֹא תִסָּחֵק}$  means to take oneself away from him, or, as it is expressed in x. 4, to leave one's station; cf. Hos. xi. 2: "They (the prophets of Jahve) called to them, forthwith they betook themselves away from them." It is possible that in the choice of the expression, the phrase  $\text{לֹא תִסָּחֵק}$ , "to be put into a state of alarm before any one," Job xxiii. 15, was not without influence. The indef.  $\text{לֹא תִסָּחֵק}$ , Deut. xvii. 1, xxiii. 10, cf. xiii. 12, xix. 20, 2 Kings iv. 41, etc., is to be referred (with Rosenm., Knobel, Bullock, and others) to undertakings which aim at resisting the will of the king, and reach their climax in conspiracy against the king's throne and life (Prov. xxiv. 21b).  $\text{לֹא תִסָּחֵק}$  might mean: persist not in it; but the warning does not presuppose that the entrance thereon had already taken place, but seeks to prevent it, thus: enter not, go not, engage not, like *'amad ḥ'derek*, Ps. i. 1; *'amad baḥayil*, 2 Kings xxiii. 3; cf. Ps. cvi. 23; Jer. xxiii. 18. Also the Arab. *'amada li* = *intendit, proposuit sibi rem*, is compared; it is used in the general sense of "to make toward something, to stretch to something." Otherwise Ewald, Elst., Ginsb., and Zöckl.: stand not at an evil word (of the king), provoking him to anger thereby still more,—against ver. 5, where  $\text{לֹא תִסָּחֵק}$ , as generally (cf. Ps. cxli. 4), means an evil thing, and against the close connection of  $\text{לֹא תִסָּחֵק}$ , which is to be presupposed. Hitzig even: stand not at an

evil command, *i.e.* hesitate not to do even that which is evil, which the king commands, with the remark that here a *servilismus* is introduced as speaking, who, in saying of the king, "All that pleaseth him he doeth," uses words which are used only of God the Almighty, John i. 14, Ps. xxxiii. 9, etc. Hengst., Hahn, Dale, and others therefore dream of the heavenly King in the text. But proverbs of the earthly king, such as Prov. xx. 2, say the very same thing; and if the Mishna *Sanhedrin* ii. 2, to which Tyler refers, says of the king, "The king cannot himself be a judge, nor can any one judge him; he does not give evidence, and no evidence can be given against him," a sovereignty is thus attributed to the king, which is formulated in 3*b* and established in the verse following.

Ver. 4. "Inasmuch as the word of a king is powerful; and who can say to him: What doest thou?" The same thing is said of God, Job ix. 12, Isa. xlv. 9, Dan. iv. 32, Wisd. xii. 12, but also of the king, especially of the unlimited monarch of a despotic state. *Baasher* verifies as שָׁרָא at ii. 16; cf. Gen. xxxix. 9, 23; Greek, ἐν ᾧ and ἐφ' ᾧ. Burger arbitrarily: *quae dixit* (רָבַר for דָּבַר), *rex, in ea potestatem habet*. The adjectival impers. use of the noun *shilton* = *potestatem habens*, is peculiar; in the Talm. and Midrash, *shilton*, like the Assyr. *siltannu*,<sup>1</sup> means the ruler (*vid.* under v. 8). That which now follows is not, as Hitzig supposes, an opposing voice which makes itself heard, but as ver. 2 is compared with Rom. xiii. 5, so is ver. 5 with Rom. xiii. 3.

Ver. 5. "Whoso remaineth true to the commandment will experience nothing evil; and the heart of the wise man will know a time and judicial decision." That by מִצְוָה is here to be understood not the commandment of God, at least not immediately, as at Prov. xix. 16 (Ewald), but that of the king, and generally an injunction and appointment of the superior authority, is seen from the context, which treats not of God, but of the ruler over a state. Knobel and others explain: He who observeth the commandment engageth not with an evil thing, and the wise mind knoweth time and right. But יָרַע is never thus used (the author uses for this, עָמַר בָּ), and the same meaning is to be supposed for the repeated יָרַע: it means to arrive at the knowledge of; in the first instance: to suffer, Ezek. xxv. 14; cf. Isa. ix. 8; Hos. ix. 7; in the second, to experience, Josh. xxiv. 31; Ps. xvi. 11. It may also, indeed, be translated after ix. 12: a wise heart knoweth time and judgment, viz. that they will not fail; but why should we not render יָרַע both times fut., since nothing stands in the way? We do not translate: a wise heart,

<sup>1</sup>  *Vid. Fried. Delitzsch's Assyr. Stud. p. 129 f.*

a wise mind (Knobel), although this is possible, 1 Kings iii. 12 (cf. Ps. xc. 12), but: the heart of a wise man, which is made more natural by x. 2, Prov. xvi. 23. The heart of a wise man, which is not hurried forward by dynastic oppression to a selfish forgetfulness of duty, but in quietness and hope (Lam. iii. 26) awaits the interposition of God, will come to the knowledge that there is an *etā*, a time, when oppression has an end, and a *mašpat*, when it suffers punishment. Well adapted to the sense in which *etā* is here used is the remark of Elia Levita in his *Tiqqān*, that עת corresponds to the German *Zeit* and the Romanic *tempo*, but מן to the German *Ziel* and the Romanic *termino*. The LXX. translates *κατὰ ἐπιστάς*; and, in fact, מן עת is a hendidays, which, however, consists in the division of one conception into two. The heart of the wise man remaining true to duty will come to learn that there is a terminus and judicial decision, for everything has an end when it falls under the fate for which it is ripe, especially the sinner.

Ver. 6. "For there is a time and decision for everything, for the wickedness of man becomes too great." From 6a there follow four clauses with מן; by such monotonous repetition of one and the same word, the author also elsewhere renders the exposition difficult, affording too free a space for understanding the מן as confirming, or as hypothetical, and for co-ordinating or subordinating to each other the clauses with מן. Presupposing the correctness of our exposition of 5a, the clause 6a with מן may be rendered parenthetically, and that with מן in 6b hypothetically: "an end and decision the heart of the wise man will come to experience (because for everything there is an end and decision), supposing that the wickedness of man has become great upon him, i.e. his burden of guilt has reached its full measure." We suppose thereby (1) that מן, which appears from the accent on the ult. to be an adj., can also be the 3d pret., since before מן the tone has gone back to *etā* (cf. Gen. xxvi. 10; Isa. xi. 1), to protect it from being put aside; but generally the accenting of such forms of מן hovers between the penult. and the ult., e.g. Ps. lxxix. 5, lv. 22; Prov. xiv. 19. Then (2) that מן goes back to מן, without distinction of persons, which has a support in vi. 1, and that thus a great מן is meant lying upon man, which finally finds its punishment. But this view of the relation of the clauses fails, in that it affords no connection for ver. 7. It appears to be best to co-ordinate all the four מן as members of one chain of proof, which reaches its point in 8b, viz. in the following manner: the heart of a wise man will see the time and the judgment of the ruler, laying to his heart the temptation to rebellion; for (1) as the author has already said, iii. 17: "God

will judge the righteous as well as the wicked, for there is with Him a time for every purpose and for every act;" (2) the wickedness of man (by which, as ver. 9 shows, despots are aimed at) which he has committed, becomes great upon him, so that suddenly at once the judgment of God will break in upon him; (3) he knows not what will be done; (4) no one can tell him how (*quomodo*) it, the future, will be, so that he might in any way anticipate it—the judgment will overwhelm him unexpectedly and irretrievably: wickedness does not save its possessor.

Vers. 7 and 8 thus continue the *For* and *For*: "For he knoweth not that which shall be; for who can tell him how it will be? There is no man who has power over the wind, to restrain the wind; and no one has authority over the day of death; and there is no discharge in the war; and wickedness does not save its possessor." The actor has the sin upon himself, and bears it; if it reaches the terminus of full measure, it suddenly overwhelms him in punishment, and the too great burden oppresses its bearer (Hitzig, under Isa. xxiv. 20). This עת וביט' comes unforeseen, for he (the man who heaps up sins) knoweth not *id quod fiet*; it arrives unforeseen, for *quomodo fiet*, who can show it to him? Thus, *e.g.*, the tyrant knows not that he will die by assassination, and no one can say to him how that will happen, so that he might make arrangements for his protection. Rightly the LXX. καθὼς ἔσται; on the contrary, the Targ., Hitzig, and Ginsburg: when it will be;<sup>1</sup> but באֲשֶׁר signifies *quum*, iv. 17, v. 3, viii. 16, but not *quando*, which must be expressed by מתי (Mishnic אֵימָת, אֵימָתִי).

Now follows the concluding thought of the four בִּי, whereby 5b is established. There are four impossibilities enumerated; the fourth is the point of the enumeration constructed in the form of a numerical proverb. (1) No man has power over the wind, to check the wind. Ewald, Hengst., Zöckl, and others understand רוח, with the Targ., Jerome, and Luther, of the Spirit (רוח חיים); but man can limit this physically when he puts a violent termination to life, and must restrain it morally by ruling it, Prov. xvi. 32, xxv. 28. On the contrary, the wind הרוח is, after xi. 5, incalculable, and to rule over it is the exclusive prerogative of Divine Omnipotence, Prov. xxx. 4.

The transition to the second impossibility is mediated by this, that in רוח, according to the *usus loq.*, the ideas of the breath of animal life, and of wind as the breath as it were of the life of the whole of nature, are interwoven. (2) No one has power over the

<sup>1</sup> The Venet. ἐν ᾧ, as if the text had באֲשֶׁר.

day of death: death, viz. natural death, comes to a man without his being able to see it before, to determine it, or to change it. With  $\text{עֲלֵה}$  there here interchanges  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$ , which is rendered by the LXX. and Venet. as *abstr.*, also by the Syr. But as at Dan. iii. 2, so also above at ver. 4, it is *concr.*, and will be so also in the passage before us, as generally in the Talm. and Midrash, in contradistinction to the *abstr.*, which is  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$ , after the forms  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$ ,  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$ , etc., e.g. *Dere-shih rabba*, c. 85 *estr.*: "Every king and ruler  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$  who had not a  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$ , a command (government, sway) in the land, said that that did not satisfy him, the king of Babylon had to place an under-Caesar in Jericho," etc.<sup>1</sup> Thus: no man possesses rule or is a ruler . . .

A transition is made from the inevitable law of death to the inexorable severity of the law of war; (3) there is no discharge, no dispensation, whether for a time merely (*excusatio*), or a full discharge (*dimissio*), in war, which in its fearful rigour (*vid.* on the contrary, Deut. xx. 5-8) was the Persian law (cf. above, p. 214). Even so, every possibility of escape is cut off by the law of the divine requital; (4) wickedness will not save ( $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$ , causative, as always) its lord (cf. the proverb: "Unfaithfulness strikes its own master") or possessor; i.e. the wicked person, when the  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$  comes, is hopelessly lost. Grätz would adopt the reading  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$  instead of  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$ , but the fate of the  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$   $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$ , or of the  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$ , is certainly that to which the concatenation of thought from ver. 6 leads, as also the disjunctive accent at the end of the three first clauses of ver. 8 denotes. But that in the words *ha'al rasha'* (not  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$ ) a despotic king is thought of ( $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$ , as at v. 10, 12, vii. 12; Prov. iii. 27; cf. under Prov. i. 19), is placed beyond a doubt by the epilogistic verse:

Ver. 9. "All that I have seen, and that, too, directing my heart to all the labour that is done under the sun: to the time when a man rules over a man to his hurt." The relation of the clauses is mistaken by Jerome, Luther, Hengst., Vañh., Ginsburg, and others, who begin a new clause with  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$ : "there is a time," etc.; and Zöckl., who ventures to interpret  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$   $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$  as epexegetical of  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$   $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$  ("every work that is done under the sun"). The clause  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$  is an adverbial subordinate clause (*vid.* under iv. 2): *et advertendo quidem animum*.  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$  is accus. of time, as at Jer. li. 33; cf. Ps. iv. 8, the relation of *ach asher*, like  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$   $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$ , i. 7, xi. 3. All that, viz. the wisdom of patient fidelity to duty, the perniciousness of revolutionary selfishness, and the suddenness with which the judgment comes, he has

<sup>1</sup> Regarding the distinction between  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$  and  $\text{עֲלֵשׁ}$ , *vid.* Baer's *Abodath Jisrael*, p. 385.

seen (for he observed the actions done under the sun), with his own eyes, at the time when man ruled over man לָרַע לוֹ, not: to his own [the ruler's] injury (Symm., Jerome), but: to the injury (LXX., Theod., τοῦ κακῶσαι αὐτόν, and thus also the Targ. and Syr.) of this second man; for after 'eth asher, a description and not a judgment was to be expected. The man who rules over man to the hurt of the latter rules as a tyrant; and this whole section, beginning with viii. 1, treats of the right wisdom of life at a time of tyrannical government.

*It is with the Righteous as with the Wicked, and with the Wicked as with the Righteous,—it is best to enjoy Life as long as God grants it, viii. 10-15.*

The theme of the following section shows itself by “and then” to be cognate. It is the opposition of the fate of the wicked and of the righteous to the inalienable consciousness of a moral government of the world; this opposition comes forth, under the unhappy tyrannical government of which the foregoing section treats, as a prominent phenomenon.

Ver. 10. “And then I have seen the wicked buried, and they came to rest; but away from the holy place they had to depart, and were forgotten in the city, such as acted justly: also this is vain.” The double particle כֵּן signifies, in such a manner, or under such circumstances; with “I have seen” following, it may introduce an observation coming under that which precedes (בֵּן = Mishnic בְּכֶן), or, with the force of the Lat. *inde*, introduce a further observation of that ruler; this temporal signification “then” (= אָז), according to which we have translated, it has in the Targ. (*vid.* Levy's *W. B.*).<sup>1</sup> Apparently the observation has two different classes of men in view, and refers to their fate, contradicting, according to appearance, the rectitude of God. Opposite to the רָשָׁע (“the wicked”) stand they who are described as אֲשֶׁר יָשָׁר: they who have practised what is rightly directed, what stands in a right relation (*vid.* regarding יָשָׁר, as noun, under Prov. xi. 19), have brought the morally right into practice, *i.e.* have acted with fidelity and honour (עָשָׂה בֵּן, as at 2 Kings vii. 9). Koheleth has seen the wicked buried; רָאָה is followed by the particip. as predic. obj., as is שָׁמַע, vii. 21; but קְבוּרִים is not followed by יִבְאִים (which, besides not being distinct enough as *part. perfecti*, would be, as at Neh. xiii. 22, *part. praes.*), but, according to the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. יָבֵן, 2 Chron. xxxii. 31; Ewald, § 354a; Baer's *Abodath Jisrael*, pp. 384, 386.

favourite transition of the particip. into the finite, Gesen. § 134. 2, by  $\text{אֲנִי}$ , not  $\text{אֲנִי}$ ; for the disjunctive *Rebba* has the fuller form with  $\text{י}$ ; cf. Isa. xlv. 20 with Job xvii. 10, and above, at ii. 23. "To enter in" is here, after Isa. xlvii. 2, = to enter into peace, come to rest.<sup>1</sup> That what follows  $\text{עַל־כֵּן}$  does not relate to the wicked, has been mistaken by the LXX., Aquila, Symm., Theod., and Jerome, who translate by *ἐπυρόθησαν*, *laudabantur*, and thus read  $\text{חַיִּים־עַל־כֵּן}$  (the *Hiläpa*, Ps. cvi. 47, in the pass. sense), a word which is used in the Talm. and Midrash along with  $\text{חַיִּים}$ .<sup>2</sup> The latter, testified to by the Targ. and Syr., is without doubt the correct reading: the structure of the antithetical parallel members is chiasmic; the naming of the persons in 1 $\alpha$  $\alpha$  precedes that which is declared, and in 1 $\alpha$  $\beta$  it follows it; cf. Ps. lxx. 5b, lxxv. 9b. The fut. forms here gain, by the retrospective perfects going before, a past signification.  $\text{עַל־כֵּן}$ , "the place of the holy," is equivalent to  $\text{עַל־כֵּן הַקֹּדֶשׁ}$ , as also at Lev. vii. 6. Ewald understands by it the place of burial: "the upright were driven away (cast out) from the holy place of graves." Thus e.g. also Zöckl, who renders: but wandered far from the place of the holy . . . those who did righteously, i.e. they had to be buried in graves neither holy nor honourable. But this form of expression is not found among the many designations of a burial-place used by the Jews (vid. below, xii. 5, and Hamburger's *Real-Encycl. für Bibel u. Talm.*, article "Grab"). God's-acre is called the "good place,"<sup>3</sup> but not the "holy place." The "holy place," if not Jerusalem itself, which is called by Isaiah II. (xlviii. 2), Neh., and Dan, *'er haqqodesh* (as now *el-hadr*), is the holy ground of the temple of God, the *τόπος ἁγίος* (Matt. xxiv. 15), as Aquila and Symm. translate. If, now, we find *min* connected with the verb *halak*, it is to be presupposed that the *min* designates the point of departure, as also  $\text{מִן הַקֹּדֶשׁ}$ , Isa. xiv. 19. Thus not: to wander far from the holy place; nor as Hitz., who points  $\text{עַל־כֵּן}$ : they pass away (perish) far from the holy place. The subject is the being driven away from the holy place, but not as if  $\text{עַל־כֵּן}$  were causative, in the sense of  $\text{עַל־כֵּן}$ , and meant *ejicere*, with an indef. subj. (Ewald, *Heiligst., Elst.*),—it is also, iv. 15, xi. 9, only the intens. of *Kal*,—but  $\text{עַל־כֵּן}$  denotes, after Ps. xxxviii. 7, Job xxx. 28, cf. xxiv. 10, the meditative, dull, slow walk of those who are compelled

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Zunz, *Zur Gesch. u. Literatur*, pp. 356–359.

<sup>2</sup> The Midrash *Tanchuma*, Par.  $\text{רַבִּי}$ , *ibid.*, uses both expressions; the Talm. *Gittin* 56a, applies the passage to Titus, who took away the furniture of the temple to magnify himself therewith in his city.

<sup>3</sup> Vid. Tendlau's *Sprichw.*, No. 431.

against their will to depart from the place which they love (Ps. xxvi. 8, lxxxiv. 2 ff.). They must go forth (whither, is not said, but probably into a foreign country; cf. Amos vii. 17), and only too soon are they forgotten in the city, viz. the holy city; a younger generation knows nothing more of them, and not even a gravestone brings them back to the memory of their people. Also this is a vanity, like the many others already registered—this, viz., that the wicked while living, and also in their death, possess the sacred native soil; while, on the contrary, the upright are constrained to depart from it, and are soon forgotten. Divine rectitude is herein missed. Certainly it exists, and is also recognised, but it does not show itself always when we should expect it, nor so soon as appears to us to be salutary.

Ver. 11. "Because judgment against the work of the wicked man is not speedily executed, for this reason the heart of the children of men is full within them, to this, that they do evil." The clause with *asher* is connected first with the foregoing *gam-zeh havel*: thus vain, after the nature of a perverted world (*inversus ordo*), events go on, because . . . (*asher*, as at iv. 3, vi. 12b; cf. Deut. iii. 24); but the following clause with '*al-ken* makes this clause with *asher* reflex. an antecedent of itself (*asher* = '*al-asher*)—originally it is not meant as an antecedent. פִּתְנָם<sup>1</sup> (here to be written after נֶעְשָׂה, with פ raph., and, besides, also with כ raph.), in the post-exilic books, is the Persian *paigam*, Armen. *patgam*, which is derived from the ancient Pers. *paiti-gama*: "Something that has happened, tidings, news." The Heb. has adopted the word in the general sense of "sentence;" in the passage before us it signifies the saying or sentence of the judge, as the Pers. word, like the Arab. *naban*, is used principally of the sayings of a prophet (who is called *peighâm-bar*). Zirkel regards it as the Greek φθέγμα; but thus, also, the words אִשְׁמֵל אֶפְרָיִם strangely agree in sound with σμίλλη, φορέϊον, without being borrowed from the Greek. The long *a* of the word is, as Elst. shows, i. 20, invariable; also here פִּתְנָם is the constr. To point פִּתְנָם, with Heiligst. and Burg., is thus unwarrantable. It is more remarkable that the word is construed fem. instead of mas. For since אֵין is construed<sup>2</sup> neither in the bibl. nor in the Mishnic

<sup>1</sup> With כ raph. in H. P. and the older edd., as also Esth. i. 20; Dan. iii. 16. Thus also the punctuator Jekuthiél in his *En hakore* to Esth. i. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Ginsburg points in favour of נֶעְשָׂה as fin. to Ex. iii. 2, but there אֶפְרָיִם is particip. ; to Jer. xxxviii. 5, but there יִכָּל (if it is not to be read יְכֹל) represents an attributive clause; and to Job xxxv. 15, but there the word is rightly pointed אֵין, not אֵין; and this, like the vulg. Arab. *laysa*, is used as an emphatic لَا.

style with the finite of the verb,  $\text{עָשָׂה}$  is not the 3d *pres.*, but the particip. It is not, however, necessary, with Hitz., to read  $\text{עָשָׂה}$ . The foreign word, like the (Arab.) *ʿasasa*, *επισκευασα*, admits of use in the double genit. (Ewald, § 174g); but it is also possible that the fem.  $\text{עָשָׂה}$  is *per. attract.*, occasioned by  $\text{עָשָׂה}$ , as Kimchi, *Miklol* 16a, supposes (cf. besides, under x. 16).  $\text{עָשָׂה}$  is const. governed by *philagme*, and *karu'ah* is thus obj. genit. The LXX, Syr., and Jerome read  $\text{עָשָׂה}$ , which would be possible only if *philagme* = *man*—after the analogy of the Heb.-Aram. phrase, *עָשָׂה* ('*asapha*') = *to take one's due of any one, i.e. to take vengeance on him, to punish him*—could mean the full execution of punishment on any one; but it means here, as Jerome rightly translates, *sententia*; impossible, however, with *karu'ah*, *sententia vestra mala*. Hengst supposes that not only the traditional text, but also the accentuation, is correct, for he construes: because a sentence (of the heavenly Judge) is not executed, the work of wickedness is haste, i.e. speedy. Thus also Dachselt in the *folgie anerkennen*. Mercerus, on the contrary, remarks that the accents are not in the first instance marks of interpolation, but of colligation. In fact, genit. word-connections do not exclude the keeping them asunder by distinctives such as *Psalms* and *Tiphcha*, Isa x. 2, and also *Zabrah*, as e.g. Eccl. i. 4. The LXX. well renders: "Therefore the heart of the sons of men is fully persuaded in them to do evil;" for which Jerome, freely, after Symm.: *oblique timore alio p[ro]p[ri]i hominum perpetrare mala*. The heart of one becomes full to do anything, i.e. it acquires full courage thereto (Luzzatto, § 590; *g[ra]m blando faciendo*); cf. Eccl. vii. 5: "Where is he who has his heart filled to do it" (thus rightly, Keil), i.e. whom it has encouraged to so bold an undertaking.  $\text{עָשָׂה}$  in itself unnecessarily heightens the expression of the inwardness of the destructive work (vid. *Psychol.* p. 151 f.). The sentence of punishment does not take effect *effusa*, hastily (adv. accus. for *diminuta*, iv. 12), therefore men are secure, and they give themselves with full, i.e. with fearless and shameless, boldness to the practice of evil. The author confirms this further, but not without expressing his own conviction that there is a righteous requital which contradicts this appearance.

Vers. 12, 13. "Because a sinner doeth evil an hundred times, and he becometh old therein, although I know that it will go well with them that fear God, that fear before Him: but it will not go well with the wicked, and he shall not live long, like a shadow; because he feareth not before God." Ewald (whom Heiligst., Elat., and Zöckl. follow), as among the ancients, e.g. Mendelssohn, trans-

lates ver. 12: "Though a sinner do evil an hundred times, and live long, yet I know," etc. That an antecedent may begin with *asher* is admissible, Lev. iv. 22, Deut. xviii. 22; but in the case lying before us, still less acceptable than at ver. 11. For, in the first place, this *asher* of the antecedent cannot mean "although," but only "considering that;" and in places such as vi. 3, where this "considering that" may be exchanged with "although," there follows not the part, but the fut. natural to the concessive clause; then, in the second place, by this antecedent rendering of *asher* a closer connection of 12*a* and 12*b* is indeed gained, but the mediation of ver. 12 and ver. 11 is lost; in the third place, **כִּי נָם**, in the meaning "however" (*gam*, ὅμως, with affirmative *ki*), is not found; not *asher*, but just this *ki gam*,<sup>1</sup> signifies, in the passage before us, as at iv. 14, **ἐὶ καί**, although,—only a somewhat otherwise applied *gam ki*, Ewald, § 362*b*, as **כִּי עַל-כֵּן** is a somewhat otherwise applied **עַל-כֵּן כִּי**. Rightly, Hitzig: "In 12*a*, 11*a* is again resumed, and it is explained how tardy justice has such a consequence." The sinner is thereby encouraged in sinning, because he does evil, and always again evil, and yet enjoys himself in all the pleasures of long life. Regarding **חֲמַטָּה** for **חֲסָדָה**, *vid.* above, p. 197, 1. **מֵאָה** is = **מֵאָה פְּעָמִים**, an hundred times, as **אַחַת**, Job xl. 5, is = **פַּעַם אַחַת**; Hengst. and others, inexactly: an hundredfold, which would have required the word **מֵאָהִים**; and falsely, Ginsburg, with the Targ.: an hundred years, which would have required **מֵאָה**, *scil.* **שָׁנָה**, Gen. xvii. 17. This *centies* (Jerome) is, like **מֵאָה**, *scil.* **בָּנִים**, vi. 3, a round number for a great many, as at Prov. xvii. 10, and frequently in the Talm. and Midrash, *e.g.* *Wajikra rabba*, c. 27: "an hundred deeply-breathed sighs (**מֵאָה** **פְּעִיחָה**) the mother gave forth."<sup>2</sup> The meaning of **וַיִּמְאֲרֶה לוֹ** is in general clear: he becomes therein old. Jerome, improbable: *et per patientiam sustentatur*, as Mendelssohn: he experiences forbearance, for they supply **אֵפוֹ** (Isa. xlviii. 9), and make God the subject. **לוֹ** is in any case the so-called *dat. ethic.*; and the only question is, whether the doing of evil has to be taken from **עֲשֵׂה רָע**,<sup>3</sup> as obj. to **וּמֵאָה**: he practises it to him long, or whether, which is more probable, **יָמִים** is

<sup>1</sup> That **נָם** is not pointed **נִם**, has its reason in the disjunctive *Jethib* with **כִּי**, which is not interchanged with the conjunctive *Mahpach*. Thus, viii. 1, **מִי כִּי**, and viii. 7, **כִּי כִּי**.

<sup>2</sup> *Id.* Jac. Reifmann in the *Zeitsch.*, הַמְגִיד, 1874, p. 342.

<sup>3</sup> We expect these two words (cf. Gen. xxxi. 12) with the retrogression of the tone; but as this ceases, as a rule, with *Mercha* before *Tifcha* and *Pashta*, Gen. xlvii. 3, Ex. xviii. 5, Deut. iv. 42, xix. 4, Isa. x. 14 (cf. the penult. accent of **יִאכָּל**, Lev. xxii. 10, 19, and **בָּנָה**, Gen. iv. 17, with the ult. accent Lev. xxii. 14; Hab.

to be supplied after 13*a*, so that לְאָרְכָּהּ signifies to live long, as at Prov. xxviii. 2, to last long; the *dat. ethic.* gives the idea of the feeling of contentment connected with long life: he thereupon sins wantonly, and becomes old in it in good health.

That is the actual state of the case, which the author cannot conceal from himself; although, on the other hand, as by way of limitation he adds כִּי . . . אֲמִי, he well knows that there is a moral government of the world, and that this must finally prevail. We may not translate: that it should go well, but rather: that it must go well; but there is no reason not to interpret the fut. as a pure indic.: that it shall go well, viz. finally,—it is a postulate of his consciousness which the author here expresses; that which exists in appearance contradicts this consciousness, which, however, in spite of this, asserts itself. That to לְאָרְכָּהּ the clause כִּי יִשְׁכַּח, explaining *idem per idem*, is added, has certainly its reason in this, that at the time of the author the name "fearers of God" [*Gottesfürchtige*] had come into use. "The fearers of God, who fear before (יִשְׁכַּח), as at iii. 14) Him," are such as are in reality what they are called.

In ver. 13, Hitzig, followed by Elster, Burg., and Zöckl, places the division at כִּי יִשְׁכַּח: like the shadow is he who fears not before God. Nothing can in point of syntax be said against this (cf. 1 Chron. xxix. 15), although כִּי יִשְׁכַּח "like the shadow is he who," is in point of style awkward. But that the author did not use so rude a style is manifest from vi. 12, according to which כִּי יִשְׁכַּח is rightly referred to כִּי יִשְׁכַּח . . . לְאָרְכָּהּ. Is then the shadow, asks Hitzig, because it does not "prolong its days," therefore כִּי יִשְׁכַּח? How subtle and literal is this use of כִּי יִשְׁכַּח! Certainly the shadow survives not a day; but for that very reason it is short-lived, it may even indeed be called כִּי יִשְׁכַּח, because it has not existence for a single day. In general, *ὅτι*, *ὡς*, *σικα*, is applicable to the life of all men, Ps. cxliv. 4, Wied ii. 5, etc. It is true of the wicked, if we keep in view the righteous divine requital, especially that he is short-lived like the shadow, "because he has no fear before God," and that in consequence of this want of fear his life is shortened by his sin inflicting its own punishment, and by the act of God. *Asher*, 13*b*, as at 11*a*, 12*a*, is the relative conj. Also in ver. 14, כִּי יִשְׁכַּח (כִּי) as a pronoun, and כִּי יִשְׁכַּח (כִּי) as a conj., are mixed together. After the author has declared the reality of a moral government of the world as an inalienable fact of human consciousness, and particularly of his own consciousness, he places over against this fact ii. 17), so with *Mercha* sometimes also before other disjunctives, as here before *Tehir*.

of consciousness the actual state of things partly at least contradicting it.

Ver. 14. "There is a vanity which is done on the earth; that there be just men, to whom it happeneth according to the conduct of the wicked; and that there be wicked men, to whom it happeneth according to the conduct of the righteous—I said, that also this is vain." The limiting clause with *ki gam*, 12*b*, 13, is subordinated to the observation specified in vers. 10–12*a*, and the confirmation of it is continued here in ver. 14. Regarding הִנִּיץ, to happen, *vid.* above, p. 193, under נָצַץ. Jerome translates 'הָרָ' כִּמְ' by *quasi opera egerint impiorum*, and 'הָרָ' כִּמְ' by *quasi justorum facta habeant; instar operis* . . . would be better, such as is conformable to the mode of acting of the one and of the other; for כִּי is in the Semitic style of speech a *nomen*, which annexes to itself the word that follows it in the genitive, and runs through all the relations of case. This contradictory distribution of destiny deceives, misleads, and causes to err; it belongs to the illusory shadowy side of this present life, it is a *hevel*. The concluding clause of this verse: "I said, that also this is vain," begins to draw the *facit* from the observation, and is continued in the verse following.

Ver. 15. "And I commended joy, that there is nothing better for a man under the sun than to eat and drink and enjoy himself; and that this accompanies him in his labour throughout all the days of his life, which God hath given him under the sun." We already read the *ultimatum*, 15*a*, in a similar form at ii. 24, iii. 12, 22; cf. v. 17. With הוּא לִי either begins a new clause, and the fut. is then jussive: "let this accompany him," or it is subordinate to the foregoing infinitives, and the fut. is then subjunctive: *et ut id eum comitetur*. The LXX. and other Greeks translate less appropriately indicat.: καὶ αὐτὸ συμπροσέσται αὐτῷ. Thus also Ewald, Hengst., Zöckl., and others: and this clings to him, which, however, would rather be expressed by וְהוּא יִתְרֹן לוֹ or וְהוּא חֲלָקוֹ. The verb לִוָּה (R. לוֹ, to twist, to bend) does not mean to cling to = to remain, but to adhere to, to follow, to accompany; cf. under Gen. xviii. 16. The possibility of the meaning, "to accompany," for the *Kal*, is supported by the derivatives לִוִּיתָהּ and לִוִּי (particularly לִוִּיתַת הַמֵּתִים, convoy of the dead); the verb, however, in this signification extra-bibl. is found only in *Pih.* and *Hiph.*<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Baer in *Abodath Jisrael*, p. 39.

*The Fruitlessness of all Philosophizing*, viii. 16, 17.

Like the distributions of destiny, so also labour and toil here below appear to the author to be on all sides an inextricable series of mysteries. Far from drawing atheistical conclusions therefrom, he sees in all that is done, viewed in its last causality, the work of God, *i.e.* the carrying out into execution of a divine law, the accomplishment of a divine plan. But this work of God, in spite of all his earnest endeavours, remains for man a subject of research for the future. Treating of this inexplicable difficulty, the words here used by the author himself are also hard to be understood.

Vers. 16, 17. "When I gave my heart to know wisdom, and to view the business which is done on the earth (for neither day nor night doth he see sleep with his eyes): then have I seen all the work of God, that a man is unable to find out the work which is done under the sun: therefore that a man wearyeth himself to seek out, and yet findeth not; and although a wise man taketh in hand to know,—he is unable to find." A long period without a premeditated plan has here formed itself under the hand of the author. As it lies before us, it is halved by the *ver* in *ʾerūda* ("then I have seen"); the principal clause, introduced by "when I gave," can nowhere otherwise begin than here; but it is not indicated by the syntactical structure. Yet in Chron. and Neh. apodosis of *וְעָבַד* begin with the second consec. modus, *e.g.* 1 Chron. xvii. 1, Neh. iv. 1, and frequently; but the author here uses this modus only rarely, and not (*vid.* iv. 1, 7) as a sign of an apodosis.

We consider, first, the protasis, with the parenthesis in which it terminates. The phrase *לְעֵבֶר הַלֵּב*, to direct the heart, to give attention and effort toward something, we have now frequently met with from i. 13 down. The aim is here twofold: (1) "to know wisdom" (*cf.* i. 17), *i.e.* to gain the knowledge of that which is wisdom, and which is to be regarded as wisdom, *viz.* solid knowledge regarding the essence, causes, and objects of things; (2) by such knowledge about that which wisdom is in itself "to see earthly labour," and—this arises from the combination of the two resolutions—to comprehend this labour in accordance with the claims of true wisdom from the point of view of its last ground and aim. Regarding *ʿeyarav*, *vid.* under iii. 10. "On the earth" and "under the sun" are parallel designations of this world.

With *וְעָבַד* begins a parenthetical clause. *Kî* may also, it is true, be rendered as at 17a: the labour on the earth, that he, *etc.* (Zöckl); but this restlessness, almost renouncing sleep, is thereby

pressed too much into the foreground as the special obj. of the *r'uth* (therefore Ginsburg introduces "how that"); thus better to render this clause with *ki gam*, as establishing the fact that there is 'inyan, self-tormenting, restless labour on the earth. Thus also אִינְיָנִי is easier explained, which scarcely goes back to *laadam*, 15a (Hitz.), but shows that the author, by 'inyan, has specially men in view. וְגַם בַּיּוֹם וְגַם בַּלַּיְלָה is = גַּם בַּיּוֹם גַּם בַּלַּיְלָה: as well by day as by night, with the negat. following (cf. Num. xxiii. 25; Isa. xlvi. 8): neither by day nor by night; not only by day, but also in the night, not. "To see sleep" is a phrase occurring only here; cf. Terence, *Heautontim.* iii. 1. 82, *Somnum hercle ego hac nocte oculis non vidi meis*, for which we use the expression: "In this whole night my eyes have seen no sleep." The not wishing to sleep, and not being able to sleep, is such an hyperbole, carrying its limitation in itself, as is found in Cicero (*ad Famil.* vii. 30): *Fuit mirifica vigilantia, qui toto suo consulatu somnum non vidit.*

With וְ, "Then I have seen," begins the apodosis: *vidi totum Dei opus non posse hominem assequi*. As at ii. 24b, the author places the obj. in the foreground, and lets the pred. with *ki* follow (for other examples of this so-called antiposis, *vid.* under Gen. i. 4). He sees in the labour here below one side of God's work carrying itself forward amid this restless confusion, and sets forth this work of God, as at iii. 11 (but where the connection of the thoughts is different), as an object of knowledge remaining beyond the reach of man. He cannot come to it, or, as כִּנְיָנָא properly means, he reaches not to it, therefore "that a man wearies himself to seek, and yet finds not," i.e. that the search on the part of a man with all his endeavours comes not to its aim. בְּכָל אֲשֶׁר [Ewald's emendation, instead of the words of the text before us]: for all this, that *quantumcunque* (Ewald, § 362c), which seems to have been approved of by the LXX., Syr., and Jerome, is rightly rejected by Hitzig; *Ushel asher* is Heb., exactly equivalent to Aram. בְּרִילָה, e.g. Gen. vi. 3; and is rightly glossed by Rashi, Kimchi, *Michlol* 47b, by בְּשִׁבְלֵי שֶׁ and בְּעֵבֹר שֶׁ. The accent dividing the verse stands on *yim'tsa*, for to this word extends the first half of the apodosis, with *v'gam* begins the second. *Gam im* is = *ei kai*, as *gam ki* is = *èàv kai*. יֹאמֵר is to be understood after 'אֵמָּה, vii. 23: also if (although) the wise man resolves to know, he cannot reach that which is to be known. The characteristic mark of the wise man is thus not so much the possession as the striving after it. He strives after knowledge, but the highest problems remain unsolved by him, and his ideal of knowledge unrealized.

*The Power of Fate, and the best possible Thing for Man in his Want of Freedom, ix. 1-12.*

He cannot attain unto it, for to the thoughts as well as to the acts of man God has put a limit.

ix. 1. "For all this I brought to my consciousness, and all this I sought to make clear to me, that the righteous, and the wise, and their deeds, are in God's hands: neither love nor hatred stands in the knowledge of man, all lies before them." With *ki* follows the verification of what is said in viii. 17b, "is unable to find out," from the fact of men, even the best and the wisest of men, being on all sides conditioned. This conditioning is a fact which he layeth to his heart (vii. 2), or (since he here presents himself less as a feeling than as a thinking man, and the heart as reflecting) which he has brought to his consciousness, and which he has sought to bring out into clearness. *וְכָל־זֶה* has here not the force of an *inf. absol.*, so that it subordinates itself in an adverbial manner (*et ventilando quidem*)—for it nowhere stands in the same rank with the *inf. absol.*; but the *inf.* with *ל* (?) has the force of an intentional (with a tendency) fut., since the governing *וְכָל־זֶה*, as at iii. 15a, *וְכָל־זֶה*, and at Hab. i. 17b, *וְכָל־זֶה*, is to be supplied (*vid. comm.* on these passages, and under Isa. xlv. 14): *operari debi ut ventilaretur (exciteretur)*, or shorter: *ventilaturus fui*. Regarding the form *וְכָל־זֶה*, which is matapl. for *וְכָל־זֶה*, and the double idea of sifting (particularly winnowing, *ventilare*) of the R. *כָּר*, *vid.* under iii. 18. In the post-bibl. Heb. the words *לְהַעֲסֹר עַל כָּר* would denote the very same as is here expressed by the brief significant word *וְכָל־זֶה*; a matter in the clearness of its actual condition is called *כָּר עַל כָּר* (from *כָּר*, after the form *קָרָה* purity, *vid.* Buxtorf's *Lex. Talm.* col. 366). The LXX. and Syr. have read *וְכָל־זֶה רָאָה* instead of *וְכָל־זֶה*, apparently because they could not see their way with it: "And my heart has seen all this." The expression "all this" refers both times to what follows; *asher* is, as at viii. 12, relat. conj., in the sense of *ὅτι*, *quod*, and introduces, as at vii. 29, cf. viii. 14, the unfolding of the *וְכָל־זֶה*—an unfolding, *viz.*, of the conditioning of man, which viii. 17 declared on one side of it, and whose further verification is here placed in view with *ki*, 1a. The righteous, and the wise, and their doings, are in God's hand, *i.e.* power (Ps. xxxi. 16; Prov. xxi. 1; Job xii. 10, etc.); as well their persons as their actions, in respect of their last cause, are conditioned by God, the Governor of the world and the Former of history; also the righteous and the wise learn to feel this dependence, not only in their being and in what befalls them, but also in their conduct; also this is not fully attained, *לֹא־*

ידם, they are also therein not sufficient of themselves. Regarding 'aradêhem, corresponding to the Aram. 'avadêhon, *vid.* 'avad, p. 194.

The expression now following cannot mean that man does not know whether he will experience the love or hatred of God, *i.e.* providences of a happy nature proceeding from the love of God, or of an unhappy nature proceeding from the hatred of God (J. D. Michaelis, Knobel, Vaih., Hengst., Zockl.), for אהבה and שנא are too general for this,—man is thus, as the expression denotes, not the obj., but the subj. to both. Rightly, Hitz., as also Ewald: “Since man has not his actions in his own power, he knows not whether he will love or hate.” Certainly this sounds deterministic; but is it not true that personal sympathies and antipathies, from which love and hatred unfold themselves, come within the sphere of man, not only as to their objects, in consequence of the divine arrangement, but also in themselves anticipate the knowledge and the will of man? and is it less true that the love which he now cherishes toward another man changes itself, without his previous knowledge, by means of unexpected causes, into hatred, and, on the other hand, the hatred into love? Neither love nor hatred is the product of a man's self-determination; but self-determination, and with it the function of freedom, begins for the first time over against those already present, in their beginnings. In הכל לפני, “by all that is before him,” that is brought to a general expression, in which לפני has not the ethical meaning proceeding from the local: before them, *prae = penes eos* (*vid.* Song, under viii. 12a), but the purely local meaning, and referred to time: love, hatred, and generally all things, stand before man; God causes them to meet him (*cf.* the use of הקרה); they belong to the future, which is beyond his power. Thus the Targ., Symm., and most modern interpreters; on the contrary, Luther: “neither the love nor the hatred of any one which he has for himself,” which is, linguistically, purely impossible; Kleinert: “Neither the love nor the hatred of things does man see through, nor anything else which is before his eyes,” for which we ought at least to have had the words אשר לפני; and Tyler: “Men discern neither love nor hatred in all that is before them,” as if the text were בכל אשר. The future can, it is true, be designated by אחרית, and the past by לפנים, but according to the most natural way of representation (*vid.* Orelli's *Synon. der Zeit*, p. 14) the future is that which lies before a man, and the past that which is behind him. The question is of importance, which of the two words הכל לפני has the accent. If the accent be on לפני, then the meaning is, that all lies before men deprived of their freedom; if the accent be on הכל, then the meaning is, that all

things, events of all kinds, lie before them, and that God determines which shall happen to them. The latter is more accordant with the order of words lying before us, and shows itself to be that which is intended by the further progress of the thoughts. Every possible thing may befall a man—what actually meets him is the determination and providence of God. The determination is not according to the moral condition of a man, so that the one can guide to no certain conclusion as to the other.

Ver. 2. "All is the same which comes to all: one event happens to the righteous and the wicked, to the good and the pure and the impure; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: as with the good, so is it with the sinner; with him that sweareth, as with him that feareth an oath." Hitzig translates: "All are alike, one fate comes on all" adding the remark, that to make כָּל־אִישׁ at the same time pred. to כָּל and subj. to כָּל־אִישׁ was, for the poetaster, too much. This translation is indeed in matter, as well as in point of syntax, difficult to be comprehended. Rather, with Ewald, translate: All is as if all had one fate (death); but why then this useless *et* *etiam*, only darkening the thought? But certainly, since in כָּל<sup>1</sup> the past is again resumed, it is to be supposed that it does not mean personally, *omnes*, but neut., *omnia*; and כָּל־אִישׁ, on the contrary, manifestly refers (as at x. 3) to persons. Herein agreeing with Ewald and, besides, with Knobel, Zöckl, and others, we accept the interpunction as it lies before us. The apparently meaningless clause, *omnia sicut omnibus*, gives, if we separate *sicut* into *sic* and *et*, the brief but pregnant thought: All is (thus) as it happens to all, *i.e.* there is no distinction of their experiences nor of their persons; all of every sort happens in the same way to all men of every sort. The thought, written in cyphers in this manner, is then illustrated; the *lamele* following leave no doubt as to the meaning of כָּל־אִישׁ. Men are classified according to their different kinds. The good and the pure stand opposite the impure; כָּסָפִים is thus the defiled, Hos. v. 3, cf. Kzek. xxxvi. 25, in body and soul. That the author has here in his mind the precepts of the law regarding the pure and the impure, is to be concluded from the following contrast: he who offers sacrifice, and he who does not offer sacrifice, *i.e.* he who not only does not bring free-will offerings, but not even the sacrifices that are obligatory. Finally, he who swears, and he who is afraid of an oath, are distinguished. Thus, Zech. v. 3, he who

<sup>1</sup> The LXX. Syr., and Aq. have read together the end of ver. 1 and the beginning of ver. 2. Here Jerome also is dependent on this mode of reading: *sed omnia in futurum servantur incerta* (כָּל).

swears stands along with him who steals. In itself, certainly, swearing an oath is not a sin; in certain circumstances (*vid.* viii. 2) it is a necessary, solemn act (Isa. lxxv. 16). But here, in the passage from Zechariah, swearing of an unrighteous kind is meant, i.e. wanton swearing, a calling upon God when it is not necessary, and, it may be, even to confirm an untruth, Ex. xx. 7. Compare Matt. v. 34. The order of the words 'שָׁב' 'וְיָ' (cf. as to the expression, the Mishnic יָאָהֳרָא) is as at Nah. iii. 1; Isa. xxii. 2; cf. above, v. 8b. One event befalls all these men of different characters, by which here not death exclusively is meant (as at iii. 19, ii. 14), but this only chiefly as the same end of these experiences which are not determined according to the moral condition of men. In the expression of the equality, there is an example of stylistic refinement in a threefold change; 'כִּטּוֹב כִּפְהָ' denotes that the experience of the good is the experience of the sinner, and may be translated, "*wie der Gute so der Sünder*" [as the good, so the sinner], as well as "*so der Gute wie der Sünder*" [so the good as the sinner] (cf. Köhler, under Hag. ii. 3). This sameness of fate, in which we perceive the want of the inter-connection of the physical and moral order of the world, is in itself and in its influence an evil matter.

Ver. 3. "This is an evil in all that is done under the sun, that one event happeneth to all: and also the heart of the children of men is full of evil; and madness possesseth their heart during their life, and after it they go to the dead." As וְהָ, 1a, points to the *asher* following, in which it unfolds itself, so here to the *ki* following. We do not translate: This is the worst thing (Jerome: *hoc est pessimum*), which, after Josh. xiv. 15, Judg. vi. 15, Song i. 8, would have required the words הָרַע בְּכָל—the author does not designate the equality of fate as the greatest evil, but as an evil mixed with all earthly events. It is an evil in itself, as being a contradiction to the moral order of the world; and it is such also on account of its demoralizing influences. The author here repeats what he had already, viii. 11, said in a more special reference, that because evil is not in this world visibly punished, men become confident and bold in sinning. *Vegam* (referable to the whole clause, at the beginning of which it is placed) stands beside *zeh ra'*, connecting with that which is evil in itself its evil influences. מְלֵא might be an adj., for this (only once, Jer. vi. 11), like the verb, is connected with the accus., e.g. Deut. xxxiii. 23. But, since not a statement but a *factum* had to be uttered, it is finite, as at viii. 11. Thus Jerome, after Symm.: *sed et cor filiorum hominum repletur malitia et procacitate juxta cor eorum in vita sua*. Keeping out of view the

false *sed*, this translation corresponds to the accenting which gives the conjunctive *Kadma* to כִּי. But without doubt an independent substantival clause begins with וְהִנֵּה; and madness is in their heart (*vid.* i. 17) their life long; for, without taking heed to God's will and to what is pleasing to God, or seeking after instruction, they think only of the satisfaction of their inclinations and lusts.

"And after that they go to the dead"—they who had so given themselves up to evil, and revelled in fleshly lusts with security, go the way of all flesh, as do the righteous, and the wise, and just, because they know that they go beyond all restraining bounds. Most modern interpreters (Hitz., Ew., etc.) render *aharai*, after Jer. li. 46, adverbially, with the suffix understood neut.: afterwards (Jerome, *post haec*). But at iii. 22, vi. 12, vii. 14, the suffix refers to man: after him, him who liveth here=after he has laid down his life. Why should it not be thus understood also here? It is true וְהִנֵּה precedes it; but in the reverse way, sing. and plur. also interchange in ver. 1; cf. iii. 12. Rightly the Targ., as with Kleinert and others, we also explain: after their (his) lifetime. A man's life finally falls into the past, it lies behind him, and he goes forth to the dead; and along with self-consciousness, all the pleasures and joy of life at the same time come to an end.

Ver. 4. "For (to him) who shall be always joined to all the living, there is hope: for even a living dog is better than a dead lion." The interrog. מִי אֵלֶּיךָ, *quis est qui*, acquires the force of a relative, *quicumque* (*quicunque*), and may be interpreted, Ex. xxxii. 33, 2 Sam. xx. 12, just as here (cf. the simple *מי*, v. 9), in both ways; particularly the latter passage (2 Sam. xx. 11) is also analogous to the one before us in the formation of the apodosis. The *Chethib* יִבְרָךְ does not admit of any tenable meaning. In conformity with the *usus loq.*, Elster reads מִי אֵלֶּיךָ יִבְרָךְ, "who has a choice?" But this rendering has no connection with what follows; the sequence of thoughts fails. Most interpreters, in opposition to the *usus loq.*, by pointing יִבְרָךְ or יִבְרָכֶיךָ, render: Who is (more correctly: will be) excepted? or also: Who is it that is to be preferred (the living or the dead)? The verb יִבְרָךְ signifies to choose, to select; and the choice may be connected with an exception, a preference; but in itself the verb means neither *excipere* nor *præferre*.<sup>1</sup> All the old translators, with right, follow the *Keri*, and the Syr. renders it correctly, word for word: to every one who is joined (שִׁירָקָה, Aram. = Heb. יִבְרָךְ) to all the living there is

<sup>1</sup> Luther translates, "far to all the living there is that which is desired, namely, hope," as if the text were מִי אֵלֶּיךָ יִבְרָכֶיךָ.

hope; and this translation is more probable than that on which Symm. ("who shall always continue to live?") and Jerome (*nemo est qui semper vivat et qui hujus rei habeat fiduciam*) proceed: Who is he that is joined to the whole? *i.e.* to the absolute life; or as Hitzig: Who is he who would join himself to all the living (like the saying, "The everlasting Jew")? The expression 'יש בִּטְ' does not connect itself so easily and directly with these two latter renderings as with that we have adopted, in which, as also in the other two, a different accentuation of the half-verse is to be adopted as follows:

כִּי מִי אֲשֶׁר יִחְבֹּר אֶל-כָּל-הַחַיִּים יֵשׁ בִּטְחָן

The accentuation lying before us in the text, which gives a great disjunctive to 'יִחְבֹּר' as well as to 'יֵשׁ', appears to warrant the *Chethib* (cf. Hitzig under Ezek. xxii. 24), by which it is possible to interpret 'יֵשׁ' . . . 'כִּי' as in itself an interrog. clause. The *Keri* 'יֵשׁ' does not admit of this, for Dachselt's *quis associabit se (sc. mortuis? = nemo socius mortuorum fieri vult)* is a linguistic impossibility; the reflex may be used for the pass., but not the pass. for the reflex., which is also an argument against Ewald's translation: Who is joined to the living has hope. Also the Targ. and Rashi, although explaining according to the Midrash, cannot forbear connecting 'אֶל-כָּל-הָחַי' with 'יֵשׁ', and thus dividing the verse at 'יֵשׁ' instead of at 'יִחְבֹּר'. It is not, however, to be supposed that the accentuation refers to the *Chethib*; it proceeds on some interpretation, contrary to the connection, such as this: he who is received into God's fellowship has to hope for the full life (in eternity). The true meaning, according to the connection, is this: that whoever (*quicumque*) is only always joined (whether by birth or the preservation of life) to all the living, *i.e.* to living beings, be they who they may, has full confidence, hope, and joy; for in respect to a living dog, this is even better than a dead lion. Symmachus translates: *κυνὶ ζῶντι βέλτιον ἔστιν ἢ λέοντι τεθνηκότι*, which Rosenm., Herzf., and Grätz approve of. But apart from the obliquity of the comparison, that with a living dog it is better than with a dead lion, since with the latter is neither good nor evil (*vid.* however, vi. 5b), for such a meaning the words ought to have been: *chēlēv hāi tov lo min ha'aryēh hammeth.*

As the verifying clause stands before us, it is connected not with 'יֵשׁ בִּטְ', but with 'אֶל-כָּל-הָחַי', of that which is to be verified; the לֵ gives emphatic prominence (Ewald, § 310b) to the subject, to which the expression refers as at Ps. lxxxix. 19, 2 Chron. vii. 21 (cf. Jer. xviii. 16), Isa. xxxii. 1: A living dog is better than a dead lion, *i.e.* it

is better to be a dog which lives, than that lion which is dead. The dog, which occurs in the Holy Scriptures only in relation to a shepherd's dog (Job xxx. 1), and as for the rest, appears as a voracious filthy beast, roaming about without a master, is the proverbial emblem of that which is common, or low, or contemptible, 1 Sam. xvii. 43; cf. "dog's head," 2 Sam. iii. 8; "dead dog," 1 Sam. xxiv. 15; 2 Sam. ix. 8, xvi. 9. The lion, on the other hand, is the king, or, as Agur (Prov. xxx. 30) calls it, the hero among beasts. But if it be dead, then all is over with its dignity and its strength; the existence of a living dog is to be preferred to that of the dead lion. The art. in 'פֶּדָה is not that denoting species (Dale), which is excluded by *hammeth*, but it points to the carcase of a lion which is present. The author, who elsewhere prefers death and nonentity to life, iv. 2 f, vii. 1, appears to have fallen into contradiction with himself; but there he views life pessimistically in its, for the most part, unhappy experiences, while here he regards it in itself as a good affording the possibility of enjoyment. It lies, however, in the nature of his standpoint that he should not be able to find the right medium between the sorrow of the world and the pleasure of life. Although postulating a retribution in eternity, yet in his thoughts about the future he does not rise above the comfortless idea of Hades.

Vers. 5, 6. He sarcastically verifies his comparison in favour of a living dog. "For the living know that they shall die; but the dead know not anything, and have no more a reward; for their memory is forgotten. Their love, as well as their hatred and their envy, has long ago perished, and they have part no more for ever in all that is done under the sun." The description of the condition of death begins sarcastically and then becomes elegiac. "They have no reward further," viz. in this upper world, since there it is only too soon forgotten that they once existed, and that they did anything worthy of being remembered; Koheleth might here indeed, with his view shrouded in dark clouds, even suppose that God also forgot them, Job xiv. 13. The suff. of 'פֶּדָה, etc., present themselves as subjective, and there is no reason, with Knobel and Ginsburg, to render them objectively: not merely the objects of their love, and hatred, and envy, are lost to them, but these their affections and strivings themselves have ceased (Rosenm., Hitzig, Zöckl., and others), they lie (*K'var 'aradah*) far behind them as absolutely gone; for the dead have no part more in the history which is unfolding itself amid the light of the upper world, and they can have no more any part therein, for the dead as not living are not only without knowledge, but also without feeling and desire. The representation

of the state after death is here more comfortless than anywhere else. For elsewhere we read that those who have been living here spend in *Sheol*, *i.e.* in the deep (R. שְׁוֹל, to be loose, to hang down, to go downwards) realm of the dead, as *r'phaim* (Isa. xiv. 9, etc.), lying beneath the upper world, far from the love and the praise of God (Ps. vi. 3, xxx. 10), a prospectless (Job vii. 7 f., xiv. 6-12; Ps. lxxxviii. 11-13), dark, shadowy existence; the soul in Hades, though neither annihilated nor sleeping, finds itself in a state of death no less than does the body in the grave. But here the state of death is not even set forth over against the idea of the dissolution of life, the complete annihilation of individuality, much less that a retribution in eternity, *i.e.* a retribution executed, if not here, yet at some time, postulated elsewhere by the author, throws a ray of light into the night of death. The apocryphal book of the Wisdom of Solomon, which distinguishes between a state of blessedness and a state of misery measured out to men in the future following death, has in this surpassed the canonical Book of Koheleth. In vain do the Targ., Midrash, and the older Christian interpreters refer that which is said to the wicked dead; others regard Koheleth as introducing here the discourse of atheists (*e.g.* Oetinger), and interpret, under the influence of monstrous self-deception, ver. 7 as the voice of the spirit (Hengst.) opposing the voice of the flesh. But that which Koheleth expresses here only in a particularly rugged way is the view of Hades predominating in the O. T. It is the consequence of viewing death from the side of its anger. Revelation intentionally permits this manner of viewing it to remain; but from premises which the revelation sets forth, the religious consciousness in the course of time draws always more decidedly the conclusion, that the man who is united to God will fully reach through death that which since the entrance of sin into the world cannot be reached without the loss of this present life, *i.e.* without death, *viz.* a more perfect life in fellowship with God. Yet the confusion of the O. T. representation of Hades remains; in the Book of Sirach it also still throws its deep shadows (xvii. 22 f.) into the contemplation of the future; for the first time the N. T. solution actually removes the confusion, and turns the scale in favour of the view of death on its side of light. In this history of the ideas of eternity moving forward amid many fluctuations to the N. T. goal, a significant place belongs to the Book of Koheleth; certainly the Christian interpreter ought not to have an interest in explaining away and concealing the imperfections of knowledge which made it impossible for the author spiritually to rise above his pessimism. He does not rise, in con-

trast to his pessimism, above an eudaemonism which is earthly, which, without knowing of a future life (not like the modern pessimism, without *wishing to know* of a future life), recommends a pleasant enjoyment of the present life, so far as that is morally allowable:

Vers. 7-10. "Go, eat thy bread with joy, and drink thy wine with a merry heart; for long ago hath God accepted thy work. Let thy garments be always white; and let not oil be wanting to thy head. Enjoy life with a wife whom thou lovest through all the days of thy vain life, which He hath given thee under the sun—through all thy vain days: for that is thy portion in life, and in thy labour wherewith thou weariest thyself under the sun. All that thy hand may find to do with thy might, that do; for there is not work, and calculation, and knowledge, and wisdom, in the under world, whither thou shalt go." Hengstenberg perceives here the counterpart of the spirit; on the contrary, Oetinger, Mendelssohn, and others, discover also here, and here for the first time rightly, the utterance of an epicurean thought. But, in fact, this  $\text{וְעָנֵה}$  down to  $\text{וְעָנֵה}$  is the most distinct personal utterance of the author, his *otium crasso* which pervades the whole book, and here forms a particularly copious conclusion of a long series of thoughts. We recapitulate this series of thoughts: One fate, at last the same final event, happens to all men, without making any distinction according to their moral condition,—an evil matter, so much the more evil, as it encourages to wickedness and light-mindedness; the way of man, without exception, leads to the dead, and all further prospect is cut off; for only he who belongs to the class of living beings has a joyful spirit, has a spirit of enterprise: even the lowest being, if it live, stands higher in worth, and is better, than the highest if it be dead; for death is the end of all knowledge and feeling, the being cut off from the living under the sun. From this, that there is only one life, one life on this side of eternity, he deduces the exhortation to enjoy the one as much as possible; God Himself, to whom we owe it, will have it so that we enjoy it, within the moral limits prescribed by Himself indeed, for this limitation is certainly given with His approbation. Incorrectly, the Targ., Rashi, Hengst., Ginsb., and Zöckl. explain: For thy moral conduct and effort have pleased Him long ago—the person addressed is some one, not a definite person, who could be thus set forth as such a witness to be commended. Rather with Grotius and others: *Quia Deus foret laboribus tuis h. e. eos ita prosperavit, ut cuncta quae vitam delectant abunde tibi suppetant.* The thought is wholly in the spirit of the Book of Koheleth; for the fruit

of labour and the enjoyment of this fruit of labour, as at ii. 24, iii. 13, etc., is a gift from above; and besides, this may be said to the person addressed, since 7*a* presupposes that he has at his disposal heart-strengthening bread and heart-refreshing wine. But in these two explanations the meaning of כָּבֵד is not comprehended. It was left untranslated by the old translators, from their not understanding it. Rightly, Aben Ezra: For God wills that thou shouldst thus do [indulge in these enjoyments]; more correctly, Hitzig: Long ago God has beforehand permitted this thy conduct, so that thou hast no room for scruples about it. How significant כָּבֵד is for the thought, is indicated by the accentuation which gives to it *Zakef*: from afore-time God has impressed the seal of His approbation on this thy eating with joy, this thy drinking with a merry heart.—The assigning of the reason gives courage to the enjoyment, but at the same time gives to it a consecration; for it is the will of God that we should enjoy life, thus it is self-evident that we have to enjoy it as He wills it to be enjoyed.

Ver. 8. The white garments, לְבָנִים, are in contrast to the black robes of mourning, and thus are an expression of festal joy, of a happy mood; black and white are, according to the ancients, colour-symbols, the colours respectively of sorrow and joy, to which light and darkness correspond.<sup>1</sup> Fragrant oil is also, according to Prov. xxvii. 9, one of the heart-refreshing things. Sorrow and anointing exclude one another, 2 Sam. xiv. 2; joy and oil stand in closest mutual relation, Ps. xlv. 8, Isa. lxi. 3; oil which smooths the hair and makes the face shine (*vid.* under Ps. civ. 15). This oil ought not to be wanting to the head, and thus the perpetuity of a happy life should suffer no interruption.

In 9*a* most translators render: Enjoy life with the wife whom thou lovest; but the author purposely does not use the word הָאִשָּׁה, but אִשָּׁה; and also that he uses הַיָּיִם, and not הַחַיִּים, is not without significance. He means: Bring into experience what life, what happiness, is (cf. the indetermin. ideas, Ps. xxxiv. 13) with a wife whom thou hast loved (Jerome: *quacunque tibi placuerit feminarum*), in which there lies indirectly the call to choose such an one; whereby the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Shabbath* 114*a*: "Bury me neither in white nor in black garments: not in white, because perhaps I may not be one of the blessed, and am like a bridegroom among mourners; not in black, because perhaps I may be one of the blessed, and am like a mourner among bridegrooms." *Semachoth* ii. 10: Him who is outside the congregation, they do not bury with solemnity; the brothers and relatives of such must clothe and veil themselves in white; cf. *Joma* 39*b*. Elsewhere white is the colour of innocence, *Shabbath* 153*a*, *Midrash* under Prov. xvi. 11; and black the colour of guilt, *Kiddushin* 40*a*, etc.

pessimistic criticism of the female sex, vii. 26-28, so far as the author is concerned, falls into the background, since eudaemonism, the other side of his view of the world, predominates. The accus. designation of time, "through all the days of the life of thy vanity (*i.e.* of thy transient vain life)," is like vi. 12, cf. vii. 15. It is repeated in "all the days of thy vanity;" the repetition is heavy and unnecessary (therefore omitted by the LXX., Targ., and Syr.); probably like *וְכָל יְמֵי חַיֶּיךָ*, Ps. xlv. 5, a *ditto*; Hitzig, however, finds also here great emphasis. The relative clause standing after the first designation of time refers to "the days which He (*הוא*, 7*b*) has granted under the sun." *He* in 9*b* refers attractionally to *הוא* (Jerome: *haec est enim pars*), as at iii. 22, v. 17, cf. vii. 2; *אין* of the Babyl. is therefore to be rejected; this enjoyment, particularly of marriage joys, is thy part in life, and in thy work which thou accomplishest under the sun, *i.e.* the real portion of gain allotted to thee which thou mayest and oughtest to enjoy here below.

Ver. 10. The author, however, recommends no continual *dolce far niente*, no idle, useless sluggard-life devoted to pleasure, but he gives to his exhortation to joy the converse side: "All that thy hand may reach (*i.e.* what thou canst accomplish and is possible to thee, 1 Sam. x. 7; Lev. xii. 8) to accomplish it with thy might, that do." The accentuation is ingenious. If the author meant: That do with all might (Jerome: *instantiter operare*), then he would have said *וְכָל-כֹּחְךָ* (Gen. xxxi. 6). As the words lie before us, they call on him who is addressed to come not short in his work of any possibility according to the measure of his strength, thus to a work straining his capacity to the uttermost. The reason for the call, 10*b*, turns back to the clause from which it was inferred: in Hades, whither thou must go (*iturus es*), there is no work, and reckoning (*cid.* vii. 25), and knowledge (*וְדַעַת*<sup>1</sup>), and no wisdom. Practice and theory have then an end. Thus: Enjoy, but not without working, ere the night cometh when no man can work. Thus spake Jesus (John ix. 4), but in a different sense indeed from Koheleth. The night which He meant is the termination of this present life, which for Him, as for every man, has its particular work, which is either accomplished within the limits of this life, or is not accomplished at all.

<sup>1</sup> Not *וְדַעַת*, because the word has the conjunctive, not the disjunctive accent, *cid.* under Ps. lv. 10. The punctuation, as we have already several times remarked, is not consistent in this: cf. *וְדַעַת*, ii. 26, and *וְדַעַת*, Ps. lxxv. 9, both of which are contrary to the rule (*cid.* Baer in Abulwalld's *Kama*, p. 119, note 2).

*The Incalculableness of the Issues and of the Duration of Life,*  
ix. 11, 12.

Another reflection, so far not without connection in the foregoing, as the fact of experience, that ability is yet no security for the issue aimed at and merited, is chiefly referred to wisdom :

Ver. 11. "Further, I came to see under the sun, that the race belongs not to the swift, and the war not to the heroes, and also not bread to the wise man, and not riches to the prudent, and not favour to men of knowledge; for time and chance happeneth to them all." The nearest preceding 'רָא, to which this 'שֶׁב־וְרָא suitably connects itself, is at viii. 17. Instead of *redii et ridendo quidem = rursus vidi* (cf. viii. 9 and under ix. 1), we had at iv. 1 the simpler expression, *redii et vidi*. The five times repeated ל is that of property, of that, viz., by virtue of which one is master of that which is named, has power over it, disposes of it freely. The race belongs not to the swift (מְרוֹץ, masc. to מְרוֹצָה, only here), i.e. their fleetness is yet no guarantee that on account of it they will reach the goal. Luther freely: "To be fleet does not help in running," i.e. running to an object or goal. "The war belongs not to the heroes," means that much rather it belongs to the Lord, 1 Sam. xvii. 47.—God alone gives the victory (Ps. xxxiii. 16). Even so the gaining of bread, riches, favour (i.e. influence, reputation), does not lie in wisdom, prudence, knowledge of themselves, as an indispensable means thereto; but the obtaining of them, or the not obtaining of them, depends on times and circumstances which lie beyond the control of man, and is thus, in the final result, conditioned by God (cf. Rom. ix. 16<sup>1</sup>); time and fate happen to all whose ability appears to warrant the issue, they both [time and fate] encounter them and bar to them the way; they are in an inexplicable manner dependent on both, and helplessly subject to them. As the idea of spiritual superiority is here expressed in a threefold manner by 'הָחַ (whence 'לָחַ of the plur., also with the art. ix. 1; Ex. xxxvi. 4; Esth. i. 13), 'הָנֶפֶץ, and 'הָיָה, so at Isa. xi. 2, the gifts of "wisdom," "counsel," and "knowledge" follow each other. 'Eth is here "time" with its special circumstances (conjunctures), and *pega'*, "accident," particularly as an adversity, disappointment, for the word is used also without any addition (1 Kings v. 18) of misfortune (cf. שִׁיר פְּנֵעִים, Ps. iii. xci.). The masc. 'יָקִי is regulated after 'וֶפֶ; 'eth can, however, be used in the masc., Song ii. 12; Böttch. § 648, viz. "with the misapprehension of its origin" (v. Orelli).

<sup>1</sup> But not Jer. ix. 22; this passage, referred to by Bernstein, is of a different nature.

This limitation of man in his efforts, in spite of all his capacity, has its reason in this, that he is on the whole not master of his own life :

Ver. 12. "For man also knoweth not his time: like the fishes which are caught in an evil net, and like the birds which are caught in the snare—like them are the sons of men snared in an evil time, when it suddenly breaks in upon them." The particles **וְ** **כִּי** are here not so clearly connected as at viii. 12, iv. 14, where, more correctly, the pointing should be **וְ** **כִּי** (*ki* with the conjunct. accent); *ki* rules the sentence; and *gam*, as to its meaning, belongs to *eth-'itto*. The particular has its reason from the general: man is not master of his own time, his own person, and his own life, and thus not of the fruits of his capabilities and his actions, in spite of the previously favourable conditions which appear to place the result beyond a doubt; for ere the result is reached of which he appears to be able to entertain a certainty, suddenly his time may expire, and his term of life be exhausted. Jerome translates *'itto* (cf. vii. 17) rightly by *finem suum*; **נָתַן**, with the gen. following, frequently (*vid.* under Job xxiv. 1) means the point of time when the fate of any one is decided,—the *terminus* where a reckoning is made; here, directly, the *terminus ad quem*. The suddenness with which men are frequently overtaken with the catastrophe which puts an end to their life, is seen by comparison with the fishes which are suddenly caught in the net, and the birds which are suddenly caught in the snare. With **וְ** (that are caught) there is interchanged, in two variations of expression, **הַמִּתְחַבְּטִים**, which is incorrectly written, by v. d. Hooght, Norzi, and others, **הַמִּתְחַבְּטִים**<sup>1</sup> **מִצְוֵה**, a net,—of which the plur. form vii. 26 is used,—goes back, as does the similar designation of a bulwark (14*b*), to the root-conception of searching (hunting), and receives here the epithet "evil." Birds, **צִפְרִים** (from a ground-form with a short terminal vowel; cf. Assy. *iṣṣur*, from *iṣpur*), are, on account of their weakness, as at Isa. xxxi. 5, as a figure of tender love, represented in the fem.

The second half of the verse, in conformity with its structure, begins with **כִּהֵם** (which more frequently occurs as **כְּמִתְחַבְּטִים**). **כִּי** is *part. Pa.* for **מִתְחַבְּטִים** (Ewald, § 170*d*); the particip. **מִתְחַבְּטִים** is rejected, and **כִּי** is treated altogether as a guttural, the impracticable doubling of which is compensated for by the lengthening of the vowel. The use of the *part.* is here stranger than *e.g.* at Prov. xi. 13, xv. 32; the fact repeating itself is here treated as a property. Like the fish and the birds are they, such as are caught, etc. Otherwise Hitz. :

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Ed. König, *Gedanke, Laut u. Accent* (1874), p. 72.

Like these are they caught, during the continuance of their life in the evil time . . . ; but the being snared does not, however, according to the double figure, precede the catastrophe, but is its consequence. Rightly, Ginsb. : "Like these are the sons of men ensnared in the time of misfortune." רָעָה might be adj., as at Amos v. 13, Mic. ii. 3 ; but since it lies nearer to refer רָעָה to *ra'ah* than to *'eth*, thus *ra'ah*, like the frequently occurring *yom ra'ah* (vii. 14 ; cf. Jer. xvii. 17 with xv. 11), may be thought of as genit. An example of that which is here said is found in the fatal wounding of Ahab by means of an arrow which was not aimed at him, so that he died "at the time of the going down of the sun," 2 Chron. xviii. 33, 34.

THE FURTHER SETTING FORTH OF EXPERIENCES, WITH PROVERBS  
INTERMIXED.—IX. 13—X. 15.

*Experiences and Proverbs touching Wisdom and the Contrasts to it,*  
ix. 13—x. 3.

With the words, "further, I saw," 11*a*, the author introduced the fact he had observed, that there is not always a sure and honoured position in life connected with wisdom as its consequence ; here he narrates an experience which, by way of example, shows how little wisdom profits, notwithstanding the extraordinary result it produces.

Ver. 13. "Also this have I come to see as wisdom under the sun, and it appeared great to me." The Venet. construes falsely : "This also have I seen : wisdom under the sun ;" as also Hitzig, who reads נָה (neut. as at vii. 27). There is no reason thus to break up the sentence which introduces the following experience. *Zoh* is connected with *hhochmah*, but not as Luther renders it : "I have also seen this wisdom," which would have required the words נָה חָכְמָה, but, as Jerome does : *Hanc quoque sub sole vidi sapientiam* ; this, however, since *gam-zoh*, as at v. 15, cf. 18, is attractively related to *hhochmah* as its pred., is = "also in this I saw wisdom," as the LXX. translates, or as Zöckl. : "also this have I seen—come to find out as wisdom,"—also this, viz., the following incident narrated, in which wisdom of exceeding greatness presented itself to me. As Mordecai is called "great among the Jews," Esth. x. 3, so here Koheleth says that the wisdom which came to light therein appeared to him great (גָּדוֹל, as elsewhere בְּעֵינַי or לִפְנֵי).

Now follows an experience, which, however, has not merely a

light side, but also a dark side; for wisdom, which accomplished so great a matter, reaped only ingratitude:

Vers. 14, 15. "A little city, and men therein only a few,—to which a great king came near, and he besieged it, and erected against it high bulwarks. And he met therein a poor wise man, and who saved the city by his wisdom; and no man thought of that poor man." What may be said as to the hist. reference of these words has already been noticed; *vid.* above, p. 215. The "great king" is probably an Asiatic monarch, and that the Persian; Jerome translates verbally: *Castas parva et pauci in ea viri, venit contra eam*—the former is the subj. and the latter its pred.; the object stands first, plastically rigid, and there then follows what happened to it; the structure of the sentence is fundamentally the same as I<sup>a</sup> civ. 25. The expression *לָקַח סָבִיב* which may be used of any kind of coming to anything, is here, as at Gen. xxxii. 9, meant of a hostile approach. The object of a siege and a hostile attack is usually denoted by *לָקַח*, 2 Kings xvi. 5; Isa. vii. 1. Two Codd. of de Rossi's have the word *לָקַח*, but that is an error of transcription; the plur. of *לָקַח* is *לָקַחוּ*, Isa. xix. 4. *לָקַח* is, as at vii. 26, plur. of *לָקַח* (from *לָקַח*, to lie in wait); here, as elsewhere, *מִגְדָּן* and *מִגְדָּן* is the siege-tower erected on the ground or on the rampart, from which to spy out the weak points of the beleaguered place so as to assail it.

The words following *וְהָיָה* are rendered by the Targ., Syr., Jerome, Arab., and Luther: "and there was found in it," most interpreters explain accordingly, as they point to i. 10, *וְהָיָה*, *dicat aliquis*. But that *וְהָיָה* in this sequence of thought is = *וְהָיָה* (Job xlii. 15), is only to be supposed if it were impossible to regard the king as the subject, which Ewald with the LXX. and the Venet. does in spite of § 294b. It is true it would not be possible if, as Vaih. remarks, the finding presupposed a searching; but cf. on the contrary, *e.g.* Deut. xxiv. 1, I<sup>a</sup> civi. 3. We also say of one whom, contrary to expectation, a superior meets with, that he has found his match, that he has found his man. Thus it is here said of the great king, he found in the city a poor wise man—met therein with such an one, against whom his plan was shattered. *עָלֵה* is the adjective of the person of the poor man designated by *יֵשׁ מִלֵּל* (cf. 2 Chron. ii. 13); the accents correctly indicate this relation. Instead of *עָלֵה*, the older language would use *עָלֵה*; it does not, like the author here, use pure perfects, but makes the chief factum prominent by the *fut. consec.* The *i* of *millat* is, as at xiii. 9, that of *limited* before *Makkeph*, referred back to the original *a*. The making prominent of the subject contained in *millat* by means of *hu* is favourable to the

supposition that *umatsa'* has the king as its subject; while even where no opposition (as *eg.* at Jer. xvii. 18) lies before us this pleonasm belongs to the stylistic peculiarities of the book (*vid.* above, p. 198, No. 3). Instead of *adam lo*, the older form is *ish lo*; perhaps the author here wishes to avoid the repetition of *ish*, but at vii. 20 he also uses *adam* instead of *ish*, where no such reason existed.

Threatened by a powerful assailant, with whom it could not enter into battle, the little city, deserted by its men to a small remainder capable of bearing arms (this idea one appears to be under the necessity of connecting with *עַם . . . יְהוָה*), found itself in the greatest straits; but when all had been given up as lost, it was saved by the wisdom of the poor man (perhaps in the same way as Abel-beth-maacha, 2 Sam. xx., by the wisdom of a woman). But after this was done, the wise poor man quickly again fell into the background; no man thought of him, as he deserved to have been thought of, as the saviour of the city; he was still poor, and remained so, and *pauper homo raro civit cum nomine claret*. The poor man with his wisdom, Hengst. remarks, is Israel. And Wangemann (1856), generalizing the parable: "The beleaguered city is the life of the individual; the great king who lays siege to it is death and the judgment of the Lord." But sounder and more appropriate is the remark of Luther: *Est exemplum generale, cujus in multis historiis simile reperitur*; and: *Sic Themistocles multa bona fecit suis civibus, sed expertus summam ingrati-tudinem*. The author narrates an actual history, in which, on the one hand, he had seen what great things wisdom can do; and from which, on the other hand, he has drawn the following lesson:

Ver. 16. "And I said: Better is wisdom than strength; but the wisdom of the poor is despised, and his words are not heard." With the words, "I saw," the author introduces his observations, and with "I said" his reflections (*vid.* above, No. 3, p. 198). Wisdom is better than strength, since it does more for the wise man, and through him for others, than physical force,—more, as expressed in vii. 19, than ten mighty men. But the *respect* which wisdom otherwise secures for a man, if it is the wisdom of a poor man, sinks into *despect*, to which his poverty exposes him,—if necessity arises, his service, as the above history shows, is valued; but as a rule his words are unheeded, for the crowd estimate the worth of him whom they willingly hear according to the outward respect in which he is held.

To the lessons gathered from experience, are now added instructive proverbs of kindred contents.

Ver. 17. "The words of the wise, heard in quiet, have the superiority above the cry of a ruler among fools." Instead of *torim*

*min*, there stands here the simple *min*, *prae*, as at iv. 17, to express the superiority of the one to the other. Hitzig finds in this proverb the meaning that, as that history has shown, the words of the wise, heard with tranquillity, gain the victory over the cry of a ruler over fools. But (1) the contrast of אָזַי and אָזַי? require us to attribute the tranquillity to the wise man himself, and not to his hearers; (2) 'אָזַי is not a ruler over fools, by which it would remain questionable whether he himself was not a fool (cf. Job xii. 26), but a ruler among fools (cf. 2 Sam. xxiii. 3, 'אָזַי, "a ruler among men;" and Prov. xxxvi. 30, 'אָזַי, "the hero among beasts"), i.e. one who among fools takes the place of chief. The words of the poor wise man pass by unheeded, they are not listened to, because he does not possess an imposing splendid outward appearance, in accordance with which the crowd estimate the value of a man's words; the wise man does not seek to gain esteem by means of a pompous violent deportment; his words 'אָזַי are heard, let themselves be heard, are to be heard (cf. e.g. Song ii. 12) in quiet (Isa. xxx. 15); for, trusting to their own inward power of conviction, and committing the result to God, he despises vociferous pomp, and the external force of earthly expedients (cf. Isa. xlii. 2; Matt. xii. 19); but the words of the wise, which are to be heard in unassuming, passionless quietness, are of more value than the vociferation with which a king among fools, an arch-fool, a *non plus ultra* among fools, trumpets forth his pretended wisdom and constrains his hearers.

Ver. 18. The following proverb also leans on the history above narrated: "Better is wisdom than weapons of war; and one sinner destroyeth much good." The above history has shown by way of example that wisdom accomplishes more than implements of war, אָזַי אֶשְׂרָא (Assyr. *asat soharu*<sup>1</sup>), i.e. than all the apparatus belonging to preparation for war. But the much good which a wise man is accomplishing or has accomplished, one sinner (אֶחָד cf. above, p. 254, note) by treachery or calumny may render vain, or may even destroy, through mere malicious pleasure in evil. This is a synthetic distich whose two parts may be interpreted independently. As wisdom accomplishes something great, so a single villain may have a far-reaching influence, viz. such as destroys much good.

x. 1. The second half of the foregoing double proverb introduces what now follows: "Poisonous flies make to stink, make to ferment the oil of the preparer of ointment; heavier than wisdom,

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Fried. Delitzsch's *Assyr. Stud.* p. 129.

<sup>2</sup> The Syr. (not the Targ.) had אֶחָד before it, and thus realized it, which appears to correspond better with the parall. חֲכָמָה.

than honour, weighs a little folly." We do not need to change זבובי מות, on account of the foll. sing. of the pred., either into זבובי מ' (as possible by Hitz.) or זב' ימות (Luzz.); both are inadmissible, for the style of Koheleth is not adorned with archaisms such as *Chirek compaginis*; and also such an attrib. clause as זבוב ימות, "a fly which dies," is for him too refined; but both are also unnecessary, for a plur. of the subj., in which the plurality of the individuals comes less into view than the oneness of their character, is frequently enough followed by the sing. of the pred., e.g. Gen. xlix. 22; Joel i. 20; Isa. lix. 12, etc. It is a question, however, whether by זבובי מות, death-bringing, i.e. poisonous flies (LXX., Targ.,<sup>1</sup> Luther) or dead flies (Symm., Syr., Jerome) is meant. We decide in favour of the former; for (1) זבובי מות for זבובים מתים (ix. 4; Isa. xxxvii. 36), "death-flies" for "dead flies," would be an affected poetic expression without analogy; while, on the contrary, "death-flies" for "deadly flies" is a genit. connection, such as כלי מות [instruments of death, i.e. deadly instruments] and the like; Böttcher understands dung-flies; but the expression can scarcely extend to the designation of flies which are found on dead bodies. Meanwhile, it is very possible that by the expression זב' מ', such flies are thought of as carry death from dead bodies to those that are living; the Assy. *syllabare*, show how closely the Semites distinguished manifold kinds of זבובים (Assyr. *zumbi* = *zubbi*). (2) In favour of "dead flies," it has been remarked that that influence on the contents of a pot of ointment is effected not merely by poison-flies, but, generally, by flies that have fallen into it.

But since the oil mixed with perfumes may also be of the kind which, instead of being changed by a dead body, much rather embalms it; so it does not surprise us that the exciter of fermentation is thus drastically described by *μύλαι θανατοῦσαι* (LXX.); it happens, besides, also on this account, because "a little folly" corresponds as a contrasted figure to the little destructive carcase,—wisdom יה' בע' ("giveth life," vii. 12), a little folly is thus like little deadly flies. The sequence of ideas יב' יב' (maketh the ointment stink) is natural. The corrupting body communicates its foul savour to the ointment, makes it boil up, i.e. puts it into a state of fermentation, in consequence of which it foams and raises up small blisters, אבעבועות (Rashi). To the asyndeton יב' יב', there corresponds, in 1b, the asyndeton מ' מ' ; the Targ., Syr., and Jerome,<sup>2</sup> who translate by

<sup>1</sup> The Targ. interprets, as the Talm. and Mid. do, deadly flies as a figure of the *prava concupiscentia*. Similarly Wangemann: a mind buried in the world.

<sup>2</sup> The LXX. entirely remodels 1b: *τίμιον ἔσται*. ("a little wisdom is more

"and," are therefore not witnesses for the phrase 'אִסָּךְ, but the Venet. (καὶ τῆς δόξης) had this certainly before it; it is, in relation to the other, inferior in point of evidence.<sup>1</sup> In general, it is evident that the point of comparison is the hurtfulness, widely extending itself, of a matter which in appearance is insignificant. Therefore the meaning of 1b cannot be that a little folly is more weighty than wisdom, than honour, viz. in the eyes of the blinded crowd (Zöckl, Dächsel). This limitation the author ought to have expressed, for without it the sentence is an untruth. Jerome, following the Targ. and Midrash, explains: *Profusus est super sapientiam et gloriam stultitia parva*, understanding by wisdom and honour the self-elation therewith connected; besides, this thought, which Luther limits by the introduction of *seu* [i.e. folly is sometimes better than wisdom, etc.], is in harmony neither with that which goes before nor with that which follows. Luzz., as already Aben Ezra, Grotius, Geiger, Hengst., and the more recent English expositors, transfer the verses of 1a zoymatically to 1b: *similiter profusus similis sapientiae et gloriae vitium foetifera facit soliditas parva*. But יִרְ' forbids this transference, and, besides, כֹּחַ יִרְ' "honoured on account of," is an improbable expression; also כֹּחַ יִרְ' presents a tautology, which Luzz. seeks to remove by glossing 'כֹּחַ, as the Targ. does, by כֹּחַ וְכֹחַ. Already Rashi has rightly explained by taking יִרְ' (Syr. *jahle*, Arab. *zafar*, *zafie*), in its primary meaning, as synonym of כֹּחַ: more weighty, i.e. heavier and weighing more than wisdom, than honour, is a little folly; and he reminds us that a single foolish act can at once change into their contrary the wisdom and the honour of a man, destroying both, making it as if they had never been, cf. 1 Cor. v. 6. The sentence is true both in an intellectual and in a moral reference. Wisdom and honour are

honour than the great glory of folly"), i.e. כֹּחַ חֲכָמָה מְכַבֵּד כִּסְלוֹת רַב (כֹּחַ in the sense of "great multitude"). Van der Palm (1784) regards this as the original form of the text.

<sup>1</sup> מְכַבֵּד; thus in the Bible edit. 1505, 1615, Genoa 1618, Plantin 1562, Jablonski 1609, and also v. d. Hooght and Norri. In the Ven. 1515, 1531, 1615, מְכַבֵּד is found with the copulat. *et*, a form which is adopted by Michaelis. Thus also the Concord. edit., and thus, originally, it stood in J., but has been corrected to מְכַבֵּד. F., however, has מְכַבֵּד, with the marginal remark: מְכַבֵּד כֹּחַ חֲכָמָה מְכַבֵּד כִּסְלוֹת רַב (Simson ha-Nakham, to whom the writer of the Frankl. Cod. 1294 here refers for the reading: כֹּחַ, without the copul. *et*, is often called by him his voucher). This is also the correct Masoretic reading; for if 'כֹּחַ were to be read, then the word would be in the catalogue of words of which three begin with their initial letter, and a fourth has introduced a *et* before it (*Mss. Jo.* f. 28, *Ochla veochla*, Nr. 15).

swept away by a little *quantum* of folly; it places both in the shade, it outweighs them in the scale; it stamps the man, notwithstanding the wisdom and dignity which otherwise belong to him, as a fool. The expressive רִמָּן רֶמֶס is purposely used here; the dealer in ointments (*pigmentarius*) can now do nothing with the corrupted perfume,—thus the wisdom which a man possesses, the honour which he has hitherto enjoyed, avail him no longer; the proportionally small portion of folly which has become an ingredient in his personality gives him the character of a fool, and operates to his dishonour. Knobel construes rightly; but his explanation (also of Heiligst., Elst., Ginsb.): “a little folly frequently shows itself more efficacious and fruitful than the wisdom of an honoured wise man,” helps itself with a “frequently” inserted, and weakens טַב to a subordinated idea, and is opposed to the figure, which requires a personality.

Vers. 2, 3. A double proverb regarding wisdom and folly in their difference: “The heart of a wise man is directed to his right hand, and the heart of the fool to his left. And also on the way where a fool goeth, there his heart faileth him, and he saith to all that he is a fool.” Most interpreters translate: The heart of the wise man is at his right hand, *i.e.* it is in the right place. But this designation, meant figuratively and yet sounding anatomically, would be in bad taste<sup>1</sup> in this distinguishing double form (*vid.* on the contrary, ii. 14). The ל is that of direction;<sup>2</sup> and that which is situated to the right of a man is figuratively a designation of the right; and that to the left, a designation of the wrong. The designation proceeds from a different idea from that at Deut. v. 32, etc.; that which lies to the right, as that lying at a man’s right hand, is that to which his calling and duty point him; הֵשִׁיב denotes, in the later Hebrew, “to turn oneself to the wrong side.”

Ver. 3. This proverb forms, along with the preceding, a tetrastich, for it is divided into two parts by *var.* The *Kerí* has removed the art. in כֶּשֶׁ and שֶׁה, vi. 10, as incompatible with the ש. The order of the words *v’gam-baderek k’shehsachal holek* is inverted for *v’gam k’shehsachal baderek holek*, cf. iii. 13, and also *rav shēyihyn*, vi. 3; so

<sup>1</sup> Christ. Fried. Bauer (1732) explains as we do, and remarks, “If we translate: the heart of the wise is at his right hand, but the heart of the fool at his left, it appears as if the heart of the prudent and of the foolish must have a different position in the human body, thus affording to the profane ground for mockery.”

<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, ver. 2 has become a Jewish saying with reference to the study of a book (this thought of as Heb.): The wise always turn over the leaves backwards, repeating that which has been read; the fool forwards, superficially anticipating that which has not yet been read, and scarcely able to wait for the end.

far as this signifies, "supposing that they are many." Plainly the author intends to give prominence to "on the way;" and why, but because the fool, the inclination of whose heart, according to 2*b*, always goes to the left, is now placed in view as he presents himself in his public manner of life. Instead of חָסֵר לִב־הוּא we have here the verbal clause לִבּוֹ חָסֵר, which is not, after vi. 2, to be translated: *corde suo caret* (Herzl., Ginsb.), contrary to the suff. and also the order of the words, but, after ix. 8: *cor ejus deficit*, i.e. his understanding is at fault; for לֵב, here and at ver. 2, is thus used in a double sense, as the Greek *νοῦς* and the Lat. *mens* can also be used: there it means pure, formal, intellectual soul-life; here, pregnantly (*Psychol.* p. 249), as at vii. 7, cf. Hos. iv. 11, the understanding or the knowledge and will of what is right. The fool takes no step without showing that his understanding is not there,—that, so to speak, he does not take it along with him, but has left it at home. He even carries his folly about publicly, and prides himself in it as if it were wisdom: he says to all that he is a fool, *se esse stultum* (thus, correctly, most Jewish and Christian interpreters, e.g. Rashi and Rambach). The expression follows the scheme of Ps. ix. 21: May the heathen know *mortales se esse* (*vid. l.c.*). Otherwise Luther, with Symm. and Jerome: "he takes every man as a fool;" but this thought has no support in the connection, and would undoubtedly be expressed by סָכָלִים הָמָּה. Still differently Knobel and Ewald: he says to all, "it is foolish;" Hitzig, on the contrary, justly remarks that סָכָל is not used of actions and things; this also is true of כָּסִיל, against himself, v. 2, where he translates *qol k'sil* by "foolish discourses."

*The Caprice of Rulers and the Perverted World, x. 4-7.*

Wisdom is a strong protection. To this thought, from which the foregoing group proceeded, there is here subordinated the following admonition.

Ver. 4. This verse shows what is the wise conduct of a subject, and particularly of a servant, when the anger of the ruler breaks forth: "If the ill-humour of the ruler rise up against thee, do not leave thy post; for patience leaves out great sins." Luther connects ver. 4 and ver. 3 by "therefore;" for by the potentate he understands such an one as, himself a fool, holds all who contradict him to be fools: then it is best to let his folly rage on. But the מוֹשֵׁל is a different person from the סָכָל; and מִקֵּ' אֶל-תִּנָּח does not mean, "let not yourself get into a passion," or, as he more accurately ex-

plains in the *Annotationes*: “remain self-possessed” (similarly Hitzig: lose not thy mental state or composure), but, in conformity with חלך . . . אל, viii. 3, “forsake not the post (synon. מַעֲמֵד and מַצֵּב, Isa. xxii. 19, cf. 23) which thou hast received.” The person addressed is thus represented not merely as a subject, but officially as a subordinate officer: if the ruler’s displeasure (רִיחַ, as at Judg. viii. 3; Prov. xxix. 11) rises up against him (עָלָה, as elsewhere; cf. אָף, Ps. lxxiii. 21; or חָמָה, 2 Sam. xi. 20), he ought not, in the consciousness that he does not merit his displeasure, hastily give up his situation which has been entrusted to him and renounce submission; for patience, gentleness (regarding מַרְפָּא, *vid.* Prov. xii. 18) יֵן . . . נֵר’.

This concluding clause of the verse is usually translated: “It appeaseth (pacifieth) great sins” (LXX. καταπαύσει, Symm. παύσει). The phrase (חָמָה) אָף הַגִּבִּיחַ is not to be compared, for it signifies quieting by an exhausting outbreak; on the contrary, יָנִיה in the passage before us must signify quieting, as the preventing of an outbreak (cf. Prov. xv. 1). It appears more correct to render הַגִּבִּיחַ in both cases in the sense of *éâv, missum facere*: to leave great sins is = not to commit them, to give up the lust thereto; for *hinniahk* signifies to let go, to leave off, *e.g.* Jer. xiv. 9; and to indulge, Esth. iii. 8, here as at vii. 18, xi. 6, “to keep the hands from something.” The great sins cannot certainly be thought of as those of the ruler; for on his part only one comes into view, if indeed, according to the old legal conception, it could be called such, *viz.* cruel proceeding with reference to him who wilfully withdraws from him, and thus proves his opposition; much rather we are to think of the great sins into which he who is the object of the ruler’s displeasure might fall, *viz.* treason (viii. 2), insubordination, self-destruction, and at the same time, since he does not stand alone, or make common cause with others who are discontented, the drawing of others into inevitable ruin (viii. 3b). All these sins, into which he falls who answers wrath with wrath, patience avoids, and puts a check to them. The king’s anger is perhaps justified; the admonition, however, would be otherwise expressed than by מֶקֶד אֶל-חֲנָה, if it were not presupposed that it was not justified; and thus without μετά-βασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος an *I*-section follows the reflection regarding wise deportment as over against the king’s displeasure, a section which describes from experience and from personal observation the world turned upside down in the state.

Ver. 5. “There is an evil which I have seen under the sun, like an error which proceedeth from the ruler.” The introduction by the virtual relative *räithi* is as at v. 12, cf. vi. 1. Knobel, Hengst., and

others give to the כ of 'שׁ the meaning of "according to," or "in consequence of which," which harmonizes neither with *ra'ah* nor with *räithi*. Also Kleinert's translation: "There is a misery—I have seen it under the sun—in respect of an error which proceedeth from the ruler," is untenable; for by this translation *ra'ah* is made the pred. while it is the subj. to שׁ, and *kishgagah* the unfolding of this subject. Hitzig also remarks: "as [*wie ein*] an error, instead of which we have: in respect to [*um einen*] an error;" for he confounds things incongruous. Hitz., however, rightly recognises, as also Kleinert, the כ as *Caph veritatis*, which measures the concrete with the ideal, Isa. xiii. 6, compares the individual with the general which therein comes to view, Ezek. xxvi. 10; Neh. vii. 2; cf. 2 Sam. ix. 8. Koheleth saw an evil under the sun; something which was like an error, appeared to him altogether like an error which proceedeth from the ruler. If we could translate 'שׁ by *quod exiit*, then כ would be the usual *Caph similitudinis*; but since it must be translated by *quod exit*, כשׁ' וגו' places the observed fact under a comprehensive generality: it had the nature of an error proceeding from the ruler. If this is correct, it is so much the less to be assumed that by השלם God is to be understood (Dan. v. 21), as Jerome was taught by his *Hebraeus*: *quod putent homines in hac inaequalitate rerum illum non juste et ut aequum est judicare*. It is a governor in a state that is meant, by whom an error might easily be committed, and only too frequently is committed, in the promotion or degradation of persons. But since the world, with its wonderful division of high and low, appears like as it were an error proceeding from the Most High, there certainly falls a shadow on the providence of God Himself, the Governor of the world; but yet not so immediately that the subject of discourse is an "error" of God, which would be a saying more than irreverent. יצה = יצה is the metaplastic form for יצהה or יצהת (for which at Deut. xxviii. 57 incorrectly יוצת), not an error of transcription, as Olsh. supposes; *vid.* to the contrary, above, No. 1, p. 197. מלפני (Symm. ἐξ ἔμπροσθεν) with יצה is the old *usus loq.* There now follows a sketch of the perverted world.

Vers. 6, 7. "Folly is set on great heights, and the rich must sit in lowliness. I have seen servants upon horses, and princes like servants walking on foot." The word הסכל (with double *seghol*, Aram. סכלי) is used here instead of those in whom it is personified. Elsewhere a multiplicity of things great, such as עמים, מים, and the like, is heightened by רבים (cf. *e.g.* Ps. xviii. 17); here "great heights" are such as are of a high, or the highest degree; *rabbim*, instead of *harabbim*, is more appos. than adjunct. (cf. Gen. xliii.

14; Ps. lxxviii. 28, cxliii. 10; Jer. ii. 21), in the sense of "many" (e.g. Ginsburg: "in many high positions") it mixes with the poetry of the description dull prose.<sup>1</sup> 'Ashirim also is peculiarly used: *divites* = *nobiles* (cf. אֲשִׁירִים, Isa. xxxii. 5), those to whom their family inheritance gives a claim to a high station, who possess the means of training themselves for high offices, which they regard as places of honour, not as sources of gain. *Regibus multis*, Grotius here remarks, quoting from Sallust and Tacitus, *suspecti qui excellunt sive sapientia sive nobilitate aut opibus*. Hence it appears that the relation of slaves and princes to each other is suggested; *hoc discrimen*, says Justin, xli. 3, of the Parthians, *inter servos liberosque est quod servi pedibus, liberi nonnisi equis incedunt*; this distinction is set aside, princes must walk 'al-haarëts, i.e. b'regel (b'raglêhëm), and in their stead (Jer. xvii. 25) slaves sit high on horseback, and rule over them (the princes),—an offensive spectacle, Prov. xix. 10. The eunuch Bagoas (vid. above, p. 214), long all-powerful at the Persian Court, is an example of the evil consequences of this reversal of the natural relations of men.

*That which is Difficult exposes to Danger; that which is Improper brings Trouble; that which comes Too Late is not of use*, x. 8-11.

How much time, thought, and paper have been expended in seeking to find out a close connection between this group of verses and that going before! Some read in them warnings against rising in rebellion against despots (Ginsb.); others (e.g. Zöckl.) place these proverbs in relation to the by no means enviable lot of those upstarts (Zöckl.); more simply and more appropriately, Luther here finds exemplified the thought that to govern (*regere homines et gerere res humanas*) is a difficult matter; on the other hand, Luzz. finds in 8-11 the thought that all depends on fate, and not on the wisdom of man. In reality, this section forms a member in the carrying forward of the theme which the author has been discussing from ix. 13: wisdom and folly in their mutual relations, particularly in difficult situations of life. The catchword of the foregoing section is מְרִפָּה, patience, resignation, which guards against rendering evil for evil; and the catchword of the following section is הַבְּשִׁיר, considerate and provisory straining of the means toward the accomplishment of that which one purposes to do. The author presents a prelude in

<sup>1</sup> Luzz. reads נָתַן: "Folly brings many into high places." The order of the words, however, does not favour this.

four sentences, which denote by way of example, that whoever undertakes any severe labour, at the same time faces the dangers connected therewith.

Vers. 8, 9. "He that diggeth a pit may fall into it; whoso breaketh down walls, a serpent may sting him. Whoso pulleth out stones may do himself hurt therewith; he who cleaveth wood may endanger himself thereby." The futures are not the expression of that which will necessarily take place, for, thus rendered, these four statements would be contrary to experience; they are the expression of a possibility. The fut. **יפול** is not here meant as predicting an event, as where the clause 8a is a figure of self-punishment arising from the destruction prepared for others, Prov. xxvi. 27; Sir. xxvii. 26. **גִּזְמִין** is, Prov. xxvi. 27, the Targum word for **שְׁחַת**, ditch, from **גָּזַם** = **שָׁחַת**, *depressum esse*. **גִּזְרִי** (R. **גָּר**, to cut), something cutting off, something dividing, is a wall as a boundary and means of protection drawn round a garden, vineyard, or farm-court; **פֶּרֶן גִּזְרִי** is the reverse of **גִּזְרִי פֶּרֶן**, Isa. lviii. 12. Serpents are accustomed to nestle in the crevices and holes of walls, as well as in the earth (for a city-wall is called **חוֹמָה** and **חֵל**); thus he who breaks into such a wall may expect that the serpent which is there will bite him (cf. Amos v. 19). To tear down stones, *hissi'a*, is synon. of *hhatsav*, to break stones, Isa. li. 1; yet *hhotsēv* does not usually mean the stone-breaker, but the stone-cutter (stone-mason); *hissi'a*, from *nasa'*, to tear out, does not also signify, 1 Kings v. 31, "to transport," and here, along with wood-splitting, is certainly to be thought of as a breaking loose or separating in the quarry or shaft. *Ne'etsav* signifies elsewhere to be afflicted; here, where the reference is not to the internal but the external feeling: to suffer pain, or reflex.: to injure oneself painfully; the derivat. *'etsev* signifies also severe labour; but to find this signification in the *Niph.* ("he who has painful labour") is contrary to the *usus loq.*, and contrary to the meaning intended here, where generally actual injuries are in view. Accordingly **יִסְכֵּן בְּעַצְמוֹ**, for which the Mishn. **יִסְכֵּן בְּעַצְמוֹ**,<sup>1</sup> "he brings himself into danger," would denote, to be placed in danger of life and limb, cf. *Gittin* 65b; *Chullin* 37a; and it is therefore not necessary, with Hitzig and others, to translate after the *vulnerabitur* of Jerome: "He may wound himself thereby;" there is not a denom. **סָכַן**, to cut, to wound, derived from **סָכַן** (**שָׁכַן**), an instrument for cutting, a knife.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* above, p. 194.

<sup>2</sup> The Midrash understands the whole ethically, and illustrates it by the example of *Rabsake* [we know now that the half-Assyr., half-Accad. word *rabsak*

The sum of these four clauses is certainly not merely that he who undertakes a dangerous matter exposes himself to danger; the author means to say, in this series of proverbs which treat of the distinction between wisdom and folly, that the wise man is everywhere conscious of his danger, and guards against it. These two verses (8, 9) come under this definite point of view by the following proverb; wisdom has just this value in providing against the manifold dangers and difficulties which every undertaking brings along with it.<sup>1</sup> This is illustrated by a fifth example, and then it is declared with reference to all together.

Ver. 10. "If the iron has become blunt, and he has not whetted the face, then he must give more strength to the effort; but wisdom has the superiority in setting right." This proverb of iron, *i.e.* iron instruments (בְּרִזָּה, from בָּרַז, to pierce, like the Arab. name for iron, *hadid*, means essentially something pointed), is one of the most difficult in the Book of Koheleth,—linguistically the most difficult, because scarcely anywhere else are so many peculiar and unexampled forms of words to be found. The old translators afford no help for the understanding of it. The advocates of the hypothesis of a Dialogue have here a support in אִם, which may be rendered interrogatively; but where would we find, syntactically as well as actually, the answer? Also, the explanations which understand חֵילִים in the sense of war-troops, armies, which is certainly its nearest-lying meaning, bring out no appropriate thought; for the thought that even blunt iron, as far as it is not externally altogether spoiled (*lo-phanim qilqal*), or: although it has not a sharpened edge (Rashi, Rashbam), might be an equipment for an army, or gain the victory, would, although it were true, not fit the context; Ginsburg explains: If the axe be blunt, and he (who goes out against the tyrant) do not sharpen it beforehand (*phanim*, after Jerome, for *l'phanim*, which is impossible, and besides leads to nothing, since *l'phanim* means *ehedem* [formerly], but not *zuvor* [*prius*], Ewald, § 220a), he (the tyrant) only increases his army; on the contrary, wisdom hath the advantage by repairing the mischief (without the war being unequal);—but the "ruler" of the foregoing group has here long ago disappeared, and it is only a bold imagination which discovers in the *hu* of 10a the person addressed in ver. 4, and represents him as a rebel, and augments

means a military chief], whom report makes a brother of Manasseh, and a renegade in the Assyrian service.

<sup>1</sup> Thus rightly Carl Lang in his *Salom. Kunst im Psalter* (Marburg 1874). He sees in vers. 8–10 a beautiful heptastich. But as to its contents, ver. 11 also belongs to this group.

him into a warlike force, but recklessly going forth with unwhetted swords. The correct meaning for the whole, in general at least, is found if, after the example of Abulwalid and Kimchi, we interpret **נִבֵּר הַיָּלִים** of the increasing of strength, the augmenting of the effort of strength, not, as Aben-Ezra, of conquering, outstripping, surpassing; **נִבֵּר** means to make strong, to strengthen, Zech. x. 6, 12; and **הַיָּלִים**, as plur. of **יָלִי**, strength, is supported by **נִבְּוֵי הַיָּלִים**, 1 Chron. vii. 5, 7, 11, 40, the plur. of **יָלִי**; the LXX. renders by *δυνάμεις δυνάμώσει* [and he shall strengthen the forces], and the Peshito has **יָלִי** for *δυνάμεις*, Acts viii. 13, xix. 11 (cf. Chald. Syr. **אַתְחִיל**, to strengthen oneself, to become strengthened). Thus understanding the words **יָחַ' יָחַ'** of *intentio virium*, and that not with reference to sharpening (Luth., Grotius), but to the splitting of wood, etc. (Geier, Desvieux, Mendelss.), all modern interpreters, with the exception of a few who lose themselves on their own path, gain the thought, that in all undertakings wisdom hath the advantage in the devising of means subservient to an end. The diversities in the interpretation of details leave the essence of this thought untouched. Hitz., Böttch., Zöckl., Lange, and others make the wood-splitter, or, in general, the labourer, the subject to **קָרָה**, referring **וְהוּא** to the iron, and, contrary to the accents, beginning the apodosis with *qilqal*: "If he (one) has made the iron blunt, and it is without an edge, he swings it, and applies his strength." **לֹא-פָנִים**, "without an edge" (*lo* for *b'lo*), would be linguistically as correct as **לֹא בָנִים**, "without children," 1 Chron. ii. 30, 32; Ewald, § 286*g*; and *qilqal* would have a meaning in some measure supported by Ezek. xxi. 26. But granting that *qilqal*, which there signifies "to shake," may be used of the swinging of an axe (for which we may refer to the Aethiop. *kualkuala*, *kalkala*, of the swinging of a sword), yet **קִלְקִלוּ** (**קִלְקִל אֹתוֹ**) could have been used, and, besides, **פָּנִים** means, not like **פִּי**, the edge, but, as a somewhat wider idea, the front, face (Ezek. xxi. 21; cf. Assy. *pan ilippi*, the forepart of a ship); "it has no edge" would have been expressed by **וְהוּא לֹא פָה** (**פִּיפִיּוֹת**), or by **וְהוּא אֵינּוּ מְלֻטָּשׁ** (**מִזְרָט, מִזְרָח**). We therefore translate: if the iron has become blunt, *hebes factum sit* (for the *Pih.* of intransitives has frequently the meaning of an inchoative or desiderative stem, like **מָעַט**, to become little, *decrescere*, xii. 3; **בָּהָה**, *hebescere, caligare*, Ezek. xxi. 12; Ewald, § 120*d*), and he (who uses it) has not polished (whetted) the face of it, he will (must) increase the force. **וְהוּא** does not refer to the iron, but, since there was no reason to emphasize the sameness of the subject (as *e.g.* 2 Chron. xxxii. 30), to the labourer, and thus makes, as with the other explanation, the change of subject notice-

able (as *e.g.* 2 Chron. xxvi. 1). The order of the words 'וה... קל, *et ille non faciem (ferri) exacuit*, is as at Isa. liii. 9; cf. also the position of *lo* in 2 Sam. iii. 34; Num. xvi. 29.

קלקל, or pointed with *Pattach* instead of *Tsere* (cf. *garqar*, Num. xxiv. 17) in bibl. usage, from the root-meaning *levem esse*, signifies to move with ease, *i.e.* quickness (as also in the Arab. and Aethiop.), to shake (according to which the LXX. and Syr. render it by *ταράσσειν*, רָלַח, to shake, and thereby to trouble, make muddy); in the Mishn. usage, to make light, little, to bring down, to destroy; here it means to make light = even and smooth (the contrast of rugged and notched), a meaning the possibility of which is warranted by נָה' קָלָל, Ezek. i. 7, Dan. x. 6 (which is compared by Jewish lexicographers and interpreters), which is translated by all the old translators "glittering brass," and which, more probably than Ewald's "to steel" (temper), is derived from the root *qal*, to burn, glow.<sup>1</sup> With *vahhaylim* the apodosis begins; the style of Koheleth recognises this *vav apod.* in conditional clauses, iv. 11, cf. Gen. xliii. 9, Ruth iii. 13, Job vii. 4, Mic. v. 7, and is fond of the inverted order of the words for the sake of emphasis, xi. 8, cf. Jer. xxxvii. 10, and above, under vii. 22.

In 10*b* there follows the common clause containing the application. Hitzig, Elster, and Zöckl. incorrectly translate: "and it is a profit wisely to handle wisdom;" for instead of the inf. absol. הָבֵן, they unnecessarily read the inf. constr. הַבְשִׁיר, and connect הַבְשִׁיר הַבְנָה, which is a phrase altogether unparalleled. *Hichsir* means to set in the right position (*vid.* above, p. 193, *kaser*), and the sentence will thus mean: the advantage which the placing rightly of the means serviceable to an end affords, is wisdom—*i.e.* wisdom bears this advantage in itself, brings it with it, concretely: a wise man is he who reflects upon this advantage. It is certainly also possible that הַבֵּשׂ, after the manner of the *Hiph.* הַצְלִיחַ and הַשְׁכִּיל, directly means "to succeed," or causatively: "to make to succeed." We might explain, as *e.g.* Knobel: the advantage of success, or of the causing of prosperity, is wisdom, *i.e.* it is that which secures this gain. But the meaning prevalent in post-bibl. Heb. of making fit, equipping,—a predisposition corresponding to a definite aim or result,—is much more conformable to the example from which the *porisma* is deduced. Buxtorf translates the *Hiph.* as a Mishnic word by *aptare*, *rectificare*. Tyler suggests along with "right guidance" the meaning "pre-arrangement," which we prefer.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Regarding the two roots, *vid.* Fried. Delitzsch's *Indogerm.-Sem. Stud.* p. 91 f.

<sup>2</sup> Also the twofold Haggadic explanation, *Taanith* 8a, gives to *hachshir* the

Ver. 11. The last proverb of this series presents for consideration the uselessness of him who comes too late. "If a serpent bite without enchantment, the charmer is of no use." The Talm. interprets this **אם**, like that of ver. 10, also as interrog.: Does the serpent bite without its being whispered to, *i.e.* without a providential determination impelling it thereto? *Jer. Peah*, i. 1. But **שִׁחַשׁ**, except at Isa. xxvi. 16, where whispering prayers are meant, signifies the whispering of formulas of charming; "serpents are not to be charmed (tamed)," **לִחַשׁ**, *Jer. viii. 17.* Rather for **בַּעַל הָלָשׁ** the meaning of slander is possible, which is given to it in the Haggada, *Taanith 8a*: All the beasts will one day all at once say to the serpent: the lion walks on the earth and eats, the wolf tears asunder and eats; but what enjoyment hast thou by thy bite? and it answers them: "Also the slanderer (**לִבְעַל הַלָּשׁוֹן**) has certainly no profit." Accordingly the Targ., Jerome, and Luther translate; but if **אם** is conditional, and the *vav* of *v'ēn* connects the protasis and the apodosis, then *ba'al hallashon* must denote a man of tongue, *viz.* of an enchanting tongue, and thus a charmer (LXX., Syr.). This name for the charmer, one of many, is not unintentional; the tongue is an instrument, as iron is, ver. 10: the latter must be sharp, if it would not make greater effort necessary; the former, if it is to gain its object, must be used at the right time. The serpent bites **בְּלִי לֶחֶם**, when it bites before it has been charmed (*cf. b'lo yomo, Job xv. 32*); there are also serpents which bite without letting themselves be charmed; but here this is the point, that it anticipates the enchantment, and thus that the charmer comes too late, and can make no use of his tongue for the intended purpose, and therefore has no advantage from his act. There appropriately follow here proverbs of the use of the tongue on the part of a wise man, and its misuse on the part of a fool.

*The Worthless Prating and the Aimless Labour of the Fool, x. 12-15.*

It is wisdom, as the preceding series of proverbs has shown, to be on one's guard to provide oneself with the right means, and to observe the right time. These characteristics of the wise man ver. 11 has brought to view, by an example from the sphere of action in which the tongue serves as the instrument. There now follows, not unexpectedly, a proverb with reference to that which the words of a wise man and the words of a fool respectively bring about.

meaning of "to set, *à priori*, in the right place." Luther translated *qilqal* twice correctly, but further follows the impossible rendering of Jerome: *multo labore exacuetur, et post industriam sequetur sapientia.*

Ver. 12. "The words of a wise man's mouth are grace; but the lips of a fool swallow him up." The words from a wise man's mouth are יָן, graciousness, *i.e.* gracious in their contents, their form and manner of utterance, and thus also they gain favour, affection, approbation, for culture (education) produces favour, Prov. xiii. 15, and its lips grace (pleasantness), which has so wide an influence that he can call a king his friend, Prov. xxii. 11, although, according to ix. 11, that does not always so happen as is to be expected. The lips of a fool, on the contrary, swallow him, *i.e.* lead him to destruction. The *Pih.* עֶזֶז, which at Prov. xix. 28 means to swallow down, and at Prov. xxi. 20 to swallow = to consume in luxury, to spend dissolutely, has here the metaphorical meaning of to destroy, to take out of the way (for that which is swallowed up disappears). שְׂפָתָיו is parallel form to שְׂפָתַי, like the Aram. כַּפּוֹת. The construction is, as at Prov. xiv. 3, "the lips of the wise תְּשַׁמְּרֵם preserve them;" the idea of unity, in the conception of the lips as an instrument of speech, prevails over the idea of plurality. The words of the wise are heart-winning, and those of the fool self-destructive. This is verified in the following verse.

Ver. 13. "The beginning of the words of his mouth is foolishness; and the end of his mouth is mischievous madness." From folly (absurdity) the words which are heard from a fool's mouth rise to madness, which is compounded of presumption, wantonness, and frenzy, and which, in itself a symptom of mental and moral depravity, brings as its consequence destruction on himself (Prov. xviii. 17). The adjective רָעָה is as in חֲלִי רָע, which interchanges with רָעָה הוֹי vi. 2, v. 12, etc. The end of his mouth, viz. of his speaking, is = the end of the words of his mouth, viz. the end which they at last reach. Instead of *holeloth*, there is here, with the adj. following, *holeluth*, with the usual ending of *abstracta*. The following proverb says how the words of the fool move between these two poles of folly and wicked madness: he speaks much, and as if he knew all things.

Ver. 14. "And the fool maketh many words: while a man yet doth not know that which shall be; and what shall be when he is no more, who can show him that?" The *vav* at the beginning of this verse corresponds to the Lat. *accedit quod*. That he who in 12b was named *k'esil* is now named *hassachal*, arises from this, that meanwhile *sichluth* has been predicated of him. The relation of 14b to 14a, Geier has rightly defined: *Probatur absurditas multiloquii a communi ignorantia ac imbecillitate humana, quae tamen praecipue dominatur apud ignaros stultos*. We miss before *lo-yeda'* an "although" (*gam*,

Neh. vi. 1, or *ki gam*, viii. 12); the clause is, after the manner of a clause denoting state or condition, subordinated to the principal clause, as at Ps. v. 10: "an open grave is their throat 'לִשְׁתָּיָהּ, although they smooth their tongue, *i.e.* speak flatteringly." The LXX., Syr., Symm., and Jerome seek to rectify the tautology *id quod futurum est et quod futurum est* (cf. on the other hand, viii. 7), for they read 'מה שהיה . . . יה. But the second *quod futurum* certainly preserves by 'מֵאָחָר its distinguishing nearer definition. Hitzig explains: "What is done, and what after this (that is done) is done." Scarcely correctly: *aharav* of the parallel passage, vi. 12, cf. vii. 14, ix. 3, requires for the suffix a personal reference, so that thus *meaharav*, as at Deut. xxix. 21, means "from his death and onwards." Thus, first, the knowledge of the future is denied to man; then the knowledge of what will be done after his death; and generally, of what will then be done. The fool, without any consciousness of human ignorance, acts as if he knew all, and utters about all and everything a multitude of words; for he uselessly fatigues himself with his ignorance, which remains far behind the knowledge that is possible for man.

Ver. 15. "The labour of the foolish wearieth him who knoweth not how to go to the city." If we do not seek to explain: labour such as fools have wearies him (the fool), then we have here such a *synallage numeri* as at Isa. ii. 8, Hos. iv. 8, for from the plur. a transition is made to the distributive or individualizing sing. A greater anomaly is the treatment of the noun עָמַל as fem. (greater even than the same of the noun *pithgam*, viii. 11, which admitted of attractional explanation, and, besides, in a foreign word was not strange). Kimchi, *Michlol* 10a, supposes that עָמַל is thought of in the sense of יָנִיעַת עָמַל; impossible, for one does not use such an expression. Hitzig, and with him Hengst., sees the occasion for the *synallage* in the discordance of the masc. יָנִיעַת; but without hesitation we use the expressions יָנִיעַת, Mic. v. 6, יָנִיעַת, Josh. vi. 26, and the like. 'Amal also cannot be here *fem. unitatis* (Böttch. § 657. 4), for it denotes the wearisome striving of fools as a whole and individually. We have thus to suppose that the author has taken the liberty of using 'amal once as fem. (*vid.* on the contrary, ii. 18, 20), as the poet, Prov. iv. 13, in the introduction of the Book of Proverbs uses *musar* once as fem., and as the similarly formed מְכַבֵּד is used in two genders. The fool kindles himself up and perplexes himself, as if he could enlighten the world and make it happy,—he who does not even know how to go to the city. Ewald remarks: "Apparently proverbial, viz. to bribe the great lords in the city." For us who, notwithstanding ver. 16, do not trouble ourselves any more with the

tyrants of ver. 4, such thoughts, which do violence to the connection, are unnecessary. Hitzig also, and with him Elst. and Zöckl., thinks of the city as the residence of the rulers from whom oppression proceeds, but from whom also help against oppression is to be sought. All this is to be rejected. Not to know how to go to the city, is = not to be able to find the open public street, and, like the Syrians, 2 Kings vi. 18 f., to be smitten with blindness. The way to the city is *via notissima et tritissima*. Rightly Grotius, like Aben Ezra: *Multi quaestionibus arduis se fatigant, cum ne obvia quidem norint, quale est iter ad urbem*. אֶל-עִיר is vulgar for אֶל-הָעִיר. In the Greek language also the word πόλις has a definite signification, and Athens is called ἄστυ, mostly without the art. But Stamboul, the name of which may seem as an illustration of the proverbial phrase, “not to know how to go to the city,” is = εἰς τὴν πόλιν. Grätz finds here an allusion to the Essenes, who avoided the city—*habeat sibi!*

### THIRD CONCLUDING SECTION, WITH THE FINALE AND EPILOGUE

- (A.) WARNINGS AGAINST IDLE REVELRY AND IMPROVIDENCE, AND A CALL TO A FRESH EFFORT AFTER A HAPPY IMPROVEMENT OF LIFE.—  
X. 16—XI. 7.

*The Prosperity of a Country, its Misfortune, and Thoughtful Foresight,*  
x. 16—20.

Interpreters have sought in every way to discover a close connection between the following proverbs of the bad and good princes, and those that precede. Hitzig, rightly dissatisfied with this forced attempt, cuts the knot by putting vers. 16–19 into the mouth of the fool, ver. 15: Koheleth, ver. 20, refers to him this rash freedom of speech, and warns him against such language; for, supposing that vers. 16–19 were the words of Koheleth, in ver. 20 he would contradict himself. This unworthy perversion of the contents of the section rectifies itself. The supposed words of the fool belong to the most peculiar, most impressive, and most beautiful utterances of the חכם which the Book of Koheleth contains, and the warning, ver. 20, against cursing the king, stands in no contradiction to the “woe,” ver. 16; Isaiah under Ahaz, Jeremiah under Zedekiah, actually show how the two are in harmony; and the apostles even in the times of Nero acted on their “honour the king.” Rather it may be said that the author in ver. 16, from fools in general (ver. 15)

comes to speak of folly in the position occupied by a king and princes. But "folly" is not the characteristic name for that which is unseemly and indecorous which is blamed in these high lords. From x. 16, the Book of Koheleth turns toward the conclusion; since it represents itself as a discourse of Solomon's on the subject of the wisdom of life, and all through has a sharp eye on rulers and their surroundings, it is not strange that it treated of it in x. 4-7, and again now returns to the theme it had scarcely left.

Vers. 16, 17. "Woe to thee, O land, whose king is a child, and whose princes sit at table in the early morning! Happy art thou, O land, whose king is a noble, and whose princes sit at table at the right time, in manly strength, and not in drunkenness!" Regarding אָ, *vid.* above, p. 191. Instead of אֶשְׁרֵי, the older language would rather use the phrase אֶשְׁרֵי נֶעַר מְלָכּוֹ; and instead of *na'ar*, we might correctly use, after Prov. xxx. 22, 'ēved; but not as Grätz thinks, who from this verse deduces the reference of the book to Herod (the "slave of the Hasmonean house," as the Talm. names him), in the same meaning. For *na'ar*, it is true, sometimes means—*e.g.* as Ziba's by-name (2 Sam. xix. 18 [17])—a servant, but never a slave as such, so that here, in the latter sense, it might be the contrast of בְּנֵי־חֹרִים; it is to be understood after Isa. iii. 12; and Solomon, Bishop of Constance, understood this woe rightly, for he found it fulfilled at the time of the last German Karolingian Ludwig III.<sup>1</sup> *Na'ar* is a very extensively applicable word in regard to the age of a person. King Solomon and the prophets Jeremiah and Zechariah show that *na'ar* may be used with reference to one in a high office; but here it is one of few years of age who is meant, who is incapable of ruling, and shows himself as childish in this, that he lets himself be led by bad guides in accordance with their pleasure. In 16b, the author perhaps thinks of the heads of the aristocracy who have the phantom-king in their power: intending to fatten themselves, they begin their feasting with the break of day. If we translate *yochēlu* by "they eat," 16b sounds as if to breakfast were a sin,—with us such an abbreviation of the thought so open to misconception would be a fault in style, but not so with a Hebrew.<sup>2</sup> אָכַל (for אָכַל לָהֶם, Ps. xiv. 4) is here eating for eating's sake, eating as its own object, eating which, in the morning, comes in the place of fresh activity in one's calling, consecrated by prayer. Instead of אֶשְׁרֵי, 17a, there ought properly to have been אֶשְׁרֵי; but (1) אֶשְׁרֵי has this peculiarity, to be explained from its interjectional usage, that with the suff.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Büchmann's *Geflügelte Worte*, p. 178, 5th ed. (1868).

<sup>2</sup> *Vid. Gesch. d. jüd. Poesie*, p. 188 f.

added it remains in the form of the *st. constr.*, for we say *e.g.* אֲשֶׁרִיךְ for אֲשֶׁרִיךְ; (2) the sing. form אֲשֶׁר, inflected אֲשֶׁרִי, so substitutes itself that אֲשֶׁרִיךְ, or, more correctly, אֲשֶׁרִיךְ, and אֲשֶׁרִיךְו, Prov. xxix. 19, the latter for אֲשֶׁרִיךְו, are used (*vid.* under Song ii. 14). Regarding *bēn-hhorim*, *vid.* above, p. 191; the root-word signifies to be white (*vid.* under Gen. xl. 16). A noble is called *hhor*, Isa. xxxiv. 12; and one noble by birth, more closely, or also merely descriptively (Gesen. *Lehrgeb.* p. 649), *bēn-hhorim*, from his purer complexion, by which persons of rank were distinguished from the common people (Lam. iv. 7). In the passage before us, *bēn-hhorim* is an ethical conception, as *e.g.* also *generosus* becomes such, for it connects with the idea of noble by birth that of noble in disposition, and the latter predominates (cf. Song vii. 2, *nadiv*): it is well with a land whose king is of noble mind, is a man of noble character, or, if we give to *bēn-hhorim* the Mishnic meaning, is truly a free man (cf. John viii. 36). Of princes after the pattern of such a king, the contrary of what is said 16b is true: they do not eat early in the morning, but *ba'et*, "at the right time;" everywhere else this is expressed by *b'itto* (iii. 11); here the expression—corresponding to the Greek ἐν καιρῷ, the Lat. *in tempore*—is perhaps occasioned by the contrast *baboqēr*, "in the morning." Eating at the right time is more closely characterized by *bighvurah v'lo vashsh'thi*. Jerome, whom Luther follows, translates: *ad reficiendum et non ad luxuriam*. Hitz., Ginsb., and Zöckl, "for strengthening" (obtaining strength), not: "for feasting;" but that *beth* might introduce the object aimed at (after Hitz., proceeding from the *beth* of exchange), we have already considered under ii. 4. The author, wishing to say this, ought to have written לְנוֹבְרָה וְלֹא לְשִׁתִּי. Better, Hahn: "in strength, but not in drunkenness,"—as heroes, but not as drunkards (Isa. v. 22). Ewald's "in virtue, and not in debauchery," is also thus meant. But what is that: to eat in virtue, *i.e.* the dignity of a man? The author much rather represents them as eating in manly strength, *i.e.* as this requires it (cf. the plur. Ps. lxxi. 16 and Ps. xc. 10), only not *bashti* ("in drunkenness—excess"), so that eating and drinking become objects in themselves. Kleinert, well: as men, and not as gluttons. The Masora makes, under *bashti*, the note לִית, *i.e.* שִׁתִּי has here a meaning which it has not elsewhere, it signifies drunkenness; elsewhere it means the web of a web. The Targ. gives the word the meaning of weakness (חֲלָשָׁה), after the Midrash, which explains it by בְּחַשְׁשָׁו (in weakness); Menahem b. Saruk takes along with it in this sense נִשְׁתָּה, Jer. li. 30. The Talm. *Shabbath* 10a, however, explains it rightly by בְּשִׁתִּיהָ שֶׁל־יָיִן.

Ver. 18. Since, now, ver. 19 has only to do with princes, the

following proverb of the consequences of sloth receives a particular reference in the frame of this mirror for princes: "Through being idle the roof falleth; and through laziness of the hands the house leaketh." Ewald, Redslob, Olsh., Hitz., and Fürst, as already Aben Ezra, understand the dual עַלְלִי of the two idle hands, but a similar attribut. adject.-dual is not found in Heb.; on the contrary, *ephraim*, *m'rathaim* Jer. l. 21, *rish'athaim*, and, in a certain measure, also *riqmathaim*, speak in favour of the intensification of the dual; 'atsaltaim is related to 'atslah, as *Faulenzen* [being idle, living in idleness] to *Faulheit* [laziness], it means doubled, i.e. great, constant laziness (Gesen. *H. Wört.*, and Böttch. in the *N. Aehrenl.*, under this passage). If 'atsaltaim were an attribut. designation of the hands, then *shiph-luth yadaim* would be lowness, i.e. the hanging down of the hands languidly by the side; the former would agree better with the second than with the first passage. Regarding the difference between *hamm'qareh* (the beams and joists of a house) and *hamqareh* (*contignans*), *vid.* note below.<sup>1</sup> Since exceeding laziness leaves alone everything that could support the house, the beams fall (יִפּוּ, *Niph.* מָכַד), and the house drops, i.e. lets the rain through (יִרְלֶה, with *o*, in spite of the intrans. signification); cf. the Arab. proverb of the three things which make a house insufferable, under Prov. xix. 13. Also the community, whom the king and the nobles represent, is a בַּיִת, as e.g. Israel is called the house of Jacob. If the rulers neglect their duty, abusing their high position in obeying their own lusts, then the kingdom (state) becomes as a dilapidated house, affording no longer any protection, and at last a *machshelah*, a ruined building, Isa. iii. 6. It becomes so by slothfulness, and the prodigal love of pleasure associated therewith.

Ver. 19. "Meals they make into a pleasure, and wine cheereth the life, and money maketh everything serviceable." By עֲשִׂים, wicked princes are without doubt thought of,—but not immediately, since 16*b* is too remote to give the subject to ver. 19. The subject which 'osim bears in itself (= 'osim hēm) might be syntactically definite, as e.g. Ps. xxxiii. 5, אֱהֵב, He, Jahve, loves, thus: those princes, or, from ver. 18: such slothful men; but 'osim is better rendered, like e.g. *omrim*, Ex. v. 16 (Ewald, § 200*a*), and as in the Mishna we read קִירִין and the like with gramm. indef. subj.: they make, but so that by it the slothful just designated, and those of a princely rank are meant (cf. a similar use of the *inf. abs.*, as here of the part. in the

<sup>1</sup> הַמִּקְרָה, with *mem* Dageshed (Masora: לִית רִנָּה); in Ps. civ. 3, on the contrary, the *mem* has *Raphe*, for there it is particip. (*Michlol* 46*a*; *Parchon's Lex.* f. 3, col. 1).

historical style, Isa. xxii. 13). Ginsburg's rendering is altogether at fault: "They turn bread and wine which cheereth life into revelry." If עֲשֵׂה and לֶחֶם as its object stand together, the meaning is, "to prepare a feast," Ezek. iv. 15; cf. 'avad l'hēm, Dan. v. 1. Here, as there, 'osim l'hēm signifies *coenam faciunt* (*parant*). The ל of 'עֲשֵׂה is not the sign of the factitive obj. (as l'el, Isa. xlv. 17), and thus not, as Hitz. supposes, the conditioning ל with which adv. conceptions are formed,—e.g. Lam. iv. 5, 'לֶמַעַן הָאֵלֶּה, where Jerome rightly translates, *voluptuose* (*vid. E. Gerlach, l.c.*),—but, which is most natural and is very appropriate, it is the ל of the aim or purpose: *non ad debitam corporis refectioem, sed ad mera ludicra et stulta gaudia* (Geier). פִּנּוּן is laughter, as that to which he utters the sentence (ii. 2): Thou art mad. It is incorrect, moreover, to take l'hēm v'yaim together, and to render y'sammahh hayaim as an attribut. clause to yain: this epitheton ornans of wine would here be a most unsuitable weakening of the figure intended. It is only an apparent reason for this, that what Ps. civ. 15 says in praise of wine the author cannot here turn into a denunciatory reproach. Wine is certainly fitted to make glad the heart of a man; but here the subject of discourse is duty-forgetting idlers, to whom chiefly wine must be brought (Isa. v. 12) to cheer their life (this sluggard-life spent in feasting and revelry). The fut. יַעֲשֶׂה is meant in the same modal sense as יִגְבֵּר, 10a: wine must accomplish that for them. And they can feast and drink, for they have money, and money הַכֹּל ... יַעֲשֶׂה. Luther hits the meaning: "Money must procure everything for them;" but the clause is too general; and better thus, after Jerome, the Zürich Bible: "unto money are all things obedient." The old Jewish interpreters compare Hos. ii. 23 f., where עֲנֵה, with *accus. petentis*, signifies, "to answer a request, to gratify a desire." But in the passage before us הַכֹּל is not the obj. accus. of *petentis*, but *petiti*; for 'anah is connected with the accus. of that to which one answers as well as of that which one answers, e.g. Job xl. 2, cf. ix. 3. It is unnecessary, with Hitzig, to interpret יַעֲנֵה as *Hiph.*: Money makes all to hear (him who has the money),—makes it that nothing is refused to his wish. It is the *Kal*: Money answers to every demand, hears every wish, grants whatever one longs for, helps to all; as Menander says: "Silver and gold,—these are, according to my opinion, the most useful gods; if these have a place in the house, wish what thou wilt (εὔξαι τί βούλει), all will be thine;" and Horace, *Epod.* i. 6. 36 s.:

"Scilicet uxorem cum dote fidemque et amicos  
Et genus et formam regina pecunia donat."

The author has now described the king who is a misfortune and him who is a blessing to the land, and princes as they ought to be and as they ought not to be, but particularly luxurious idle courtiers; there is now a warning given which has for its motive not only prudence, but also, according to viii. 2, religiousness.

Ver. 20. "Curse not the king even in thy thought; and in thy bed-chamber curse not the rich; for the birds of the air carry away the sound, and the winged creature telleth the matter." In the Books of Daniel and Chronicles, מִרְעָ, in the sense of γνώσις, is a synon. of הַשְׁכֵּל and הַכְמָה; here it is rightly translated by the LXX. by συνείδησις; it does not correspond with the moral-religious idea of conscience, but yet it touches it, for it designates the quiet, inner consciousness (*Psychol.* p. 134) which judges according to moral criteria: even (*gam*, as *e.g.* Deut. xxiii. 3) in the inner region of his thoughts<sup>1</sup> one must not curse the king (cf. vii. 4 f.) nor the rich (which here, as at 6b, without distinction of the aristocracy of wealth and of birth, signifies those who are placed in a high princely position, and have wealth, the *nervus rerum*, at their disposal) in his bed-chamber, the innermost room of the house, where one thinks himself free from treachery, and thus may utter whatever he thinks without concealment (2 Kings vi. 12): for the birds of the air may carry forth or bring out (Lat. *deferrent*, whence *delator*) that which is rumoured, and the possessor of a pair of wings (cf. Prov. i. 17), after the *Chethib* (whose ה of the art. is unnecessarily erased by the *Keri*,<sup>2</sup> as at iii. 6, 10): the possessor of wings (double-winged), shall further tell the matter. As to its meaning, it is the same as the proverb quoted by the Midrash: "walls have ears."<sup>3</sup> Geier thinks of the swallows which helped to the discovery of Bessus, the murderer of his father, and the cranes which betrayed the murderer of Ibycus, as comparisons approaching that which is here said. There would certainly be no hyperbole if the author thought of carrier-pigeons (Paxton, Kitto) in the service of espionage. But the reason for the warning is hyperbolical, like an hundred others in all languages:

*"Aures fert paries, oculos nemus: ergo cavere  
Debet qui loquitur, ne possint verba nocere."*

<sup>1</sup> Hengst., not finding the transition from *scientia* to *conscientia* natural, gives, after Hartmann, the meaning of "study-chamber" to the word מִרְעָ; but neither the Heb. nor the Aram. has this meaning, although Ps. lxviii. 13 Targ. touches it.

<sup>2</sup> הַכְמָה with unpointed *He*, because it is not read in the *Keri*; similarly הַחֲתִיב (1 Sam. xxvi. 22). Cf. *Mas. fin.* f. 22, and *Ochla veochla*, No. 166.

<sup>3</sup> Vid. Tendlau's *Sprichwörter*, No. 861.

*Act Prudently, but not too Prudently—the Future is God's;  
Enjoy Life—the World to come is Dark, xi. 1–8.*

There are interpreters (as *e.g.* Zöckl.) who regard the concluding part of the book as commencing with xi. 1, and do not acknowledge any connection with that which immediately precedes; but from x. 16 the book draws to its conclusion. לַחֵם, x. 19, affords an external connection for the proverb here following; but, since the proverb x. 20 lies between, the sequence after the same catchword is uncertain. Whether there is here a more inward connection, and what it is, is determined by the interpretation of xi. 1, which proceeds in two fundamentally different directions, the one finding therein recommended unscrupulous beneficence, the other an unscrupulous spirit of enterprise. We decide in favour of the latter: it is a call, derived from commercial pursuits, to engage in fresh enterprise.

xi. 1. "Let thy bread go forth over the watery mirror: for in the course of many days shalt thou find it." Most interpreters, chiefly the Talm., Midrash, and Targ.,<sup>1</sup> regard this as an exhortation to charity, which although practised without expectation of reward, does not yet remain unrewarded at last. An Aram. proverb of Ben Sira's (*vid.* Buxtorf's *Florilegium*, p. 171) proceeds on this interpretation: "Scatter thy bread on the water and on the dry land; in the end of the days thou findest it again." Knobel quotes a similar Arab. proverb from Diez' *Denkwürdigkeiten von Asien* (Souvenirs of Asia), II. 106: "Do good; cast thy bread into the water: thou shalt be repaid some day." See also the proverb in Goethe's *Westöst. Divan*, compared by Herzfeld. Voltaire, in his *Précis de l'Ecclésiaste en vers*, also adopts this rendering:

*Repandez vos bienfaits avec magnificence,  
Même aux moins vertueux ne les refusez pas.  
Ne vous informez pas de leur reconnaissance—  
Il est grand, il est beau de faire des ingrats.*

That instead of "into the water (the sea)" of these or similar proverbs, Koheleth uses here the expression, "on the face of (עַל־פָּנֵי) the waters," makes no difference; Eastern bread has for the most part

<sup>1</sup> The Midrash tells the following story: Rabbi Akiba sees a ship wrecked which carried in it one learned in the law. He finds him again actively engaged in Cappadocia. What whale, he asked him, has vomited thee out upon dry land? How hast thou merited this? The scribe learned in the law thereupon related that when he went on board the ship, he gave a loaf of bread to a poor man, who thanked him for it, saying: As thou hast saved my life, may thy life be saved. Thereupon Akiba thought of the proverb in Eccles. xi. 1. Similarly the Targ.: Extend to the poor the bread for thy support; they sail in ships over the water.

the form of cakes, and is thin (especially such as is prepared hastily for guests, *'ughoth* or *matstsoth*, Gen. xviii. 6, xix. 3); so that when thrown into the water, it remains on the surface (like a chip of wood, Hos. x. 7), and is carried away by the stream. But שֶׁלֶחַ, with this reference of the proverb to beneficence, is strange; instead of it, the word הִשְׁלַח was rather to be expected; the LXX. renders by ἀπόστειλον; the Syr., *shadar*; Jerome, *mitte*; Venet. πέμπε; thus by none is the pure idea of casting forth connected with שֶׁלֶחַ. And the reason given does not harmonize with this reference: "for in the course of many days (*b'rov yamin*, cf. *mērov yamim*, Isa. xxiv. 22) wilt thou find it" (not "find it again," which would be expressed by תִּשְׁבֹּב הַמָּוֶה). This indefinite designation of time, which yet definitely points to the remote future, does not thus indicate that the subject is the recompense of noble self-renunciation which is sooner or later rewarded, and often immediately, but exactly accords with the idea of commerce carried on with foreign countries, which expects to attain its object only after a long period of waiting. In the proper sense, they send their bread over the surface of the water who, as Ps. cvii. 33 expresses, "do business in great waters." It is a figure taken from the corn trade of a seaport (*vid.* p. 216), an illustration of the thought: seek thy support in the way of bold, confident adventure.<sup>1</sup> Bread in לֶחֶם is the designation of the means of making a living or gain, and bread in תַּמְצִיחוֹ the designation of the gain (cf. ix. 11). Hitzig's explanation: Throw thy bread into the water = venture thy hope, is forced; and of the same character are all the attempts to understand the word of agricultural pursuits; *e.g.* by van der Palm: *sementem fac juxta aquas* (or: *in loca irrigua*); Grätz even translates: "Throw thy corn on the surface of the water," and understands this, with the fancy of a Martial, of begetting children. Mendelssohn is right in remarking that the exhortation shows itself to be that of Koheleth-Solomon, whose ships traded to Tarshish and Ophir. Only the reference to self-sacrificing beneficence stands on a level with it as worthy of consideration. With Ginsburg, we may in this way say that a proverb as to our dealings with those who are above us, is followed by a proverb regarding those who are below us; with those others a proverb regarding judicious courageous venturing, ranks itself with a proverb regarding a rashness which is to be discountenanced; and the following proverb does not say: Give a portion, distribute of that which is thine, to seven and also to eight: for it is well done that thou gainest for thee friends with the unrighteous

<sup>1</sup> The Greek phrase σπείρειν πόντον, "to sow the sea" = to undertake a fruitless work, is of an altogether different character; cf. Amos vi. 12.

mammon for a time when thou thyself mayest unexpectedly be in want; but it is a prudent rule which is here placed by the side of counsel to bold adventure:

Ver. 2. "Divide the portion into seven, yea, eight (parts); for thou knowest not what evil shall happen on the earth." With that other interpretation, עָלֶיךָ was to be expected instead of 'al-haarets; for an evil spreading abroad over the earth, a calamity to the land, does not yet fall on every one without exception; and why was not the רָעָה designated directly as personal? The impression of the words 'לְשֹׁמֵר . . . הָיָה, established in this general manner, is certainly this, that on the supposition of the possibility of a universal catastrophe breaking in, they advise a division of our property, so that if we are involved in it, our all may not at once be lost, but only this or that part of it, as Jacob, Gen. xxxii. 9, says. With reference to 1*a*, it is most natural to suppose that one is counselled not to venture his all in one expedition, so that if this is lost in a storm, all might not at once be lost (Mendelss., Preston, Hitz., Stuart); with the same right, since 1*a* is only an example, the counsel may be regarded as denoting that one must not commit all to one caravan; or, since in ver. 2 לְחַמֵּךְ is to be represented not merely as a means of obtaining gain, that one ought not to lay up all he has gathered in one place, Judg. vi. 11, Jer. xli. 8 (Nachtigal); in short, that one ought not to put all into one business, or, as we say literally, venture all on one card. הֵלֶךְ is either the portion which one possesses, *i.e.* the measure of the possession that has fallen to him (Ps. xvi. 5), or נָתַן הֵלֶךְ means to make portions, to undertake a division. In the first case, the expression הֵלֶךְ . . . נָתַן follows the scheme of Gen. xvii. 20: make the part into seven, yea, into eight (parts); in the second case, the scheme of Josh. xviii. 5: make division into seven, etc. We prefer the former, because otherwise that which is to be divided remains unknown; הֵלֶךְ is the part now in possession: make the much or the little that thou hast into seven or yet more parts. The rising from seven to eight is as at Job v. 19, and like the expression *ter quaterque*, etc. The same inverted order of words as in 2*b* is found in Esth. vi. 3; 2 Kings viii. 12.

Ver. 3. With this verse there is not now a transition, εἰς ἄλλο γένος (as when one understands ver. 1 f. of beneficence); the thoughts down to ver. 6 move in the same track. "When the clouds are full of rain, they empty themselves on the earth: and if a tree fall in the south, or in the north—the place where the tree falleth, there it lieth." Man knows not—this is the reference of the verse backwards—what misfortune, as *e.g.* hurricane, flood, scarcity, will come

upon the earth; for all that is done follows fixed laws, and the binding together of cause and effect is removed beyond the influence of the will of man, and also in individual cases beyond his knowledge.

The interpunction of 3a a: אִם-יִמְלֹאוּ הָעָנָנִים נֶשֶׁם (not as by v. d. Hooght, Mendelss., and elsewhere הָעָנָנִים, but as the Venet. 1515, 21, Michael. הָעָנָנִים, for immediately before the tone syllable *Mahpach* is changed into *Mercha*) appears on the first glance to be erroneous, and much rather it appears that the accentuation ought to be

אִם-יִמְלֹאוּ הָעָנָנִים נֶשֶׁם עַל-הָאָרֶץ יִרְקוּ

but on closer inspection נֶשֶׁם is rightly referred to the conditional antecedent, for "the clouds could be filled also with hail, and thus not pour down rain" (Hitz.). As in iv. 10, the fut. stands in the protasis as well as in the apodosis. If A is done, then as a consequence B will be done; the old language would prefer the words וְהִרְקוּ . . . נִמְלֹאוּ (כִּי) אִם, Ewald, § 355b: as often as A happens, so always happens B. יִרְקוּ carries (without needing an external object to be supplied), as internally transitive, its object in itself: if the clouds above fill themselves with rain, they make an emptying, *i.e.* they empty themselves downwards. Man cannot, if the previous condition is fixed, change the necessary consequences of it.

The second conditioning clause: *si ceciderit lignum ad austrum aut ad aquilonem, in quocunque loco ceciderit ibi erit*. Thus rightly Jerome (*vid.* above, p. 152). It might also be said: אִם-יִפֹּל עֵץ אִם בָּצֵץ, and if a tree falls, whether it be in the south or in the north; this *sive . . . sive* would thus be a parenthetical parallel definition. Thus regarded, the protasis as it lies before us consists in itself, as the two *v'im* in Amos ix 3, of two correlated halves: "And if a tree falls on the south side, and (or) if it fall on the north side," *i.e.* whether it fall on the one or on the other. The *Athnach*, which more correctly belongs to יִרְקוּ, sets off in an expressive way the protasis over against the apodosis; that a new clause begins with *v'im yippol* is unmistakeable; for the contrary, there was need for a chief disjunctive to בָּצֵץ. *M'qom* is *accus. loci* for *bimqom*, as at Esth. iv. 3, viii. 17. *Sham* is rightly not connected with the relat. clause (cf. Ezek. vi. 13); the relation is the same as at i. 7. The fut. יִהְיֶה is formed from הָיָה, whence ii. 22, as at Neh. vi. 6, and in the Mishna (*Aboth*, vi. 1; <sup>1</sup> *Aboda zara*, iii. 8) the part. הֹיָה. As the jussive form יִהְיֶה is formed from יִהְיֶה, so יִהְיֶה (יִהְיֶה) passes into יִהְיֶה, which is here written יִהְיֶה. Hitzig supposes that, according to the passage before us and Job xxxvii. 6, the word appears to have been written with א,

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* Baer, *Abodath Jisrael*, p. 290.

in the sense of "to fall." Certainly **הוה** has the root-signification of *delabi, cadere*, and derives from thence the meaning of *accidere, exsistere, esse* (*vid.* under Job xxxvii. 6); in the Book of Job, however, **הוה** may have this meaning as an Arabism; in the *usus loq.* of the author of the Book of Koheleth it certainly was no longer so used. Rather it may be said that **יהי** had to be written with an **א** added to distinguish it from the abbreviated tetragramm, if the **א**, as in **אבנא**, Isa. xxviii. 12, and **הל'**, Josh. x. 24, does not merely represent the long terminal vowel (cf. the German-Jewish **רוא** = thou, **ריא** = the, etc.).<sup>1</sup> Moreover, **יהוא**, as written, approaches the Mishnic inflection of the fut. of the verb **הוה**; the sing. there is **יהא**, **תהא**, **אָהא**, and the plur. **יהי**, according to which Rashi, Aben Ezra, and Kimchi interpret **יהוא** here also as plur; Luzzatto, § 670, hesitates, but in his Commentary he takes it as sing., as the context requires: there will it (the tree) be, or in accordance with the more lively meaning of the verb **הוה**: there will it find itself, there it continues to lie. As it is an invariable law of nature according to which the clouds discharge the masses of water that have become too heavy for them, so it is an unchangeable law of nature that the tree that has fallen before the axe or the tempest follows the direction in which it is impelled. Thus the future forms itself according to laws beyond the control of the human will, and man also has no certain knowledge of the future; wherefore he does well to be composed as to the worst, and to adopt prudent preventive measures regarding it. This is the reference of ver. 3 looking backwards. But, on the other hand, from this incalculableness of the future—this is the reference of ver. 3 looking forwards—he ought not to give up fresh venturesome activity, much rather he ought to abstain from useless and impeding calculations and scruples.

Ver. 4. "He who observeth the wind shall not sow; and he that regardeth the clouds shall not reap." The proverb is not to be understood literally, but in the spirit of the whole *paraenesis*: it is not directed against the provident observation, guided by experience, of the monitions and warnings lying in the present condition of the weather, but against that useless, because impossible, calculation of the coming state of the weather, which waits on from day to day, from week to week, till the right time for sowing and reaping has passed away. The seed-time requires rain so as to open up and moisten the ground; he who has too much hesitation observes (**שמר**, as at Job xxxix. 1) the wind whether it will bring rain (Prov.

<sup>1</sup> Otherwise Ewald, § 192b: **יהוא**, Aram. of **הוא** (as **בוא**) = **הוא**.

xxv. 23), and on that account puts off the sowing of the seed till it is too late. The time of harvest requires warmth without rain (Prov. xxvi. 1); but the scrupulous and timid man, who can never be sure enough, looks at the clouds (cf. Isa. xlvii. 13), scents rainy weather, and finds now and never any security for the right weather for the gathering in of the fruits of the field. He who would accomplish and gain anything, must have confidence and courage to venture something; the conditions of success cannot be wholly reckoned upon, the future is in the hand of God, the All-Conditioning.

Ver. 5. "As thou hast no knowledge what is the way of the wind, like as the bones in the womb of her who is with child; so thou knowest not the work of God who accomplisheth all." Luther, after Jerome, renders rightly: "As thou knowest not the way of the wind, and how the bones in the mother's womb do grow; so," etc. The clause, *instar ossium in ventre praegnantis*, is the so-called *comparatio decurtata* for *instar ignorantiae tuae ossium*, etc., like thy ignorance regarding the bones, i.e. the growth of the bones. 'בָּעֵץ,<sup>1</sup> because more closely defined by 'בְּבִי הָמָּה, has not the art. used elsewhere after כּ of comparison; an example for the regular syntax (vid. Riehm, under Ps. xvii. 12) is found at Deut. xxxii. 2. That man has no power over the wind, we read at viii. 8; the way of the wind he knows not (John iii. 8), because he has not the wind under his control: man knows fundamentally only that which he rules. Regarding the origin and development of the embryo as a secret which remained a mystery to the Israel. Chokma, vid. *Psychol.* p. 209 ff. For 'עֵצָה, cf. Ps. cxxxix. 15 and Job x. 11. Regarding *m'leah*, pregnant (like the Lat. *plena*), vid. above, p. 193. With fine discrimination, the fut. לֹא יָדַע in the apodosis interchanges with the particip. יֹדֵעַ in the protasis, as when we say: If thou knowest not that, as a consequence thou shalt also not know this. As a man must confess his ignorance in respect to the way of the wind, and the formation of the child in the mother's womb; so in general the work of God the All-Working lies beyond his knowledge: he can neither penetrate it in the entirety of its connection, nor in the details of its accomplishment. The idea 'oseh kol, Isa. xlv. 24, is intentionally unfolded in a fut. relat. clause, because here the fut. in the natural world, as well as in human history, comes principally into view. For that very reason the words אֶת־הַכֹּל are also used, not: (as in passages where there is a reference to the world of creation in its present condition) *eth-kol-elleh*, Isa. lxvi. 2. Also the growth of the

<sup>1</sup> The Targ. reads 'בָּעֵץ, and construes: What the way of the spirit in the bones, i.e. how the embryo becomes animated.

child in the mother's womb is compared to the growth of the future in the womb of the present, out of which it is born (Prov. xxvii. 1; cf. Zeph. ii. 2). What is established by this proof that man is not lord of the future,—viz. that in the activity of his calling he should shake off anxious concern about the future,—is once again inferred with the combination of what is said in vers. 4 and 2 (according to our interpretation, here confirmed).

Ver. 6. "In the morning sow thy seed, and towards evening withdraw not thine hand; for thou knowest not which shall prosper, whether this or that, or whether both together shall well succeed. The cultivation of the land is the prototype of all labour (Gen. ii. 15*b*), and sowing is therefore an emblem of all activity in one's pursuit; this general meaning for אֶל . . . יָרָךְ (like vii. 18; synon. with אֶל . . . יָרָךְ, Josh. x. 6, of the older language) is to be accepted. The parallel word to *babokēr* is not *ba'ērēv*; for the cessation from work (Judg. xix. 16; Ps. civ. 23) must not be excluded, but incessant labour (cf. Luke ix. 62) must be continued until the evening. And as ver. 2 counsels that one should not make his success depend exclusively on one enterprise, but should divide that which he has to dispose of, and at the same time make manifold trials; so here also we have the reason for restless activity of manifold labour from morning till evening: success or failure (v. 5*b*) is in the hand of God,—man knows not which (*quid*, here, according to the sense, *utrum*) will prosper (*vid.* regarding *kasher*, above, p. 193), whether (הֲ) this or (אִם) that, and whether (וְאִם), etc.; *vid.* regarding the three-membered disjunctive question, Ewald, § 361; and regarding *k'ēhhad*, above, p. 192; it is in common use in the more modern language, as *e.g.* also in the last benediction of the *Shemone-Esra*: בִּרְכֵנוּ . . . כָּאֶחָד "bless us, our Father, us all together." שְׁנֵיָהֶם goes back to the two הֵן, understood neut. (as at vii. 18; cf. on the contrary, vi. 5). The LXX. rightly: καὶ ἐὰν (better: εἴτε) τὰ δύο ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. Luther, who translates: "and if both together it shall be better," has been misled by Jerome.

The proverb now following shows its connection with the preceding by the copula *vav*. "The tendency of the advice in vers. 1, 2, 6, to secure guarantees for life, is justified in ver. 7: life is beautiful, and worthy of being cared for." Thus Hitzig; but the connection is simpler. It is in the spirit of the whole book that, along with the call to earnest activity, there should be the call to the pleasant enjoyment of life: he who faithfully labours has a right to enjoy his life; and this joy of life, based on fidelity to one's calling, and consecrated by the fear of God, is the most real and the

highest enjoyment here below. In this sense the *fruere vita* here connects itself with the *labora* :

Vers. 7, 8. "And sweet is the light, and pleasant it is for the eyes to see the sun: for if a man live through many years, he ought to rejoice in them all, and remember the days of darkness; that there will be many of them. All that cometh is vain." Dale translates the copula *vav* introducing ver. 7 by "yes," and Bullock by "truly," both thus giving to it a false colouring. "Light," Zöckler remarks, stands here for "life." But it means only what the word denotes, viz. the light of life in this world (Ps. lvi. 14; Job xxxiii. 30), to which the sun, as the source of it, is related, as וַיֵּאָרָא is to וַיֵּאָרָא. Cf. Eurip. *Hippol.*, ὁ λαμπρὸς αἰθὴρ κ.τ.λ., and *Iphigen. in Aulis*, 1218–19, μὴ μ' ἀπολέσης κ.τ.λ.: "Destroy not my youth; to see the light is sweet," etc. The ו in וַיֵּאָרָא has the short vowel *Pattach*, here and at 1 Sam. xvi. 7, after the Masora.<sup>1</sup>

The *ki* beginning ver. 8 is translated by Knobel, Hitz., Ewald, and others by "*ja*" (yes); by Heiligstedt, as if a negative preceded by *immo*; but as the *vav* of 7a is copulative "and," so here the *ki* is causal "for." If it had been said: man must enjoy himself as long as he lives, for the light is sweet, etc., then the joy would have its reason in the opportunity given for it. Instead of this, the occasion given for joy has its reason in this, that a man ought to rejoice, viz. according to God's arrangement and ordinance: the light is sweet, and it is pleasant for the eyes to see the sun; for it ought thus to be, that a man, however long he may live, should continue to enjoy his fair life, especially in view of the night which awaits him. *Ki im* are not here, as at iii. 12, viii. 15, where a negative precedes, to be taken together; but *ki* assigns the reason, and *im* begins a hypothetical protasis, as at Ex. viii. 17, and frequently. *Im*, with the conclusion following, presents something impossible, as e.g. Ps. l. 12, *si esurirem*, or also the extreme of that which is possible as actual, e.g. Isa. vii. 18, *si peccata vestra sint instar coccini*. In the latter case, the clause with the concessive particle may be changed into a sentence with a concessive conjunctive, as at Isa. x. 22: "for though thy people, O Israel, be as numerous as the sand of the sea;" and here: "though a man may live ever so many years." The second *ki* after וְיִשְׁכַּח is the explicat. *quod*, as at ii. 24, iv. 4, viii. 17, etc.: he must remember the days of darkness, that there shall be many of them, and, at all events, not fewer than the many years available for the happy enjoyment of life. In this connection *kol-shebbā'*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. on the contrary, at Gen. iii. 6 and Prov. x. 26, where it has the *Kametz*; cf. also *Michlol* 53b.

denotes all that will come after this life. If Hitz. remarks that the sentence: "All that is future is vanity," is a false thought, this may now also be said of his own sentence extracted from the words: "All that is, is transitory." For all that is done, in time may pass away; but it is not actually transitory (הֶבֶל). But the sentence also respects not all that is future, but all that comes after this life, which must appear as vain (*hēvel*) to him for whom, as for Koheleth, the future is not less veiled in the dark night of Hades, as it was for Horace, i. 4. 16 s.:

*"Jam te premet nox fabulaeque Manes  
Et domus exilis Plutonia."*

Also, for Koheleth as for Horace, iv. 7. 16, man at last becomes *pulvis et umbra*, and that which thus awaits him is *hēvel*. Tyler is right, that "the shadowy and unsubstantial condition of the dead and the darkness of Sheol" is thus referred to. הָבֵא signifies not that which is *nascens*, but *futurum*, e.g. *Sanhedrin* 27a, "from the present וְלִהְיֶה and for the future" (for which, elsewhere, the expression לְעֵתִי לָבֵא is used). The Venet. construes falsely: All (the days) in which vanity will overtake (him); and Luther, referring בֵּא as the 3d pers. to the past, follows the misleading of Jerome. Rightly the LXX. and Theod.: πᾶν τὸ ἐρχόμενον.

(B.) FINALE, WITH AN EPIPHONEMA.—XI. 9—XII. 7, 8.

In xi. 7, 8, having again reached the fundamental saying of his earthly eudaemonism, the author now discontinues this his *ceterum censeo*, and artistically rounds off his book; for having begun it with an *ouverture*, i. 2–11, he concludes it with a *finale*, xi. 9–xii. 7. Man, in view of the long night of death into which he goes forth, ought to enjoy the life granted to him. This fundamental thought of the book, to which the author has given a poetic colouring, xi. 7, 8, now amplifies itself into an animated highly poetical call to a young man to enjoy life, but not without the consciousness that he must render unto God an account for it. That the call is addressed not to a man as such, but to the young man,—including, however, after the rule *a potiori fit denominatio*, young women,—is explained from this, that the *terminus a quo* of an intelligent, responsible enjoyment of life stands over against the *terminus ad quem*, the night of death, with its pre-intimation in hoary old age. Without any connecting word, and thus as a new point of departure, the *finale* begins:

Ver. 9. "Rejoice, young man, in thy youth; and let thy heart

cheer thee in the days of thy youth, and walk in the ways of thine heart, and in the sight of thine eyes: but know, that for all this God will bring thee to judgment." The parallel בִּיטִי shows that the *beth* in בִּילְךָ (with ר aspirated) does not introduce the reason of the joy, but the time suitable for it. Instead of *v'yithav libb'cha*, "let thy heart be of good cheer," as the expression might also be, the words are *vithiv'cha libb'cha*, "make thy heart of good cheer to thee,"—so, viz., that from this centre brightness may irradiate thy countenance (Prov. xv. 13) and thy whole personality, *vid.* *Psychologie*, p. 249. *V'huroth*, the period of youth, is here and at xii. 1 = Num. xi. 28, *v'hhurim*, as the only once occurring *n'uroth*, Jer. xxxii. 30, is = the elsewhere generally used *n'urim*; the form in *ôth* is the more modern (cf. *k'luloth*, Jer. ii. 2). "Ways of the heart" are thus ways into which the impulse of the heart leads, and which satisfy the heart. מִן עֵינֶיךָ, at vi. 9, designates the pleasure felt in the presence of the object before one; here, a sight which draws and fastens the eyes upon it. The *Chethib* has the plur. מֵרַי, which is known to the language (Dan. i. 15; Song ii. 14), and which would here designate the multitude of the objects which delight the eyes, which is not unsuitable; the *Pih.* הֵלֶךְ denotes also elsewhere, frequently, e.g. Ps. cxxxi. 1, walking, in an ethical sense; Hitz., Zöckl., and others interpret the first ב as specifying the sphere, and the second as specifying the norm ("according to the sight of thine eyes"); but they both introduce that wherein he ought to act freely and joyfully: in the ways of thy heart, into which it draws thee; and in the sight of thine eyes, towards which they direct themselves with interest. The LXX. B. renders, "and not after the sight of thine eyes." This "not" (μῆ), which is wanting in A. C., is an interpolation, in view of the warning, Num. xv. 39, against following the impulse of the heart and of the eyes; the Targ. also therefore has: "be prudent with reference to the sight of thine eyes." But this moralizing of the text is superfluous, since the call to the youthful enjoyment of life is accompanied with the *nota bene*: but know that God will bring thee to an account for all this; and thus it excludes sinful sensual desire. In the midst of an address, where a yet closer definition follows, בָּמַשׁ is thus punctuated, xii. 14, Job xiv. 3, Ps. cxliii. 3; here, in the conclusion of the sentence, it is בָּמַשׁ. Hitzig supposes that there is denoted by it, that the sins of youth are punished by chronic disease and abandonment in old age; Knobel and others understand by the judgment, the self-punishment of sins by all manner of evil consequences, which the O. T. looks upon as divinely inflicted penalties. But in view of the facts of experience,

that God's righteous requital is in this life too frequently escaped, viii. 14, the author, here and at iii. 17, xii. 14, postulates a final judgment, which removes the contradiction of this present time, and which must thus be in the future; he has no clear idea of the time and manner of this final judgment, but his faith in God places the certainty of it beyond all doubt. The call to rejoice is now completed by the call to avoid all that occasions inward and outward sorrow.

Ver. 10. "And remove sorrow from thy heart, and banish evil from thy flesh: for youth and age, not yet grown to grey hairs, are vain." Jerome translates: *aufer iram a corde tuo*, and remarks in his *Comm.*: *in ira omnes perturbationes animi comprehendit*; but כַּעַס (R. כָּס, *contundere, confringere*) does not signify anger, but includes both anger and sorrow, and thus corresponds to the specific ideas, "sadness, moroseness, fretfulness." The clause following, Jerome translates: *et amove malitiam a carne tua*, with the remark: *in carnis malitia universas significat corporis voluptates*; but רָעָה is not taken in an ethical, but in a physical sense: כַּעַס is that which brings sorrow to the heart; and רָעָה, that which brings evil to the flesh (בִּשָּׁר, *opp.* לֵב, ii. 3, Prov. xiv. 30). More correctly than the Vulgate, Luther renders: "banish sorrow from thy heart, and put evil from thy body." He ought to free himself from that which is injurious to the inner and the outer man, and hurtfully affects it; for youth, destined for and disposed to joy, is *hēvel*, i.e. transitory, and only too soon passes away. Almost all modern interpreters (excepting the Jewish), in view of Ps. cx. 3, give to שְׁחֹרֹת the meaning of "the dawn of the morning;" but the connection with יְלֻדוֹת would then be tautological; the Mishn.-Midrash *usus loq.*, in conformity with which the Targ. translates, "days of black hair," proves that the word does not go back to שְׁחַר, morning dawn, morning-red, but immediately to שְׁחֹר, black (*vid.* above, p. 196), and as the contrast of שִׁיבָה (non-bibl. שִׁיבוֹת, 'סִיב', 'סָב'), *canities*, denotes the time of black hair, and thus, in the compass of its conception, goes beyond יְלֻדוֹת, since it comprehends both the period of youth and of manhood, and thus the whole period during which the strength of life remains unbroken.<sup>1</sup>

With xii. 1 (where, inappropriately, a new chapter begins,

<sup>1</sup> The Mishna, *Nedarim* iii. 8, jurist. determines that שְׁחֹרֵי הָרֹאשׁ denotes men, with the exclusion of women (whose hair is covered) and children. It is disputed (*vid.* Baer's *Abodath Jisrael*, p. 279) whether הַשְׁחֹרֶת, *Aboth* iii. 16, *Derech erez* c. II., *Midrash* under Lam. ii. 11, is = שְׁחֹרֹת, but without right; *ben-tishhorēth* is used for a grown-up son in full manly strength.

instead of beginning with xi. 9) the call takes a new course, resting its argument on the transitoriness of youth: "And remember thy Creator in the days of thy youth, ere the days of evil come, and the years draw nigh, of which thou shalt say: I have no pleasure in them." The *plur. majest.* בּוֹרֵאֵי is = עֲשִׂים as a designation of the Creator, Job xxxv. 10, Isa. liv. 5, Ps. cxlix. 2; in so recent a book it cannot surprise us (cf. above, p. 292), since it is also not altogether foreign to the post-bibl. language. The expression is warranted, and the Midrash ingeniously interprets the combination of its letters.<sup>1</sup> Regarding the words 'ad asher lo, commonly used in the Mishna (e.g. *Horajoth* iii. 3; *Nedarim* x. 4), or 'ad shello (Targ. 'ad d'lo), *antequam*, *vid.* above, p. 195. The days of evil (*viz.* at least, first, of bodily evil, cf. *κακία*, Matt. vi. 34) are those of feeble, helpless old age, perceptibly marking the failure of bodily and mental strength; parallel to these are the years of which (*asher*, as at i. 10) one has to say: I have no pleasure in them (*bahēm* for *bahēn*, as at ii. 6, *mehēm* for *mehēn*). These evil days, adverse years, are now described symptomatically, and that in an allegorical manner, for the "ere" of 1b is brought to a grand unfolding.

Ver. 2. "Ere the sun becomes dark, and the light, and the moon, and the stars, and the clouds return after the rain." Umbreit, Elster, and Ginsburg find here the thought: ere death overtakes thee; the figure under which the approach of death is described being that of a gathering storm. But apart from other objections (*vid.* Gurlitt, "zur Erkl. d. B. Koheleth," in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1865), this idea is opposed by the consideration that the author seeks to describe how man, having become old, goes forth (הֵלֵךְ, 5b) to death, and that not till ver. 7 does he reach it. Also Taylor's view, that what precedes 5b is as a dirge expressing the feelings experienced on the day of a person's death, is untenable; it is discredited already by this, that it confuses together the days of evil, 1b, and the many days of darkness, *i.e.* the long night of Hades, xi. 8; and besides, it leaves unanswered the question, what is the meaning of the clouds returning after the rain. Hahn replies: The rain is death, and the return is the entrance again into the nothingness which went before the entrance into this life. Knobel, as already Luther and also Winzer (who had made the exposition of the Book of Koheleth one of the labours of his life), sees in the darkening of the sun, etc., a figure of the decay of hitherto joyful prosperity; and in the clouds after the

<sup>1</sup> It finds these things expressed in it, partly directly and partly indirectly: remember בּוֹרֵךְ, thy fountain (origin); בּוֹרֵךְ, thy grave; and בּוֹרֵאֵי, thy Creator. Thus *Jer. Sota* ii. 3, and Midrash under Eccles. xii. 1.

rain a figure of the cloudy days of sorrow which always anew visit those who are worn out by old age. Hitz., Ewald, Vaih., Zöckl., and Tyler, proceeding from thence, find the unity of the separate features of the figure in the comparison of advanced old age, as the winter of life to the rainy winter of the (Palestinian) year. That is right. But since in the sequel obviously the *marasmus senilis* of the separate parts of the body is set forth in allegorical enigmatic figures, it is asked whether this allegorical figurative discourse does not probably commence in ver. 2. Certainly the sun, moon, and stars occur also in such pictures of the night of judgment, obscuring all the lights of the heavens, as at Isa. xiii. 10; but that here, where the author thus ranks together in immediate sequence 'הַשֶּׁשׁ . . . יְהִיב', and as he joins the stars with the moon, so the light with the sun, he has not connected the idea of certain corresponding things in the nature and life of man with these four emblems of light, is yet very improbable. Even though it might be impossible to find out that which is represented, yet this would be no decisive argument against the significance of the figures; the *canzones* in Dante's *Convito*, which he there himself interprets, are an example that the allegorical meaning which a poet attaches to his poetry may be present even where it cannot be easily understood or can only be conjectured.

The attempts at interpreting these figures have certainly been wholly or for the most part unfortunate. We satisfy ourselves by registering only the oldest: their glosses are in matter tasteless, but they are at least of linguistic interest. A Barajtha, *Shabbath* 151-152a, seeking to interpret this closing picture of the Book of Koheleth, says of the sun and the light: "this is the brow and the nose;" of the moon: "this is the soul;" of the stars: "this the cheeks." Similarly, but varying a little, the Midrash to Lev. c. 18 and to Koheleth: the sun = the brightness of the countenance; light = the brow; the moon = the nose; the stars = the upper part of the cheeks (which in an old man fall in). Otherwise, but following the Midrash more than the Talmud, the Targum: the sun = the stately brightness of thy countenance; light = the light of thine eyes; the moon = the ornament of thy cheeks; the stars = the apple of thine eye. All the three understand the rain of wine (Talm. בכי), and the clouds of the veil of the eyes (Targ.: "thy eye-lashes"), but without doing justice to שוב אהר; only one repulsive interpretation in the Midrash takes these words into account. In all these interpretations there is only one grain of truth, this, viz., that the moon in the Talm. is interpreted of the נשמה, *anima*, for which the more correct word would have been נפש;

but it has been shown, *Psychol.* p. 154, that the Jewish, like the Arab. psychology, reverses terminologically the relation between רוח (נשמה), spirit, and נפש, soul.

The older Christian interpretations are also on the right track. Glassius (as also v. Meyer and Smith in "The portraiture of old age") sees in the sun, light, etc., emblems of the *interna microcosmi lumina mentis*; and yet better, Chr. Friedr. Bauer (1732) sees in 2a a representation of the thought: "ere understanding and sense fail thee." We have elsewhere shown that רוח חיים (נשמה) and נפש חיה (for which nowhere נפש חיים) are related to each other as the *principium principians* and *principium principatum* of life (*Psychol.* p. 79), and as the root distinctions of the male and female, of the predominantly active and the receptive (*Psychol.* p. 103). Thus the figurative language of ver. 3 is interpreted in the following manner. The sun is the male spirit רוח (which, like שמש, is used in both genders) or נשמה, after Prov. xx. 27, a light of Jahve which penetrates with its light of self-examination and self-knowledge the innermost being of man, called by the Lord, Matt. vi. 23 (cf. 1 Cor. ii. 11), "the light that is in thee." The light, viz. the clear light of day proceeding from the sun, is the activity of the spirit in its unweakened intensity: sharp apprehension, clear thought, faithful and serviceable memory. The moon is the soul; for, according to the Heb. idea, the moon, whether it is called ירח or לבנה, is also in relation to the sun a figure of the female (cf. Gen. xxxvii. 9 f., where the sun in Joseph's dream = Jacob-Israel, the moon = Rachel); and that the soul, viz. the animal soul, by means of which the spirit becomes the principle of the life of the body (Gen. ii. 7), is related to the spirit as female *σκεῦος ἀσθενέστερον*, is evident from passages such as Ps. xlii. 6, where the spirit supports the soul (*animus animam*) with its consolation. And the stars? We are permitted to suppose in the author of the Book of Koheleth a knowledge, as Schrader<sup>1</sup> has shown, of the old Babyl.-Assyr. seven astral gods, which consisted of the sun, moon, and the five planets; and thus it will not be too much to understand the stars, as representing the five planets, of the five senses (Mishn. הרקשות,<sup>2</sup> later הַדָּשִׁים, cf. the verb, ii. 25) which mediate the receptive relation of the soul to the outer world (*Psychol.* p. 233). But we cannot see our way further to explain 2b patholo.-anatom., as Geier is disposed to do: *Nonnulli haec accommodant ad crassos illos ac pituosos senum vapores ex debili ventriculo in cerebrum adscendentes continuo, ubi itidem imbres* (נשם) *h. e. destillationes creber-*

<sup>1</sup> Vid. "Sterne" in Schenkel's *Bib. Lex. and Stud. u. Krit.* 1874.

<sup>2</sup> Thus the five senses are called, e.g. *Bamidbar rabba*, c. 14.

*rimae per oculos lippientes, per nares guttatim fluentes, per os subinde excreans cet., quae sane defluxiones, tussis ac catharri in juvenibus non ita sunt frequentia, quippe ubi calor multo adhuc fortior, consumens dissipansque humores.* It is enough to understand עָבִים of cases of sickness and attacks of weakness which disturb the power of thought, obscure the consciousness, darken the mind, and which *ahhar haggashēm*, after they have once overtaken him and then have ceased, quickly again return without permitting him long to experience health. A cloudy day is = a day of misfortune, Joel ii. 2, Zeph. i. 15; an overflowing rain is a scourge of God, Ezek. xiii. 13, xxxviii. 22; and one visited by misfortune after misfortune complains, Ps. xlii. 8 [7]: "Deep calleth unto deep at the noise of thy waterspouts: all thy waves and thy billows are gone over me."

Ver. 3. To the thought: Ere the mind and the senses begin to be darkened, and the winter of life with its clouds and storms approaches, the further details here following stand in a subordinate relation: "That day when the watchers of the house tremble, and the strong men bow themselves, and the grinders rest, because they have become few, and the women looking out of the windows are darkened." Regarding יָמִים with art.: *eo (illo) tempore, vid.* under Song viii. 8. What follows is regarded by Winzer, with Mich., Spohr, and partly Nachtigal, as a further description of the night to which old age, ver. 2, is compared: Watchers then guard the house; labourers are wearied with the labours and cares of the day; the maids who have to grind at the mill have gone to rest; and almost all have already fallen asleep; the women who look out from the windows are unrecognisable, because it has become dark. But what kind of cowardly watchers are those who "tremble," and what kind of (*per antiphrasin*) strong men who "bow themselves" at evening like children when they have belly-ache! Ginsburg regards vers. 2-5 as a continuation of the description of the consequences of the storm under which human life comes to an end: the last consequence is this, that they who experience it lose the taste for almonds and the appetite for locusts. But what is the meaning of this quaint figure? it would certainly be a meaningless and aimless digression. Taylor hears in this verse the mourning for the dead from ver. 2, where death is described: the watchers of the house tremble; the strong men bow themselves, viz. from sorrow, because of the blank death has made in the house, etc.; but even supposing that this picture had a connection in ver. 2, how strange would it be!—the lookers out at the windows must

be the "ladies," who are fond of amusing themselves at windows, and who now—are darkened. Is there anything more comical than such little ladies having become darkened (whether externally or internally remains undetermined)? However one may judge of the figurative language of ver. 2, ver. 3 begins the allegorical description of hoary old age after its individual bodily symptoms; interpreters also, such as Knobel, Hitz., and Ewald, do not shrink from seeking out the significance of the individual figures after the old Haggadic manner. The Talm. says of *shomrē habbayith*: these are the loins and ribs; of the *anshē hehhayil*: these are the bones; of *harooth baarūbboth*: these, the eyes. The Midrash understands the watchers of the house, of the knees of the aged man; the men of strength, of his ribs or arms; the women at the mill, of the digestive organs (הַמִּסֵּס,<sup>1</sup> the stomach, from *omasum*); those who have become few, of the teeth; the women looking out at the window, of the eyes; another interpretation, which by *harooth* thinks of the lungs, is not worth notice.

Here also the Targ. principally follows the Midrash: it translates the watchers of the house by "thy knees;" strong men by "thine arms;" the women at the mill by "the teeth of thy mouth;" the women who look out at the window by "thine eyes." These interpretations for the most part are correct, only those referable to the internal organs are in bad taste; references to these must be excluded from the interpretation, for weakness of the stomach, emphysema of the lungs, etc., are not appropriate as poetical figures. The most common biblical figures of the relation of the spirit or the soul to the body is, as we have shown, *Psychol.* p. 227, that of the body as of the house of the inner man. This house, as that of an old man, is on all sides in a ruinous condition. The *shomrē habbayith* are the arms terminating in the hands, which bring to the house whatever is suitable for it, and keep away from it whatever threatens to do it injury; these protectors of the house have lost their vigour and elasticity (Gen. xlix. 24), they tremble, are palsied (זָעַזְעוּ, from זָעַזַּע, *Pilp.* זָעַזַּע, bibl. and Mishn.: to move violently hither and thither, to tremble, to shake<sup>2</sup>), so that they are able neither to grasp securely, to hold fast and use, nor actively to keep back and forcibly avert evil. *Anshē hehhayil* designates the legs, for the *shoqē häish* are the seat of his strength, Ps. cxlvii. 10; the legs of a man in the fulness of youthful strength are like marble pillars, Song x. 15; but those of the old man *hith'authu* (*Hithpa.* only here) have bowed themselves, they

<sup>1</sup> This *hamses* is properly the second stomach of the ruminants, the cellular caul.

<sup>2</sup> Vid. Friedr. Delitzsch's *Indogerm.-Sem. Stud.* p. 65f.

have lost their tight form, they are shrunken (נִרְעָבָה, Job iv. 4, etc.) and loose; 4 Macc. iv. 5 calls this τὴν ἐκ τοῦ γήρωος νωθρότητα ποδῶν ἐπικύφων. To maidens who grind (cf. בָּרָה בְּמִלֵּי, Num. xi. 8 and Isa. xlvii. 2) the corn by means of a hand-mill are compared the teeth, the name of which in the old language is masc., but in the modern (cf. Prov. xxix. 19), as also in the Syr. and Arab., is fem.; the reference of the figure to these instruments for grinding is not to be missed; the Arab. *tahinat* and the Syr. *tahonto* signify *dens molaris*, and we now call 6 of the 32 teeth *Mahlzähne* (molar teeth, or grinders); the Greeks used for them the word *μύλαι* (Ps. lvii. 7, LXX.). Regarding מִלֵּי, LXX. ἡργησαν (= ἀεργοὶ ἐγενήθησαν), *vid.* above, p. 191.<sup>1</sup> The clause מִלֵּי בָּרָה (LXX. ὅτι ὠλιγώθησαν) assigns the reason that the grinders rest, *i.e.* are not at work, that they have become few: they stand no longer in a row; they are isolated, and (as is to be supposed) are also in themselves defective. Taylor interprets *mīetu* transitively: the women grinding rest when they have wrought a little, *i.e.* they interrupt their labour, because on account of the occurrence of death, guests are now no longer entertained; but the beautiful appropriate allegory maintains its place against this supposed lamentation for the dead; also מִלֵּי does not signify to accomplish a little (Targ.), but to take away, to become few (LXX., Syr., Jerome, Venet., Luther), as such a *Pih.* as x. 10, קָהָה, to become blunt. And by מִלֵּי הָרָאָה we are not to think, with Taylor, of women such as Sisera's mother or Michal, who look out of the window, but of the eyes, more exactly the apples of the eyes, to which the *orbita* (LXX. ἐν ταῖς ὀπαῖς; Symm. διὰ τῶν ὀπῶν) and the eyelids with the eye-lashes are related as a window is to those who look out; מִלֵּי (from מִלֵּי, R. רב, to entwine firmly and closely) is the window, consisting of a lattice of wood; the eyes are, as Cicero (*Tusc.* i. 20) calls them, *quasi fenestras animi*; the soul-eyes, so to speak, without which it could not experience what sight is, look by means of the external eyes; and these soul-bodily eyes have become darkened in the old man, the power of seeing is weakened, and the experiences of sight are indistinct, the light of the eyes is extinguished (although not without exception, Deut. xxxiv. 7).

<sup>1</sup> We find a similar allegory in *Shabbath* 152a. The emperor asked the Rabbi Joshua b. Chanania why he did not visit בֵּי אַבְרִין (a place where learned conversation, particularly on religious subjects, was carried on). He answered: "The mount is snow (= the hair of the head is white), ice surrounds me (= whiskers and beard on the chin white), its (of my body) dogs bark not (the voice fails), and its grinders (the teeth) grind not." The proper meaning of בֵּי אַבְרִין, Levy has not been able clearly to bring to light in his *Neuhebr. u. Chald. W. B.*

Ver. 4. From the eyes the allegory proceeds to the mouth, and the repugnance of the old man to every noise disturbing his rest: "And the doors to the street are closed, when the mill sounds low; and he rises up at the voice of a bird; and all the daughters of song must lower themselves." By the door toward the street the Talm. and Midrash understand the pores or the emptying members of the body,—a meaning so far from being ignoble, that even in the Jewish morning prayer a *Beracha* is found in these words: "Blessed art Thou, O Lord our God, King of the world, who hast wisely formed man, and made for him manifold apertures and cavities. It is manifest and well known before the throne of Thy Majesty, that if one of these cavities is opened, or one of these apertures closed, it is impossible for him to exist and to stand before Thee; blessed art Thou, O Lord, the Physician of the body, and who doest wondrous works!" The words which follow בִּשְׁׁ . . . הֵט are accordingly to be regarded as assigning a reason for this closing: the non-appearance of excretion has its reason in defective digestion in this, that the stomach does not grind (Talm.: בִּשְׁבִיל<sup>1</sup> קורקבן ונו'). But the dual דְּלָתַיִם suggests a pair of similar and related members, and בִּשְׁוֵיִם a pair of members open before the eyes, and not such as modesty requires to be veiled. The Targum therefore understands the shutting of the doors properly; but the mills, after the indication lying in הֵט [grinding maids], it understands of the organs of eating and tasting, for it translates: "thy feet will be fettered, so that thou canst not go out into the street; and appetite will fail thee." But that is an awkward amalgamation of the literal with the allegorical, which condemns itself by this, that it separates the close connection of the two expressions required by בִּשְׁפִל, which also may be said of the reference of דְּלָתַיִם to the ears, into which no sound, even from the noisy market, penetrates (Gurlitt, Grätz). We have for דְּלָתַיִם a key, already found by Aben Ezra, in Job xli. 6 [2], where the jaws of the leviathan are called דְּלָתַי פָּנָיו; and as Herzf. and Hitz. explain, so Samuel Aripol in his *Commentary*, which appeared in Constantinople, 1855, rightly: "He calls the jaws דְּלָתַיִם, to denote that not two דְּלָתוֹת in two places, but in one place, are meant, after the manner of a door opening out to the street, which is large, and consists of two folds or wings, דְּלָתוֹת, which, like the lips (הַשְּׁפָתַיִם, better: the jaws), form a whole in two parts; and the meaning is, that at the time of old age the lips are closed and drawn in, because the teeth have disappeared, or, as the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Berachoth* 61b: The stomach (קורקבן) grinds. As *hamses* is properly the caul of the ruminant, so this word קורקבן is the crop (bibl. מְרָאָה) of the bird.

text says, because the noise of the mill is low, just because he has no teeth to grind with." The connection of קנר and בִּשְׁפֶל is, however, closer still: the jaws of an old man are closed externally, for the sound of the mill is low; i.e. since, when one masticates his food with the jaws of a toothless mouth, there is heard only a dull sound of this chewing (*Mumpfelns*, vid. Weigand's *Deut. W. B.*), i.e. laborious masticating. He cannot any more crack or crunch and break his food, one hears only a dull munching and sucking.—The voice of the mouth (Bauer, Hitz., Gurlitt, Zöckl.) cannot be the meaning of קל הֵט; the set of teeth (Gurlitt indeed substitutes, 3b, the cavity of the mouth) is not the organ of voice, although it contributes to the formation of certain sounds of words, and is of importance for the full sound of the voice.

בִּשְׁפֶל, "to the street," is here = on the street side; שְׁפֶל is, as at Prov. xvi. 19, infin. (Symmachus: ἀχρειωθείσης τῆς φωνῆς; the Venet.: ἐν τῷ ταπεινώσθαι τὴν φωνήν), and is to be understood after Isa. xxix. 4; טחנה stands for רחם, as the vulgar Arab. *tahūn* and *mathana* instead of the antiquated *rahā*. Winzer now supposes that the picture of the night is continued in 4b: *et subsistit (vox molar) ad cantum galli, et submissius canunt cantatrices* (viz. *molitrices*). Elster, with Umbreit, supposes the description of a storm continued: the sparrow rises up to cry, and all the singing birds sink down (flutter restlessly on the ground). And Taylor supposes the lament for the dead continued, paraphrasing: But the bird of evil omen [owl, or raven] raises his dirge, and the merry voice of the singing girls is silent.

These three pictures, however, are mere fancies, and are also evidently here forced upon the text; for יקום קול cannot mean *subsistit vox*, but, on the contrary (cf. Hos. x. 14), *surgit (tollitur) vox*; and יקום לקול cannot mean: it (the bird) raises itself to cry, which would have required יקום לתת קולו, or at least לקול, after קום למלחמה, etc.; besides, it is to be presumed that צפור is genit., like קול עונב and the like, not nom. of the subj. It is natural, with Hitz., Ewald, Heiligst., Zöck., to refer *qol tsippor* to the peeping, whispering voice ("childish treble" of Shakespeare) of the old man (cf. *tsiphtseph*, Isa. xxix. 4, xxxviii. 14, x. 14, viii. 19). But the translation: "And it (the voice) approaches a sparrow's voice," is inadmissible, since for קום the meaning, "to pass from one state to another," cannot be proved from 1 Sam. xxii. 13, Mic. ii. 8; קום signifies there always "to rise up," and besides, *qol tahhanah* is not the voice of the mouth supplied with teeth, but the sound of the chewing of a toothless mouth. If *l'qol* is connected with a verb of external movement,

or of that of the soul, it always denotes the occasion of this movement, Num. xvi. 34 ; Ezek. xxvii. 28 ; Job xxi. 12 ; Hab. iii. 16. Influenced by this inalienable sense of the language, the Talm. explains 'צַפּ . . . וַיָּקוּם by "even a bird awakes him." Thus also literally the Midrash, and accordingly the Targ. paraphrasing : "thou shalt awaken out of thy sleep for a bird, as for thieves breaking in at night." That is correct, only it is unnecessary to limit וַיָּקוּם (or rather וַיָּקוּם<sup>1</sup> which accords with the still continued subordination of ver. 4 to the *eo die quo* of ver. 3a) to rising up from sleep, as if it were synonymous with וַיַּעֲזוּר : the old man is weak (nervously weak) and easily frightened, and on account of the deadening of his senses (after the figure of ver. 2, the darkening of the five stars) is so liable to mistake, that if even a bird chirps, he is frightened by it out of his rest (cf. *hēkim*, Isa. xiv. 9).

Also in the interpretation of the clause וַיִּשְׁחֻהוּ . . . הַשִּׁיר, the ancients are in the right track. The Talm. explains: even all music and song appear to him like common chattering (שׁוּחָה or, according to other readings, שִׁיחָה); the proper meaning of יִשְׁחֻהוּ is thus Haggad. twisted. Less correctly the Midrash: בְּנוֹת הַשִּׁיר are his lips, or they are the reins which think, and the heart decides (on this curious psychol. conception, cf. *Chullin* 11a, and particularly *Berachoth* 61a, together with my *Psychol.* p. 269). The reference to the internal organs is *à priori* improbable throughout; the Targ. with the right tact decides in favour of the lips: "And thy lips are untuned, so that they can no more say (sing) songs." In this translation of the Talm. there are compounded, as frequently, two different interpretations, viz. that interpretation of בְּנֵי הַשִּׁיר, which is proved by the בָּל going before to be incorrect, because impossible; and the interpretation of these "daughters of song" of "songs," as if these were synonymous designations, as when in Arab. misfortunes are called *banatu binasan*, and the like (*vid.* Lane's *Lex.* I. p. 263); בֵּית קוֹל, which in Mish. denotes a separate voice (the voice of heaven), but in Syr. the separate word, may be compared. But יִשְׁחֻהוּ (fut. *Niph.* of שָׁחָה) will not accord with this interpretation. For that בְּנֵי הַשִּׁיר denotes songs (Hitz., Heiligst.), or the sound of singing (Böttch.), or the words (Ewald) of the old man himself, which are now softened down so as to be scarcely audible, is yet

<sup>1</sup> Vav with *Cholem* in H. F. Thus rightly, according to the Masora, which places it in the catalogue of those words which occur once with a higher (יָקוּם) and once with a lower vowel (יָקוּם), *Mas. fin.* 2a b, *Ochlaweoehla*, No. 5; cf. also Aben Ezra's *Comm.* under Ps. lxxx. 19; *Zachoth* 23a, *Safa berura* 21b (where Lipmann is uncertain as to the meaning).

too improbable ; it is an insipid idea that the old man gives forth these feeble “ daughters of song ” from his mouth. We explain שָׁחַ of a being bowed down, which is external to the old man, and accordingly understand *b'noth hashshir* not of pieces of music (Aq. πάντα τὰ τῆς ᾠδῆς) which must be lowered to *pianissimo*, but according to the parallel already rightly acknowledged by Desvœux, 2 Sam. xix. 36, where the aged Barzillai says that he has now no longer an ear for the voice of singing men and singing women, of singing birds (cf. זָמִירָא of a singing bird in the Syrian fables of Sophos, and *banoth* of the branches of a fruit tree, Gen. xlix. 22), and, indeed, so that these are a figure of all creatures skilled in singing, and taking pleasure in it : all beings that are fond of singing, and to which it has become as a second nature, must lower themselves, viz. the voice of their song (Isa. xxix. 4) (cf. the *Kal*, Ps. xxxv. 14, and to the modal sense of the fut. x. 10, יִנָּבֵר, and x. 19, יִשְׁפֹּחַ), i.e. must timidly retire, they dare not make themselves heard, because the old man, who is terrified by the twittering of a little bird, cannot bear it.

Ver. 5a. From this his repugnance to singing, and music, and all loud noises, progress in the description is made to the difficulty such aged men have in motion: “Also they are afraid of that which is high; and there are all kinds of fearful things in the way . . .” The description moves forward in a series of independent sentences; that בָּיִם שׁ to which it was subordinate in ver. 3, and still also in ver. 4, is now lost sight of. In the main it is rightly explained by the Talm., and with it the Midrash: “Even a little hillock appears to him like a high mountain; and if he has to go on a journey, he meets something that terrifies him;” the Targ. has adopted the second part of this explanation. נִבְּחָה (falsely referred by the Targ. to the time lying far back in the past) is understood neut.; cf. 1 Sam. xvi. 7. Such decrepid old men are afraid of (יִרְאוּ, not *videbunt*, as the LXX., Symm., Ar., and the Venet. translate, who seem to have had before them the defective יִרְאוּ) a height,—it alarms them as something insurmountable, because their breath and their limbs fail them when they attempt it; and *hathhhattim* (plur. of the intensifying form of חָתַח, *consternatio*, Job xli. 25), i.e. all kinds of *formidines* (not *formido*, Ewald, § 179a, Böttch. § 762, for the plur. is as in *salsilloth*, 'aph'appim, etc., thought of as such), meet them in the way. As the sluggard says: there is a lion in the way, and under this pretence remains slothfully at home, Prov. xxiv. 13, xxii. 13, so old men do not venture out; for to them a damp road appears like a very morass; a gravelly path, as full of neck-breaking hillocks; an undulating path, as fearfully steep and

precipitous; that which is not shaded, as oppressively hot and exhausting—they want strength and courage to overcome difficulties, and their anxiety pictures out dangers before them where there are none.

5b. The allegory is now continued in individual independent figures: "And the almond tree is in blossom." The Talm. explains 'הש' of the haunch-bone projecting (from leanness); the Midrash, of the bones of the vertebral column, conceived of as incorruptible and as that round which will take place the future restoration of the human body,—probably the cross bone, *os sacrum*,<sup>1</sup> inserted between the two thigh bones of the pelvis as a pointed wedge; cf. Jerome in his *Comm.*: *quidam sacram spinam interpretantur quod decrescentibus natium cornibus spina accrescat et floreat*; לֹחַ is an Old Heb., Aram., and Arab. name of the almond tree and the almond nut (*vid.* under Gen. xxx. 37), and this, perhaps, is the reason of this identification of the emblematic שֶׁקֶר with לֹחַ (the *os sacrum*, or *vertebra magna*) of the spine. The Targ. follows the Midrash in translating: the רִישׁ שֵׁן (the top of the spine) will protrude from leanness like an almond tree (*viz.* from which the leaves have been stripped). In these purely arbitrary interpretations nothing is correct but (1) that שֶׁקֶר is understood not of the almond fruit, but of the almond tree, as also at Jer. i. 11 (the rod of an almond tree); (2) that יִנְאֵץ (notwithstanding that these interpreters had it before them unpointed) is interpreted, as also by the LXX., Syr., Jerome, and the Venet., in the sense of blossoming, or the bursting out of blossoms by means of the opening up of the buds. Many interpreters understand שֶׁקֶר of almond fruit (Winzer, Ewald, Ginsb., Rödiger, etc.), for they derive יִנְאֵץ from נֶאֱצָה, as Aben Ezra had already done, and explain by: *fastidit amygdalam (nucem)*, or *fastidium creat amygdala*. But (1) יִנְאֵץ for יִנְאֵץ (Hiph. of נֶאֱצָה, to disdain, to treat scornfully) is a change of vowels unexampled; we must, with such an explanation, read either יִנְאֵץ, *fastiditur* (Gaab), or יִנְאֵץ; (2) almond nuts, indeed, belong to the more noble productions of the land and the delicacies, Gen. xliii. 11, but dainties, κατ' ἐξ., at the same time they are not, so that it would be appropriate to exemplify the blunted sensation of taste in the old man, by saying that he no more cracks and eats almonds. The explanation of Hitzig, who reads יִנְאֵץ, and interprets the almond tree as at Song vii. 9 the palm, to denote a woman, for he translates: the almond tree refuses (*viz.* the old man), we set aside as too ingenious; and we leave to those interpreters who derive יִנְאֵץ from

<sup>1</sup> The Jewish opinion of the incorruptible continuance of this bone may be connected with the designation *os sacrum*; the meaning of this is controverted, *vid.* Hyrtl's *Anatomie*, § 124.

נֶאֱמַר, and understand רִשְׁקָר<sup>1</sup> of the *glans penis* (Bottch, Furst, and several older interpreters), to follow their own foul and repulsive criticism. נֶאֱמַר is an incorrect reading for נֶאֱמַר, as at Hos. x. 14, עֲשֵׂה for עֲשֵׂה, and, in Prov., רִשְׁקָר for רִשְׁקָר (Gesen. § 73. 4); and besides, as at Song vi. 11, הִנֵּה, regular *Hiph.* of נֶאֱמַר (נֶאֱמַר, Lam. iv. 15), to move tremblingly (vibrate), to glisten, blossom (cf. טֵס, to flee, and נִסַּח, Assy. *nisannu*, the flower-month). Thus deriving this verbal form, Ewald, and with him Heiligst, interprets the blossoming almond tree as a figure of the winter of life: "it is as if the almond tree blossomed, which in the midst of winter has already blossoms on its dry, leafless stem." But the blossoms of the almond tree are rather, after Num. xvii. 23, a figure of special life-strength, and we must thus, thrown back to נֶאֱמַר from נֶאֱמַר (to flourish), rather explain, with Furrer (in Schenkel's *B. L.*), as similarly Herzf.: the almond tree refuses, *i.e.* ceases, to blossom; the winter of old age is followed by no spring; or also, as Dale and Taylor: the almond tree repels, *i.e.* the old man has no longer a joyful welcome for this messenger of spring. But his general thought has already found expression in ver. 2; the blossoming almond tree must be here an emblem of a more special relation. Hengst. supposes that "the juniper tree (for this is the proper meaning of שִׁקְרָה) is in bloom" is = sleeplessness in full blossom stands by the old man; but that would be a meaningless expression. Nothing is more natural than that the blossoming almond tree is intended to denote the same as is indicated by the phrase of the Latin poet: *Intempestivi funduntur vertice cani* (Luther, Geiger, Grot., Vaih., Luzz., Gurlitt, Tyler, Bullock, etc.). It has been objected that the almond blossoms are not pure white, but according to the variety, they are pale-red, or also white; so that Thomson, in his beautiful *Land and the Book*, can with right say: "The almond tree is the type of old age whose hair is white;" and why? "The white blossoms completely cover the whole tree." Besides, Bauer (1732) has already remarked that the almond blossoms, at first tinged with red, when they are ready to fall off become white as snow; with which may be compared a clause cited by Ewald from Bodenstedt's *A Thousand and One Days in the Orient*: "The white blossoms fall from the almond trees like snow-flakes." Accordingly, Dächsel is right when he explains, after the example of Zöckler: "the almond tree with its reddish flower in late winter, which strews the ground with its blossoms, which have gradually become white like snow-flakes, is an emblem of the winter of old age with its falling silvery hair."

<sup>1</sup> Abulwalid understands שִׁקְרָה and חֲנֹכַּח sexually, and glosses the latter by *jundub* (the locust), which in Arab. is a figure of suffering and patience.

Ver. 5c. From the change in the colour of the hair, the allegory now proceeds to the impairing of the elasticity of the thighs and of their power of bearing a load, the *malum coxae senile* (in a wider than the usual pathological sense): "And the grasshopper (*i.e.* locust, **חֲנָב**, Samar. **חרנבה** = **חֲנָל**, Lev. xi. 22) becomes a burden." Many interpreters (Merc., Döderl., Gaab, Winz., Gesen., Winer, Dale) find in these words **יִסְ' הָח'** the meaning that locust-food, or that the chirping of grasshoppers, is burdensome to him (the old man); but even supposing that it may at once be assumed that he was a keen aeridophagus (locusts, steeped in butter, are like crabs (shrimps) spread on slices of butter and bread), or that he had formerly a particular delight in the chirping of the **τέττιξ**, which the ancients number among singing birds (cf. Taylor, *l.c.*), and that he has now no longer any joy in the song of the *tettix*, although it is regarded as soothing and tending to lull to rest, and an Anacreon could in his old days even sing his **μακαρίζομέν σε, τέττιξ**,—yet these two interpretations are impossible, because **יִסְ' הָח'** may mean to burden and to move with difficulty, but not "to become burdensome." For the same reason, nothing is more absurd than the explanation of Kimchi and Gurlitt: Even a grasshopper, this small insect, burdens him; for which Zöckl, more naturally: the hopping and chirping of the grasshopper is burdensome to him; as we say, The fly on the wall annoys him. Also Ewald and Heiligstedt's interpretation: "it is as if the locust raised itself to fly, breaking and stripping off its old husk," is inadmissible; for **הסתכל** can mean *se portare laboriose*, but not *ad evolandum eniti*; the comparison (Arab.) *tahmmal* gains the meaning to hurry onwards, to proceed on an even way, like the Hebr. **השכים**, to take upon the shoulder; it properly means, to burden oneself, *i.e.* to take on one's back in order to get away; but the grasshopper coming out of its case carries away with it nothing but itself. For us, such interpretations—to which, particularly, the advocates of the several hypotheses of a storm, night, and mourning, are constrained—are already set aside by this, that according to the allegory **יִנ' הַש'**, **יִס' הַח'** must also signify something characteristic of the body of an old man. The LXX., Jerome, and Ar. translate: the locust becomes fat; the Syr.: it grows. It is true, indeed, that great corpulence, or also a morbid dropsical swelling of the belly (*ascites*), is one of the symptoms of advanced old age; but supposing that the (voracious) locust might be an emblem of a corpulent man, yet **הסתכל** means neither to become fat nor to grow. But because the locust in reality suggests the idea of a corpulent man, the figure cannot at the same time be intended to mean that the old man is like a

skeleton, consisting as it were of nothing but skin and bone (Lyra, Luther, Bauer, Dathe); the resemblance of a locust to the back-bone and its joints (Glassius, Köhler, Vaih.) is not in view; only the position of the locust's feet for leaping admits the comparison of the prominent *scapulae* (shoulder-blades); but shoulder-blades (*scapulae alatae*), angular and standing out from the chest, are characteristics of a consumptive, not of a senile habit. Also we must cease, with Hitz., Böttch., Luzz., and Gratz, to understand the figure as denoting the *φαλλός* to be now impotent; for relaxation and shrinking do not agree with *הסתבל*, which suggests something burdensome by being weighty. The Midrash interprets *החנב* by "ankles," and the Targ. translates accordingly: the ankles (*אִסְתָּוָר*, from the Pers. *ustuwār*, firm) of thy feet will swell—unsuitably, for "ankles" affords no point of comparison with locusts, and they have no resemblance to their springing feet. The Talm., glossing *החנב* by "these are the buttocks" (*nates*) (cf. Arab. *'ajab*, the *os coccygis*, Syn. *'ajuz*, as the Talm. *ענבות* interchanges with *עכנ*), is on the right track. There is nothing, indeed, more probable than that *חנב* is a figure of the *coxa*, the hinder region of the pelvis, where the lower part of the body balances itself in the hip-joint, and the motion of standing up and going receives its impulse and direction by the muscular strength there concentrated. This part of the body may be called the locust, because it includes in itself the mechanism which the two-membered foot for springing, placed at an acute angle, presents in the locust. Referred to this *coxa*, the loins, *יסתבל* has its most appropriate meaning: the marrow disappears from the bones, elasticity from the muscles, the cartilage and oily substance from the joints, and, as a consequence, the middle of the body drags itself along with difficulty; or: it is with difficulty moved along (*Hithpa.* as pass., like viii. 10); it is stiff, particularly in the morning, and the old man is accustomed to swing his arms backwards, and to push himself on as it were from behind. In favour of this interpretation (but not deciding it) is the accord of *חנב* with *ענב* = *κόκκυξ* (by which the *os coccygis* is designated as the cuckoo's bone). Also the verbal stem (Arab.) *jahab* supplies an analogous name: not *jahab*, which denotes the air passage (but not, as Knobel supposes, the breath itself; for the verb signifies to separate, to form a partition, Mishn. *מחיצה*), but (Arab.) *jahabat*, already compared by Bochart, which denotes the point (dual), the two points or projections of the two hip-bones (*vid.* Lane's *Lex.*), which, together with the *os sacrum* lying between, form the ring of the pelvis.

Ver. 5*d*. From the weakening of the power of motion, the allegory passes on to the decay of sensual desires, and of the organs

appertaining thereto: "And the caper-berry fails" . . . The meaning "caper" for **הַאֵבִי** is evidenced by the LXX. (*ἡ κάππαρις*, Arab. *alkabar*), the Syr., and Jerome (*capparis*), and this rendering is confirmed by the Mishnic **אֲבִינֹת**, which in contradistinction to **תְּמָרוֹת**, *i.e.* the tender branches, and **קַפְרִיסִין**, *i.e.* the rind of fruit, signifies the berry-like flower-buds of the caper bush,<sup>1</sup> according to Buxtorf (*vid.* above, p. 190). This Talm. word, it is true, is pointed **אֲבִינֹת**; but that makes no difference, for **אֲבִינֹת** is related to **אֲבִינֹת** merely as making the word emphatic, probably to distinguish the name of the caper from the fem. of the adj. **אֲבִינֹת**, which signifies *avida*, *egena*. But in the main they are both one; for that **אֲבִינֹת** may designate "desire" (Abulwalid:<sup>2</sup> *aliradat*; Parchon: **הַתְּאוּה**; Venet.: *ἡ ὀρεξίς*; Luther: *alle Lust*), or "neediness," "poverty" (the Syr. in its second translation of this clause), is impossible, because the form would be unexampled and incomprehensible; only the desiring soul, or the desiring, craving member (*vid.* Kimchi), could be so named. But now the caper is so named, which even to this day is used to give to food a more piquant taste (cf. Plutarch's *Sympos.* vi. qu. 2. . It is also said that the caper is a means of exciting sexual desire (*aphrodisiacum*); and there are examples of its use for this purpose from the Middle Ages, indeed, but none from the records of antiquity; Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* xx. 14 (59), knew nothing of it, although he speaks at length of the uses and effects of the *capparis*. The Talm. explains **הַאֵבִי** by **חֲמָדָה**, the Midrash by **תְּאוּה**, the Targ. by **מִשְׁכָּבָא**, interpreting the word directly without reference to the caper in this sense. If *haaviyonah* thus denotes the caper, we have not thence to conclude that it incites to sexual love, and still less are we, with the Jewish interpreters, whom Böttch. follows, to understand the word of the *membrum virile* itself; the Arab. name for the caper, *'itar*, which is compared by Grätz, which has an obscene meaning, designates also other aromatic plants. We shall proceed so much the more securely if we turn away from the idea of sexual impulse and hold by the idea of the impulse of self-preservation, namely, appetite for food, since **אֲבִינֹת** (from **אָבָה**, the root-meaning of which, "to desire,"

<sup>1</sup> The caper-bush is called in the Mish. **צִלְפָּה**, and is celebrated, *Beza* 25a, cf. *Shabbath* 30b (where, according to J. S. Bloch's supposition, the disciple who meets Gamaliel is the Apostle Paul), on account of its unconquerable life-power, its quick development of fruit, and manifold products. The caper-tree is planted, says *Berachoth* 36a, "with a view to its branches;" the eatable branches or twigs here meant are called **שִׁתִּי** (**שִׁתִּי**). Another name for the caper-tree is **נִצְפָה**, *Demai* i. 1, *Berachoth* 36a, 40b; and another name for the bud of the caper-blossom is **פְּרָחָא**, *Berachoth* 36b (cf. Aruch, under the words *aviyonoth* and *ts'elaph*).

<sup>2</sup> In his *Dictionary of Roots* (*kitâb el-uşûl*), edited by Neubauer, Oxford 1873-4.

s undoubtedly <sup>1</sup>) denotes a poor man, as one who desires that which is indispensable to the support of life; the caper is accordingly called *viyonah*, as being *appetitiva*, i.e. exciting to appetite for food, and the meaning will not be that the old man is like a caper-berry which, when fully ripe, bursts its husks and scatters its seed (Rosenm., Viner in his *R. W.*, Ewald, Taylor, etc.), as also the LXX., Symm. καὶ διαλυθῇ ἡ ἐπίπνοος, i.e. as Jerome translates it, *et dissolvetur spiritus fortitudo*, perhaps ἐπίπνοος, the strength or elasticity of the spirit), and Jerome understand the figure; but since it is to be presupposed that the name of the caper, in itself significant, will also be significant for the figure: *capparis est irrita sive vim suam non exerit* ותפר as inwardly trans. *Hiph.* of פּרר, to break in pieces, frustrate), i.e. even such means of excitement as capers, these appetite-berries, are unable to stimulate the dormant and phlegmatic stomach of the old man (thus e.g. Bullock). Hitzig, indeed, maintains that the cessation of the enjoyment of love in old age is not to be overlooked; but (1) the use of artificial means for stimulating this natural impulse in an old man, who is here described simply as such, without reference to his previous life and its moral state, would make him a sensualist; and (2) moral statistics show that with the decay of the body lust does not always (although this would be in accordance with nature, Gen. xvii. 17; Rom. iv. 19) expire; moreover, the author of the Book of Koheleth is no Juvenal or Martial, to take pleasure, like many of his interpreters, in exhibiting the *res venerae*.

Ver. 5e. And in view of the clause following, the ceasing from nourishment as the last symptom of the certain approach of death is more appropriate than the cessation from sexual desire: "For," thus the author continues after this description of the enfeebled condition of the hoary old man, "man goeth to his everlasting habitation, and the mourners go about the streets." One has to observe that the *antequam* of the *memento Creatoris tui in diebus juventutis tuae* is continued in vers. 6 and 7. The words 'ad asher lo are thrice repeated. The chief group in the description is subordinated to the second 'ad asher lo; this relation is syntactically indicated also in ver. 4 by the subjective form וְיָקִים, and continues logically in ver. 5, although without any grammatical sign, for וְיָנֵא and וְתִפֹּר are indicative. Accordingly the clause with בִּי, 5b, will not be definitive; considerably the accentuation does not begin a new verse with בִּי: the symptoms of *marasmus* already spoken of are here explained by this, that man is on his way to the grave, and, as we say, has already one foot in it.

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Fried. Delitzsch's *Indogerman.-Sem. Stud.* I. p. 62 f. Also the Arab. *âby* in the language of the Negd means nothing else.

The part. הָלַךְ is also here not so much the expression of the *fut. instans* (*iturus est*), like ix. 10, as of the present (Venet. : ἀπείσι); cf. Gen. xv. 2, where also these two possible renderings stand in question. “Everlasting house” is the name for the grave of the dead, according to Diodorus Sic. i. 51, also among the Egyptians, and on old Lat. monuments also the expression *domus aeterna* is found (*vid.* Knobel); the comfortless designation, which corresponds<sup>1</sup> to the as yet darkened idea of Hades, remained with the Jews in spite of the hope of the resurrection they had meanwhile received; cf. Tob. iii. 6; *Sanhedrin* 19a, “the churchyard of *Huṣal*,” “to a churchyard” (*beth ’olam*); “at the door of the churchyard” (*beth ’olam*), *Vajikra rabba*, c. 12. Cf. also above, p. 191, and Assy. *bit ’idii* = בית ער of the under-world (Bab.-Assyr. Epic, “*Höllenfahrt der Istar*,” i. 4).

The clause following means that mourners already go about the streets (cf. סָבַב, Song iii. 3, and *Pil.* Song iii. 2; Ps. lix. 7) expecting the death of the dying. We would say: the undertaker tarries in the neighbourhood of the house to be at hand, and to offer his services. For *hassophdim* are here, as Knobel, Winz., and others rightly explain, the mourners, *saphdanin* (*sophdanin*), hired for the purpose of playing the mourning music (with the horn שִׁפּוּרָא, *Moëd katan* 27b, or flute, חֲלִילִים, at the least with two, *Kethuboth* 46b; cf. Lat. *siticines*) and of singing the lament for the dead, *qui conducti plorant in funere* (Horace, *Poet.* 433), along with whom were mourning women, מְקוֹנְנוֹת (Lat. *præficae*) (cf. Buxtorf’s *Lex. Talm.* col. 1524 s.),—a custom which existed from remote antiquity, according to 2 Sam. iii. 31; Jer. xxxiv. 5. The Talm. contains several such lamentations for the dead, as *e.g.* that of a “mourner” (הָהוּא סָפְדָנָא) for R. Abina: “The palms wave their heads for the palm-like just man,” etc.; and of the famed “mourner” Bar-Kippuk on the same occasion: “If the fire falls upon the cedar, what shall the hyssop of the walls do?” etc. (*Moëd katan* 25b<sup>2</sup>)—many of the סָפְדָנִים were accordingly elegiac poets. This section of ver. 5 does not refer to the funeral itself, for the procession of the mourners about the bier ought in that case to have been more distinctly expressed; and that they walked about in the streets before the funeral (Isa. xv. 3) was not a custom, so far as we know. They formed a component part of the procession following the bier to the grave in Judea, as *Shabbath* 153a remarks with

<sup>1</sup> The Syr. renders *beth ’olam* by *domus laboris sui*, which is perhaps to be understood after Job iii. 17b.

<sup>2</sup> Given in full in *Wiss. Kunst Judenth.* p. 230 ff. Regarding the lament for the dead among the Haurans, *vid.* Wetzstein’s treatise on the Syrian Threshing-Table in Bastian’s *Zeitsch. für Ethnologie*, 1873.

reference to this passage, and in Galilee going before it ; to mourn over the death, to reverse it, if possible, was not the business of these mourners, but of the relatives (Hitz.), who were thus not merely called **הסופרים**. The Targ. translates : “ and the angels will go about, who demand an account of thee, like the mourning singers who go about the streets, to record what account of thee is to be given.” It is unnecessary to change **בְּסוֹפְרֵי** into **בְּסָפְרֵי** (*instar scribarum*). According to the idea of the Targumist, the *sophdim* go about to collect materials for the lament for the dead. The dirge was not always very scrupulously formed ; wherefore it is said in *Berachoth* 62a, “ as is the estimate of the dead that is given, so is the estimate of the mourners (singers and orators at the funeral), and of those who respond to their words.” It is most natural to see the object of the mourners going about in their desire to be on the spot when death takes place.<sup>1</sup>

Vers. 6, 7. A third *'ad asher lo* now follows (cf. v. 1, 2) ; the first placed the old man in view, with his *désagrément* in general ; the second described in detail his bodily weaknesses, presenting themselves as forerunners of death ; the third brings to view the dissolution of the life of the body, by which the separation of the soul and the body, and the return of both to their original condition is completed. “ Ere the silver cord is loosed, and the golden bowl is shattered, and the pitcher is broken at the fountain, and the wheel is shattered in the well, and the dust returns to the earth as that which it was, and the spirit returns to God who gave it.” Before entering into the contents of these verses, we shall consider the form in which some of the words are presented. The *Chethib* **יִרְחֵק** we readily let drop, for in any case it must be said that the silver cord is put out of action ; and this word, whether we read it **יִרְחֵק** or **יִרְחֵק** (Venet. *μακρυνθη*), is too indefinite, and, supposing that by the silver cord a component part of the body is meant, even inappropriate, since the organs which cease to perform their functions are not removed away from the dead body, but remain in it when dead. But the *Keri* **יִרְחֵק** (“ is

<sup>1</sup> The Arab. funeral dirge furnishes at once an illustration of “ and the mourners go about the streets.” What Wetzstein wrote to me ought not, I believe, to be kept from the reader : “ In Damascus the men certainly take part in the dirge ; they go about the reservoir in the court of the house along with the mourning women, and behave themselves like women ; but this does not take place in the villages. But whether the ‘ going about the streets ’ might seem as an evidence that in old times in the towns, as now in the villages, the *menaṣṣa* (bed of state) was placed with the mourning tent in the open street without, is a question. If this were the case, the *sôphdim* might appear publicly ; only I would then understand by the word not hired mourners, but the relatives of the dead.” But then **מִפְּהָ**, as at Ps. xxvi. 6 **מִזְבֵּחַ**, ought to have been joined to **סָבַב** as the object of the going about.

unbound") has also its difficulty. The verb **רָחַק** signifies to bind together, to chain; the bibl. Heb. uses it of the binding of prisoners, Nah. iii. 18, cf. Isa. xl. 19; the post-bibl. Heb. of binding = shutting up (contrast of **פָּתַח**, *Pesikta*, ed. Buber, 176a, whence *Mezia* 107b, **שׁוּרָא וּרְיָחָא**, a wall and enclosure); the Arab. of shutting up and closing a hole, rent, split (*e.g.* *murtatik*, a plant with its flower-buds as yet shut up; *rutūk*, inaccessibleness). The Targumist<sup>1</sup> accordingly understands **יִרְחַק** of binding = lameness (palsy); Rashi and Aben Ezra, of shrivelling; this may be possible, however, for **יִרְחַק**, used of a "cord," the meaning that first presents itself, is "to be firmly bound;" but this affords no appropriate sense, and we have therefore to give to the *Niph.* the contrasted meaning of setting free, *discatenare* (Parchon, Kimchi); this, however, is not justified by examples, for a privat. *Niph.* is unexampled, Ewald, § 121e; **נָלַב**, Job xi. 12, does not mean to be deprived of heart (understanding), but to gain heart (understanding). Since, however, we still need here the idea of setting loose or tearing asunder (LXX. *ἀνατραπῆ*; Symm. *κοπήναι*; Syr. **נַחֲפַסַּק**, from **פָּסַק**, *abscindere*; Jerome, *rumpatur*), we have only the choice of interpreting *yērathēq* either, in spite of the appearance to the contrary, in the meaning of *constringitur*, of a violent drawing together of the cord stretched out lengthwise; or, with Pfannkuche, Gesen., Ewald, to read **יִתְחַק** ("is torn asunder"), which one expects, after Isa. xxxiii. 20; cf. Judg. xvi. 9, Jer. x. 20. Hitzig reaches the same, for he explains **יִרְחַק** = **יִתְחַק**, from (Arab.) *kharak*, to tear asunder (of the sound of the tearing<sup>2</sup>); and Böttcher, by adopting the reading **יִתְחַק**; but without any support in Heb. and Chald. *usus loq.* **נָלָה**, which is applied to the second figure, is certainly<sup>3</sup> a vessel of a round form (from **נָלַל**, to roll, revolve round), like the **נָלָה** which received the oil and conducted it to the seven lamps of the candlestick in Zech. iv.; but to understand **וַיִּתְחַרֵּץ** of the running out of the oil not expressly named (Luther: "and the golden fountain runs out") would be contrary to the *usus loq.*; it is the metapl. form for **וַיִּתְחַרֵּץ**, *et confringitur*, as **יִרְיָן**, Isa. xlii. 4, for **יִרְיָן**, from **רִצָּץ**, cogn. **רָעַע**, Ps. ii. 9, whence **נִרְיָן**, 6b, the regularly formed *Niph.* (the fut. of which, **יִתְרִיץ**, Ezek. xxix. 7). We said that oil is

<sup>1</sup> Similarly the LXX. understands **וַיִּתְחַרֵּץ**, καὶ συντροχάσῃ (*i.e.* as Jerome in his *Comm.* explains: *si fuerit in suo funiculo convoluta*), which is impossible.

<sup>2</sup> *Vid.* my treatise, *Physiol. u. Musik*, u.s.w., p. 31.

<sup>3</sup> The LXX., unsuitably, τὸ ἀνθήμιον, which, *per synecdochen partis pro toto*, signifies the capital (of a pillar). Thus, perhaps, also are meant Symm. τὸ περιφρίς, Jerome *vitta*, Venet. τὸ στίφος, and the Syr. "apple." Among the Arabs, this ornament on the capital is called *tabaryz* ("prominence").

not expressly named. But perhaps it is meant by *הזָהָב*. The *gullah* above the candlestick which Zechariah saw was, according to ver. 12, provided with two golden pipes, in which were two olive trees standing on either side, which sunk therein the tuft-like end of their branches, of which it is said that they emptied out of themselves *hazzahav* into the oil vessels. Here it is manifest that *hazzahav* means, in the one instance, the precious metal of which the pipes are formed; and in the other, the fluid gold of the oil contained in the olive branches. Accordingly, Hitzig understands *gullath hazzahav* here also; for he takes *gullah* as a figure of the body, the golden oil as a figure of the soul, and the silver cord as a figure of vital energy.

Thus, with Hitz., understanding *gullath hazzahav* after the passage in Zechariah, I have correctly represented the meaning of the figures in my *Psychol.* p. 228, as follows:—"The silver cord = the soul directing and bearing the body as living; the lamp hanging by this silver cord = the body animated by the soul, and dependent on it; the golden oil = the spirit, of which it is said, Prov. xx. 27, that it is a lamp of God." I think that this interpretation of the golden oil commends itself in preference to Zöckler's interpretation, which is adopted by Dächsel, of the precious *fluidum* of the blood; for if *hazzahav* is a metaphorical designation of oil, we have to think of it as the material for burning and light; but the principle of bright life in man is the spirit (*ruahh hhayim* or *nishmath hhayim*); and in the passage in Zechariah also, oil, which makes the candlestick give light, is a figure of the spirit (ver. 6, *ki im-b'ruhki*). But, as one may also suppose, it is not probable that here, with the same genit. connection, *הכסף* is to be understood of the material and the quality; and *hazzahav*, on the contrary, of the contents. A golden vessel is, according to its most natural meaning, a vessel which is made of gold, thus a vessel of a precious kind. A golden vessel cannot certainly be broken in pieces, but we need not therefore understand an earthenware vessel only gilded, as by a silver cord is to be understood only that which has a silver line running through it (Gesen. in the *Thes.*); *רָצוץ* may also denote that which is violently crushed or broken, Isa. xlii. 3; cf. Judg. ix. 53. If *gullath hazzahav*, however, designates a golden vessel, the reference of the figure to the body, and at the same time of the silver cord to the vital energy or the soul, is then excluded,—for that which animates stands yet above that which is animated,—the two metallic figures in this their distribution cannot be comprehended in this reference. We have thus to ask, since *gullath hazzahav* is not the body itself: What in the human

body is compared to a silver cord and to a golden vessel? What, moreover, to a pitcher at the fountain, and to a wheel or a windlass? Winzer settles this question by finding in the two double figures only in general the thoughts represented: *antequam vita ex tenui quasi filo suspensa pereat*, and (which is essentially the same) *antequam machina corporis destruat*. Gurlitt also protests against the allegorical explanation of the details, but he cannot refrain from interpreting more specially than Winzer. Two *momenta*, he says, there are which, when a man dies, in the most impressive way present themselves to view: the extinction of consciousness, and the perfect cessation, complete ruin, of the bodily organism. The extinction of consciousness is figuratively represented by the golden lamp, which is hung up by a silver cord in the midst of a house or tent, and now, since the cord which holds it is broken, it falls down and is shattered to pieces, so that there is at once deep darkness; the destruction of the bodily organism, by a fountain, at which the essential parts of its machinery, the pitcher and windlass, are broken and rendered for ever useless. This interpretation of Gurlitt's affords sufficient support to the expectation of the allegorical meaning with which we approached ver. 6; and we would be satisfied therewith, if one of the figures did not oppose us, without seeking long for a more special allegorical meaning: the pitcher at the fountain or well (כֵּר, not הֵכֵר, because determined by 'al-hammabu'a) is without doubt the heart which beats to the last breath of the dying man, which is likened to a pitcher which, without intermission, receives and again sends forth the blood. That the blood flows through the body like living water is a fact cognizable and perceptible without the knowledge of its course; fountain (מְקוֹר) and blood appear also elsewhere as associated ideas, Lev. xii. 7; and *nishbar*, as here *v'tishshabër*, used of a pitcher, is a usual scriptural word for the heart brought into a state of death, or near to death, Jer. xxiii. 9; Ps. lxix. 21. From this *gullath hazzahav* must also have a special allegorical sense; and if, as Gurlitt supposes, the golden vessel that is about to be destroyed is a figure of the perishing self-consciousness (whereby it is always doubtful that, with this interpretation, the characteristic feature of light in the figure is wanting), then it is natural to go further, and to understand the golden vessel directly of the head of a man, and to compare the breaking of the skull, Judg. ix. 53, expressed by *vataritz eth-gulgot*, with the words here before us, *vatharutz gullath hazzahav*; perhaps by *gullath* the author thought of the cogn.—both as to root and meaning—גִּלְגֹּלֶת; but, besides, the comparison of the head, the bones of which form an oval

bowl, with *gullath* is of itself also natural. It is true that, according to the ancient view, not the head, but the heart, is the seat of the life of the spirit; "in the heart, Ephrem said (*Opp. Syr.* ii. 316), the thinking spirit (*chuschobo*) acts as in its palace;" and the understanding, the Arabians<sup>1</sup> also say, sits in the heart, and thus between the ribs. Everything by which בִּשְׁר and נֶפֶשׁ is affected—thus, briefly formulated, the older bibl. idea—comes in the לֵב into the light of consciousness. But the Book of Koheleth belongs to a time in which spiritual-psychical actions began to be placed in mediate causal relation with the head; the Book of Daniel represents this newer mode of conception, ii. 28, iv. 2, vii. 10, vii. 15. The image of the monarchies seen in Nebuchadnezzar's dream, ii. 32, 38, had a golden head; the head is described as golden, as it is the *membrum praecipuum* of the human body; it is compared to gold as to that which is most precious, as, on the other hand, רֶאשׁ is used as a metaphorical designation of that which is most precious. The breaking to pieces of the head, the death-blow which it receives, shows itself in this, that he who is sick unto death is unable to hold his head erect, that it sinks down against his will according to the law of gravity; as also in this, that the countenance assumes the aspect which we designate the *facies hippocratica*, and that feeling is gradually destroyed; but, above all, that is thought of which Ovid says of one who was dying: *et resupinus humum moribundo vertice pulsat*.

If we now further inquire regarding the meaning of the silver cord, nothing can obviously be meant by it which is locally above the golden bowl which would be hanging under it; also גִּלְתֵּי הַכֶּסֶף itself certainly admits no such literal antitype,—the concavity of the גִּלְתֵּי is below, and that of a גִּלְתֵּי, on the other hand, is above. The silver cord will be found if a component part of the structure of the body is pointed to, which stands in a mutually related connection with the head and the brain, the rending asunder of which brings death with it. Now, as is well known, dying finally always depends on the brain and the upper spinal marrow; and the ancients already interpreted the silver cord of the spinal marrow, which is called by a figure terminologically related to the silver cord, חֵוֹם הַשֶּׁדֶרֶה (the spinal cord), and as a cord-like lengthening of the brain into the spinal channel could not be more appropriately named; the centre is grey, but the external coating is white. We do not, however, maintain that *hakkēsēph* points to the white colour; but the spinal marrow is related, in the matter of its value for the life of man, to

<sup>1</sup> *Vid. Noldeke's Poesien d. alten Araber*, p. 190.

the brain as silver is to gold. Since not a violent but a natural death is the subject, the fatal stroke that falls on the spinal marrow is not some kind of mechanical injury, but, according as יִרְחֵק [is unbound] is explained or is changed into יִנָּתֵק [is torn asunder], is to be thought of either as constriction = shrinking together, consuming away, exhaustion; or as unchaining = paralysis or disabling; or as tearing asunder = destruction of the connection of the individual parts. The emendation יִנָּתֵק most commends itself; it remains, however, possible that יִרְחֵק is meant in the sense of morbid contraction (*vid.* Rashi); at any rate, the fate of the גִּלְהָ is the consequence of the fate of the הַבֵּל, which carries and holds the *gullah*, and does not break without at the same time bringing destruction on it; as also the brain and the spinal marrow stand in a relation of solidarity to each other, and the head receives<sup>1</sup> from the spinal marrow (as distinguished from the so-called prolonged marrow) the death-stroke. As the silver cord and the bowl, so the pitcher and the well and the wheel stand in interchangeable relation to each other. We do not say: the wheel at the fountain, as is translated by Hitz., Ewald, and others; for (1) the fountain is called בְּאֵר, not בּוֹר (בֹּאֵר), which, according to the usage (*vid.* Hitz. under Jer. vii. 9), signifies a pit, and particularly a hole, for holding water, a cistern, reservoir; but for this there was no need for a wheel, and it is also excluded by that which had to be represented; (2) the expression *galgal el-habor* is purposely not used, but *hagalgal el-habor*, that we may not take *el-habor* as virtual adj. to *galgal* (the wheel being at the בּוֹר), but as the designation of the place into which the wheel falls when it is shattered. Rightly, the LXX. renders 'al-hammabu'a by ἐπὶ τῇ πηγήν, and *el-habor* by ἐπὶ τὸν λάκκον. The figure of a well (*mabbu'a*) formed by means of digging, and thus deep, is artistically conceived; out of this the water is drawn by means of a pitcher (כֵּי, Gen. xxiv. 14, a word as curiously according with the Greek κάδος as those mentioned in pp. 12 and 74, whence (Arab.) *kadd*, to exhaust, to pitcher-out, as it were; syn. רֶלֶי, a vessel for drawing out water; Assyr. *di-lu*, the zodiacal sign of the water-carrier), and to facilitate this there is a wheel or windlass placed above (Syr. *gilgla d'vira*), by which a rope is wound up and down (*vid.* Smith's *Bibl. Dict.* under "well").<sup>2</sup> The Midrash refers to the deep draw-

<sup>1</sup> Many interpreters (lately Ewald, Hengst, Zöckl., Taylor, and others) understand the silver cord of the thread of life; the spinal marrow is, without any figure, this thread of life itself.

<sup>2</sup> Wetzstein remarks, that it is translated by "cylinder" better than by "wheel," since the *galgal* is here not at a river, but over a draw-well.

well of the hill town of Sepporis, which was supplied with such rollers serving as a pulley (polyspast). Wheel and pitcher stand in as close mutual relation as air and blood, which come into contact in the lungs. The wheel is the figure of the breathing organ, which expands and contracts (winds and unwinds) itself like a draw-rope by its inhaling and exhaling breath. The throat, as the organ of respiration and speech, is called נִרְוֹן (Ps. cxv. 7) and נִרְנָרוֹת (*vid.* under Prov. i. 9), from נָרָה or נָרַר, to draw, σπᾶν (τὸν ἀέρα, Wisd. vii. 3). When this wheel makes its last laborious revolution, there is heard the death-rattle. There is a peculiar rattling sound, which they who once hear it never forget, when the wheel swings to an end—the so-called choking rheum, which consists in this, that the secretion which the dying cannot cough up moves up and down in the air-passages, and finally chokes him. When thus the breathings become always weaker, and sometimes are interrupted for a minute, and at last cease altogether, there takes place what is here designated as the breaking to pieces of the wheel in the pit within—the life is extinguished, he who has breathed his last will be laid as a corpse in the grave (בּוֹר, Ps. xxviii. 1, and frequently), the σῶμα has become a πτώμα (Mark vi. 29 ; cf. Num. xiv. 32). The dust, *i.e.* the dust of which the body was formed, goes back to the earth again like as it was (originally dust), and the spirit returns to God who gave it. וְיֵשֶׁב subordinates itself to the 'ad asher lo, also in the form as subjunct. ; the interchange of the full and the abbreviated forms occurs, however, elsewhere in the indic. sense, *e.g.* Job xiii. 27 ; Ewald, § 343b. Shuv 'al occurs also at 2 Chron. xxx. 9 ; and אָל and אֵל interchange without distinction in the more modern language ; but here, as also at 6b, not without intention, the way downwards is to be distinguished from the way upwards (cf. iii. 21). בְּאִשְׁרֵי הָיָה is = בְּשִׁפְתֶּיהָ, *instar ejus quod fuit*. The body returns to the dust from which it was taken, Gen. iii. 19, to the dust of its original material, Ps. civ. 29 ; and the spirit goes back to the God of its origin, to whom it belongs.

We have purposely not interrupted our interpretation of the enigmatical figures of ver. 6 by the citation and criticism of diverging views, and content ourselves here with a specification of the oldest expositions. The interpretation of *Shabbath* 152a does not extend to ver. 6. The Midrash says of the silver cord : זו חוט השדרה (as later, Rashi, Aben Ezra, and many others), of the golden vessel : זו נלגלת (as we), and it now adds only more in jest : “the throat which swallows up the gold and lets the silver run through.” The pitcher becoming leaky must be כרס, the belly, which three days after death

is wont to burst. And as for *hagalgal*, reference is made to the draw-wells of Sepporis; so for *el havor*, after Job xxi. 33, to the clods of Tiberias: he lies deep below, "like those clods of the deep-lying Tiberias." The Targ. takes its own way, without following the Midrash, and translates: "before thy tongue [this of חבל] is bound and thou art unable to speak any more, and the brain of thy head [this the גלה] is shattered, and thy gall [= כר] is broken with thy liver [= המבוע], and thy body [= הגלגל] hastens away [רץ of רץ] into the grave." These interpretations have at least historical and linguistic value; they also contain separate correct renderings. A *quodlibet* of other interpretations<sup>1</sup> is found in my *Psychol.* p. 229, and in Zöckler, *ad loc.* A principal error in these consists in this, that they read Koheleth as if he had been a disciple of Boerhaave, and Harvey, and other masters. Wunderbar in his *Bibl.-Talm. medicin* (1850) takes all in earnest, that the author knew already of the nervous system and the circulation of the blood; for, as he himself says, there is nothing new under the sun. As far as concerns my opinion, says Oetinger in his exposition (*Sämmt. Schrift. herausg. von Ehmann*, IV. p. 254), I dare not affirm that Solomon had a knowledge *systematis nervolympatici*, as also *circuli sanguinis*, such as learned physicians now possess; yet I believe that the Holy Spirit spake thus through Solomon, that what in subsequent times was discovered as to these matters might be found under these words. This judgment also goes too far; the figure of death which Koheleth presents contains no anticipation of modern discoveries; yet it is not without its value for the historical development of anthropology, for science and poetry combine in it; it is as true to fact as it is poetically beautiful.

The author has now reached the close. His Koheleth-Solomon has made all earthly things small, and at last remains seated on this dust-heap of *vanitas vanitatum*. The motto-like saying, i. 2, is here repeated as a *quod erat demonstrandum*, like a summary conclusion. The book, artistically constructed in whole and in its parts, comes to a close, rounding itself off as in a circle in the epiphonema:

Ver. 8. "O vanity of vanities, saith Koheleth, all is vain." If we here look back to ver. 7, that which is there said of the spirit can be no consolation. With right, Hofmann in his *Schriftbeweis*, I. 490, says: "That it is the personal spirit of a man which returns to God; and that it returns to God without losing its consciousness, is an idea foreign to this proverb." Also, *Psychol.* p. 410, it is willingly conceded that the author wished here to

<sup>1</sup> Geiger in the *Deut. Morg. Zeitsch.* xxvii. 800, translates xii. 6 arbitrarily: and the stone-lid (גלגל in the sense of the Mish.-Targ. גולל) presses on the grave.

express, first, only the fact, in itself comfortless, that the component parts of the human body return whence they came. But the comfortless avers of the proverb is yet not without a consoling reverse. For what the author, iii. 21, represents as an unsettled possibility, that the spirit of a dying man goes not downwards like that of a beast, but upwards, he here affirms as an actual truth.<sup>1</sup> From this, that he thus finally decides the question as an advantage to a man above a beast, it follows of necessity that the return of the spirit to God cannot be thought of as a resumption of the spirit into the essence of God (resorption or remanation), as the cessation of his independent existence, although, as also at Job xxxiv. 14, Ps. civ. 29, the nearest object of the expression is directed to the ruin of the soul-corporeal life of man which directly follows the return of the spirit to God. The same conclusion arises from this, that the idea of the return of the spirit to God, in which the author at last finds rest, cannot yet stand in a subordinate place with reference to the idea of Hades, above which it raises itself; with the latter the spirit remains indestructible, although it has sunk into a silent, inactive life. And in the third place, that conclusion flows from the fact that the author is forced by the present contradiction between human experience and the righteousness of God to the postulate of a judgment finally settling these contradictions, iii. 17, xi. 9, cf. xii. 14, whence it immediately follows that the continued existence of the spirit is thought of as a well-known truth (*Psychol.* p. 127). The Targ. translates, not against the spirit of the book: "the spirit will return to stand in judgment before God, who gave it to thee." In this connection of thoughts Koheleth says more than what Lucretius says (ii. 998 ss.):

*Cedit item retro, de terra quod fuit ante,  
In terras, et quod missum est ex aetheris oris  
Id rursum caeli rellatum templa receptant.*

A comforting thought lies in the words אִשֶּׁר נָתַןָהּ. The gifts of God are on His side ἀμεταμέλητα (Rom. xi. 29). When He receives back that which was given, He receives it back to restore it again in another manner. Such thoughts connect themselves with the reference to God the Giver. Meanwhile the author next aims at showing the vanity of man, viz. of man as living here. Body and spirit are separated, and depart each in its own direction. Not only the world and the labours by which man is encompassed are "vain," and not only is that which man has and does and experiences "vain," but also

<sup>1</sup> In the Rig-Veda that which is immortal in man is called *manas*; the later language calls it *âtman*; vid. Muir in the *Asiatic Journal*, 1865, p. 305.

man himself as such is vain, and thus—this is the *facit*—all is רבב, “vain.”

(C.) THE EPILOGUE.—XII. 9–14.

In an unexpected manner there now follows a postscript. Since the book closes with the epiphonema xii. 8 as having reached the intended goal, the supposition that what follows xii. 8 is from another hand is more natural than the contrary. Of the question of genuineness there cannot be here properly anything said, for only that which is not what it professes to be and ought to be, is spurious; the postscript is certainly according to tradition an integral part of the Book of Koheleth (Bullock), but not as an original organic formal part of it, and still less does it expressly bear self-evidence of this. At the least, those who regard Solomon as the author of the book ought to contend against the recognition in xii. 9 ff. of an appendix by a later hand. Hahn, however, regards the same Solomon who speaks in ver. 8 as continuing to speak in ver. 9, for he interprets אמר, which, however, only means *inquit*, as perf., looking back to the completed book, and regards this retrospect as continued in ver. 9 ff., without being hindered by the interchange of the *I* and of the following historical *he*, which is contained in “saith Koheleth.” Dale even ventures the assertion, that the Book of Koheleth could have closed with the unsatisfying pure negative, ver. 8, as little as the Gospel of Mark with “and they were afraid” (xvi. 8). As if ver. 13 f. expressed postulates not already contained in the book itself! The epilogue has certainly manifestly the object of recommending the author of the book, Koheleth-Solomon, and of sealing the contents of the book. If Solomon himself were the author, the epilogue would stand in the same relation to the book as John xxi. 24 f. to the fourth Gospel, of the Johannean origin of which a voice from the apostolic church there bears witness.<sup>1</sup>

It is a serious anachronism when modern interpreters of Scripture occupy the standpoint of the old, who take the name of the man after whom the book is entitled, without more ado, as the name of its author from first to last.<sup>2</sup> To what childish puerilities a bigotry so uncritical descends is seen in the case of Christ.

<sup>1</sup> Hoelemann, in *Abth.* II. of his *Bibel-Studien* (1860), draws a parallel between these two epilogues; he regards them as original formal parts of the Solomonic Koheleth and of the Johannean Gospel, and seeks to prove that they stand in more than external and accidental relation to the two works respectively.

<sup>2</sup> Thus John Miller, in his *Commentary on the Proverbs* (New York, 1872), regards Solomon as the author of the entire Book of Proverbs and also of Ecclesi-

Fried. Bauer (1732). In this section, vers. 9-12, he says Solomon turns especially to his son Rehoboam, and delivers to him this *Solennel*-discourse or sermon as an instruction for his future life. He recommends it [the sermon] at once on account of the author, ver. 9, and of its contents, ver. 10, which accord, ver. 11, with his other writings, and from which altogether Rehoboam could find sufficient information, so that to write to him several books would be unnecessary. After this apostrophe to his son the preacher turns round to the entire *auditorio*, and addresses them in *הָבֵל נִשְׁמָע*. But we are all permitted to hear what is the final aim and intention of this sermon: Fear thou God, and keep His commandments; for such ought every man to be, etc.

A rationalism not less fruitful in wonderful conceits appeared over against this dreamy irrationalism. Döderlein (1784) says of Koheleth: "As it appears, so the author feigned, that this was a lecture or treatise which Solomon delivered before his literary academy; for this academy I am inclined to understand under the name 'Koheleth.'" The epilogue appears to him as an appendage by another hand. Such is the opinion also of J. E. Ch. Schmidt (1794), Bertholdt (in his *Einleit.* 1812 ff.), Umbreit (1818, 20), and Knobel (1836), who maintain that this appendage is aimless, in form as in doctrine, out of harmony with the book, revealing by the "endless book-making" a more recent time, and thus is an addition by a later author. This negative critical result Grätz (1871) has sought, following Krochmal (in his *More nebuche hazeman*, 1851, 54), to raise to a positive result. Vers. 9-11 are to him as an apology of the Book of Koheleth, and vers. 12-14 as a clause defining the collection of the Hagiographa, which is completed by the reception into it of the Book of Koheleth; and this bipartite epilogue as an addition belonging to the period of the Synod of Jabneh, about A.D. 90 (*vid.* above, p. 189).

If, nevertheless, we regard this epilogue as a postscript by the author of the book himself, we have not only Herzfeld on our side, who has given his verdict against all Knobel's arguments, but also Hitzig, who (Hilgenfeld's *Zeitsch.* 1872, p. 566) has rejected Grätz' Herod-hypothesis, as well as also his introduction of the epilogue into the history of the canon, or, as Geiger (*Jüd. Zeitsch.* 1872, p. 123) has expressed himself, has dealt with it according to its

astes. His interpretation of Scripture proceeds on the fundamental principle, in itself commendable, that the Scripture never expresses trivialities ("each text must be a brilliant"); but it is not to be forgotten that the O. T., in relation to the high school of the New, is in reality a *trivium*, and that the depth of the words of Scripture is not everywhere the same, but varies according to the author and the times.

merit. Also in Bloch's monograph on the Book of Koheleth (1872) there are many striking arguments against placing the authorship of the book in the Herod-Mishn. period, although the view of this critic, that the book contains notes of Solomon's with interpolations, and an epilogue by the collector, who sought to soften the impression of the gloomy pessimism of these notes, is neither cold nor hot.

We have already (p. 206) shown that the epilogue is written quite in the same style as the book itself; its language is like that of the chronicler; it approaches the idiom of the Mishna, but, with reference to it, is yet somewhat older. That the first part of the epilogue, vers. 9-11, serves an important end, is also proved (p. 206),—it establishes the book as a production of the Chokma, which had Solomon as its pattern; and the second part, vers. 12-14, bears on it the stamp of this Chokma, for it places all the teaching of the book under the double watchword: "Fear God," and "There is a judgment" (Job xxviii. 28, xix. 29; cf. Eccles. v. 6, xi. 9). In the book, Koheleth-Solomon speaks, whose mask the author puts on; here, he speaks, letting the mask fall off, of Koheleth. That in his time (the Persian) too much was done in the way of making books, we may well believe. In addition to authors by profession, there have always been amateurs; the habit of much writing is old, although in the course of time it has always assumed greater dimensions. A complaint in reference to this sounds strange, at least from the mouth of an author who has contented himself with leaving to posterity a work so small, though important. We nowhere encounter any necessity for regarding the author of the book and of the epilogue as different persons. The spirit and tone of the book and of the epilogue are one. The epilogue seals only the distinction between the pessimism of the book and the modern pessimism, which is without God and without a future.

Ver. 9. In connection with ver. 8, where Koheleth has spoken his last word, the author, who has introduced him as speaking hitherto, continues: "And, moreover, because Koheleth was wise, he taught the people knowledge; he applied and searched out and formed many proverbs." The postscript begins with "and" because it is connected with the concluding words of the book—only externally, however; nothing is more unwarrantable than to make ver. 8 the beginning of the postscript on account of the *var.* The LXX. translate *καὶ περισσὸν* (Venet. *περιττὸν*) ὅτι; as Hitz. : "it remains (to be said) that Koheleth was a wise man," etc.; and Dale may be right, that ויתר is in this sense as subj., pointed with *Zakeph gadhol* (cf. Gen. xvi. 16, xx. 4, and the obj. thus pointed, Ex. xxiii. 3). But that Koheleth

was "a wise man" is nothing remaining to be said, for as such he certainly speaks in the whole book from beginning to end; the עור, unconnected, following, shows that this his property is presupposed as needing no further testimony. But untenable also is the translation: So much the greater Koheleth was as a wise man, so much the more, etc. (Heinem., Südfeld); עור does not signify *eo magis*; the Heb. language has a different way of expressing such an intensification: כל הגדול מחברו יצרו גדול ממנו, *i.e.* the higher the position is which one assumes, so much the greater are the temptations to which he is exposed. Rightly, Luther: "This same preacher was not only wise, but," etc. ויתר signifies, vii. 11, "and an advance (benefit, gain);" here ש ויתר, "and something going beyond this, that," etc.—thought of as accus.-adv.: "going beyond this, that = moreover, because" (Gesen., Knobel, Vaih., Ginsb., Grätz); *vid.* above, p. 192. Thus 'od is in order, which introduces that which goes beyond the property and position of a "wise man" as such. That which goes beyond does not consist in this, that he taught the people knowledge, for that is just the meaning of the name *Koheleth*; the statement which 'od introduces is contained in the concluding member of the compound sentence; the after-word begins with this, that it designates the Koheleth who appears in the more esoteric book before us as הכב, as the very same person who also composed the comprehensive people's book, the *Mishle*. He has taught the people knowledge; for he has placed, *i.e.* formed ("stellen," to place, as "*Schriftsteller*" = author; modern Heb. מְחַבֵּר; Arab. *muṣannif*),<sup>1</sup> many proverbs, as the fruit of mature reflection and diligent research. The obj. *m'shalim harbēh* belongs only to *tiqqēn*, which ἀσυνδέτως (according to the style of the epilogue and of the book, as is shown above, p. 207) follows the two preparative mental efforts, whose *resultat* it was. Rightly, as to the syntax, Zöckler, and, as to the matter, Hitzig: "Apparently the author has here not 1 Kings v. 12, but the canonical Book of Proverbs in his eye." The language is peculiar. Not only is חִקֵּן exclusively peculiar (*vid.* above, p. 196) to the Book of Koheleth, but also חָזַן, *perpendere* (cf. Assyr. *uzunū*, reflection), to consider, and the *Pih.* חִקֵּר. Regarding the position of *harbeh*, *vid.* above, p. 230.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cogn. in the meaning "*verfassen*" = to compose, is יָסַד; *vid.* Zunz' *Aufs.*: "To compose and to translate," expressed in Heb. in *Deut. Morg. Zeitsch.* xxv. p. 435 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Harbeh bēchēh*, Ezra x. 1, which signifies "making much weeping," makes no exception in favour of the scribe. Cf. *hatsne'a lecheth*, Mic. vi. 8; *haphlē vaphlē*, Isa. xxix. 14.

Ver. 10. It is further said of Koheleth, that he put forth efforts not only to find words of a pleasant form, but, above all, of exact truth: "Koheleth strove to find words of pleasantness, and, written in sincerity, words of truth." The unconnected beginning *bigqesh Koheleth* is like *dibbarti ani*, i. 16, etc., in the book itself. Three objects follow *limtso*. But Hitz. reads the *inf. absol.* וְכָתוּב instead of וְכָתוּב, and translates: to find pleasing words, and correctly to write words of truth. Such a continuance of the *inf. const.* by the *inf. absol.* is possible; 1 Sam. xxv. 26, cf. 31. But why should וְכָתוּב not be the continuance of the finite (Aq., Syr.), as *e.g.* at viii. 9, and that in the nearest adverbial sense: *et scribendo quidem sincere verba veritatis*, i.e. he strove, according to his best knowledge and conscience, to write true words, at the same time also to find out pleasing words; thus sought to connect truth as to the matter with beauty as to the manner? *V'chathuv* needs no modification in its form. But it is not to be translated: and that which was right was written by him; for the ellipsis is inadmissible, and כָּתוּב מִן is not correct Heb. Rightly the LXX., καὶ γεγραμμένον εὐθύτητος. כָּתוּב signifies "written," and may also, as the name of the Hagiographa כְּתוּבִים shows, signify "a writing;" *kakathuvah*, 2 Chron. xxx. 5, is = "in accordance with the writing;" and *b'lo kakathuv*, 2 Chron. xxx. 18, "contrary to the writing;" in the post-bibl. the phrase אָמַר הַכָּתוּב = ἡ γραφή λέγει, is used. The objection made by Ginsburg, that *kathuv* never means, as *k'thav* does, "a writing," is thus nugatory. However, we do not at all here need this subst. meaning, וְכָתוּב is neut. particip., and יָשָׁר certainly not the genit., as the LXX. renders (reading וְכָתוּב), but also not the nom. of the subj. (Hoelem.), but, since יָשָׁר is the designation of a mode of thought and of a relation, the accus. of manner, like *v'yashar*, Ps. cxix. 18; *emeth*, Ps. cxxxii. 11; *emunah*, Ps. cxix. 75. Regarding the common use of such an accus. of the nearer definition in the passive part., *vid.* Ewald, § 284c. The asyndeton *v'chathuv yosher divre emeth* is like that at x. 1, *mehhochmah michvod*. That which follows *limtso* we interpret as its threefold object. Thus it is said that Koheleth directed his effort towards an attractive form (cf. *avne-hephets*, Isa. liv. 12); but, before all, towards the truth, both subjectively (יָשָׁר) and objectively (אֱמֶת), of that which was formulated and expressed in writing.

Ver. 11. From the words of Koheleth the author comes to the words of the wise man in general; so that what he says of the latter finds its application to himself and his book: "Words of the wise are as like goads, and like fastened nails which are put together

in collections—they are given by one shepherd.” The LXX., Aq., and Theod. translate *darvonoth* by *βούκεντρα*, the Venet. by *βουπλήγες*; and that is also correct. The word is one of three found in the Jerus. Gemara, *Sanhedrin* x. 1, to designate a rod for driving (oxen) —רִבֵּן (from רִבַּב, to sharpen, to point), מְלִמֵּךְ (from לָמַד, to adjust, teach, exercise), and מְרַדֵּעַ (from רָדַע, to hold back, *repellere*); we read *ka-dār<sup>e</sup>vonoth*; Gesen., Ewald, Hitz., and others are in error in reading *dorvonoth*; for the so-called light *Metheg*, which under certain circumstances can be changed into an accent, and the *Kametz chatuph* exclude one another.<sup>1</sup> If רִבֵּן is the goad, the point of comparison is that which is to be excited intellectually and morally. Incorrectly, Gesen., Hitz., and others: like goads, because easily and deeply impressing themselves on the heart as well as on the memory. For goads, *aculei*, the Hebrews use the word קוֹצִים; *dar<sup>e</sup>vonoth* also are goads, but designed for driving on, thus *stimuli* (Jerome); and is there a more natural commendation for the proverbs of the wise men than that they incite to self-reflection, and urge to all kinds of noble effort? *Divre* and *dar<sup>e</sup>vonoth* have the same three commencing consonants, and, both for the ear and the eye, form a paronomasia. In the following comparison, it is a question whether *ba'ale asuppoth* (plur. of *ba'al asuppoth*, or of the double plur. *ba'al asuppah*, like e.g. *sare missim*, Ex. i. 11, of *sar mas*) is meant of persons, like *ba'al hallashon*, x. 11, cf. *ba'al k'naphayim*, x. 20, or of things, as *ba'al piphioth*, Isa. xli. 15; and thus, whether it is a designation parallel to חֲכָמִים or to דְּבָרֵי. The Talm. Jer. *Sanhedrin* x. 1, wavers, for there it is referred first to the members of assemblies (viz. of the *Sanedrium*), and then is explained by “words which are spoken in the assembly.” If we understand it of persons, as it was actually used in the Talm. (vid. above, p. 191), then by *asuppoth* we must understand the societies of wise men, and by *ba'ale asuppoth*, of the academicians (Venet.: *δεσπότες ξυναγμάτων*; Luther: “masters of assemblies”) belonging to such academies. But an appropriate meaning of this second comparison is not to be reached in this way. For if we translate: and as nails driven in are the members of the society, it is not easy to see what this wonderful comparison means; and what is then further said: they are given from one shepherd, reminds us indeed of Eph. iv. 11, but, as said of this perfectly unknown great one, is for us incomprehensible. Or if we translate, after Isa. xxviii. 1: and (the words of

<sup>1</sup> The *Kametz* is the *Kametz gadhol* (opp. *Kametz chatuph*), and may for this reason have the accent *Munach* instead of *Metheg*. Vid. *Michlol* 153b, 182b. The case is the same as at Gen. xxxix. 34, where *mimmachōrāth* is to be read. Cf. Baer's *Metheg-Setz*. § 27 and § 18.

the wise are) like the fastened nails of the members of the society, it is as tautological as if I should say : words of wise men are like fastened nails of wise men bound together in a society (as a confederacy, union). Quite impossible are the translations : like nails driven in by the masters of assemblies (thus *e.g.* Lightfoot, and recently Bullock), for the accus. with the pass. particip. may express some nearer definition, but not (as of the genit.) the effective cause ; and : like a nail driven in are the (words) of the masters of assemblies (Tyler : “those of editors of collections”), for ellipt. genit., dependent on a governing word carrying forward its influence, are indeed possible, *e.g.* Isa. lxi. 7, but that a governing word itself, as *ba’ale*, may be the governed genit. of one omitted, as here *divre*, is without example.<sup>1</sup> It is also inconsistent to understand *ba’ale asuppoth* after the analogy of *ba’ale masoreth* (the Masoretes) and the like. It will not be meant of the persons of the wise, but of the proverbs of the wise. So far we agree with Lang and Hoelem. Lang (1874) thinks to come to a right understanding of the “much abused” expression by translating, “lords of troops,”—a designation of proverbs which, being by many acknowledged and kept in remembrance, possess a kind of lordship over men’s minds ; but that is already inadmissible, because *asuppoth* designates not any multitude of men, but associations with a definite end and aim. Hoelem. is content with this idea ; for he connects together “planted as leaders of assemblies,” and finds therein the thought, that the words of the wise serve as seeds and as guiding lights for the expositions in the congregation ; but *ba’ale* denotes masters, not in the sense of leaders, but of possessors ; and as *ba’ale b’rith*, Gen. xiv. 13, signifies “the confederated,” *ba’ale sh’vu’ah*, Neh. vi. 18, “the sworn,” and the frequently occurring *ba’ale ha’ir*, “the citizens ;” so *ba’ale asuppoth* means, the possessors of assemblies and of the assembled themselves, or the possessors of collections and of the things collected. Thus *ba’ale asuppoth* will be a designation of the “words of the wise” (as in *shalishim*, choice men = choice proverbs, Prov. xxii. 20, in a certain measure personified), as of those which form or constitute collections, and which stand together in order and rank (Hitz., Ewald, Elst., Zöckl., and others). Of such it may properly be said, that they are like nails driven in, for they are secured against separation,—they are, so to speak, made nail-fast, they stand on one common ground ; and their being fixed in such connection not only is a help to the memory,

<sup>1</sup> Regarding this omission of the *mudâf* [the governing noun], where this is naturally supplied before a genitive from the preceding, cf. Samachschari’s *Mufaṣṣal*, p. 43, l. 8–13.

but also to the understanding of them. The Book of Koheleth itself is such an *asuppah*; for it contains a multitude of separate proverbs, which are thoughtfully ranged together, and are introduced into the severe, critical sermon on the nothingness of all earthly things as oases affording rest and refreshment; as similarly, in the later Talmudic literature, Haggadic parts follow long stretches of hair-splitting dialectics, and afford to the reader an agreeable repose.

And when he says of the "proverbs of the wise," individually and as formed into collections: נָתַנּוּ מִרְעָה אֶחָד, *i.e.* they are the gift of one shepherd, he gives it to be understood that his "words of Koheleth," if not immediately written by Solomon himself, have yet one fountain with the Solomonic Book of Proverbs,—God, the one God, who guides and cares as a shepherd for all who fear Him, and suffers them to want nothing which is necessary to their spiritual support and advancement (Ps. xxiii. 1, xxviii. 9). "*Mēro'eh ehad*," says Grätz, "is yet obscure, since it seldom, and that only poetically, designates the Shepherd of Israel. It cannot certainly refer to Moses." Not to Moses, it is true (Targ.), nor to Solomon, as the father, the pattern, and, as it were, the patron of "the wise," but to God, who is here named the ἀρχιποίμην as spiritual preserver (provider), not without reference to the figure of a shepherd from the goad, and the figure of household economy from the nails; for רעה, in the language of the Chokma (Prov. v. 21), is in meaning cogn. to the N. T. conception of edification.<sup>1</sup> Regarding *masm'eroth* (iron nails), *vid.* above, p. 193; the word is not used of tent spikes (Spohn, Ginsb.),—it is masc., the sing. is מִשְׁמָר (מִסְמָר), Arab. *mismār*. תְּקוּעִים is = נְטוּעִים (cf. Dan. xi. 45 with Gen. xxxi. 25), post-bibl. (*vid.* Jer. Sanhedrin) קְבוּעִים (Jerome, *in altum defixi*). *Min* with the pass., as at Job xxi. 1, xxviii. 4, Ps. xxxvii. 23 (Ewald, § 295*b*), is not synonymous with the Greek ὑπό (*vid.* above, p. 67). The LXX. well: "given by those of the counsel from one shepherd." Hitzig reads מִרְעָה, and accordingly translates: "which are given united as a pasture," but in *mēro'eh ehad* there lies a significant apologetic hint in favour of the collection of proverbs by the younger Solomon (Koheleth) in relation to that of the old. This is the point of the verse, and it is broken off by Hitzig's conjecture.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Vid.* my Heb. *Römerbrief*, p. 97.

<sup>2</sup> J. F. Reimann, in the preface to his Introduction to the *Historia Litterarum antediluviana*, translates, ver. 11: "The words of the wise are like hewn-out marble, and the beautiful *collectanea* like set diamonds, which are presented by a good friend." A *Disputatio philologica* by Abr. Wolf, Königsberg 1723, contends against this παρρημηνεία.

Ver. 12. With *v'yother mehemmah* the postscript takes a new departure, warning against too much reading, and finally pointing once more to the one thing needful: "And besides, my son, be warned: for there is no end of much book-making; and much study is a weariness of the body." With "my son," the teacher of wisdom here, as in the Book of Proverbs, addresses the disciple who places himself under his instruction. Hitzig translates, construing *mehemmah* with *hizzaher*: "And for the rest: by these (the 'words of Koheleth,' ver. 10) be informed." But (1) נִזְהָר, according to usage, does not signify in general to be taught, but to be made wiser, warned; particularly the imper. הִזְהָר is cogn. with הִשְׁמַר (cf. *Targ. Jer.* Ex. x. 28, לֹא אֶזְהָר לָךְ = הִשְׁמַר לָךְ), and in fact an object of the warning follows; (2) *min* after *yother* is naturally to be regarded as connected with it, and not with *hizzaher* (cf. *Esth.* vi. 6, *Sota* vii. 7; cf. *Ps.* xix. 12). The punctuation of *v'yother* and *mehemmah* is thus not to be interfered with. Either *hemmah* points back to *divre* (ver. 11): And as to what goes beyond these (in relation thereto) be warned (Schelling: *quidquid ultra haec est, ab iis cave tibi*, and thus *e.g.* Oehler in Herzog's *R. E.* vii. 248); or, which is more probable, since the *divre* are without a fixed beginning, and the difference between true and false "wise men" is not here expressed, *hemmah* refers back to all that has hitherto been said, and *v'yother mehemmah* signifies not the result thereof (Ewald, § 285e), but that which remains thereafter: and what is more than that (which has hitherto been said), *i.e.* what remains to be said after that hitherto said; Lat. *et quod superest, quod reliquum est*.

In 12b, Hitzig also proposes a different interpunction from that which lies before us; but at the same time, in the place of the significant double sentence, he proposes a simple sentence: "to make many books, without end, and much exertion of mind (in making these), is a weariness of the body." The author thus gives the reason for his writing no more. But with xii. 8 he has certainly brought his theme to a close, and he writes no further; because he does not write for hire and without an aim, but for a high end, according to a fixed plan; and whether he will leave off with this his book or not is a matter of perfect indifference to the readers of this one book; and that the writing of many books without end will exhaust a man's mind and bring down his body, is not that a flat truism? We rather prefer Herzfeld's translation, which harmonizes with Rashbam's: "But more than these (the wise men) can teach thee, my son, teach thyself: to make many books there would be no end; and much preaching is fatiguing to the body." But נִזְהָר cannot mean to

“teach oneself,” and *ēn qētz* does not mean *non esset finis*, but *non est finis*; and for *lahach* the meaning “to preach” (which Luther also gives to it) is not at all shown from the Arab. *lahjat*, which signifies the tongue as that which is eager (to learn, etc.), and then also occurs as a choice name for tongues in general. Thus the idea of a double sentence, which is the most natural, is maintained, as the LXX. has already rendered it. The *n. actionis* עֲשֵׂיתָ with its object is the subject of the sentence, of which it is said *ēn qēts*, it is without end; Hitzig’s opinion, that *ēn lach qētz* must mean *non est ei finis*, is not justified; for *ēn qēts* is a virtual adj., as *ēn ’avel*, Deut. xxxiii. 4, and the like, and as such the pred. of the substantival sentence. Regarding לִיְהִי, *avidum discendi legendique studium*, *vid.* above, p. 193. C. A. Bode (1777) renders well: *polygraphiae nullus est finis et polymathia corpus delessat*. Against this endless making of books and much study the postscript warns, for it says that this exhausts the bodily strength without (for this is the reverse side of the judgment) truly furthering the mind, which rather becomes decentralized by this πολυπραγμοσύνη. The meaning of the warning accords with the phrase coined by Pliny (*Ep.* vii. 9), *multum non multa*. One ought to hold by the “words of the wise,” to which also the “words of Koheleth,” comprehended in the *asuppah* of the book before us, belong; for all that one can learn by hearing or by reading amounts at last, if we deduct all that is unessential and unenduring, to a *unum necessarium*:

Ver. 13. “The final result, after all is learned, (is this): Fear God and keep His commandments; for this is the end of every man.” Many expositors, as Jerome, the Venet., and Luther, render נִשְׁמָע as fut.: The conclusion of the discourse we would all hear (Salomon); or: The conclusion of the whole discourse or matter let us hear (Panzer, 1773, de Wette-Augusti); Hitzig also takes together *soph davar hakol* = *soph davar kol-haddavar*: The end of the whole discourse let us hear. But הַכֹּל for כָּלֵנוּ is contrary to the style of the book; and as a general rule, the author uses הַכֹּל for the most part of things, seldom of persons. And also *soph davar hakol*, which it would be better to explain (“the final word of the whole”), with Ewald, § 291a, after *y’mē-olam mosheh*, Isa. lxiii. 11 (cf. *Proverbs*, vol. II. p. 267, note), than it is explained by Hitzig, although, in spite of Philippi’s (*Stat. const.* p. 17) doubt, possible in point of style, and also exemplified in the later period of the language (1 Chron. ix. 13), is yet a stylistic crudeness which the author could have avoided either by writing *soph d’var hakol*, or better, *soph kol-haddavar*. נִשְׁמָע, Ewald, § 168b, renders as a particip. by *audiendum*; but

that also does not commend itself, for *נשמע* signifies nothing else than *auditum*, and acquires the meaning of *audiendum* when from the empirical matter of fact that which is inwardly necessary is concluded; the translation: The final word of the whole is to be heard, *audiendum est*, would only be admissible if also the translation *auditum est* were possible, which is not the case. Is *נשמע* thus possibly the pausal form of the finite *נשמע*? We might explain: The end of the matter (*summa summarum*), all is heard, when, viz., that which follows is heard, which comprehends all that is to be known. Or as Hoelem.: Enough, all is heard, since, viz., that which is given in the book to be learned contains the essence of all true knowledge, viz., the following two fundamental doctrines. This retrospective reference of *hakol nishm'a* is more natural than the prospective reference; but, on the other hand, it is also more probable that *soph davar* denotes the final *resultat* than that it denotes the conclusion of the discourse. The right explanation will be that which combines the retrospective reference of *hakol nishm'a* and the resultative reference of *soph davar*. Accordingly, Mendelss. appears to us to be correct when he explains: After thou hast heard all the words of the wise . . . this is the final result, etc. *Finis (summa) rei, omnia audita is = omnibus auditis*, for the sentence denoting the conditions remains externally undesignated, in the same way as at x. 14; Deut. xxi. 1; Ezra x. 6 (Ewald, § 341b). After the clause, *soph . . . nishm'a*, *Athnach* stands where we put a colon: the mediating *hocce est* is omitted just as at vii. 12b (where translate: yet the preference of knowledge is this, that, etc.).

The sentence, *eth-haelohim y'ra* ("fear God"), repeating itself from v. 6, is the kernel and the star of the whole book, the highest moral demand which mitigates its pessimism and hallows its eudaemonism. The admonition proceeding therefrom, "and keep His commandments," is included in *lishm'o'a*, iv. 17 [v. 1], which places the hearing of the divine word, viz. a hearing for the purpose of observing, as the very soul of the worship of God above all the *opus operatum* of ceremonial services.

The connection of the clause, *ki-zeh kol-haadam*, Hitzig mediates in an unnecessary, roundabout way: "but not thou alone, but this ought every man." But why this negative here introduced to stamp כִּי as an *immo* establishing it? It is also certainly suitable as the immediate confirmation of the rectitude of the double admonition finally expressing all. The clause has the form of a simple judgment, it is a substantival clause, the briefest expression for the thought which is intended. What is that thought? The LXX.

renders: *ὅτι τοῦτο πᾶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος*; also Symm. and the Venet. render *kol haadam* by *πᾶς ὁ ἄνθρ.*, and an unnamed translator has *ὅλος ὁ ἄνθρ.*, according to which also the translation of Jerome is to be understood, *hoc est enim omnis homo*. Thus among the moderns, Herzf., Ewald, Elst., and Heiligst.: for that is the whole man, viz. as to his destiny, the end of his existence (cf. as to the subject-matter, Job xxviii. 28); and v. Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 456): this is the whole of man, viz. as Grotius explains: *totum hominis bonum*; or as Dale and Bullock: "the whole duty of man;" or as Tyler: "the universal law (לך, like the Mishnic לך) of man;" or as Hoelem.: that which gives to man for the first time his true and full worth. Knobel also suggests for consideration this rendering: this is the all of man, i.e. on this all with man rests. But against this there is the one fact, that *kol-haadam* never signifies the whole man, and as little anywhere the whole (the all) of a man. It signifies either "all men" (*πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οἱ πά. ἄνθρ. οἱ ἄνθρ. πά.*), as at vii. 2, *hu soph kol-haadam*, or, of the same meaning as *kol-haadam*, "every man" (*πᾶς ἄνθρωπος*), as at iii. 13, v. 18 (LXX., also vii. 2: *τοῦτο τέλος παντὸς ἀνθρώπου*); and it is yet more than improbable that the common expression, instead of which *haadam kullo* was available, should here have been used in a sense elsewhere unexampled. Continuing in the track of the *usus loq.*, and particularly of the style of the author, we shall thus have to translate: "for this is every man." If we use for it: "for this is every man's," the clause becomes at once distinct; Zirkel renders *kol-haadam* as genit., and reckons the expression among the Graecisms of the book: *παντὸς ἀνθρώπου*, viz. *πράγμα*. Or if, with Knobel, Hitz., Böttch., and Ginsburg, we might borrow a verb to supplement the preceding imperat.: "for this ought every man to do," we should also in this way gain the meaning to be expected; but the clause lying before us is certainly a substantival clause, like *meh haadam*, ii. 12, not an elliptical verbal clause, like Isa. xxiii. 5, xxvi. 9, where the verb to be supplied easily unfolds itself from the ל of the end of the movement.

We have here a case which is frequent in the Semitic languages, in which subj. and pred. are connected in the form of a simple judgment, and it is left for the hearer to find out the relation sustained by the pred. to the subj.—e.g. Ps. cx. 3, cix. 4, "I am prayer;" and in the Book of Koheleth, iii. 19, "the children of men are a chance."<sup>1</sup> In the same way we have here to explain: for that is every man,

<sup>1</sup> Vid. Fleischer's *Abh. ü. einige Arten der Nominalapposition*, 1862, and Philippi's *St. const.* p. 90 ff.

viz. according to his destiny and duty; excellently, Luther: for that belongs to all men. With right, Hahn, like Bauer (1732), regards the pronoun as pred. (not subj. as at vii. 2): "this, *i.e.* thus constituted, that they must do this, are all men," or rather: this = under obligation thereto, is every man.<sup>1</sup> It is a great thought that is thereby expressed, viz. the reduction of the Israelitish law to its common human essence. This has not escaped the old Jewish teachers. What can this mean: *zeh kol-haadam*? it is asked, *Berachoth* 6b; and R. Elazar answers: "The whole world is comprehended therein;" and R. Abba bar-Cahana: "This fundamental law is of the same importance to the universe;" and R. Simeon b. Azzai: "The universe has been created only for the purpose of being commanded this."<sup>2</sup>

Ver. 14. As we render *zeh kol-haadam* as expressive of the same obligation lying on all men without exception, this verse appropriately follows: "For God shall bring every work into the judgment upon all that is concealed, whether it be good or bad." To bring into judgment is, as at xi. 9 = to bring to an account. There the punctuation is 'בְּמִשְׁפָּט, here 'בְּמִשְׁפָּט, as, according to rule, the art. is omitted where the idea is determined by a relative clause or an added description; for *b'mishpat 'al kol-ne'llam* are taken together: in the judgment upon all that is concealed (cf. Rom. ii. 16; 1 Cor. iv. 5, τὰ κρυπτά). Hitzig, however, punctuates here 'בְּמִשְׁפָּט, and explains על as of the same meaning as the distributive ל, *e.g.* Gen. ix. 5, 10; but in this sense על never interchanges with ל. And wherefore this subtlety? The judgment upon all that is concealed is a judgment from the cognition of which nothing, not even the most secret, can escape; and that על משפט is not a Germanism, is shown from xi. 9; to execute judgment on (Germ. *an*) any one is expressed by ב, Ps. cxix. 84, Wisd. vi. 6; judgment upon (*über*) any one may be expressed by the genit. of him whom it concerns, Jer. li. 9; but judgment upon anything (Symm. *περὶ παντὸς παροραθέντος*) cannot otherwise be expressed than by על. Rather על may be rendered as a connecting particle: "together with all that is concealed" (Vaih., Hahn); but כל-מעשה certainly comprehends all, and with כל-נעלם

<sup>1</sup> Hitz. thus renders הֵיאָה, Jer. xlv. 4b, predicat.: "And it is such, all the world."

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Jer. Nedarim* ix. 3: "Thou oughtest to love thy neighbour as thyself," says R. Akiba, is a principal sentence in the Law. Ben-Azzai says: "The words *zeh . . . adam* (Gen. v. 1) are it in a yet higher degree," because therein the oneness of the origin and the destiny of all men is contained. Aben Ezra alludes to the same thing, when at the close of his *Comm.* he remarks: "The secret of the non-use of the divine name יהוה in Gen. i.-ii. 3 is the secret of the Book of Koheleth."

this comprehensive idea is only deepened. The accent dividing the verse stands rightly under נָעֲלָם;<sup>1</sup> for *sive bonum sive malum* (as at v. 11) is not related to *ne'llam* as disjoining, but to *kol-ma'aseh*.

This certainty of a final judgment of personal character is the Ariadne-thread by which Koheleth at last brings himself safely out of the labyrinth of his scepticism. The prospect of a general judgment upon the nations prevailing in the O. T., cannot sufficiently set at rest the faith (*vid. e.g.* Ps. lxxiii., Jer. xii. 1–3) which is tried by the unequal distributions of present destiny. Certainly the natural, and particularly the national connection in which men stand to one another, is not without an influence on their moral condition; but this influence does not remove accountability,—the *individuum* is at the same time a person; the object of the final judgment will not be societies as such, but only persons, although not without regard to their circle of life. This personal view of the final judgment does not yet in the O. T. receive a preponderance over the national view; such figures of an universal and individualizing personal judgment as Matt. vii. 21–23, Rev. xx. 12, are nowhere found in it; the object of the final judgment are nations, kingdoms, cities, and conditions of men. But here, with Koheleth, a beginning is made in the direction of regarding the final judgment as the final judgment of men, and as lying in the future, beyond the present time. What Job xix. 25–27 postulates in the absence of a present judgment of his cause, and the Apocalyptic Dan. xii. 2 saw as a dualistic issue of the history of his people, comes out here for the first time in the form of doctrine into that universally-human expression which is continued in the announcements of Jesus and the apostles. Kleinert sees here the morning-dawn of a new revelation breaking forth; and Himpel says, in view of this conclusion, that Koheleth is a precious link in the chain of the preparation for the gospel; and rightly. In the Book of Koheleth the O. T. religion sings its funeral song, but not without finally breaking the ban of nationality and of bondage to this present life, which made it unable to solve the mysteries of life, and thus not without prophesying its resurrection in an expanded glorified form as the religion of humanity.

<sup>1</sup> Thus rightly pointed in F. with *Dagesh* in *lamed*, to make distinct the *y* as quiescent (cf. 1 Kings x. 3; and, on the other hand, Neh. iii. 11, Ps. xxvi. 4). Cf. נָעֲלָם with *Dagesh* in *shin*, on account of the preceding quiescent guttural, like נָחַ, ix. 8; נָחַ, Lev. xi. 16; נָחַ, Num. i. 7, etc.; cf. *Luth. Zeitsch.* 1863, p. 413.

The synagogal lesson repeats the 13th verse after the 14th, to gain thereby a conclusion of a pleasing sound. The Masoretic *Siman* (*vox memorialis*) of those four books, in which, after the last verse, on account of its severe contents, the verse going before is repeated in reading, is ית"קק. The י refers to ישעיה (Isaiah), ה to תריסר (the Book of the Twelve Prophets), the first ק to קהלת, the second ק to קינות (Lamentations). The Lamentations and Koheleth always stand together. But there are two different arrangements of the five *Megilloth*, viz. that of the calendar of festivals which has passed into our printed editions: the Song, Ruth, Lamentations, Koheleth, and Esther (*vid.* above, p. 3); and the Masoretic arrangement, according to the history of their origin: Ruth, the Song, Koheleth, Lamentations, and Esther.







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